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SECTION XXIII
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SEVENTH AIR FORCE.
A. GIKERAL.
a. The staff for CTG 57,2 was formed by selecting key person
nel from the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadrons of the Seventh Air
99
Force and VII Air Force Service Command, The Adjutant General, A-l,
A-2, and A-3 made up the Air Force Commander's staff; the A-4 section
operated under control of the Service Commander.
100
237 enlisted men, were furnished from the 443 d
Signal Construction Battalion.
C. ACTIVITIES OF A-2.
2. Intelligence planning.
101
material and target charts of enemy objectives were prepared in ad-
van oe by JICPOA, 64th Topographical Engineers, Objective Data Section
of the Seventh Air Force, the Photo Interpretation Detachment, and
A-2 of the Bomber Command, and reproduced in quantity* Terrain,
weather, flying conditions to be expected, characteristics of the
Pacific theater, distances, geological construction of its islands,
and many oilier important items of intelligence were disseminated to
combat crews. Immediately upon arrival at ADVQN a safe-hand intel
ligence pouch service between ADVON and A-2, Rear Echelon, was es
tablished, resulting in rapid dissemination of mission reports, photo
graphs, and similar intelligence material.
3. Combat intelligence.
¦n
102
d. Intelligence personnel
of ASSRONS (Air Service Support
Squadrons) utilized in the Galvanic operations were thoroughly trained
prior to their departure from Hawaii. In addition to special lectures
given these personnel, they were furnished a guide which outlined in
detail their functions of furnishing current intelligence of the enemy
to their commanders, supervision and execution of counter-intelligence
measures, and obtaining adequate publicity for the personnel and accom*
plishments of their units.
D. ACTIVITIES OF A-3.
1. Planning .
a. Planning of the Galvanic operation was done by Joint Army
able to the enemy in the Gilbert and Marshall groups which could cause
considerable difficulty to our forces in accomplishing their mission.
Striking units in sufficient strength to deny the use of these airfields
to the enemy was of primary importance to success of the operation. In
planning the operational role of the Seventh Air Force, based on its
assigned mission of neutralization of enemy airfields within supporting
range, two important factors entered the picture: First, the size of
force available for such an operation and its capabilities; second, the
force necessary to adequately defend Oahu during this operation. The
entire planning of Galvanic had to be aggressive, bold, thorough, and
based on the shortest possible time schedule. It was necessary to strike
the enemy with all force available, coordinating the action of all units
concerned for maximum concentration.
2. Organization.
103
Headquarters Seventh Air Force, ADVON
Headquarters VII Bomber Command, ADVON
Headquarters 11th Bomb Group
42d Bcmb Squadron (H)
431st Bomb Squadron (H)
98th Bomb Squadron (H)
26th Bomb Squadron (H)
1) Funafuti
Funafuti Advanced Headquarters and the 42d and
431st Heavy Bomber Squadrons,
2) Nanomea
Nanomea 27th and 38th Heavy Bomber Squadrons.
3) Canton
Canton 26th and 392 dHeavy Bomber Squadrons.
4) llukufetau
llukufetau
- 98th Heavy Bomber Squadron.
5) Baker
Baker 45th Fighter Squadron and staging point
for heavy bombardment aircraft based on
Canton.
104
small runways approximately 6,000 feet in length, carved out of coco
nut groves.
105
2. Procurement of supplies and equipment.
106
minor changes necessitated continuous revision of the t/e to keep pace
with the changing orgarization of the ASSRDI.
- 107
-
supplies were made known to the Navy Joint Shipping Control through
TJSAFICPA. Daily conferences with the Joint Shipping Control were
held to secure allocation of bottoms for movement. Due to shortage
of bottoms, priorities had to be established to insure that the
organizations and supplies which were of the greatest importance to
guarantee the success of the operational plan were placed on posi
tion in time to accomplish their mission. This shortage of bottoms
caused air echelons of tactical units to operate from airdromes in
the Ellice Islands without effective support from ground echelons
and air service units for a short period of time.
6. Construction of airdromes.
108
of GARFOR due to the probability -that it would be leap-frogged to
new base.
109
f
operate the General Air Force Assembly and Intransit Depot set up to
I
110
Standard types of equipment were constantly studied to determine modi
fications required to better equipment for field conditions. Modifi
cations known to be required were made prior to departure of units from
Oahu. Other modifications were made in the field as necessity was de
termined. New types of equipment were service tested in the field.
