G.R. No.

93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a
confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a
"hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and
personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy."1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and
sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of
P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial
court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a
tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.2 The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung
paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin
ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon —
ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi
hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa
'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang
certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.
CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.
ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel.
Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako.
Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own
merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong
hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —
ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba
makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka
puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga
magulang ko.
ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng
hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok
kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastangan
mo ako.
CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na.
Magsumbong ka.3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly
taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication,
and other purposes." An information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act,
dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of
Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named
accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record the
latter's conversation with said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly record the said conversation and
thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of
R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash,
agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under
R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a
communication by a person other than a participant to the communication.4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in
a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision
declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A.
4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do
not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari.5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
respondent Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the
instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable
provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by
one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to
the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in
the communication.8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of
the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would
not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200
penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that
consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was
not illegal under the said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where
the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its
express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation
would be either impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and
Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to
whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to
penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of
the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
"even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with
another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this
provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent
court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to
make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications
taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Tañada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy
would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made
by all the parties but by some parties and involved not criminal cases that would be
mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civil cases or special
proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties but perhaps
by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the actuation of the
parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative
of their intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor, that
the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense but
as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Tañada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations
taken without the authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the
observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it is
not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the parties. I
believe that all the parties should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of
directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties
know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and observations are being made
should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Tañada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please be
informed that whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness and
that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging statements
against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any more. But if you are going to take
a recording of the observations and remarks of a person without him knowing that it is
being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being recorded may be used
against him, I think it is unfair.

xxx xxx xxx

(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now
worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under
Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.
Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the
communication between one person and another person — not between a speaker and
a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-
quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view
held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the
private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A.
4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that
an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape
recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the
Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere
(in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature
of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be
professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of
R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the
word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the
latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the
"process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a
common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are
broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of
"meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange,
on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the
latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private
communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation"
and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory
Note to the bill quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from
their conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature
of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people have
some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversationsare often
characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of
anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of
communication, among others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution.
Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the nature
of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of
his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and
satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange
of communication between individuals — free from every unjustifiable intrusion by
whatever means.17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of
telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of
overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200
because a telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or
arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that "penal statutes must
be construed strictly in favor of the accused."20 The instant case turns on a different
note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A.
4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized
"recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts
punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and
unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 100800 January 27, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMEO BONIAO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Wenceslao I. Ponferrada III for accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In the morning of 1 February 1990, Adolfo Estampa, Cirilo Dispolo, Alfredo Llano, Sr.
and Alfredo Llano, Jr. were shot to death in front of a sari-sari store in sitio Katigahan,
Mat-i, Surigao City. Each sustained multiple gunshot wounds in various parts of their
bodies.1 The assailant, identified by witnesses as Romeo Boniao, a CAFGU2 member
stationed in Brazil, Malimono, Surigao del Norte, approached the victims from behind
and fired his M-14 armalite service rifle at the four (4) who were then seated on a
bench, facing the store and partaking of their snacks. Romeo Boniao (Appellant for
short) voluntarily surrendered later on the same day of the shooting and declared that
he killed the victims in self-defense.
After the appropriate preliminary investigation, the appellant was charged with four (4)
separate crimes of murder in an Information3 filed on 16 February 1990 with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao del Norte. The accusatory portion thereof reads:
That on or about February 1, 1990, in Sitio Katigahan, Barangay Mat-i, Surigao City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and by means of treachery
and armed with an M-14 rifle, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot Alfredo H. Llano, Cirilo S. Dispolo, Adolfo B. Estampa and
Alfredo S. Llano, Jr. with the use of said M-14 rifle, thereby inflicting upon them serious
and mortal gunshot wounds which caused their instantaneous death (sic), to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased in such amount as may be allowed
them by law.
Contrary to law with the qualifying circumstance of treachery.4
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3037 and was raffled off to Branch 30
thereof.
Appellant did not move to quash the information on the ground that it charges more than
one (1) offense.
When arraigned on 22 March 1990, the appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio,
pleaded not guilty. However, during pre-trial, he claimed responsibility for the killing,
acknowledged that the weapon used in the shooting was the M-14 armalite rifle
allegedly issued to him by virtue of his being a CAFGU member, asserted that all the
bullets that hit the victims came from the same weapon and intimated that he would
invoke self-defense to justify his acts.5 On the first day of trial, the appellant, through
counsel de parte, Atty. Wenceslao Ponferrada III, affirmed these admissions and
reiterated the theory of self-defense.6
The prosecution presented seven (7) witnesses, namely: Virginita Estampa Llano, the
owner of the store where the shooting occurred; Alfredo Estampa and Jessie Estampa,
nephew and younger brother, respectively, of Virginita who were, at the time of the
shooting, at the house where the store is located; Dra. Milagros T. Regaña, the
Municipal Health Officer of Surigao City who conducted the post-mortem examinations
on the bodies of the victims; and the widows of three (3) of the victims. On the other
hand, the appellant took the witness stand together with his witnesses — the two (2)
military men to whom he voluntarily surrendered.
The case for the prosecution is summed up by the trial court as follows:
The gist of the evidence of the State is to the effect that on February 1, 1990, 6:00 (sic)
A.M., Virginita Llano Estampa and her husband went to Brazil, Malimono, Surigao del
Norte to report to the Cadre or CAFGU Team Leader, the loss of their fighting cock
wherein one of the suspects for such loss was Romeo Boniao, a CAFGU member.
Romeo Boniao, was summoned by the "Cadre" team leader, who (sic) denied any
knowledge regarding the loss of the fighting cock of the Estampas. This being the result
of their inquiry, the latter then proceeded home to Sitio Katigahan, Mat-i, Surigao City, a
neighboring barangay of Brazil.
At 11:00 o'clock in the morning of the same day, while the four victims Adolfo Estampa,
Cirilo Dispolo, Alfredo Llano, Jr. and Alfredo Llano, Sr., in that order, were having
snacks in the store of Virginita Llano Estampa, accused Romeo Boniao arrived from
behind and immediately gunned (sic) the victims with his M-14 rifle, hitting them in
different parts of their bodies resulting to their untimely death (sic).7
The Autopsy Reports prepared by Dr. Milagros T. Regaña describe in detail the gunshot
wounds sustained by each of the victims and the causes of their deaths. A summary
thereof follows:
a) Adolfo Estampa:
Twenty (20) gunshot wounds located anteriorly, at least thirteen of which are entrance
wounds surrounded by gunpowder tattoing (sic) or contusion collar; and six (6) located
posteriorly, at least four (4) of which are entrance wounds.
The cause of death is "Cardiopulmonary arrest. Secondary to cardiac injury and
hemorrhage (3 multiple). Secondary to gunshot wounds chest." 8
b) Cerito (sic) Dispolo:
Six (6) gunshot wounds located anteriorly, at least three of which are entrance wounds;
and one entrance wound located posteriorly.
The cause of death is "Cardiopulmonary Arrest. Secondary to cerebral injury.
Secondary to gunshot wound left temporal area." 9
c) Alfredo Llano, Sr.:
Six (6) gunshot wounds located anteriorly, at least three (3) of which are entrance
wounds; and three (3) entrance wounds located posteriorly.
The cause of death is: "Cardiorespiratory arrest. Secondary to cerebral injury.
Secondary to gunshot wound left eye."10
d) Alfredo Llano, Jr.:
Eleven (11) gunshot wounds located anteriorly, at least four (4) of which are entrance
wounds; and four (4) wounds located posteriorly.
The cause of death is: "Cardiopulmonary arrest. Secondary to cerebral injury.
Secondary to gunshot wound (Head) [left occiput and] right face." 11
The appellant offered the following version of the incident:
. . . (t)hat on 31 January 1990, Adolfo Estampa with some companions offered to the
accused, Romeo Boniao a fighting cock for P50.00. Short of cash, accused gave
P25.00, with a promise to give the balance the following day. Early in the morning of
February 1, 1990, he heard of rumors and it immediately registered into his mind and he
surmised that the cock sold to him might be the stolen cock just to put him into (sic)
shame and ridicule, the victims being notorious for crimes against property and are
suspected NPA symphatizers (sic). Romeo Boniao, compared to the four victims was
shorter, around 5 feet more or less. He is a good and doting forarm (sic) of his father
from whom are (sic) dependent for support and subsistence. Alone, he brought the cock
to Adolfo Estampa to return the same and demand for the return of his partial payment.
But instead of giving an answer Adolfo Estampa snatched and grabbed the M-14 of
accused Romeo Boniao. The three other victims tried to assault the accused by helping
Adolfo Estampa. In the heat of the struggle for possession, the safety lock release,
accused (sic) unknowingly pressed the trigger sending forth automatic (sic) burst of fire.
Accused immediately left the scene and hiked along mountain trails to evade
retaliations (sic) from relatives and comrades of the victims, reputed as NPA mass
operatives, until he reach (sic) the Philippine Army Station at Pilar, Bad-as. Sison,
Surigao del Norte, and surrendered voluntarily and narrated the events that transpired
and was eventually brought to M/Sgt. Villaba, Chief of the CAFGU cadre, to surrender
again and finally to the Police Station of Sison, Surigao del Norte, to surrender for the
3rd time and final disposition. . . . 12
On 27 August 1990, the trial court promulgated its decision 13 finding the appellant guilty
of four (4) separate crimes of murder and sentencing him in each to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victims appropriate sums as moral
damages and for funeral expenses.
It rejected the appellant's claim of self-defense and ruled that the killings were attended
by the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. Thus:
The allegation of self-defense comes from the lone testimony of the accused, without
any collaborating evidence, like other witnesses to support the same.
In its (sic) memorandum accused harped on the wounds found in the anterior (front)
part of the victims bodies, ostensibly to support its (sic) theory that the victims were the
aggressors.
Scrutinizing the description and location (sic) of the multiple wounds suffered by the four
victims, it is noted however that several bullet wounds "entrance" are also found at the
back (posteriorly), of the bodies, to wit:
Adolfo Estampa:
Posteriorly:
WOUND # 1: . . .
WOUND # 2: . . .
WOUND # 4: . . .
WOUND # 5: . . .
[Exhibit B-1, p. 106, rec.;]
It is further noted that the bullet wounds were located on the right back portion of the
victims. For instance Adolfo Estampa, among others was hit in the "right buttocks" and
"mid sacrum", taking the blunt (sic) of the initial automatic fire, being seated on the
bench on the extreme right from the direction of assailant (sic).
Cirilo Dispolo, who was seated next to Adolfo Estampa, suffered wounds in the "right
thighs" (sic) (wound No. 6, 7); "right wrist"; and "right hand" (wounds Nos. 3 and 4).
Alfredo Llano, Jr. seated after Dispolo, had his right side of the face blown off (wound
No. 1); in (sic) the right nipple (wound No. 5); right upper and lower quadrant of
abdomen (sic) (wound No. 6); right forearm (wound No. 7); right thigh (wound No. 8).
[Exhibit D, p. 110, rec.;]
Alfredo Llano, Sr. was seated next or at last of the four, had (sic) wounds found in "right
(sic) moxilla, right lower jaw" (wound No. 2); "right thigh" (wound No. 3); right forearm'
(wound No. 4); "right ninth rib"(wound No. 5). [Exhibit C, p. 108, rec.;]
The hits on the right portion (sic) of the victims' bodies, in the forearm, thighs, face and
buttocks, all point to the fact that the assailant fired from behind, obliquely to the right
direction of the four victims who were seated side by side on a bench fronting the store
of witness Virginita Llano.
The finding of the medico legal officer of wounds with gun powder burns (tatooing) (sic)
and others without, indicate (sic) two things. Those without gun powder burns were fired
from a distance while those with gun powder burns were fired at close range. This fact
completely destroys the assertion that the shooting was accidental and at close range,
while victims (sic) were grappling for the weapon.
It is safe to assume that the firing at close range was an insurance that no one will live
to tell the tale.
There are three elements of (sic) self-defense, namely: unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim; reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused in order to
prevent or repel the victim's unlawful aggression; and lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the accused. The most important element is unlawful aggression for without
it, the other elements will not have any basis.
But who was the real unlawful aggressor in this case? Was the unlawful aggressor the
accused who was armed with M-14 (sic) rifle or the four victims who were unarmed but
who, according to the accused, were trying to grab his rifle?
By accused on (sic) admission he was aggrieved because allegedly a stolen cock was
sold to him, to put him to shame and ridicule by the victims who are (sic) reputed to be
NPA sympathizers. His mission that morning was not friendly.
In the absence of any evidence corroborating the testimony of the accused, it is difficult
to believe that the victims, without any provocation at all, would just attack and try to
disarm the accused, not unless if the gun was pointed to them and they are (sic) trying
to defend themselves from a possible assassination (sic). In which case, the ones
actually employing
self-defense were the victims, only that they have failed.
The law requires that the unlawful aggression should be one causing not only an
eminent (sic) danger but actual and immediate danger to the life of the person who is
defending himself. Granting that the four victims were indeed trying to grab the M-14
rifle of the accused as testified to by him, will that warrant an outright shooting and
killing of the victims? Of course, that is not the kind of self-defense contemplated by the
law. The means of repelling it should only be commensurate to the degree of danger
that a person may have on his life.
The accused is not firm in his plea for (sic) self-defense, otherwise, he could not have
alleged that he only accidentally pressed the trigger of his M-14 rifle while they were at
the height of grappling for the possession of his gun, and in the process hit four different
moving targets.
Accused can not claim self-defense at (sic) the same time alleging (sic) that the killing of
the victims were (sic) due to accidental (sic) firing of his gun. If there was really such a
need to use his gun in order to preserve his life, the gun could not have been fired
accidentally but deliberately used by him. [People v. Tapeno, G.R. 33573, August 25,
1988;].
It was established that the number of wounds sustained by the victims were: Cirilo
Dispolo — 7; Adolfo Estampa — 26; Alfredo Llano, Sr. — 9; and Alfredo Llano, Jr. 15.
[Exhibits A to D, pp. 104-111, rec.;] Practically all the bullets contained in the magazine
of the defendant's firearm have (sic) landed on the different parts of the bodies of the
victims without a single miss, and yet, the accused has alleged that the firing was
accidental and has (sic) occurred while the accused on one hand and the four victims
on the other hand, were rumbling, scrambling and grappling for the possession of the
said firearm.
A plea of self-defense may be accepted only when it is established that the accused did
not initiate the unlawful aggression. If unlawful aggression on the part of the victim has
not been proved by the evidence for the defense because the accused was actually the
aggressor, then his claim for self-defense can not be accepted. [People v. Montejo,
G.R. 66857, November 21, 1988;]
From the foregoing, the court can not appreciate the plea of
self-defense. On the other hand, it has been satisfactorily shown that the killing was
attended by treachery, qualifying it to murder, and aggravated by evident premeditation.
What remains to be determined is whether the killing of the four constitutes a complex
crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
There is no question that several shots were fired by the accused all hitting fatally the
four victims.
How the slaughter was consummated is aptly described by witness Alfredo Llano. That
(sic) the accused approaching from behind the four persons seated on the bench
immediately shot one (sic ) after the other in successive shots followed by strapping or
automatic firing. Seeing the massacre completed shouted (sic), "all my enemies are
dead." [TSN,
pp. 14-28, May 17, 1990;]
The death (sic) of the four having been caused by distinct and several bullets fired from
the M-14 rifle successively by the accused, the crime committed cannot be complex.
Where the killing is not shown to have been committed by a single discharge of firearm
(sic), the crime can not be complex. [People v. Tilos, L2715, 30 SCRA 734;).
A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed.
Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such
acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. [People v. Pernida, 30 SCRA 748 citing
People v. Macaso, 85 Phil. 819: People v. Daligdig, 89 Phil. 598; People v. Mones, 85
Phil. 331; People v. Dosirto, (CA 45 O.G. No. 10, p. 4542);]. 14
The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS the accused, ROMEO BONIAO, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. Considering in his favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, which is offset by the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation,
METES (sic) the medium penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, for the death of Adolfo
Estampa; the SAME PENALTY of Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Cirilo Dispolo;
the SAME PENALTY for the death of Alfredo Llano, Jr.; and the SAME PENALTY for
the death of Alfredo Llano, Sr.
To indemnify the heirs of Adolfo Estampa, the sum of P30,000.00, plus funeral
expenses of P5,000.00 and P10,000.00 moral damages;
To the heirs of Cirilo Dispolo, the sum of P30,000.00, plus P5,000.00 funeral expenses
and P10,000.00 moral damages;
To the heirs of Alfredo Llano, Jr., the sum of P30,000.00, plus P5,000.00 funeral
expenses and P10,000.00 moral damages; and
To the heirs of Alfredo Llano, Sr., the amount of P30,000.00, plus P5,000.00 funeral
expenses and P10,000.00 moral damages; without any subsidiary imprisonment, in
case of insolvency;
To suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 15
On 10 September 1990, the appellant filed his Notice of Appeal. 16

In his Appellant's Brief, the appellant initially contends that he may not be held liable for
murder as there was no proof of the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation
and treachery; hence, only homicide could have been committed. And even then, he
asserts that he is not liable therefor because he acted in legitimate self-defense. He
then submits the following assignment of errors: 1) the lower court erred in finding that
the guilt of the accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt; 2) the lower court
erred in giving more weight to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who are all
relatives of the victims and are therefore biased; and 3) the lower court erred in making
its decision based on presumptions, surmises and inferences. 17
After a painstaking review of the records of this case, We rule that except for its
appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation with respect to the
deaths of Cirilo Dispolo, Alfredo Llano, Sr. and Alfredo Llano, Jr., which We find to be
erroneous, and the penalties imposed therefor which We likewise find to be incorrect,
the trial court was correct in convicting the appellant for four (4) crimes of murder.
In the light of the appellant's defense, the errors imputed to the trial court deserve scant
consideration.
By invoking self-defense, the appellant admitted killing the four (4) victims. The burden
is, therefore, upon him to prove the existence, by clear and convincing evidence, of its
essential requisites; 18 otherwise stated, the onus probandi was thus shifted to
him. 19 He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of
that of the prosecution, 20 for even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved
after he himself admitted the killing. 21
The three (3) requisites of self-defense are: 1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim ; 2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and 3)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 22
Appellant miserably failed to discharge such burden.
At the outset, it must be stated that the trial court's observation that the appellant is not
firm in his plea of self-defense, is well founded. Indeed, while he invoked self-defense to
justify the killings, he did not admit that he intentionally fired his weapon to repel the
purported attack against him. Instead, he alleged that the shooting was merely
accidental as he unknowingly pressed the trigger of his M-14 armalite, thereby sending
forth automatic bursts of fire while he and Adolfo Estampa were grappling for its
possession. Such vacillation betrays the weak foundation of his theory of self-defense.
