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Necessity Lost: Modality and Logic in Early


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Necessity Lost

.e ion
Modality and Logic in
Early Analytic Philosophy,

an iss
Volume One

du
m
per
Sanford Shieh

ut
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h@ itho
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sh ite w
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or not
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Contents

.e ion
Contents v

an iss
Introduction 1

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Necessity Lost: Frege . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

m
Necessity Lost: Russell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Looking Ahead: Necessity Regained . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

per
I Frege 12

ut
1 Judgment, Modality, and Amodalism 14
1.1 Frege against Traditional Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

ey
h@ itho
1.1.1 A Brief Sketch of Traditional Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.1.2 Kant on Judgment and Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.1.3 Problems of Traditional Logic . . . .
sl . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.1.4 The Fregean Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.2 Judgment in Begriffsschrift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
sh ite w

1.3 Modality in Frege’s Begriffsschrift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35


we
1.4 Are Sense and Reference Modal? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.5 Amodalism about Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1.5.1 Against Hilbert and Korselt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.5.2 Thoughts are not Temporal or Spatial . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.6 Inadequate Grounds for Amodalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
c
ie

2 From Judgment to Amodalism 54


or not

2.1 Judgment before the Sense/Reference Distinction . . . . . . . . . . 55


2.2 Judgment and Truth in “On Sense and Reference” . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.2.1 Judgment as the Step to a Truth-Value . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.2.2 The Redundancy of Truth-Predication . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
o

2.2.3 Two Varieties of Redundancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63


d.

2.2.4 Doubts about Redundancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63


:d

2.2.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.3 The Indefinability of Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.4 What is a Step to a Truth-Value? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
aft

2.5 The Recognitional Conception of Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72


2.5.1 The Supervenience of Truth-Predicating Judgments . . . . . 72
nf

2.5.2 Judgment as Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73


Dr

2.5.3 Recognition as Advance to the Level of Referents . . . . . . 73


2.5.4 Thoughts (Gedanken) as Representations (Vorstellungen) . . 74
sa

2.5.5 Recognition and the Constitution of the Step to a Truth-Value 78


2.5.6 The Recognitional Conception and Redundancy . . . . . . . 81
2.5.7 Nugatio ab Omnia Nævo Vindicatus . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.5.8 Two Worries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
vi CONTENTS

2.5.8.1 Aren’t Vorstellungen Psychological? . . . . . . . 83


2.5.8.2 Isn’t the Recognitional Conception a Correspon-
dence Theory of Truth? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

.e ion
2.5.9 The Recognitional Conception and the Reference-Relation
Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.5.10 Recognition and Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2.6 Judgment, Judging, Factivity, and Apparent Thoughts . . . . . . . . 90

an iss
2.6.1 Against the Factivity of Fregean Judgment . . . . . . . . . 91

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2.6.2 For the Factivity of Fregean Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
2.6.3 Judging vs. Judgment; Holding True vs. Acknowledgment

m
of Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
2.6.4 The Independence of Truth from Acknowledgment of Truth 94

per
2.6.5 A Letter to Jourdain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
2.6.6 Apparent Thoughts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
2.7 The Basic Argument for Amodalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
2.8 A Concluding Remark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

ut
3 Fregean Amodalism 103

ey
3.1 Parts of Thoughts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
h@ itho
3.1.1 Between Begriffsschrift and the Sense/Reference Distinction 104
3.1.2 After the Sense/Reference Distinction . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
sl
3.1.3 Multiple Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 Fregean Accounts of Temporal Modalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
110
111
sh ite w

3.2.1 Senses Expressed as a Function of Time . . . . . . . . . . . 112


we
3.2.2 Another Argument against Temporal Modalism . . . . . . . 113
3.2.2.1 Redundancy and Temporalism . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.2.2.2 Propositional Attitudes or Compound Thoughts? . 117
3.2.3 Senses presenting Times as Parts of Thoughts . . . . . . . . 121
3.3 Fregean Accounts of Metaphysical Modalism . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
c

3.3.1 A Parallel to Temporal Modalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123


ie

3.3.2 Circumstances as Thoughts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125


or not

3.3.3 Fregean Rational Reconstructions of Hilbert on Geometry . 128


3.4 Concluding Remark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

4 Frege on the Nature of Logic 136


o

4.1 Analyticity, Apriority, and Modality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137


d.

4.2 Frege’s Main Characterizations of Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141


:d

4.2.1 Generality or Universality (Allgemeinheit) . . . . . . . . . . 141


4.2.2 Logical Laws are Truths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
4.2.3 The Justification of Logical Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
aft

4.2.4 Primitive and Dependent Truths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147


4.2.5 Logical and other Sources of Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . 148
nf

4.2.6 Primitive Truths, Axioms and Justificational Independence . 149


Dr

4.2.7 Self-Evidence and Self-Sufficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151


4.3 The Constitution of Justificational Self-Sufficiency . . . . . . . . . 155
sa

4.3.1 Semantics and Soundness Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . 157


4.3.1.1 Soundness Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
4.3.1.2 Frege and Soundness Arguments . . . . . . . . . 159
4.3.2 Soundness Arguments as Logicality Arguments . . . . . . . 162
CONTENTS vii

4.3.3 Is Frege giving Logicality Arguments? . . . . . . . . . . . 164


4.3.4 A Problem for Logicality Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
4.3.5 An Alternative to the Logicality Interpretation? . . . . . . . 170

.e ion
II Russell 172

an iss
5 The Idealist Origins of Logicism 174
5.1 Bradley’s Theory of Modality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

du
5.1.1 Hypothetical Judgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

m
5.1.2 Judgments of Necessity and Possibility . . . . . . . . . . . 178
5.2 Geometry, Logic, and Necessity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

per
5.2.1 Kant on Geometry and the Problem of Non-Euclidean Ge-
ometries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
5.2.2 Differences with Kant: Syntheticity, Apriority, and Necessity 183
5.2.3 The Transcendental Justification of Projective Geometry . . 185
5.3 The Ultimate Indemonstrability of Necessity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

ut
5.4 Necessity and Logicism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

ey
5.4.1 Main Features of Axioms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
h@ itho
5.4.2 The Logical Calculus and Analysis of Manifolds . . . . . . 194
5.4.2.1 Manifolds, Judgments, and Predicates . . . . . . 195
sl
5.4.2.2 The Analysis of Equivalence, Axioms, and Rules
of Inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
sh ite w

5.4.2.3 Non-Empirical Intuition of Axioms . . . . . . . . 198


we
5.4.2.4 The Logical Calculus as Modal Logicism . . . . . 198
5.4.2.5 The Logicism of As If . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
5.4.3 The Main Problem of Russell’s Account of the Logical Calculus200
5.5 Concluding Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
c

6 The Rejection of Modality 204


ie

6.1 The Path to the Rejection of Modality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205


or not

6.2 Bradley’s Theory of Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208


6.3 Moore’s Critique of Bradley’s Theory of Judgment . . . . . . . . . 211
6.4 Moore’s Metaphysics of Judgment and Propositions . . . . . . . . . 218
6.5 Russell’s Metaphysics of Propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
6.5.1 Terms, Being, and Existence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
o
d.

6.5.2 Things, Concepts, and Modes of Occurrence . . . . . . . . 222


:d

6.5.3 The Unity of the Proposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223


6.5.4 Denoting Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
6.6 Moore’s Critique of Kant’s View of Necessity . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
aft

6.7 Russell’s Amodalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228


nf

7 Completing the Rejection of Idealism 231


Dr

7.1 Russell against Internal Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231


7.2 Bradley on Metaphysics and the Composition of Wholes . . . . . . 233
sa

7.2.1 The Argument against Psychological Atomism . . . . . . . 234


7.2.2 The Regress Argument against the Relations . . . . . . . . 236
7.3 Bradley’s Regresses, the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and Modality 239
7.4 Parts and Wholes in Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
7.4.1 Russell’s Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
viii CONTENTS

7.4.2 Aggregates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247


7.4.3 Unities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

.e ion
8 Logic and Implication 250
8.1 Inference and Formal Implication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
8.2 The Generality of Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
8.3 Problems of Formal Implication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

an iss
8.3.1 The Composition of Propositions of Formal Implication . . 259
8.3.2 The Inferential Justification of Formal Implications . . . . . 261

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8.4 The Materiality and Indefinability of Implication . . . . . . . . . . 262

m
8.5 Whence Material Implication? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
8.6 Implication in Principia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

per
9 The Continuing Banishment of Modality 277
9.1 Moore on Necessity as Logical Priority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
9.2 Russell on our “Feelings” of Necessity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
9.2.1 The Feeling from Apriority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282

ut
9.2.2 The Feeling from Demonstrability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284

ey
9.2.3 The Feeling from Analyticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
h@ itho
9.2.4 The Feeling from Generality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
9.2.5 The Significance of the Feelings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
sl
9.2.6 Amodalism after the Rejection of Moore-Russell Propositions 290
9.3 After “Necessity and Possibility” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
sh ite w

9.3.1 “Some Explanations in Reply to Mr. Bradley” (1910) . . . . 291


we
9.3.2 The Problems of Philosophy (1912) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
9.3.3 “On the Notion of Cause” (1912-13) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
9.3.4 The Theory of Knowledge (1913) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
9.3.5 Our Knowledge of the External World (1914) . . . . . . . . 294
9.3.6 “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” (1918-9) . . . . . . 294
c

9.3.7 Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (1919) . . . . . . 298


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or not

Bibliography 301
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d.
:d
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nf
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Introduction

.e ion
Logic, as most philosophers would agree, consists of the standards of correctness
governing all deductive reasoning. A long tradition, going back to Aristotle, con-

an iss
ceives of these standards in terms of the concepts of necessity and possibility: a
line of reasoning is correct if the truth of its conclusion follows necessarily from the

du
truth of its premises or, put differently, if it is not possible for the conclusion to be

m
false when the premises are true. While necessity and possibility—the concepts of
modality—are of central importance in contemporary analytic philosophy, and while

per
the philosophy of logic is an active area of research, there is at present relatively
little work on the question whether modality is indeed intrinsic to the standards of
correctness that constitute logic.
However, this question of the relationship between modality and logic is the
crux of a debate which dates back to the beginnings of analytic philosophy, in the

ut
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The founders of analytic philosophy,

ey
Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, form one side of this debate. While they of
h@ itho
course accept that the correctness of deductive reasoning involves truth and falsity,
they also insist that logic has fundamentally nothing to do with modality. It is logic,
sl
rather than modality, that lies at the foundation of their philosophies, and so they
explained away modal concepts in terms of logical ones. The other side of the debate
sh ite w

consists of replies to Frege and Russell by two of their immediate successors, C. I.


we
Lewis and Ludwig Wittgenstein. They argue, against Frege and Russell, that reason,
truth, and logic are not conceivable independently of modality. So for them modality
is philosophically prior, and the nature of logic is explained in terms of necessity and
possibility.
The present book is the first of two volumes in which I offer a detailed account
c

of this debate over the relative philosophical priority of modality and logic. The first
ie

volume focuses on Frege and Russell’s side of the debate. The second volume focuses
or not

on Lewis’s and Wittgenstein’s replies to Frege and Russell. In the next two sections
of this introduction I will outline my main interpretive arguments concerning Frege
and Russell. I will then briefly sketch the interpretations of Lewis and Wittgenstein
to be presented in Volume II. I will conclude with a remark on the relevance of this
o

theme in early analytic philosophy to contemporary analytic philosophy.


d.
:d

Necessity Lost: Frege


aft

My discussion of Frege begins by showing how his rejection of modality follows


from central philosophical commitments, and ends with an account of his conception
nf

of the nature of logic.


