SECOND DIVISION

NELIA PASUMBAL DE CHAVEZ- ADM. CASE NO. No. 5195

BLANCO, REPRESENTED BY HER

ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ATTY. Present:

EUGENIA J. MUOZ,

Complainant, QUISUMBING, J.,

Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA,

- versus - VELASCO, JR., and

BRION, JJ.

ATTY. JAIME B. LUMASAG, JR., Promulgated:

Respondent.

April 16, 2009

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Nelia P. de Chavez-Blanco against respondent Atty. Jaime Lumasag, Jr., for
deceit, dishonesty and gross misconduct.

In a Report and Recommendation dated 11 December 2001,[1] the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner Milagros San Juan found
respondent guilty of the charges and recommended the penalty of disbarment. Subsequently, the IBP Board of Governors reduced the penalty to a
five (5)-year suspension in its Resolution XV-2002-229 dated 29 June 2001. In a Resolution dated 9 December 2002, the Court, however,
remanded the case to the IBP in view of its findings that no formal hearing/investigation was conducted.

Upon remand to the IBP, the case was re-assigned to IBP Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa and hearings were accordingly held thereafter.

Through her attorney-in-fact, Atty. Eugenia J. Muoz, complainant alleged in her Complaint[2] that she was a resident of the United States of America
together with her husband, Mario Blanco. She also stated that she owned two (2) adjacent parcels of land in Quezon City, each with an area of 400
square meters, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 22162 and 22163 registered in her name. In a document dated 20 November
1989, she authorized respondent, who were her husbands first cousin, to sell said lots.[3]
In a letter dated 20 March 1990, respondent reported that he had sold only one lot for the price of P320,000.00 and therefrom he deducted
P38,130.00 for taxes and commissions. And, allegedly, per complainants instructions, he remitted the remaining balance of P281,900.00 to a
certain Belen Johnnes.[4]

In 1995, complainant was informed by respondent that the other lot remained unsold due to the presence of squatters on the property.

In December 1998, Mario Blanco discovered that in truth, the two (2) lots had been sold on 11 March 1990 to the spouses Celso and Consolacion
Martinez for the price of P1,120,000.00, and that new titles had been issued to the transferees. Mario Blanco confronted respondent with these
facts in a letter, but the latter disregarded the same. Thus, in May 1999, complainant, through Atty. Muoz sent a demand letter to respondent
directing him to remit and turn over to her the entire proceeds of the sale of the properties.

Soon thereafter, respondent admitted the sale of the properties and his receipt of its proceeds, but he never tendered or offered to tender the same
to complainant. Despite repeated and continued demands, respondent has since not remitted the amount equivalent to P838,100.00 (P278,000.00
for the first parcel of land and P560,000.00 for the second).[5]

Complainant also averred that the Special Power of Attorney dated 16 January 1989, which respondent had used to sell the lots is a forgery and a
falsified document, as the signature therein were not the real signatures of complainant and her spouse. In addition, they could not have
acknowledged the document before a notary, as they were not in the Philippines at the time.[6]

For his part, respondent vehemently denied all the accusations of deceit, dishonesty and gross misconduct.[7]

Respondent countered that Mario Blanco was the true owner of the properties, which had to be titled in complainants name, as Mario Blanco was a
U.S. citizen. Mario Blanco had requested him to look for a buyer of the properties and, in the course of selling them, respondent claimed that he had
only transacted with the former and never with complainant. Respondent averred that he had been authorized in November 1989 to sell the
property, through a Special Power of Attorney, for a price of not less than P250,000.00 net for the owner.[8]

Respondent also alleged that the deed of absolute sale if the two (2) lots had been executed on 19 March 1990 but, only one lot was initially paid in
the amount of P281,980.00, which he immediately remitted to Mario Blanco. The payment for the other lot was withheld, pending the relocation of
the squatters who had been occupying the premises. And when respondent had finally collected the proceeds of the second lot more than three (3)
years after, he asked Mario Blanco if the former could use the amount for a real estate venture whose profit, if successful, he would share with the
latter. Mario Blanco allegedly did not think twice and consented to the proposal. The venture, however, did not push through.[9]