As correctly concluded by the trial court in its decision, the "(a)ccused can not claim
self-defense at the same time alleging (sic) that the killing of the victims were (sic) due
to accidental (sic) firing of his gun. If there was really such a need to use his gun in
order to preserve his life, the gun could not have been fired accidentally but deliberately
used by him." 23
The record is bereft of any evidence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victims. In
the first place, they were seated on a bench outside the store partaking of their snacks
immediately before the shooting. Secondly, all of them were unarmed. Finally, none of
them committed any act which could have even remotely posed any real danger to the
life or personal safety of the appellant. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual,
sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude. 24 In other words, there has to exist a real danger to
the life or personal safety of the person claiming self-defense. 25
In the case at bar, the appellant was clearly the unlawful aggressor. When he saw the
victims with their backs towards him, he immediately opened fire, hitting Adolfo
Estampa first then Cirilo Dispolo, Alfredo Llano, Jr. and finally, Alfredo Llano, Sr. That
he was in a position obliquely to the right of the posterior sides of the victims at the time
he fired at them is, as correctly determined by the trial court, adequately supported by
the locations of the gunshot wounds.
Appellant's claim that he initially confronted Adolfo Estampa about the cock but that the
latter grabbed his armalite, is hardly credible. Prosecution witness Virginia Estampa,
who was in the store at that time, did not witness any confrontation. On cross-
examination of prosecution witness Alfredo Estampa, the defense counsel tried but
miserably failed to establish the fact of confrontation. Thus:
ATTY. PONFERRADA III:
xxx xxx xxx
Q So that the following morning as you said Boniao was there at the scene of the
incident on February 1, at around 10:30 a.m., right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you saw Boniao confronting the four persons why (sic) they accused him of
stealing the chicken or cock?
A He did not because he immediate (sic) shot the four persons.

Q Do you mean to say you saw Boniao coming and approaching the store of Virginita?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you when you saw Boniao coming and approaching the store of
Virginita?
A I was on the bench.
Q But you heard Boniao confronting Llano why (sic) he accused him, did you hear that?
A He did not because he directly shot the four persons. 26
Neither are We convinced by the appellant's assertion that his claim of self-defense is
supported by the presence of several wounds in the anterior or front side of the bodies
of the victims, which indicates that the latter were hit in a face-to-face confrontation.
While it is not disputed that such wounds existed, it is equally true that there were
several entrance wounds found at the victims' backs, thereby supporting the
eyewitnesses' account of the incident. Based on the autopsy reports of Dr. Regaña,
Adolfo Estampa sustained at least four (4) entrance wounds in his back, Cirilo Dispolo
had one (1), Alfredo Llano, Sr. had three (3) and Alfredo Llano, Jr. had four (4).
Appellant offered no credible evidence to explain how these entrance wounds were
inflicted. Plainly taken, his argument that the anterior entrance wounds conclusively
prove his theory of self-defense, is baseless and self-serving.
Considering that the appellant was the aggressor, his employment of any means in
furtherance of the aggression cannot be considered as the rational means to repel an
illegal aggression; 27 moreover, since there was no unlawful aggression on the part of
the victims, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete. "It is a statutory and
doctrinal requirement that for the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the presence
of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense,
complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed an unlawful aggression
against the person defending himself." 28 Simply put, unlawful aggression is
indispensable for it is the main ingredient of self-defense. 29
And even assuming for the sake of argument that there was unlawful aggression on the
part of any or all of the victims, there was, nevertheless, no reasonable necessity for the
means employed to repel it. As the autopsy reports reveal, more than thirty (30) rounds
were fired from the appellant's weapon, all of which hit the intended targets. The
appellant admitted that one (1) magazine of his M-14 armalite rifle contains twenty (20)
bullets. 30Obviously, therefore, he reloaded his weapon with a second magazine after
using up the contents of the first magazine. Firing more than thirty (30) M-14 armalite
bullets at unarmed victims was clearly unnecessary; it only highlighted the appellant's
irrevocable decision to kill Adolfo and those who happened to be with him at that
precise moment.
These acts further show that the killing of the victims was not merely accidental but
deliberate. Having used more bullets than necessary, the appellant cannot now be
heard to say that he wanted only to repel a purported attack by the victims; the multiple
shots which he fired at them unmistakably manifested the calculated pursuit of a
decision to kill. Indeed, the locations, number and gravity of the wounds inflicted on the
victims belie the appellant's pretensions that he acted in self-defense. Physical evidence
is evidence of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses. 31
There was sufficient provocation on the part of the appellant because it is obvious that
he left his house with murder in his heart. He was certainly not on a mission of peace. In
his version of the incident, the appellant reveals that he surmised that Adolfo Estampa
sold him a stolen fighting cock to put him to shame and ridicule. Hence, he journeyed to
return the same and recover his downpayment of P25.00. He did not, however, express
in his testimony his real feelings at that time. It is only in the Appellant's Brief that he first
manifested the same in this wise:
. . . He believed that the Estampas was (sic) trying to have one over him. He was
maligned, humiliated and dishonored and shamed in the presence of his cadreman (sic)
and neighbors. . . . 32
Thus, armed with his fully loaded M-14 armalite rifle and a spare magazine — also full
of ammunition — he started his hunt for Adolfo. If his intended business was merely to
return the cock and recover the downpayment, it was not necessary for him to have
toted his armalite; neither was it imperative for him to have brought two (2) fully loaded
magazines. Besides, he could not have carried his armalite outside the territorial
jurisdiction of his CAFGU unit (Malimono, Surigao del Norte) as he lacked the proper
permission from his superiors. Furthermore, he did not show that he was in hot pursuit
of members of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (CPP-NPA)
— a circumstance which would have been possibly excused him from obtaining the
required permission.
He thus armed himself to kill the man who he believed maligned and dishonored him,
and put him to shame and disrepute.
The appellant's other contentions, such as the charge of inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the alleged error committed by the trial
court in giving credence to such testimonies, the witnesses who gave the same being
related to the victims, are equally without merit. While witnesses Virginita Estampa
Llano, Alfredo Estampa and Jessie Estampa were related in one way or another to the
victims, save for Cirilo Dispolo, relationship does not by itself preclude the trial court
from believing such testimonies or impair the witnesses' credibility. They are not
disqualified by the Rules on that ground 33 alone; this Court has held that it is not to be
lightly supposed that relatives of the deceased would callously violate their conscience
to avenge the death of a dear one by blaming it on persons whom they believe to be
innocent thereof. 34
Anent the inconsistencies cited by the appellant, We find the same to refer to minor
matters. In view of the settled rule that minor inconsistencies do in fact strengthen rather
than weaken the witness' credibility, 35 as these discrepancies indicate that the
responses given were honest and unrehearsed, 36 the appellant's challenge must fail.
Equally unfounded is the appellant's sweeping charge that the trial court based its
decision on presumptions, conjectures and surmises. Both testimonial and physical
evidence on record fully support the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The killings in this case were clearly attended by treachery. It has been duly established
that the appellant shot the unarmed and unsuspecting victims suddenly, without any
warning and from behind to ensure that they would not put up any defense. That he
purposely adopted this mode of attack to consummate the crime without any risk to
himself is beyond doubt. There is treachery when the attack on the victim was sudden
and unexpected and from behind and without warning, with the victim's back turned
towards his
assailant; 37 or when the attack was so sudden and unexpected that the victim was
unable to defend himself, thus ensuring the execution of the criminal act without risk to
the assailant. 38
We likewise agree with the trial court that evident premeditation was duly established in
this case. The following requisites must concur before evident premeditation may be
appreciated: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient
lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. 39
The third requisite simply means that there must be a period sufficient in a judicial
sense to afford a full opportunity for meditation and reflection — sufficient time to allow
the conscience of the actor to overcome the resolution of his will (vencer las
determinaciones dela voluntad) had he desired to hearken to its warnings. 40
In the instant case, Adolfo Estampa and his wife reported the loss of their fighting cock
to the CAFGU Team Leader stationed in Brazil, Malimono, Surigao del Norte at 6:00
o'clock in the morning of 1 February 1990. Being one of the suspected authors of the
loss, the appellant was summoned by the team leader and confronted about the same.
The former, considering such accusation defamatory, denied the same; according to
him, he was maligned, humiliated, dishonored and shamed in the presence of both his
cadremen and neighbors. Some time after 10:00 o'clock that same morning, the
appellant, armed with his M-14 armalite rifle with two (2) magazines of bullets, started
his journey to Katigahan, Mat-i, Surigao City to look for Adolfo Estampa. As earlier
noted, there was no reason for him to have carried his firearm if his only purpose was to
return the cock and recover the alleged downpayment. We are morally convinced that in
reality, the appellant had resolved to kill Adolfo Estampa to exact vengeance for the
wrong the latter had supposedly committed; the appellant was out to vindicate his
name, reputation and honor. Moreover, the nearly five (5) hours that had elapsed from
the time the appellant was allegedly maligned, dishonored and shamed until the time he
actually shot the hapless victims, was sufficient enough for meditation and reflection.
This Court has ruled that the lapse of just two (2) hours from the inception of the plan to
the execution of the crime satisfies the last requisite for the appreciation of evident
premeditation. 41
However, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated against the appellant with
respect to the shooting of Cirilo Dispolo, Alfredo Llano, Sr. and Alfredo Llano, Jr. There
is no evidence on record to show that the appellant had these three (3) in mind before
embarking on his sinister journey or at any time before seeing all the victims. Only
Adolfo Estampa was his intended victim. Evidently, premeditation cannot be
appreciated if the deceased was not the intended victim. 42
Summing up, the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation —
both alleged in the information — attended the killing of Adolfo Estampa. Since
treachery is enough to qualify the killing to murder, 43 evident premeditation should be
considered only as a generic aggravating circumstance. 44
The trial court correctly rule that the appellant committed four (4) separate crimes of
murder and not a complex offense under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. As he
separately aimed at and fired upon each of the victims with different bullets, the
appellant thus had a separate criminal intent for each of them. Deeply rooted is the
doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute
separate and distinct crimes. 45
Appellant, however, had successfully proved, and the trial court had properly credited in
his favor, the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender. 46 Accordingly, with
respect to the death of Adolfo Estampa, this mitigating circumstance offsets the generic
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation; applying paragraph 4, in relation to
paragraph 1, Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed by law for
murder shall be imposed in its medium period. With respect to the deaths of the other
three (3) victims, however, this mitigating circumstance, not being offset by any generic
aggravating circumstance, shall, pursuant to paragraph 2 of said Article 64, warrant the
imposition of the minimum period of the penalty prescribed by law for murder.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion
temporal maximum to death for the crime of murder. Following the doctrine laid down
in People vs. Muñoz, 47 the imposable penalties should then be:
a) for the murder of Adolfo Estampa, reclusion perpetua, and.
b) for each of the murders of Cirilo Dispolo, Alfredo Llano, Sr. and Alfredo Llano,
Jr., reclusion temporal maximum.
However, the Indeterminate Sentence Law 48 benefits the appellant with respect to the
deaths of the last three (3) victims. He could, therefore, be sentenced to a penalty the
maximum of which should be within the range of reclusion temporal maximum and the
minimum of which, in view again of People vs. Muñoz, 49 should be within the range
of<i< b=""></i<>
rision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium. This Court hereby fixes it at ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as minimum to seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum in
each of the murders of Cirilo Dispolo, Alfredo Llano, Sr. and Alfredo Llano, Jr.
Considering the current policy of this Court, the indemnity for the deaths of the victims
should be increased to P50,000.00 in each case.
WHEREFORE, except to the extent as above modified, the challenged decision of
Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City in Criminal Case No. 3037 is
hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. As modified, (a) with respect to the murders of Cirilo
Dispolo, Alfredo Llano, Sr. and Alfredo Llano, Jr., the appellant is hereby sentenced in
each case to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of from ten (10) years and one (1) day
of Prision Mayor Maximum asminimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal Maximum as maximum, and (b) the indemnity is
hereby increased to P50,000.00 in each of the four (4) murders.
Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-18498 March 30, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF VITO BORROMEO. JOSE H. JUNQUERA, petitioner-
appellee,
vs.
CRISPIN BORROMEO, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor-appellant.
Benjamin A. Rallon for oppositor-appellant Fortunato Borromeo.
Crispen Baizas and Associates for heirs oppositors-appellants Tomas Borromeo and
Amelia Borromeo.
Office of the Solicitor General for intervenor oppositor-appellant Republic.
Miguel Cuenco and Fernando S. Ruiz for heirs oppositors-appellants Crispin Borromeo,
Teofilo Borromeo, et al.
Filiberto Leonardo for petitioner-appellee.

DIZON, J.:
Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of the City of Cebu, died on March
13, 1952, in Parañaque, Rizal, at the age of 88 years, without forced heirs but leaving
extensive properties in the province of Cebu.
On April 19 of the same year, Jose H. Junquera, filed with the Court of First Instance of
said province a petition for the probate of a one page document as the last will left by
said deceased, devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all
surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and designating Junquera as
executor thereof (Special Proceedings No. 916-R). The document — now in the record
as Exhibit "A" — was dated May 17, 1946, drafted in Spanish, and allegedly signed, and
thumbmarked by said deceased, in the presence of Dr. Cornelio G. Gandionco, Eusebio
Cabiluna and Filiberto Leonardo as attesting witnesses. On June 14, 1952, the probate
court appointed Junquera as special administrator of the estate.
On November 14 of the same year, Teofilo Borromeo filed an opposition to the probate
of the will based on the following grounds: (1) that the formalities required by law had
not been complied with; (2) that the testator was mentally incapable of making a will at
the time of its execution; (3) that the will was procured by undue and improper influence,
on the part of the beneficiaries and/or some other person; (4) that the signature of the
testator was procured by fraud; and (5) that the testator acted by mistake or did not
intend the instrument he signed to be his will at the time he affixed his signature thereto.
Upon motion of the abovenamed oppositor, on June 9, 1953, the Court removed
Junquera as special administrator and appointed Dr. Patricio Beltran in his place.
On November 27, 1953, Vitaliana Borromeo, a niece of the deceased, filed her own
opposition to the probate of the will, on the ground that the signature "Vito Borromeo"
appearing thereon was a forgery. Other oppositions were subsequently filed by
Patrocinio Borromeo de Tabotabo (her opposition was later withdrawn), Lilia Morre de
Tabotabo, Lamberto Morre, Patricia Morre de Ranario, Aurora Morre de Borromeo,
Ramon Ocampo, Isagani Morre and Rosario Morre, invoking substantially the same
grounds mentioned heretofore.
Meanwhile, Tomas, Amelia and Fortunato Borromeo, manifestly on behalf of the "Cebu
Arcade Company, T. L. Borromeo y Cia.", a duly organized partnership controlled by
them, filed a motion to exclude from the inventory of the Estate previously filed by the
new special administrator, thirteen parcels of land situated in the City of Cebu with a
total area of 2,148 square meters, alleging that during his lifetime the deceased testator
had sold said lots to them, as evidenced by the document now in the record as Exhibit
F-1 executed on May 17, 1945, confirming the alleged previous sale. After due hearing,
the court, in its order of July 16, 1954, denied the motion for exclusion, ruling that
movants' remedy was to file a separate accion reivindicatoria against the administrator.
On October 28, 1955, the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for leave to
intervene and join the oppositors in contesting the probate of the will, on the ground
that, should the estate be adjudicated the latter by intestacy, it stood to collect a
considerable amount by way of estate and inheritance taxes. In its order of December
10 of the same year, the Court allowed the intervention.
After a prolonged trial, on May 28, 1960, the Court rendered a decision denying the
probate of the will and declaring itself without jurisdiction to pass upon the question of
ownership over the thirteen lots which the Cebu Arcade etc. claimed as its own. All the
parties appealed — the proponents of the will from the portion of the decision denying
probate, and the oppositors and the Republic of the Philippines, from that portion
thereof where the court refused to decide the question of ownership of the thirteen lots
already mentioned.
The proponents of the disputed will, mainly with the testimony of the three attesting
witnesses, Cornelio Gandionco, Filiberto Leonardo and Eusebio Cabiluna, sought to
prove the following facts:
In the morning of May 17, 1945, Tomas Borromeo, complying with the request of Vito
Borromeo, went to the house of Atty. Filiberto Leonardo to request him to be a witness
at the execution of the latter's last will. Dr. Cornelio Gandionco, who at the time
happened to be in the house of Leonardo, was likewise requested to act as such.
Together, the three went to the residence of Vito Borromeo at Ramos Street, Cebu City.
Upon their arrival the third witness, Eusebio Cabiluna, who was living on the ground
floor of the house, was asked to come upstairs. Thereafter, in their presence, Vito
Borromeo executed first, the document Exhibit "F" (deed of confirmation of an alleged
previous sale to Cebu Arcade Company, T. L. Borromeo y Cia.) witnessed by
Gandionco and Cabiluna. Later, Vito Borromeo, being of sound and disposing mind,
and without pressure or influence exerted on him, dictated the substance of his will to
Tomas Borromeo, who in turn typewrote it in proper legal language. The document was
then read by Vito Borromeo, who later signed and thumbmarked it (Exhibit "A") and
carbon copies thereof (Exhibits "E" and "K") in the presence of the attesting witnesses,
who, in turn, signed the will and its copies in the presence of Vito Borromeo and of each
other.
Proponents also placed the Rev. Fr. Julio Corres, a Spanish Catholic priest who was
the confessor of Vito Borromeo from 1942 to 1946, the Rev. Fr. Sergio Alfafara, who
was his confessor from 1946 to 1947, and Vicenta Mañacap, a mid-wife who lived in the
testator's house and had served him from May 1945 up to his death on March 30, 1952
on the witness stand. The gist of their testimony is to the effect that at the time of the
execution of the will, Vito Borromeo was still strong and could move around freely with
the aid of a cane; that he was still mentally alert and was a man of strong will; that his
right hand was unimpaired and he could write with it unaided; that as a matter of fact —
according to Vicenta Mañacap — he still wrote personal letters to Tomas Borromeo,
could eat by himself and even played the piano.
