Air France vs Rafael Carrascoso

Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Negligence – Malfeasance – Quasi-Delict

Remedial Law – Evidence – Hearsay Rule – Res Gestae – Startling Event
 In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en
route to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip ticket by
Air France. But during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager
of Air France to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a “better right”
than him. Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and upon advise of
other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and was transferred to the
plane’s tourist class.
 After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air
France for damages for the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court,
Carrascoso testified, among others, that he when he was forced to take the tourist
class, he went to the plane’s pantry where he was approached by a plane purser
who told him that he noted in the plane’s journal the following:
First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will,
and that the captain refused to intervene
 The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually
awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
 Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the
issuance of a first class ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be
seated in first class because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true
intent between the parties.
 Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascoso’s testimony regarding
the note made by the purser because the said note was never presented in court.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the testimony of Carrasoso regarding the note which was not
presented in court is admissible in evidence.
HELD 1: Yes. It appears that Air France’s liability is based on culpa-contractual and on
culpa aquiliana.
Culpa Contractual
 There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was
a contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract
was breached when Air France failed to furnish first class transportation at
Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when Air France’s employee
compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth “after he was
already, seated” and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he
suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him
mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting
in moral damages.
 The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air France’s claim that the issuance
of a first class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first
class seat. Such claim is simply incredible.
Culpa Aquiliana
 Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France
and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers
do not contract merely for transportation.
o They have a right to be treated by the carrier’s employees with kindness,
respect, courtesy and due consideration.
o They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious
language, indignities and abuses from such employees.
 So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Air France’s
contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty.
 The stress of Carrascoso’s action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a
violation of public duty by the Air France — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are
proper.
HELD: 2: Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based on res gestae.
The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the
entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule.
Such testimony is admissible. Besides, when the dialogue between Carrascoso
and the purser happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and
continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down.
Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. The
utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and
related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been
guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the
res gestae.

Maceda vs. Vasquez (G.R. No. 102781)

 Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman
against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that
petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal
cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined
and decided on or before January 31, 1989.
 When in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5
civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged
that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.
Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into
the SC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts
Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious
misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under
the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
 In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his
certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into
 the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation
of the doctrine of separation of powers.
 Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over
all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest
municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges’
and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action
against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
 Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the
same to the SC for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the
scope of their administrative duties.

Demetrio Demetria vs Manuel Alba

148 SCRA 208 – Political Law – Transfer of Funds – Power of the President to Realign
Funds
 Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa
sought to prohibit Manuel Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977.
Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the said PD.
This Section provides that:
“The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated
for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the
Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations
Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.”
 Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer
of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law
be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
 However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege
granted under the Constitution. It empowers the President to indiscriminately
transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred
are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or
whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said
transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in
the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative
 powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional
infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
 But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item
to another in the GAA may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and
efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another here.

People vs. Sola

 CFI Negros Occidental issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the
deceased bodies of 7 persons believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola
in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. On September 16,
1980 armed with the above warrant, the 332nd PC/INP Company proceeded to the
place of Sola.
 Diggings made in a canefield yielded two common graves containing the 7 bodies.
Seven (7) separate complaints for murder were thus filed against Pablo Sola and
18 other persons. The municipal court found probable cause against the accused
and ordered their arrest.
 However, without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence
of guilt of the accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail for
their temporary release. Pablo Sola and two others have since been released
from detention.
 The witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears that if
the trial is held at the CFI Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from Kabankalan,
their safety could be jeopardized. At least 2 of the accused are official with power
and influence in Kabankalan and they have been released on bail. In addition, most
of the accused remained at large. There have been reports made to police
authorities of threats made on the families of the witnesses.

Issues: 1. Whether or not change of venue is proper

2. Whether or not the bail bond should be cancelled for failure to abide by the basic
requirement that the prosecution be heard in a case where the accused ischarged with a
capital offense, prior to bail being granted.

Held:

Change of venue
  Change of venue has become moot and academic with the transfer of the case to
Bacolod City. However, the case proceeds with this discussion:

To compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its

witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a
mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which
courts have been established.