Respondent strongly maintained that the two (2) lots had been sold for only P563,960.00.[10]

Finally, respondent denied the charge of falsification. He claimed that complainant and her spouse, Mario Blanco, had in fact signed the Special
Power of Attorney, but it was only notarized later.[11]

In his Report and Recommendation dated 4 December 2006, Atty. Dennis A.B. Funa arrived at the following findings:

It appears from the records that the two lots were sold by Respondent for P560,000.00, not P1,120,000.00 as alleged by Complainant. The basis is
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 11, 1990 which shows that the two lots composing 800 sq. meters being sold for P560,000.00. There
appears to be no documentary basis for the claimed amount of P1,120,000.00 of Complainant. However, Respondent in his Comment stated that
the two lots were sold by him for P563,960.00. In any case, we shall uphold and apply the amount stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale.
In Respondents letter dated March 20, 1990, he acknowledged that he already received P320,000.00 as the total value of one lot. Moreover, the
computation shows that the P320,000.00 was only for 400 sq.m. as the computation stated: 400 sq.m. x 800p/sqm=P320,000.00. Therefore, if the
first lot was sold for P320,000.00, then the second lot must have been sold for P240,000 x x x

x x x there was clear deception on the part of Respondent when he wrote the letter dated March 20, 1990 informing the Blanco spouses that he had
sold only one of the two parcels of land for P320,000.00. This is belied by the fact that on March 11, 1990, or 9 days before he wrote the letter, a
Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by him selling the two lots for P560,000.00. This Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized on March 19, 1990.
During the hearing, Respondent admitted that the Deed of Sale covered two lots. Clearly, Respondent was not forthcoming towards the Blanco
spouses.

xxx

x x x Instead of representing that two lots had been sold for P560,000.00. Respondent only represented that he sold only one lot for P320,000.00
and pocketing the balance of P240,000.00.

xxx

During the course of hearing, Respondent claims that the Deed of Sale referred to above is a fake, and that there is a Deed of Sale showing a
selling price of P320,000.00 which is the real Deed of Sale. However, no such Deed of Sale has been presented by Respondent and no such Deed
of Sale appears in the records. Later in the hearing, Respondent retracted his statement claiming he was merely confused.

As for the alleged falsification of a Special Power of Attorney dated January 16, 1989, wherein the signatures of the Blanco spouses appear in the
SPA when they were not in the Philippines on January 16, 1989 but were allegedly in the United States, their absence in the country has not been
satisfactorily established since mere xerox copies of their passports, although noted by a notary public, cannot duly establish their absence in the
country on that date. Other acceptable documents such as a certification from the Bureau of Immigration would have been appropriate but which,
however, had not been presented. In any case, Respondent denies the charge of falsification.[12] (Citations omitted) [Emphasis supplied]

Accordingly, the IBP Commissioner recommended that, in view of the fact that respondent was already 72 years old, he be meted out the penalty of
suspension of one (1)-year suspension, not disbarment as had been prayed for and not 5 year-suspension as had been earlier resolved by the IBP
Board of Governors. Moreover, the IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be ordered to deliver to Complainant the amount of
P240,000.00 plus the legal interest rate of 6% per annum computed from March 1990.

On 31 May 2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVII-2007-222 adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of
the IBP Commissioner.[13]

The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the IBP, but a reduction of the recommended penalty is called for, following the dictum that the
appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.[14]

A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the legal profession.
Specifically, Rule 1.01 thereof provides:

Rule 1.01A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

There is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that respondent committed dishonesty and abused the confidence
reposed in him by the complainant and her spouse.
Records show that two lots had been sold by respondent as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of 11 March 1990. Respondent, however,
taking advantage of the absence of complainant and her spouse from the Philippines and their complete trust in him, deceitfully informed them in a
letter dated 20 March 1990 that he had sold only one. It can be reasonably deduced from the exchanges between the parties that the proceeds of
the first lot had been transmitted to complainant and her spouse. Respondents contention, though, that he had been authorized to retain the
proceeds of the second is specious, as complainant and her spouse could not have given the same, having been left in the dark as regards its sale.
And despite repeated demands, to date, there is no showing that the outstanding amount has been paid. Thus, respondents deceitful conduct
warrants disciplinary sanction and a directive for the remittance of the remaining proceeds is in order.