On the other hand, the oppositors presented several witnesses who testified that the
signatures purporting to be those of Vito Borromeo on the document Exhibit "A" and its
copies were forgeries; that they were too good and too perfect signatures and,
therefore, quite impossible for the deceased — an ailing man already 82 years old on
May 17, 1945 — to write; that he was found "positive for bacillus leprosy" by Dr. Antonio
Garcia as early as 1926 or 1927, having been treated for it consistently by injections of
chaulmoogra oil administered by Dr. Max Borromeo and Dr. Cornelio Gandionco; that
Vito Borromeo's usual signatures during his better days had always been characterized
by certain flourishes, technically called "rubric"; that Vito Borromeo had also reared and
educated two of the oppositors, Crispin Borromeo and the late Teofilo Borromeo and
there was no conceivable reason why they were left out in the will, if any such will had
really been made by him knowingly; that the testamentary witness Cornelio Gandionco,
is a nephew of the other witness, Filiberto Leonardo, and was the fiance of Angeles
Borromeo, a sister of Tomas Borromeo, one of the instituted heirs; that the third
testamentary witness, Eusebio Cabiluna is the real father of Fortunato Borromeo,
another instituted heir, who admittedly grew up and was reared by Vito Borromeo and
his wife Juliana Evangelista since he was barely three months; that Amelia Borromeo,
the third instituted heir, is a younger sister of Tomas Borromeo and dependent upon
him; that on May 17, 1945, the deceased's leprosy was so far advanced that the fingers
of his right hand were already hardened and atrophied, this making it difficult, if not
impossible, for him to write; and that on the same date, his sense of hearing and his
eyesight had been considerably impaired, his eyes being always watery due to the
progress of his leprosy.
The oppositors also presented Felipe Logan of the National Bureau of Investigation and
Jose G. Villanueva, as handwriting experts, who testified, after examining the supposed
signatures of the deceased in Exhibit "A" and comparing them with his accepted
standard signatures, that the questioned signatures were forgeries. The proponents,
however, presented their own handwriting expert, Martin Ramos, who testified to the
contrary.
The trial court refused to believe the testimony of the attesting witnesses and, as a
result, denied the petition for probate, because, in its opinion, they appeared not to be
"wholly disinterested persons" and because of the serious discrepancies in their
testimonies with respect to the number of copies made of the disputed document. The
court also found that the physical condition of the deceased at the time of the execution
of the questioned document was such that it was highly improbable, if not impossible,
for him to have affixed his signatures on the documents Exhibits A, E and K in the
spontaneous and excellent manner they appear to have been written. Thus, the court
was also led to believe the testimony of the handwriting experts for oppositors, —
adverse to the genuineness of the signatures of Vito Borromeo on the questioned
document — more than that of the handwriting expert presented by the proponents of
the will.
It seems clear, therefore, that the main issue to be decided in the present appeal is
whether or not the evidence of record is sufficient to prove the due execution of the will
in question.1äwphï1.ñët
It must be conceded that in this jurisdiction, the subscribing witnesses to a contested
will are regarded as the best witnesses in connection with its due execution. It is
similarly true, however, that to deserve full credit, their test, testimony must be
reasonable and unbiased, and that, as in the case of any other witness, their testimony
may be overcome by any competent evidence — direct or circumstantial (Board, etc. vs.
Shasser, 10 Kan. 585, 168 Pac. 836 [1917]).
It is also an appellate practice of long standing in this jurisdiction to accord great weight
to the findings of fact made by the trial court and not to disturb them unless said court
had failed to consider material facts and circumstances or had given undue weight to, or
misconstrued the testimony of particular witnesses, the reason for this being that the
trial judge had full opportunity to hear and observe the conduct and demeanor of the
witnesses while testifying and was consequently in a better position than the reviewing
court to determine the question of their credibility. While this is not applicable to the
present case because His Honor, the judge who penned the appealed decision was not
the same judge before whom the evidence of the parties was presented, it must be
stated that, judging from the carefully written decision under review, it was only after a
thorough study of the record that His Honor arrived at the conclusion that the
subscribing witnesses do not appear to be wholly disinterested persons.
On the matter of the number of copies made of the questioned will allegedly signed by
the testator and the three subscribing witnesses, His Honor found that Cabiluna was
very uncertain and confused; that a certain stage of his examination, he said that
only two copies of the will were prepared — the original and one carbon copy — while
at another stage he affirmed that he did not know whether or not there was a duplicate
and that all he could say was that he had affixed his signature three times (Transcript,
Marquiala, August 22, 1958, pp. 49-50). In truth, however, he really signed six (6) times
— twice on the original and twice on each of the two copies. Adding confusion to the
situation is the answer he gave when he was asked if Vito Borromeo also signed the
carbon copy, to which his answer was "I did not see" (Idem., p. 50).
On the other hand, the other subscribing witness, Atty. Filiberto Leonardo, testified
categorically that there were only the original and one carbon copy of the will and that
the testator and all the subscribing witnesses signed both (Transcript, Marquiala,
December 23, 1953, pp. 167, 210, and 218). However, the naked and highly disturbing
fact is that, contrary to what is inferable from the vacillating testimony of Cabiluna and
the categorical assertion of Atty. Leonardo, the proponents of the questioned will
themselves presented three copies of said will; the original, a carbon duplicate copy and
a carbon triplicate copy, now in the record as Exhibits A, E and K, respectively.
While it is true that the testimony of these subscribing witnesses was given around eight
years after the alleged execution of the questioned will, still we believe that the
transaction in which they claim to have taken an important part is of such character and
importance that it can not be a very easy matter for anyone of them to have a hazy
recollection of the number of copies signed by the testator and by them. Stranger still
would it be for them to say something in open contradiction with the reality on the
matter. If, as may be clearly deduced from their testimony — Cabiluna and Leonardo's
— there was only the original and one copy signed by the testator and the subscribing
witnesses, why is it that three — original and two copies — were really in existence and
were produced in court during the trial?
In the case of the third subscribing witness, Dr. Cornelio Gandionco, the imputation was
made by two witnesses, Dr. Teofilo Borromeo and Judge Crispin Borromeo, that he was
the fiance of Angeles Borromeo, sister of Tomas Borromeo, who is one of the three
heirs instituted in the questioned will, evidently to show that he is not a completely
disinterested witness. The evidence to this effect appears to have remained
unimpeached, although the proponents of the will could have done it by calling on Dr.
Gandionco himself or on Angeles Borromeo to deny the imputation.
Moreover, the evidence also disclose that Dr. Gandionco was the uncle of the other
subscribing witness, Atty. Leonardo, and that, in fact, they were living together at the
time of the alleged execution of the will. This circumstance — apparently trivial — can
not be taken lightly because in view of appellee's claim that Angeles Borromeo was the
fiance of Dr. Gandionco, it would not be unreasonable to entertain the suspicion that
both subscribing witnesses were not wholly disinterested. Material to this point is the
fact established by the evidence that Atty. Leonardo was the notary public before whom
the document Exhibit 4-A — which purports to convey to a partnership controlled by the
heirs instituted in the questioned will thirteen parcels of land situated in the commercial
center of Cebu City — was supposedly acknowledged by the testator on the same date
May 17, 1945.
In the light of the foregoing, We can not see our way clear to holding that the trial court
erred in refusing to give full credit to the testimony of the three subscribing witnesses.
It has also been held that the condition and physical appearance of a questioned
document constitute a valuable factor which, if correctly evaluated in the light of
surrounding circumstances, may help in determining whether it is genuine or forged.
Subscribing witnesses may forget or exaggerate what they really know, saw, heard or
did; they may be biased and, therefore, tell only half truths to mislead the court or favor
one party to the prejudice of the other. This can not be said of the condition and
physical appearance of the questioned document itself. Both, albeit silently, will reveal
the naked truth, hiding nothing, forgetting nothing, and exaggerating nothing. For this
reason, independently of the conflicting opinions expressed by the handwriting experts
called to the witness stand by the parties, we have carefully examined and considered
the physical appearance and condition of the original and two copies of the questioned
will found in the record — particularly the signatures attributed to the testator — and We
have come to the conclusion that the latter could not have been written by him.
Upon the face of the original and two copies of the contested will (Exhibits A, E and K)
appear a total of six alleged signatures of the testator. They are all well written along a
practically straight line, without any visible sign of tremor or lack of firmness in the hand
that wrote them. In fact, in the respects just adverted to, they appear better written than
the unquestioned signatures, of attesting witnesses Gandionco and Cabiluna, inspite of
the fact that on the date of the alleged execution of the will (May 17, 1945) the testator
was considerably older and in a much poorer physical condition than they. According to
the evidence, the testator was then a sick man, eighty-two years old, with the entire left
half of his body paralyzed since six years before, while the oldest attesting witness
(Cabiluna) was around sixty-five years of age and Leonardo and Gandionco were only
forty-four and forty-five years old respectively, and were all in good health. Despite the
obviously very poor physical condition of the testator, Leonardo claims that he signed
the alleged will unaided, writing his name thereon slowly but continuously or without
interruption, and that, on the same occasion, he signed his name several times not only
on the original of the will and its copies but also on the original and several copies of the
alleged confirmatory sale Exhibit F-1 and on his residence certificate. Considering all
the attendant circumstances, we agree with the lower court that Vito Borromeo could
not have written the questioned signatures.
In view of what has been said heretofore, We find it unnecessary to examine and
consider in detail the conflicting testimony of the handwriting experts presented by the
parties: Martin Ramos by the proponents of the will, to sustain the genuineness of the
questioned signatures, and Felipe Logan and Jose G. Villanueva, by the oppositors, to
prove that said signatures are forgeries. We shall limit ourselves in this connection to
quoting with approval the following portion of the appealed decision:
What the Court finds to be a weakness in the conclusions of Martin Ramos, based on
his comparative examination of the questioned and standard signatures of Vito
Borromeo, is his apparent assumption that all the signatures were made by Vito
Borromeo under equality or similarity of circumstances, that is, that in all instances Vito
Borromeo had normal use of both of his hands, — the right and the left. He failed to
take into account that when Vito Borromeo allegedly affixed those signatures on May
17, 1945 on Exhibits 'A', 'E', and 'K' the left portion of his body, including the left hand,
was already paralyzed, and Vito Borromeo was represented to have written his name
alone by himself and unaided. Maybe, if he was previously apprised of those
circumstances, he would hesitate to make the conclusion that those flawless signatures
reading Vito Borromeo, written straight and in a form as good as, if not better than, the
signatures of three much younger attesting witnesses, were positively in the handwriting
of the 82-year old, ailing, and paralytic Vito Borromeo. The Court consequently, finds
itself not disposed to adopt his conclusions, but on the contrary is inclined toward the
views of the other two experts witnesses, Felipe Logan and Jose G. Villanueva.
As stated at the outset, the contested will is claimed to have been signed
and thumbmarked by the testator. An examination of the thumbmarks, however, readily
shows that, as the lower court found, the same are "glaringly far from being distinct and
clear"; that "they are not a possible means of identification" nor can "they possibly be
identified to be those of Vito Borromeo, or for that matter, of any other person
whatsoever". It is, therefore, obvious, that they are of little use in the resolution of the
issue before Us.
We shall now consider the appeal, taken by the oppositors and the Republic of the
Philippines from that portion of the decision where the lower court declined to decide
with finality the question of who owns the thirteen parcels of land subject-matter of the
confirmatory sale Exhibit F-1 and whether or not they should be included in or excluded
from the inventory of properties of the Estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo.
It appears that on February 11, 1954 Tomas, Amelia, and Fortunato Borromeo, through
counsel, filed a motion for the exclusion from the inventory of the Estate of the thirteen
lots therein mentioned, with a total area of 2,348 square meters, claiming that the same
had been sold by the deceased Vito Borromeo during his lifetime to the Cebu Arcade, T.
L. Borromeo y Cia. This motion for exclusion was denied by the lower court in its order
of July 16, 1954, and the ruling was reiterated in the appealed decision "for the same
reasons and considerations" upon which it rejected the probate of the will. The ruling on
the matter, however, was expressly made provisional in nature.
We believe, and so hold, that the resolution of the lower court on this matter is correct
because said court, acting in its capacity as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to
determine with finality the question of ownership involved. That such matter must be
litigated in a separate action has been the established jurisprudence in this jurisdiction
(Ongsinco vs. Borja, L-7635, July 25, 1955; Mallari vs. Mallari, L-4656, February 23,
1953; Garcia vs. Martin, G.R. No. L-9233, June 29, 1957; Cordova vs. Ocampo, 73 Phil.
661; Pascual vs. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561 and others), except where a party merely prays
for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of any particular property, in which case
the probate court may pass upon provisionally, the question of inclusion or exclusion,
but without prejudice to its final determination in an appropriate separate action (Garcia
vs. Garcia, 67 Phil. 353; Marcelino vs. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388; Guinguing vs. Abuton, 48
Phil. 144, 147).
In view of all the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
G.R. No. 92740 March 23, 1992
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
JAIME M. RAMOS, NILDA RAMOS, ERLINDA ILANO, MILAGROS ILANO, DANIEL
ILANO AND FELIPA JAVALERA, respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated March 15, 1990 affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21, directing the Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL, for short) to pay
the private respondents the amounts specified therein as actual, moral and temperate
damages as well as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
The antecedents facts are briefly recounted by the appellate court, as follows:
Plaintiffs Jaime Ramos, Nilda Ramos, Erlinda Ilano, Milagros Ilano, Daniel Ilano and
Felipe Javalera, are officers of the Negros Telephone Company who held confirmed
tickets for PAL Flight No. 264 from Naga City to Manila on September 24, 1985,
scheduled to depart for Manila at 4:25 p.m. The tickets were brought sometime in
August 1985. Among the conditions included in plaintiffs tickets is the following:
1. CHECK-IN TIME — Please check in at the Airport Passenger check-in counter at
least one hour before PUBLISHED departure time of your flight. We will consider your
accommodation forfeited in favor of waitlisted passenger if you fail to check-in at least
30 minutes before PUBLISHED departure time. (Exhs. (1-A-A, 2-A-1, S-A, O-A-1, tsn.
Nov 23, 1987, p. 8).
Plaintiffs claim in their Complaint that they went tot he check-in counter of the
defendant's Naga branch at least one (1) hour before the published departure time but
no one was at the counter until 30 minutes before departure, but upon checking -in and
presentation of their tickets to the employee/clerk who showed up, their tickets were
cancelled and the seats awarded to chance passengers; plaintiffs had to go to Manila
by bus, and seek actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees for breach
of contract of carriage.
Defendant disclaim any liability, claiming that the non-accommodation of plaintiff on the
said flight was due to their having check-in (sic) late for their flight. It is averred even if
defendant is found liable to the plaintiffs such liability is confined to, and limited by, the
CAB Economic Regulations No. 7 in conjunction with P.D. 589.
The trial court rendered judgment finding defendant guilty of breach of contract of
carriage in bumping-off the plaintiffs from its F264 flight of September 25, 1985, and
ordered defendant to pay:
1) P1,250.20 — the total value of the tickets:
2) P22.50 — the total value of airport security fees and terminal fees;
3) P20,000.00 — for each of the plaintiffs for moral and temperate damages; and
4) P5,000.00 — for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. (Rollo, pp. 35-36)
PAL appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 15, 990, the appellate court rendered
a decision, the dispositive portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against
appellant.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 42)
Hence, this present petition with the following legal questions:
1. Can the Honorable Court of Appeals validity promulgate the questioned decision by
the simple expedient of adopting in toto the trial court's finding that defendant-appellant
is liable for damages on the sole issue of credibility of witnesses without considering the
material admissions made by the plaintiffs and other evidence on record that
substantiate the defense of defendant-appellant.
2. Can the Honorable Court award legally moral and temperate damages plus attorney's
fees of P5,000.00 contrary to the evidence and established jurisprudence. (Rollo, p. 9)
Under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, each party in a case is required to
prove his affirmative allegations. In civil cases, the degree of evidence required of a
party in order to support his claim is preponderance of evidence or that evidence
adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party
(Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 83376, May
29, 1989, 173 SCRA 619, 625).
The case at bar presents a simple question of fact: Whether or not the private
respondents were late in checking-in for their flight from Naga City to Manila on
September 24. 1985. It is immediately apparent from the records of this case that the
claims of the parties on this question are dramatically opposed. As a rule, the
determination of a question of fact depends largely on the credibility of
witnesses unless some documentary evidence is available which clearly substantiates
the issue and whose genuineness and probative value is not disputed (Legarda v.
Miaile, 88 Phil. 637, 642). The exception to the rule now runs true in this case.
We reverse. This case once more illustrates Our power to re-weigh the findings of lower
courts when the same are not supported by the record or not based on substantial
evidence (see Cruz v. Villarin, G.R. No. 75679, January 12, 1990, 181 SCRA 53, 61).
It is an admitted fact that the private respondents knew of the required check-in time for
passengers. The time requirement is prominently printed as one of the conditions of
carriage on their tickets, i.e., that the airport passenger should check-in at least one
hour before published departure time of his flight and PAL shall consider his
accommodation forfeited in favor of waistlisted passengers if he fails to check-in at least
30 minutes.
We note that while the aforequoted condition has always been applied strictly and
without exception (TSN, December 16, 1987, p. 11), the station manager, however, may
exercise his discretion to allow passengers who checked-in late to board provided the
flight is not fully booked and seats are available (ibid, pp. 17-18). On September 24,
1985, flight 264 from Naga to Manila was fully booked owing to the Peñafrancia Festival
(TSN, January 25, 1988, p.5). In addition, PAL morning flights 261 and 262 were
canceled resulting in a big number o f waitlisted passengers. (TSN, November 23,
1987, p. 6).
The private respondents claim that they were on time in checking-in for their flight; that
no PAL personnel attended to them until much later which accounted for their late
check-in; that PAL advanced the check-in time and the departure of their flight resulting
in their non-accommodation; and that they suffered physical difficulties, anxieties and
business losses.
The evidence on record does not support the above contentions. We note that there
were two other confirmed passengers who came ahead of the private respondents but
were refused accommodation because they were late. Edmundo Araquel, then the
check-in-clerk, testified on this point, as follows:
Atty. Marcelino C. Calica, counsel for PAL
Q Before the plaintiffs arrive (sic) at the check-in counter, do you recall if there were
other passengers who arrived at the counter and they were advised that they were late?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who were those persons?
A My former classmates at Ateneo, sir, Rose Capati and Go, Merly.
Q Were these two passengers also confirmed passengers on this flight?
A Yes, sir.
Q I show to you a document which is entitled "Passenger Manifest of flight 264,
September 24, 1985," which we request to be marked as Exh. "5" you said earlier that
aside from the plaintiffs here there were two other passengers who also checked in but
they were also late and you mentioned the names of these passengers as Capati and
Go, please point to us that entry which will show the names of Go and Capati?
A Here, sir, numbers 13 and 14 of the Manifest.
ATTY. CALICA: We request that passengers 13 and 14 be marked in evidence, Go for
13 and Capati for 14 as Exh. "5-A."
Q You said that these two passengers you mentioned were also similarly denied
accommodations because they checked in late, did they check in before or after the
plaintiffs?
A Before, sir.
Q What time did they appear at the counter?
A 4:01 p.m., sir.
Q What happened when they checked in at 4:01?