Dr

In Chapter 1 I first give the philosophical background of Frege’s view of modal-


ity in his first book, Begriffsschrift (1879). The background is Kant’s theory of judg-
sa

ment. Kant held that in making a judgment a judger forms a representation. Frege
rejects this view, and claims that judgment has nothing to do with the formation of
representations, but consists of taking a representation, however formed, to be true. A
number of commentators have noted this difference between Frege and Kant, with-
out, however, giving any account of why they differ. I show that Frege’s grounds
2 Introduction

for this disagreement lie in one of Frege’s great achievements in Begriffsschrift: the
formulation of modern quantificational logic. Frege’s logic resolves a number of dif-
ficulties with the traditional logic of Kant’s time, and Frege rejects those aspects of

.e ion
Kant’s conception of judgment which depend on features of traditional logic super-
seded by Frege’s logic. This disagreement does not extend to Kant’s account of the
modality of judgment, because for Kant modality is not a feature of the represen-
tation involved in a judgment, but rather the attitude the judger adopts towards that

an iss
representation. Thus, in Begriffsschrift Frege also accepts that necessity and possi-

du
bility are not aspects of the representation involved in a judgment—the “content” of
a judgment in Frege’s terminology. For Frege, then, the judgment that necessarily

m
2+2=4 has the same content as the non-modal judgment that 2+2=4. As he puts it,
ascribing necessity “has no meaning for us” (1879, §4, 5; emphases in original).1

per
After the early Begriffsschrift Frege never discusses modality. However, I show
that Frege’s mature philosophy commits him to rejecting a conception of necessity
and possibility widely accepted throughout the history of philosophy, down to the
present day. According to this conception, necessity and possibility are modes of

ut
truth and falsity, that is, different ways of being true or false. Some thoughts or
propositions are in fact true, but might have been false. Others are not only actually

ey
true, but could not have been false. Yet others are in fact false, but might have been
h@ itho
true. Finally, some are not only false, but could not have been true. Moreover, what
it means to say that a thought might be true or might be false is explained in terms
sl
of alternatives to the circumstances that actually obtain: a thought might be true if
it is true in alternative, non-actual circumstances, and might be false if it is false
sh ite w

in alternative circumstances. This notion of alternative circumstances is expressed


we
vividly by Leibniz’s possible worlds. In Leibnizian terms, a thought is necessarily
true if it is true in all possible worlds, and possibly true if it is true in some world.
Thus, the concepts of necessity and possibility require the relativization of truth and
falsity: a proposition isn’t simply true or false; rather, it is true or false relative to a
set of circumstances or a possible world.
c

If this is the right conception of necessity and possibility, then Frege is commit-
ie

ted to rejecting these modal concepts, because he insists that there is no relativization
or not

of truth and falsity. Truth is absolute, and there is no such thing as truth in certain
circumstances, as opposed to truth simpliciter. Hence there are no modes of truth,
and no classification of truths into actual, possible or necessary.
In Chapter 2 I take up the question of why Frege insists on the absoluteness of
o

truth. Frege’s grounds lie in two puzzling and controversial positions of his mature
d.

philosophy. First, Frege claims that truth and falsity are two objects, called “truth-
:d

values,” which are the referents of thoughts, and that judgment consists in “taking a

1
In the case of this book I find that each of the three existing translations has distinct advantages and
aft

disadvantages, so I give my own translations based on them.


In the case of citations of other texts of Frege and texts of Wittgenstein, I use generally use standard
nf

translations, with which I do not much disagree. However, occasionally I do differ from them on a num-
Dr

ber of small points pertaining to the interpretive arguments I’m making and so I have (mostly slightly)
modified the translations. Rather than indicate all these modifications, I always provide the original texts
in footnotes. Thus the original of the quoted text to which this note is attached is:
sa

Wenn ich einen Satz als nothwendig bezeichne, so gebe ich dadurch einen Wink über meine
Urtheilsgründe. Da aber hierdurch der begriffliche Inhalt des Urtheils nicht berührt wird, so
hat die Form des apodiktischen Urtheils für uns keine Bedeutung. (1879, 5)
Necessity Lost: Frege 3

step from a thought to a truth-value” (1892, 35).2 Second, Frege holds that ascribing
truth to a thought is in some way redundant; for example, a sentence such as ‘the
thought that 5 is a prime number is true’ says no more than the simple sentence ‘5

.e ion
is a prime number’ does (1892, 34-5).3 These claims appear to be in tension with
one another: if truth is an object referred to by the thought that 5 is a prime number,
then isn’t it the case that the sentence ‘the thought that Saturn is a planet is true’ is
about this object, while the sentence ‘Saturn is a planet’ is not? Commentators have

an iss
tended to resolve this tension by arguing that Frege either didn’t really, or shouldn’t
have held one or the other of these positions.4 I show, however, how Frege can

du
consistently maintain both positions.

m
My interpretation rests on three claims about Frege’s conceptions of judgment,
truth, and thought. First, for Frege, a thought represents something to be the case. For

per
example, the thought that Saturn is a planet represents an object, Saturn, as falling
under the concept of being a planet. Second, a judgment is fundamentally the recog-
nition that what a thought represents obtains. To make the judgment that Saturn is
a planet is to recognize that the object Saturn does indeed fall under the concept of

ut
being a planet. Judgment is primarily knowing what is the case, and truth is involved
in judgment only secondarily: recognizing the truth of a thought supervenes on rec-

ey
ognizing the obtaining of what that thought represents. By recognizing that Saturn
h@ itho
falls under the concept of being a planet, one thereby also recognizes the truth of
the thought that Saturn is a planet; alternatively, recognizing that this thought has
sl
the property of truth is at bottom just recognizing that Saturn falls under the con-
cept of being a planet. This is not to deny that truth is a property of thoughts. It is
sh ite w

only to hold that truth is not a fundamental property of thought. Truth is that prop-
we
erty of thoughts which one recognizes in virtue of recognizing the obtaining of what
thoughts represent. This view, it should be noted, is a repudiation of Frege’s ear-
lier Begriffsschrift characterization of judgment as fundamentally taking a thought to
be true. Finally, the primary function of a thought is to be a step to the acquisition
of knowledge, which is to say, to judgment. This is the meaning of Frege’s claim
c

that judgment is taking a step from a thought to a truth-value: making a judgment is


ie

going beyond a mere representation of what is the case to recognizing that what is
or not

represented actually obtains.


These claims are incompatible with the view that truth and falsity are relative.
We can see the incompatibility in the following way. Suppose that truth and falsity
are relative. Then, a thought is not determined as true or false except with respect
o

to a time, a place, or a circumstance. From Frege’s perspective, what this purported


d.

thought represents, by itself, without a time, place or circumstance, is not something


:d

that one can recognize to obtain, or recognize not to obtain. Hence this purported
thought fails to provide what is required for judgment; it fails to fulfill the primary
function of thoughts and so is, at best, a defective thought, if it is a thought at all. The
aft

truth and falsity of genuine thoughts are absolute.


This conclusion, I show in Chapter 3, indicates how Frege explains away certain
nf

intuitions that seem to support the relativity of truth. Intuitively it seems that a sen-
Dr

2
Urteilen kann als Fortschreiten von einem Gedanken zu seinem Wahrheitswerte gefaßt wer-
sa

den.(1967, 150)
3
Man kann ja geradezu sagen: ‘der Gedanke, daß 5 eine Primzahl ist, ist wahr’. Wenn man aber
genauer zusieht, so bemerkt man, daß damit eigentlich nichts mehr gesagt ist als in dem einfachen Satze
‘5 ist eine Primzahl’. (1967, 150)
4
For example, Heck (2007) holds that Frege should not have accepted the redundancy of truth ascrip-
tions, while Greimann (2007) questions whether Frege really took truth and falsity to be objects.
4 Introduction

tence like ‘France is a monarchy’ may be false in 2016 but true in 1788. Frege’s op-
ponent would explain this intuition by holding that this sentence expresses a thought
that is false in 2016 and true in 1788. The opponent’s claim, then, is that only given

.e ion
a time is this supposed thought true. This means that only given a period of time—
here in 1788—is there such a thing as recognizing what is represented as obtaining.
From Frege’s perspective the only way to make sense of this claim is to take what is
represented to be something about in 1788. The sentence ‘France is a monarchy’ is

an iss
true in 1788 not because it expresses a thought that is true relative to this time, but

du
rather because it expresses a thought about this time, and that thought is absolutely
true. In Chapter 3 I also extend this account to Fregean explanations of sentences

m
that appear to ascribe necessity or possibility to thoughts. This chapter concludes my
account of Frege’s rejection of modality. On this account, the rejection of all modal

per
distinctions flows from central elements of Frege’s mature philosophy.
In Chapter 4 I turn to Frege’s conception of logic. First, I show that for Frege
neither apriority nor analyticity makes a truth logical. Frege explicitly formulates
his own versions of Kant’s analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions.

ut
For Frege these distinctions, like necessity and possibility, are themselves explained
in terms of logical notions. Thus, the nature of logic is not characterized in terms

ey
of analyticity or apriority, but rather the other way around. Incidentally, Frege’s ac-
h@ itho
count of these distinctions allows not only for synthetic a priori truths, but also for
necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori truths.
sl
Second, logic for Frege is a system of truths, some of which are primitive logical
truths and the remainder of which are justified on the basis of the primitive logical
sh ite w

truths. Frege conceives of logic as determining the correctness of the justification of


we
judgments by inference from other judgments. In order to avoid an infinite regress,
inferential justification must rest on judgments that are not themselves inferentially
justified. These endpoints of justification divide into three kinds of judgments: those
justified by sense-perception, those justified by pure intuition of space, and those
justified by what Frege calls “the logical source of knowledge.”5 This last kind of
c

judgments are the primitive truths of logic. Frege suggests that primitive logical
ie

truths are non-inferentially justified in that, in some sense, they provide their own
or not

justifications—they are self-justifying. The central questions about Frege’s concep-


tion of logic are: what is it for a thought to be self-justifying, and how do we know
which thoughts are self-justifying? On my reading, Frege entertains the view that a
thought is self-justifying just in case it is true in virtue of its logical structure. How-
o

ever, he also has reasons for holding that there are no non-circular arguments for
d.

demonstrating that a thought is self-justifying. Thus, there are no justifications by


:d

inference for the claim that a thought is a primitive law of logic. So, if we know
that some thought is a primitive logical truth, the source of this knowledge is not
inference, but something like sense-perception or pure intuition of space.
aft
nf

Necessity Lost: Russell


Dr

Russell’s views of modality are closely bound up with his conversion away from late
sa

nineteenth-century British idealism. I begin in Chapter 5 with a discussion of the


role of modality in Russell’s idealist philosophy of mathematics. At the beginning of

5
Frege’s phrase is “logischen Erkenntnisquelle,” and it occurs in a letter to Hilbert written in 1899
Frege (1969a [henceforth cited as NS], 63).
Necessity Lost: Russell 5

this period, Russell held a largely Kantian view of geometry as comprising necessary
truths that are not justified either by sensory experience or by formal logic. Their
justification consists in a transcendental argument resting on certain conditions of

.e ion
possibility of experience. Russell then came to think that transcendental arguments
cannot establish the necessity of judgments. Finally, towards the end of this period,
Russell came very close to adopting a version of logicism: the fundamental axioms
of the mathematical theory of classes, a theory which is used in all mathematics, are

an iss
logical axioms. So the justification of at least one branch of mathematics would con-

du
sist of formal logic. Russell’s move to this logicist view was motivated by an attempt
to account for the necessity of mathematics. Under the influence of F. H. Bradley’s

m
theory that all necessity lies in the connection between the premises and conclusions
of logical inferences, Russell came to take the necessity of the fundamental axioms

per
of mathematics to rest on their being rules of inference. These rules are based on im-
plications among mathematical concepts, where implication is a necessary inferential
relation.
Once Russell fully rejected idealism, however, he came also to reject the no-

ut
tions of necessity and possibility. How this came about is the topic of Chapter 6. It
is well-known that the rejection of idealism was a collaborative enterprise in which

ey
Russell was engaged together with G. E. Moore. One of the central elements of this
h@ itho
rejection is Moore’s criticism of Bradley’s theory of judgment, which Moore presents
in “The Nature of Judgment” (1899). Bradley holds that making a judgment consists
sl
of ascribing to reality a concept that is abstracted from immediate experience, and
conceives of this abstraction as the imposition of a division on an originally unified
sh ite w

experience. Moore’s arguments against this theory have not, in general, been taken
we
very seriously.6 However, I show that in fact they present a substantial challenge to
Bradley. Moore argues that nothing abstracted from an originally undivided experi-
ence can be part of another originally undivided experience, just a slice cut from one
cake cannot be identical to a slice cut from another cake. So a concept abstracted
from one experience cannot apply to any aspect of reality that appears in the other
c

experience. Thus, Bradley has no coherent account of the supposed concept that he
ie

claims to be the object of judgment. Following this criticism Moore formulates an


or not

alternative theory of judgment according to which the object of a judgment is not ab-
stracted from immediate experience, but an entity—called a proposition—composed
of mind-independent concepts that the judgment is about.
On the basis of this conception of proposition Moore then criticizes Kant’s the-
o

ory of necessity. Moore takes Kant to hold that necessity applies only to strictly uni-
d.

versal and non-empirical judgments. Against this Moore argues that all judgments,
:d

even particular empirical ones such as that expressed by the sentence ‘something red
exists now’, are necessarily true if they are true at all. This argument has received
little attention. I show that it begins with an argument for the absoluteness of the
aft

truth of propositions. The premises of this sub-argument are drawn from the Moore-
Russell theory of propositions, and include in particular the claim that facts are true
nf

propositions. From the absoluteness of the truth of propositions Moore then infers
Dr

that if any judgment whatsoever is true, then it is necessarily true.


