LEGISLATIVE

DEPARTMENT
CASE: MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA and MARIA
ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS
DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as
founding members of the Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), respondents, SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-
IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS
FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI),
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP) and LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors..
G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997
TOPIC: Initiative; Referendum
FACTS:
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special attention, as this system of initiative was
unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to a few scholars, before the drafting of the
1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself, through the original proponent and
the main sponsor of the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the Constitution,
characterized this system as innovative. Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were
recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a
constitutional convention. For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to give
due course to this petition.
In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend Constitution, to lift
term limits of elective officials, by people’s initiative. Delfin wanted COMELEC to control and
supervise said people’s initiative the signature-gathering all over the country. The proposition is:
“Do you approve of lifting the term limits of all elective government officials, amending for the
purpose Sections 4 ) and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article 8 of
Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution?” Said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted
to the people, and after it is signed by at least 12% total number of registered voters in the country,
it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the petition. Petitioners Sen. Roco et
al moved for dismissal of the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition
properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
a. Constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed.
b. Republic Act No. 6735 provides for 3 systems on initiative but failed to provide any
subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. This
deliberate omission indicates matter of people’s initiative was left to some future law.
 c. COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of people’s
initiative. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing
law.
d. People’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof.
Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision.
e. Congress nor any government agency has not yet appropriated funds for people’s
initiative.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the people can directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
It was intended to include or cover people’s initiative on amendments to the Constitution
but, as worded, it does not adequately cover such intiative. Article XVII Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution providing for amendments to Constitution, is not self-executory. While the
Constitution has recognized or granted the right of the people to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution via PI, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not
provide for its implementation.
FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was
a delayed afterthought. The word is not relevant to the section which is silent as to amendments of
the Constitution.
SECOND: Unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide
for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Sec 5(c) does not include the
provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
THIRD: No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence
as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national
and local laws. The argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is not accepted
to be subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in
scope. Under Subtitle II and III, the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative
involved, but on its nature and character.
CASE: RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952
REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
TOPIC: Initiative; Referendum
FACTS:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite
that will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2
and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also
claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million
individuals.
The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying
Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive
Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed
changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form
of government.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC
indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735
inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause
on proposals to amend the Constitution;
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE:
The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that
allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
 Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three
per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The
framers plainly stated that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to them.” The framers
also “envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must
“prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential
elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent
or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal
must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is
first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition.
Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only
if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures – that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the
paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court
a copy of a signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their
Memorandum on 11 October 2006.
SECOND ISSUE:
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements
of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to
amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA
6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of
initiative to amend the Constitution.
An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition.
Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not
comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on
amendments to the Constitution.
CASE: VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA
MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN
AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT
KAUNLARAN, and LUZON FARMERS PARTY, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON, PINATUBO,
NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-
KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-
POWER, INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP,
NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAKBAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS,
ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA
PILIPINAS -- All Being Party-List Parties/Organizations -- and Hon. MANUEL B.
VILLAR, JR. in His Capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives,
respondents.
G.R. No. 136781 October 6, 2000
TOPIC: Party-list
FACTS:
There are 4 parameters to determine the winners in a party-list election under RA 7941:
1. 20% allocation
2. 2% threshold
3. 3-seat limit
4. Proportional representation
The Congress enacted RA 7941 on Mar. 3, 1995 which states that the State shall “promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives.
The State shall also develop the simplest scheme possible to guarantee a full, free and open
party system by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature.”
ISSUE/S:
1. Is the 20% allocation mandatory? Should the 20% allocation for party-list be filled up
completely all the time?
2. Are the 2% threshold and the 3-seat limit constitutional?
3. How should the additional seats be determined?
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE: NO.
Sec. 5(2) Art. 6 merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress. The Congress has
prerogative to determine whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement, and the
mechanics by which it is to be filled up.
SECOND ISSUE: YES.
The 2% threshold and the 3-seat limit are consistent with the very essence of “representation.” The
3-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the legislative. Thus, no single
group would dominate.
