CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW AND BEYOND

CASE: MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL, respondents.

G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997

TOPIC: Self-executory provisions of the Constitution; National patrimony

FACTS:

Respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization

program of the Philippine Government, sold through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the
eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel.

When the bidding was conducted, two (2) bidders participated, namely: petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton
as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more
than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder,
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a manager’s check as bid security.

GSIS refused.

In the petitioner’s apprehension, it filed a petition praying that the bid will be given to its
favor.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

RULING: YES. It is a self-executing provision.

 Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle,
such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision
which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred
and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law.

The named provision is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very
words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution
declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to
enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if
there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself
by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings.
Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
CASE: JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA,
et.al, petitioners vs. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his
capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

TOPIC: Self-executory provisions of the Constitution; intergenerational responsibility

FACTS:

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents.

The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro
Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant
(respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused
a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License
Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief
prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.
 Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the
court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge
gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action?

RULING: YES.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not
agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said
right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many
other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O.
192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the
governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the
country's natural resources.

The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of
the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the
objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and
functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced
and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.

The case at bar is of common interest to all Filipinos. The right to a balanced and healthy
ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The said
right implies the judicious management of the country’s forests. This right is also the mandate of
the government through DENR. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the
correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. All
licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.
CASE: KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS,
ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM
TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN,
RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN
S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, REP.
JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners, vs. MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as
Chairman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the PHILIPPINE
GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. No. 118910 November 16, 1995

TOPIC: Self-executing provisions of the constitution

FACTS:

PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased
online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket
or at least P35,000 per terminal annually.

30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ
its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may
purchase the equipment for P25 million.

A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease
Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease. It is still violative of PCSO's
charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding.

It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be
questioned because it has become the law of the case. According to the respondents, ELA is
different from the Contract of Lease; therefore bidding is not required. The power to determine if
ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds.
Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because
they were not parties to the contract.
ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the ELA between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine
Gaming Management Corp. is invalid.

RULING: NO.

Pertinent to the issue, the Supreme Court held:

“x x x

(3) that the ELA is valid as a lease contract under the Civil Code and is not contrary to the
charter of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office;

(4) that under §1(A) of its charter (R.A. 1169), the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
has authority to enter into a contract for the holding of an on-line lottery, whether alone or
in association, collaboration or joint venture with another party, so long as it itselfholds or
conducts such lottery; and

(5) That the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) in question did not have to be submitted
to public bidding as a condition for its validity.”

E.O. No. 301, §1 applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and
equipment. It does not refer to contracts of lease of equipment like the ELA. The provisions on
lease are found in §§ 6 and 7 but they refer to the lease of privately-owned buildings or spaces for
government use or of government-owned buildings or spaces for private use, and these provisions
do not require public bidding. It is thus difficult to see how E.O. No. 301 can be applied to the
ELA when the only feature of the ELA that may be thought of as close to a contract of purchase
and sale is the option to buy given to the PCSO. An option to buy is not of course a contract of
purchase and sale.

Indeed the question is not whether compared with the former joint venture agreement the
present lease contract is “[more] advantageous to the government.” The question is whether under
the circumstances, the ELA is the most advantageous contract that could be obtained compared
with similar lease agreements which the PCSO could have made with other parties. Petitioners
have not shown that more favorable terms could have been obtained by the PCSO or that at any
rate the ELA, which the PCSO concluded with the PGMC, is disadvantageous to the government.
CASE: ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA
MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention, WORLD WAR II
VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY
SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C.
TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA,
respondents. JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention, SENATOR
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention

G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003

TOPIC: Rules in interpreting the Constitution; Impeachment proceedings

FACTS:

The 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules
approved by the 11th Congress.

The House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on

Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).

Former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment

complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high
crimes.”

The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October
2003 for being insufficient in substance.

The following day, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.

Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme
Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing
of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5
of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.”

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the
12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of
the Constitution.
2. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of
the Constitution.

RULING:

FIRST ISSUE: YES. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is
unconstitutional.

Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate
its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said
rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for
other specific limitations on its power to make rules.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law.
If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication
have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.

SECOND ISSUE: YES. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on
June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October
23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
CASE: SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD,
petitioners, vs. SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B.
FERNAN, respondents.

G.R. No. 134577 November 18, 1998

TOPIC: Political question; Justiciable controversy

FACTS:

During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan was
declared the duly elected President of the Senate. The following were likewise elected: Senator
Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.

Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly
the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He
explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those
who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."

During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier
manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering seven (7)
and, thus, also a minority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus
on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with
Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate
met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.

The majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority
leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the
minority leader of the Senate.

The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition
for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully
holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them,
rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?

RULING: NO.

The Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate President,
since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction

(1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention;" and
(2) because the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a session and therein elect a Senate President.

The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
by the senators was not a political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the
Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations.
Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of
the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.

While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number
constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members
who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the
minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become
the minority leader.
CASE: JOSUE JAVELLANA, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, respondents.

G.R. No. L-36142 March 31, 1973

TOPIC: Political question; Justiciable controversy

FACTS:

On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of
plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from
implementing any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935
Constitution. This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter
and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated. Javellana
also alleged that the President had announced the immediate implementation of the new
constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including.

Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said

proposed constitution upon ground the that the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is
without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve proposed
constitution; without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed
constitution; and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was not a free election, hence
null and void.

Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any
order, decree, and proclamation which have the same import and objective.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable or political
question, and therefore non-justiciable.