Russell understands the conclusion of Moore’s argument somewhat differently
sa

from the way Moore does. As Russell sees it, if every true proposition is necessarily

6
For example, in one of the most careful and extensive discussions of Moore’s philosophy, T. Baldwin
(1990), these arguments are taken to be “very obscure,” and based on misunderstandings of Bradley (see
in particular 1990, 14).
6 Introduction

true, then necessity marks no distinction among true propositions. The same holds for
possibility. Hence there is no such thing as necessary truth or possible truth, distinct
from truth tout court. As Russell puts it in The Principles of Mathematics, “there

.e ion
seems to be no true proposition of which there is any sense in saying that it might
have been false. …. What is true, is true; what is false, is false; and concerning
fundamentals, there is nothing more to be said” (1903, §430, 454).
So Russell, just like Frege, rejects modality because of the absoluteness of truth,

an iss
and holds truth to be absolute on the basis of a central philosophical commitment.

du
While for Frege the absoluteness of truth is founded on his conceptions of judgment,
truth, and thought, for Russell it rests on the theory of propositions central to his and

m
Moore’s rejection of idealism.
Russell and Moore’s rejection of idealism is not based solely on Moore’s ar-

per
guments against Bradley’s theory of judgment. Another basis is Russell’s argument
against what he takes to be Bradley’s theory of relations. A standard view is that
there is nothing more to Russell and Moore’s rejection of idealism than these argu-
ments. In particular, it is generally thought that neither Russell nor Moore made any

ut
effort to read Bradley charitably, to try to see how Bradley might have reasons which
at least seem cogent for holding his theories of judgment and relations. But in fact,

ey
as I argue in Chapter 7, Russell offers a diagnosis of Bradley’s arguments as tacitly
h@ itho
relying on a modal principle of sufficient reason: if, although a situation actually ob-
tains, it is possible for that situation not to have obtained, then there must be a reason
sl
why it does actually obtain. However, if one rejects, as Russell does, any distinction
between what might be the case and what actually is the case, then Bradley’s modal
sh ite w

principle of sufficient reason collapses, and with it Bradley’s justification for ideal-
we
ism. So Russell’s opposition to modality doesn’t merely follow from his rejection of
idealism, but also completes his rejection of idealism.
In Chapter 8 I discuss Russell’s conception of logic. This conception differs in
one respect from Frege’s. While for Frege the hallmark of primitive logical truth is
being self-justifying, for Russell the axioms of logic are rules of inference involving
c

the relation of implication. This is a carryover from Russell’s idealist period, in which
ie

he took mathematical axioms to be rules of inference based on implications. The


or not

main difference is that implication, in this earlier view, is a relation of necessary


connection. With the banishment of modality, Russell replaces necessary connection
with generality: the axioms of logic are generalizations stating which propositions
stand in a relation called material implication. These generalizations are rules of
o

inference because they determine which inferences from propositions to propositions


d.

are logically valid.


:d

Material implication is one of the most notorious features of Russell’s view of


logic. The reason is that Russell accepts a number of counter-intuitive claims about
material implication, for instance, “false propositions imply all propositions, and true
aft

propositions are implied by all propositions” (1903, 15). Nowadays these claims are
often labelled the “paradoxes of material implication,” and they have received well-
nf

known criticisms from C. I. Lewis and W. V. Quine. I take up Lewis’s criticisms


Dr

in Volume II, but in Chapter 8 of this volume I show how Russell would be able to
resist Quine’s criticisms. The grounds of this resistance reveals a central element of
sa

Russell’s conception of logic. In particular, Russell’s grounds consist of his view in


Principles that implication is not definable. I show that what Russell means by this is
that there is no analysis of what implication consists in. From Russell’s perspective,
a criticism like Quine’s amounts to the claim that implication is analyzable in terms
Necessity Lost: Russell 7

of truth and falsity, but Russell has reasons for holding that such an analysis would
be viciously circular.
The critical consequence of this Russellian argument for the unanalyzability of

.e ion
implication is that there is, ultimately, no non-circular demonstration that proposi-
tions stand in the relation of implication. So, ultimately, we do not attain our knowl-
edge of implication, which includes our knowledge of the axioms of logic, by inferen-
tial justification. It follows, Russell holds, that our knowledge of which propositions

an iss
imply what others is something akin to sense-perception, in that it is non-inferential.

du
Russell describes it as “acquaintance,” or “perceiving with a mental telescope” (1903,
xv). Russell suggests that this mental perception proceeds by reflection on what

m
forms of inference are indispensable in deductive reasoning. Thus Russell’s accep-
tance of the “paradoxes” derives from the fact that he takes the “paradoxes” to follows

per
from such indispensable forms of deductive inference.
It may be suggested that, by time Russell co-authored Principia Mathematica
with A. N. Whitehead, he no longer accepts the unanalyzability of implication, since
in that work implication is given a definition. However, I argue that definition in

ut
Principia is no longer analysis, as it is in Principles. Rather, definition in Principia is,
in fact, an ancestor of Rudolf Carnap’s notion of explication: the precise delineation

ey
of some aspect of a pre-theoretical notion for theoretical purposes, where the result of
h@ itho
incorporating the sharpened notion in theory is judged by pragmatic considerations
(see Carnap, 1950, 3). Thus, Russell continues to hold that there is no analysis of what
sl
implication consists in. However, reflection on our practice of deductive reasoning
enables us to detect certain indispensable features of implication and, for the purpose
sh ite w

of obtaining a simpler formulation of logic we can replace implication with an ersatz


we
that has these features.
My account of Russell’s thesis of the unanalyzability of implication points to
an affinity between Frege’s and Russell’s conceptions of logic. Both argue that our
identification of which thoughts or propositions are the first principles of deductive
reasoning is not inferentially justified, and so issues from a source that is like sense-
c

perception or pure intuition.


ie

In Chapter 9 I discuss a change in the grounds of Russell’s opposition to modality


or not

after Principles. The importance of this change is that it makes it possible for Rus-
sell to continue to reject modal concepts even after a major change in his philosophy
that appears to block Moore’s argument for the absoluteness of truth. The impetus
for this change appeared around 1906, when Russell started to worry that the theory
o

of propositions he and Moore developed fails to explain how true propositions differ
d.

from false ones. By 1910, Russell holds that there are no Moore-Russell propositions,
:d

and moves to an account of judgment now known as the multiple-relation theory of


judgment. One consequence of moving to the multiple-relation theory is that Rus-
sell no longer holds that facts are true propositions. So a key premises of Moore’s
aft

argument for the absoluteness of truth is gone.


However, Russell did not change his opposition to modality, because by 1905
nf

he had come up with another anti-modal argument. The argument begins with a sur-
Dr

vey of intuitions about modality. Russell proceeds to make these intuitions more
precise in terms of notions of logic. Each of the resulting accounts, however, has
sa

one or more of three characteristics: (a) the property of propositions it picks out is
not logically, but at best epistemologically, significant; (b) the account doesn’t dis-
tinguish necessary from true or contingent propositions, or, (c) the account conflicts
with some other intuition we have about necessity or possibility. Russell takes this
8 Introduction

result to provide evidence that we have no single coherent intuitive conception of


necessity and possibility. So, even if this evidence is not conclusive, it’s unclear
whether anything would be lost to logic and philosophy if we simply replaced modal

.e ion
concepts with one or the other of the accounts of modal intuitions in logical terms.
For the rest of Russell’s career, he continued to maintain that in the absence of co-
herent intuitions about necessity and possibility, these concepts are best eliminated
in favor of coherent logical reconstructions.

an iss
du
Looking Ahead: Necessity Regained

m
In this section I sketch the argument of Volume II of this book, which is concerned

per
with Lewis’s and Wittgenstein’s responses to Frege and Russell’s views of modality
and logic. Lewis and Wittgenstein do not question the absoluteness of truth. How-
ever, they also do not need truth to be relative in order to account for necessity and
possibility, because they take these modal concepts to be primitive and unanalyz-
able. For Lewis they are independent of truth and falsity. For Wittgenstein, truth and

ut
falsity are to be accounted for in terms of possibility. They both argue, in different

ey
ways, that these primitive modal notions are essential to the nature of logic.
h@ itho
Lewis sl
Nowadays Lewis is best-known for having formulated the first systems of modern
sh ite w

modal logic, which he called systems of strict implication. However, while the logic
we
of strict implication is well-understood, its philosophical grounding is not.7 The stan-
dard account is that the entire basis of Lewis’s rejection of Russell’s logic consists of
the counter-intuitive “paradoxes” of material implication mentioned above. Lewis’s
notion of strict implication is intended to do no more than match our intuitions about
implication.
c

The problem with this standard interpretation is that the argument it attributes to
ie

Lewis is not effective against Russell. The reason is that the definition of implication
or not

which Russell uses in Principia is intended solely to simplify the formulation of logic
while capturing the most important feature of implication: no true proposition implies
a false one. The justification of this definition of implication is purely pragmatic, so,
the fact that the definition fails to match our intuitions about implication is beside the
point.
o
d.

On my interpretation, Lewis’s fundamental criticism of Russell is based on a


:d

little-noticed pragmatic element in Russell’s conception of logic. Russell acknowl-


edges that logic has to be useful in reasoning: we have to be able to acquire knowledge
by starting from propositions known to be true and deducing, using logic, proposi-
aft

tions we don’t already know to be true. This requires that the implications described
by the axioms of logic have a kind of apriority: they have to be knowable without
nf

knowing the truth or falsity of the propositions that they describe as standing in the
Dr

relation of implication. The problem that Lewis sees in this Russellian pragmatic
requirement is that if one reasoned in accordance with material implication, then one
sa

would not be able to demonstrate that Russell’s logical axioms have the kind of apri-
ority that underlies the usefulness of logic. In order to account for this apriority,
implication has to be understood in ancient Aristotelian modal terms: a proposition

7
A notable exception is the discussion in Curley (1975).
Looking Ahead: Necessity Regained 9

implies another if it is impossible for the first to be true and the second to be false.
This is Lewis’s notion of strict implication. The upshot is that if Russell is to cer-
tify his supposed logical axioms as having the kind of apriority required by logic, he

.e ion
would have to reason in accordance with principles other than those logical axioms.
So Russell’s axioms do not govern all reasoning. But logic does govern all reasoning.
So Russell’s axioms have to be supplemented to count as logic, but the supplemen-
tation consists precisely of modal axioms, precisely what Russell is committed to

an iss
avoiding.

du
m
Wittgenstein
I focus on two aspects of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922):8

per
the so-called picture theory of propositions, and the criticism of Frege and Russell’s
conception of logic.
In much of the existing work on the Tractatus it seems to be assumed that
Wittgenstein had already adopted the picture theory in the “Notes on Logic” that

ut
he dictated in the fall of 1913. But this is not so. I show that there is considerably
more philosophical development in Wittgenstein’s thinking than has been realized.

ey
In the “Notes on Logic” manuscripts we find only the claim that propositions are facts
h@ itho
and the claim that propositional facts represent facts in the world by the stipulation
of correlations between representing and represented facts. Moreover, Wittgenstein
sl
realized not long after formulating this theory of propositions that it is defective. In
particular, it can no more give an account of falsity than the Moore-Russell theory
sh ite w

of propositions can account for the distinction between true and false propositions.
we
This realization is recorded in the first of the notebooks that Wittgenstein kept while
serving as an officer of the Austrian army in World War I. It is in this notebook that
Wittgenstein proposed accounting for false propositions by considering how pictures
can be false. However, in the wartime notebooks the analogy between propositions
and pictures doesn’t solve the problem of falsity. It is only in the Tractatus that
c

Wittgenstein formulated a solution, and the solution depends on construing picturing


ie

modally: a fact may function as a picture only if it is the realization of a possibility,


or not

where that possibility is also a possibility for the things pictured. This possibility
for the pictured things may or may not be realized; if realized, then the picture is
true, and if not realized, the picture is false. In this way, possibility finally resolves
the problem of falsity and, in this solution, possibility is a primitive notion which
o

underlies truth and falsity.


d.

