ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS
officio. So ordered.
1) G.R. No. L-12088 December 23, 1959
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MORO SUMAGUINA MACARANDANG, defendant-appellant.
Valeriano V. Rovira for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Assistant Solicitor General Florencio
Villamor for appellee.
PARAS, C. J.:
Moro Sumaguina Macarandang was accused an, after trial, convicted of the crime of illegal
possesion of fire-arms in the Court of First Instance of Lanao under the following
information:
That on or about June 8, 1954, in the Municipality of Marantao, Province of Lanao, Republic
of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep and have his custody
and control one Riot Gun, Winchester, 12 GA. SN-924131 and (8) rounds of ammunitions,
without firs having obtained in proper license or permit therefore from competent authority.
In the present appeal the accused, admitting the ownership and of the firearm and
ammunitions in question, invokes as his legal excuse or authority therefor, the appointment
issued him by Governor Dimakuta as secret agent on October 1, 1953, which reads as
follows:1awphi1.net
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
For having shown good faith by previously surrending to this Office a firearm, Datu
Sumaguina Macarandang of Kamalig, Marantao, Lanao, has been appointed SECRET
AGENT of peace and order campaigns and detention of crimes. Accordingly, he is hereby
authorized to hold and carry in his possession one (1) Riot Winchester Shotgun, 12 GA.
Serial No. 942131 with twenty(20) rounds of ammunitions for the successful execution of his
hazardous mission.
Datu Sumaguina Macarandang shall personally report to me from time to time all activities
and whereabouts of lawless and wanted elements roaming in the Municipal District of
Marantoa, as well as all matters affecting tranquility therein existing.lawphi1.net
It may be true that, as held by the trial court, the Governor has no authority to issue any
firearm license or permit; but section 879 of the Revise Administrative Code provides, as
shown at lease by the subject matter therefor, that "peace officers" are exempted from the
requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. The appointment of the
accused as secret agent to the assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns
and detention of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer"
equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and accused acquitted, with costs de
2) G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and
Solicitor O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether
or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial
governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does not.
The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August
14, 1962 reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a
violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act
No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his
possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22,
without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the
necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."
When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset
asked the counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in
possession of the gun involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to
possess the same and that we can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an
agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine
Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not question
the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of law would be
submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question to be "whether or not a secret
agent is not required to get a license for his firearm."
Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could
pass on their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit
that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information
was found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having
secured the necessary license or permit thereof from the corresponding authority?" The
accused, now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the
lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao
also affirms that the accused admits."
1
Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision."
Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his
appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas,
dated June 2, 1962;1 another document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to
the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential
mission;2 the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent, 3 a certificate dated March
11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste. 4 Counsel for the
accused then stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to
submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and
qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a
license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time to file their
respective memoranda.1äwphï1.ñët
Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the
accused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and
ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the Government."
The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must
be affirmed.
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any
person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or
any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms,
parts of firearms, or ammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition
regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of
Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers,
municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are
not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for
use in the performance of their official duties."6
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not
exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the
law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused must
stand. It cannot be set aside.
Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was
acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret
agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes,
sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of
the municipal police expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not
within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory
provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v.
Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
3) G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees,
vs.
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for
plaintiff-appellee.
Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant.
ANTONIO, J.:p
Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas,
in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging
from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories
provided by law, which raises in issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive
application of Our ruling in People v. Mapa.1
The complaint filed against the accused reads:
That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the poblacion,
Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a person not authorized by law, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his possession, custody and direct
control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with one (1) live ammunition and four (4)
empty shells without first securing the necessary permit or license to possess the same.
At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after
which trial was accordingly held.
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and
the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He,
however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or
permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas
and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said
appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in
question.
Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as claimed by
him. His appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads:
Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you will be an
effective agent in the detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and order in the
province of Batangas, especially with respect to the suppression of trafficking in explosives,
jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the detection of unlicensed firearms,
you are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of the undersigned, the appointment to take
effect immediately, or as soon as you have qualified for the position. As such Secret Agent,
your duties shall be those generally of a peace officer and particularly to help in the
2
preservation of peace and order in this province and to make reports thereon to me once or
twice a month. It should be clearly understood that any abuse of authority on your part shall
be considered sufficient ground for the automatic cancellation of your appointment and
immediate separation from the service. In accordance with the decision of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the right to bear a
firearm, particularly described below, for use in connection with the performance of your
duties.
By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by taking
your oath of office and filing the original thereof with us.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO LEVISTE
Provincial Governor
FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:
Kind: — ROHM-Revolver
Make: — German
SN: — 64
Cal:— .22
On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of
Batangas as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling
activities, wanted persons, loose firearms, subversives and other similar subjects that might
affect the peace and order condition in Batangas province, and in connection with these
duties he was temporarily authorized to possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64,
for his personal protection while in the performance of his duties.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned
appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm
subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme
Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang2 and People vs. Lucero.3 The trial court, while
conceding on the basis of the evidence of record the accused had really been appointed
Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial
Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and carry the firearm
described in the complaint, nevertheless held the accused in its decision dated December
27, 1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground
that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were
reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating
circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent.
Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero,
supra, and People v. Mapa, supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment
of conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the time he was found to
possess a certain firearm and ammunition without license or permit, he had an appointment
from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
order and in the detection of crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said firearm and
ammunition. We therefore held that while it is true that the Governor has no authority to
issue any firearm license or permit, nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the
issuance of license to possess firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent
to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and detection of crimes, sufficiently placed
him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police
who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are exempted from the
requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We held that
under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to the
accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the batallion commander
to effect the capture of a Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine
in Macarandang, and by implication, that in Lucero, We sustained the judgment of
conviction on the following ground:
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any
person to ... possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any
instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts
of firearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised
Administrative Code.) The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly
and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of
Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers,
municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are
not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for
use in the performance of their official duties." (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.)
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not
exempt. ... .
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial
Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the
prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959)
and People v. Lucero (1958). Our decision in People v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid
doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: Should appellant be
acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction
stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa?
The Solicitor General is of the first view, and he accordingly recommends reversal of the
appealed judgment.
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what
the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system ... ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the
law as of the date that law originally passed, since this Court's construction merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed intends to
effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal
3
maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation placed upon the written law
by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down
in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at
the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in
1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on
the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and
application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be
reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret
Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing
doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would
attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit
therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act
which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted,
with costs de oficio.
4) G.R. No. L-22291 November 15, 1976
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JESUS SANTAYANA Y ESCUDERO, defendant-appellant.
Ernesto C. Hidalgo and Enrique Jocson for appellant.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Trial
Attorney Josefina Domingo de Leon for appellee.
CONCEPCION, JR., J:
Accused, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was found guilty of the crime of illegal possesion of
firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year and one (1) day to
two (2) years and to pay the costs.
The essential facts are not in dispute. On February 19, 1962, accused Jesus Santayana,
was appointed as "Special Agent" 1 by then Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On
March 9, 1962, a Memorandum Receipt 2 for equipment was issued in the name of the
accused regarding one pistol Melior SN-122137 with one (1) mag and stock. Col. Maristela
likewise issued an undated certification 3 to the effect that the accused was an accredited
member of the CIS and the pistol described in the said Memorandum Receipt was given to
him by virtue of his appointment as special agent and that he was authorized to carry and
possess the same in the performance of his official duty and for his personal protection. On
October 29, 1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in possession of the above-
described pistol with four rounds of ammunition, cal. 25, without a license to possess them.