14, Administrative order. Administrative orders covering all ad
ministrative instructions and the supply plan applicable to Air Force
units were prepared* Supplementary administrative instructions were
covered in the Base Development Plan for the island concerned.
(3) Fighters
-
111
(3) 4 combination air-borne radio and radar test
benches •
112
Include a definite number or quantity of tactical squadrons of certain
types, the Depot Supply Officer coordinated the t/e v s and computed the
amount of equipment and supplies required for the operation, for both
tactical and service squadrons. All balances of Air Corps supply stock
involved were checked for availability and obligated for the Galvanic
operation* Emergency requisitions were instituted for those items not
on hand* Balances on hand and available for issue accounted for about
84% of the Air Corps items required by the final approved t/E's for the
ASSRONS and tactical squadrons. About 1,888 items, or approximately
16$ of the required items, had to be requisitioned from the mainland.
Every priority procurement means was used to carry on procurement oper
ations in accordance with the addition or deletion of articles of equip
ment as caused by modifications to equipment. By constant initiation
and close follow-up of emergency radios and requisitions over 500 items
of equipment and supply were secured from the mainland to fillshortages
resulting from such modifications*
(1) To maintain extreme secrecy throughout preparation for
this operation, the plans and ultimate purpose of these
involved detailed supply activities were divulged to
only -three individuals, the Depot Supply Officer, the
Property Control Officer of the Supply Department, and
the Chief Clerk of the Property Control Branch of the
Supply Department* Because it was necessary to make
a deadline of 8 days from tbe starting time of prepar
ation of balance check and procurement requirements,
tills portion of -the supply departments work was most
difficult.
113
plies for movement, a system was magu rated and followed involving
preparation of Shipping Tickets (AAF Form #104) for eaoh using ser
Ist Base ASSRCN) listing all
items of it's equipment and supplies, followed by issue and packing
or crating in accordance with these shipping tickets* Preparation
of these forms required 9,844 pages of Shipping Tickets (AAF Form
#104) upon which were typed 87,031 items for issue, packing and
crating, and took 1600 man hours*
Engineering Section
Supply Section
Transportation Section
Defense and Operations Section
Weather Section
Medical Section.
114
f• As part of the training program for the enlisted personnel
of the ASSBONS the complete facilities of the Supply School were made
available to the commanding officer of each ASSRCN. Many enlisted men
designated as supply personnel attended the regular classes carried on
concurrently at the Supply School. The following outline of the con
centrated course in supply procedure for enlisted personnel illustrates
the thorough fundamental training given these men before their departure*
I* Orientation
II• Review of Organisation of Amy Air Forces
lII* Sohelons of Maintenance, Supply , and Recla
mation (Stress laid on Echelons of Technical
Supply)
IV* Army Air Force Classification of Material
(T*o* 00-36-A-l)
V. Status of Army Air Force Equipment and Supplies
VI. Army Air Force Stock List (T.O. 00-35A-6)
VII* General Provisions for Storage of AAF Equipment
and Supplies (AAF Regulation 65-19)
VIII. Regulations
IX. Army Air Force Vouchers
X. Army Air Force Supply Forms.
115
(1) 10,000 boxes of supplies were moved.
(2) 6,000 drums of aviaticn gasoline were moved to
Baker*
General
Vehicles and Gasoline 185,400
"
1,884,672 pounds
General
Vehicles 476,300
"
351,900 pounds
"
Baker
November-
Dec 1 Jan 15
2,070,072 pounds
2,421,546
828,200
116
shipment to the destination*
117
cations between the airfields at Tarawa was assumed by the Seventh
Air Force. Air Warning and Fighter Direction for Canton, Baker, and
Hakin was also the responsibility of the Seventh Air Force, The
operation of the SCR- 588 at Funafuti again was under the jurisdic
tion of the Seventh Air Force. Bomber strike and air search and re
connaissance stations were set up at the Joint Centers at each base.
Radio aids to navigation such as radio ranges and low frequency
homing transmitters were installed by the AACS. Radar and YG beacons
were installed by the Navy.
118
remedied but not in time to be of maximum use for the Galvanic action.