A I told them also that they were late so they cannot be accommodated and they tried to
protest, but they decided later on just to refund the ticket. (TSN of November 23, 1987,
pp. 11-12)
Shortly after, the private respondents followed the aforesaid two passengers at the
counter. At this juncture, Araquel declared, thus:
Q Now, you said that you met the plaintiffs in this case because they were passengers
of Flight 264 on September 24, 1985 and they were not accommodated because they
checked in late, what time did these plaintiffs check in?
A Around 4:02 p.m., sir.
Q Who was the clerk at the check in counter who attended to them?
A I was the one, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said when you were presented the tickets of the plaintiffs in this case and noting
that they were late for checking in, immediately after advising them that they were late,
you said you made annotation on the tickets?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you Exhs. "A," "B," "C," and "D," which are the tickets of Mr. & Mrs.
Jaime Ramos for Exh. "A," Exh. "B" ticket of Mr. & Mrs. Daniel Ilano, "C" ticket of Felipa
Javalera and "D" ticket of Erlinda Ilano, will you please go over the same and point to us
the notations you said you made on these tickets?
A This particular time, sir. (Witness pointing to the notation "Late" and the time "4:02"
appearing at the upper righthand of the tickets Exhs. "A," "B," "C," and "D.")
Q How long did it take after the tickets were tendered to you for checking in and before
you made this notation?
A It was just seconds, sir.
Q On the tickets being tendered for check-in and noting that they were late, you mean
to say you immediately made annotations?
A Yes, sir. That is an S.O.P. of the office.
Q So on what time did you base that 4:02?
A At the check-in counter clock, sir.
Q At the time you placed the time, what was the time reflected at the counter clock?
A 4:02, sir. (ibid, pp. 8-11)
The private respondents submitted no controverting evidence. As clearly manifested
above, the intervening time between Capati and Go and the private respondents took
only a mere second. If indeed, the private respondents were at the check-in counter at
3:30 p.m., they could have been the first ones to be attended to by Araquel than Capati
and Go. They cold have also protested if they were the earliest passengers at the
counter but were ignored by Araquel in favor of Go and Capati. They did not.
It is likewise improbable that not a single PAL personnel was in attendance at the
counter when the check-in counter was supposed to be opened at 3:25 p.m. It mist be
remembered that the morning flight to Manila was canceled and hence, it is not
farfetched for Us to believe that the PAL personnel then have their hands full in dealing
with the passengers of the morning flight who became waitlisted passengers. Moreover,
the emphatic assertions of private respondent Daniel Javalora Ilano regarding the
absence of a PAL personnel lost its impact during the cross examination:
ATTY. CALICA —
Q So, you maintain therefore that for all the time that you waited for there for the whole
twenty (20) minutes the check-in counter and other PAL Offices there — the whole
counter was completely unmanned? I am referring to the whole area there where it is
enclosed by a counter.
I will describe to you, for the benefit of the court.
When you approach the counter at Naga Airport, the counter is enclosed, I mean, you
cannot just go inside the PAL office, right? there is some sort of counter where you deal
with the PAL personnel and you approximate this counter to be five (5) to six (6) meters.
Now, this space after the counter, did you observe what fixtures or enclosures are
contained there inside the enclosed space?
A I am not sure whether there are offices or enclosures there.
Q You have been traveling and had opportunity to check-in your tickets so may times.
Everytime that you check-in, how many personnel are manning the check-in counter?
A There are about three (3) or four (4), sir.
Q Everytime, there are three (3) or four (4)?
A Everytime but not that time.
Q I am referring to your previous trips, I am not referring to this incident.
On previous occasions when you took the flight with Pili Airport and you see three (3) or
four (4) personnel everytime, are all these three (3) or four (4) personnel at the counter
or some are standing at the counter or others are seated on the table doing something
or what? Will you describe to us?
A Some are handling the baggages and some are checking-in the tickets.
Q So, on most occasions when you check-in and say, there were at least three (3) of
four (4) people at the check-in counter, one would attend to the tickets, another to the
check in baggage, if any. Now, do you notice if somebody evade when you check-in
your ticket. This other person would receive the flight coupon which is detached from
your ticket and record it on what we call passenger manifest?
A That's true.
Q Now, it is clear one would attend to the baggage, another person would receive the
ticket, detach the coupon and one would record it on the passenger manifest. What
about the fourth, what was he doing, if you recall?
A I think, putting the identification tags on the baggages (sic). (TSN, November 17,
1986, p. 38)
Ilano's declaration becomes even more patently unreliable in the face of the Daily
Station Report of PAL dated September 24, 1985 which contained the working hours of
its personnel from 0600 to 1700 and their respective assignments, as follows:
ATTY. CALICA
Q Normally upon opening of the check-in counter, how many PAL personnel are
assigned to man the counter?
EDMUNDO ARAQUEL
A A total of four personnel with the assistance of others.
Q Who are these personnel are assigned to the counter and what specific duties they
performed?
A Mr. Oropesa handled the cargo, Mr. Espiritu handled the ticketing, Mr. Valencia and
me handled the checking in of passengers.
Q Are you referring to this particular flight 264 on September 24, 1985?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who was assigned as check-in clerk that particular time?
A I was the one with Mr. Valencia, sir.
Q What was Mr. Valencia doing?
A He assisted me, sir.
Q How?
A If a group of passengers simultaneously check in, we divided the work between us.
(TSN, November 23, 1987, p. 7)
xxx xxx xxx
Q When the plaintiffs testified in this case particularly plaintiff Daniel Ilano and Felipa
Javalera at the previous hearings said plaintiffs stated that they arrived at the check-in
counter at about 3:25 or 3:30 and there was nobody in the counter, what can you say to
that?
A We cannot leave the counter, sir. That was always manned from 3:25 up to the last
minute. We were there assigned to handle the checking in of the passengers.
Q You mentioned earlier that aside from you there were other personnel assigned to the
check-in counter and you even mentioned about a certain Valencia assisting you, do
you have any evidence to show said assignment of personnel at the airport?
A Yes, sir.
Q I show to you a daily station report from 24 September 1985 covering working hours
0600 to 1700, will you please go over the same and thereafter tell us from the personnel
listed in this Daily Station Report what were the name (sic) of the personnel assigned to
man a check-in counter at that time?
A There (sic) persons assigned were Mr. Oropesa, Mr. Espiritu, Mr. Medevilla, myself
and Mr. Valencia.
Q You mentioned about Mr. Espiritu, what was his specific task at that time?
A He was handling the ticketing, sir.
Q What about Mr. Medevilla?
A He was taking care of the ramp handling.
Q And Mr. Oropesa?
A He was handling the incoming cargo.
ATTY. CALICA: We request that this Daily Station Report be marked Exh. "6" and the
portion of the Report which shows the deployment of personnel of PAL Naga Station on
September 24, 1985 as "6-A."
Q Plaintiffs in this case testified that when they checked in there was nobody manning
the counter and they had to wait for twenty minutes before someone came in to the
counter, what can you say to that?
A It is not true because all the time we were there from the start, an hour before the
flight we were there because we were assigned there.
Q Plaintiff Daniel Ilano testified that he went to the counter twice, first at 3:25 and it was
only at 4:00 p.m. that somebody went to the counter and attended to him and while he
expected his boarding pass he was told instead that plaintiffs could not be
accommodated because they were late, what can you say to that?
A The truth is we were always there and we never left the counter from the start of the
check-in time of 3:25 we were all there, we never left the counter.
Q Until what time did you remain at the check-in counter?
A At around 4:15 p.m., sir.
Q You said that the check-in counter was closed at 3:55, for what purpose were you still
manning the check-in counter?
A To attend to the passenger who are late in checking in because they also need
assistance in explaining to them the situation.
Q So it was for that purpose you were there?
A Yes, sir. (ibid., pp. 16-18)
It is significant to note that there were no other passenger who checked-in late after the
private respondents (TSN, November 23, 1987, p. 13). In the absence of any
controverting evidence, the documentary evidence presented to corroborate the
testimonies of PAL's witnesses are prima facie evidence of the truth of their allegations.
The plane tickets of the private respondents, exhs. "1," "2," "3," "4," (with emphasis on
the printed condition of the contract of carriage regarding check-in time as well as on
the notation "late 4:02" stamped on the flight coupon by the check-in clerk immediately
upon the check-in of private respondents) and the passenger Manifest of Flight PR 264,
exh. "5," (which showed the non-accommodation of Capati and Go an the private
respondents)are entries made in the regular course of business which the private
respondents failed to overcome with substantial and convincing evidence other than
their testimonies. Consequently, they carry more weight and credence. A writing or
document made contemporaneously with a transaction in which are evidenced facts
pertinent to an issue, when admitted as proof of those facts, is ordinarily regarded as
more reliable proof and of greater probative force than the oral testimony of a witness
as to such facts based upon memory and recollection (20 Am Jur S 1179, 1029 cited in
Francisco, Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines Annotated, 1973 Edition, Volume
VII, Part II, p. 654). Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable as against a written
document that speaks a uniform language (Spouses Vicente and Salome de Leon v.
CA., et al., G.R. No. 95511, January 30, 1992). This dictum is amply demonstrated by
the diverse allegations of the private respondents in their complaint (where they claimed
that no one was at the counter until thirty (30) minutes before the published departure
time and that the employee who finally attended to them marked them late, Records, p.
2) and in their testimonies (where they contended that there were two different PAL
personnel who attended to them at the check-in counter. TSNs of November 17, 1986,
pp. 41-45 and of May 18, 1987, pp. 5-6). Private respondents' only objection to these
documents is that they are self-serving cannot be sustained. The hearsay rule will not
apply in this case as statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly connected
with the main transaction as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate, qualify or
characterize the act, are admissible as apart of the res gestae (32 C.J.S., S. 411, 30-
31). Based on these circumstances, We are inclined to believe the version of PAL.
When the private respondents purchased their tickets, they were instantaneously bound
by the conditions of the contract of carriage particularly the check-in time requirement.
The terms of the contract are clear. Their failure to come on time for check-in should not
militate against PAL. Their non-accommodation on that flight was the result of their own
action or inaction and the ensuing cancellation of their tickets by PAL is only proper.
Furthermore, We do not find anything suspicious in the fact that PAL flight 264 departed
at 4:13 p.m. instead of 4:25 p.m. Apart from their verbal assertions, the private
respondents did not show any evidence of irregularity. It being clear that all the
passengers have already boarded, there was no sense in keeping them waiting for the
scheduled time of departure before the plane could take flight.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the Court of
Appeals dated March 15, 1990 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 117609. December 29, 1998]
HEIRS OF SEVERA P. GREGORIO, represented by its Administratrix
BUENCONSEJO PINEDA VDA. DE VIVAR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
RICARDO SANTOS, ROSALINA PALOMO, SPOUSES WILSON TAN and BENITA
LUI TAN, respondents.

DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is an appeal by way of petition for review on certiorari from the decision of the
Court of Appeals which reversed the holding of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 79, in Civil CaseNo. Q-49254, entitled Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio, et al., vs.
Rosalina Palomo, vs. spouses Wilson and Benita Lui Tan, nullified the questioned
Deed of Absolute Sale, dated July 14, 1971, as falsified, fictitious and forged, and
adjudged the defendant spouses, Wilson Tan and Benita Lui Tan, as
purchasers/holders in bad faith.
As culled by the Court of Appeals, the facts of the case are, as follows:
Spouses Wilson Tan and Benita Lui Tan are the registered owners of a 1,381.1 square
meter lot located along Quezon Blvd., Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 349788 issued
by the register of Deeds of Quezon City.
The lot was previously owned by Severa Gregorio as evidenced by TCT No. 8787
issued to her on January 4, 1949.
Sometime in 1965, Shell company leased the lot from Severa for a period of twenty (20)
years.
On September 20, 1976, Severa died intestate leaving behind three (3) legitimate
children - Buenconsejo Vivar, Jesusa aGalang and Cecilio Pineda. On March 9, 1982,
Cecilio died.
In late September or October,1986, after the lease with Shell Company expired,
Buenconsejo Vivar tried to sell the lot to one Federico Ng. So she asked her son Oliver
to get certified true copies of the pertinent documents from the Quezon City Registry of
Deeds. Oliver was able to secure certified true copies of (1) deed of absolute sale dated
July 18,1971 executed by Severa Gregorio in favor of Ricardo Santos; (2) deed of
absolute sale dated September 17, 1986 executed by Ricardo Santos in favor of
spouses Wilson and Benita Tan; and (3) deed of assignment executed by spouses
Felicisimo and Rosalina Palomo in favor of spouses Wilson and Benita Tan.
Buenconsejo was shocked to find that her brothers title, TCT No. 8787, was cancelled
and that in lieu thereof, TCT No. 349787 was issued to spouses Tan.
Records show that Severa Gregorio sold to Ricardo Santos 2/3 portion of the lot.
Santos, in turn, sold the same 2/3 portion to spouses Wilson and Benita Tan
for P1,400,000.00.
With respect to the remaining 1/3 portion, it appears that in 1978, spouses Felicisimo
and Rosalina Palomo filed with the then Court of First Instance of Caloocan City an
action for a sum of money against Jesusa Galang (Severas daughter) and her husband
Victoriano Galang. The court decided the case in favor of the Palomos. On December
20, 1978, the 1/3 undivided share of Jesusa in the lot was sold on execution to the
Palomos, being the highest bidders. The Galangs failed to redeem the property within
one year. Hence, a final deed of sale in favor of the Palomos was confirmed by the
court and recorded in the Quezon City Registry of Deeds.
On September 18, 1986, the Palomos assigned to spouses Wilson and Benita Tan that
1/3 portion of the lot for P800,000.00.
On the same day, September 18, 1986, at the instance of spouses Tan, (1) the deed of
sale between Severa Gregorio and Ricardo Santos, (2) the subsequent deed of sale
between Ricardo Santos and spouses Tan and (3) the deed of assignment between
spouses Palomo and spouses Tan were registered in the Quezon City Registry of
Deeds. Consequently, TCT No. 8787 in the name of Severa Gregorio was cancelled
and TCT No. 349788 was issued in the name of spouses Tan covering the entire lot.
On October 30, 1986, the heirs of Severa Gregorio filed with the trial court the instant
complaint against spouses Tan for cancellation of title and/or reconveyance with
damages alleging that the deeds of conveyance were forged and are therefore void.
Thereafter, or on June 11, 1988, a fire gutted the Quezon City Hall Building. The entire
records of this case were destroyed. The key documents, such as the original copy of
the deed of sale between Severa Gregorio and Ricardo Santos dated July 14, 1971
covering 2/3 portion of the lot; the original copy of the deed of sale between Ricardo
Santos and spouses Tan covering the same portion dated September 17, 1986; the
original copy of the deed of assignment from spouses Palomo to spouses Tan covering
1/3 portion of the same lot dated September 18, 1986; and the original copy of TCT No.
349788 in the names of spouses Tan were all burned.
On July 10, 1989, the trial court issued an order for the reconstitution of the records.
The parties had hardly started the reconstitution when, on September 29, 1989, the
heirs of Gregorio filed an amended and/or supplemental complaint which was admitted
by the court. The supplemental matters revolved around the signature of Severa
Gregorio affixed to the July 14, 1971 deed of sale between her and Ricardo Santos. On
February 12, 1990, spouses Tan filed an answer to the amended complaint alleging that
the deed of sale was genuine and that they purchased the property in good faith.
Summons on defendant Ricardo Santos was effected through publication on May 28,
June 4, and June 11, 1990. However, Santos did not file any answer. He was
accordingly declared in default on September13, 1990.
During the trial, the heirs of Gregorio presented as their witnesses Bienvenido Albacea,
a Questioned Document Examiner of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); Dr.
Wilhelmina Vibar, daughter of Buenconsejo Vibar; and Viterbo Cahilig, Records Officer,
Quezon City Register of Deeds. Spouses Tan presented appellant Wilson Tan; Atty.
Jose Ramos Sunga, counsel of spouses Tan; Records Officer Viterbo Cahilig; and June
Pangilinan, OIC of the Records Section of the Regional Trial Court in Kalookan.
Defendants Palomo did not present any evidence but adopted all the testimonial and
documentary evidence adduced by spouses Tan.
On December 29, 1992, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, a decision is hereby rendered in this case as follows:
1. Declaring the forged Deed of Sale purportedly signed and executed by Severa P.
Gregorio in favor of defendant Ricardo G. Santos dated July 18, 1971 conveying
the subject property covered by TCT No. 8787 null and void ab initio;
2. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Ricardo G. Santos in favor of
spouses Wilson C. Tan and Benita Lui Tan dated September 17, 1986 conveying 2/3
undivided portion of the subjectproperty covered by TCT No. 8787 null and void ab
initio;
3. Declaring and maintaining the validity of the Deed of Assignment executed by
Spouses Felicisimo Palomo and Rosalina Palomo in favor of spouses Wilson C. Tan
and Benito Lui Tan dated September 18, 1986 regarding 1/3 undivided portion of the
subject property covered by TCT No. 8787;
4. Declaring null and void and ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 349788, Quezon
City Registry, in the name of spouses Wilson C. Tan and Benita Lui Tan;
5. Declaring null and void and ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 349789, Quezon
City Registry, in the name of Ricardo G. Santos;
6. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to reinstate TCT No. 8787, Quezon
City Registry, in the name of the registered owner Severa P. Gregorio including all
the entries in the memorandum of encumbrances;
7. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to annotate the memorandum of
encumbrance of TCT No. 8787, the Deed of Assignment of 1/3 undivided share of
spouses Felicisimo Palomo and Rosalina Palomo in favor of spouses Wilson C. Tan
and Benita Lui Tan dated September 18, 1986;
8. Ordering defendant Ricardo G. Santos to pay plaintiffs attorneys fees in the sum of
P50,000.00;
9. Ordering defendant Ricardo G. Santos to pay and return to spouses Wilson C. Tan
and Benita Lui Tan the purchase price of 2/3 portion of the subject property in the sum
of P1,400,000.00 with legal rate of interest to be computed from the date of the filing of
this case until it is fully paid;
10. Ordering defendant Ricardo G. Santos to pay spouses Wilson C. Tan and Benita Lui
Tan P100,000.00 moral damages and P50,000.00 attorneys fees;
11. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay spouses Wilson C. Tan and Benita Lui Tan the sum
of P69,946.41 by way of reimbursement of the taxes paid for the subject property by
spouses Tan.[1]
From the aforesaid Decision, both the plaintiffs and defendant spouses Tan appealed to
the Court of Appeals - the plaintiffs with respect to the ruling below (a) ordering them to
reimburse the spouses Tan the sum of P69,946.41 representing unpaid realty taxes
allegedly paid by the latter for the property, (b) declaring as valid the deed of
assignment between the spouses Palomo and defendant spouses Tan overthe 1/3
undivided portion of subject lot, and (c) disallowing the removal and/or demolition of
whatever improvements plaintiffs may have introduced on the property. Defendants
appealed with respect to the finding by the trial court that they were not innocent
purchasers for value of the 2/3 undivided portion or interest in the property and that the
notarized Deed of Sale dated July 14, 1971 was falsified and forged.