According to a fairly widespread interpretation, Wittgenstein takes Frege and


:d

Russell to be wrong in holding that the propositions of logic are true in virtue of being
correct representations of the world. I read Wittgenstein’s criticism differently. His
worry concerns a point I establish in Chapters 4 and 8 of the present volume: Frege
aft

and Russell hold that our identification of thoughts or propositions as primitive logi-
cal axioms has no inferential justification, but rather is grounded in a non-inferential
nf

source analogous to sense-perception. The problem, from Wittgenstein’s point of


Dr

view, is that it is unclear how non-sensorily perceiving that a proposition is objec-


tively logical is distinguishable from being determined by one’s subjective psycho-
sa

logical makeup to find this proposition logical. To escape this problem, Wittgenstein
holds that logic does not fundamentally consist in a set propositions at all.
For Wittgenstein, logic consists fundamentally of how propositions in general
8
The Tractatus will be cited, in the text, by remark number.
10 Introduction

represent. Propositions in general are truth-functions of other propositions. What this


means for Wittgenstein is that certain necessities and impossibilities govern how a
proposition pictures in relation to how the propositions of which it is a truth-function

.e ion
picture. For example, if a proposition R is a disjunction of propositions P and Q,
then it’s impossible for R to picture correctly at the same time that both P and Q
picture incorrectly. And, if either P or Q pictures correctly, then it is necessary that R
pictures correctly as well. This latter necessity makes it correct to infer a disjunction

an iss
from either of the disjuncts. In this way, necessity is restored to the logical standards

du
of correctness of all reasoning.
These necessities and impossibilities also mean that a proposition is not fully

m
distinct from those propositions of which it is a truth-function. Thus the disjunction
R wouldn’t be the proposition that it is if it were possible for it to be true and both

per
disjuncts P and Q false, or for it to be false and either disjunct P or Q true. Hence the
standards of correctness of all reasoning lie in the natures of the propositions involved
in the reasoning, not in other, logical, propositions. Logic is not concentrated in a
special set of propositions, but pervades all propositions. This is not to deny that

ut
there are such things as propositions of logic. It is, rather, to claim that the nature
of propositional picturing is primary and the truth of logical propositions derivative.

ey
Hence, as Wittgenstein puts it, “we can get on without logical propositions” (6.122).9
h@ itho
Concluding Remarkssl
sh ite w

In contemporary analytic philosophy modal concepts, especially the Leibnizian no-


we
tion of possible worlds, play a central role. The metaphysics and semantics of modality—
the nature and reality of possible worlds and the truth conditions of modal discourse—
are core philosophical subjects and topics of ongoing research. Moreover, modal con-
cepts furnish a widely used framework for approaching philosophical problems and
arguments: causation, intentionality, and normativity are analyzed in modal terms,
c

claims in aesthetics are formulated in modal language, and arguments in political


ie

philosophy are given in terms of states of affairs in other possible worlds.


or not

Many contemporary analytic philosophers with an interest in the history of their


tradition realize that this has not always been the case; before the 1970s the default
attitude towards modality among analytic philosophers was one of some degree of
suspicion. According to a fairly widespread view, the logical positivists were re-
o

sponsible for this anti-modal attitude. They are taken to have rejected necessity and
d.

possibility on the basis of two doctrines. First, their anti-metaphysical empiricist cri-
:d

terion of significance: a sentence is meaningful only if it can be verified or falsified


on the basis of sensory experience. Second, sense perception informs us only of what
is the case in the world, not of what must be or might have been the case. It follows
aft

that sentences which purport to describe necessary or merely possible states of af-
fairs are not verifiable by sensory experience and so have no cognitive meaning.10
nf

9
Dr

wir … ohne die logischen Sätze auskommen können


10
This view of positivism and the rejection of modality is in fact flawed in a number of ways. For one
thing, Rudolf Carnap, one of the most prominent thinkers of logical positivism, not only took modality
sa

seriously, but was one of the first logicians to formulate a system of quantified modal logic. The most
important critic of modality in mid-twentieth century analytic philosophy was actually W. V. Quine, but
Quine was also a critic of positivism, and his rejection of modal notions had nothing to do with the criterion
of cognitive significance. As I show in Shieh (2013), Quine’s rejection of modality is closely intertwined
with the conception of modality in Carnap’s logical empiricism; both Carnap’s conception and Quine’s
critique are far more complex and philosophically subtle than the argument against modality standardly
Concluding Remarks 11

On this view, the justification of modal concepts in face of this positivist argument
has two components. First, ordinary thought and discourse is permeated with modal
notions, so in the absence of any argument against their coherence there is no rea-

.e ion
son to distrust our intuitive acceptance of these concepts. Second, the criterion of
cognitive significance faces serious difficulties. Hence the doubts about modality
manufactured by the positivists evaporated, and so we are justified in resting with
our intuitive acceptance of modal concepts.

an iss
The early analytic debate over modality shows, to begin with, that the positivists

du
were not the only, or the first, analytic philosophers to argue against modal concepts.
It shows, more importantly, that objections to modality may turn on considerations

m
entirely different from those attributed to the positivists. From the perspective of this
debate, the legitimacy of modal concepts has nothing to do with whether we have

per
sensory evidence for modal statements, but rather turns on the relativization of truth,
the usefulness of logic, and the nature of propositional representation of the world.
Thus, the significance of the early analytic debate for contemporary philosophy is
that it provides the basis for a reconsideration of our current assumptions about how

ut
the legitimacy of modal concepts is to be attacked and defended. Through such a
reconsideration we would reach a better philosophical understanding of the nature of

ey
necessity and possibility, and their relation to the foundations of logic.
h@ itho
sl
sh ite w
we
c
ie
or not
o
d.
:d
aft
nf
Dr
sa

attributed to the positivists.


Dr
aft
sa :d
nf o
or not
d. c
sh ite w
ie
h@ itho Part I

Frege
we ut
sl per
ey m
an iss
.e ion
du
Dr
aft
sa :d
nf o
or not
d. c
sh ite w
ie
h@ itho
we ut
sl per
ey m
an iss
.e ion
du
1

.e ion
Judgment, Modality, and Amodalism

an iss
The only explicit discussion of necessity and possibility in Frege’s writings occurs

du
in §4 of his first book, Begriffsschrift. One of my aims in this chapter is to spell

m
out, from that discussion, Frege’s views about modality in Begriffsschrift. I begin
with the philosophical context required for fully understanding Begriffsschrift §4.

per
One part of this context, to be discussed in §1.1, consists of the view of judgment
informing Kant’s philosophical conception of the logical theory of his time. The other
part of this context derives from Frege’s greatest achievement in Begriffsschrift: the
formulation of modern higher-order quantificational logic to replace the traditional
logic of his time, which remained largely what Kant took to be logic.1 As we will see

ut
in §1.1, Frege’s logic overcomes a number of shortcomings of traditional logic. His

ey
solutions to the problems of traditional logic, I show in §1.2, make a central aspect
h@ itho
of Kant’s view of judgment untenable, and so lead Frege to an alternative view of
judgment that accords better with his own version of logic. As we will see in §1.3,
sl
this philosophical context shows that what Frege is doing in Begriffsschrift §4 is
examining Kant’s classification of judgments in order to determine which of Kant’s
sh ite w

distinctions among judgments remain viable from the perspective of Frege’s view of
we
judgment. A part of this examination focuses on Kant’s account of modal distinctions
among judgments. This leads Frege to his account of modality, according to which
modal distinctions have no significance for logic.
It is widely acknowledged that Frege’s adoption of the distinction between sense
and reference, roughly a decade after Begriffsschrift, is of central importance in his
c

philosophical development. So it’s natural to wonder if Frege’s view of modality


ie

changed after the sense/reference distinction. My second main aim in this chapter
or not

is to show that, after adopting the sense/reference distinction, Frege remains com-
mitted to the insignificance of modality. In order to do this, I first outline, in §1.4,
a tempting interpretation of Frege’s notion of sense as a modal notion, according to
which the sense of a linguistic expression determines the reference of that expression
o

with respect to possible states of the world. Then, in §1.5, I show how this inter-
d.

pretation fails. The main problem, as we will see, is that this interpretation conflicts
:d

1
Frege was not the first to attempt to go beyond traditional logic. In the nineteenth century George
Boole formulated an algebraic approach to interpreting and solving problems in logic—see in particular
The Laws of Thought (1854). Among the logicians who worked on Boole’s algebra of logic program is
aft

Charles S. Peirce, who, starting in his “Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives” (1870), also
moved towards a version of quantification theory. There is no evidence in Begriffsschrift that Frege had
nf

thought much, if at all, about the Boolean tradition. However, Begriffsschrift received a critical review by
Dr

Ernst Schröder (1880), one of the most prominent members of the Boolean school, claiming that Frege’s
logic is no more than a version of a part of Boole’s logic. This prompted Frege to a study of the Booleans,
culminating in a long essay, “Boole’s Calculating Logic and the Begriffsschrift” (1880), in which Frege
sa

pointed out a number of difficulties for Boolean logic that Frege’s logic resolves. Frege’s reaction to
Boolean logic is discussed in §3.1 below.
My rendering of the title of this essay reflects the convention I adopt of using ‘Begriffsschrift’ to refer to
the book, and ‘Begriffsschrift’, unitalicized, to mention the (closely related) languages defined and used
in that book and in Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (1893). The language(s) are sometimes called
‘concept-script’ in English.
Frege against Traditional Logic 15

with Frege’s insistence that truth is absolute. Thoughts and judgments are true, pe-
riod; they are not true at a time, or at a place, or in a possible circumstance. The
absoluteness of truth implies that there are no ways or modes of being true, that is to

.e ion
say, no distinction between being necessarily true, being possibly true, and simply
being true. I call this position amodalism about truth. The critical question about
Frege’s amodalism is why he would hold such a position. My answer to this ques-
tion constitutes Chapter 2. To prepare the way for that account of Frege’s grounds

an iss
for amodalism, I conclude the present chapter by surveying, in §1.6, some relatively

du
simple answers that have been proposed, and showing that they are all incomplete.

m
1.1 Frege against Traditional Logic

per
1.1.1 A Brief Sketch of Traditional Logic
What Kant took to be logic consists of Aristotle’s theory of syllogisms together with
certain non-syllogistic forms of inference of what nowadays would be called truth-

ut
functional or propositional logic. I will call this traditional logic.

ey
The basic framework of Aristotle’s logic is laid out in Chapter A of Prior Analyt-
h@ itho
ics.2 A syllogistic argument consists of three assertions (apophanseis), two of which
are the premises and the third of which is the conclusion. Assertions are composed of
sl
terms: a subject term and a predicate term. Terms are either individual or universal.
Individual terms hold of only one thing; universal terms hold of many things. Sub-
jects may be either individual or universal, but predicates can only be universals. An
sh ite w
we
assertion either affirms or denies the predicate of the subject. Moreover, if the subject
of an assertion is a universal term, then the predicate may be affirmed of the subject
either universally or in part. Similarly, a predicate may be denied either universally
or in part. Thus, there are four types of assertions: universal affirmations—‘all S is
P’, universal denials—‘no S is P’, particular affirmations—‘some S is P’, and par-
c

ticular denials—‘some S is not P’. We can think of each of these types as assertions
ie

having a common logical form, since whether a syllogistic argument is valid or not
or not

is determined by the types of assertions that are its premises and conclusion.
The two premises of a syllogistic argument have exactly one term—called the
middle term—in common. The other two terms in the premises are called the extreme
terms, and the conclusion of the syllogistic argument is composed of the extreme
terms. The predicate of the conclusion is called the major term and the subject of
o
d.