An investigation was conducted and thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed against
the accused. The case underwent trial after which the accused was convicted of the crime
charged with its corresponding penalty. Hence, the case was appealed to US and the
accused assigned three errors allegedly committed by the trial court in disposing of this
case.
Of these assigned errors, the two main issued posed are whether or not the present subject
matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court pursuant to Republic Act
No. 2613; and whether or not the appointment of the appellant as special agent of the CIS
which apparently authorizes him to carry and posses firearms exempts him from securing a
license or permit corresponding thereto.
Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, there is no doubt that under Section 87 of Republic Act
No. 286, as amended by Republic Act No. 2613, the justice over cases of illegal possession
of firearms. But equally the Court of First Instance of Manila, which took cognizance of this
case had jurisdiction over the offense charged because under Section 44 of Republic Act
No. 296, Court of First Instance have original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which the
penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six (6) months, or a fine of more than
two hundred pesos (P200.00)"; and the offense charged in the information is punishable by
imprisonment for a period of not less than one (1) year and one (1) day nor more than five
(5) years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00) or more than five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
From the foregoing, it is evident that the jurisdiction of the Municipal Courts over Criminal
Cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more than six (6)
months or fine of not more than two hundred (P200.00) pesos or both such imprisonment
and fine is exclusive and original to said courts. But considering that the offense of illegal
possession of firearms with which the appellant was charged is penalized by imprisonment
for a period of not less than one (1) year and one (1) day or more than five (5) years, or both
such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos or more
than five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos (Republic Act No. 4), the offense, therefore, does not
fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. The Court of First
Instance has concurrent jurisdiction over the same.
As to the second issue to be resolved, there is no question that appellant was appointed as
CIS secret agent with the authority to carry and possess firearms. 4 Indeed, appellant was
issued a firearm in the performance of his official duties and for his personal protection. 5 It
also appears that appellant was informed by Col. Maristela that it was not necessary for him
to apply for a license or to register the said firearm because it was government property and
therefore could not legally be registered or licensed in appellant's name. 6 Capt. Adolfo M.
Bringas from whom appellant received the firearm also informed the latter that no permit to
carry the pistol was necessary "because you are already appointed as CIS agent."
At the time of appellant's apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing is enunciated in the
case of People vs. Macarandang 7 wherein We held that the appointment of a civilian as
"secret agent to assist in the maintenace of peace and order campaigns and detection of
crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a 'peace officer' equivalent even to a
member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879." The case of People vs.
Mapa 8 revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case only on August 30, 1967. Under the
4
Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of appellant's appointment as secret
agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol in question.
Wherefore, and conformably with the recommendation of the Solicitor General, the decision
appealed from is hereby reversed and appellant Jesus Santayana y Escudero is hereby
acquitted. The bond for his provisional release is cancelled. Costs de oficio.
Case Digest: Primicias vs Municipality of Urdaneta
Facts:
On February 8, 1965, Primicia was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when
he was found violating Municipal Order 3, Series of 1964 for overtaking a truck. The Courts
of First Instance decided that from the action initiated by Primicias, the Municipal Order was
null and void and had been repealed by Republic Act 4136, the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code
Issues:
1. Whether or not Municipal Order 3 of Urdaneta is null and void
2. Whether or not the Municipal Order is not definite in its terms or ambiguous.
Held:
1. Municipal Order 3 is null and void as there is an explicit repeal in RA 4136 and as per
general rule, the later law prevails over an earlier law and any conflict between a municipal
order and a national law must be ruled in favor of the statute.
2. Yes, the terms of Municipal Order 3 was ambiguous and not definite. “Vehicular Traffic” is
not defined and no distinctions were made between cars, trucks, buses, etc.
Appealed decision is therefore AFFIRMED.
Case Digest: Ortigas & Co. vs Feati Bank & Trust Co.
Facts:
On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at
Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred
their rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed was executed
with stipulations, one of which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential
purposes only. This was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and
101511. Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic
Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati started construction of a building on both lots to be
devoted for banking purposes but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written
demand to stop construction but Feati continued contending that the building was being
constructed according to the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27
declaring the area along the West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone.
Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of Feati.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial and
commercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of
Titles.
Held:
Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local
Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the
municipality should be “liberally construed in it’s favour”, “to give more power to the local
government in promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the
community”. This is found in the General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-
impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.
Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health,
safety, peace and order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it would not
be a conducive residential area considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which
results in the surrounding industrial and commercial establishments.
Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.
Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2
2001
[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]
FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal
gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on
December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more
serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only
stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in
suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was
thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President
Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the
crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will
not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant,
5
saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of
office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family
later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for
WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further
proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed
for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic
of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.
ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.
RULING:
1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I EDSA II
exercise of people power of freedom of
speech and freedom of assemblyto
exercise of the people power of petition the government for redress of
revolution which overthrew the whole grievances which only affected the office of
government. the President.
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of intra constitutional and the resignation of
the new government that resulted from it the sitting President that it caused and the
cannot be the subject of judicial review succession of the Vice President as
President are subject to judicial review.
presented a political question; involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution
require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art
II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII.
The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They
also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both
were present when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing
material relevant issues—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive
resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by
his leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he
was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President
(without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same
service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before,
during and after January 20, 2001.
3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed
H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate
passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been
terminated. It is clear is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President.
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer
temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and
addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that
he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch
of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery
and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially
plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a
non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to
commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is
that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally
is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible.
Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and
legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court
also said that Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the
trial has influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court
said that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the
publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the
prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
6
Estrada vs Sandiganbayan GR No 148560 19 November 2001
Facts: On 4 April 2001, an Information for plunder was filed against former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to
be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as
amended by RA 7659, assailed the said law for being unconstitutional. He contends that (a)
it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the “reasonable doubt” standard
in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element ofmens rea in crimes already
punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are violations of fundamental right
of due process.
Issue: Whether or not the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague?
Decision: The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is
whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by common understanding and practice. The “vagueness” doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague
statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected
speech. The theory is that “[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily
apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is
deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a
statute drawn with narrow specificity.” The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected
speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
Title: People v. Jaime Jose, G.R. No. L-28232
Subject Matter: Conspiracy
Facts:
On June 26, 1967, four principal-accused Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr., Eduardo Aquino
and Rogelio Cañal conspired together, confederated with and mutually helped one another,
then and there, to willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design to forcibly abduct
Magdalena “Maggie” dela Riva, 25 years old and single, a movie actress by profession at
the time of the incident, where the four principal accused, by means of force and
intimidation using a deadly weapon, have carnal knowledge of the complainant against her
will, and brought her to the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, and hence committed the crime of
Forcible Abduction with Rape.
Having established the element of conspiracy, the trial court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible abduction with rape and sentences each of them to
the death penalty.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court made a proper ruling of the case considering the element of
conspiracy.
Held:
No, the trial court’s ruling was not proper. The SC ruled that since the element of conspiracy
was present, where the act of one is the act of all, each of the accused is also liable for the
crime committed by each of the other persons who conspired to commit the crime. The SC
modified the judgment as follows: appellants Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr., and Eduardo
Aquino are guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and each and every
one of them is likewise convicted of three (3) other crimes of rape. As a consequence
thereof, each of them is likewise convicted with four death penalties and to indemnify the
victim of the sum of P10,000 in each of the four crimes. The case against Rogelio Cañal
was dismissed only in so far as the criminal liability is concerned due to his death in prison
prior to promulgation of judgment.