THIRD ISSUE:
To determine the additional seats, 3 steps will be followed:
a. rank the highest to lowest. The highest is called the “first” party.
b. determine the seats the “first” party will have. For the “first” party, it will have a 6%
benchmark. Every succeeding additional 2% of votes from the first 2% requirement
will constitute 1 additional seat. If the “first” party gets 2 additional seats, then the next
in rank will get less.
c. to solve for the additional seats of other qualified parties, the formula provided below
will be used:
additional seats no. of votes no. of for the = of the party x additional concerned no.
of votes of seats of the party the “first” party “first” party
CASE: BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND
TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(sitting as the National Board of Canvassers), Respondent. ARTS BUSINESS AND
SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor. AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS), Intervenor.
G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009
TOPIC: Party-list
FACTS:
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers,
made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the
following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the
remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987
Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners
at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then
it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from
the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of
the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-
list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred
that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list,
to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list
election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical
impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory,
then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the
prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation
(which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the
3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political
parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral
parties.
ISSUE/S:
How are party-list seats allocated?
RULING:
Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is
guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also
get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
RANKING: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
2% GUARANTY. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least
two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to
one guaranteed seat each.
ADDITIONAL SEATS 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according
to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to
their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
LIMITATION. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more
than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because
they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party
List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision
in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first
round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are
given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted
from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each.
There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please
refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round,
particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in
determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the
process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining
number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of
seats allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
 In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is
7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number
of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a
two-percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3
seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because
the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the two-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there
are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those
higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
CASE: ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013
TOPIC: Party-list
FACTS:
52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the
Supreme Court (SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed
resolutions issued in October, November and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these
party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a “marginalized and underrepresented
sector,” their nominees do not come from a “marginalized and underrepresented sector,” and/or
some of the organizations or groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to
represent in Congress.
Petitioners argued that the poll body committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
some of the petitioners’ application for accreditation and cancelling the existing accreditation of
the rest. They also lamented the poll body’s “denial” to accord them due process in the
evaluation proceedings.
The high court consolidated these cases; Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio was
tasked as the Member-in-charge of the case.
Status quo ante orders (SQAO) were issued in all 54 petitions which restored the status
quo prior to the disqualification of petitioners. However, only 39 of the 52 petitioners or only 41
petitions were able to secure a mandatory injunction, directing the Comelec to include their
names in the printing of official ballots.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said
party-lists.
RULING: NO.
The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the
Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in
the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
 2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral
party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or
lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
“marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to
the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent
the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined
political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a
track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some
of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified.
In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the
practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional
prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list
system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections
will encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized
and underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The
Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list
elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the
BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the
framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list
system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for
the “marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political
constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major
political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the
needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system
itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to
include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically
at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among
others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se
economically marginalized but are still qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not
have well-defined political constituencies” as they are ideologically marginalized.
CASE: BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 177597 July 16, 2008
TOPIC: Regional assembly
FACTS:
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of
Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a
plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district
comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with power
to create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional
Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised
of the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is
now only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that
status quo should be retained; however, just for the purposes of the elections, the first district
should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City – this is also while awaiting a decisive
declaration from Congress as to Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or part of any).
Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan
with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate
legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her
rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning – in fact he won). She contended that under
the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains
legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato
is being deprived of a representative in the HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S.
Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.
RULING: YES.
RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section
10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected.
 Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or
barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must
follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict
with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units
affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution
for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government
units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative
bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided
no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to
provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code,
and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot
validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and
that a province, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that
in order to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district.
Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so Sema’s contention is untenable. On the
other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a
legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts
is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and
provinces.
CASE: IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
TOPIC: Residence requirement
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place was
seven (7) months.
On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District
of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and
disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not comply with the
constitutional requirement for residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency
requirement for candidates for the House of Representative.
In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months
to since childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation
showing that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First
District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the
proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one year
residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative.
RULING: YES.
The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte.
Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept
of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a
candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987
Constitution.