As to the charge of falsification, the Court agrees with the IBP that the same appears to be unsubstantiated. Settled is the rule that, in administrative
proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant. In fact, if the complainant, upon
whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the
respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.[15] Mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof.[16]

Respondents actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct for which he may be suspended,
following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or
for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a case without authority to so do.

Complainant asks that respondent be disbarred. The Court finds, however, that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline
respondent. The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of
the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. While the Court will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, the Court will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the
desired end. In this case, the Court finds the recommended penalty of suspension of two (2) years for respondent to be too severe, considering his
advanced age. The Court believes that a suspension of six (6) months is sufficient. Suspension, by the way, is not primarily intended as
punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession.[17]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Jaime Lumasag, Jr. is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6)
MONTHS, effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely. Further, respondent is
ordered to deliver to complainant the amount of P240,000.00 plus legal interest rate of 6% per annum computed from March 1990.

Let notice of this Resolution be spread in respondents record as an attorney in this Court, and notice thereof be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.

SO ORDERED

CASE DIGESTS

Nelia Chavez-Blanco v. Jaime Lumansag Jr. A.C. No. 5195, April 16, 2009
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Nelia P. de Chavez-Blanco against respondent Atty. Jaime Lumasag, Jr., for
deceit, dishonesty and gross misconduct.

Through her attorney-in-fact, Atty. Eugenia J. Muoz, complainant alleged in her Complaint[2] that she was a resident of the United States of America
together with her husband, Mario Blanco. She also stated that she owned two (2) adjacent parcels of land in Quezon City, each with an area of 400
square meters, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 22162 and 22163 registered in her name. In a document dated 20 November
1989, she authorized respondent, who were her husbands first cousin, to sell said lots.[3]
In a letter dated 20 March 1990, respondent reported that he had sold only one lot for the price of P320,000.00 and therefrom he deducted
P38,130.00 for taxes and commissions. And, allegedly, per complainants instructions, he remitted the remaining balance of P281,900.00 to a
certain Belen Johnnes.[4]
In 1995, complainant was informed by respondent that the other lot remained unsold due to the presence of squatters on the property.
In December 1998, Mario Blanco discovered that in truth, the two (2) lots had been sold on 11 March 1990 to the spouses Celso and Consolacion
Martinez for the price of P1,120,000.00, and that new titles had been issued to the transferees. Mario Blanco confronted respondent with these
facts in a letter, but the latter disregarded the same. Thus, in May 1999, complainant, through Atty. Muoz sent a demand letter to respondent
directing him to remit and turn over to her the entire proceeds of the sale of the properties.
Soon thereafter, respondent admitted the sale of the properties and his receipt of its proceeds, but he never tendered or offered to tender the same
to complainant. Despite repeated and continued demands, respondent has since not remitted the amount equivalent to P838,100.00 (P278,000.00
for the first parcel of land and P560,000.00 for the second).[5]
Complainant also averred that the Special Power of Attorney dated 16 January 1989, which respondent had used to sell the lots is a forgery and a
falsified document, as the signature therein were not the real signatures of complainant and her spouse. In addition, they could not have
acknowledged the document before a notary, as they were not in the Philippines at the time.[6]
For his part, respondent vehemently denied all the accusations of deceit, dishonesty and gross misconduct.[7]

ISSUE: WON respondent Atty. Jaime Lumansag, Jr. can be disbarred?

RULING:

YES. The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the IBP, but a reduction of the recommended penalty is called for, following the dictum
that the appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.[14]
The Court finds, however, that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. The supreme penalty of disbarment is
meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of
the bar. While the Court will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, the
Court will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. In this case, the Court finds the recommended
penalty of suspension of two (2) years for respondent to be too severe, considering his advanced age. The Court believes that a suspension of six
(6) months is sufficient. Suspension, by the way, is not primarily intended as punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal
profession.[17]

Atty. Jaime Lumasag, Jr. is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS and is ordered to deliver to complainant the
amount of P240,000.00 plus legal interest rate of 6% per annum computed from March 1990.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-41692 April 30, 1976

EUGENIO CABRAL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. BENIGNO M. PUNO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF BULACAN, and SILVINO SAN DIEGO,
respondents.