the conclusion the minor term. The premise containing the major term is the major
:d

premise, and the premise containing the minor term is the minor premise.
We can illustrate this terminology by reference to what is perhaps the most fa-
miliar example of a valid form of syllogistic argument, the one named Barbara by
aft

medieval logicians:
All As are Bs
nf

All Bs are Cs
Dr

Therefore, all As are Cs.


sa

In Barbara all the premises and the conclusion are universal affirmations, the middle
term is B, the major term is C, the minor term is A, the first premise is minor, and the
second premise is major.
2
This sketch follows the excellent introductory account Smith (1989). See also Kapp (1931), W.
Kneale and M. Kneale (1984, Chapters 1-2), and Beaney (1996, Chapter 1).
16 Judgment, Modality, and Amodalism

By Kant’s time, logic was generally recognized as including more than Aristo-
tle’s syllogistic theory. In Kant’s courses on logic, for example, four non-syllogistic
forms of inference are regularly presented. Two of these are called hypothetical infer-

.e ion
ences or hypothetical syllogisms. In the Jäsche Logic Kant describes these as having
a “hypothetical proposition [hypothetischen Satz]” as major premise, where a hypo-
thetical proposition, Kant explains, “consists of two propositions, (1.) an antecedent
proposition (antecedens) and (2.) a consequent proposition (consequens)” (Kant,

an iss
2004 [henceforth cited as LL], 622). The two forms of hypothetical inference differ

du
on whether the minor premise affirms the antecedent or denies the consequent of the
major premise. They are called:

m
• Modus ponendo ponens – if p then q, p, therefore q

per
• Modus tollendo tollens – if p then q, not q, therefore not p
The other two forms of inference are called disjunctive inferences or disjunctive syl-
logisms. These have a “disjunctive proposition” (disjunktiver Satz) as major premise,
where the disjunction is understood exclusively, so that the propositions propositions

ut
disjoined are represented as mutually incompatible and jointly exhaustive. The two

ey
forms of disjunctive inference differ on whether the minor premise affirms or denies
h@ itho
one of the disjuncts. They are called:


sl
Modus ponendo tollens – either p or q, p, therefore not q
Modus tollendo ponens – either p or q, not p, therefore q (Kant, 1876 [henceforth
cited as JL], §§75-78,142-144)3
sh ite w
we
1.1.2 Kant on Judgment and Logic
I turn now to discuss one aspect of Kant’s philosophical conception of logic, namely
his view of judgment. Kant took the premises and conclusions of arguments to be
c

judgments, and the logical forms of traditional logic to be part of a classification of


ie

judgments. Among the many characterizations of judgment in Kant’s writings, the


or not

one most directly relevant to our purposes is from the first chapter of the Analytic
of Concepts of the Critique of Pure Reason: “All judgments are … functions of
unity among our representations [Vorstellungen],” where a function is “the unity of
the action [Handlung] of ordering different representations under a common one”
(1998, A69/B94, A68/B93; emphases mine).4 This characterization is amplified in
o
d.

the Jäsche Logic, where a judgment is identified as “the representation [Vorstellung]


:d

of the unity of the consciousness of various representations” (2004, §17, 597).5 In


the Jäsche Logic we also find a distinction between matter and form of judgments:
aft

3
It is reasonably clear that Aristotle did not consider these forms of inference. For an account of their
nf

historical development in the logic of the Peripatetics see Bobzien (2002), who notes that it is not known
Dr

how these forms of inference received these names.


4
Alle Urteile sind … Funktionen der Einheit unter unseren Vorstellungen, da nämlich statt einer un-
mittelbaren Vorstellung eine höhere, die diese und mehrere unter sich begreift, zur Erkenntnis des Gegen-
sa

standes gebraucht, und viel mögliche Erkenntnisse dadurch in einer zusammengezogen werden. (1956,
A68/B93)
Ich verstehe aber unter Funktion die Einheit der Handlung, verschiedene Vorstellungen unter einer
gemeinschaftlichen zu ordnen. (1956, A69/B94)
5
Ein Urtheil ist die Vorstellung der Einheit des Bewusstseins verschiedener Vorstellungen. (1876,
109)
Frege against Traditional Logic 17

Matter and form belong to every judgment as essential constituents of it. The matter of the
judgment consists in the given representations that are combined in the unity of consciousness
in the judgment, the form in the determination of the way [Art und Weise] that the various

.e ion
representations belong, as such, to one consciousness. (2004, §18, 598; last emphasis mine)6

Here is one possible way of understanding these claims.7 For Kant judging is an act
of unifying or ordering representations, which produces a representation of those re-

an iss
presentations as ordered or unified. Kant uses the term ‘Urteil’ sometimes to refer to
the act of judging, and sometimes to the representation that results from the act. I will

du
use ‘judgment’ to refer only to the resulting representation, reserving ‘judging’ for

m
the act. There are various ways in which this unifying or ordering is carried out; these
ways are functions or forms of judging. These forms of judging correspond to the

per
forms of the judgments produced. In the Jäsche Logic, the latter forms are explicitly
said to be “logical forms” of judgments: §20 is titled “Logical Forms of Judgment:
Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality” (2004, §17, 598).8
In the First Critique Kant provides what he claims to be an exhaustive specifica-
tion and classification of the ways of judging, which are performed by “abstract[ing]

ut
from all content of a judgment in general, and attend[ing] only to the mere form of the

ey
understanding in it” (1998, A70/B95; emphases mine).9,10 Here “content” seems to
h@ itho
be the same as “matter” in the Jäsche Logic: the specific representations that are com-
bined by judging into judgments. The classification is the notorious “table of judg-
sl
ments”; according to Kant “the function of thinking [in a judgment] can be brought
under four titles” (Kant, 1998 [henceforth cited as CPR], A70/B95): quantity, qual-
ity, relation, and modality.11 What exactly this classification amounts to and on what
sh ite w
we
it is based are both controversial issues. I give now a simplified account that avoids
as much as possible all the controversies.
For Kant, there are two types of representations: intuitions and concepts. Each
intuition represents immediately a single individual, while a concept represents me-
diately many individuals. The two most general ways of judging are (i) subsuming
c

individuals under concepts, and (ii) subordinating lower (less general) concepts under
ie

higher (more general) concepts. Furthermore, there are a number of ways of subordi-
or not

nating a concept under another, and this takes us to the logical forms of Aristotelian
syllogistic. In a subordination, the (lower) concept that is subordinated is the subject-
concept, and the (higher) concept under which the subject-concept is subordinated is
6
Zu jedem Urtheile gehören, als wesentliche Bestandstücke desselben, Materie und Form. — In den
o

gegebenen, zur Einheit des Bewusstseins im Urtheile verbundenen Erkenntnissen besteht die M a t e r
d.

i e ; in der Bestimmung der Art und Weise, wie die verschiedenen Vorstellungen, als solche, zu einem
:d

Bewusstsein gehören, die F o r m des Urtheils.(1876, 109-110)


7
In this account I’m indebted to Longuenesse (1993) and Hanna (2014).
8
Logische Formen der Urtheile: Quantität, Qualität, Relation und Modalität (1876, 110).
9
von allem Inhalte eines Urteils überhaupt abstrahieren, und nur auf die bloße Verstandesform darin
aft

achtgeben (1956, A70/B95).


10
The table as Kant presents it doesn’t in fact fit this description. Kant’s classifications do not actually
nf

abstract from the contents of judgments. For example, if one abstracted from the contents of infinite
Dr

judgments, one ought to arrive at a sub-species of affirmative judgments; indeed that is how they are
treated in traditional Aristotelian or Wolffian logic. So Kant’s classifications are sensitive to the contents
of judgments. This is why Kant goes on to call the table “the transcendental table of all moments of thinking
sa

in judgments” (1998, A73/B98). The occurrence of “transcendental” here shows that the classifications
are more fine-grained than those in general logic, and it’s a puzzle why Kant takes them to abstract from
all content.
I’m grateful to Ian Proops for bringing this point to my attention.
11
die Funktion des Denkens in [eines Urteils] unter vier Titel gebracht werden könne (1956, A70/B95).
Kant’s terminology is fluid; in the Jäsche Logic these four are called “moments” rather than “titles.”
18 Judgment, Modality, and Amodalism

the predicate-concept. Two ways of subordinating a concept under another are: (a) all
of the extension of the subject-concept is represented as included in the extension of
the predicate-concept, and (b) only part is.12 These types of subordination produce,

.e ion
respectively, universal and particular judgments. These two types of judgments are
said to differ in quantity; in Kant’s terminology, universal judgments and particular
judgments are two “moments” under the “title” of quantity. Another classification of
ways of subordinating concepts is: (c) the extension of the subject is represented as

an iss
included in the extension of the predicate-concept, or (b) the extension of the subject
is represented as excluded from that of the predicate.13 These types of subordination

du
are respectively affirmative and negative judgments; they differ in quality and are

m
different moments under the title of quality. Clearly the classifications with respect
to quantity and to quality are meant to cut across one another in order to yield the

per
four types of judgments involved in syllogistic inference. A universal negative judg-
ment, for example, differs in quality but not in quantity from a universal affirmative
judgment.14
Now, as we saw, Kant includes as part of logic four types of valid inference not

ut
treated in Aristotle’s logic: two types of hypothetical syllogisms and two types of
disjunctive syllogisms. He took the logical forms of the conditional and the disjunc-

ey
tive premises of these syllogisms to correspond to two additional ways of judging.
h@ itho
One of these ways represents an antecedent judgment and a consequent judgment as
standing in the relation of ground and consequence; this type of judging produces
sl
the hypothetical judgments that are the major premises of hypothetical syllogisms.
Kant gives as an example “If there is perfect justice, then obstinate evil will be pun-
sh ite w

ished” (1998, A73/B98).15 Another way of judging represents a set of judgments as


we
standing in the relation of being mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive specifica-
tions of a concept; Kant’s example is “The world exists either through blind chance,
or through inner necessity, or through an external cause” (1998, A74/B99).16 This
type of judging produces the disjunctive judgments that are the major premises of
disjunctive syllogisms. These two types of judging differ with respect to relation,
c

and are two moments under the title of relation. Both of these types of judging are
ie

also contrasted with the type of judging that produces judgments occurring in Aris-
or not

totelian syllogisms: in those judgments, what is represented as being related are not
judgments, but concepts. Those judgments are called categorical judgments, and dif-
fer with respect to relation from hypothetical and disjunctive judgments. It would
appear that categorical judgments are more basic than hypothetical and disjunctive
o

ones, since without categorical judging there would be no production of any judg-
d.

ments out of concepts, and so no judgments for hypothetical and disjunctive judging
:d

to relate, although Kant treats them as on a par.

12
The notion of extension here Kant expresses with the term ‘sphere’ (Sphäre). Kant also has another
aft

notion of extension, namely, the class of concepts subordinate to a given concept in a tree of Porphyry-style
“division.” Thanks to Ian Proops for reminding me of this.
nf

13
It may be that for Kant the relations of inclusion and exclusion hold between concepts rather than ex-
tensions of concepts, for then in an analytic affirmative judgment the predicate concept would be included
Dr

within the subject-concept, as Kant says.