An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences
in different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of
persuasiveness as required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor
of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile
of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible
to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was
obviously referring to petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.
Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for
a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned
resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of
Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First District
of Leyte.
CASE: SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD
and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), respondents.
G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008
TOPIC: Qualifications
FACTS:
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools,
officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s
office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue. As far as pertinent, the
challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—Authorized drug testing shall be done by any
government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and
monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing
shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will
determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test
which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to
undergo drug testing:
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.—Students of secondary and
tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as
contained in the school’s student handbook and with notice to the parents,
undergo a random drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.—Officers and
employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall
be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company’s
work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the
workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous
drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for
suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the
Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a criminal
offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six
(6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the
national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
ISSUE/S:
Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification
for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for
candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution?
RULING: YES.
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution,
effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution (refer to the aforementioned facts). As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires
a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity
of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted
upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the
chain with the proviso that “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of
his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper context,
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification
layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate.
Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or
after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot
assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
Congress’ inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain
limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract,
the limits on legislative power in the following wise: “Someone has said that the powers of the
legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In
constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegated authority, the
powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of the
constitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily
implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which
the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.”
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and
constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the
allowable subjects of legislation. The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the
Bill of Rights and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the
qualifications of candidates for senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering
election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose
qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress
cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be
sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should
not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the
Constitution.
CASE: DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO, and SALVADOR M. VIARI,
Petitioners, vs. RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent.
G.R. No. 175352
TOPIC: Disqualifications
FACTS:
Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City
Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard
J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who was elected
Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his
incumbency as Senator.
Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors,
respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides that “[n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or employment in
the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.”
Petitioners cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999,
which held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon
automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held the position of Chairman
of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5,[1] held that the office
of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the
prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the
PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government
official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded,
and privately-run charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors
four-fifths of which are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit
his legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.
The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264
and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article
XIV of the 1935 Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide
for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are
owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.” The Court
thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities
and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.
Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of the
Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the
pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the
PNRC Charter.
ISSUE/S:
Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the constitutionality
of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?
RULING:
NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it
was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a
GOCC nor a private corporation.
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not
among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case.
We have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of constitutionality in
Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:
This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is
a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law
to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is
raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment,
that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such
question will be unavoidable.
[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . . the PNRC Charter.
Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was
some other ground upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC,
the entity most adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even
originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly
reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of
existence in this country.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June
11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855,
R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws
relating to the PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional
proscription on the creation of private corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not
strictly in the nature of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not just in
terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by
the State and the international community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure
is sui generis. It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has
remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935
Constitution and during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The
PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on constitutional
grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.
 [T]his Court [must] recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and
respect the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva
Convention has the force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. This constitutional
provision must be reconciled and harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution,
instead of using the latter to negate the former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the
Corporation Code just like any other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight
of the PNRC’s special status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State,
designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, can neither “be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its
character of neutrality” as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is
regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.
Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the
government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof . . . so much so that respondent, under the
Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he
served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private
corporation” within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized
under the Corporation Code. [T]he sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach
controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the
government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international law.
This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the
constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that
the PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to
provide a substantial portion of the country’s blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is
unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic
manner that would not only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of
disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the
international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore
stay.
CASE: ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and
THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, THE AUDITOR, and THE DISBURSING OFFICER
OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, respondents, RAUL S.
MANGLAPUS, JESUS G. BARRERA, PABLO S. TRILLANA III, VICTOR DE LA
SERNA, MARCELO B. FERNAN, JOSE Y. FERIA, LEONARDO SIGUION
REYNA, VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and JUAN V. BORRA, Intervenors.
G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971
TOPIC: Election
FACTS:
After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held on November 10,
1970, the convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. On the early morning of
September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which seeks to amend
Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution, lowering the voting age to 18.
On September 30, 1971, COMELEC resolved to inform the Constitutional Convention that
it will hold the plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971. Arturo
Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition against COMELEC and prayed that Organic Resolution
No. 1 and acts in obedience to the resolution be null and void.