LEGISLATIVE INTENT
PEOPLE v. VENANCIO CONCEPCION +
DECISION
44 Phil. 126
MALCOLM, J.:
By telegrams and a letter of confirmation to the manager of the Aparri branch of the
Philippine National Bank, Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank,
between April 10, 1919, and May 7, 1919, authorized an extension of credit in favor of
"Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." in the amount of P300,000. This special authorization was
essential in view of the memorandum order of President Concepcion dated May 17, 1918,
limiting the discretional power of the local manager at Aparri, Cagayan, to grant loans and
discount negotiable documents to P5,000, which, in certain cases, could be increased to
P10,000. Pursuant to this authorization, credit aggregating P300,000, was granted the firm
of "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C," the only security required consisting of six demand notes.
The notes, together with the interest, were taken up and paid by July 17, 1919.
"Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." was a copartnership capitalized at P100,000. Anacleto
Concepcion contributed P5,000; Clara Vda. de Concepcion, P5,000; Miguel S. Concepcion,
P20,000; Clemente Puno, P20,000; and Rosario San Agustin, "casada con Gral. Venancio
Concepcion," P50,000. Member Miguel S. Concepcion was the administrator of the
company.
On the facts recounted, Venancio Concepcion, as President of the Philippine National Bank
and as member of the board of directors of this bank, was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Cagayan with a violation of section 35 of Act No. 2747. He was found guilty by
the Honorable Enrique V. Filamor, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to
7
imprisonment for one year and six months, to pay a fine of P3,000, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs.
Section 35 of Act No. 2747, effective on February 20, 1918, just mentioned, to which
reference must hereafter repeatedly be made, reads as follows: "The National Bank shall
not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the members of the board of directors of the
bank nor to agents of the branch banks." Section 49 of the same Act provides : "Any person
who shall violate any of the provisions of this Act shall be punished by a fine not to exceed
ten thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not to exceed five years, or by both such fine and
imprisonment." These two sections were in effect in 1919 when the alleged unlawful acts
took place, but were repealed by Act No. 2938, approved on January 30,1921.
Counsel for the defense assign ten errors as having been committed by the trial court.
These errors they have argued adroitly and exhaustively in their printed brief, and again in
oral argument, Attorney-General Villa-Real, in an exceptionally accurate and
comprehensive brief, answers the propositions of appellant one by one.
The questions presented are reduced to their simplest elements in the opinion which
follows:
I. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en
C." by Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, a "loan" within the
meaning of section 35 of Act No. 2747? Counsel argue that the documents of record do not
prove that authority to make a loan was given, but only show the concession of a credit. In
this statement of fact, counsel is correct, for the exhibits in question speak of a "credito"
(credit) and not of a "prestamo" (loan).
The "credit" of an individual means his ability to borrow money by virtue of the confidence or
trust reposed by a lender that he will pay what he may promise. (Donnell vs. Jones [1848],
13 Ala., 490; Bouvier's Law Dictionary.) A "loan" means the delivery by one party and the
receipt by the other party of a given sum of money, upon an agreement, express or implied,
to repay the sum loaned, with or without interest. (Payne vs. Gardiner [1864], 29 N. Y.,
146,167.) The concession of a "credit" necessarily involves the granting of "loans" up to the
limit of the amount fixed in the "credit."
II. Was the granting of a credit of 300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en
C," by Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, a "loan" or a
"discount"? Counsel argue that while section 35 of Act No. 2747 prohibits the granting of a
"loan," it does not prohibit what is commonly known as a "discount."
In a letter dated August 7, 1916, H. Parker Willis, then President of the National Bank,
inquired of the Insular Auditor whether section 37 of Act No. 2612 was intended to apply to
discounts as well as to loans. The ruling of the Acting Insular Auditor, dated August 11,
1916, was to the effect that said section referred to loans alone, and placed no restriction
upon discount transactions. It becomes material, therefore, to discover the distinction
between a "loan" and a "discount," and to ascertain if the instant transaction comes under
the first or the latter denomination.
Discounts are favored by bankers because of their liquid nature, growing, as they do, out of
an actual, live, transaction. But in its last analysis, to discount a paper is only a mode of
loaning money, with, however, these distinctions: (1) In a discount, interest is deducted in
advance, while in a loan, interest is taken at the expiration of a credit; (2) a discount is
always on double-name paper; a loan is generally on single-name paper.
Conceding, without deciding, that, as ruled by the Insular Auditor, the law covers loans and
not discounts, yet the conclusion is inevitable that the demand notes signed by the firm
"Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." were not discount paper but were mere evidences of
indebtedness, because (1) interest was not deducted from the face of the notes, but was
paid when the notes fell due; and (2) they were single-name and not double-name paper.
The facts of the instant case having relation to this phase of the argument are not
essentially different from the facts in the Binalbagan Estate case. Just as there it was
declared that the operations constituted a loan and not a discount, so should we here lay
down the same ruling.
III. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership, "Puno y Concepcion, S.
en C." by Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, an "indirect
loan" within the meaning of section 35 of Act No. 2747?
Counsel argue that a loan to the partnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." was not an
"indirect loan." In this connection, it should be recalled that the wife of the defendant held
one-half of the capital of this partnership.
In the interpretation and construction of statutes, the primary rule is to ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the Legislature. In this instance, the purpose of the Legislature is
plainly to erect a wall of safety against temptation for a director of the bank. The prohibition
against indirect loans is a recognition of the familiar maxim that no man may serve two
masters-that where personal interest clashes with fidelity to duty the latter almost always
suffers. If, therefore, it is shown that the husband is financially interested in the success or
failure of his wife's business venture, a loan to a partnership of which the wife of a director is
a member, falls within the prohibition.
Various provisions of the Civil Code serve to establish the familiar relationship called a
conjugal partnership. (Articles 1315, 1393, 1401, 1407, 1408, and 1412 can be specially
noted.) A loan, therefore, to a partnership of which the wife of a director of a bank is a
member, is an indirect loan to such director.
That it was the intention of the Legislature to prohibit exactly such an occurrence is shown
by the acknowledged fact that in this instance the defendant was tempted to mingle his
personal and family affairs with his official duties, and to permit the loan of P300,000 to a
partnership of no established reputation and without asking for collateral security.
In the case of Lester and Wife vs. Howard Bank ([1870], 33 Md., 558; 3 Am. Rep., 211), the
Supreme Court of Maryland said:
"What then was the purpose of the law when it declared that no director or officer should
borrow of the bank, and 'if any director/ etc., shall be convicted,' etc., 'of directly or indirectly
violating this section he shall be punished by fine and imprisonment?" We say to protect the
8
stockholders, depositors and creditors of the bank, against the temptation to which the
directors and officers might be exposed, and the power which as such they must
necessarily possess in the control and management of the bank, and the legislature
unwilling to rely upon the implied understanding that in assuming this relation they would not
acquire any interest hostile or adverse to the most exact and faithful discharge of duty,
declared in express terms that they should not borrow, etc., of the bank."
In the case of People vs. Knapp ([1912], 206 N. Y., 373), relied upon in the Binalbagan
Estate decision, it was said:
"We are of opinion the statute forbade the loan to his copartnership firm as well as to
himself directly. The loan was made indirectly to him through his firm."
IV. Could Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, be convicted of
a violation of section 35 of Act No. 2747 in relation with section 49 of the same Act, when
these portions of Act No. 2747 were repealed by Act No. 2938, prior to the filing of the
information and the rendition of the judgment?
As noted along toward the beginning of this opinion, section 49 of Act No. 2747, in relation
to section 35 of the same Act, provides a punishment for any person who shall violate any
of the provisions of the Act. It is contended, however, by the appellant, that the repeal of
these sections of Act No. 2747 by Act No. 2938 has served to take away the basis for
criminal prosecution.