On April 29, 1994, the Twelfth Division of the Court of Appeals came out with a
decision[2] reversing the aforementioned findings of the trial court, and disposing, thus:
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The ownership and title of spouses Wilson Tan and Benita Lui Tan over
the entire disputed lot are declared valid. Costs against the plaintiffs-appellants heirs of
Severa Gregorio.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Hence, the appeal by the heirs of Severa Gregorio assigning as errors, that:
A. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO
THE TESTIMONY OF THE NBI HANDWRITING EXPERT FOR THE REASON THAT
WHAT HE TESTIFIED ON IN COURT WAS A MERE XEROX COPY OF THE
QUESTIONED DEED OF SALE, AND
B. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT
SPOUSES TAN ARE INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE AND IN GOOD FAITH
WITH RESPECT TO THE 2/3 PORTION OF THE SUBJECT LOT CONVEYED TO
THEM BY RICARDO SANTOS.
The assignment of rights by the spouses Palomo to respondent spouses Tan over a 1/3
portion of subject property sold on execution to the Palomos in satisfaction of a final
judgment is not raised as anissue in this appeal.
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for not giving credence to the testimony of NBI
handwriting expert Bienvenido Albacea, who examined the deed of sale in question and
concluded that the signature thereon purporting to be that of the late Severa Gregorio,
is forged. They contend that, as borne out by the records, (1) on September 10, 1987,
Albacea conducted an examination of the original copy of subject deed of sale dated
July 14, 1971 at the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City; (2) on the basis of
such examination, he arrived at the conclusion that the signature appearing thereon
was forged; (3) unfortunately, as a result of the fire of June 11, 1988, which destroyed
the Quezon City Hall, the records of the case were all burned including the original copy
of the aforesaid deed of sale; and (4) the said original copy of the deed of sale could not
be produced in court thereby necessitating the presentation of a certified true xerox
copy thereof.[4]
Following the ruling in U.S. vs. Gregorio[5] and Borje vs. Sandiganbayan[6], the Court of
Appeals reversed the findings by the trial court and ruled out the testimony of the NBI
handwriting expert, holding that when the genuineness of signatures on a document is
sought to be proved or disproved through comparison of standard signatures with the
questioned signatures, a xerox copy or photo copy cannot be used by the expert
witness in lieu of the original. It disregarded the expert testimony of the said witness
who presented during his testimony in court only a mere photostat (xerox) copy of the
subjectdeed of sale.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Basic is the rule of evidence that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself except in
the instances mentioned in Section 3,Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. Mere
photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence rule.[7] This is
especially true when the issue is that of forgery.
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence[8] and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The
best evidence of a forged signature in an instrument is the instrument itself reflecting the
alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison
between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the
person whose signature is theorized upon to have been forged. Without the original
document containing the alleged forged signature, one cannot make a definitive
comparison which would establish forgery. A comparison based on a mere xerox copy
or reproduction of the document under controversy cannot produce reliable results.
Petitioners claim that what was actually examined by the NBI expert on September 10,
1987 at the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City was the original copy of the
deed of sale dated July 14, 1971 but a fire accident supervened preventing its
introduction during trial.
This contention of petitioners is untenable. Due to the technicality of the procedure
involved in the examination of forged documents, the expertise of questioned document
examiners is usually helpful.However, resort to questioned document examiners is not
mandatory and while probably useful, they are not indispensable in examining or
comparing handwriting.[9] A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony
of handwriting experts. Although such testimony may be useful, the judge still exercises
independent judgement on the issue of authenticity of the signatures under scrutiny.
The judge cannot rely on the mere testimony of the handwriting expert. In the case of
Gamido vs. Court of Appeals[10] (citing the case of Alcon vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 162 SCRA 833), the Court held that the authenticity of signatures
... is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that questions concerning , e.g.,
quantum physics or topology or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly
technical nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a
questioned signature is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion
rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue.
A judge must therefore conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in
order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity and this cannot be done
without the original copy being produced in court.
Neither can we discern any sustainable basis for the second assigned error relied upon
by petitioners.
The Court of Appeals found that the petitioners were not able to overcome the
presumption of good faith which benefits defendant spouses Tan and that
At any rate, the heirs of Gregorio failed to present evidence of any dishonest purpose or
moral obliquity on the part of the spouses Tan. In fact, no bad judgment or negligence
can be attributed to them because they took the necessary steps to protect their
investment.[11]
It is axiomatic that good faith is always presumed unless convincing evidence to the
contrary is adduced. It is incumbent upon the party alleging bad faith to sufficiently
prove such allegation. Absent enough proof thereof, the presumption of good faith
prevails. In the case under examination, the burden of proving bad faith therefore lies
with petitioners (plaintiffs below) but they failed to discharge such onus
probandi. Without a clear and persuasive substantiation of bad faith, the presumption of
good faith in favor of respondents stands.
In view of the indefeasibility of a torrens title, every person dealing on registered lands
may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and
he is not required to go beyond the certificate and inquire into the circumstances
culminating in the vendors acquisition of the property.[12] The rights of innocent third
persons who relied on the correctness of the certificate of title and acquired rights over
the property covered thereby cannot be disregarded and the courts cannot order the
cancellation of such certificate for that would impair or erode public confidence in the
torrens system of land registration.[13]
When a portion of registered property was sold and the sale was duly registered (and
annotated in the certificate of title of the vendor), the vendee technically becomes the
owner of the sold portion as of the registration of the sale although the title to said
property is still in the name of the vendor.[14]
It bears stressing, however, that the indefeasibility of the torrens title should not be used
as a means to perpetuate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Mere
registration of sale is not good enough. Good faith must concur with registration
because otherwise registration becomes an exercise in futility.[15]
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that
some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair
price at the time of purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of
some other person in the property.[16] As good faith primarily refers to a state of mind
and is always a question of intention, evidence as to conduct and outward acts are
usually resorted to in order to arrive at a reasonable determination of the inward motive
or intention.[17]
In this case, when the spouses Tan purchased the subject property from defendant
Santos, the title was clean and free from any lien and encumbrance except for the claim
of the spouses Palomos by virtue of a final judgment in court awarding 1/3 undivided
portion of the lot to the latter. As a matter of fact, the trial court and the Court of Appeals
were in agreement with the following factual findings, to wit:
Wilson Tan testified that...they did not know or meet Severa P. Gregorio but they came
across her name in 1986 when the property was offered to them by Zapata Realty. x x x
They asked for a xerox copy of the title and they were given a xerox copy of the title in
the name of Severa Gregorio and a Deed of Sale between Severa Gregorio and
Ricardo Santos. He verified the title in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City and found the title clean except for that portion belonging to the Palomos. So he
agreed to purchase the lot at the offered price of P2,000.00 per sq.m. x x x ( RTC
Decision, p. 13)
The Court of Appeals likewise found as follows:
x x x Tan did not know the Gregorio family before he purchased the lot. He learned
about the lot being offered for sale through Zapata Realty, a professional real
estate broker . Ricardo Santos showed Tan the original 1971 deed of sale from Severa
Gregorio to him (Santos) and the duplicate original copy of her TCT No. 8787. Tan went
to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and satisfied himselfwith the
authenticity of the documents shown by Santos. With respect to the 1/3 portion, Tan
had the title cleaned of all adverse claims before he purchased the share of the
Palomos. Also, before buying the lot , he visited it to check its condition. (Rollo, p.35)
Good faith is the opposite of fraud and consists of the honest intention to abstain from
taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another.[18] From the
evidence on record, it can be gleaned that respondent spouses Tan were not personally
acquainted with Santos prior to the sale. They bought the property through a real estate
broker, Zapata Realty, and not from Santos himself. But they satisfied themselves that
subject certificate of title was clean, and of the genuineness and authenticity of the deed
of sale of Santos, by personally verifying the same with the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City. Such verification, in fact, disclosed that subject certificate of title was free
from any adverse claim except that of the Palomos. Respondent spouses Tan even
consulted a lawyer before proceeding with the sale.Verily, the latter were not amiss in
their duty to ascertain their vendors capacity to sell the property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision appealed
from AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 122290. April 6, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REYNALDO BAGO y
MADRID, accused-appellant,
ARMANDO CAPARAS y CUENCO and RODOLFO ONGSECO y VEGO, accused.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Appellant REYNALDO BAGO was charged with qualified theft, while his co-accused
ARMANDO CAPARAS and RODOLFO ONGSECO were charged with simple theft, in
an Information[1]which reads:
"That sometime during the period from January 1992 to March 23, 1992, in Quezon
City, Philippines, REYNALDO BAGO y MADRID, being then employed as factory
worker of the Azkcon Metal Industries detailed with the Power Construction Supply
Company located at No. 130 Judge Juan Luna Street, San Francisco del Monte, this
City, and as such has free access to the different departments of the company, with
grave abuse of confidence, in conspiracy with his co-accused ARMANDO CAPARAS
and RODOLFO ONGSECO y VEGO, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and
consent of the owner thereof, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and carry away assorted cold rolled sheets and scraps valued in the total amount
of P194,865.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to Power Construction Supply
Company, represented by WILLIAM HILO, to the damage and prejudice of the owner
thereof in the aforementioned amount.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
Appellant and his co-accused pled not guilty. Trial ensued.
Appellant was an employee of Azkcon Metal Industries (Azkcon for brevity) from 1988
to 1992. He started working as a factory worker and later became a machine operator
and a truck helper. From 1991 to 1992, he served as team leader at the cutting
department under the supervision of Material Comptroller WILLIAM HILO who kept
track of all the materials coming in and going out of the companys plant in Kalookan
City.[2]
Azkcon has a business arrangement with Power Construction Supply Company (Power
Construction) whereby Azkcon buys cold rolled sheets from the latter. These cold rolled
sheets are also cut by Power Construction for a fee and Azkcon converts them into
drums or containers. Appellants job was to go to Power Constructions establishment in
Quezon City to oversee the cutting of the cold rolled sheets and ensure their delivery to
Azkcon using the trucks sent by Hilo.[3]
On April 21, 1992, appellant and his co-workers[4] went to Power Construction and
loaded two cold rolled sheets in a truck owned by Azkcon.[5] Before entering the
premises of Azkcon, appellant presented to security guard RUBEN DE LA CRUZ
MANANGAN two receipts,[6] both dated April 21, 1992, covering the cold rolled sheets
from Power Construction. Manangan inspected the contents of the truck. As everything
was accounted for, Manangan stamped on the two receipts covering the materials.
Appellant then presented a third receipt,[7] with Invoice No. 51111, dated March 23,
1992, for stamping. Manangan likewise stamped the third receipt. As the third receipt
bore a different date, Manangan asked appellant if the materials covered by said receipt
were in the truck. Appellant replied that the materials had long been delivered.
Manangan did not investigate further but later reported the incident to the Chief of
Security Department, AFLOR ONG. Ong checked the third receipt and when he failed
to find the materials listed thereon, he reported to Hilo.[8]
Upon receipt of the report, Hilo discreetly conducted a more in-depth investigation. He
found out that the materials covered by the third receipt, worth P192,000.00, were not
delivered to Azkcon. He checked the third receipt and the gate pass of Power
Construction for March 23, 1992 - the date of the questioned transaction - and
discovered that the truck used by appellant on said date did not belong to Azkcon. It
also turned out that the subject materials had already been paid for by Azkcon. [9]
Power Constructions security guard, JUN GAVARAN, confirmed that on March 23,
1992, appellant and his companions picked up cold rolled sheets from Power
Construction and loaded them in a truck. The truck did not bear the logo of Azkcon.
Gavaran noted on a ledger that the truck came at 2:15 p.m. and left at 3:35 p.m.
Hilo did not immediately report the matter to his superior. He chose to wait for appellant
to commit a similar misdemeanor and catch him red-handed. He waited in vain. He then
decided to inform his superiors about the theft in May 1992. Hilo was directed to report
the theft and file a complaint with the police authorities.
A police team, led by SPO3 ALFREDO ALFARO, investigated appellant at Azkcon.
Appellant insisted that the materials covered by the third receipt had been delivered to
Azkcon. The investigation of appellant continued at the police station. PO3 Andres
Balod interrogated appellant. Appellant asked for a lawyer and was brought to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where he was assisted by Atty. Florimond C.
Rous. Atty. Rous talked to him and inquired if he was willing to give a statement to the
police. The interrogation then proceeded and appellant admitted his participation in the
theft. He disclosed that his cohorts on May 23, 1992 were ARMANDO CAPARAS and
RODOLFO ONGSECO, former employees of Azkcon. He revealed that they usually
loaded the stolen materials in a truck rented by Caparas and Ongseco. He
received P10,000 to P35,000[10] for his participation in the different thefts.[11] Appellant
affixed his signature on the written statement.[12] After the investigation, PO3 Balod
referred the case to Fiscal Paragua. h Y
The next day, the police went to Malinta, Valenzuela and apprehended accused
Caparas and Ongseco. It was appellant who pointed out the residence of Caparas and
Ongseco to the police. The two identified a certain Chua as the alleged buyer of the
stolen goods. The police invited Chua for investigation. Inexplicably, the investigation of
Chua was not reduced to writing.[13]
Appellant denied participation in the crime charged. He described his job as team leader
at the cutting department of Azkcon. He said that Hilo would order him to proceed to
Power Construction Supply to oversee the cutting and procurement of the materials
needed by Azkcon. Hilo would then instruct him to wait for his call and the arrival of their
truck at Power Construction Supply. They would usually use Azkcons trucks, but at
other times, Hilo would rent trucks from others.[14]
As soon as the truck would arrive at the premises of the supplier, the driver would ask
for appellant. He would then load the materials in the truck and would show the receipts
covering the materials to the security guard of Power Construction Supply for stamping.
The materials inside the truck would be counterchecked against the quantity and quality
stated in the receipts. Appellant would then return to Azkcon usually at about 4:00 p.m.
Thus, he would mainly stay at the suppliers premises to oversee the cutting of the cold
rolled sheets.[15]
Appellant claimed he does not know prosecution witness Jun Gavaran, the security
guard of Philippine Construction Supply. He also denied knowing accused Caparas and
Ongseco. Allegedly, he saw them for the first time at the police station. He admitted
knowing prosecution witnesses Manangan and Ong. He acknowledged that he had no
quarrel with Gavaran, Manangan and Ong.[16]
On May 21, 1992, four (4) policemen in civilian clothes arrested him without a warrant
while working in Azkcon. They told him that Hilo filed a complaint against him. He was
detained at the La Loma police station. Hilo came and pointed him as the one
responsible for the theft but without informing him what he stole. Upon orders of Hilo,
the policemen started to beat him. They forced him to admit the crime. They also
compelled him to give a statement but he refused.[17]
The next day, the policemen and Hilo brought him to Valenzuela. Hilo indicated to the
policemen the residence of accused Caparas and Ongseco. That was the first time he
saw his co-accused.[18]
Then, the policemen forced appellant to go to the IBP office in Quezon City. They gave
him Atty. Rous as counsel although he insisted on hiring his own counsel. Atty. Rous
never conferred with him. No investigation was conducted at the IBP. The police did not
ask him a single question. Without reading his prepared statement, he signed it as the
police threatened to harm him. He acknowledged his signatures on the invoices marked
as Exhibits "A" to "D",[19] but claimed he could not recall the circumstances under which
he signed them.[20]
After seven (7) days at the La Loma police station, he was taken to the Fiscals Office in
Quezon City. The inquest fiscal did not talk to him. He was asked about the
voluntariness of his signature in his extra-judicial confession.[21]
Thereafter, he was brought back to the station.[22]
Appellants father, PABLO BAGO, testified that on June 15, 1992, he went to the NBI to
seek protection for his son as they were receiving threats from Hilo and police officers
Balod and Alfaro. Days later, Hilo, Alfaro and Balod went to his house in Quezon City
looking for appellant. Hilo warned that appellant should admit the crime lest something
untoward would happen to him.[23] Again, after his sons arraignment, a certain Col.
Hernandez visited their house and insisted on taking appellant to Azkcon. Pablo
refused, arguing that the case had already been filed in court.[24] On another occasion,
Col. Hernandez and his lady friend dropped by his house and convinced him and his
son to talk to Mr. King, the owner of Azkcon. During their meeting, Mr. King allegedly
told Pablo that he knew that appellant was innocent but asked him to testify against the
persons responsible for the crime. Pablo replied that they would think about the
proposal.[25] Mr. Kings lawyer, Atty. Capistrano, also gave him the same advice. Atty.
Capistrano requested them to go to his office where appellant could execute a
statement. Instead of going there, Pablo and the appellant proceeded to the office of
appellants lawyer.[26]
Allegedly, appellant was maltreated while in the custody of the police. Pablo claimed
that he reported the physical abuse to the NBI.[27]
Prosecutions rebuttal witness ATTY. FLORIMUND C. ROUS, free legal aid counsel of
IBP, testified that on May 22, 1992, appellant was brought to their office for the
execution of his extra-judicial confession. As a matter of procedure, he first examined
the body of appellant to determine any sign of physical abuse or maltreatment while the
latter was in police custody. Finding none, he inquired from appellant whether he was
willing to confess to the commission of the theft. Beforehand, he already informed
appellant of the consequence of his confession, i.e., that it could be used against him.
Nonetheless, appellant affirmed his willingness to execute a written confession. Thus,
the policeman proceeded to take the statement of appellant. Appellant signed his
extrajudicial confession[28] in his (Atty. Rous) presence.
Rebuttal witness ATTY. MELANIO CAPISTRANO testified that he was Azkcons legal
counsel. He confirmed that a conference was held at Azkcon premises in connection
with the theft. Present were appellant, Pablo Bago, Mr. King and a former employee of
Azkcon. Due to the complexity of the modus operandi, Mr. King suspected that
appellant had other companions in committing the theft. Mr. King then informed him that
appellant had agreed to turn state witness. Appellant confessed that his supervisor
William Hilo, a certain Severino Encarnacion and his co-accused Ongseco and Caparas
took part in the heist. Allegedly, Encarnacion was the brains behind the theft; Hilo took
care of the operations on the Azkcon side, while Ongseco and Caparas took care of the
procurement of the stolen goods. Atty. Capistrano expressed reservations about the
involvement of Hilo as he was the one who reported the theft to the management. After
the conference, he advised appellant to consult his own lawyer and execute a statement
so he could determine if they would use appellant as a state witness. Prior to his
arraignment, appellant was told that he should decide whether he wanted to be a state
witness. In their next scheduled meeting, appellant and his lawyer, Atty. Jambora, failed
to appear.[29]
On sur-rebuttal, Pablo Bago insisted that on July 1992, Col. Hernandez went to
Pearanda, Nueva Ecija and took pictures of his house. Col. Hernandez invited him and
appellant to go to Azkcon. They refused as appellant had already posted bail at that
time. Atty. Capistrano, on the other hand, insisted that appellant should name the other
employees involved in the theft so that they could be dismissed from the company. [30]
On April 26, 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City[31] convicted appellant of
qualified theft. Accused Caparas and Ongseco were acquitted for insufficiency of
evidence. The dispositive portion of the decision[32] reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused REYNALDO BAGO
y MADRID guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Qualified Theft as
defined and penalized under Article 308, in relation to Article 309, paragraph 1 and
Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences said accused to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from Twenty (20) years and One (1) day
of Reclusion Perpetua as minimum to Twenty-Eight (28) years, Ten (10) months and
One (1) day of Reclusion Perpetua as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law
and to indemnify the complainant in the sum of P194,865.00, representing the value of
the stolen cold rolled sheets, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to pay the costs.