Arturo Agustines for petitioner.

Celso B. Poblete for private respondent.

ANTONIO, J.:p

Certiorari and prohibition to nullify the Order of respondent Judge dated May 21, 1975, reviving the Information in Criminal Case No. B-537-74 of
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Baliwag Branch, and to prohibit said court from conducting further proceedings on the case.

On the complaint of private respondent Silvino San Diego, the Provincial Fiscal filed an Information on September 24, 1974 with respondent court,
accusing petitioner Eugenio Cabral of the crime of Falsification of Public Document for allegedly falsifying on August 14, 1948 the signature of
Silvino San Diego in a deed of sale of a parcel of land. Before arraignment, petitioner moved to quash the Information on the ground of prescription
of the crime charge, as the said document of sale of Lot No. 378-C was notarized on August 14, 1948, registered with the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan on August 26, 1948 and as a consequence the original certificate of title was cancelled and a new transfer certificate of title issued, and
since then Eugenio Cabral had publicly and continuously possessed said property and exercised acts of ownership thereon, which facts are
apparently admitted in the letter of San Diego's lawyer to Cabral on September 17, 1953. After hearing said motion, Judge Juan F. Echiverri, in a
Resolution dated March 25, 1975, granted the motion to quash and dismissed the Information on the ground of prescription. The order of dismissal
was predicated upon said court's finding that the factual averments contained in the notion to quash were supported by the evidence. Private
prosecutor, who was not present during the hearing of the motion to quash, filed a motion dated April 8, 1975, for the reconsideration of said
Resolution. This was opposed by petitioner on the ground that San Diego can no longer intervene in the criminal case, having filed a civil action in
April 1974 against the same accused (Eugenio Cabral) on the basis of the same factual averments contained in the criminal Information. Acting on
the motion for reconsideration, respondent. Judge Benigno M. Puno, now presiding, ordered on May 12, 1975 the Fiscal to "make known his
position to the Court." In compliance with said Order, the Fiscal submitted his comment dated May 19, 1975, expressing the view that the crime, has
not prescribed as Silvino San Diego stated that he only discovered the crime sometime in October 1970, and "... that, in the interest of justice,
arraignment and trial is proper to ventilate the respective evidence of both parties in their total meaning and import in determining once and for all
the direction and thrust of these evidence of both parties."

Two (2) days later on, or on May 21, 1975, respondent Judge set aside the Resolution of March 25, 1975, and reinstated the Information. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration of the Order on the ground that (a) "the judgment of acquittal which became final immediately upon promulgation and
could not, therefore, be recalled for correction or amendment"; and (b) by instituting Civil Case No. 120-V-74, respondent San Diego lost his right to
intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case. This motion was denied, as well as the second motion for reconsideration, hence this petition,
raising the issue of whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to set aside its Resolution of March 25, 1975.

The issue being purely legal and considering that the matter has been amply discuss in the pleadings, 1 this case was deemed submitted for
decision without need of memoranda.

The Solicitor General was required to appear in this case, and he recommends giving due course to the petition and the reversal of the challenged
order. According to the Solicitor General, the Resolution of March 25, 1975 dismissing the Information on the ground of prescription of the crime
became a bar to another charge of falsification, including the revival of the Information. This is more so, because said Resolution had already
become final and executory, inasmuch as the Fiscal neither sought its reconsideration nor appealed therefrom within the. reglementary period of
fifteen (15) days after his receipt of a copy thereof on March 31, 1975. When the Fiscal moved to reinstate the case on May 21, 1975, or about two
(2) months from receipt of a copy of the order of dismissal, the same had already long been final.

We agree with the Solicitor General. The Rules of Court is explicit that an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense. 2 Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code also provides that "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds
for "total extinction of criminal liability." Petitioner was charged with the crime of falsification under Article 172, sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of the
Revised Penal Code, which carries an imposable penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than
P5,000.00. This crime prescribes ten (10) years. 3 Here, San Diego had actual if not constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the document
was registered in the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948.

