TOPIC: I.B.1.

KINDS OF TORT LIABILITIES

TITLE: GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH V. CA
CITATION: G.R. NO. 97336, FEBRUARY 19, 1993

FACTS:

Marilou filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint for damages against the Gashem
for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She that she is twenty-two (22)
years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly
respected in her community; Gashem, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen and is an
exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan
City; the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that
they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school
semester, which was in October of that year; Gashem then visited Marilou’s parents in to
secure their approval to the marriage; thereafter, Gashem forced her to live with him in his
apartment; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the
complaint, Gashem's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to
kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a
representative of the barangay captain, Gashem repudiated their marriage agreement and
asked her not to live with him anymore because he is already married to someone living in
Bacolod City.
Marilou then prayed for judgment ordering Gashem to pay her damages in the amount
of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00,
attorney's fees and costs. The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and ordered Gashem to pay
damages and attorney's fees.

ISSUE:

Whether damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of
Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

RULING:

Yes.
Art. 21 NCC: Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
However, where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of
his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual
act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to
marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter.
It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In this case, Marilou surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single
Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction. Gashem could not be held liable
for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal
Code because Marilou was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.

NOTE:
Read SC’s discussion on Torts below (mao ni ang related sa topic)

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.

is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-
delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an
Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it
includes not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery,
false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned
by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts,
with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between these opposite
spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond
redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19
and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs;
it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23

TOPIC: I.B.2. KINDS OF TORT LIABILITIES

TITLE: EXXON SHIPPING CO. ET AL. V. BAKER ET AL.
CITATION: 554 U.S. 471

FACTS:

In 1989, petitioners’ (collectively, Exxon) supertanker grounded on a reef off Alaska,

spilling millions of gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound. The accident occurred after
the tanker’s captain, Joseph Hazelwood—who had a history of alcohol abuse and whose blood
still had a high alcohol level 11 hours after the spill—inexplicably exited the bridge, leaving a
tricky course correction to unlicensed subordinates. Exxon spent some $2.1 billion in cleanup
efforts, pleaded guilty to criminal violations occasioning fines, settled a civil action by the
United States and Alaska for at least $900 million, and paid another $303 million in voluntary
payments to private parties. Other civil cases were consolidated into this one, brought against
Exxon, Hazelwood, and others to recover economic losses suffered by respondents (hereinafter
Baker), who depend on Prince William Sound for their livelihoods. The District Court calculated
total relevant compensatory damages to be $507.5 million, to go along with the $2.5 billion
punitive damage award.

ISSUE:

Was the award of $ 2.5 billion greater than maritime law would allow in the
circumstances?

RULING:

Yes. Punitive-damages award against the owner was excessive as a matter of maritime
common law. In the circumstances of the case, the award should be limited to an amount equal
to compensatory damages. Furthermore, The prevailing American rule limits punitive damages
to cases of "enormity," in which a defendant's conduct is outrageous, owing to gross
negligence, willful, wanton, and reckless indifference for others' rights, or even more
deplorable behavior. The consensus today is that punitive damages are aimed at retribution
and deterring harmful conduct.

TOPIC: II. 1. QUASI DELICT

TITLE: ANDAMO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
CITATION: G.R. NO. 74761, NOVEMBER 6, 1990

FACTS:

Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land
which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a
religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an
artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners’ land,
caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners’ crops and plants, washed away costly
fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons,
and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, before the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin,
officers and directors of herein respondent Corporation, for destruction by means of inundation
under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
 Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent
corporation, this time a civil case, for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction before the same court.
On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and
opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. On April 26, 1984, the trial court,
acting on respondent corporation’s motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued an
order suspending further hearings in Civil Case No. TG- 748 until after judgment in the related
Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.
The trial court issued on August 27, 1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil Case No.
TG-748 for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case
was still unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the
Rules of Court which provides that “criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may
be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.”
Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. On February
17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division, promulgated a decision,
affirming the questioned order of the trial court. A motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated May 19, 1986.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the dismissal of the civil case proper?

RULINGS:

NO.
The court cited that under Articles 2176 and Article 2177 of the Civil Code,
“Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this chapter.”
“Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.”
The court further cited the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals in which it held that a
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or
crime—a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility
for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce
civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or
culpa extracontractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the
criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal
where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in
which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability.
In the present case, the court ruled that civil action filed by the petitioner is one under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are
present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant,
or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the
plaintiff.
Therefore, the dismissal of the civil action of the trial court is improper.