"Accused ARMANDO CAPARAS Y CUENCO and RODOLFO ONGSECO Y VEGO are
hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.
"SO ORDERED."
Appellant moved for reconsideration of the trial courts decision. The motion was denied
for lack of merit,[33] although the dispositive portion of the trial courts decision was
amended, thus:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
"Pursuant to People vs. Conrado Lucas (240 SCRA 66), [the] dispositive portion of the
decision is hereby modified but only insofar as accused Reynaldo Bago is concerned to
read as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Reynaldo Bago y
Madrid GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the crime of Qualified Theft as
defined and penalized under Article 309, paragraph 1 and Article 310 of the Revised
Penal Code, and hereby sentences said accused to the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
with the accessory penalties of the law, and to indemnify the complainant in the sum of
P194,865.00, representing the value of the stolen cold rolled sheets, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, with costs.
"SO ORDERED."
The Appellants Brief raises two issues, to wit: Misoedp
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME OF QUALIFIED THEFT BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS
PROVEN THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED, REYNALDO BAGO, BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
We affirm with modification.
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove even by circumstantial evidence
that he asported the cold rolled sheets in question. He asserts that these materials were
delivered to Azkcon as evidenced by the receipt[34] duly stamped by the guard on duty.
He states:
"x x x [T]he best evidence that the materials were actually delivered at Azkcon Metal
Industries is the receipt duly stamped by the guard on duty. Res ipsa loquitor. To
receive the testimony of the security guard, that he stamped the receipt even without
the goods because he trusted the accused, would set a precedent that will eventually
convict an innocent person. After duly stamping the receipt, it is very easy for the
security guard to claim otherwise to avoid liability."[35]
Appellant also contends that his task was to oversee the delivery of the materials from
their supplier to Azkcon. Allegedly, it was erroneous to conclude that he stole the
materials just because they could not be found in its premises as he was not
responsible for any material lost therein.
Lastly, appellant belittles the documents showing that the truck he used in taking out the
materials from Power Construction on March 23, 1992 did not belong to Azkcon. He
claims that said documents had no bearing on his culpability. Scjuris
We reject these contentions. Mis-edp
First. Appellant, in effect, assails the testimony of Ruben Manangan, the security guard
who stamped the receipt marked as Exhibit "C", on the ground that the receipt itself
shows that the materials were delivered to Azkcon. Appellant argues that the receipt is
the best evidence and should be given more credence than Manangans testimony.
Appellants argument is bereft of merit for Manangans testimony is corroborated by
another witness, William Hilo, Material Comptroller of Azkcon who kept track of all
materials coming in and going out of Azkcons plant. He testified that on April 21, 1992,
he received three (3) receipts but only two (2) materials were delivered to Azkcons
premises. The receipt marked as Exhibit "C" covered the missing materials. Manangans
testimony is further corroborated by two (2) pieces of documentary evidence: first, by
Power Construction Supply Co. Gatepass Invoice No. 51111 dated March 22,
1992[36] which shows that the materials covered by Exhibit "C" were taken out by
appellant from the premises of Power Construction Supply on March 23, 1992, about a
month before the receipt was stamped; and second, by a document from Power
Construction Supply dated March 23, 1992 containing information about the truck used
in pulling out the materials from Power Construction Supply on said date. The truck bore
license plate no. PRC-513 and was not owned by Azkcon. The truck belonged to a
certain Ruel Fernando who had no contractual relation with Azkcon and said vehicle
was not to be used to take out materials from Power Construction Supply. In view of
these corroborations, we hold that the trial court did not err in giving credence to
Manangans testimony despite the receipt. Es m
Appellant can not rely on the best evidence rule which states: Msesm
"SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot
be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the whole; and Exsm
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in
a public office."[37]
The rule cannot be invoked unless the content of a writing is the subject of judicial
inquiry, in which case, the best evidence is the original writing itself. The rule pertains to
the admissibility of secondary evidence to prove the contents of a document. In the
case at bar, no secondary evidence is offered to prove the content of a document. What
is being questioned by appellant is the weight given by the trial court to the testimony of
Manangan over the receipt which on its face shows that the materials in question were
delivered to Azkcons premises. Clearly, the best evidence rule finds no application on
this issue. Es msc
Second. It is well settled that before conviction can be based on circumstantial
evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain of
events which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
defendant, to the exclusion of others, as the author of the crime.[38] Thus, the
following requisites must be met: 1) there must be more than one circumstance; 2) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; 3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. [39]
In the case at bar, the trial court convicted the appellant based on this chain of
events: Court
"1. Azkcon Metal Industries is engaged in metal business and for this purpose
contracted a business arrangement with Power Construction Supply whereby Azkcon
purchases the cold rolled sheets from the latter and the cold rolled sheets are cut by
Power Construction Supply;
"2. Accused Bago is a trusted employee of Azkcon and detailed with Power
Construction Supply Company in charge of the Cutting Department; and that as such he
was authorized by Mr. William Hilo, Controller Manager of Azkcon, to pull out
from the Power Construction Supply the cut materials and to deliver the same to
Azkcon;
"3. On April 21, 1992, accused Bago, together with his co-employees, Danilo Baylosis
and Candido Querobin entered the Azkcon premises with deliveries of two cold rolled
sheets loaded in the truck. Security Guard Manangan inspected the materials in the
truck and after confirming that the materials were loaded in the truck, he stamped the
receipts upon request of accused Bago. Thereafter, accused Bago brought out another
receipt and requested Security Guard Manangan to likewise stamp the same. Security
Guard Manangan checked the goods covered by the third receipt and found there
were no cold rolled sheets for the third receipt. The third receipt carried a different
date. Security Guard Manangan asked accused Bago as to the whereabouts of the
materials covered by the third receipt and the latter replied that they had long been
delivered. Nevertheless, Security Guard Manangan stamped this last receipt because
he trusted that accused would not do anything bad;
"4. On April 21, 1992, William Hilo, the material controller of Azkcon, discovered
that there were three (3) receipts which came in, but only two materials were
delivered inside the company compound. The materials covered by the two (2)
receipts were delivered but the materials covered by the third receipt were not. Hilo
conducted an inventory and asked accused Bago the whereabouts of the materials in
question. Accused Bago insisted that the materials had long been delivered. Hilo
proceeded with his investigation and was able to secure from the Power Construction
Supply Company Gatepass Invoice No. 51111 dated March 22, 1992 (Exh. "D")
which shows that the materials covered by the third receipt were taken out by
accused Bago from the premises of Power Construction Supply on March 23,
1992; J lexj
"5. Hilo was able to secure from Power Construction Supply a document dated March
23, 1992 (Exh. "E") which contained information on the truck used in pulling out the
materials from Power Construction Supply on March 22, 1992 (sic). The truck bears
Plate No. PRC-513 and is not owned by Azkcon. As per copy of the certificate of
registration secured from the Land Transportation Office, the truck is owned by a certain
Ruel Fernando who has no contractual relations with Azkcon. Said vehicle is likewise
not authorized to pull out materials from the Power Construction Supply."
The trial court concluded that the foregoing circumstances lead to a reasonable
conclusion that appellant asported the materials covered by Exhibit "C".
We agree. Misact
Appellant cannot rely on the fact that the third receipt was duly stamped by security
guard Ruben Manangan on April 21, 1992. Manangan explained well why he stamped
the receipt. He said:[40]
"Q: On April 21, 1992, did you report for work as security guard at AZKCON Metal
Industries?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And was there any unusual incident that transpired on that day, if you recall?
A: There was a truck which was carrying two (2) cold rolled sheets.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: By the way, who were with (sic) the truck which carried the (2) cold rolled sheets
which you mentioned?
A: Bago sir. Esmm is
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Now, when this truck came [in], with Reynaldo Bago with Bailosis and Querubin,
carrying deliveries of two (2) cold rolled sheets, what happened after that, if anything
happened?
A: After I inspected the two (2) cold rolled sheets, I stamped the receipts for them.
Q: Before you stamped the receipts for these two (2) cold rolled sheets, did you make
sure that the goods were there?
A: Yes sir.
Q: What happened after that?
A: After I stamped the two (2) receipts, he brought out another receipt which they asked
me to stamp also.
Q: By the way, who asked you to stamp the two (2) receipts covering the two (2) cold
rolled sheets loaded in the truck?
A: Bago sir.
xxxxxxxxx
COURT
xxxxxxxxx
Q: And who was the one who brought out this other receipt for stamping?
A: Bago sir.
Q: And what did he tell you, if he told you anything about this receipt?
A: He said "please put a stamp on this receipt".
Q: Did you?
A: Yes, because I trusted him. Lexj uris
Q: And did you also check whether the goods covered by this 3rd receipt was (sic) in
the truck unloaded?
A: Sir there was no cold rolled sheet for that receipt.
Q: And why did you stamp this receipt for cold rolled sheets for that receipt? (sic)
A: Because I trusted him that he would not do anything bad.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Now, in spite of the fact that your personal knowledge of the person Reynaldo Bago
was in the course of your performance of your duty, including Reynaldo Bago (sic), you
would like to impress upon us that in spite of that you trusted him?
ATTY. CAPISTRANO:
Argumentative, your Honor. Kyle
COURT:
Witness may answer.
A: Yes sir.
Q: In spite of the fact that the 3rd receipt according to you, when you inspected it, there
was no cold rolled sheets covering "Exhibit "C"?
A: No material sir. Mis-oedp
Q: In spite of the fact that you did not find any Cold Rolled Sheets material you
still honored the receipt by affixing you signature after you stamped it, correct?
A: Yes sir, but when I saw the receipt it had a different date.
Q: xxx [D]id you ask Reynaldo Bago "why is it a different date" and "why are
there no Cold Rolled Sheets is (sic) the 3rd receipt"?
A: I asked him "where these materials are" and he told me that it has (sic) long
been delivered.
Q: Now did you ask him where it was (sic) delivered and what place of AZKCON did he
deposit these Cold Rolled Sheets which are (sic) covered by this 3rd receipt?
A: No, sir.
Q: Now with regards (sic) to your duty as security guard, did you call the attention of the
management about this 3rd receipt with no Cold Rolled Sheets and you stamped the
receipt knowing that there was (sic) no materials inside. Did you ask the management,
the president, the manager, the foreman or whoever it is (sic) on duty at the time?
A: I reported it to our chief Aflor Ong. Ed-pm-is
Q: Who is this Aflor Ong?
A: Chief."[41]
The fact of non-delivery of the subject materials to Azkcon was established through the
testimony of two other witnesses, namely, William Hilo and the Chief Security Officer
Aflor Ong. Hilo declared:[42]
"ATTY. CAPISTRANO
Q: On April 21 (1992), would you please tell us what happened on that date?
A: On April 21, the materials arrived and the guard checked it (sic) and I checked it (sic)
also. We found out that there were three (3) receipts but there were only two (2)
materials inside the company.
Q: How did you come to know this, Mr. Witness? Calrsc
A: It was reported by the OIC of the Security Guard, sir.
Q: You spoke of three (3) receipts, did you come to see these receipts?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If I will show you them again (sic), will you be able to identify the same?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I am showing to you these receipts which was (sic) previously marked as Exhibits
"A", "B" and "C", are these the three (3) receipts which you mentioned a while ago?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Would you kindly take a look at these receipts and tell the Honorable Court, which
particular receipt is controversial in the sense that the goods described therein did not
enter your company premises?
ATTY. HAMBON: (sic)
I will object to that, Your Honor, incompetent.
COURT:
The witness may answer.
(The witness is examining the document)
INTERPRETER:
Witness is pointing to Exhibits "A" and "B", as the one with the materials arrived (sic)
and pointed to Exhibit "C" as the controversial receipt.
ATTY. CAPISTRANO:
xxxxxxxxx
Q: For how long have you known Reynaldo Bago?
A: Since (sic) two (2) years, sir.
Q: What is the specific function of Reynaldo Bago in your company?
A: Reynaldo Bago is in charge of Cutting Department.
Q: As a Material Controller, do you have any supervision of (sic) Reynaldo Bago?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: By the way, at the bottom portion of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", there appears a
signature, can you go over this (sic) and tell the Honorable Court, whose signatures
stated (sic) therein?
A: This is a signature of Reynaldo Bago.
INTERPRETER:
Witness is pointing to a signature on Exhibit "A". Jle-xj
ATTY. CAPISTRANO:
Which I request, You Honor, to be marked as Exhibit "A-2".
COURT:
Mark it. Esmsc
ATTY. CAPISTRANO:
Q: How about in Exhibit "B"?
A: The same it was the signature of Reynaldo Bago.
ATTY. CAPISTRANO:
At this juncture, Your Honor, may I request that this portion be marked as Exhibit "B-2".
Q: How about Exhibit "C"?
A: The same Mr. Reynaldo Bagos signature.
ATTY. CAPISTRANO:
May I request, Your Honor, that the pointed portion of Exhibit "C", be marked in
evidence as Exhibit "C-2".
Q: Why do you know that these are the signature (sic) of Reynaldo Bago?
A: Because I am in charge of Reynaldo Bago, and I know his signature.
Q: If Reynaldo Bago is in Court, can you point to him?
INTERPRETER: Calrky
Witness is pointing to a person who identified himself as Reynaldo Madrid Bago.
ATTY. CAPISTRANO:
Q: You said that this matter was reported to you by the OIC of the Security Guard, (sic)
when this matter was reported to you, what step or steps did you take, if any?
A: I conducted an actual inventory and confronted Reynaldo Bago and asked him where
are (sic) the materials which is (sic) in question.
Q: You said that your (sic) conducted an actual inventory what was your findings
in your inventory?
A: According to my findings the materials did not reach the company.
ATTY. HAMBON: (sic)
Your Honor, may I request that [that] portion be stricken-off the record.
COURT:
The witness may answer, place that on record.
ATTY. CAPISTRANO:
When you said that according to your findings that (sic) the materials did not arrive, to
what particular receipt are (sic) you referring to? Misedp
This one, sir.
INTERPRETER:
Witness is pointing to Exhibit "C".
Q: You said that you confronted Reynaldo Bago, what transpired during your
confrontation?
A: He told me that the material arrived long before but when I checked it out, I found out
that it didnt arrived" (sic).
Prosecution witness Aflor Ong testified as follows:[43]
"Q: And would you kindly inform this Honorable Court whether there is any unusual
incident that transpired on April 21, 1992 as you were then performing your duty as
chief security guard.
A: About the receipts of materials delivered, Sir.
Q: Would you kindly elaborate on that?
A: There were 3 receipts but only two (2) items were delivered.
Q: And how did you come to know this?
A: It was reported to me by the security guard on duty.
Q: And who was this security guard who reported the matter to you?
A: Security guard Ruben Manangan, Sir.
Q: And when this matter was reported to you, what did you do, if you did anything?
A: I checked it also and after I checked, I reported it to William Hilo.
Q: What precisely did you check?
A: The items.
Q: Did you find these items for the 3rd receipt?
A: None, Sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Now according to you, on April 21, 1992 you were at AZKCON Metal Industries?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: And your attention was invited on the first two receipts, containing the Cold Rolled
Materials?
ATTY. CAPISTRANO:
Misleading your Honor.
COURT:
Three (3) Receipts.
Q: Your attention was invited by 3 receipts.
A: After the guard reported it to me, Sir.
Q: Who was this guard who reports (sic) to you?
ATTY. CAPISTRANO:
Already answered your Honor.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
A: Ruben Manangan.
Q: What time did he make the report?
A: Four to Five in the afternoon Sir.
Q: And what was the report all about?
A: About two (2) cold rolled sheets, Sir.
Q: What is it?
A: Only two (2) cold rolled sheets were delivered, one is (sic) missing.
Q: And, of course, the security guard showed to you the 3rd receipt which did not cover
the materials in the cargo truck?
ATTY. CAPISTRANO:
Misleading again, your Honor.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
A: Witness may answer (sic).
Q: You are, of course, referring to Exhibit "C"?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: At the time the report was shown to you, did you inspect the truck?
A: Yes, Sir. Scslx
Q: And you did not find actually the materials?
A: I did not find the material covering this Exhibit "C".
Q: Covering the 3rd receipt?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: After you inspected, what action did you take, because it was reported to you by the
security guard?
A: I reported it to Mr. William Hilo, the one in-charge of the materials."[44]
The trial court correctly found that appellant was a trusted employee of Azkcon. He
was in-charge of overseeing the cutting of the materials at Power Construction and
ensuring their delivery to Azkcon. Due to this trust, he succeeded in withdrawing from
the said supplier the cold rolled sheets covered by Exhibits "A" and "B" dated April 21,
1992 and Exhibit "C" (Invoice No. 51111), dated March 23, 1992. Appellant signed
these receipts to signify that he obtained the materials from the supplier. However, only
the materials covered by Exhibits "A" and "B" were delivered to Azkcon on April 21,
1992. Those covered by Exhibit "C" were not delivered. Significantly, the materials
procured on April 21, 1992 were delivered that same day, as shown by the stamp marks
on Exhibits "A" and "B". In contrast, the materials he took from the supplier on March
23, 1992 could not be found in the premises of Azkcon and there was no evidence that
he delivered them on said date or on any other day thereafter. Inexplicably, appellant
presented the third receipt (Invoice No. 51111) dated March 23, 1992 for stamping only
on April 21, 1992. The reasonable conclusion is that he asported the materials covered
by Exhibit "C".
Clearly, all the elements of theft were established, to wit: (1) there was a taking of
personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking was without the
consent of the owner; (4) the taking was done with intent to gain; and (5) the taking was
accomplished without violence or intimidation against the person or force upon
things.[45] As the theft was committed with grave abuse of confidence, appellant is
guilty of qualified theft.
Third. We now come to the correctness of the penalty imposed on appellant.
The trial court sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In its
Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General opined that the penalty was erroneous. It
noted that:
"The present case falls under Article 308, in relation to Article 309, paragraph one (1)
and Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, for the purpose of determining the penalty
to be imposed on appellant. x x x.