ISSUE/S:
1. Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?
2. Is the Organic Resolution No. 1 constitutional?
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE:
The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec, the issue of whether or not
a resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the constitution is a justiciable
one and thus subject to judicial review. The jurisdiction is not because the Court is superior to the
Convention but they are both subject to the Constitution.
SECOND ISSUE:
The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single amendment in Organic
Resolution No. 1 violated Sec. 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which states that all amendments
must be submitted to the people in a single election or plebiscite. Moreover, the voter must be
provided sufficient time and ample basis to assess the amendment in relation to the other parts of
the Constitution, not separately but together.
CASE: JOSE AVELINO, petitioner, vs. MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent.
G.R. No. L-2821 March 4, 1949
TOPIC: Quorum
FACTS:
In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order to formulate
charges against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the Senate
President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from
delivering his speech. Before Senator Tañada could deliver his privilege speech to formulate
charges against the incumbent Senate President, the petitioner, motu propio adjourned the session
of the Senate and walked out with his followers.
Senator Cabili request to made the following incidents into a record:
 The deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate
President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the
session in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate.
 Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz suggested that respondent be designated to preside
over the session which suggestion was carried unanimously.
 The respondent, Senator Mariano Cuenco, thereupon took the Chair.
Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting Secretary upon motion of Senator Arranz, because the
Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner when the latter
abandoned the session.
Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his
privilege speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No.
68), and submitted his motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.
The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare
him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco, contending that the
latter had not been validly elected because twelve members did not constitute a quorum – the
majority required of the 24-member Senate.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Resolutions 67 and 68 was validly approved.
RULING: YES. It was validly constituted, supposing that the Court has jurisdiction.
Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was the majority required by the
Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate, because, firstly, the minute say so,
secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including
Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of
Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty-three
senators.
 When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each House” shall constitute a quorum,
“the House: does not mean “all” the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute “the
House”. There is a difference between a majority of “the House”, the latter requiring less number
than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23),
constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
CASE: RAUL A. VILLEGAS, petitioner, vs. ASSEMBLYMAN VALENTINO L. LEGASPI,
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, BRANCH 11, presided by HON.
FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, District Judge; BRIGIDA VERA CRUZ, joined in and
assisted by her husband JOSE VERA CRUZ, and PRIMITIVO CANIA JR.,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-53869 March 25, 1982
TOPIC: Appearance as counsel
FACTS:
This case is a consolidation of two cases involving the issue of whether or not a member
of Congress may appear before the regular courts as counsel for ordinary litigants.
Case 1
In September 1979, Raul Villegas filed a civil case against spouses Vera Cruz et al before
the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu. The Vera Cruz spouses filed their answer to the complaint
and they were represented by Valentino Legaspi, then a member of the Batasang Pambansa.
Villegas then challenged the representation made by Legaspi as counsel for the spouses on the
ground that it is unconstitutional; as pointed out by Villegas “no member of the Batasang
Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction”. The presiding
judge however overruled Villegas’ challenged and proceeded with the trial. The judge said that
CFIs have appellate jurisdiction.
Case 2
In July 1979, Edgardo Reyes filed a civil case against N. V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken
Excelsior-De Maas, a corporation, before CFI Rizal. Estanisalo Fernandez appeared as counsel for
the corporation. Reyes questions the appearance of Fernandez as counsel for the corporation on
the same ground invoked in Case 1 because Fernandez is also a member of the Batasang Pambansa.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the said members, Estanislao Fernandez and Valentino Legaspi, of the Batasang
Pambansa may appear as counsels before the said CFIs.
RULING: NO.
Members of Congress are prohibited to appear as counsel berfore CFI’s acting in their
original jurisdiction. CFI’s have dual personalities.
They can be courts of general original jurisdiction (courts of origin) or appellate courts
depending on the case that they took cognizance of. In the cases at bar, CFI Cebu and CFI Rizal
acted as a courts of general original jurisdiction. Both cases were not elevated to the said CFIs
from any lower courts. Thus, the CFIs in the case at bar are “courts without appellate jurisdiction”.