14
In the Critique of Pure Reason the classification of quantity and quality each includes one more type
sa

than discussed in the text: singular judgments under the title of quantity, infinite judgments in the title of
quality. For more discussion, see Brandt (1991), Longuenesse (1993), Wolff (1995), as well the classic
study by Reich (1932).
15
wenn eine vollkommene Gerechtigkeit da ist, so wird der beharrlich Bose bestraft (1956, A73/B98).
16
die Welt ist entweder durch einen blinden Zufall da, oder durch innere Notwendigkeit, oder durch
eine äußere Ursache (1956, A73/B98).
Frege against Traditional Logic 19

In addition to these types of judging connected with traditional logical forms,


Kant also distinguishes three types of judging that are of particular importance for
us, namely judgings and judgments that differ with respect to modality:

.e ion
The modality of judgments is a quite special function of them, which is distinctive in that it
contributes nothing to the content of the judgment (for besides quantity, quality, and relation
there is nothing more that constitutes the content of a judgment), but rather concerns only

an iss
the value of the copula in relation to thinking in general. Problematic judgments are those in
which one regards the assertion or denial as merely possible (arbitrary). Assertoric judgments

du
are those in which it is considered actual (true). Apodictic 17 judgments are those in which it

m
is seen as necessary. (1998, 209, A74/B100; emphases mine).18

In the Jäsche Logic Kant gives the following examples of the three modalities of

per
judgment:
• ‘The soul of man may be immortal’ expresses a problematic judgment.
• ‘The human soul is immortal’ expresses an assertoric judgment.

ut
• ‘The soul of man must be immortal’ expresses an apodictic judgment.

ey
h@ itho
One salient puzzle about Kant’s account is what he means by claiming that
modality “contributes nothing to the content of the judgment.” The logical forms
sl
of judgments, as we saw, are identified by “abstracting from all contents of judg-
ments.” So, don’t the forms differing with respect to quantity, quality, and relation
also contribute nothing to the contents of judgments? The answer to this question lies
sh ite w

in the parenthetical remark following the claim that modality doesn’t contribute to the
we
content of judgment: “besides quantity, quality, and relation there is nothing more
that constitutes the content of a judgment.” By “content” (Inhalt) Kant here means
something different from “matter” (Materie). The matter of a judgment consists of
the specific concepts represented as ordered or unified. By “content of judgment”
Kant here means that which is produced by an act of judging: a particular repre-
c

sentation of the particular way in which specific concepts are unified or ordered. So
ie

Kant’s claim is that the logical forms of the representations produced by judging dif-
or not

fer only with respect to quantity, quality, and relation, not with respect to modality.
This means that two results of judging could represent exactly the same unification
or ordering of representations and yet differ in modality. For example, the problem-
atic judgment expressed by ‘all human souls may be immortal’ is exactly the same
o

representation of the same type of subordination of the concept human soul under the
d.
:d

concept immortal as the representation that is the apodictic judgment expressed by


‘all human souls must be immortal’.
This answer leads to the other salient puzzle about Kant’s account: what is dif-
ference in modality of judgment, if it’s not difference in representations produced by
aft

judging? Kant tells us that differences in modality consist in differences in “the value
of the copula in relation to thinking in general.” But what does this mean?
nf
Dr

17
The German term ‘Apodiktische’, like the English term ‘apodictic’, derives from the Greek term
‘apodeiktos’, meaning “demonstrable”; the verb form is ‘apodeiknunai’.
sa

18
Die Modalität der Urtheile ist eine ganz besondere Funktion derselben, die das Unterscheidende an
sich hat, daß sie nichts zum Inhalte des Urtheils beiträgt, (denn außer Große, Qualität und Verhäaltnis ist
nichts mehr, was den Inhalt eines Urteils ausmachte,) sondern nur den Werth der Copula in Beziehung auf
das Denken überhaupt angeht. P r o b l e m a t i s c h e Urteile sind solche, wo man das Bejahen oder
Verneinen als bloß m ö g l i c h (beliebig) annimmt. A s s e r t o r i s c h e, da es als w i r k l i c h (wahr)
betrachtet wird. A p o d i k t i s c h e, in denen man es als n o t w e n d i g ansieht (1998, A74/B100).
20 Judgment, Modality, and Amodalism

What Kant goes on to say, after he introduces the three modalities of judgments
suggests an answer:

.e ion
the two judgments whose relation constitutes the hypothetical judgment … are all merely prob-
lematic. In [‘if there is perfect justice, then obstinate evil will be punished’] the proposition
‘there is perfect justice’ is not said assertorically, but is only thought of as an arbitrary judg-
ment that it is possible that someone might assume, and only the consequence is assertoric.

an iss
…. The assertoric speaks with logical actuality or truth, as say in a hypothetical syllogism
the antecedent in the major premise is problematic, but that in the minor premise assertoric,

du
and indicates that the proposition is already bound to the understanding according to its laws;

m
the apodictic proposition thinks of the assertoric one as determined through these laws of the
understanding itself, and as thus asserting a priori, and in this way expresses logical necessity.
(1998, 209-210, A75-6/B101; emphases mine)19

per
The “hypothetical syllogism” Kant mentions here is surely modus (ponendo) ponens.
A judgment (a representation of a unification of representations) that occurs as the
antecedent of the hypothetical judgment which is the major premise of this syllogism

ut
is problematic. But, the very same representation is assertoric when it occurs on its
own as the minor premise of the syllogism. The basis of the distinction is that when

ey
this representation occurs as the antecedent of a hypothetical judgment, it is merely
h@ itho
assumed, but when it occurs on its own it is asserted to be true. It is less clear which
of the judgments occurring in this form of inference Kant takes to be apodictic, but he
sl
does explicitly characterize the apodictic judgment as “expressing logical necessity.”
Now, Aristotle holds that the conclusion of the syllogism follows of necessity from
sh ite w

the premises. So, it is plausible to take the conclusion of modus ponens to be what
we
Kant is here characterizing as an apodictic judgment. Moreover, the Aristotelian
conception suggests that the conclusion of an inference counts as apodictic because
when a judgment follows from others by inference, then it not merely asserted as
true, but also asserted as true in virtue of following necessarily from true premises.
What this shows is that, for Kant, each act of judging involves something more
c

than producing a judgment. This something more is adopting one of three attitudes
ie

towards this judgment. One attitude is taking the judgment to represent how certain
or not

concepts or judgments might be ordered; this is judging problematically. This is how


one would have to judge if one is producing a judgment J as material for producing
further representations of how J is related to other judgments. Another attitude is
taking the judgment produced to represent how certain concepts or judgments are
o

actually ordered, without, however, basing the attitude on having inferred the judg-
d.

ment from other judgments. This is taking the representation produced to be true; it
:d

is judging assertorically. Finally, one may take the judgment produced to represent
how certain concepts or judgments must be ordered, in virtue of being inferred from
other true judgments. This is judging apodictically. Although adopting one of these
aft

attitudes is part of every act of judging, it is independent of the matter and the logical
nf

19
sind die beiden Urteile, deren Verhältnis das hypothetische Urteil ausmacht … insgesamt nur prob-
Dr

lematisch.
In [wenn eine vollkommene Gerechtigkeit da ist, so wird der beharrlich Bose bestraft]: es ist eine vol-
lkommene Gerechtigkeit da, nicht assertorisch gesagt, sondern nur als ein beliebiges Urteil, wovon es
sa

möglich ist, daß jemand es annehme, gedacht, und nur die Konsequenz ist assertorisch. …. Der asser-
torische sagt von logischer Wirklichkeit oder Wahrheit, wie etwa in einem hypothetischen Vernunftschluß
das Antecedens im Obersatze problematisch, im Untersatze assertorisch vorkommt, und zeigt an, daß der
Satz mit dem Verstande nach dessen Gesetzen schon verbunden sei, der apodiktische Satz denkt sich den
assertorischen durch diese Gesetze des Verstandes selbst bestimmt, und daher a priori behauptend, und
drückt auf solche Weise logische Notwendigkeit aus. (1956, A75-6/B101)
Frege against Traditional Logic 21

forms of the representation produced by that act of judging.20


To sum up, Kant’s philosophical conception of traditional logic consists of the
following elements:

.e ion
1. Judging consists of

(a) producing a judgment, where there are four ways of producing a cat-

an iss
egorical judgment from two concepts, and two ways of producing a
judgment from other judgments, and

du
(b) adopting an attitude towards the judgment produced.

m
2. The logical structure or form of judgments consists of the way in which judg-

per
ments are conceived of as divided into parts in order to specify what forms of
inference are deductively valid and what forms invalid.
3. The logical structure of a judgment is determined by the various ways of judg-
ing:

ut
(c) The logical parts of categorical judgments are subject and predicate

ey
concepts, and their logical structures are given by the ways in which
h@ itho
the concepts are represented as put together: by affirmation or denial,
and by universality or particularity.
(d)
sl
The logical parts of hypothetical and disjunctive judgments are judg-
ments, and their logical structures are given by the ways in which the
sh ite w

judgments are represented as put together: in the relation of ground


we
and consequence, or in the relation of being exhaustive alternatives.

4. There are three attitudes that may be adopted towards a judgment none of
which has an effect on the logical structure of that judgment: assuming the
judgment to be true, asserting it to be true, or asserting it to be true in virtue
c

of following inferentially from other judgments.


ie
or not

1.1.3 Problems of Traditional Logic


There are three salient intractable problems in traditional logic resolved by Frege’s
logic. Each of the three is a failure to account for the validity of obviously correct
forms of inference.21 I will focus on just one of these failures, since from Frege’s
o
d.

solution to just this problem one may see how he is led to opposed Kant’s view of
:d

judgment.22
20
My account is indebted to Longuenesse (2006, 145) and Leech (2012, 272-4), although I differ from
aft

them in that I take the adoption of an attitude rather than the role in inference to be fundamental to Kant’s
modalities of judgment, so that not all three of the modalities are essentially connected with inference.
21
For a clear exposition of these problems see Noonan (2001).
nf

22
The other two failures are the following. First, traditional logic cannot (easily) account for the va-
Dr

lidity of inferences involving multiple generality. A famous example is:


All horses are animals
sa

Therefore, all horses’ heads are animals heads.


Another familiar manifestation of this failure of traditional logic lies in the fact that arguments like
Some soprano is admired by all tenors
Therefore, all tenors admire some soprano.
are valid, but arguments like
22 Judgment, Modality, and Amodalism

The problem concerns arguments like23


(1) Everyone deceives himself

.e ion
(2) Therefore, Freud deceives Freud
(3) Therefore, someone deceives Freud
This is clearly a valid argument, but it’s hard to see that it is by the principles of

an iss
syllogistic inference. The first step of the argument can be construed as a universal

du
affirmation whose terms are person and self-deceiver:

m
(4) All persons are self-deceivers
The conclusion can be taken to be a particular affirmation whose terms are person

per
and deceiver of Freud:
(5) Some person is a deceiver of Freud
Aristotle doesn’t distinguish logically between universal and particular terms. Thus,

ut
given our construal of the conclusion, it seems that the terms of the second premise

ey
are is Freud and is a deceiver of Freud. The second step, then, can be construed
h@ itho
either as a universal affirmation,
(6) sl
All that is Freud is a deceiver of Freud,
or as a particular affirmation,
sh ite w
we
(7) Some that is Freud is a deceiver of Freud
So the argument would have one of two forms:

All Ps are Ss All Ps are Ss


c

All Hs are Cs Some Hs are Cs


ie

Some Ps are Cs Some Ps are Cs


or not

But, since in neither of these is there a middle term, neither is the form of a syllogism.
A fortiori, neither is the form of a valid syllogism.
Of course there is evidently a suppressed premise in this argument, namely, that
Freud is a person. Taking the original statement (1) as major premise and this sup-
o
d.

pressed premise as minor one obtains an instance of Barbara:


:d

• All persons are self-deceivers


• All that is Freud is a person
aft

• Therefore, all that is Freud is a self-deceiver.


All tenors admire some sopranos.
nf

Therefore, some soprano is admired by all tenors.


Dr

are not valid. Second, traditional logic cannot (easily) account for valid inferences from non-categorical
judgments to categorical ones. For example,
sa

Either animals are rational or animals are irrational.


Therefore, animals are either rational or irrational.