"Since the lower court found that the value of the thing stolen was P194,865.00, the
penalty prescribed in this case, had it been a case of simple theft, is imprisonment of 20
years corresponding to reclusion temporal. Since the offense was committed with grave
abuse of confidence, then the prescribed penalty for qualified theft proven in this case
is death, which is the penalty next higher by two degrees than the given penalty for
simple theft above mentioned. In which event, this case is subject further to the rules
provided in Article 74, in relation to Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code. They provide:
ART. 74. Penalty higher than reclusion perpetua in certain cases In cases in which the
law prescribes a penalty higher than another given penalty, without specifically
designating the name of the former, if such higher penalty should be that of death, the
same penalty and the accessory penalties of article 40, shall be considered as the next
higher penalty.
xxxxxxxxx
ART. 40. Death Its accessory penalties The death penalty, when it is not executed by
reason of commutation or pardon, shall carry with it that of perpetual absolute
disqualification and that of civil interdiction during the thirty years following the date of
the sentence, unless such accessory penalties have been expressly remitted in the
pardon.'
Consequently, the penalty actually prescribed in this case for the crime of qualified theft
is twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, together with the accessory penalties of
perpetual absolute disqualification and that of civil interdiction during thirty (30) years
following the date of the sentence.
"Since this case is subject to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the determination of the
maximum and minimum ranges of the sentence is governed by rules contained in the
analogous case of People v. Pabalan, to wit:
Applying the mandate of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall
therefore be taken from the maximum period of said basic penalty in Article 315 as
augmented by the additional years of imprisonment, while the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to
that provided by law, without considering the incremental penalty for the amounts in
excess of P22,000.00. xxx'
Based on the foregoing considerations, the penalty imposed on appellant should fall
within the minimum range of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,
with a duration of two (2) years, four (4) months and (1) day to six (6) years, and twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal with the accessory penalties of death, as maximum. It
is respectfully recommended that appellant be sentenced to the penalty of six (6) years
of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal with the
accessory penalties of death as maximum."
We disagree.
Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code provides the penalty for simple theft. It reads:
"1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of
the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if
the value of the thing stolen exceed the latter amount, the penalty shall be
the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for
each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions
of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the
case may be."
The value of the property stolen by appellant was P194,448.00. Under Article 309, the
basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be imposed in
the maximumperiod since the value of the stolen goods exceeded P22,000.00. To
determine the additional years of imprisonment prescribed in Article 309 (1), we have to
deduct the amount of P22,000.00, thus leaving the amount of P172,448.00. Next, the
net amount should be divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount
below P10,000.00. Thus, seventeen (17) years must be added to the basic penalty of
the maximum period of prision mayor minimum and medium periods.[46] The penalty
of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods has a range of six years (6) and
one (1) day to ten (10) years. Its maximum period is eight (8) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day to ten (10) years, and the incremental penalty is seventeen (17) years.
Had appellant committed simple theft, the penalty should have been twenty years
of reclusion temporal, the maximum penalty allowable under Article 309, subject to
the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Slxmis
Considering that the theft is qualified by grave abuse of confidence, the penalty
is two degrees higher than that specified under Article 309.[47] In the case of People
vs. Caales,[48] we were confronted with the same issue of determining how the penalty
under Article 309 should be increased by two degrees. In said case, we adopted the
disquisition of the appellate court, thus: Slxsc
"x x x. Under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, two degrees higher than reclusion
temporal is death. This is likewise conformable with Article 74 of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides that:
ART. 74. Penalty higher than reclusion perpetua in certain cases.In cases in which the
law prescribes a penalty higher than another given penalty, without specifically
designating the name of the former, if such higher penalty should be that of death, the
same penalty and the accessory penalties of Article 40, shall be considered as the next
higher penalty. x x x.
"The provision however, proscribes the imposition of the death penalty resulting from
the graduation of the penalty. It bears stressing that Article 74 of the Revised Penal
Code was based on Article 93 of the old Penal Code which provided that if the penalty
is reclusion perpetua, the next higher penalty would be the same penalty but the convict
in such cases cannot be pardoned until forty years had elapsed (Aquino, Comments on
the Revised Penal Code, 1987 ed., Volume 1, page 709).
But there is a pervading divergence of opinion among commentators of the Revised
Penal Code as to what the higher penalty referred to in Article 74 of the Revised Penal
Code should be. Some authors are of the view that the higher penalty would be
reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties for the said penalty. But then, under
Article 74 of the Revised Penal Code, the accessory penalties under Article 40 of the
Revised Penal Code should be imposed. Still others, like former Senator Ambrosio
Padilla, are of the view that the higher penalty is reclusion perpetua with the accessory
penalties of death under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code if the death penalty is
commuted. But then, the accessory penalty under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code
is perpetual absolute disqualification and civil interdiction during thirty (30) years
following the date of sentence, whereas, the accessory penalty of reclusion perpetua
under Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code is civil interdiction for life and perpetual
absolute disqualification. As aptly observed by former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino,
there seems to be an absurdity under the latter view (Aquino, Comments on the
Revised Penal Code, supra). On the other hand, Justice Albert is of the firm view
that: Esmmis
The Code meant to say here that the judgment should provide that the convict should
not be given the benefit of the provisions of Article 27 until forty years should have
elapsed; otherwise, there could be no difference at all between reclusion perpetua when
imposed as a penalty next higher in degree and when it is imposed as the penalty fixed
by law. (Albert, Comments on the Revised Penal Code, 1932 edition, page 240).
to which Justice Luis Reyes subscribes (Reyes, Comments on the Revised Penal Code,
1981 ed., Vol. 1, page 746). Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino likewise is in
accord with the opinion of Justice Albert.
x x x.
Justice Albert believes that the penalty higher than reclusion perpetua is reclusion
perpetua for forty years with the accessory penalties of death under Art. 40. Otherwise,
as he said there could be no difference at all between reclusion perpetua, when
imposed as the penalty next higher in degree and when it is imposed as the penalty
fixed by law. This opinion is supported by Art. 93 of the old Penal Code from which Art.
74 was taken. Art. 93 provides that if the given penalty is cadena perpetua or reclusion
perpetua, the next higher penalty shall be these same penalties but the convict in such
case cannot be pardoned until forty years have elapsed. (Aquino, Comments on the
Revised Penal Code, 1987 ed., Volume 1, pages 708-709).'
"We are likewise in accord with the opinion of Justice Albert as a logical explanation of
Article 74 of the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, Caales should be meted the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for Forty Years with the accessory penalties of death
under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code. In fine, Caales is not entitled to pardon
before the lapse of the forty-year period (Reyes, Comments on the Revised Penal
Code, 1977 ed., Volume 1, page 747)."

This reiterated our ruling in People vs. Reyes,[49] where we held: Mesm
"In the crime of theft, if the value of the thing stolen exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty
shall be prision mayor in its maximum period and one year for each additional
P10,000.00, but the total penalty shall not exceed twenty years or reclusion temporal.
However, if that crime of theft is attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
which convert the taking into qualified theft, the penalty next higher by two
degrees shall be imposed, that is, at least, reclusion perpetua."[50]
In accord with the foregoing, we hold that appellant was correctly meted the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of death under Article 40 of the
Revised Penal Code.Missdaa
Fourth. As regards the grant of actual damages, the rule is that actual damages cannot
be allowed unless supported by evidence in the record.[51] William Hilo testified that the
value of the missing cold rolled sheets was P192,000.00 and the incurred cutting cost
was P2,448.00, for a total value of P194,448.00.[52] Thus, the award for actual damages
must be reduced byP417.00.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the April 26, 1995 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City (Branch 92), in Criminal Case No. Q-92-30833, as amended by the Order dated
August 15, 1995, is AFFIRMED subject to the modification that the actual damages is
reduced to P194,448.00. Kycalr
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 80505 : December 4, 1990.]
192 SCRA 28
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MARIO TANDOY y
LIM, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133 dated October 13, 1987,
convicting Mario Tandoy of the crime of violation of Art. II, Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is before us on appeal.
The information against the accused-appellant read as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of May 1986, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell eight (8) pieces of dried marijuana flowering tops, two (2) pieces of dried
marijuana flowering tops and crushed dried marijuana flowering tops, which are
prohibited drug, for and in consideration of P20.00.
Upon arraignment, Tandoy entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, Judge Buenaventura
J. Guerrero rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which declared:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Mario Tandoy y Lim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and cost.: nad
The marijuana confiscated in this case is declared confiscated and forfeited and ordered
turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposal.
SO ORDERED.
The accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors in this appeal:
1. The Court a quo erred in finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged despite lack of evidence to prove that he sold marijuana to the poseur-buyer.
2. The Court a quo erred in admitting in evidence against the accused Exh. "E-2-A"
which is merely a xerox copy of the P10.00 bill allegedly used as buy-bust money.
The evidence of the prosecution may be summarized as follows:
On May 27, 1986, at about 3:30 p.m. Lt. Salido, Jr. of the Makati Police Station
dispatched Pfc. Herino de la Cruz, and Detectives Pablo R. Singayan, Nicanor
Candolesas, Luisito de la Cruz, Estanislao Dalumpines, Antonio Manalastas and Virgilio
Padua to conduct a buy-bust operation at Solchuaga St., Barangay Singkamas, Makati.
The target area was a store along the said street, and Singayan was to pose as the
buyer. He stood alone near the store waiting for any pusher to approach. The other
members of the team strategically positioned themselves. Soon, three men approached
Singayan. One of them was the accused-appellant, who said without preamble: "Pare,
gusto mo bang umiskor?" Singayan said yes. The exchange was made then and there
— two rolls/pieces of marijuana for one P10.00 and two P5.00 bills marked ANU
(meaning Anti-Narcotics Unit).
The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy. Manalastas and Candolesas made a
body search of the accused-appellant and took from him the marked money, as well as
eight more rolls/foils of marijuana and crushed leaves.: nad
The arresting officers brought Tandoy to the Office of the Anti-Narcotics Unit, Makati
Police Station, for investigation by Detective Marvin Pajilan. The accused-appellant
chose to remain silent after having been informed of his constitutional rights.
These events were narrated under oath by De la Cruz, Singayan and Pajilan. 1
Microscopic, chemical and chromotographic examination was performed on the
confiscated marijuana by Raquel P. Angeles, forensic chemist of the National Bureau of
Investigation, who later testified that the findings were positive. The marijuana was
offered as an exhibit. 2
As might be expected, the accused-appellant had a different story. His testimony was
that from 1:30 to 4:00 p.m. of the day in question, he was playing "cara y cruz" with 15
other persons along Solchuaga St. when somebody suddenly said that policemen were
making arrests. The players grabbed the bet money and scampered. However, he and
a certain Danny (another "cara y cruz" player) were caught and taken to the Narcotics
Command headquarters in Makati. There they were mauled and warned that if they did
not point to their fellow pushers, they would rot in jail. The accused-appellant denied he
had sold marijuana to Singayan and insisted the bills taken from him were the bet
money he had grabbed at the "cara y cruz" game. 3
The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and
to listen to their respective testimonies, gave more credence to the statements of the
arresting officers. Applying the presumption that they had performed their duties in a
regular manner, it rejected Tandoy's uncorroborated allegation that he had been
manhandled and framed. Tandoy had not submitted sufficient evidence of his charges,
let alone his admission that he had no quarrel with the peace officers whom he had met
only on the day of his arrest.
In People v. Patog, 4 this Court held:
When there is no evidence and nothing to indicate the principal witness for the
prosecution was actuated by improper motives, the presumption is that he was not so
actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
Tandoy submits that "one will not sell this prohibited drug to another who is a total
stranger until the seller is certain of the identity of the buyer."
The conjecture must be rejected.: nad
In People v. Paco, 5 this Court observed:
Drug-pushing when done on a small level as in this case belongs to that class of crimes
that may be committed at anytime and at any place. After the offer to buy is accepted
and the exchange is made, the illegal transaction is completed in a few minutes. The
fact that the parties are in a public place and in the presence of other people may not
always discourage them from pursuing their illegal trade as these factors may even
serve to camouflage the same. Hence, the Court has sustained the conviction of drug
pushers caught selling illegal drugs in a billiard hall (People v. Rubio, G.R. No. 66875,
June 19, 1986, 142 SCRA 329; People v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 72141, January 12,
1987, 147 SCRA 252), in front of a store (People vs. Khan, supra) along a street at
1:45 p.m. (People v. Toledo, G.R. No. 67609, November 22, 1985, 140 SCRA 259), and
in front of a house (People v. Policarpio, G.R. No. 69844, February 23, 1988).
As the Court has also held, "What matters is not an existing familiarity between the
buyer and the seller but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery
of the marijuana leaves." 6
Under the second assigned error, the accused-appellant invokes the best evidence rule
and questions the admission by the trial court of the xerox copy only of the marked
P10.00 bill.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, correctly refuted that contention thus:
This assigned error centers on the trial court's admission of the P10.00 bill marked
money (Exh. E-2-A) which, according to the appellant, is excluded under the best
evidence rule for being a mere xerox copy. Apparently, appellant erroneously thinks that
said marked money is an ordinary document falling under Sec. 2, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court which excludes the introduction of secondary evidence except
in the five (5) instances mentioned therein.:-cralaw
The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject
of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually
executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the
best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. (Cf. Moran,
op. cit., pp. 76-77; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78.)
Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the
purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents, other substitutionary
evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is therefore admissible without the need of
accounting for the original.
Moreover, the presentation at the trial of the "buy-bust money" was not indispensable to
the conviction of the accused-appellant because the sale of the marijuana had been
adequately proved by the testimony of the police officers. So long as the marijuana
actually sold by the accused-appellant had been submitted as an exhibit, the failure to
produce the marked money itself would not constitute a fatal omission.
We are convinced from the evidence on record that the prosecution has overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused-appellant with proof
beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt. He must therefore suffer the penalty prescribed by
law for those who would visit the scourge of drug addiction upon our people.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision AFFIRMED in
toto, with costs against the accused-appellant.: nad
SO ORDERED
[G.R. No. 126696. January 21, 1999]
SECURITY BANK & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. TRIUMPH LUMBER AND
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondent.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court the petitioner
asks this Court to reverse the decision[1] of 28 December 1995 and the resolution[2] of
17 September 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 33513. The former set
aside the decision[3] of 14 November 1990 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati in
Civil Case No. 16882 and ordered the petitioner to reimburse the private respondent the
value of the alleged forged checks drawn against private respondents account, plus
interest and attorneys fees. The latter denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner and private respondent were the defendant and plaintiff, respectively, in Civil
Case No. 16882.
The factual antecedents of this case were summarized by the trial court in its decision in
Civil Case No. 16882; thus:
Based on plaintiffs evidence, it appears that plaintiff is a depositor in good standing of
defendant banks branch at Sucat, Paraaque, under current checking account no. 210-
0053-60. Plaintiff claims that on March 23 and 24, 1987, three (3) checks all payable to
cash and all drawn against plaintiffs aforementioned current account were presented for
encashment at defendants Sucat Paraaque branch, to wit: Security Bank check nos.
466779 and 466777, both dated March 23, 1987 in the amount of P150,000.00
and P130,000.00, respectively; and Security Bank Check no. 466780 dated March 24,
1987 in the amount of P20,000.00. (Exhs. A, A-1 to A-3, B, B-1 to B-3, C, C-1 to C-3)
Plaintiff also claims that due to defendant banks gross negligence and inexcusable
negligence in exercising ordinary diligence in verifying from plaintiff the encashment of
plaintiffs checks whose amount exceed P10,000.00 and in determining the forgery of
drawers signatures, the aforesaid three (3) checks were encashed by unauthorized
persons to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff corporation. (Exhs. D, D-1, D-2)
Plaintiff then requested the defendant to credit back and restore to its account the value
of the checks which were wrongfully encashed in the amount of P300,000.00 but
despite due demand the defendant failed to pay its liability. (Exhs. F, F-1, F-2) Finally,
plaintiff claims that per findings of the PC Crime Laboratory, the signatures of Co Yok
Teng and Yu Chun Kit, the authorized [signatories] of plaintiff were forged. (Exhs. E, E-1
to E-4, G, G-1, G-2, H, I, I-1, I-2)
Upon the other hand, the defendant bank claims that on June 19, 1985 the plaintiff
corporation opened savings account no. 3220-0529-79 and current account no. 3210-
0053-60 with defendant banks branch in Sucat, Paraaque, Metro Manila. In order to
make the said current and savings account operational, the plaintiff herein provided the
defendant with the requisite specimen signature cards which in efect authorized
defendant bank to honor withdrawals on the basis of any two of three signatures affixed
thereon, specifically those of Mr. Dee Kong, Mr. Co Yok Teng and Mr. Chun Yun Kit, the
president, treasurer and general manager, respectively, of plaintiff corporation. (Exhs. 3,
4) Subsequently, plaintiff executed an automatic transfer agreement authorizing
defendant bank to transfer cleared funds from plaintiffs savings account to its current
account at any time whenever funds in the current account are insufficient to meet
withdrawals therefrom or are below the stipulated minimum balance. (Exhs. 5, 6, 6-A)
Defendant also claims that the savings account pass book and the check booklets were
kept by the plaintiff in its filing cabinet but on March 23, 1987 the plaintiff herein
discovered that the door of his office was forced open including that of the filing cabinet
where the check booklets and other bank documents were being kept by the plaintiff.
(pp. 32-33, TSN of August 15, 1988) Defendant further claims that the incident was not
reported to the police authorities by the plaintiff nor was there any advise given to
defendant bank and that on the same day of the discovery by plaintiff of the burglary,
said plaintiff nevertheless made three separate deposits in a total amount
of P374,554.10. (Exhs. 1, 1-A, 1-B, 2-A, 2-B) Defendant also claims that immediately
after the said deposit of P374,554.10 has been made by the plaintiff, three checks
namely: check no. 466779 dated March 23, 1987 in the amount of P130,000.00; check
no. 466779 dated March 23, 1987 of P150,000.00 and check no. 466780 dated March
24, 1987 in the amount of P20,000.00 which [were] all payable to cash were
successively presented to defendant bank for encashment which was given due course
by the latter after said checks have passed through the standard bank procedure for
verification of the check signatures and the regularity of the material particulars of said
checks. (pp. 6, 19, 20, 39, TSN of February 1, 1989, p. 21, TSN of August 15, 1988)[4]
On the basis of such factual environment, the trial court found no preponderance of
evidence to support private respondents complaint. The private respondent failed to
show that the signatures on the subject checks were forged. It did not even present in
court the originals of the checks. Neither did it bother to explain its failure to do so.