 The witnesses in the case are fearful of their lives. They are afraid they would be
killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because
of this fear, they may either refuse to testify or testify falsely to save their lives.

Right of bail

The bail bonds must be cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of Executive Judge
Alfonso Baguio for such hearing.

Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense
be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all
the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the
motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action,
the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation
of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be
considered void on that ground.

Justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness
must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true. This
norm which is of the very essence of due process as the embodiment of justice requires
that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of
guilt. It does not suffice, as asserted herein, that the questions asked by the municipal
judge before bail was granted could be characterized as searching. That fact did not cure
an infirmity of a jurisdictional character. (People vs. Sola, G.R. No. L-56158-64 March 17,
1981)
MANIAGO V. CA (G.R. NO. 104392)
 One of the shuttle buses owned by petitioner Ruben Maniago, and driven by Herminio
Andaya, figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by
respondent Boado along Loakan Road, Baguio City.

 A criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple
physical injuries was filed against petitioner’s driver. A month later, respondent Boado
filed a civil case for damages against petitioner Maniago himself. Petitioner moved that
the civil case be suspended citing that a criminal case was already pending.

 The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the civil action could proceed
independently of the criminal action. On appeal to CA, petitioner reiterated his
contention adding that the civil action could not proceed because no reservation to
bring it separately was made in the criminal case. CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Issue: Whether or not the civil action may proceed independently of the criminal action when
no reservation of right to bring it separately was made.

Ruling: NO. SC reached the conclusion that the right to bring an action for damages under the
Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule III, §1, otherwise it should be dismissed.

 To begin with, §1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute
separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be
deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case.

 Such civil actions are not limited to those which arise “from the offense charged,” as
originally provided in Rule III before the amendment of the Rules of Court in 1988. In
other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil
liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of
the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the
criminal action.

IN RE: EDILLON (1978)

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. On
November 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) unanimously recommended to
the Court the removal of the name of Edillon from its Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to
pay his membership dues” to the IBP notwithstanding multiple due notices sent to him.

ISSUES:
1. WHETHER THE COURT IS WITHOUT POWER TO CO MPEL HIM TO
B E CO ME A M EMBE R O F T HE I N TEG R ATE D B AR O F TH E
PHILIPPINES.

2. WHETHER THE PROVISION OF THE COURT RULE REQUIRING

P AY M E N T O F A ME MB E RS HI P F EE I S VO I D.
3. W H E TH E R TH E E N F O R C E M E N T O F TH E P E N AL TY P R O V I S I O N S
WO UL D AM O U N T TO A D E P RI V ATI O N O F PR O PE R TY WI THO U T
D U E PRO C ES S AN D H E NC E I NF RI NGE S O N O N E O F HI S
C O N S TI TU TI O N AL R I G H T S.

4. WHETHER THE POWER OF SC TO STRIKE THE NAME OF A

L AW Y E R FRO M I TS RO LL O F ATTO R N E Y S I S V AL I D.

HELD:
1. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of Edillon’s
constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate
with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of
the regulatory program — the lawyers.

But, assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member
of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the
State.

2. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Court, to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section
5 of the 1973 Constitution) — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers
are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to
which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.

3. Whether the practice of law is a property right, the respondent’s right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry.
And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not
void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But it must be emphasized that the practice of law is not a property right but
a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to
exact compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the
name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and
supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion.

Respondent Marcial A. Edillon is disbarred, and his name was ordered to be stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
In re: Judge Manzano
An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City Committees on
Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees.

It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions.

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs
of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out
the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law
of its existence

Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is provided that—

Section 6. Supervision.—The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be under the

supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly accomplishment reports shall be
submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Justice.

Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shag
not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art.
VIII, Constitution).

Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice,
which discharges an administrative function, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is
constrained to deny his request.

Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs. Macaraig
(39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:

2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced

with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire
application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a
position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle.
Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust
reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo,
can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official,
however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such
a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his
sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be
satisfied with nothing less.

This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or
unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form
part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases
contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society.
Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance
to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when such
assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.