This same question has been previously submitted and has received an answer adverse to
such contention in the cases of United States vs. Cuna ([1908], 12 Phil., 241); People vs.
Concepcion ([1922], 43 Phil., 653); and Ong Chang Wing and Kwong Fok vs. United States
([1910], 218 U. S., 272; 40 Phil., 1046). In other words, it has been the holding, and it must
again be the holding, that where an Act of the Legislature which penalizes an offense
repeals a former Act which penalized the same offense, such repeal does not have the
effect of thereafter depriving the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence offenders
charged with violations of the old law.
V. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en
C." by Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, in violation of
section 35 of Act No. 2747, penalized by this law?
Counsel argue that since the prohibition contained in section 35 of Act No. 2747 is on the
bank, and since section 49 of said Act provides a punishment not on the bank when it
violates any provision of the law, but on a person violating any provision of the same, and
imposing imprisonment as a part of the penalty, the prohibition contained in said section 35
is without penal sanction.
The answer is that when the corporation itself is forbidden to do an act, the prohibition
extends to the board of directors, and to each director separately and individually. (People
vs. Concepcion, supra.)
VI. Does the alleged good faith of Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine
National Bank, in extending the credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y
Concepcion, S. en C." constitute a legal defense?
Counsel argue that if defendant committed the acts of which he was convicted, it was
because he was misled by rulings coming from the Insular Auditor. It is furthermore stated
that since the loans made to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." have been
paid, no loss has been suffered by the Philippine National Bank.
Neither argument, even if conceded to be true, is conclusive. Under the statute which the
defendant has violated, criminal intent is not necessarily material. The doing of the inhibited
act, inhibited on account of public policy and public interest, constitutes the crime. And, in
this instance, as previously demonstrated, the acts of the President of the Philippine
National Bank do not fall within the purview of the rulings of the Insular Auditor, even
conceding that such rulings have controlling effect.
Morse, in his work, Banks and Banking, section 125, says:
"It is fraud for directors to secure by means of their trust, any advantage not common to the
other stockholders. The law will not allow private profit from a trust, and will not listen to any
proof of honest intent."
JUDGMENT
On a review of the evidence of record, with reference to the decision of the trial court, and
the errors assigned by the appellant, and with reference to previous decisions of this court
on the same subject, we are irresistibly led to the conclusion that no reversible error was
committed in the trial of this case, and that the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the information. The penalty imposed by the trial
judge falls within the limits of the punitive provisions of the law. Judgment is affirmed, with
the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
People v. Concepcion
G.R. No. 19190 (November 29, 1922)
FACTS:
Defendant authorized an extension of credit in favor of Concepcion, a co-
partnership. Defendant’s wife was a director of this co-partnership. Defendant was found
guilty of violating Sec. 35 of Act No. 2747 which says that “The National Bank shall not,
directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the members of the Board of Directors of the bank
nor to agents of the branch banks.” This Section was in effect in 1919 but was repealed in Act
No. 2938 approved on January 30, 1921.
ISSUE:
W/N Defendant can be convicted of violating Sections of Act No. 2747, which were
repealed by Act No. 2938.
HELD:
In the interpretation and construction, the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the
intention of the Legislature. Section 49 in relation to Sec. 25 of Act No. 2747 provides a
punishment for any person who shall violate any provisions of the Act. Defendant contends
that the repeal of these Sections by Act No. 2938 has served to take away basis for
9
criminal prosecution. The Court holds that where an act of the Legislature which
penalizes an offense repeals a former act which penalized the same offense, such
repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the Courts of jurisdiction to try,
convict and sentence offenders charged with violations of the old law.
Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Padua (G.R. No. L-72873. May 28, 1987)
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.
Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.
Ponente: CRUZ
FACTS:
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in
‘the name of their deceased parents. One of them transferred his undivided share by way of
absolute sale. A year later, his sister sold her share in a “Con Pacto de Retro Sale”. By
virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area
corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The
vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. with their consent, their son
Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was dismissed
when it appeared that he was an American citizen. Another coheir filed her own complaint
invoking the same right of redemption of her brother. Trial court dismissed the complaint,
on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from
notice of the sales. Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge
of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. Respondent court reversed
the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the New Civil
Code.
HELD:
YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated.
RATIO:
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing
was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended
during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for
redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the
justifications for this exception.
While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts] nevertheless
have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, [courts] defer not
to “the letter that killeth” but to “the spirit that vivifieth,” to give effect to the law maker’s will.
RAMOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124354. December 29, 1999.
Ponente: Kapunan
FACTS:
Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to remove stone from her gall bladder
(cholecystectomy). They hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, to conduct the surgery at the De Los
Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Hosaka assured them that he would find a good
anesthesiologist. But the operation did not go as planned, Dr. Hosaka arrived 3 hours late
for the operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist “botched” the administration of the
anesthesia causing Erlinda to go into a coma and suffer brain damage. The botched
operation was witnessed by Herminda Cruz, sister in law of Erlinda and Dean of College of
Nursing of Capitol Medical Center.
The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the surgeon and the anesthesiologist
for damages. The petitioners showed expert testimony showing that Erlinda's condition was
caused by the anesthesiologist in not exercising reasonable care in “intubating” Erlinda.
Eyewitnesses heard the anesthesiologist saying “Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang
pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.”
Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda was robust and fit to undergo surgery.
The RTC held that the anesthesiologist ommitted to exercise due care in intubating the
patient, the surgeon was remiss in his obligation to provide a “good anesthesiologist” and
for arriving 3 hours late and the hospital is liable for the negligence of the doctors and for
not cancelling the operation after the surgeon failed to arrive on time. The surgeon,
anesthesiologist and the DLSMC were all held jointly and severally liable for damages to
petitioners. The CA reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not the private respondents were negligent and thereby caused the
comatose condition of Ramos.
HELD:
Yes, private respondents were all negligent and are solidarily liable for the damages.
10
RATIO:
Res ipsa loquitur – a procedural or evidentiary rule which means “the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself.” It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an
injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation, where ordinarily in a medical
malpractice case, the complaining party must present expert testimony to prove that the
attending physician was negligent.
This doctrine finds application in this case. On the day of the operation, Erlinda Ramos
already surrendered her person to the private respondents who had complete and exclusive
control over her. Apart from the gallstone problem, she was neurologically sound and fit.
Then, after the procedure, she was comatose and brain damaged—res ipsa loquitur!—the
thing speaks for itself!
Negligence – Private respondents were not able to disprove the presumption of negligence
on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her
condition. One need not be an anesthesiologist in order to tell whether or not the intubation
was a success. [res ipsa loquitur applies here]. The Supreme Court also found that the
anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation which
indicates unfamiliarity with the patient and which is an act of negligence and irresponsibility.
The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He failed to exercise the proper authority
as the “captain of the ship” in determining if the anesthesiologist observed the proper
protocols. Also, because he was late, he did not have time to confer with the
anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.
The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of the family in hiring and supervision of its doctors (Art. 2180). The hospital was
negligent since they are the one in control of the hiring and firing of their “consultants”.
While these consultants are not employees, hospitals still exert significant controls on the
selection and termination of doctors who work there which is one of the hallmarks of an
employer-employee reationship. Thus, the hospital was allocated a share in the liability.
Damages – temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or
compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing.
WIRETAPPING
Socorro Ramirez vs. CA and Garcia [G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995]
Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S.
Garcia, vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner
offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy.”. Private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire
tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.”
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information. The trial court granted the said motion.
The private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court,
which referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent Court of
Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the trial court’s order as null and void, after
subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration by the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of
a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.
HELD:
NO. Petition denied. Costs against petitioner.
