Can an »Anthropological Ontology« Supply Music with an Acceptable Semiology?

: A
Philosophical Appraisal of Musicology According to Jean Molino &Jean-Jacques Nattiez
Author(s): Fionn Bennett
Source: International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music, Vol. 44, No. 1 (JUNE
2013), pp. 119-136
Published by: Croatian Musicological Society
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 F.Bennett:
Canan»Anthropological
Ontology« Music I IRASM44
Supply
with
anAcceptable APhilosophical of | (2013)1: 119-136
Semiology?: Appraisal
Musicology toJeanMolino
According Nattiez
& Jean-Jacques

Fionn Bennett
de Reims
Université
Champagne-Ardenne
Cirlep
(EA-4299)
Can an »Anthropological 57,ruePierre
Taittinger
51096REIMSCedex
Ontology« Supply Music France
E-mail:
with an Acceptable fionn_bennett53@hotmail.com
Semiology?: A Philosophical UDC:78.01NATTIEZ,J.-J.,
of MOLINO,J.
Appraisal Musicology Research
Paper
to Jean Molino Izvorni
znanstveni
rad
According Received:
September 3,2012
& Jean-Jacques Nattiez 3.rujna
Primljeno: 2012.
March
Accepted: 15,2013
Prihvačeno:
15.ožujka2013.

Abstract- Résumé
Music theoristsJ.Molino and
J.-J.
Nattiez believe music has
a »unity«anda »universality«.
They arefounded upon man's
biologyandhis»neuro-cogni-
Introduction tive
faculties«.Onthebasisof
this
assumption they affirm that
| music hasmeaning ifa human
Confrontedby theblooming,buzzing profusion »interprétant«isaround to
confermeaning onitanddeny
ofeverythingthathas been going on in music theory thatmusic canbemeaningful in
anyother way. Toassessthe
forthe last decade or so, the casual observermight andcreditworthiness
feasibility
be forgivenforthinkingthereis no longeranything ofsucha theory, thispaper
adopts anessentially eco-criti-
sui generisabout it. He or she might even suspect calperspective. Thecaseis
thatcentrifugaltendencieshave alreadypropelled it made that founding musical
symbolism exclusively onan
beyond the disintegrationpoint.But that- pace Pat- »anthropological
problematic
ontology«
anddisserves
is
the
rickMcCreless (MCCRELESS 1997:295) - is just an ofanthropos,
interests the
intended beneficiary.Instead of
appearance. In any event,thereexist factorswhich itsupposes
that, that itwould
lend it a discursiveunicityand impose discernable bebetter tofollow theadvice of
orientationsupon it. One such is the »Ouverture«of eco-musicologist R.Murray
Schafer andusemusic togive
Claude Levi-Strauss's 1964 opus Le Cru et le Cuit. naturea voice anda language
andusetheintelligence it
This work in effectfaced music theorywith a stark communicates as a resource
choice. forrestoringanentente cordiale
withourmore-than-human
The firstwas to accept Lévi-Strauss'sview that surroundings.
it is music's vocation and finalityto be in a subser- Keywords: Musicand
Ontology • Eco-Critical
vient,'homological' and 'referential'relationshipto Musicology • Musicand
Reference • Musical
'structures'in non-musicalmedia and that thereis Narratology • Criticism of
somethingsubversiveabout any attemptto deny it Post-modern Musicology
• MusicTheory ofJean
(LÉVI-STRAUSS 1964:29ff. & LÉVI-STRAUSS Molino

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IPa cmAAi¿uió) 1
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Canan»Anthropological
Ontology« Music
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Semiology?: of
Appraisal
Musicology toJeanMolino
According & Jean-Jacques
Nattiez

1971:578ff.).The alternativewas to findcrediblereasons fordissentingfromthis

view.
Though having to chose between these two positions did in effectdivide
musicologists into »referentialists«or »absolutists« (FELD & FOX 1994:52),
generalisationsbased on theassumptionthatthisis actuallythecase are difficult to
make and at bestoflimitedutility. Thereare a couple ofreasonswhythisis so. First,
fewcommentators ortheoristsdefinethesetermsin exactlythesame way.1Secondly,
thepitfallsofadheringtoo explicitlyor categoricallyto one positionor theotherare
by now known to all sides in thecontroversy and as a resulteveryonehedges and
conditionstheirpositionin ways and to a degreewhichmakes it difficult to accuse
themofbeingunambiguouslyin one camp or theother.Finally,even when anytwo
commentatorsare clearlyin one camp or another,thatis no guaranteethatthey
don't oppose one anotheron everyotherpoint of musicologicalimportanceand
considerthatwhat separates and opposes themis more importantthan the view
theyshareon whethermusic is by naturereferential or absolutist.
Still,despite the caveats thatare requiredto take factslike these intoconsid-
eration,the split in the musicological communitywe are speaking of here does
apply and the differences between theoristswithineach of the two camps do not
obscure the factthatin each we findreactionsand positionson the views raised
by Lévi-Strausswhich are clear,consistentand eminentlycommentworthy. This
is especially trueof theworks ofJean-Jacques Nattiez and JeanMolino.
In a series of landmark criticaland theoreticalworks which are literally
encyclopaedic in scope, theyhave frontallyassaulted Lévi-Strauss'sstructuralist
musicological'referentialism'. And notalone do theydo so adroitly,witherudition
and an impressivearrayof data and insightdrawn froma pluralityof disciplines
and sciences,theyhave made sure thattheirdiscourseis credible,comprehensive
and »fondé«by supplying it with an ontology,a semiology,an aestheticsand a
historiography. More thanthat,theyjustifytheireagernessforour attentionwith
theclaim thattheirmusicologicaltheorisingis »pourle XXIe siècle«, by whichthey
mean thatit responds to and lives up to what our epoch mightreasonablyexpect
of a musicologywith a legitimaterightto speak in its name.
This of course is a boon forthe would-be commentatorand layperson.First,
because making the case thatone's musicologyresponds to what nostrumaevum
oughtto expectof a theoryofmusic whichis sensitiveto epochal issues opens the
discussion up to non-musicologists.Second, it relates musicological mattersto

1Forexample,
absolutists
subdivide whomaintain
into»formalists«, thataffectandemotion
playnoroleinmusical whomaintain
and»expressionists«
meaning, do(cf.NATTIEZ
they 1990:107ff.,
COOK2001:174-75& DAVIES,2003:65-67, referentialists
Likewise,
126ff.). subdivideinto»structural-
ists«wholinkmusical
meaningtodenotataintheexternal
worldandthosewhomakemusicrefer to
theinterpretive ofanauthor
activity orlistener
(asperRiffaterre
andKivy)orofsociety
(asperAdorno
andKramer).