23
This example comes Frege’s discussion of the sentence ‘Cato killed Cato’ in Begriffsschrift §9. My
discussion of this issue is derived from the excellent detailed analysis in Rumfitt (1994).
Frege against Traditional Logic 23

But this doesn’t help, because this intermediate conclusion together with the original
statement (2) yields one of the following two arguments:

.e ion
All that is Freud is a self-deceiver.
All that is Freud is a deceiver of Freud
Some person is a deceiver of Freud

an iss
All that is Freud is a self-deceiver

du
Some that is Freud is a deceiver of Freud

m
Some person is a deceiver of Freud

per
But again, since there is no middle term in either argument, neither is a valid syllo-
gism.
The problem posed by this argument for Aristotelian logic is this. In order to
see the original (3) as following from (2), we have to understand (2) as predicating

ut
deceiver of Freud of whatever is Freud, which of course is just one particular person.
If we understand (2) in this way, then, since is a person is rightly predicated of this

ey
particular person, it follows that something, which is correctly called person, is such
h@ itho
that deceiver of Freud is predicated of him. But in premise (1) an entirely different
term, namely self-deceiver, is predicated of all persons. Given that Freud is a person
sl
it follows that self-deceiver is rightly predicated of him, but what does that have to do
with whether deceiver of Freud is rightly predicated of him? Missing in syllogistic
sh ite w

theory is the logical connection between these two terms.


we

1.1.4 The Fregean Solution


Frege’s way of overcoming this difficulty of traditional logic rests on three moves.
The first move is to conceive of statements in terms of the notions of function
c

and argument. In Begriffsschrift Frege explains these notions in terms of the sentence
ie
or not

(8) Hydrogen is lighter than carbon dioxide.24


Frege writes,

we can put in the place of the sign for hydrogen the sign for oxygen or the sign for nitrogen.
o

This changes the sense in such a way that ‘oxygen’ or ‘nitrogen’ enters into the relations in
d.

which ‘hydrogen’ stood before. If one thinks of an expression as variable in this way, it splits
:d

up into a constant component [Bestandteil], which presents the totality of relations, and a sign,
which can be thought of as replaceable by others, and which means [bedeutet] the object that
stands in these relations. The former component I call a function, the latter its argument. (1879,
aft

§9, 15)25
nf

24
Actually Frege doesn’t mention a sentence of natural language, but rather a sentence of Begriffss-
Dr

chrift that expresses “den Umstand, dass Wasserstoffgas leichter als Kohlensäuregas ist” (1879, §9, 15).
25
Denken wir den Umstand, dass Wasserstoffgas leichter als Kohlensäuregas ist, in unserer Formel-
sprache ausgedrückt, so können wir an die Stelle des Zeichens für Wasserstoffgas das Zeichen für Sauer-
sa

stoffgas oder das für Stickstoffgas einsetzen. Hierdurch ändert sich der Sinn in der Weise, dass ‘Sauerstof-
fgas’ oder ‘Stickstoffgas’ in die Beziehungen eintritt, in denen zuvor ‘Wasserstoffgas’ stand. Indem man
einen Ausdruck in dieser Weise veränderlich denkt, zerfällt derselbe in einen bleibenden Bestandtheil, der
die Gesammtheit der Beziehungen darstellt, und in das Zeichen, welches durch andere ersetzbar gedacht
wird, und welches den Gegenstand bedeutet, der in diesen Beziehungen sich befindet. Den ersteren Be-
standtheil nenne ich Function, den letzteren ihr Argument.
24 Judgment, Modality, and Amodalism

In §1.2 below I will discuss in some detail what exactly this explanation means. For
the moment I want to focus on what Frege takes to be a critical claim about these
notions: a single sentence may be thought of as “splitting up” into function and ar-

.e ion
gument in a number of different ways. For example, if one thinks of replacing, in
(2) Freud deceives Freud,

an iss
both occurrences of ‘Freud’ with another sign—‘Siddhartha’, ‘the Queen of Eng-
land’, etc.—one thereby thinks of this sentence as splitting into the argument ‘Freud’

du
and the function

m
(9) ξ deceives ξ,

per
where the two occurrences of ‘ξ’ indicate the two places in sentence (2) from which
‘Freud’ is removed and replaced by other signs. But if one thinks of replacing just
the ‘Freud’ on the left of ‘deceives’ in (2), one thereby thinks of (2) as splitting into
the argument ‘Freud’ and a different function:

ut
(10) ξ deceives Freud

ey
Although Frege doesn’t say so, it is natural to take the sentence which is split up into
h@ itho
a function and an argument as the value of that function for that argument. Thus we
can rephrase the point we have just presented as the claim that a single statement
sl
may be the value of two different functions. As we will see, this underlies the logical
connection missing in Aristotelian syllogistic between the predicates self-deceiver
sh ite w

and deceiver of Freud.


we
Frege’s second move is to account in a new way for universality or generality
(Allgemeinheit). On this new account, a statement of universality is construed as
stating that all values of a function are true statements. Frege introduced what is, in
essence, the universal quantifier and the binding of variables of contemporary logic to
express universality. Thus, using contemporary rather than Frege’s own notation, the
c

judgment that everything deceives Freud would be expressed by putting a variable,


ie

for example, ‘x’, in the argument place ‘ξ’ of (9), and attaching a universal quantifier
or not

with ‘x’ as the variable of quantification:


(∀x)(x deceives x)
This universal judgment logically implies all the judgments expressed by values of
o

the function (9). So, for Frege, universality does not consist in asserting a concept
d.

of all member of the extension of another concept, as is the case in traditional logic.
:d

Rather, it consists of asserting the truth of all values of a function. In Aristotelian


logic the universality of an affirmation or negation is restricted to the extension of a
concept; for Frege universality is totally unrestricted.
aft

Frege’s final move is to introduce what in contemporary logic is called a truth-


functionally adequate set of connectives—the conditional and negation—for con-
nf

structing statements from statements.


Dr

Once all three of these innovations are in place, Frege can express the four types
of judgments of Aristotelian syllogistic in such a way that the logical connections
sa

among the judgments (1)-(3) become manifest. For example, the expression of a
universal affirmation such as (1) would be conceived of as proceeding in the following
stages. First, construct a statement using the conditional sign:
(11) Freud is a person ⊃ Freud deceives Freud
Frege against Traditional Logic 25

Second, conceive this statement as splitting into a function and an argument, that is,
conceive of it as the value of

.e ion
(12) ξ is a person ⊃ ξ deceives ξ
for ‘Freud’ as argument. Finally, use the universal quantifier to form the universal
statement

an iss
(13) (∀x)(x is a person ⊃ x deceives x)

du
This is the Fregean expression of the universal affirmation (4).26

m
The expression of particular affirmations in the language of Begriffsschrift is
more complicated for two reasons. First, in this language there is no existential quan-

per
tifier, not even a defined one; Frege simply uses (what we would write as) ‘∼(∀x)∼’.
Second, the only sentential connectives are negation and the conditional. These com-
plications are not essential for our purposes, so I will assume that there are defined
signs for the existential quantifier and conjunction. By analogy with the formation
of a universal statement from a function, an existential statement is formed from a

ut
function by attaching an existential quantifier with a variable of quantification bind-

ey
ing the argument-places of the function. Such a statement asserts that at least one
h@ itho
value of a function is a true statement.
Now we can give a Fregean representation of the validity of the argument (1)-
sl
(3). The first step is the universal judgment (13). This statement implies (11), the
statement from which it is formed. Now, (11), together with the tacit premise
sh ite w
we
(14) Freud is a person
implies truth-functionally the conjunction
(15) Freud is a person & Freud deceives Freud
c

This sentence is the value of the function


ie

(16) ξ is a person & ξ deceives Freud


or not

for ‘Freud’ as argument. So it implies the existential statement one may form from
it:
(17) (∃x)(x is a person & x deceives Freud)27
o
d.

But this is just the particular affirmation that is the conclusion of the argument.
:d

Crucial to this Fregean account of the validity of (1)-(3) is the fact that
(2) Freud deceives Freud
aft

is a value of both the function


nf

(9) ξ deceives ξ
Dr

and the function


sa

26
See Begriffsschrift §12 for Frege’s account of universal affirmative statements.
27
Three features of Frege’s logical system in Begriffsschrift makes the representation of this argument
in that system more complex: (a) Frege doesn’t have an existential quantifier, not even a defined one,
(b) his primitive sentential connectives are negation and conjunction, and (c) the only rule of inference is
modus ponens.
26 Judgment, Modality, and Amodalism

(10) ξ deceives Freud.


That (2) is a value of (9) displays the logical connection of the conditional

.e ion
(11) Freud is a person ⊃ Freud deceives Freud,
in which (2) is consequent, with the universal judgment expressed as

an iss
(13) (∀x)(x is a person ⊃ x deceives x).

du
That (2) is a value of (10) displays the logical connection of the conjunction

m
(15) Freud is a person & Freud deceives Freud,

per
in which (2) is the right conjunct, with the particular judgment expressed as
(17) (∃x)(x is a person & x deceives Freud).
It is this multiplicity of analyses of a statement into function and argument that en-

ut
ables the expression of the logical connection between the terms self-deceiver and
deceiver of Freud, missing from Aristotelian syllogistic.

ey
Note that this Fregean solution shows that, for Frege, contents have logical struc-
h@ itho
tures consisting of the following logical parts: function, argument, universal quan-
tification, negation, and conditionality.
sl
sh ite w

1.2 Judgment in Begriffsschrift: against Kant’s


we
Conception of Judgment
In §§2 and 3 of Begriffsschrift, Frege advances an account of judgment that tacitly
rejects Kant’s conception of judging and judgment. In this section, I show that Frege’s
own account of judgment and his rejection of Kant’s conception both rest on the
c

resolution of the problems of traditional logic effected by Frege’s logic.


ie

I begin with Frege’s characterization of judgment. Frege distinguishes judgment


or not

(Urtheil) from the content of judgment (Inhalt des Urtheils). He introduces a sign,
‘ ’, which expresses a judgment when it occurs to the left of a combination of
signs (Zeichensverbindung) which states (angiebt) the content of the judgment. He
then tells us that the sign ‘ ’ is in fact composed of a vertical stroke, ‘ | ’, called
o

the judgment-stroke, and a horizontal stroke, ‘ ’, called the content-stroke. As its


d.
:d

name suggests, it’s the judgment-stroke that is to be used to express judgment. If the
judgment-stroke is omitted from ‘ ’, so that only the content-stroke remains,

then the judgment will be transformed into a mere combination of representations (Vorstel-
aft

lungsverbindung), of which the writer does not state whether he acknowledges [zuerkennen]
its truth or not (Frege, 1879 [henceforth cited as BS], 1-2; emphases in the original).28
nf
Dr

Frege illustrates this claim with an example:


sa

28
Wenn man den kleinen senkrechten Strich am linken Ende des wagerechten fortlässt, so soll dies das
Urtheil in eine blosse Vorstellungsverbindung verwandeln, von welcher der Schreibende nicht ausdrückt,
ob er ihr Wahrheit zuerkenne oder nicht. (BS, 1-2)
‘Zuerkennen’ is a legal term, and one of its meanings is acknowledging the legal rights of a person. An-
other English translation is ‘adjudge’, meaning ‘pronounce or pass sentence on something’, i.e., something
that a judge does. So ‘ihr Wahrheit zuerkenne’ may also be rendered ‘pronounce on its truth’.
Judgment in Begriffsschrift 27

(18) opposite magnetic poles attract one another


expresses a judgment, but

.e ion
(19) opposite magnetic poles attract one another
does something else; it is intended to

an iss
produce in the reader merely the representation [Vorstellung] of the mutual attraction of op-
posite magnetic poles, say in order to draw consequences from it and to test by means of these

du
the correctness of the thought. In this case we paraphrase using the words ‘the circumstance

m
that’ or ‘the proposition that’. (BS, 2; first emphasis mine)29

These quotations show two things. First, Frege’s distinction between judgment and

per
content rests on the intuition that one can suppose that something is the case, in or-
der to reason from that supposition, without believing or holding that it is the case,
and subsequently come to hold or to accept that this very thing is indeed the case.
Similarly, in an early manuscript titled “Logic,” dated 1879-91 by the editors of the

ut
Nachlass, Frege writes,

ey
h@ itho
Before we judge, we often raise questions. A mathematician will articulate a theorem to him-
self before he can prove it. A physicist assumes hypothetically a law, in order to test it by
experience. We grasp the content of a truth before we acknowledge it as true …. (1979, 7)30
sl
The intuition here is that when we raise a question whether something is the case or
sh ite w

articulate what is to be demonstrated, we do not already hold this something to be the


we
case or to have been proven. Rather, in such situations we merely “grasp” a content.
If we subsequently, by proof or empirical testing, come to accept that this content
is indeed the case, we then make a judgment. So making a judgment is holding a
content to be the case. Now, we also see from these passages that for Frege judging
is acknowledging the truth of a content or acknowledging a content as true. So it’s
c

plausible to assume that for Frege judging is holding a content to be true.