RATIO:
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-
quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view
held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the
private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
[P]etitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
“communication” to a point of absurdity.
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice;
and NTC
G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008
FACTS: Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes
where the parties to the conversation discussed “rigging” the results of the 2004 elections to
favor President Arroyo. On 6 June 2005, Presidential spokesperson Bunye held a press
conference in Malacañang Palace, where he played before the presidential press corps two
compact disc recordings of conversations between a woman and a man. Bunye identified
the woman in both recordings as President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the
second compact disc had been “spliced” to make it appear that President Arroyo was talking
to Garcillano.
However, on 9 June 2005, Bunye backtracked and stated that the woman’s voice in the
compact discs was not President Arroyo’s after all.3 Meanwhile, other individuals went
public, claiming possession of the genuine copy of the Garci Tapes. Respondent Gonzalez
11
ordered the NBI to investigate media organizations which aired the Garci Tapes for possible
violation of Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press release warning radio and television stations that
airing the Garci Tapes is a ” cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the
licenses or authorizations” issued to them. On 14 June 2005, NTC officers met with officers
of the broadcasters group KBP, to dispel fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a
joint press statement expressing commitment to press freedom
On 21 June 2005, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as citizen, filed this petition to
nullify the “acts, issuances, and orders” of the NTC and respondent Gonzalez (respondents)
on the following grounds: (1) respondents’ conduct violated freedom of expression and the
right of the people to information on matters of public concern under Section 7, Article III of
the Constitution, and (2) the NTC acted ultra vires when it warned radio and television
stations against airing the Garci Tapes.
ISSUE: The principal issue for resolution is whether the NTC warning embodied in the press
release of 11 June 2005 constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of
expression.
1. Standing to File Petition
Petitioner has standing to file this petition. When the issue involves freedom of expression,
as in the present case, any citizen has the right to bring suit to question the constitutionality
of a government action in violation of freedom of expression, whether or not the government
action is directed at such citizen. Freedom of expression, being fundamental to the
preservation of a free, open and democratic society, is of transcendental importance that
must be defended by every patriotic citizen at the earliest opportunity.
2. Overview of Freedom of Expression, Prior Restraint and Subsequent Punishment
Freedom of expression is the foundation of a free, open and democratic society. Freedom of
expression is an indispensable condition8 to the exercise of almost all other civil and
political rights. Freedom of expression allows citizens to expose and check abuses of public
officials. Freedom of expression allows citizens to make informed choices of candidates for
public office.
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution prohibits the enactment of any law curtailing freedom
of expression:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
Thus, the rule is that expression is not subject to any prior restraint or censorship because
the Constitution commands that freedom of expression shall not be abridged. Over time,
however, courts have carved out narrow and well defined exceptions to this rule out of
necessity.
The exceptions, when expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction
to only four categories of expression, namely:
pornography,
false or misleading advertisement,
advocacy of imminent lawless action, and
danger to national security.
All other expression is not subject to prior restraint.
Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value expression.
Any content-based prior restraint on protected expression is unconstitutional without
exception. A protected expression means what it says – it is absolutely protected from
censorship. Thus, there can be no prior restraint on public debates on the amendment or
repeal of existing laws, on the ratification of treaties, on the imposition of new tax measures,
or on proposed amendments to the Constitution.
If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it is content-
neutral even if it burdens expression. A content-neutral restraint is a restraint which
regulates the time, place or manner of the expression in public places without any restraint
on the content of the expression. Courts will subject content-neutral restraints to
intermediate scrutiny. An example of a content-neutral restraint is a permit specifying the
date, time and route of a rally passing through busy public streets. A content-neutral prior
restraint on protected expression which does not touch on the content of the expression
enjoys the presumption of validity and is thus enforceable subject to appeal to the courts.
Expression that may be subject to prior restraint is unprotected expression or low-value
expression. By definition, prior restraint on unprotected expression is content-based since
the restraint is imposed because of the content itself. In this jurisdiction, there are currently
only four categories of unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint. This
Court recognized false or misleading advertisement as unprotected expression only in
October 2007.
Only unprotected expression may be subject to prior restraint. However, any such prior
restraint on unprotected expression must hurdle a high barrier. First, such prior restraint is
presumed unconstitutional. Second, the government bears a heavy burden of proving the
constitutionality of the prior restraint.
Prior restraint is a more severe restriction on freedom of expression than subsequent
punishment. Although subsequent punishment also deters expression, still the ideas are
disseminated to the public. Prior restraint prevents even the dissemination of ideas to the
public.
12
While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, such expression may be
subject to subsequent punishment,27 either civilly or criminally. Similarly, if the unprotected
expression does not warrant prior restraint, the same expression may still be subject to
subsequent punishment, civilly or criminally. Libel falls under this class of unprotected
expression.
However, if the expression cannot be subject to the lesser restriction of subsequent
punishment, logically it cannot also be subject to the more severe restriction of prior
restraint. Thus, since profane language or “hate speech” against a religious minority is not
subject to subsequent punishment in this jurisdiction, such expression cannot be subject to
prior restraint.
If the unprotected expression warrants prior restraint, necessarily the same expression is
subject to subsequent punishment. There must be a law punishing criminally the
unprotected expression before prior restraint on such expression can be justified.
The prevailing test in this jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of government action
imposing prior restraint on three categories of unprotected expression – pornography,31
advocacy of imminent lawless action, and danger to national security – is the clear and
present danger test.32 The expression restrained must present a clear and present danger
of bringing about a substantive evil that the State has a right and duty to prevent, and such
danger must be grave and imminent.
Prior restraint on unprotected expression takes many forms – it may be a law, administrative
regulation, or impermissible pressures like threats of revoking licenses or withholding
of benefits.34 The impermissible pressures need not be embodied in a government agency
regulation, but may emanate from policies, advisories or conduct of officials of government
agencies.
3. Government Action in the Present Case
The government action in the present case is a warning by the NTC that the airing or
broadcasting of the Garci Tapes by radio and television stations is a “cause for the
suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations” issued to radio
and television stations. The NTC warning, embodied in a press release, relies on two
grounds. First, the airing of the Garci Tapes “is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued to
radio and TV stations.” Second, the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated, and
subsequent investigation may establish that the tapes contain false information or willful
misrepresentation.
The NTC does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected
expression that may be subject to prior restraint. The NTC does not specify what
substantive evil the State seeks to prevent in imposing prior restraint on the airing of the
Garci Tapes. The NTC does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil, of grave and imminent character, that the
State has a right and duty to prevent.
The NTC did not conduct any hearing in reaching its conclusion that the airing of the Garci
Tapes constitutes a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. There is also the issue
of whether a wireless cellular phone conversation is covered by the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
Clearly, the NTC has no factual or legal basis in claiming that the airing of the Garci Tapes
constitutes a violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. The radio and television stations were
not even given an opportunity to be heard by the NTC. The NTC did not observe basic due
process as mandated in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.
The NTC concedes that the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated as accurate or
truthful. The NTC also concedes that only “after a prosecution or appropriate investigation”
can it be established that the Garci Tapes constitute “false information and/or willful
misrepresentation.” Clearly, the NTC admits that it does not even know if the Garci Tapes
contain false information or willful misrepresentation.
4. Nature of Prior Restraint in the Present Case
The NTC action restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is a content-based prior restraint
because it is directed at the message of the Garci Tapes. The NTC’s claim that the Garci
Tapes might contain “false information and/or willful misrepresentation,” and thus should not
be publicly aired, is an admission that the restraint is content-based.
5. Nature of Expression in the Present Case
The public airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression because it does not fall under
any of the four existing categories of unprotected expression recognized in this jurisdiction.