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 F.Bennett:
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According & Jean-Jacques
Nattiez

extra-musicologicalconsiderations. Finally, it makes appraising the differing

views easier.For to theextentthattheexpectationsofthe21stcenturyis a criterion,
itsufficesto identifythoseexpectationsto be in a positionto judge whichmusico-
- -
logical discourse Nattiezand Molino's or some other bestsatisfiesthestipulated
criterion.
However,beforewe look at what doesmatterto our epoch, and which music
theorisingbest measures up to such a criterion,leťs look at the way Nattiez and
Molino subjectmusic and its meaningto an »anthropologicalontology«and why
theyfeel thisis necessaryand useful. Let's startwith a summaryreview of their
»semiologyof symbolicforms«.To simplify, let'sreferonly to JeanMolino forit is
he who is creditedwiththe paternityof thissemiology.

On the Semiology,Ontology and Aestheticsof JeanMolino's Musicology

For JeanMolino, musical signs are »tripartite«.That is to say theyare consti-

tuted,first,of a material,sonic substratewhich is semanticallyor semiologically
»neutral«.This 'neutral'sonic raw materialbecomes meaningfulwhen thecreators
and consumers of music »interpret«,either »poietically« or »esthesically«,the
musical sounds theyfashionor hear.This theydo withthehelp ofthemeaningof
other,pre-existingsigns. But the meanings of these othersigns are not conferred
on themby a »signifié«.Pursuantto Peirce's»omnesymbolům de symbolo « principle
(PEIRCE 1998:10),they derive from interpretations yet of other signs originating
insideor outside thedomain ofmusical symbolism.Foreven ifmusical symbolism
and the semiosphereit describesis »sui generis «, it is also - as per Marcel Mauss
- partof a »faitsocialtotal«and as such only one of the myriadof inter-impacting
and inter-enriching symbolismsman uses to give meaningto his world,to things,
to himselfand to others(MOLINO 2009:18,76 & 114).
Now because none of these signs or theirmeanings ever referto anything
exceptothersigns and meaningsand theseothersigns and meaningsare generated
»poietically«or »esthesically«by anthropos , »thesymbollinganimal«,theresulting
is
semiology dependent on an »anthropologicalontology«.In otherwords, signs
and meanings »are« nothingbut what human interprétants make them»be« qua
signs.Alternately, without the meaningthey receive from homo symbolicus theydo
not »exist«qua signs (NATTIEZ 1990:7 & 22; MOLINO 2009:17,86ff.).
Foremostamong the argumentsmarshalled in defence of this semiological
doctrineis the fact that it supplies symbolisationand the symbol synthesising
facultywithan »enracinement physiologique «, i.e., theyare rootedin man's biologi-
cal and physicalconditions(MusiquesV'356,379, 1175 & MOLINO 2009:129,143,
410-12). Necessarily so, forif anythingcan supply music and musicology with
»unité« and »universalité«it is »les capacitésphysiques , perceptiveset cognitivesde
l'espèce«for as much as these capacities constitute »un cadre dont il est impossible

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IRASMAAio " ^ Bennett:
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Semiology?: of
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Musicology toJeanMolino
According & Jean-Jacques
Nattiez

pourl'esprithumainde sortir«.And because musical symbolismhas no othercondi-

tion of possibility,purpose or raisond'êtrethanthe one prescribedforit by man's
physiologyand psychology,it is in referenceto them thatMolino develops his
theoryof aestheticsor »jugementdegoût«.
As portrayedin Le singemusicien(MOLINO 2009:127,143-44),the aesthetics
whichresultsfromthehuman facultyoí jugement degoûtis essentiallyan Aufhebung
the
reflecting »goûts« of the individual interprétants inventoriedin it.However,as
personal tastes are »variable« and it
»relative«, is not thegoûtofan interprétantqua
'individual' which countsforaesthetics.What countsforthatis a jugementde goût
reflectingsomethingcommonto all interprétants. Namely a physiologycapable of
interfacing with musical sound and a neuro-cognitiveapparatus capable of
interpreting it.On thisinter-subjectivelygroundedbasis, one's aestheticsis 'anthro-
pological' without being arbitrary,relativistic
or idiosyncratic.2
Now with all due respectto anyone whose jugementde goût is gratifiedto
hear thesethingssaid about music and itsvocation,itsontologyand itssemiology,
itnonethelesshas to be said thattheidea is vulnerableto doubts about itsviability,
applicabilityand desirabilityRathermore thanit is feasibleto discuss in a single
paper. To give an idea of just one of the more substantivematterswe cannot go
intoherebut whichwould merita fullinquiry,letus considera problemwe see in
what could be meantby invokingan »anthropologicalontology«.

Is Human Physiology an Adequate Ontological Basis forElaborating

a Musicology?

If it were one's intentionto make anthropos thefundamentum inconcussum of

one's ontology,and one wanted the idea to be taken seriously,presumablyone
would at some point or anotherask thematicallyabout the ontologicalstatus of
one's foundingvalue. In any event,thisis what everyotherthinkerin the world
does today when theypropose an ontology.For doing thatis the only way they
could hope to avoid the trap Aquinas, Suarez, Descartes and Kant found them-
selves in when MartinHeidegger,so to speak, drew a circlearound thefundamen-
tuminconcussum in each of theirrespectiveontologies and then asked: »What is
the ontologicalstatusof thisens? In otherwords, why do you thinkthatthe pre-
supposition oftheexistence ofthisensall unto itselfprovidesyourontologywithan
adequate foundation?For ifan ontologydoesn'taccountontologically forthevalue
which founds it,then itsfundamentum is just a presupposition.And if a presup-

2Inaddition
tothisbiologico-physiological
andaesthetic there
rationale, isa utilitarian
rationale:
withsymbols(musical,artistic
orother),
manliberateshimself
from theconditionof»animality«to
which hewouldotherwise becondemnedbecausewithhissymbols
heisthemaster nottheslaveof
the»immédiateté
deVicietdumaintenant«
(MOLINO2009:121-22).