Thus, it could be presumed that the original checks were wilfully suppressed and would
be adverse to private respondents case if produced. Moreover, the signatures on the
checks were not compared with the specimen signature appearing on the specimen
signatures cards provided by the private respondent upon opening its current account
with petitioner. Thus, the opinion of the expert witness is not worthy of credit. Besides,
the private respondent failed to present Mr. Co Yok Teng, one of the signatories of the
checks in question, to deny the genuineness of the signatures.
The trial court was convinced that the petitioner bank had exercised due care and
diligence in determining the authenticity of the checks in question before they were
encashed. It was rather the private respondent that had been negligent in the care and
custody of the corporate checks. After the incident in question occurred, the private
respondent should have reported the matter to the police authorities or to the bank in
order that the latter could undertake stringent measure to counteract any attempt to
forge the corporate checks. But private respondent did not. Hence, private respondent
should be the one to bear the loss.
In view of such findings, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered the
petitioner to reimburse the private respondent the sum of P300,000, plus interest at the
rate of 2 % per month from 24 March 1987 until full payment thereof, as well as
attorneys fees equivalent to 25 % of the principal obligation.
The Court of Appeals held that it was not necessary for the private respondent to prove
that the signatures on the three checks in question were forged because of the following
admissions set forth in petitioners answer:
14. Plaintiff was guilty of negligence substantially contributing to the unauthorized
signatures or forgery of the signatures on the checks mentioned in the complaint.
15. The alleged forged signatures on the checks were sufficiently adroit as to escape
detection even under the officers scrutiny.
20.3 Anna P. Naval and Roberto N. Gabutao verbally admitted that the checks were
forged.
21. Anna Naval and Roberto Gabutao are now facing charges for estafa thru
Falsification of Commercial Documents under Criminal Case No. 30004 pending with
the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, sitting at Makati, Metro
Manila.
According to the Court of Appeals, the expert witness, contrary to the trial courts finding,
was able to examine the signatures on the original checks and compared them with the
standard signatures of the signatories. The photographic enlargements of the
questioned checks, which she identified in court, were in fact taken from the original
checks. With the banks admission in its answer, as well as the unrebutted testimony of
the expert witness and of Chun Yun Kit, there could be no doubt that the signatures on
the questioned checks were forged.
The Court of Appeals likewise held that the petitioner must be the one to bear the
consequences of its failure to detect the forgery. Besides, petitioner was less than
prudent in the treatment of private respondents account. It did not observe its
arrangement with the private respondent that it would inform the latter whenever a
check of more than P10,000 would be presented for encashment. Neither did it ask the
payee to present an identification card or to bring someone who could attest to identity
of the payee.
After its motion for reconsideration was denied[5] by the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed
this petition contending that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
I
THE SIGNATURES ON THE CHECKS IN QUESTION WERE FORGED
II
WHETHER THE SIGNATURES WERE FORGED IS NO LONGER AN ISSUE IN THE
CASE CONSIDERING THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES SET FORTH IN
PETITIONERS ANSWER
III
THE PETITIONER ITSELF WAS NEGLIGENT AND THAT THE RESPONDENT
EXERCISED DUE CARE IN THE CUSTODY OF ITS CHECKS AND OTHER RELATED
DOCUMENTS
IV
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF P300,000.00 PLUS
INTEREST THEREOF AS WELL AS ATTORNEYS FEES.
In the first assigned error, the petitioner alleges that the best evidence of the forgery
were the original checks bearing the alleged forged signatures of private respondents
officers. In spite of the timely objection made by the petitioner, the private respondent
introduced in evidence mere photocopies of the questioned checks. The failure to
produce the originals of the checks was a fatal omission inasmuch as there would be no
evidentiary basis for the court to declare that the instruments were forgeries. Likewise
such failure amounted to a willful suppression of evidence, which created a presumption
that its production would be unfavorable to respondents case.[6] It could also be
presumed that the checks in question [were] genuine checks regularly issued by the
respondent in the course of its business, bearing the genuine signatures of the officers
whom it authorized to sign in its behalf.[7] Also, an unfavorable inference could be drawn
from the unexplained failure of private respondent to call as its witness Mr. Co Yok
Teng, whose signature was among those allegedly forged.
Petitioner, further contends that the opinion of private respondents expert witness,
Crispina V. Tabo, Senior Document Examiner of the PC Crime Laboratory, has no
weight and deserves no consideration. Tabo did not use as basis of her analytical study
the standard signatures of Chun Yun Kit and Co Yok Teng on the specimen signature
cards provided by the respondent upon opening Current Account No. 3210-0523-60
with the petitioner. It was to be against these standard signatures appearing on the
specimen cards that petitioner was to honor checks drawn against private respondents
account. What Tabo utilized for comparisons were signatures that were not even
authenticated by Chun Yun Kit and Co Yok Teng. Neither was it proved that the
supposed standard signatures had been written closely proximate to the date of the
questioned checks. Moreover, the requested signatures on the long bond paper
written post litem motam could not be accepted as standards of comparison because of
the ease with which they[could] be disguised to intentionally differentiate them from
those being challenged.[8]
As to the second assigned error, petitioner maintains that its Answer contained a
specific denial of private respondents allegation of forgery. It could set in its answer
affirmative and negative defenses alternatively even if they were inconsistent with each
other.[9]
With respect to its third assigned error, petitioner asserts that it exercised due care and
diligence in the payment of private respondents checks by first verifying in accordance
with standard bank practices and procedures the genuineness of the signatures and
endorsements. Upon the other hand, the private respondent, in the management of its
business affairs, fell short of the diligence and the ordinary prudence required under the
circumstances. It should have advised petitioner of the alleged burglary so that
petitioner could have applied stricter rules in the processing of checks drawn against
private respondents account, but it did not bother to do so. Neither did it reconcile its
account, balances with the petitioner in order to forestall the happening of the forgery.
In the last assigned error, the petitioner alleges that in view of the reasons it stated in
the first and third assigned errors the petitioner cannot be obliged to pay the amount
of P300,000 plus interest. On the contrary, petitioner is entitled to an award of attorneys
fees because private respondents complaint was insincere, baseless, and intended to
harass, annoy and defame [it].[10]
Upon the other hand, the respondent claims that petitioner should have filed a petition
for review by certiorari and not merely a petition for review. The determination of
negligence by the Court of Appeals is a question of fact that cannot be disturbed on
appeal. Even asuming that the instant case is an exception to the rule limiting the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to reviewing errors of law nonetheless, the
issue of forgery was adequately proved by preponderance of evidence.
This appeal is meritorious.
Well settled is the rule that in the exercise of our power of review the findings of facts of
the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on this Court. However, there are
recognized exceptions, among which is when the factual findings of the trial court and
the appellate court are conflicting.[11] The disagreement between the trial court and the
Court of Appeals in the factual conclusion, especially with regard to the alleged forgery
of the signatures on the questioned checks and the negligence of the parties, has
constrained us to examine the evidence submitted by the parties.
On the issue of forgery, we are unable to agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals
that the petitioner admitted in its Answer[12] to the complaint the forgery of the
signatures. Far from admitting the forgery, petitioner categorically denied that the
signatures on the questioned checks were forgeries. However, by way of an alternative
affirmative defense, petitioner contended that it had exercised reasonable degree of
diligence in detecting whether there was forgery. Even assuming that the signatures on
the checks were forged, still petitioner could not be held liable for the value of the
checks because all the checks were complete and regular on their face. The alleged
forged signatures were sufficiently adroit as to escape detection even under the officers
scrutiny.
The Court of Appeals also erred in holding that forgery was duly established. First,
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court was not complied with by private respondent.
The Section explicitly provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. This
is what is known as the best evidence rule. The exceptions are as follows:
1. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror;
2. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
3. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot
be examined in court without great loss of time, and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the whole; and
4. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in
a public office.
In this case, the originals of the alleged forged checks had to be produced, since it was
never shown that any of these exceptions was present. What the private respondent
offered were mere photocopies of the checks in question marked as Exhibits A, B, and
C.[13] It never explained the reason why it could not produce the originals of the checks.
Its expert witness Crispina Tabo admitted though that the original checks were taken
back by the investigating policeman, Glenn Ticson; thus:
ATTY. NARAG:
Q Do you have a copy, Madam Witness of the checks which were submitted to you
under question?
A It was only a xerox copy, because the original was withdrawn by the investigating
policeman, which is in (sic) the name of Glenn Ticzon, sir.
Q Do you want to impress the court that the originals of these checks were submitted to
you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you have a copy of the originals of the checks under (sic) standards?
A Xerox copies only, because it was also withdrawn by the investigating policeman, who
is Mr. Glenn Ticzon.[14]
Yet, the said policeman was not presented to produce the original checks.
It is true that the photocopies of the questioned checks were all identified by private
respondents witness Yu Chun Kit during his direct testimony[15] without objection on the
part of petitioners counsel. The latter even cross-examined Yu Chun Kit,[16] and, at the
formal offer of said exhibits, he objected to their admission solely on the grounds that
they were irrelevant, immaterial and self-serving.[17] The photocopies of the checks may
therefore be admitted for failure of petitioner to tender an appropriate objection[18] to
their admission. Nevertheless, their probative value is nil.[19]
Then, too, the proper procedure in the investigation of a disputed handwriting was not
observed. The initial step in such investigation is the introduction of the genuine
handwriting of the party sought to be charged with the disputed writing, which is to serve
as a standard of comparison.[20] The standard or the exemplar must therefore be proved
to be genuine.[21] For the purpose of proving the genuineness of a handwriting Section
22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of a person may be
proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he
has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the
witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the
handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by
a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as
genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to
the satisfaction of the judge.
In BA Finance v. Court of Appeals,[22] we had the occasion to the rule that the
genuineness of a standard writing may be established by any of the following: (1) by the
admission of the person sought to be charged with the disputed writing made at or for
the purposes of the trial, or by his testimony; (2) by witnesses who saw the standards
written or to whom or in whose hearing the person sought to be charged acknowledged
the writing thereof; (3) by evidence showing that the reputed writer of the standard has
acquiesced in or recognized the same, or that it has been adopted and acted upon by
him in his business transactions or other concerns.
We find in the records only photocopies, not the originals, of the long bond papers
containing the alleged specimen signatures.[23] Nobody was presented to prove that the
specimen signatures were in fact signatures affixed by Yu Chun Kit and Co Yok Teng.
Although the former took the witness stand, he was never called to identify or
authenticate his signatures on the said photocopy. Clearly then, Section 22 of Rule 132
of the Rules of Court and the guidelines set forth in BA Finance v. Court of
Appeals[24] were not complied with.
Moreover, the so-called specimen signatures on the bond paper were not directly turned
over to Tabo by those who purportedly wrote them. They, together with the questioned
checks, were first submitted to the Administration Branch of the PC Crime Laboratory,
then endorsed to the Questioned Document Branch. The chief of the latter branch
thereafter referred them to Tabo. Tabo never saw the parties write the specimen
signatures. She just presumed the specimen signatures to be genuine signatures of the
parties concerned. These facts were disclosed by Tabo during her cross-examination;
thus:
Q These question [sic] signatures and the specimen signatures or standard were just
given to you by the police of Paraaque?
A It was submitted to the Administrative Branch and the Administrative Branch
endorsed that to the Question Document Branch and the Chief of the Document branch
assigned that case to me, sir. That is why I received it and examined it.
COURT:
Q How do you know that, that is the genuine signature?
ATTY. REVILLA
Yes, how do you know that, that is the genuine signatures when you were not able to
see him personally write his signature?
A Because I examined the genuine signatures of Co Yok Teng which was submitted to
the office by the investigator and it is said to be genuine, and I compared the signatures
whether it is genuine or not. And upon comparing, all the specimen signatures were
written by one, and also comparing all question [sic] signatures, this one (pointing to the
chart) are written by one so, they were written, the question [sic] and specimen were
written by two different persons.
Q You did not ask the person to personally give his signature in order that there will be
basis of comparison between standard signature and the question [sic] signature?
A Your Honor, if the specimen signature is not sufficient enough to arrive at a
conclusion, we will tell the investigator to let the person involved to come to our office to
write and sign his signature, if it is not sufficient to arrive at a conclusion we let him sign.
Q So, you do not normally demand his income tax for example, the residence certificate
or other documents which contained this undisputed signature?
A We did not ask anymore additional specimen because the submitted document is
sufficient enough to arrive at the conclusion.
ATTY. REVILLA:
Q So, you just relied on what were given to you by the investigator as they informed you
that these were genuine and standard signatures?
A Yes, sir.
Q And who was that person who gave you this document?
A It was the Administrative Branch who [sic] endorsed this document to the
Documentation Branch. I do not know the person who brought that.
Q You do not know the person who brought this document to the Administrative
branch?
A Yes, sir I do not know.
Q When you started making comparison and analysis of this question [SIC] signatures
and standard signatures, you did not anymore require the person, Mr. Co Yok Teng to
appear personally to you?
A I did not, sir.[25]
ATTY. REVILLA
Q Mrs. Tabo, like the question [sic] signature of Mr. Co Yok Teng, you also did not
personally see or observe how Mr. Co Yok Teng write this standard signature?
A Yes, sir.
Q And this [sic] standard signatures were just submitted to you?
A Yes, it was submitted to the office, sir.
Q And when you made the examination and analysis of these documents the standard
and the question [sic] signature you did not require any other signature from these two
personalities except those which were delivered to you?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Q When this standard signature were submitted to you, you were just told that this is the
genuine signature of the person involved, you were just told?
A Yes, your Honor. As stated in the request it is the genuine signature.
Q So that was your basis in claiming that this is the genuine signature of the persons
involved?
A I examined first the specimen, all the specimen whether it was written by.
Q What are those specimen submitted to you?
A The same checks, your Honor, and the written standard.
Q Did you confront Co Yok Teng?
ATTY. REVILLA
A She said no, your Honor.
COURT
Q Did you confront Yu Chun Kit whether those were actually his genuine signature?
A No, your Honor.
Q So you just relied on the claim of the person who submitted to you that these are the
genuine signatures?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q And on the basis of that you compare the characteristic handwriting between the
alleged genuine and question [sic] signature?
A Yes, your Honor.[26] (underscoring ours for emphasis).
Our review of the testimony of private respondents expert witness, Crispina V. Tabo,
fails to convince us that she was a credible document examiner, despite petitioners
admission that she was. She was candid enough to admit to the court that although she
had testified more or less three hundred times as an expert, her findings were sustained
by the courts in more or less ten cases only. Thus:
Court:
Q How many times have you testified in Court?
A More or less three hundred (300) times, your Honor.
Q How many were sustained by the Court?
A More or less ten (10), sir.
Q Out of 300?
A Yes, your Honor.[27]
Besides, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, Tabo could by no yardstick be
considered to have adequate knowledge of the genuine signatures of the parties whose
signatures on the questioned checks were claimed to be forged. That knowledge could
be obtained either by (a) seeing the person write some other documents or
signatures (ex visu scriptionis); (b) seeing documents otherwise known to him to have
been written by the person in question (ex scriptis olim visis); or (c) examining, in or out
of court, for the express purpose of obtaining such knowledge, the documents said to
have been written by the person in question (ex comparatione scriptorum).[28] Tabo
could not be a witness under the first and the second. She tried to be under the third.
But under the third, it is essential that (a) certain specimens of handwriting were seen
and considered by her and (b) they were genuinely written by the person in
question.[29] Now, as stated above, Tabo had no adequate basis for concluding that the
alleged specimen signatures in the long bond paper were indeed the signatures of the
parties whose signatures in the checks were claimed to have been forged. Moreover,
we do not think that the alleged specimens before were sufficient in number.[30]
Given the fact that Mrs. Tabos testimony cannot inspire a conclusion that she was an
expert, it was error to rely on her representation. It is settled that the relative weight of
the opinions of experts by andlarge depends on the value of assistance and guidance
they furnish the court in the determination of the issue involved.[31]
On the issue of negligence, the Court of Appeals held:
[T]here is overwhelming evidence to show that appellee (petitioner herein) was less
than prudent in the treatment of appellants (private respondents) account.
According to Chun Yun Kit, they had an agreement with Appellees Assistant branch
manager, Felicidad Dimaano, that appellant should be informed whenever a check for
than P10,000.00 is presented for encashment. Dimaano did not controvert Chun Kits
testimony on this point. Such an arrangement was not observed by appellee with
respect to the payment of the checks in question. (Emphasis supplied).
We do not agree. During the hearing on 1 February 1989, Felicidad Dimaano denied
having such agreement with the private respondent. Rather, the agreement was that all
encashments over the counter of P10,000.00 and above should be accompanied by
one of the signatories of private respondent. But this agreement was made only on 31
March 1987, or a few days after the encashment of the checks in question.[32]
At any rate, since the questioned checks, which were payable to cash, appeared regular
on their face and the bank found nothing unusual in the transaction, as the respondent
usually issued checks in big amounts[33] made payable to cash or to a particular person
or to a company,[34] the petitioner cannot be faulted in paying the value of the disputed
checks.
Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, the private respondent is the one which
stands to be blamed for its predicament. Chun Yun Kit testified that in the morning of 23
March 1987, he and some employees found the doors of their office and the filing
cabinets containing the companys check booklet to have been forcibly opened. They
also found the documents in disarray. Under these circumstances, a prudent and
reasonable man would simply have to go over the check booklet to find out whether a
check was missing. But, apparently, private respondents officers and employees did not
bother to do so. If they did examine the booklet they could have readily discovered
whether a check was taken. The following testimony of Chun Yun Kit is apropos:
Q You said also during the last hearing that on the morning of March 23, 1987 you
found out in the morning that the doors of the office were forced opened?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you also testified during the last hearing that the locked [sic] of the filing cabinet
were also forced opened?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you found out on that same time and date on March 23, 1987 that the documents
in the filing cabinet were not in their proper position?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you do when you found out this [sic] circumstances on March 23, 1987?
A We did not do anything because nothing was lost.
Q Did it not occur to you Mr. Witness, that considering that burglary was committed in
your office, the doors of your office were forced opened, the locks of the filing cabinet
were forced opened, the documents placed in the filing cabinet were not in their proper
position, it did not occur to you to check the checks of the company as being placed in
the filing cabinet?
A When we examined the check booklet, we did not discover anything lost.
Q You did not at all bother Mr. Witness or your treasurer to check something might have
lost in the check [sic], considering that the burglery [sic] and the filing cabinet were
forced opened?
A No, sir.
Q Did you notice anything lost?
A No, sir.[35]
Neither did any of private respondents officers or employees report the incident to the
police authorities,[36] nor did anyone advise the petitioner of such incident so that the
latter could adopt necessary measures to prevent unauthorized encashments of private
respondents checks. Hence, as correctly held by the trial court, it is the private
respondent, not the petitioner, which must bear the loss.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 33513 is hereby REVERSED, and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati in Civil Case No. 16882 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.