In Pangan v. Pasicolan, 4 where the trial court set aside its own order dismissing the criminal case nine (9) months thereafter, this Court held that
the order was null and void for want of jurisdiction, as the first order had already become final and executory.

Petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga setting aside its order of September 10, 1956 dismissing the
case against petitioners nine months thereafter, or on June 11, 1957. The issue is whether or not the court had jurisdiction to enter that order. While
the court may find it necessary to hear the views of a private prosecutor before acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal, it does not follow
that it can set aside its order dismissing the case even if the same has already become final. There is no law which requires notice to a private
prosecutor, because under the rules all criminal actions are prosecuted "under the direction and control of the fiscal" (Section 4, Rule 106). It
appearing that the order already final, the court acted without jurisdiction in in issuing the the subsequent order.

And likewise, in People v. Sanchez, 5 it was held that "a judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal, ... Under the circumstances, the sentence having become final, no court, not even this high Tribunal, can modify it even if erroneous ...". We
hold that these rulings are applicable to the case at bar.

While it is true that the offended party, Silvino San Diego, through the private prosecutor, filed a motion 'for reconsideration within the reglementary
fifteen-day period, such move did not stop the running of the period for appeal. He did not have the legal personality to appeal or file the motion for
reconsideration on his behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case through the private prosecutor is under the direction and control of the Fiscal, and
only the motion for reconsideration or appeal filed by the Fiscal could have interrupted the period for appeal. 6
The right of the offended party to appeal is recognized under the old Code of Criminal Procedure. Under Section 4 of Rule 110 which provides that
the prosecution shall be "under the direction and control of the fiscal" without the limitation imposed by section 107 of General Order No. 58
subjecting the direction of the prosecution to the right "of the person injured to appeal from any decision of the court denying him a legal right", said
right to appeal by an offended party from an order of dismissal is no longer recognized in the offended party. ... (U)nder the new Rules of Court, the
fiscal has the direction and control of the prosecution, without being subject to the right of intervention on the part of the offended party to appeal
from an order dismis ing a criminal case upon petition of the fiscal would be tantamount to giving said party as much right the direction and control
of a criminal proceeding as that of fiscal. 7

More important, he lost his right to intervene in the criminal case. Prior to the filing of the criminal case on September 24, 1974, the spouses Silvino
San Diego and Eugenia Alcantara, on the basis of the same allegations that San Diego's signature on the deed of August 14, 1948 was a forgery,
filed on May 2, 1974 an action against Eugenio Cabral and Sabina Silvestre, with the Bulacan Court of First Instance (Civil Case No. 120-V-74) for
the recovery of the same property and damages. It appearing, therefore, from the record that at the time the order of dismissal was issued there
was a pending civil action arising out of the same alleged forged document filed by the offended party against the same defendant, the offended
party has no right to intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case,, and consequently cannot ask for the reconsideration of the order of
dismissal, or appeal from said order.8

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted, and Orders of May 21, 1975, August 4, 1975 and September 3, 1975, of respondent Judge are
hereby set aside. No pronouncement as to costs.

Fernando, C.J., Barredo (Chairman), Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Comments of Respondents were considered their answer to the petition.

2 Secs. 2(f) and 8, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Court.

3 Article 90, Revised Penal Code.

4 103 Phil. 1143.

5 101 Phil. 745, 748.

6 See People v. Atoza 100 Phil. 533; People v. Velez, 77 Phil. 1026; Ricafort v. Lernan 101 Phil. 575; People v. Florendo, 77 Phil. 16;
People v. de Moll 68 Phil. 626.

7 Francisco, Revised Rules of Court; Criminal Procedure, Second Edition, 1969, p. 904.

8 People v. Velez, supra; People v. Capistrano, 90 Phil. 823.

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CASE DIGESTS

EUGENIO CABRAL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. BENIGNO M. PUNO

FACTS:
Certiorari and prohibition to nullify the Order of respondent Judge dated May 21, 1975, reviving the Information in Criminal Case No. B-537-74 of
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Baliwag Branch, and to prohibit said court from conducting further proceedings on the case.