The airing of the Garci Tapes is essentially a political expression because it exposes that a
presidential candidate had allegedly improper conversations with a COMELEC
Commissioner right after the close of voting in the last presidential elections.
Obviously, the content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the ballot. Public
discussion on the sanctity of the ballot is indisputably a protected expression that cannot be
subject to prior restraint. In any event, public discussion on all political issues should always
remain uninhibited, robust and wide open.
The rule, which recognizes no exception, is that there can be no content-based prior
restraint on protected expression. On this ground alone, the NTC press release is
unconstitutional. Of course, if the courts determine that the subject matter of a wiretapping,
illegal or not, endangers the security of the State, the public airing of the tape becomes
unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint. However, there is no claim
here by respondents that the subject matter of the Garci Tapes involves national security
and publicly airing the tapes would endanger the security of the State.
13
The airing of the Garci Tapes does not violate the right to privacy because the content of the
Garci Tapes is a matter of important public concern. The Constitution guarantees the
people’s right to information on matters of public concern. The remedy of any person
aggrieved by the public airing of the Garci Tapes is to file a complaint for violation of the
Anti-Wiretapping Law after the commission of the crime. Subsequent punishment, absent a
lawful defense, is the remedy available in case of violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, there can be subsequent
punishment for protected expression under libel, tort or other laws. In the present case, the
NTC action seeks prior restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes, not punishment of
personnel of radio and television stations for actual violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
6. Only the Courts May Impose Content-Based Prior Restraint
The NTC has no power to impose content-based prior restraint on expression. The charter
of the NTC does not vest NTC with any content-based censorship power over radio and
television stations.
In the present case, the airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression that can never
be subject to prior restraint. However, even assuming for the sake of argument that the
airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected expression, only the courts have the
power to adjudicate on the factual and legal issue of whether the airing of the Garci Tapes
presents a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive evil that the State has a
right and duty to prevent, so as to justify the prior restraint.
Any order imposing prior restraint on unprotected expression requires prior adjudication by
the courts on whether the prior restraint is constitutional. This is a necessary consequence
from the presumption of invalidity of any prior restraint on unprotected expression.
7. Government Failed to Overcome Presumption of Invalidity
Respondents did not invoke any compelling State interest to impose prior restraint on the
public airing of the Garci Tapes. The respondents claim that they merely “fairly warned”
radio and television stations to observe the Anti-Wiretapping Law and pertinent NTC
circulars on program standards. Respondents have not explained how and why the
observance by radio and television stations of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and pertinent NTC
circulars constitutes a compelling State interest justifying prior restraint on the public airing
of the Garci Tapes.
Violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law, like the violation of any criminal statute, can always
be subject to criminal prosecution after the violation is committed. Respondents have not
explained how the violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law, or of the pertinent NTC circulars,
can incite imminent lawless behavior or endanger the security of the State.
8. The NTC Warning is a Classic Form of Prior Restraint
The NTC press release threatening to suspend or cancel the airwave permits of radio and
television stations constitutes impermissible pressure amounting to prior restraint on
protected expression. Whether the threat is made in an order, regulation, advisory or press
release, the chilling effect is the same: the threat freezes radio and television stations into
deafening silence. Radio and television stations that have invested substantial sums in
capital equipment and market development suddenly face suspension or cancellation of
their permits. The NTC threat is thus real and potent.
9. Conclusion
In sum, the NTC press release constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected
expression. There can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. This
rule has no exception.
ZALDY NUEZ, Complainant, vs.
ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO, Respondent.
A.M. No. CA-05-18-P; April 12, 2005
Facts:
The complaint arose out of respondent’s solicitation of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00)
from Zaldy Nuez (Complainant) in exchange for a speedy and favorable decision of the
latter’s pending case in the Court of Appeals.
Complainant earlier sought the assistance of Imbestigador. The crew of the TV program
accompanied him to PAOCCF-SPG where he lodged a complaint against respondent for
extortion. Thereafter, he communicated with respondent again to verify if the latter was still
asking for the money and to set up a meeting with her. Upon learning that respondent’s
offer of a favorable decision in exchange for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was still
standing, the plan for the entrapment operation was formulated by Imbestigador in
cooperation with the PAOCC.
During the hearing of this case, respondent would like the court to believe that she never
had any intention of committing a crime, that the offer of a million pesos for a favorable
decision came from complainant and that it was complainant and the law enforcers who
instigated the whole incident.
When she was asked if she had sent the text messages contained in complainant’s
cellphone and which reflected her cellphone number, respondent admitted those that were
not incriminating but claimed she did not remember those that clearly showed she was
transacting with complainant.
14
Respondent thus stated that she met with complainant only to tell the latter to stop calling
and texting her, not to get the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as pre-arranged.
Issue:
Whether or not the text messages are admissible as evidence in court?
Held:
Yes. Complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text messages
from respondent duly presented before the Committee that the latter asked for One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a favorable decision of the former’s pending case
with the CA. The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same
are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence65 which
provides:
“Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone conversations, text messages . .
. and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or
retained.”
Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, “Ephemeral electronic
communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same
or who has personal knowledge thereof . . . .” In this case, complainant who was the
recipient of said messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their
contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in
complainant’s cellphone from which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any
doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid
to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages
between her and complainant. It is also well to remember that in administrative cases,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.
The Court has no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in
determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.
Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)
GR No. L-69809, October 16, 1986 [145 SCRA 112]
FACTS:
A direct assault case against Leonardo Laconico was filed by complainant Atty. Tito Pintor
and his client Manuel Montebon. The said complainants made a telephone call to Laconico
to give their terms for withdrawal of their complaint.
Laconico, later on, called appellant Gaanan, who is also a lawyer, to come to his office to
advise him about the proposed settlement. When complainant called up, Laconico
requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone
extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. After
enumerating the conditions, several calls were made to finally confirm if the settlement is
agreeable to both parties.
As part of their agreement, Laconico has to give the money to the complainant's wife at the
office of the Department of Public Highways. But, he insisted to give the money to the
complainant himself.
After receiving the money, the complainant was arrested by the agents of the Philippine
Constabulary, who were alerted earlier before the exchange.
Appellant stated on his affidavit that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the
withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the
complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against the complainant.
In defense, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Act as the appellant heard the telephone conversation without complainant's
consent.
Trial Court: both Gaanan and Laconico were guilty of violating Sect. 1 of RA No. 4200.
IAC: affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition. The case at bar involves an interpretation of the Republic Act No. 4200
or also known as Anti-Wiretapping Act. Petitioner contends that telephones or extension
telephones are not included in the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording
devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated electronic devices
contemplated by law.
However, respondent argues that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the
term "device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion
of a complete set of a telephone apparatus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the
Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful
interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.
HELD:
No.
15

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts
penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire
record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or
spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner
prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to
communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions
thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such
record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of
offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must
be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph
or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be
considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line.
Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement", although not exclusive to that enumerated
therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that
is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a
telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by
the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common
usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone
conversation.
The petition is granted and the petitioner is acquitted of the crime of violation of Republic
Act No. 4200.
CONG. MANUEL N. MAMBA, M.D. ATTY, FRANCISCO N. MAMBA, JR., HON.
GUILLERMO SUMIGAD, HON. CALIXTO GENOVEZA, HON. MARTIN SORIANO,
HON. LOURDES FAUSTO, HON. LORENZO FERMIN, HON. ADORACION
RAQUINIO, HON. LEONIDES FAUSTO, HON. DIOGENES BALIGOD, HON.