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position sufficesto found an ontology,why thisone more so than any other?«

(HEIDEGGER 1927:24-25,109).
The trap of being unable to answer these questions in any ontologically
satisfyingway is the one Nattiez and Molino get themselves into by simply
presupposingthat,independentlyofany otherfactor,anthropos and his bio-neuro-
cognitive faculties constitute a sort of ens causa sui or »autopoietic system«,and
then on the basis of thatpresupposition,conjure into Being all the otherthings
thatcouldn'tbe thereiftheirpresupposed fundamentum wasn't there.And lest it
be objected that it is being unfairto Nattiez and Molino to hold them up to a
standard of ontological credibilityas stringentas the one Heidegger used in
assessing Suarez or Descartes, that wouldn't deprive us of other,far simpler
arguments against their ontology. For example, by assessing how well this
»ontologieanthropologique« withstandsthe argumentNattiez uses to demonstrate
the »invalidité«of earlier,rival »conceptions ontologiquesde la musique«.For if it
sufficesto identifythe foundingproposition in each of them and stringthem
togetherend to end to conclude »la juxtaposition de cespropositionssuffità invalider
la portéeuniverselledechacuned'elles«(MusiquesV:1208),whywouldn'titbe enough
to stick the foundingproposition of his own ontology on to the list to say its
pretentionsto a »portéeuniverselle« are as invalid as all the others?
But,again, our doubts about theirontology,and a few othermattersof equal
gravity, fall outside what it is feasible forus to discuss here. Indeed, even if we
limit ourselves exclusively to semiological considerations,it will be difficult
enough to cover all thereis to say on that score. But if 'semiological problems'
reallydo beset thismusicology,what are they?Let us startby identifying therisks
that,ostensibly,we are likelyto incurand the opportunitieswe are likelyto miss
ifwe failto embracethismusicologicaldiscourse.

The ArgumentsforAdopting Molino's & Nattiez's Musicology

Basically,by embracingthe ideas of Nattiez and Molino on music and its

»meaning«,we can ...
1. Strikea blow forartisticfreedom,
2. Resistelitistattitudesin musical discourse,
3. Counter »culturalistdeterminisms«or »particularisms«à la Franz Boas
(cf.Musique V:340-41),
4. Combat Eurocentricprejudices about music and prepare musicologyto
become a domain fortheorisingabout the emergenceof »world music«
(cf.,interalia, MOLINO 2009:385ff.)
5. Preventmusical discourse becoming a TrojanHorse fortheoristsbent on
making music subserve some 'absolutist', totalising'ideal', 'system' or
'metaphysics',

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ip*cma a torxAw ii9-ut> I F-Bennett:
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6. Make victoryoverAbsolutismsand Systemstheoccasion forinstituting a

musicology which lends itselfto celebratingthe dignityand felicityof
anthropos and consecratinghis rightfulstatusas homosymbolicus.
Now, because aspirations 1 to 4 raise issues and involve stakes which are
more ideological than anythingelse, we will leave it to othersto decide whether
or not and by how much theworld gains by allyingmusicologywiththeirrealisa-
tion. Besides, even if we limitourselves to points 5 and 6 thereis plentyto say.
Especially about thefeartheyreflectthatanyonewho countson theissues we are
discussingreallyis strivingfortheends Nattiez and Molino warn us about. After
all, who today isn't in favourof the dignityand felicityof anthropos ? And who,
eitherinside or outside theartworld,is aimingat allyingmusic theorywithsome
sortof totalitariansystem?
But graver than the inexistenceof theoristsstrivingfor what Nattiez and
Molino oppose are doubts thattheirdiscourse lends itselfto advancing its osten-
sible goals. Consider just threeof the conditionswhich need to be satisfiedto be
sure thattheirstrategyis workable.
Firstitshouldn'tbe possible to argue thatthebiggestthreatto thedignityand
felicityof anthropos is anthroposhimselfand thatanthropos is all the more a threat
to himselfthe more he is allowed to pursue his »jugementde goût« withoutany
countervailingor moderatingoutside influenceor limit.Second, it shouldn'tbe
possible to argue thatthe best way formusicology to help us avoid this sortof
danger is to ally itselfwithan ideal of music which sees its vocationas thatofbe-
ing a sirenwhich incitesanthropos to co-operatein controllinghis impulses and in
channelling them not just towards non-destructiveends but towardsends which
are genuinelyand sustainablyconstructive.Thirdit shouldn'tbe possible to say
that,contraryto what Nattiez and Molino contend,thetheoriesand theoriststhey
stigmatisefortheir'totalism'don'tjust as well or even betterprotectand promote
the dignityand felicityof anthropos as what theyrecommendin theirstead.
Well Nattiez and Molino satisfyus on none of theseconditions.In truth,man
doespose a threatto himselfand, as we shall see, thisis trueeven ifwe make no
mentionof 'human inhumanityto humans' to prove it. What'smore,the alterna-
tivesforavoiding the threatanthropos poses to himselfare more feasiblethanthat
proposed by Nattiez and Molino without withalbeing one jot less »anthropologi-
cal«. To show why,we will begin witha criticalanalysisoftheirsemiologyand do
so in a way which will pit us notjust againstthembut also against all 'post-struc-
turalisť,'neo-pragmatisťand 'social constructivisťdiscourseson thesign and its
functions,finalityand modusoperandi.Specificallywe will ...
1. Challenge thedoxathatsignificancedepends exclusivelyon human inter-
prétantsand theirsymbolforgingtalents
2. Maintain that it makes good semiological sense to say that other-than-
human agencies (e.g.,primalnature)can »afford«significancetoo,

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3. Contend that it is in the interestsof anthroposto cooperate with these

agencies in synthesisingsymbolsand sense, and finally
4. Reiteratethe point made by R. MurraySchaferand his WorldSoundscape
Projectcollaboratorsthatto negotiatean ententecordialewith other-than-
human agents,no code is as appropriateforthe task as music.
To get thisanalysisunderway,let us considera keyimplicationofthissemio-
- - , all unto himself,
logical doctrineand the way it improbably makes anthropos
the foundation,fulcrum,lever,power source and beneficiaryof significance.

