- Stevens contends that: The 1-year period to enforce a suit for the liability

V. Admirality and Maritime Commerce: H. COGSA
6 SCRA 180 – F.H. Stevens & Co., Inc. vs. Norddeuscher Lloyd
Concepcion
F.H. Stevens shipped thermometers through Norddeuscher Lloyd. Upon arrival of the goods,
it was discovered that some of the thermometers were missing or destroyed. So F.H.
Stevens commenced an action against Norddeuscher Lloyd, but it was dismissed. He filed
another action, this time before the CFI. Norddeuscher Lloyd claims that F.H. Stevens’ cause
of action has already expired (1-yr period). The Court ruled otherwise.
DOCTRINE
Where an action commenced in the municipal court was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction 20
days after the expiration of the period of 1 year w/in w/c plaintiff’s action could be brought,
(pursuant to CA 65, in relation to the COGSA) it is held that under Sec. 49, Act No. 190, the
period w/in w/c plaintiff could bring a new action in the proper court was renewed for another
year, beginning on the day after the first action was dismissed.
FACTS (According to plaintiff F.H. Stevens “Stevens”)
o On March 28, 1959, Stevens shipped 2,000 pieces of prismatical thermometers
- Aboard MS Schwabenstein (vessel owned by defendant Norddeuscher Lloyd)
- From Hamburg to Manila
- Valued at $650
o On May 15, 1959 the vessel arrived in Manila
o On May 21 (6 days later), the master of the vessel notified Stevens (thru its broker)
of the delivery of goods.
o Upon examination, it turned out that 1,154 pieces ($342.74) of the thermometers
were missing and/or destroyed.
o Stevens immediately filed the corresponding notice of loss and/or short delivery
Despite several demands, N. Lloyd (defendant; carrier) refused and failed to pay
($342.74; value of missing 1,154 thermometers)
o Thus Stevens incurred damages (1k atty.’s fees; P664.70 unrealized profits)
of carriers (based upon a contract of carriage of goods by sea) is prescribed
in CA 65, in relation to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA). This
period is suspended by the commencement of the FIRST action in the
municipal court (Apr 27, ’60).
- The running of the period was only RESUMED when the said first action
was dismissed (June 13, 1960)
- In support of this theory, Stevens invokes Art. 11551 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE with HOLDING: W/N Stevens’ cause of action has already prescribed. – NO.
1. Sec. 49 of Act No. 1902 bolsters Stevens’ reliance on Art. 1155.
- The action commenced by Stevens in the Municipal Court was dismissed
20 days after the expiration of the period of 1 year w/in w/c Stevens’ action
could be brought. (So basta pasok siya sa 1-yr. period nung unang beses siya
ng file ng action.)
- Under Sec. 49, Act. 190, the period w/in w/c Stevens could initiate the
present case WAS RENEWED for another year starting from the day after the
first action was dismissed. It was dismissed on June 13, 1960, so the count
down to 1 year would start on June 14, 1960 as DAY 1.
- Of note is that the dismissal in the municipal court was NOT due to
Stevens’ desistance or voluntary abandonment.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Order appealed from is REVERSED (Petitioner Stevens won). Case remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings.
DIGESTER: Viveka

On April 27, 1960, Stevens filed an action before the Municipal Court of Manila for the
recovery of the value of missing thermometers ($342.74) and damages (1k + 664.70)
- Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case (cos it
involved the exercise of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction) (June 13, 1960)

On June 24, 2 months later, Stevens commenced an action in the CFI of Manila (wherein
he narrated the above facts in his complaint).
- N. Lloyd filed an MTD. Ground: Stevens’ cause of action has already
prescribed it having been filed (June 24, 1960) a year from when it was
notified of the delivery of the thermometers (May 21, 1959).
- MTD Granted. Case was dismissed.
Hence, this appeal before the SC.

1 Art. 1155 The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a
written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by
the debtor.
2 Sec. 49. If an action commenced, in due time, a judgment for the plaintiff be reversed, or if the plaintiff fail
otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited for the commencement of such action has, at the date of
such reversal or failure, expired, the plaintiff, or if he [die] and the cause of action [survive], his representatives
may commence a new action w/in 1 year after such date, and this provision shall apply to any claim asserted
in any pleading by a defendant.
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