LORETO MABBORANG, HON. PETER SY, HON. NICCOLO MAMBA, LORETO
MAMBA, JUAN TAGUBA, DOMINGO CAMARAT, SEVERINO BUCAYU,
CASIANO CHAVENTE, ILLUMINADO BALIGOD, FELICIANO SERRANO,
TEOFILO URMA, REMIGIO DE LA CRUZ, ABELARDO BAUIT, MARIANO
MIRANDA, JR., ROMULO SERAFICA, CARLOS MANANGUIT, ERNESTO
FERMIN, ROGELIO FERNANDEZ, ERNESTO CENABRE, TRINIDAD
BALUNSAT, MIGUEL PASON, GIL BALORAN, DOMINGO CALLUENG,
BERNARDO BENITO, JUAN TURINGAN, MARCELINO CORPUZ, IGNACIO
PASCUA, JR., LEONIDES FAUSTO, TEODORICO PASTOR, DOMINADOR
CORSINO, GENEROSO AGLAUA, ZACARIAS MAGGAY, SIMEON BENZON,
PATRICIO TAGUIAM, LUCAS TAGUINOD, MA. GLORIA G. BALIGOD, LAURO
N. FAUSTO, EDGAR AGGABAO, RODOLFO CARDENAS, TERESITA
ESPINOSA, PACIFICO C. BINULUAN, ROGELIO SORIANO, ARTURO MAMBA,
DR. EXSUPERIOR YUAGA, VIVIAN DE GUZMAN, EX-CONG. FRANCISCO K.
MAMBA, CRISTINA MAMBA, EDWIN LIU, PABLO DANGA, ALICE LOA,
VICENTE TOLENTINO, NUMERIANO MACAPULAY, ROLLY
SEDANO, complainants, vs. JUDGE DOMINADOR L. GARCIA, MTC, TUAO,
CAGAYAN, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a resolution, which is more accurately a manifesto or a petition of concerned
citizens of Tuao, Cagayan, denouncing certain acts of Judge Dominador L. Garcia, Municipal
Trial Court, Tuao, Cagayan, in connection with his handling of Criminal Case No. 399, entitled
People vs. Renato Bulatao. The complainants are then Representative of the Third District of
Cagayan, the mayor and vicemayor, ten (10) members of the Sangguniang Bayan, thirty-two
(32) barrio captains, ten (10) LGU department heads of Tuao, Cagayan, and eight (8) heads
of non-governmental organizations or NGOs in the municipality of Tuao.
The resolution, dated November 4, 1996, was presented to this Court. It was adopted
at an assembly led by Rep. Manuel N. Mamba which picketed the municipal trial court on that
day.[1] The "resolution" was treated as an administrative complaint and respondent Judge
Dominador L. Garcia was required to answer. The matter was referred to Executive Judge
Orlando D. Beltran, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Tuao, Cagayan, for investigation, report,
and recommendation.[2]
Thereafter, an investigation was held during which the affidavits and sworn statements
of NBI Special Investigator Ablezer Rivera, the joint affidavit of NBI agents, Raul A. Ancheta
and Paul D. Rivera, the sworn statement of the accused in Criminal Case No. 699, Renato
Bulatao, and the testimonies of Abner P. Cardenas, clerk of court, MTC, Tuao, Cagayan and
Tomas Latauan, Jr., interpreter of the same court, were presented. The gist of the evidence
for the complainants is as follows:
16
 On August 23, 1996, a complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No.1866 (illegal
possession of firearms) was filed against a certain Renato Bulatao by the Cagayan Provincial
Police Command before the sala of respondent Judge Dominador L. Garcia of the Municipal
Trial Court, Tuao, Cagayan.[3] Respondent set the preliminary investigation on September 4,
1996, but the same was subsequently postponed and reset to October 23, 1996 as
respondent was not present, although the complaining officer, P/Sr. Inspector Danny F.
Salvador, appeared in court. On October 23, 1996, the preliminary investigation was again
reset to October 30, 1996. On October 29, 1996, the accused, Renato Bulatao, complained
to the NBI that at the scheduled preliminary investigation on September 4, 1996, P/Sr.
Inspector Salvador demanded P30,000.00 from him in consideration of the withdrawal of the
criminal case against him. According to Bulatao, the demand was reiterated by Salvador and
respondent judge on October 23, 1996. As Bulatao told them that he could not afford it, the
amount was reduced to P6,000.00.
Based on Bulataos report, the NBI set out to entrap Salvador and respondent judge. The
NBI gave Bulatao 12 pieces of P500.00 marked bills amounting to P6,000.00, which the latter
would give to Salvador and respondent the next day.[4]
Accordingly, at about 7 o'clock in the morning of the following day, October 30, Bulatao
met the NBI operatives in the house of Francisco Mamba, Sr., former representative of the
3rd District of Cagayan, where the entrapment was planned. Bulatao was given a tape
recorder to record his conversation with whoever will receive the money. At 9 a.m., Bulatao
went to the Municipal Trial Court and waited for his case to be called. At 10:30 a.m.,
respondent went out of his chambers and talked to SPO2 Jonathan Santos and SPO4 Carlos
Poli, representatives of P/Sr. Inspector Salvador in the preliminary investigation. Respondent
then called Bulatao and led him and the two police officers to the office of the MTC court
personnel. Inside, respondent asked Bulatao if he had the money with him. When he
answered in the affirmative, respondent took them to his chambers and left them there as he
proceeded to his sala. After handing the money to the police officers, Bulatao went out of
respondent's chambers.Upon his signal, the NBI operatives waiting outside respondent's
court then rushed to the judge's chambers and arrested the two police officers after recovering
11 pieces of P500.00 marked bills in their possession.[5]
After the matter was referred by this Court to Executive Judge Orlando Beltran for
investigation, the latter scheduled several hearings for the reception of evidence for the
respondent. The records show that hearings were set on different dates (December 10, 1997,
January 30, 1998, February 10, 1998, March 3, 1998, March 10, 1998, September 10, 1998,
October 9, 1998, November 11, 1998, January 5, 1999, February 9, 1999, March 4, 1999,
and April 5, 1999), but respondent did not appear despite due notice. Accordingly, he was
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence and the case was submitted for
decision. Hence only his counter-affidavit was considered, in which respondent claimed that
it was Bulatao who asked permission to talk to the two police officers. He denied that he took
the three to his chambers.[6]
On the basis of these facts, the Investigating Judge made the following
recommendation:
"The foregoing facts indisputably show that the respondent Judge allowed the use of his
chambers by the two (2) police officers SPOII Jonathan Santos and SPOIV Carlos Poli and
Renato Bulatao, the accused in the criminal case for illegal possession of firearms, so that
they could talk about the "settlement" of Bulatao's case which was then pending preliminary
investigation by the respondent Judge.Although the two (2) witnesses, Abner Cardenas and
Tomas Latauan, Jr., claimed that they did not hear the subject of the conversation between
Bulatao, on one hand, and the two (2) policemen and the respondent Judge Dominador L.
Garcia, on the other, before the three first-named persons went inside the chambers of the
respondent Judge, it is not difficult to conclude that they must have talked about the criminal
case of Bulatao and its "settlement." For if the subject-matter of their conversation were
other than said "settlement" there appears no reason or purpose to allow the policemen and
the accused to go inside the judge's chambers and there to continue their
conversation. Simply stated, the respondent judge allowed the two (2) policemen and the
accused Renato Bulatao to use his chambers so that they could consummate the
arrangements for the dismissal of the case, particularly the payment of the sum of money
being demanded as consideration for such dismissal.