On the Untenable 'Under-Inclusiveness' of Molino's Semiological

Engineering

To put our views bluntly,thissemiologyis liable to thecriticismsothershave

made of theoristslike HumbertoMaturana,Gilles Deleuze and Niklas Luhmann
who proclaimthe viabilityof »self-dependentautopoieticsystems«.Namely that
it constitutesa dangerous »autism« or solipsisticdelusion which is all the more
dangerous in thatit is a pan-anthropicintersubjectivedelusion. It boils down to
(a) a refusalto hear anythingexcept what anthropicinterprétants wantto hear
and (b) to an insistence upon this privilege to the point of defending the
»ontological« claim thatnothingexists except what it pleases anthroposto hear.
Alternately, thissemiologymakes no allowance forthepossibilitythatother-than-
human agencies or »actants«can participatein semiosis.
Of course,Nattiez and Molino would express surprisethatanyone feelsthey
have the rightto say this.Afterall, didn't theygive theirsemiologyand musical
»formes symboliques« a »fondement« in »les bruitsdu monde«and the »environment
immédiat More thanthat,don't theytellus thatthe »contexte
«? sonore«provided by
»les bruitsetmusiquesdu monde«is a »traituniverseldesmusiqueshumaines«and has
always been accommodated by anthroposboth in how he practiced music and
theorisedabout it? (MusiquesV:357-58).
They do, but thisobjectionis overruledby thefactthattheydon't allow these
other-than-human entitiesto express themselves and to participatein the process
of synthesisingsense. If theydid theywouldn't maintainthatsense is conferred
'poietically' or 'esthesically' by a human interprétantor doesn't occur at all.
Besides, the supposition thatnon-human agencies can signifyis a semiological
corollaryof the »naturalism« they specificallyabjure (cf. MOLINO 2009:78-80,
409-10; NATTIEZ 1990:120-23).So, again, they do not allow non-anthroposto
participatein semiosis , eitherthroughmusic or throughany othermedium.
Now obviously therewould be no point in criticisingthissemiologyand the
»anthropologicalontology« governingit if man's controlover his environment
was so greatthattherewas no riskhe could ever encounteranythingaround him
except what he wanted to be there.But he does not have that power. Granted,

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anthropos isn'tas badly offtoday as he was in earliertimeswhen thecontentofhis

surroundingswere less dependenton whathe wantedto be therethanon agencies
and forceswhich were as obscure as theywere dangerous to ignore. But even
today the semiosphere man creates for himselfthroughhis symbollingis not
coextensivewith what can affectand happen to him. As we are remindedevery
time an earthquake or tsunami strikes,man's »mesocosm« or »phaneron« is
subjectto undecidable eventseruptingintoitfromsomeplace outside.For despite
all the advances seismographyhas made, and we hope will continue to make,
thereis somethingintrinsically unpredictableabout earthquakesand phenomena
like it. They are connected with imponderables lurkingfurtheraway fromthe
space oftheknown thana homosymbolicus can discerneven ifthathomosymbolicus
is the world's acutest seismographerstanding guard on the very edge of the
seismologicallyknown and tryingto make potentialearthquakes submit to his
symbolicforms.Which is importantherebecause, paradoxically,the impondera-
bilityof phenomena like earthquakesis semiologicallysignificant.It tellsus that
the space of significanceis susceptible- sometimesdramatically- to eventsthat
do not depend solely on being interpretedby homosymbolicusto be real and
significant.They are instead what theoristsin ethology,sign systemstudies and
ecological psychologyhave been sayingforsome timenow, namelytheproducts
or »affordances«of non-humanagents located outsidethe space created by our
symbolsystemssignallingtheirpresence and tellingman thattheirpresence and
agentivityhave repercussions inside this space (GIBSON 1986:127sq.; HOFF-
MEYER 1996:32, 42 & passim & DEELY 2003:7-9). Which suggests that our
semiological engineering isn't inclusive enough if it fails to give theoretical
respectabilityto the idea that non-human agents contributeto the process of
synthesisingsymbols, signs and significance.Not by passively receiving the
significanceanthropos gives them,ratheras agentswhose participationis required
to synthesiseeventswhose significanceforanthropos is undeniable.
Obviously this is something which should matter to semiologistsand music
theorists,and forsome itdoes (SCHAFER 1994:205ff & 260ff;COOK 1996:106-123;
COOK 2001:173ff.;TARASTI 2002:59 & CLARKE 2005:passim.).But should it or
could it matterto anyone else? Could it matterto non-theorists ? A question which
is importantto ask because we are assessing ifMolino's theorisingis a musicology
»forthe 21st century«and judging if it is or isn't froma theoreticaland froma
more than theoreticalperspective.So could the 'under-inclusiveness'of Molino's
semiologymatterto non-semiologists?
Presumablynot. Presumablyit could only matterto themif(a) the under-in-
clusivenessof a theoryof thesign entailedconcrete, tangiblenegativeconsequences
and (b) the solution for these tangiblenegative consequences was to make our
theoriesof the sign more inclusive than Molino's. But no matterhow inclusive
semiologistsmake theirtheoryof the sign,thatby itselfwill never make what is
imponderableabout earthquakesless imponderableand therefore less dangerous.