On the complaint of private respondent Silvino San Diego, the Provincial Fiscal filed an Information on September 24, 1974 with respondent court,
accusing petitioner Eugenio Cabral of the crime of Falsification of Public Document for allegedly falsifying on August 14, 1948 the signature of
Silvino San Diego in a deed of sale of a parcel of land. Before arraignment, petitioner moved to quash the Information on the ground of prescription
of the crime charge, as the said document of sale of Lot No. 378-C was notarized on August 14, 1948, registered with the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan on August 26, 1948 and as a consequence the original certificate of title was cancelled and a new transfer certificate of title issued, and
since then Eugenio Cabral had publicly and continuously possessed said property and exercised acts of ownership thereon, which facts are
apparently admitted in the letter of San Diego's lawyer to Cabral on September 17, 1953. After hearing said motion, Judge Juan F. Echiverri, in a
Resolution dated March 25, 1975, granted the motion to quash and dismissed the Information on the ground of prescription. The order of dismissal
was predicated upon said court's finding that the factual averments contained in the notion to quash were supported by the evidence. Private
prosecutor, who was not present during the hearing of the motion to quash, filed a motion dated April 8, 1975, for the reconsideration of said
Resolution. This was opposed by petitioner on the ground that San Diego can no longer intervene in the criminal case, having filed a civil action in
April 1974 against the same accused (Eugenio Cabral) on the basis of the same factual averments contained in the criminal Information.

ISSUE: The issue being purely legal and considering that the matter has been amply discuss in the pleadings, 1 this case was deemed submitted
for decision without need of memoranda.

RULING: We agree with the Solicitor General. The Rules of Court is explicit that an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a
bar to another prosecution for the same offense. 2 Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code also provides that "prescription of the crime" is one of the
grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability." Petitioner was charged with the crime of falsification under Article 172, sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of
the Revised Penal Code, which carries an imposable penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more
than P5,000.00. This crime prescribes ten (10) years. 3 Here, San Diego had actual if not constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the
document was registered in the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948.

More important, he lost his right to intervene in the criminal case. Prior to the filing of the criminal case on September 24, 1974, the spouses Silvino
San Diego and Eugenia Alcantara, on the basis of the same allegations that San Diego's signature on the deed of August 14, 1948 was a forgery,
filed on May 2, 1974 an action against Eugenio Cabral and Sabina Silvestre, with the Bulacan Court of First Instance

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989

ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent.

Federico A. Blay for complainant.

Luciano Babiera for respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on the ground of gross immorality.

Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern University (Cebu), alleged in her verified complaint that respondent Atty. Jose B.
Aznar, then chairman of said university, had carnal knowledge of her for several times under threat that she would fail in her Pathology subject if
she would not submit to respondent's lustful desires. Complainant further alleged that when she became pregnant, respondent, through a certain
Dr. Gil Ramas, had her undergo forced abortion.

In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974, respondent filed his Answer denying any personal knowledge of complainant as
well as all the allegations contained in the complaint and by way of special defense, averred that complainant is a woman of loose morality.

On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.

The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:

EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT

Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that:

1) she was a second year medical student of the Southwestern University, the Chairman of the Board of which was respondent Jose B.
Aznar (pp. 11, 15, tsn, June 6, 1975);

2) she however failed in her Pathology subject which prompted her to approach respondent in the latter's house who assured her that she
would pass the said subject (pp. 15,16, 26, 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);

3) despite this assurance, however, she failed (p. 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);

4) sometime in February, 1973, respondent told her that she should go with him to Manila, otherwise, she would flunk in all her subjects (pp.
42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ... ;

5) on February 12, 1973, both respondent and complainant boarded the same plane (Exh. "A") for Manila; from the Manila Domestic Airport,
they proceeded to Room 905, 9th Floor of the Ambassador Hotel where they stayed for three days (Exhs. "K", "K-1" to "K-6"; p. 55, tsn, June 6, 1
975);

6) after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel, they dined at a Spanish restaurant at San Marcelino, Malate, Manila for around three hours (pp
56-57, tsn, June 6, 1975);