TOPIC: II. 2. QUASI-DELICT

TITLE: CHILD LEARNING V. TAGORIO
CITATION: G.R. NO. 150920, NOVEMBER 25, 2005

FACTS:

An action under Art 2176 was filed by the parents of Timothy Tagario, a Grade IV student of
marymount school operated and maintained by child learning center. They alleged that their
son entered the comfort room at the 3rd floor of the marymount bldg wherein he found
himself locked inside and unable to go out. in his panic, he started banging and kicking on the
door and feeling dismayed decided to open the window to call for help. In the process of
opening the window, he went right through and fell down from the third floor wherein he was
hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious physical injuries. They also contended that
CLC is at fault for its failed to install iron grills in the window.
CLC, in its defense countered that nothing was defective of about the locking
mechanism of the door and that the fal of Timothy was not due to its fault and negligence. It
maintained that it exercised the due care and diligence of a good father of a family to ensure
the safety, well-being and convenience of its students.
The trial court ruled in favor of the Tagarios and ordered CLC to pay for the damages.
The same has been affirmed upon appeal, hence, this case.

ISSUE:

WON an action under Art 2176 prospers

RULLING:

Yes.
In every tort case found under Art 2176, plaintiff has to prove by preponderance of
evidence : (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff, (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant
or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) connection between the fault or
negligence and the damages incurred.
 Fault signifies a voluntary act or ommision which causes damahe to the right of another
giving rise to an obligation on the part of the actor to repair such damage. Negligence is the
failurw to obeserve for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. Fault requires the executiin of
a positive act which causes damage to another while negligence consists of the omission to do
acts which result indamage to another.
In this case, the fact that the student had to go through the window, instead of the
door, shows that something was wrong with the door. This sufficiently points to the fact that
somethibg is wrong with it or the knob under the principle of res ipsa loquitor (thing speaks for
itself). This means to say that CLC is answerable for the failure to see to it that the doors of
their school toilets are at all times in good condition.
Moreover, it must be noted that nothibg in the building code requires for the
installment of grills. Nevertheless, should they have the diligence of a good father of family,
they should have anticipated that a child trapped due to a broken door would call out from the
window for help considering that it was 1.5.m away from the floor.
Lastly, the injuries sustained by the fall were the product of a natural and continuos
sequence, bronen by any intervening cause, the original from CLCs own negligence.

TOPIC: II. 3. QUASI-DELICT

TITLE: DR. GENEVIEVE L. HUANG VS. PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS, INC., DUSIT THANI PUBLIC CO.,
LTD. AND FIRST LEPANTO TAISHO INSURANCE CORPORATION
CITATION: G.R. NO. 180440, DECEMBER 05, 2012

FACTS:

Petitioner, Dr. Huang was invited by her friend Delia Goldberg for a swim at the hotel’s
swimming pool facility. They started at around 5:00pm. At around 7:00pm, the swimming pool
attendant informed them that the swimming pool area was about to close. They subsequently
proceeded to the shower room adjacent to the pool. When they came out of the room, the
entire swimming pool area was already pitch black and they were the only ones left.
They waited for more than 10 minutes near the door hoping that someone would come
to their rescue but they waited in vain. Dr. Huang began to walk around to look for a house
phone. Delia followed her. Petitioner saw a phone at the lifeguard’s counter. While slowly
walking towards the phone, a hard and heavy object, which later turned out to be a folding
wooden cup counter, fell on Huang’s head, knocking her down almost unconscious. Delia
immediately got hold of the phone and notified the telephone operator of the incident. It took
20 to 30 minutes for the hotel staff to arrive.
Dr. Dalumpines arrived and approached petitioner. Instead of giving her assistance, she
was presented with a “waiver” and demanded her to sign otherwise, the management will not
render any assistance which the the latter refused to do.
 When Dr. Huang went home, she started to feel extraordinary dizziness accompanied by
an uncomfortable feeling in her stomach, which lasted until the following day. She was also
experiencing sleepless nights. After she undergone a MRI test, it was found out that she had a
serious brain injury. By reason of such accident in the hotel, she suffered lost of memory which
affected the practice of her chosen profession. She then demanded payment against herein
respondents of P100,000,000 representing loss of earnings of her remaining life span. She
further had medical treatments here in the country and abroad.
Respondents averred that the lights in the swimming pool facility were remained
switched off as a normal practice of the hotel for security reasons. Moreover, they said that
they immediately responded to the accident but petitioner refused and merely asked for a
hirudoid cream.
The trial court dismissed her petition for being self serving, thus, devoid of merit.
According to the trial court, petitioner would not have met the accident had she only acted
with care and caution and since petitioner's own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of her injury, she cannot recover damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the
lower court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents should be held liable for damages.