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Appraisal
toJeanMolino
According
Musicology Nattiez
& Jean-Jacques

So in practicalterms,no one is betteror worse offifMolino does or doesn'tgive a

semiologicalstatusto agenciesor phenomenawhose dynamicsare inscrutable.
Thingsare quite different,however,when semiology,by design or by default,
allies itselfto an indifferenceor deafness toward the outside of the human
mesocosmand throughthatdeafnessposes a threatnotjust to thatoutside butalso
to anthropos Where thatis the case and can be avoided by assuming the
himself.
non-human can signifyand can use its signifyingpowers to informanthropos
about what needs to be done to avoid calamityforall concerned,but semiologists
tell us thereis no point listeningbecause only humans can symbol and create
significance,then semiology allies itselfto a danger foranthropos. So is this the
case? Is Molino liable to the reproach thathis »anthropological«semiology and
themusicologygovernedby it are in league withfactorswhich,in thefinalanaly-
? If »eco-criticaltheory«can be given any credit,we
sis, pose a threatto anthropos
would have to say he is.

An Anti-Ecological Semiology?

For what itsproponentstellus is that,by virtueofa recklesspursuitofcollec-

tive self-gratification,
anthropos has become a threatto the viabilityof the global
eco-systemand thatthisrecklessnessis dangerous to man in as much as theequi-
librium of the planetaryeco-systemis criticalto the well-being and even the
survivalof anthropos. In otherwords, the damage anthropos does to the environ-
mentis, ultimately,damage he inflictson himself.
Now ifsuch reasoningis valid - and few doubt thatit is - theecological souci
is one which ought to matterat least as much and in factmorethan the causes
Molino promotesthroughhis semiologicaltheorising.Afterall,thestakesinvolved
in assuringour ecological flanksand rearsare potentiallyof the orderof existing
or not existing.CombatingEurocentrism,elitism,holisms and totalisingsystems
are not. But let us not criticiseMolino forhis choice of prioritiesor thejugements
degoûtwhich led him to them.All thatmattersto us here is whetheror not and in
which ways his semiologyis relevantto what is arguablythe paramountsouciof
the age. When viewed in this way, i.e., in an »eco-critical«light,we draw two
conclusions,both negative.
1. By its failureto accommodate significanceoriginatingin or 'afforded'by
non-humanagencies, Molino's semiology- qua semiology- disqualifies
itselfas a means forinterfacing withnatureand fruitfully comingto terms
withit.
2. By encouraginganthropos to believe it is feasibleand desirable to inhabit
a space ofmeaningconstructedofand answerableto nothingbut impulses
rootedin his own physiology,Molino's semiology- whetherintentionally

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or not - makes itselfan accomplice to attitudes,practices and conse-

quences which disserveand even endangerits intendedbeneficiary.
And lest a hasty reading of this réquistoire failed to notice a key nuance or
two, let us make it perfectlyclear thatno one is suggestingMolino can be held
responsible for the eco-calamities everyone talks about so much or that he
condones in any way the practicesleading to them.Granted,he may have made
disparaging remarks about »naturalism« (MOLINO 2009:78-80,409-10). But
nowhere does he specificallysay thatone has to be an enemy of nature to be a
friendofanthropos. Still,semiologicalengineeringcan be an accomplice in practices
which have negativeeffectson the environmentwithoutthatbeing the intention
of its artisanand thatis what we objectto in Molino's semiology.For in theway it
is engineeredit puts itselfin thepositionofbeing unable to avoid having to chose
between (a) the advantage of anthropos or (b) the advantage ofnaturewhen, from
a semiological point of view, that choice is neithernecessary nor, in the final
analysis,tenable.Let us explain why.

Why Giving Nature a Voice and a Language Should Matterto Semiology

When Molino excludes non-anthropos fromthe symboland meaning synthe-

sisingprocess and in addition allows man to use thatpower to any end he desires,
as long,of course,as otherhumans are not prejudicedin theprocess (cf.infra),his
semiology,willy-nilly, makes naturea victimand a victimwhich cannotpossibly
defenditself.For when anthropos , qua anthropos, is entitledto unilaterallypursue
what suits him and he may notdo so at the expense of othermen,the fruitof his
endeavours can onlybe obtainedat theexpense of »non-anthropos« or,moreto the
point,at the expense of nature3.And we do mean 'at the expense of nature'. For
theonlyway such a relationshipcould yield thefruitsitis enteredintoto produce
and notbe 'at the expense' of naturewould be ifnaturein some sense consented
to and cooperated in being exploited by men4.But Molino's semiologydeprives
nature of the prior,necessary condition of possibilityof doing that because it
doesn't allow non-anthropos to communicateor to engage in any sortof dialogue
with its exploiter.Afterall, only humans can dialogue and nature isn't human.

3AsHegelputit,»Inneed,either manis madeanobject andis oppressedorelsemustmake

naturean objectandoppress it«(OnChristianity,
EarlyTheological
Writings byFriedrich 1948,
Hegel,
NewYork:207).
4Theoristsofwhatis currentlycalled»hybrid«or»produced« or »recombinant«
or»social«
naturewouldobject tothe»zero-sum«,»allornothing«, or«logicweareusinghere.Butsuch
»either
an objection
couldonlybe pertinent hereif»producednature«wasinstrumental inattenuating
or
avertingthecalamities
we'respeaking of.That,
however,is somethinghighly well-re-
authoritative,
searchedstudiesandanalysestellusisn'thappening
(SONNENFELD 2002& BENTON2001).More-
itisirrelevant
over, toMolino'ssemiology whichnowherediscussesitsecological
implications.