"In this connection, the undersigned Investigating Judge cannot help but refer to the taped
conversation between the two (2) policemen and Renato Bulatao inside the chamber of the
respondent Judge. A portion of the translated dialogue between Poli and Bulatao, which
was in Ilocano, tends to show that the P6,000.00 pay-off handed by Bulatao to the
policemen was not intended for the respondent Judge but solely for the policemen and their
superior, P/Sr. Inspector Salvador. However, it is not easy to disregard the implication
obvious from the said conversation that the respondent Judge was privy to the entire
transaction. SPOIV Poli pointedly told Bulatao "to take care of the Judge" which implies that
the Judge knew of the pay-off being made and was willing to abide by the "deal" provided
he would be "taken care of" by Bulatao.
"Such acts of the respondent Judge are improper, to say the least. He, therefore, violated
the duty of every Judge to uphold the integrity of the judiciary and to avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all activities. (Mortel vs. Leido, Jr. 44 SCAD 567). It cannot
be over-emphasized that a judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of
impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of
official duties but also in his every day life, should be beyond reproach. (Marcos, Sr. vs.
Arcangel, 72 SCAD 1). Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not
just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety. This is true
not only in the performance of their official duties but in all their activities, including their
private life. They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for
reproach. (Pedro San Juan vs. Judge Lore V. Bagalsera, RTC, BR. 23, Naga City, A. M. No.
RTJ-97-1395, December 22, 1997). In this case, the acts of the respondent judge were
clearly improper as he facilitated, if not participated in, the obviously unauthorized/illegal
transaction between the two (2) police officers and the accused Renato Bulatao for the
settlement/dismissal of the latter's criminal case, in consideration of a sum of money,
particularly since the offense charged against Bulatao is a grievous one and that it is one
which is not allowed by law to be compromised.
17
"In view of all the foregoing, the undersigned Investigating Judge respectfully recommends
that the respondent Judge Dominador L. Garcia be found guilty of improper conduct and be
punished accordingly.[7]"
The Investigating Judge's reliance on the tape-recorded conversation between Bulatao
and the two police officers is erroneous. The recording of private conversations without the
consent of the parties contravenes the provisions of Rep. Act. No. 4200, otherwise known as
the Anti-Wire Tapping Law, and renders the same inadmissible in evidence in any
proceeding.[8] The law covers even those recorded by persons privy to the private
communications, as in this case.[9] Thus, the contents of the tape recorder cannot be relied
upon to determine the culpability of respondent judge.
In all other respects, however, the findings of the Investigating Judge are in accordance
with the evidence. We hold, however, that respondent judge is guilty not just of improper
conduct but of serious misconduct. Serious misconduct is such conduct which affects a public
officer's performance of his duties as such officer and not only that which affects his character
as a private individual. For serious misconduct to warrant a dismissal from the service, there
must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired
by an intention to violate the law. It must (1) be serious, important, weighty, momentary, and
not trifling; (2) imply wrongful intention and not mere error of judgment; and (3) have a direct
relation to and be connected with the performance of his official duties. [10]
In the case at bar, it is clear that the crime of bribery was committed. Although the
evidence may not be sufficient to support a conviction in a criminal case, it is adequate for
the purpose of these proceedings. The standards of integrity required of members of the
Bench are not satisfied by conduct which merely allows one to escape the penalties of the
criminal law.[11] In an administrative proceeding, such as this case, only substantial evidence,
or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, is required.[12]
To constitute bribery, the following must be shown: (1) the offender is a public officer
within the scope of Art. 203; (2) the offender accepts an offer or a promise or receives a gift
or present by himself or through another; (3) such offer or promise is accepted, or gift received
by the public officer, (a) with a view to committing some crime; (b) in consideration of the
execution of an act which does not constitute a crime, but which is unjust; or (c) to refrain
from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and (4) the act which he agrees to
perform is connected with the performance of his official duties. [13]From the records, it is
evident that P/Sr. Inspector Salvador, a public officer, solicited money from Bulatao in
consideration of the withdrawal of the case against the latter. The former categorically told
the latter that he would withdraw the criminal case against Bulatao if Bulatao gives him
P30,000.00, which was later lowered to P6,000.00. The fact that two of his men came for the
preliminary investigation and, without hesitation, followed respondent judge to his chambers
after hearing that Bulatao had the money, bears out Bulatao's allegations. Although these
circumstances do not show conclusively that respondent judge was privy to the crime of
bribery, there is substantial evidence showing that he was at least an accomplice to the crime
who cooperated in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. [14] The
following circumstances, as corroborated by the report of the NBI and the testimonies of two
employees of the MTC, who were disinterested witnesses, show that respondent judge
knowingly and voluntarily cooperated with P/Sr. Inspector Salvador in consummating the
crime:
(1) On the day of the entrapment, respondent judge asked Bulatao if he had the money,
and when he received an affirmative answer, he took Bulatao and the two police officers to
his chambers, told the police officers to receive whatever Bulatao would give them, [15] and
then left; and
(2) When Bulatao left respondent's chambers and gave the signal to the NBI operatives
waiting outside, the marked bills were found by the agents in the possession of SPO2
Jonathan Santos, as the latter was leaving the chambers of respondent judge with SPO4
Carlos Poli. As the Investigating Judge observed, respondent willingly allowed his chambers
to be used for the consummation of the illegal transaction. The actions of respondent implies
a wrongful intention to commit an unlawful act while in the performance of his official duties.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not only impropriety
but even the appearance of impropriety in all their conduct. This includes not taking an undue
interest in the settlement of criminal cases pending before them as this may compromise the
integrity and impartiality of their office.[16] As the visible representation of the law and of justice,
their conduct must be above reproach and suspicion.[17] By acting as an accomplice to P/Sr.
Inspector Salvador, respondent judge violated not only the law but also the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Nor does the fact that respondent committed misconduct during a preliminary
investigation, which is non-judicial in character, exempt him from the disciplinary power of this
Court as the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only an addition to his judicial
functions.[18]
In Cabrera vs. Pajares,[19] where the payment of the money to respondent judge in his
chambers was witnessed by an NBI agent, this Court ordered his dismissal from the
service. Likewise, in Court Administrator vs. Hermoso,[20] where the judge received money
from a party to a case pending before his sala and was entrapped by an NBI agent, this Court
ordered his dismissal. In addition, the erring judge is liable to the forfeiture of his leave credits
and retirement benefits and his dismissal shall be with prejudice to reemployment in any
branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government-
owned and controlled corporations, as provided by Section 9, Rule 14 of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) and our
current rulings.[21]
Respondent judge was previously convicted in two administrative cases filed before this
Court. In A.M. No. MTJ-91-616, entitled "Clodualdo Escobar vs. Garcia," the Court, in a
resolution dated September l, 1992, found respondent guilty of palpable ignorance of Rule
114, section 8 resulting in the denial of due process to the prosecution in a criminal
case. Respondent was fined an amount equivalent to 15 days salary with warning that a
repetition of the same would be dealt with more severely. In another case, A.M. No. MTJ-95-
1049, entitled Eloisa Bernardo v. Garcia, the Court, in a resolution dated June 28, 1995, found
respondent guilty of deliberately delaying his decision in a civil case and falsifying certificates
of service. He was reprimanded and ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 with warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
18
 WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Dominador L. Garcia guilty of serious
misconduct and accordingly orders his DISMISSAL from the service and the forfeiture of his
leave credits and retirement benefits, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the
government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned and
controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
ZULUETA VS. CA
ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to
be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful
order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by
law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996 The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent
of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other
Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
Respondents: Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with
the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
Ponente: J. Mendoza
The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Facts:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and
papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and
consent.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence
of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and
cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled
checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the
practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence;

Held:

(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved
19