RULING:

No.
The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner’s cause of action was based on a
quasi-delict, it is incumbent upon her to prove the presence of the following requisites before
respondents PHI and DTPCI can be held liable, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b)
fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond;
and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant
and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
In this case, as found by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, petitioner
utterly failed to prove the alleged negligence of respondents PHI and DTPCI. Other than
petitioner's self-serving testimony that all the lights in the hotel's swimming pool area were
shut off and the door was locked, which allegedly prompted her to find a way out and in doing
so a folding wooden counter top fell on her head causing her injury, no other evidence was
presented to substantiate the same. Even her own companion during the night of the accident
inside the hotel's swimming pool area was never presented to corroborate her allegations.
In the case at bench, even granting that respondents PHI and DTPCI's staff negligently
turned off the lights and locked the door, the folding wooden counter top would still not fall on
petitioner's head had she not lifted the same. Although the folding wooden counter top is
within the exclusive management or control of respondents PHI and DTPCI, the falling of the
same and hitting the head of petitioner was not due to the negligence of the former. As found
by both lower courts, the folding wooden counter top did not fall on petitioner's head without
any human intervention. Records showed that petitioner lifted the said folding wooden counter
top that eventually fell and hit her head.

TOPIC: II. 4. QUASI-DELICT

TITLE: LUCAS VS. TUAÑO
CITATION: G.R. 178763, APRIL 21, 2009

FACTS:

The petitioners, Peter Lucas and his family, is suing respondent, Dr. Prospero Ma. C.
Tuaño, for damages due to medical malpractice on the grounds that Tuaño was negligent in
treating Lucas’ conjunctivitis or “sore eyes” which led to glaucoma which in turn made him
irritable and unable to support his family. Lucas consulted Tuaño when he had severe pain in
his right eye to which the respondent performed an ocular routine examination where he
diagnosed Lucas to be suffering conjunctivitis or “sore eyes” which developed Epidemic Kerato
Conjunctivitis (EKC), a viral infection to which Tuaño prescribed a steroid-based eye drop called
Maxitrol which Lucas was using before. Later on, his wife Fatima found out from the
accompanying literature of the medicine that prolonged use of steroid-based medication can
result to glaucoma. Lucas’s right eye pain reduced for a while but later on returned and it
became severe that Tuaño referred him to another ophthalmologist, Dr. Manuel B. Agulto, for a
second opinion to which Dr. Maniel Agulto wrote a letter to Tuaño stating the Lucas sustained
significant glaucoma damage.
The Regional Trial Court denied the petitioners’ claim for damages due to insufficient
evidence proving Tuaño’s medical malpractice in treating Lucas because they failed to present a
medical expert that could support their claim that what Tuaño did was indeed medical
malpractice. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals to which the court affirmed the
Regional Trial Court’s decision. Hence, the petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent, Dr. Prospero C. Tuaño, is guilty of medical malpractice.

HELD:

NO, Dr. Tuaño, is not guilty of medical malpractice.

For lack of specific law geared towards the type of negligence committed by members
of the medical profession, such claim for damages is almost always anchored on the alleged
violation of Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which states that: “Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.”
 In medical negligence cases, also called medical malpractice suits, there exist a
physician-patient relationship between the doctor and the victim. But just like any other
proceeding for damages, four essential (4) elements i.e., (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4)
proximate causation, must be established by the plaintiff/s. All the four (4) elements must co-
exist in order to find the physician negligent and, thus, liable for damages.
The onus probandi was on the patient to establish before the trial court that the
physicians ignored standard medical procedure, prescribed and administered medication with
recklessness and exhibited an absence of the competence and skills expected of general
practitioners similarly situated. Further, SC emphasizes that in order for medical malpractice to
be proven, a medical expert should be a witness to attest to the accused’s medical malpractice.
In the case at bar, Petitioners’ complaint for damages is merely based on a statement in
the literature of Maxitrol identifying the risks of its use and Dr. Agulto’s comment. Thus, Dr.
Tuaño in not liable for any medical negligence or malpractice where there is no evidence, in the
nature of expert testimony, to establish that in treating Peter, Dr. Tuaño failed to exercise
reasonable care, diligence and skill generally required in medical practice. The complaint of the
petitioners is therefore lack of legal basis.