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& Jean-Jacques

Hence, thissemiologyis clearlyliable to the charge that,willy nilly,it makes an-

thropos and natureenemies of one anotherin a war naturecannotwin.
But,ultimately,neithercan man. At least notunless thereis somethingwrong
with the reasoning employed by eco-critical thinkers.For they would have us
believe thatthe gain man makes throughthisexploitativeor »Swidden-type«re-
lationship to nature is unobtainable without a deteriorationof the apparatus
which produces what man gains thereby.And theloss incurredby thisdeteriora-
tiondoesn'thave to be proportionalto thegain thatprecipitatedit.For if»tipping
point« theoristsare right,generatinggain in thisway is subjectto the »law of di-
minishingmarginalreturns«in which yields can not alone decline exponentially
to zero but even be incapable of ever yieldinganythinghigherthanzero due to a
completeand irreparablecollapse of theover-exploitedresource(TAINTER 1988;
ZIMMERMAN 1994; LEAKEY & LEWIN 1995; LOVELOCK 2000 & LOVELOCK
2006).
Saying which,once again, in no wise means we hold Molino responsiblefor
eco-criminality or thatwe accuse him of condoningthepracticesleading to it.But
notholdinghim to accounton thisscore does not depriveus ofgroundsforbeing
dissatisfiedwith his theorizingand consideringit and its musicological implica-
tionsto be unacceptable.For to be a semiologythatmeritsour approval because
it is en phasewith the main, ecological souci of our age, it is not enough thatits
architectcannotbe accused of conspiringto do harm to the environment.Semi-
ologies meritsuch approval when (a) theycorrectlyidentifythereal soucisoftheir
times (b) make addressing themtheirpriorityand (c) submitall otherconsider-
ations to the requirementthatiftheycannotplay a positiverole in furthering the
priorityissue, at least cannotlegitimatelybe suspected of playinga negativerole
or even ofbeing indifferent to theprimarygoal. Hence, ifit is legitimateto gauge
the meritsof a semiologyby how well it measures up to a criteriologylike that
and in addition it is accepted thatthe priorityforanthropos today is ending and
reversing the anthropogenicdegradation of the global ecosystem,thenMolino's
semiology and musicology are unacceptable. For ifone wanted to see what semi-
ological theorizing looks like when it is pursued with thecompietesidisregardfor
theenvironmentand its importanceforanthropos , one could scarcelyfinda better
model than Molino's anthropologicaldiscourse. A failingwhich not merelydis-
qualifieshis discourse as one thatmeasures up to theparamountchallengeof the
age, but also leaves one wonderingwhy he doesn't see how it actuallydisserves
anthropos. For,infine, one cannot claim one is doing anythingto help anthropos if
man's indifferenceto the equilibriumof the global eco-systemcould be fatal to
him and one nonethelessadvocates a semiology which has the effectof aiding
and abettinghis deafnessto natureby leading anthropos to believe thereis nothing
thereto hear foras much as synthesizingsigns and symbols is a prerogativeof
human interprétants and themalone.

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toJeanMolino
According
Musicology Nattiez
& Jean-Jacques

Is an »Eco-Friendly«Semiology of Music Feasible and if It Is Does It

Have to Be UnfriendlytowardsAnthropos?

In fact,if it were importantto you thatyour semiology and musicologybe

»anthropological«by trulyserving the interestsof humanity,you would make
sure they do what Molino's does not do. In other words, you would engineer
themso thattheygive »non-anthropos« a voice and the semanticand narratologi-
cal resourcestheyneed to be able to tellanthropos thatdoing as he pleases against
non-anthropos entails a price to pay anthropos would do well to reflectupon. And
let no one suspect there is somethingirrationalor impracticableabout asking
semiologyto accept thisand do somethingabout it. For Molino's semiologymay
in many respectshave thebackingofthepost-structuralist and social constructiv-
ist cognoscenti sapientiaeon what the sign can and cannot do and how it can and
cannot do it. But this consensus is not some sort of summumnec plus ultraof
wisdom on the question. Other,'eco-friendly'semiological models exist (HOFF-
MEYER 1997;DEELY 2003 & CLARKE 2005) and can be operationalisedmusically
as is evident in numerous compositionsby Messiaen, Stockhausen,Cage and
Westerkamp(TARASTI 1979 & ADAMENKO 2007). In fact,in the finalanalysis,
all that is reflectedin Molino's postmodernistviews on musical meaning is the
»jugementsde valeur«or »jugements de goût«of its partisans.Hence ifone decided
thatpost-structuralist jugementsde valeurare trumpedby those which are more
appropriate for addressing the real soucisof our times,thentrumpedrightalong
withthosejugementsare theirco-relativetheoriesof the sign.Whichmeans thatif
we believe it is imperativethatanthropos cease being so high-handedin his atti-
tude and behaviour towardsnon-anthropos fwe shouldn'thesitateto embracethe
semiological corollary. In other words, we should (a) foreswearthe view that
or
symbolling semiopoiesis is the prerogativeof anthroposand he alone and (b)
admit that it is in the interestof anthroposto cooperate with other-than-human
agencies in synthesisingsigns and sense.
And if it is importantto insist on this last point, it's because making the
adjustmentsto semiologywhich satisfythisrequirementdoes not entail making
the latterless 'anthropological'or 'anti-antropological'.For thereare ways to be
'anthropological'in one's semiological engineeringwhich do not exclude non-
anthropos.For example, we can be anthropological in our theorising about
semiologyand the semanticsof music the way theoristsin the past were anthro-
pological. Namely bysubmitting anthroposand non-anthroposto a »kosmodicy«
(kog|io-8{ks) which made facilitating thefelicityofanthroposa functionoffacilitating
thefelicityofnon- anthropos. And in as much as music or mousikéwas theprinciple
expedient for attaining this entente cordiale,musicologistshave no excuse fornot
knowing that this is the way anthropos in timesbygone ordered his relationship
with non-anthropos. Indeed, if the evidence of researchin Indo-European Com-