A radio range was established at Nanomea on the 4th of December. A
radio homer was operating at Baker • Radio range and radio homer wore
both available at Canton. These last ranges and homers worked very
satisfactorily throughout the action. YG equipment was installed at
Nanomea. YH homing equipment was installed at Funafuti, Baker, and
Canton. The AACS established circuits between Canton, Funafuti,
Nanomea, and Baker. Ihe station at Nukufetau was not available for
this action* Ihe vital communications circuits for "ttie Gilbert group
were installed by December 6.
2. Intelligence.
a. As ADVON moves forward, the A-2 section, ADVON, with its
entire physical equipment, should be set up and ready to operate on
arrival of A-2 personnel, to eliminate difficulties of setting up camp
and carrying on intelligence operations simultaneously. Action is be
ing taken to insure that, if at all possible, complete duplicate A-2
physical equipment is forwarded in advance to each new ADVON head
quarters.
119
target, specific types of bombs and fuses are required); (2) Number
and types of enemy aircraft expected at each specific target deter
mines the size and type of formation that our commander will pres
cribe, the altitude of attack, and the tactics utilized; (3) So that
crews will be particularly alert when, new types of enemy aircraft are
expected over a particular target; and (4) Reliable estimates of
enemy air order of battle at the specific and alternate targets build
up morale of combat crews*
120
of missions is also necessary. Such policy has been placed in effect.
ASSRCN.
sufficiency when operating on a base away from an
Tactical units based on island airdromes
inhere there is no ASSRON will be made as self-suf
ficient as possible by issuing each unit this Class
IV equipment. Tactical units will request supplies
and repair service direct from the ASSRON charged
with air service in the area.
121
aircraft spares (Class IV (E)) to meet changes in dispositions of
tactioal aircraft. When these supplies are land-based, it is prac
tically impossible to effect movement to a new position in time to
be of value to the tactical units before the next move* These main
tenance supplies should be kept afloat in barges as much as possible,
with a working level of 10 to 30 -days supply for all aircraft based
in the ASS RON service area land based in the ASSRON supply, and a
60-day level maintained in the barges* Instructions have been issued
to maintain 10-days Class IV (£) supplies ashore and 60- days afloat
for all aircraft within the forward area. Hie barge supply will make
issues to all ASSRONS in the forward area*
.
now on procurement in accordance with these require
ments
122
g. To provide proper air service upon the initial landing of
tactical aircraft on a new strip, facilities for aviation gasoline and
oil, third echelon aircraft repair, and bomb and ammunition supply
should be installed concurrently with the construction of the air strip,
The aviation engineer battalion should remain at the airdrome until all
aviation facilities have been completed. Premature removal of the 804th
Aviation Engineer Battalion from Makin Island delayed the construction
of the above facilities* Recommendation has been made that the aviation
engineer battalions not be relieved from an advanced base until released
by the Air Force Commander.
123
f • Automatic supply of Technical Data for the advanced bases
from the mainland was too slow to arrive on schedule for use in the
Galvanic operation, for which itwas intended. Requisitions were en
tered at once by the Air Depot Supply Department for emergency handling
from the mainland to this Depot followed by immediate shipment to the
bases involved*
k* Full company t/o and E's are essential for tactical combat
operations, with all teams self-sufficient in every detail possible*
All communications teams were dependent upon the ASSRON headquarters for
administration and mess* Companies are now being sent with full t/o and
E*s, the standard set-up being a Signal Headquarters (with a Major as
Signal Officer, one Lieutenant as assistant, and three clerks) and two
companies: one Aircraft Warning Company, formed under t/o and E 11-400,
and a Signal Communications Company, formed under T/o and E 11-500* The
total number of officers and men is 337 for future assignments*
124
i
and speed up the message handling process* The Joint Communication
Center personnel from all services should be trained together before
they land on an enemy beach* A suggested Standard Operating Procedure
has been prepared and included in the Advanced Base Officer's Guide as
suggested means of standardization*
125
v. Sufficient spare parts must be readily available for
all signal equipment • including an abundance of spare parts for units
where trouble is known to occur. This applies mainly to electric
power plant equipment and to special radar installations*
126
Cfticpac File UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
R*c-j35-crf
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
A6-2/A6-1 HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
SerialO2392
6 Ootober 1943
CONFIDSITIAL
References: (a) Joint Action of the Army and the Uavy, 1935.
(b) CinCPOA File Pac-01-Ye Iy4lß Ser. 02258 of 21 Sept. 1943.
(c) CinCPOA File Pac-J4-Es L/tlB Ser. 02248 of 20 Sept. 1943.