TOPIC: II.A.1. QUASI-DELICT VS. BREACH OF CONTRACT/CULPA CONTRACTUAL

TITLE: AIR FRANCEVS. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
CITATION: G.R. NO. L-21438, SEPTEMBER 28, 1966

FACTS:

In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso, was member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that
were tourists en route to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip
ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of
Air France to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a “better right” than him.
Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and upon advice of other Filipinos on board,
Carrascoso gave up his seat and was transferred to the plane’s tourist class.
As a result, he filed a suit against Air France where the CFI Manila granted him moral
and exemplary damages. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Air France is liable for damages.

HELD:

Yes.
The Supreme Court ruled that passengers do not contract merely for transportation.
They have a right to be treated by the carrier’s employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and
due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious
language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages
against the carrier.
In this case, there exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There
was a contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract was
breached when Air France failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that
there was bad faith when Air France’s employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class
accommodation after he was already seated and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of
which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him
mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, which would result to
moral damages.
Air France’s contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of
Carrascoso’s action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by
the Air France — a case of quasi-delict.
Therefore, damages are proper.

TOPIC: II.A.2. QUASI-DELICT VS. BREACH OF CONTRACT

TITLE: PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND
BAUTISTA
CITATION: G.R. NO. 84698, FEBRUARY 4, 1992

FACTS:

Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine School of Business
Administration. Assailants, who were not members of the schools academic community, while
in the premises of PSBA, stabbed Bautista to death. This incident prompted his parents to file a
suit against PSBA and its corporate officers for damages due to their alleged negligence,
recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the
attack on the victim.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the compliant states no cause of
action against them based on quasi-delicts, as the said rule does not cover academic
institutions. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration was
likewise dismissed, and was affirmed by the appellate court. Hence, the case was forwarded to
the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PSBA may be held liable for quasi-delict.

RULING:

No.
 Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between
the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of
Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-
contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether
express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining
the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in
loco parentis. Article 2180 provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by
pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils
or students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present
case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose
acts the school could be made liable. But it does not necessarily follow that PSBA is absolved
form liability.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a
contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties is bound to comply
with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would
presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education
or a profession. This includes ensuring the safety of the students while in the school premises.
On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and
observe its rules and regulations.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding
that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former’s
negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to
determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a
breach of contractual obligation only.

TOPIC: II.A.3. QUASI-DELICT VS. BREACH OF CONTRACT/CULPA CONTRACTUAL

TITLE: MANILA RAILROAD CO. VS. COMPANIA TRASATLDNTICA
CITATION: 38 PHIL. 875, NO. 11318 OCTOBER 26, 1918

FACTS:
The Manila Railroad Company had its two locomotive boilers shipped through Compania
Trasatldntica’s (Steamship Company) steamship. Compania employed the services of Atlantic
Company to lift the boilers out of the ship’s hold and to transfer them to a barge.
Upon arrival of the ship, Atlantic Company sent out its crane with Leyden as in-charge.
However, the boiler fell to the bottom of the ship’s hold and after another attempt, the boiler
fell again. The boiler was badly damaged that it had to be reshipped to England where it was
rebuilt and afterwards returned to Manila.
Railroad Company filed a case against the Steamship Company before the CFI. The
Steamship Company brought Atlantic Company as a co-defendant and insisted that the latter is
the one responsible for the damage and is, thus, liable.
The court found that the mishap was due to the negligence of Leyden.
 The CFI issued judgment against Atlantic Company and absolved the Steamship
Company.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the liability of Atlantic and Steamship Company is the same

HELD:

No.
Negligence incident to the performance of a contractual obligation (culpa contractual) is
entirely distinct from negligence considered as an independent source of liability in the absence
of special relation. The latter species of negligence is the culpa aquiliana of the civil law; and
liability arising therefrom is governed by articles 1902-1904 of the Civil Code; while the liability
incident to the performance of contractual obligations is governed by articles 1101 et seq. and
other special provisions relative to contractual obligations.
Under the contract for transportation, the Steamship Company is liable to Railroad
Company for the injury done to the boiler while it was being discharged from the ship. The
obligation to transport the boiler necessarily involves the duty to convey and deliver it in a
proper condition according to its nature, and conformably with good faith, custom, and the law
(art. 1258, Civ. Code).
On the other hand, Atlantic Company is liable to the Steamship Company for the
damages brought upon the latter by the failure of the Atlantic Company to use due care in
discharging the boiler, regardless of the fact that the damage was caused by the negligence of
an employee who was qualified for the work and who had been chosen by the Atlantic
Company with due care.

TOPIC: II.A.4. QUASI-DELICT VS. BREACH OF CONTRACT/CULPA CONTRACTUAL

TITLE: LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN VS. MARJORIE NAVIDAD
CITATION: G.R. NO. 145804, FEBRUARY 6, 2003

FACTS:

On 14 October 1993, Nicanor Navidad, who was then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT
station after purchasing a token. While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT
tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad and a
misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight.
Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train,
operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train,
and he was killed instantaneously.
A complaint for damages was then filed against Escartin, Roman, the LRTA, the Metro
Transit Organization Inc. and Prudent for the death of Navidad. The RTC then held that Prudent
and Escartin were liable and it ordered them to pay jointly and severally the damages for the
death of Navidad.
On appeal, the CA exonerated Prudent and Escartin from any liability for the death of
Navidad and held that LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable. It ruled that the contract of
carriage had already existed when Navidad entered the place where passengers were supposed
to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not LRTA and/or Roman is liable for the death.

2. Whether or not Escartin and/or Prudent are liable.
3. Whether or not nominal damages may coexist with compensatory damages.

RULING:

1. Yes. The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to
indemnify the victim arising from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise
the high diligence required of a common carrier.
A common carrier is required by these above statutory provisions to use utmost
diligence in carrying passengers with due regard for all circumstances. This obligation exists not
only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises
where they ought to be in pursuance to then contract of carriage.
Art. 1763 renders a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a)
through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or (b) on account of willful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through
theexercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In case of
such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by
simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or
negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove
that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.

2. No. Fault was not established. If Prudent is to be held liable, it would be for a tort under
Art. 2176 in conjunction with Art. 2180.
The premise, however, for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of
the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the
basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris
families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only
be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual
matter that has not been shown.
Once the fault of the employee Escartin is established, the employer, Prudent, would be
held liable on the presumption that it did not exercise the diligence of a good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of its employees.
 In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which
breaches the contract. The liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an
independent contractor, on the other hand would be solidary.
A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission
causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article
2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract,
where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which
constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual
liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been
breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

3. No. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory
damages.
The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal
damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. It is an established rule that nominal
damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.

TOPIC: II.A.1. QUASI-DELICT VS. DELICTS

TITLE: FAUSTO BARREDO VS. SEVERINO GARCIA AND TIMOTEA ALMARIO
CITATION: G.R. NO. L-48006, JULY 8, 1942

FACTS:

At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon
and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head- on collision between a taxi of the Malate
Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was
overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from
which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a
separate civil action be reserved. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased
on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto
Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The
suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of employers in the selection of
their employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that
the separate civil suit should have been filed against Fontanilla primarily and not him.

ISSUE:

Whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus
making him primarily and directly responsible as an employer of Pedro.
RULING:

Yes.
A quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution,
independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is,
under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts of
his employee.
“Section 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when
there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.”
"Section 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable, not only
for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be
responsible.
xxx
Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused
by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or in the
performance of their duties.
xxx
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove
that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."
The responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not
because of the same, but because of the cuasi- delito, that is to say, the imprudence or
negligence of the father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher,
etc. Whenever anyone of the persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors,
incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the law presumes that the
father, guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an act of negligence in not preventing or
avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is condemned by the law.
In this case, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the
civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second,
Barredo's primary liability as an employer under article 1903. Garcia is well within his rights in
suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious
because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no
property. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action, Barredo would have
only been subsidiarily liable.

TOPIC: II.A.2. QUASI-DELICT VS. DELICTS

TITLE: ELCANO VS. HILL
CITATION: G.R. NO. L-24803, AUGUST 23, 2012