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parativePoetics is anythingto go by,thisis whatmusicwas invented for:harassing

human appetitionand volition to the goal of occupying a cosmically ordained
time,place and destinywhichwas »appropriate«(sú-f|0r|ç)because doing so con-
corded withthecosmicallyordained time,place and destinyitwas »appropriate«
forthe people and thingsaround one to occupy.And as concernsthe folkwho
ascribed to this ideal of music's vocation and finality,farfrombelieving that it
entailed anythingnon- or anti-anthropological, it was simplybeing»anthropologi-
cal« as efficaciouslyas possible.For thatis all one does when one makes sure that
man'sdependenceon natureoperatesinfavourofman'sfelicity by makingthatfelic-
a of a
ity by-product relationship to nature which respects rather thanexploitsit.
Obviously, what prompts us to bring this up here is the convictionthatthe
musicology our age needs is the one which can claim to be the theoretical
concomitantof this ideal of music's vocation and finality.In any event, if any
musicology can be considered appropriateforthis end, it would be one which
resembles ancient musicological theoriesby admittingthat the more music is
amenable to thegoal of allowing anthropos and non-anthropos to communicate,the
apter it is for in
anthropos coming to terms with nature - forthe benefitofboth.
But,alas, we will not have the space here to look at recent developmentsin
Indo-European Comparative Poetics, Applied Semiotics or Homeric Studies
whichwill help us see how men in timesbygonebelieved thatnaturehad a voice
and thatmusic was her language. Nor will we be able to see how these old ideas
on thevocationand finalityofmusic are makinga come back throughthetheories
and worksof contemporaryartistslike David Dunn, Hildegard Westerkampand
BarryTruax. However, to see how ancientideas on music are useful and impor-
tantforthesemiologicalissues we are discussinghere,it isn'tnecessaryto go into
such reconditematters.It is enough simplyto look at theirutilityforsolving the
aporias which riddle Molino's own musicology.For as strangeas it mightseem,
Molino himselfcannot do without a truchement which plays a role in his own
theorythatis analogous to the role played by thekosmodicy we referredto above.
To explain why we say that,let's go back to the point we raised earlierabout the
futilityof arguing against Molino's anthropological musicology by adducing
examples of 'man's inhumanityto man' to say thatanthropos , guided by nothing
but his jugementsde goût, is his own biggestthreat.

The Role of Universais and TranscendentalFormsin Molino's Musicology

This, of course, could be done in any numberof ways and Molino no doubt
knows it.In any event,we refuseto believe thatMolino themanis unaware of and
unappalled by how widespread human inhumanityto humans is and, alas, is
likelyto remain.But ifMolino themanknows about thissortof thingand recog-
, Molino thetheorist
nises how it constitutesa threatanthroposposes to anthropos

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According
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& Jean-Jacques

does not recognisethatthis threatis somethinghis theoryshould take into con-

siderationand act upon in any 'practical'sense. In any case, his theorisingcomes
no closer to addressing the riskthatthe differencesseparatingmen can resultin
discord or conflictthan to advocate a policy of strict»pluralism« and to apply it
across theboard (MOLINO 2009:200-02& MusiquesV:1199ff.). Hence, whetherwe
are speaking of semiology,of the musicologygoverned by it or of the ontology
governingboth, no »totalising«or »absolutising« interpretations or discourses
can be tolerated.
But neithercan »relativism«,an interdictionwhich likewise applies across
the board (MOLINO 2009:200-02,Musiques 1:56 & Musiques V:790ff.).Whatever
the issue, be it ontological,epistemological,ethicalor aesthetic,it is unacceptable
to say thatall interpretations are acceptable. Indeed to deal with the differences
betweenmen on theseissues relativismis »la piresolution«foras much as itincurs
the riskof legitimisingcriminalor inhumanjugementsdegoûts.
So, à force,the question becomes one of how best to »make sense« of this
tumultof competing,mutuallyexclusivejugementsde goûtand dealing with the
riskof conflicttheyentailwithoutrenouncingor compromisingon one's policy of
strictpluralism.Molino admits thatforthisthereis no »logicallysatisfyingsolu-
tion«,but he offersone nonetheless.Itboils down to a social constructivist variant
of the solutionused by theScholasticsin dealing witha similarproblem.Namely
institutingan intersubjectively grounded »transcendentaldetermination«of »the
One, theTrue,theGood and theBeautiful«and makingtheselattersuperordinat-
ing »Absolute Forms« we can use as a yardstickto measure by how much or little
given jugements , discourses, interpretations or goûts approximate them. In this
way we avoid the aporias of relativismbecause in thehigh courtof the transcen-
dental gold standard one creates by institutingontological, epistemological,
ethical and aestheticAbsolute Forms, not all interpretationsor jugementsare
equivalent.We also avoid thedangerofhegemonictotalisingor absolutising»sys-
tems«because the adequation of particularinterpretations to theAbsolute Forms
thatratifiestheirvalidityis onlyever one ofdegree,neverofcompleteconformity.
Hence, as thisis unattainable,no discourse can everbe in thepositionof claiming
a hegemonicpositionor role relativeto otherinterpretations.
Now thereis a lot about thisintersubjectively grounded 'eclecticpluralism'
one could be troubledby or scepticalabout. For example,it could well be thatall
one accomplishesby steeringa middle course between the Scylla of the »relativ-
ism« and the Charybdis of the »totalisingdiscourses« is to take on board the
drawbacks of both and the benefitsof neither.In any event,one has to suppose
thatif one inventsa transcendentalbenchmarkof musical or aestheticor moral
excellence,thepurpose isn'tsimplyto identifywhat derogatesfromit.It is also to
do somethingabout »bad« music,»bad« tasteand »bad« morals.But ifone »does«
anythingagainstbad taste and mediocrity, one cannot claim to be differentfrom
those Molino calls »mélophobes« because theyadvocate actingto stop music being

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an incitementto excess, unreason and disorder (Musiques V:1155). On the other