1
Incl. No. 1 to
SECTION XXIII
established or authorized by CinCPOA.
2
(1) Point to point circuits for aircraft movements
and other messages relating to the airways
service.
3
may be used instead of appending zone suffix
letter to each.
C. W. NIMITZ.
4
DISTRIBUTION: (13BT-43):
LIST II•
Special:
P, SP, MC, HTS, XI, 2, 3, 4, 5, V, Z.
C.G. Centpao
873, 3V, 11. 23, KS3, 4,
C.G. Sowespac
HYB-10,
C.G. Samoan Def. For*
C.G. 7th A. F.
C.G. sth A. F.
C.G. 11th A. F.
C.G. 4th A. F.
P. V. Mercer,
Flag Secretary.
5
B-24 Modifications
8 July 43).
3« Comply with T.O* 01-5-65, dated 5 October 43 (gas vent line when
needed).
11. Make one additional droppable bomb bay tank installation (as per
drawing No. 44D417).
1
Incl. No* 2 to
SECTION XXIII
23. Modify wiring in bombardier *e panel with rheostat and dimming
switoh (Mod. No. 5).
26. Install cal. .30 guns in nose side windows and stop*
30. Bistall modified A-2 bomb releases and synchronise control box
with racks (11-5-46, dated 28 November 43 and T*o. 11-5-23,
dated 2 March 43).
36. Install sun deflector top turret sight (T.O. 11-35-14, dated
#
14 September 42)*
37. Safety pitot static selector in off position and check for
lines being open (Mod. No* 42).
38. Relocate oxygen bottles over bomb bay (to provide additional
stowage space).
39. Modify emergency hydraulic pump handle (U.R. AD APO 953 44-36).
40, Install SCR 521 (Mod. No. 42).
41. Install galley kit. Type C-2 aft of rie£it waist gun.
42. Remove tail turret and install twin 50*8 (Mod. No. 31A).
43. Replace Carburetor jets (Install No. 700-3 B jets as per ASC
Radio No. 1298, dated 8 Dec 43).
2
45. Install blister window for Pilot and Co-pilot and widen the open
ing and equip for emergency release (Mod. No. 69).
47. Relocate pilot's seat lock handle (to opposite side of seat)*
49. Install deflector and braces for nose turret when needed*
50. Remove relief tube near bomb bay door handle and reinstall in back
of pilot* s seat near right front leg of navigator •* table (Mod.
No. 42).
3
B-25 Modifications
airplane*
No, 58).
7. Replace stocking boots that cover the nose wheel strut and elbows
with boots that cover the shock strut only (Mod. No. 60, part B).
9. Install turret stop for protection of tail from own fire when
necessary.
11. Install oil tank sump bottom self sealing, part No. 82-47083, for
left side and part No. 82-47083-1, for the right side (Shortage
of parts).
15. Modify fuselage hood at hinge point (UR APO 959 43-481)*
18. Comply with NAA Modification Center Report No. A-18, Structure
Reinforcement plus additional APO 953 reinforcement (Mod. No. 65).
1
Incl. No. 3 to
SECTION XXIII
19. Move Waist gun to middle of window, and install spoiler in front
of waist gun window. Install N6A sight (Mod. No. 64 )?
21. Install "Push to Talk11 switches on waist and tail guns (Proposed
Modification)*
23. Strengthen bulkhead blast plate for package guns (Same as Item
No, 18).
2
Fighter Aircraft Modifications
1
Incl. No. 4 to
SECTION XXIII
fIIGIASSIFIED
ARMY PORT AND
SERVICE COMMAND
¦¦¦- ¦¦¦¦¦
- : -¦¦¦ :
-'
,
U S AF IC P A P AR TIC IP AT IO N TfTkLVI
NiC OP EI
ATIO N
SECTION XXIV
-
ARMY PORT iSND SERVICE COMMAND.
B. SUPPORT.
1, Company D, 376th Port Battalion consisting of 4 officers and
220 enlisted men was assigned to the 7th Garrison Force which had th*
mission of defending the island after the assault troops left.
127
MHH^^y
i i
i i i i
i
SECTION XXV
-
27TH INFANTRY DIVISION.
A. ASSIGNMENT OF MISSION.
129
commanders and their staffs prepared boat assignment tables, boat
diagrams, shore party organization, landing diagrams, debarkation
and approach schedules. In addition, officer schools were ccnduct
ed by the BLT commander to complete the indoctrination in amphibious
training.