7) they returned to the hotel at around twelve o'clock midnight, where respondent had carnal knowledge of her twice and then thrice the next
morning (p. 59, tsn, June 6, 1975; pp. 154, 155 & 157, tsn, July 18, 1975);

8) complainant consented to the sexual desires of respondent because for her, she would sacrifice her personal honor rather than fail in her
subjects (p.6l, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ...;

9) sometime in March, 1973, complainant told respondent that she was suspecting pregnancy because she missed her menstruation (p. 76,
tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ...;

10) later, she was informed by Dr. Monsanto (an instructor in the college of medicine) that respondent wanted that an abortion be performed
upon her (p.82, tsn, July l7, 1975); ... ... ... ;

11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of respondent, and Dr. Monsato fetched her at her boarding house on the pretext that she would be
examined by Dr. Gil Ramas (pp. 87-88, tsn, July 17, 1975);

12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas she was given an injection and an inhalation mask was placed on her mouth and nose (pp. 88-90, tsn,
July 17, 1 975);

13) as a result, she lost consciousness and when she woke up, an abortion had already been performed upon her and she was weak,
bleeding and felt pain all over her body (pp. 90-91, tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ... (Rollo, pp. 38-40)

Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met complainant and a man whom complainant introduced as Atty. Aznar in front of the Ambassador Hotel
(pp. 183-184, tsn, Sept. 10, 1975; Rollo, p. 41).
Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the complainant, testified that abdominal examinations and x-ray examination of the
lumbro-sacral region of complainant showed no signs of abnormality (Rollo, p. 42).

The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:

Edilberto Caban testified that:

1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty. Aznar stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children; respondent never came to Manila
except in December, 1972; (pp. 8-9,. tsn, Nov. 24, 1977);

2. He usually slept with respondent everytime the latter comes to Manila (p. 13, tsn, Nov. 24, 1977; Rollo, pp. 42-43).

Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent stated that:

1. In February, 1973, he went to Ambassador Hotel to meet respondent; the latter had male companions at the hotel but he did not see any
woman companion of respondent Aznar;

2. He usually slept with respondent at the Ambassador Hotel and ate with him outside the hotel together with Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-15, tsn,
Jan. 13, 1978; Rollo, p. 43).

The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, respondent Aznar was never presented to refute
the allegations made against him.

In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any knowledge of the allegations in the complaint. As special defense, respondent
further alleged that the charge levelled against him is in furtherance of complainant's vow to wreck vengeance against respondent by reason of the
latter's approval of the recommendation of the Board of Trustees barring complainant from enrollment for the school year 1973-1974 because she
failed in most of her subjects. It is likewise contended that the defense did not bother to present respondent in the investigation conducted by the
Solicitor General because nothing has been shown in the hearing to prove that respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant.

Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor General made a categorical finding to the effect that respondent had carnal knowledge of
complainant, to wit:

From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was compelled to go to Manila with respondent upon the threat of respondent that if she failed to do
so, she would flunk in all her subjects and she would never become a medical intern (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975). As respondent was Chairman
of the College of Medicine, complainant had every reason to believe him.

It has been established also that complainant was brought by respondent to Ambassador Hotel in Manila for three days where he repeatedly had
carnal knowledge of her upon the threat that if she would not give in to his lustful desires, she would fail in her Pathology subject (Exhs. "A", "K", "K-
1" to "K-6" pp. 51, 52, 55-59, tsn, June 6, 1975);

xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear during the hearing. It is true that he presented Edilberto Caban and Oscar Salangsang who
testified that respondent usually slept with them every time the latter came to Manila, but their testimony (sic) is not much of help. None of them
mentioned during the hearing that they stayed and slept with respondent on February 12 to February 14, 1973 at Ambassador Hotel. ... ... ...
Besides, Edilberto Caban testified that respondent stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children in December, 1972. The dates in
question, however, are February 12 to 14, 1973, inclusive. His (Caban's) testimony, therefore, is immaterial to the present case" (Rollo, pp. 43-44).

In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against respondent Aznar has been substantiated by sufficient evidence both
testimonial and documentary; while finding insufficient and uncorroborated the accusation of intentional abortion. The Solicitor General then
recommends the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a period of not less than three (3) years.