hand, ifone is satisfiedwithdoing no more againstbad tasteand bad music than
to thank theirdefendersfor the »homage« they render one by confirmingthe
superiorityof one's own jugementsde goût(MOLINO 2009:202),what is the point
of complainingabout relativismand »anythinggoes« libertinage?
More perplexing still is why Nattiez and Molino thinkit makes sense to
borrowfromScholasticismthe »métalangage «, »procedures scientifiques de classifica-
tion« and »cadre de référence general« they use to impose »unity« on musical
phenomena while at the same time berating »essentialist reductionism« and
»paradigmesexplicatifs holistes«. What is the point criticisingessentialismand
of
metaphysics ifthe mode of inductive reasoningyou use to propose an alternative
was inventedby metaphysiciansto guarantee thatnothingbut essences, forms
and othermetaphysicalentitiescan be signifiedbyusing them?And ifone answers
this question by saying that,unlike Scholastic universaliapost rem,which are
eternal,immutableand posited a priori,all thatresultsfromyour »observation de
constantset de régularités« are »des domaineshypothétiques aux frontières floues« or
symbolicforms»aux contoursvariables«then the question arises as to what one
means about being »scientific«.
Still there are things to like about Molino's appeal to a superordinating,
transcendental»cadregénéral« formakingsense ofthediversité dejugementsdegoût
among men and dealing with the problems which cannot be solved except by
a
postulating supra-subjective arbiter. Notably the fact that it creates thepossibil-
of
ity reconciling his theories with those he refutes but which we maintain are
essentialto a musicologywhich allows music to be somethingand to functionin
a way thatmakes it a resourceforcomingto termswiththeprinciple- ecological
- souciof our times.For ifhe can admittheutilityof a »cadregénéral«consistingof
transcendental»universais«or »Absolute Forms« to make sense of thediversité de
de
jugements goût among men, presumably he couldn't object to a similar »cadre
général « being used to mediatebetweenanthropos and non-anthropos and facilitate
communicationbetweenthem.A pointwhichtakesus back to that»kosmodiké « we
referredto above.
All thatseparatesthe»cadregénéral«of thiskosmodiké and the»cadregénéral « of
Molino's transcendentaluniversaisis thatthe latteris nothingbut a collectionof
Aufhebungen derivedfrompurelyand exclusivelyhuman,all too humaninterpreta-
tions (jugements , gouts, valeurs , etc.) and answerable to nothingelse besides. The
cadregénéralof the kosmodiké favouredby his predecessors,however,included all
thisbut did notexclude everything else. It insteadgave anthropos and non-anthropos
and
interdependent complementary roles within an all-incorporating cosmicorder
or 'systasis'.One which allowed and even requiredanthropos and non-anthropos to
communicateso theycould discoverwhat is in theinterestofboth.
There is no doubt about this.It's what one would discernifone were able to
decode the hyponoiain the verse of any Poet of note. In fact,it's somethingevery

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artistand thinkerof note strovethroughtheirworks to expound. We see this,for

example, in the Symposium where Plato speaks of a »dialektos
« between anthropos
and théos,we see it in the Phaedruswhen he speaks of the reason why men in
earliertimeswere wont to listento Nymphs,Sirensand Muses in trees,rocksand
streamsand we see it in theIon where he describesthe vocation of the Rhapsode
and thefinalityofhis artas thatofcreatinga »homilia«betweenman and agencies
in the firmamentor in subterraneanvasty deeps. Notwithstandingthe mystical
overtones and the mythopoeicimagery,Plato is speaking in these passages of
somethingwhichwas theheartand lifeblood ofeverything anthropos thenbelieved
was importantto know about himself,his value and his well-beingas well as of
somethinghe thoughtwas indispensable forfoundinghis arts,sciences,aesthet-
ics and ethics. Namely tidings of things going on outsidethe semiosphere he
createsforhimselfwithhis symbols.Intelligenceabout agencies and actantslurk-
ing immanenti]/ in the phaneronaround him. Which is relevantto music and to a
musicological considerationof its narratologicaland semanticpowers because,
formerly, it was in and as mousikéthatthisdialektos took place.
Why is it importantto recall this in a discussion about Molino's semiology
and his ideas on a musicology»forthe 21st century«?Because the acceptationof
music's semiologywhich best responds to what the 21st centuryshould demand
of it is theone which makes music a tool notjust forpleasing man's goût, but also
forinterfacing hermeneuticallywith the extra-anthropic Umwelt , fordeciphering
its world-disclosivelanguage, forlearningfromthatlanguage what we must do
to restorea harmoniousrelationshipto our more-than-human Lebenswelt.This is
something ancient ideas on music'snature,vocation and finalitydid foranthropos.
Molinos' and Nattiez's do not.

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Sažetak

Može li »antropološka ontologija« pružiti glazbi prihvatljivu

semiologiju?: Filozofska procjena muzikologije prema
Jeanu Molinou i Jean-Jacquesu Nattiezu

TeoretičariglazbeJeanMolinoi Jean-Jacques Nattiezvjerujuda glazbaposjeduje»je-

dinstvo«i »univerzálnost«. Ovo vjerovanje osnivajuna biologiji čovjekai njegovihneuro-
sposobnosti.
kognitivnih Na tomtemelju onirazraduju semiologiju da sam
kojapretpostavlja
anthropospridonosi glazbenomznačenju.Prihvačajuci u osnovieko-kritičkuperspektivu,
ovaj radističeda je osnivanjeglazbenogsimbolizma na takouskomtemeljuproblematično i
neizvedivoteda u konačnici činiloše anthroposu kojemuje trebalodonijetikořist.
Ontološki je problematično jerontologijaobuhvačatotalitet onogašto postojiqua po-
stoječe.Ipak,totalitetonogaštopostojiuključuje višeod samogčovjeka.Štoviše,dioono-
ga što postoji,a štoje ljudsko,ontološki ovisio dijelukojinijeljudski.Stogaje utemeljenje
i na
semiologijemuzikologije »antropološkoj ontologiji» ontološki i
ispodpragauključivosti
stoganeizvedivo.
Daljnjapoteškočatičese postulatapremakojemljudski»interpretatori« sami mogu
simbolei značenja.Nevjerojatno,
falsificirati ovo implicira da se semiologijane bavifeno-
menimakojine ovise o čovjekovojinterpretaciji, a kojiipakbitnouvjetujui konstituiraju
prostorznačenja kojimi nastanjujemo. Prematomesemiologijanije ni toliko»ekološki
blagonaklona«kolikobi trebalabiti,što ne znáči da naše teorijeo glazbenomznačenju
morajuprestati biti»antropološke« da bi postale»ekološkiblagonaklone«. Baremne uko-
likosu antropološke u onojmjeriu kojojsu to bileu prošlim vremenima; naime,ako razmi-
šljamoo glazbikao o sredstvuza podčinjavanje anthroposai ne-anthroposa kozmodiceji
kojaod olakšanjasreče anthroposa činifunkcijuolakšanjasreče ne-anthroposa.

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