RULING: Political question

 To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or not
the said new constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935
Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the constitution
should be settled applying the provisions of the constitution in force at the time of the alleged
ratification of the old constitution.

The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the
provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the
US (from whom we patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show.

The Court held that the issue is political and “beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry.”
CASE: DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner, vs. REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M.
PINEDA, MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL. JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR., or
any other representative who may be appointed vice representative Juanita G.
Camasura, Jr., and THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, respondents.

TOPIC: Supremacy of the Constitution; Expanded judicial power

FACTS:

This case involves a question of power. May the House of Representatives, at the request
of the dominant political party therein, change that party's representation in the House Electoral
Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election
contest pending therein? May the Supreme Court review and annul that action of the House?

During the May 11, 1987 elections, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of
the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga.
Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the
remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1
member is from the NP).

Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman
Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim
Bondoc the winner of the contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received
a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize
the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del
Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of
HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the
House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of
Congressman Camasura to the HRET.
ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire upon the validity of the said act of the HRET
without violating the doctrine of separation of powers.

RULING: YES. The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching upon
the function of the legislature particularly a part thereof, HRET.

The issue here is a judicial question. It must be noted that what is being complained of is
the act of HRET not the act of Congress. In here, when Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a
decision has already been made, members of the tribunal have already voted regarding the electoral
contest involving Pineda and Bondoc wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their
representative from the HRET after the tribunal has already reached a decision. They cannot hold
the same election since the issue has already become moot and academic.

LDP is merely changing their representative to change the outcome of the election.
Camasura should be reinstated because his removal was not due to a lawful or valid cause.
Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. Expulsion of
Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.

HRET is composed of 9 members. 3 members coming from the SC. 5 coming from the
majority party (LDP). And 1 coming from the minority.
CASE: JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner, vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO
YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR, respondents.

G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

TOPIC: Supremacy of the Constitution; Expanded judicial power

FACTS:

Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted
for the position of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.

On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect

of the Nat'l Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on
Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory
of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the
election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly.

Electoral Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the
protests against the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.
On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the
protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's
petition.

Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution
confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of
contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to
hear the case.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
the controversy
RULING: The SC ruled in favor of Angara.

The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several departments and among
the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional
mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases
and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific

powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative
than to any of the other two departments of the government. That the Electoral Commission is the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly.
CASE: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, MA.
CORAZON M. AKOL, MIGUEL UY, EDUARDO H. LOPEZ, AUGUSTO C.
LAGMAN, REX C. DRILON, MIGUEL HILADO, LEY SALCEDO, and MANUEL
ALCUAZ JR., Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; COMELEC
CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN ABALOS SR.; COMELEC BIDDING and AWARD
COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN EDUARDO D. MEJOS and MEMBERS GIDEON DE
GUZMAN, JOSE F. BALBUENA, LAMBERTO P. LLAMAS, and BARTOLOME
SINOCRUZ JR.; MEGA PACIFIC eSOLUTIONS, INC.; and MEGA PACIFIC
CONSORTIUM, Respondents.

TOPIC: Grave abuse of discretion

FACTS:

Congress passed R.A. 8046 (An act authorizing the COMELEC to conduct a nationwide
demonstration of a computerized election system and pilot-test it in the March 1996 elections in
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and for other purposes). On December
22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. 8436 (An act authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated
election system in the May 11, 1998 national or local elections and in subsequent national and
local electoral exercises, providing funds therefore and for other purposes).

On October 29, 2002, COMELEC adopted its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization

program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for the three phases of its
Automated Election System: namely, Phase I-Voter Registration and Validation System; Phase II-
Automated Counting and Canvassing System; and Phase III-Electronic Transmissions.

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO No. 172, which allocated the sum of P 2.5
billion to fund the AES for May 10, 2004 elections. She authorized the release of an additional P
500 million, upon the request of COMELEC.

The COMELEC issued an “Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid”. There are 57
bidders who participated therein. The Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) found MPC and the
Total Information Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible. Both were referred to Technical
Working Group (TWG) and the Department of Science and Technology (DOST).

However, the DOST said in its Report on the Evaluation of Technical Proposals on Phase
II that both MPC and TIMC had obtained a number of failed marks in technical evaluation.
Notwithstanding these failures, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 6074, awarding the
project to MPC.

Wherefore, petitioners Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines wrote a

letter to the COMELEC chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. They protested the award of the contract
to respondent MPC. However in a letter-reply, the COMELEC rejected the protest.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in awarding the contract to
MPC in violation of law and in disregard of its own bidding rules and procedure.

RULING:

The Court has explained that COMELEC flagrantly violated the public policy on public
biddings

(1) by allowing MPC/MPEI to participate in the bidding even though it was not qualified to
do so; and
(2) by eventually awarding the contract to MPC/MPEI.

It is clear that the Commission further desecrated the law on public bidding by permitting the
winning bidder to alter the subject of the contract, in effect allowing a substantive amendment
without public bidding.

On the other hand, petitioners — suing in their capacities as taxpayers, registered voters
and concerned citizens — respond that the issues central to this case are "of transcendental
importance and of national interest." Allegedly, Comelec's flawed bidding and questionable award
of the Contract to an unqualified entity would impact directly on the success or the failure of the
electoral process. Thus, any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the will of the
people would inevitably affect their faith in the democratic system of government. Petitioners
further argue that the award of any contract for automation involves disbursement of public funds
in gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest requires that the laws governing the transaction
must be followed strictly.