On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Move in the premises to determine whether any intervening event occurred which
would render the case moot and academic (Rollo, p. 69).

On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion praying that the case at bar be considered submitted for decision on the
bases of the report and recommendation previously submitted together with the record of the case and the evidence adduced (Rollo, p. 75).

After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the finding of the Solicitor General that respondent Aznar, under the facts as stated in
the Report of the investigation conducted in the case, is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" and may therefore be removed or suspended by the
Supreme Court for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt as to his culpability of the offense imputed upon him. With the exception of the
self-serving testimonies of two witnesses presented on respondent's behalf, the records are bereft of evidence to exonerate respondent of the act
complained of, much less contradict, on material points, the testimonies of complainant herself.

While respondent denied having taken complainant to the Ambassador Hotel and there had sexual intercourse with the latter, he did not present any
evidence to show where he was at that date. While this is not a criminal proceeding, respondent would have done more than keep his silence if he
really felt unjustly traduced.

It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy this Court that he is a fit and proper person to enjoy continued
membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor downgrade the high and exacting moral standards of the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21
SCRA 439 [1967]). As once pronounced by the Court:

When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and
integrity, which at all times is expected of him. ... In the case of United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty, he may not always expect the State to
perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed if he
demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help
themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may
assist him (Quingwa SCRA 439 [1967]).

The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is partly to blame for having gone with respondent to Manila knowing fully well that
respondent is a married man ,with children, respondent should merely be suspended from the practice of law for not less than three (3) years
(Rollo, p. 47).

On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion dated April 18, 1989 alleges that since a period of about ten (10) years had already
elapsed from the time the Solicitor General made his recommendation for a three (3) years suspension and respondent is not practicing his
profession as a lawyer, the court may now consider the respondent as having been suspended during the said period and the case dismissed for
being moot and academic.

We disagree.

Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent reneged on a promise to marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra). More
importantly. complainant's knowledge of of respondent's marital status is not at issue in the case at bar. Complainant submitted to respondent's
solicitation for sexual intercourse not because of a desire for sexual gratification but because of respondent's moral ascendancy over her and fear
that if she would not accede, she would flunk in her subjects. As chairman of the college of medicine where complainant was enrolled, the latter had
every reason to believe that respondent could make good his threats. Moreover, as counsel for respondent would deem it "worthwhile to inform the
the Court that the respondent is a scion of a rich family and a very rich man in his own right and in fact is not practicing his profession before the
court" (Rollo, p. 70), mere suspension for a limited period, per se, would therefore serve no redeeming purpose. The fact that he is a rich man and
does not practice his profession as a lawyer, does not render respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral character
precedes admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good moral
character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the practice of law. The ancient and learned profession of law exacts
from its members the highest standard of morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).

Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, ... " In Arciga v. Maniwang (106 SCRA 591, [1981]), this Court
had occasion to define the concept of immoral conduct, as follows:

A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar
should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is grossly immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and
obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to
the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good
and respectable members of the community' (7 C.J.S. 959).

Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the
father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).

In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the
college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat
that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused.

WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGESTS

ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR

FACTS:

Complainant is a second year medical student of the Southwestern University in which respondent Atty. Aznar is the then Chairman of the
College of Medicine. Complainant was compelled to go to Manila with respondent for three days where he repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her
upon the threat of respondent that if she would not give in to his lustful desires, she would flunk in all her subjects and she would never become a
medical intern. After due investigation, the Solicitor General found the respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct and recommends that since the
complainant is partly to blame for having gone with respondent to Manila knowing fully well that respondent is a married man ,with children, a rich
man and is not practicing his profession before the court, he should merely be suspended from the practice of law for not less than three (3) years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the imposition of the penalty is proper.

HELD: NO.

The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a lawyer, does not render respondent a person of good moral
character. Evidence of good moral character precedes admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such requirement is not dispensed
with upon admission thereto. Good moral character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the practice of law.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for disbarment or suspension from his office as attorney, among
others, by grossly immoral conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.

In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent to have taken advantage of his position in asking complainant to go with him under
the threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused.

Respondent Jose B. Aznar is DISBARRED.