130
to the division. These camps made training aids available so that the
units could complete basic training, known-distance firing, battle
courses, specialists l training and team work in the employment of oom
bined arms. In addition, each BLT was given one week of amphibious
training at the VTaimanalo center; this training was similar to that
conducted at Waianae.
during the period 3 October
-
The 165th RCT conducted ship-to-shore exercises
22 October, employing the 20th Transport
Division. Shore Fire Control Parties were trained by the Division
Artillery for the purpose of directing Naval gunfire after arrival on
the beach.
This school was of immense value. Itnot only trained transport quarter
masters for the assault troops for the Makin operation, but also made
possible the detail of officers in Vnis capacity for ships transporting
the defense battalion*
1. Objective; Nauru.
131
of an inhabitant of Nauru with the result that Mr,
Bott, an employee of the British Phosphate Company,
arrived on Oahu about 18 August. He brought with
him printed data on Nauru, pictures (both still
and moving), and a large scale company map of the
plateau on the island. This data, plus other ver
bal information, proved extremely valuable, Mr.
Bott remained with the division for approximately
3 weeks* During this period, his time was employ
ed as follows:
132
later corrected and satisfactory maps are now
available*
133
(1) Non-TBA Engineer Equipment required.
(a) Barco hammers.
(2) Ordnance*
(a) During the period from 8 August to 30 August,
a complete physical inspection of all ordnance
in the division was made and deficiencies noted
were reported in a detailed letter to CPA with
a request for replacement of defective items.
This included:
134
(c) 50 LVT*s and as many DUKWs as could be obtained
were also requested. Late in October, infor
mation was received that the LVT 2 f s which had
been requested, would be available for employ
ment in the attack. This equipment actually
arrived and was delivered to the 27th Infantry
Division on 30 October. A provisional organiza
tion, composed of members of the 193 dTank Bat
talion had previously been organised to operate
these vehicles* This detachment, under command
of Major Inskeep, performed an outstanding piece
of work in the servicing prior to combat and
operation during combat*
(3) Signal.
135
with the problems of hostile dead. An assistant G-4
of the division was given the responsibility of the
burial of enemy dead -which he accomplished by the
employmait of the 165 th Infantry Band in conjunction
with native labor detail of approximately 50 men.
136
(f) Eh trenching tools for all personnel*
(9) Medical.
2. Ob jec ti
ve ; Makin .
The change in target was confirmed the first
week in October. Although the objective had been changed to Makin Atoll,
all the planning during the previous two months had not been wasted*
137
Valuable staff contacts had been established, the training preparations
remained unchanged* and supply requirements (including reequipping)
were changed only by reduction in the number of items required.
Intelligence*
-
of Butaritari Island, he was well informed as to
the conditions of the reefs, taro pits, swamps, and
lakes even to a greater extent than the Englishmen
who had lived there* Thus he was of greatest value
to the commanders who were to be in immediate charge
of the BLTf s.
138
group into several teams so as to accompany each land
ing unit* Plan 8 were made by which Ihe section was re
united in division headquarters as soon as practicable
after arrival ashore*
b* Plan of attack*
139
required for preliminary naval, and air bombardment,
1 BLT, reinforced, was Initially held as a floating
reserve with the intention of landing on the lagoon
side of Butaritari Island in the center of the organ
ised Jap positions at "If-hour, which hour was to be
determined dependent upon the success of the initial
landing.
140
prior to the last training cruise and too late for
combined training, Ihese parties were immediately
assigned to and lived with the units with which they
were to operate, so that close personal contact might
be obtained. The greatest difficulty in the employ
ment of these air-ground liaison groups was due to
the lack of any combined training with the carrier
groups which were eventually assigned to support the
operation.
E. .
LESSONS LSATiNED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN
1, In the lowest echelons (rifle companies, platoons, and squads
and tank platoons and individual tanks) there was no communication agency
available to link the components of the infantry-tank team* This dis
crepancy is being made the subject of intensive study and test by this
division.
141
signal agencies in an effort to provide better protection for this
equipment*
142
imeussiFiE!
UK
SECTION XXVI
-
CANTON TASK FORCE.
A, SUPPORT OF OPERATION.
143
USAFICPA PARTICIPATION IN GALVANIC OPERATION
SECTION XXVII
-
BAKER TASK FORCE.
A, PREPARATION FOR GALVANIC.
145