ie

Second, these passages show that a content is a combination of representations,


or not

and is itself a representation. I take this to mean that a content represents represen-
tations as combined. So, for example, (19) expresses a representation of a repre-
sentation of opposite magnetic poles as combined with a representation of mutual
attraction. Now, Frege holds that not all contents can be judged; the representation
o

expressed by the word ‘house’, for instance, is not by itself judgeable (BS, 2). But if
d.

a content, such as that expressed by (19), is judgeable, then its expression using the
:d

content-stroke is to be “paraphrased” (umschreiben) using the terms ‘circumstance


that’ (der Umstand, dass) or ‘statement that’ (der Satz, dass). Thus (19) is para-
phrased as
aft

(20) the circumstance that opposite magnetic poles attract one another
nf

or
Dr

29
lediglich die Vorstellung von der gegenseitigen Anziehung der ungleich namigen Magnetpole in
sa

dem Leser hervorrufen sollen, etwa um Folgerungen daraus zu ziehen und an diesen die Richtigkeit des
Gedankens zu prüfen. Wir unmschreiben in diesem Falle durch die Worte ‘der Umstand, dass’ oder ‘der
Satz, dass’.
30
Ehe wir urteilen, fragen wir oft. Der Mathematiker spricht einen Satz für sich aus, bevor er ihn
beweisen kann. Der Physiker nimmt hypothetisch ein Gesetz an, um es an der Erfahrung zu prüfen. Wir
erfassen den Inhalt der Wahrheit ehe wir ihn als wahr anerkennen …. (1969, 8)
28 Judgment, Modality, and Amodalism

(21) the statement that opposite magnetic poles attract one another
Since (19) expresses a representation of opposite magnetic poles as combined with

.e ion
mutual attraction, this representation is the circumstance or the statement that oppo-
site magnetic poles attract one another.
In Begriffsschrift Frege is concerned with only a subset of judgeable contents
that he calls “conceptual contents” (begrifflichen Inhalte); one of the principal aims

an iss
of that book is to provide a formal language for expressing conceptual content. This
notion is spelt out in §3 in terms of the pair of sentences ‘at Plataea the Greeks de-

du
feated the Persians’ and ‘at Plataea the Persians were defeated by the Greeks’. These,

m
Frege claims, have the following property: “the consequences derivable from the
first, when it is combined with certain other judgments, always follow also from

per
the second” (BS, 2-3)31 ; they are, that is to say, not different as far as inference is
concerned. Frege doesn’t deny that these sentences might express slightly differ-
ent contents; however, given their inferential indiscernibility, they must also have
some aspect or part of their contents in common. This is conceptual content. Frege’s
sample sentences show that the traditional grammatical distinction between subject

ut
and predicate does not reflect any difference in conceptual content since these sen-

ey
tences switch subject and predicate. Since the formal language he constructs in this
h@ itho
book, which I will call Begriffsschrift, is intended to express all and only conceptual
contents, it does not express any “difference between subject and predicate” (BS, 2;
sl
emphases in original).32
Having made these claims, Frege goes on to make a concession of sorts to tra-
sh ite w

ditional grammar. There is a distinction between subject and predicate in Begriffss-


we
chrift, just not the traditional one:

We can think of a language in which the statement ‘Archimedes perished at the capture of
Syracuse’ would be expressed thus: ‘The violent death of Archimedes at the capture of Syra-
cuse is a fact’. …. Such a language would have only a single predicate for all judgments,
namely, ‘is a fact’. One sees that there cannot be any question here of subject and predicate
c

in the ordinary sense. Our Begriffsschrift is such a language, and the sign is its common
ie

predicate for all judgments. (1879, 3-4)33


or not

So what expresses a judgment parallels a sentence in which ‘is a fact’ is the grammat-
ical predicate and the expression of a conceptual content is the grammatical subject.
We can get from this view further information about Frege’s conception of judgment
o

if we assume an account of what a subject-predicate sentence expresses: it expresses


d.

that the entity expressed by the subject has the property expressed by the predicate.
:d

Alternatively, it expresses that this property holds of, or is predicated of, or is ascribed
to this entity. Now, we saw above that a content is a circumstance or a proposition.
So the Begriffsschrift expression of a judgment expresses that a circumstance or a
aft

proposition has the property of being a fact, or that being a fact is predicated of a
circumstance. Now, we also saw that for Frege judging is holding a content to be
nf

31
Dr

die Folgerungen, die aus dem einen in Verbindung mit bestimmten andern gezogen werden können,
immer auch aus dem zweiten in Verbindung mit denselben andern Urtheilen folgen …
32
Unterscheidung von Subject und Prdikat
sa

33
Es lässt sich eine Sprache denken, in welcher der Satz: ‘Archimedes kam bei der Eroberung von
Syrakus um’ in folgender Weise ausgedrückt würde: ‘der gewaltsame Tod des Archimedes bei der Er-
oberung von Syrakus ist eine Thatsache’. …. Eine solche Sprache würde nur ein einziges Prädicat für
alle Urtheile haben, nämlich ‘ist eine Thatsache’. Man sieht, dass im gewohnlichen Sinne von Subject
und Prädicat hier keine Rede sein kann. Eine solche Sprache ist unsere Begriffsschrift und das Zeichen
ist ihr gemeinsames Prädicat für alle Urtheile. (1879, 3-4)
Judgment in Begriffsschrift 29

true. So it seems Frege equates being true with being a fact, and takes judging to be
ascribing or predicating the property of being a fact of a circumstance.
To sum up, in Begriffsschrift, Frege’s conception of judgment and content has

.e ion
the following ingredients
• A content is

an iss
– a representation of a combination of representations, or
– a proposition, or

du
– a circumstance.

m
• The distinction between judgment and content rests on an intuitive distinction

per
between

– supposing or assuming something to be the case, or questioning whether


something is the case, and
– holding, accepting, or believing this very thing to be the case.

ut
ey
• The intuitive distinction is captured by the distinction between
h@ itho
– grasping a content and
sl
– making a judgment with that content, or judging that content.

• Judging is
sh ite w
we
– holding a content to be true, or,
– acknowledging the truth of a content, or,
– acknowledging a content as true, or,
– predicating the property of being a fact of a circumstance, or,
c

– predicating the property of truth of a content.


ie
or not

The first ingredient shows that Frege to be alluding to Kant’s view of judgment,
since, as we saw, Kant takes judgment to be a representation (Vorstellung) of order-
ing or unifying different representations. This allusion indicates a core of agreement
between Frege and Kant underlying a terminological difference. What Kant calls
o

“judgment,” Frege calls “content,” but for both this is a representation of a combi-
d.

nation or an ordering of representations.34 In order to avoid confusions that might


:d

arise from this terminological difference, I will call Kant’s judgments “judgment-re-
presentations” and Frege’s contents “content-representations.”35
34
More precisely, Frege’s ‘Inhalt’ is what Kant sometimes means by ‘Urteil,’ the Vorstellung produced
aft

by an act of judging; this is the meaning I have undertaken to express by ‘judgment’. Kant also calls the
act ‘Urteil,’ and I use ‘judging’ to refer to the act. Remember also that in his discussion of the modality
nf

of judgments Kant uses ‘Inhalte des Urtheils’ in roughly Frege’s sense of ‘Inhalt’.
35
Dr

I take this terminology from a misquotation, in editorial footnote 6 of Bauer-Mengelberg’s translation


of Begriffsschrift in From Frege to Gödel (van Heijenoort, 1967a), of Philip Jourdain’s translation of
Frege’s comment on the occurrence of ‘Vorstellungsverbindung’ in the first paragraph of Begriffsschrift §2:
sa

“For this word I now simply say ‘Gedanke’. The word Vorstellungsinhalt’ is used now in a psychological,
now in a logical sense. Since this creates obscurities, I think it best not to use this word at all in logic”
(van Heijenoort, 1967a, 11). In fact, Frege wrote ‘Vorstellung’, not ‘Vorstelllungsinhalt’, and Jourdain
reproduced Frege’s word exactly; see Frege (1969b [henceforth cited as WB], 119) and Jourdain (1912,
242). Of course, I intend ‘content-representation’ in Frege’s logical sense. I will come back to Frege’s
comment in §2.5 below.
30 Judgment, Modality, and Amodalism

Beyond this core agreement, Frege’s characterization of judgment does seem to


point to two differences from Kant:

.e ion
• Frege emphasizes the distinction between making a judgment or judging and
grasping a content-representation; it is not clear whether Kant acknowledges
such a distinction.
• For Kant judging is an action that produces a judgment-representation; for Frege

an iss
judging is holding a content-representation to be true; Frege is silent on whether
judging has anything to do with the production of content-representations.

du
m
I want to consider two questions about these apparent differences:
• Are they indeed substantive differences?

per
• If so on what grounds does Frege depart from Kant’s views?
We begin with the first apparent difference.
The intuitive distinction between supposing that something is the case and hold-
ing that it indeed is supplies prima facie support for Frege’s distinction between judg-

ut
ing and entertaining a content-representation. Another source of support for Frege’s

ey
distinction is an intuition that when one asserts a conditional statement—for exam-
h@ itho
ple, ‘if five is even, then two divides five without remainder’—one does not thereby
assert that five is even or assert that two divides five without remainder. In Frege’s
sl
terms, one may judge the content-representation expressed by the conditional with-
out judging either of the content-representations expressed by the antecedent and by
sh ite w

the consequent. In the case of this example, one may assert the conditional precisely
we
on the basis of reasoning from the supposition that five is even to the conclusion that
two divides five without remainder; in Fregean terms, this is to start by entertain-
ing one content-representation, and then to reason to another content-representation,
without judging either. So, if Kant’s view of judgment doesn’t provide the resources
to account for or explain away these intuitions, then it does differ substantively from
c

Frege’s view, and Frege has good reason to reject Kant’s view.
ie

Now, one might think that Kant’s view does go against these intuitions, for the
or not

following reason. Recall that Kant takes a hypothetical judgment—expressed by a


conditional statement—to be a representation of a relation between two judgments.
So it seems that Kant is committed to holding that in judging what is expressed by a
conditional one thereby also judges what are expressed by the antecedent and by the
o

consequent of that conditional, contrary to our intuitions.


d.

But this reading of Kant depends on taking Kant’s term ‘judgment’ to have the
:d

sense Frege gives it, as holding a content-representation to be true. In fact, Kant does
distinguish between holding a judgment-representation to be true and merely assum-
ing or supposing it. Recall that, according to Kant, a judgment-representation p oc-
aft

curring as the antecedent of a hypothetical judgment-representation has problematic


modality, and this means that in that occurrence p is merely assumed (angenommen)
nf

to be true. However, this very same judgment-representation p, when it occurs on its


Dr

own as the minor premise of a hypothetical syllogism, has assertoric modality, and
this means that the act of judging this minor premise is not only the act of producing
sa

p but also the act of asserting p to be true. So, in fact, the first apparent difference
between Frege and Kant on judgment is merely apparent.
The second apparent difference is substantive.
I will now argue that the aspect of Kant’s view of judging that Frege rejects
is the claim that the logical structure of a judgment-representation is determined by
Judgment in Begriffsschrift 31

the way in which that judgment-representation is put together by an act of judging.


So, for Frege, the logical notion of judging has nothing to do with the production
of content-representations, but consists, rather, only of holding a content-represent-

.e ion
ation to be true. The ground for Frege’s rejection is logical: the overcoming of the
inadequacies of traditional logic requires a conception of logical structure at odds
with the conception at work in Kant’s view of judging.
This last claim is apt to seem false, for the following reasons. It is plausible that

an iss
Frege’s logic requires Kant to give up his view of the logical structure of judgments.

du
As we have seen, what Kant takes to be the logical parts of judgment-representations
is determined by traditional logic. Now, traditional logic fails to comprise the stan-

m
dards of correctness governing all inference, and so fails to be logic; Frege’s logic
overcomes these failures and so has a legitimate claim to be logic. Since the expres-

per
sion of conceptual content in Begriffsschrift is what enables Frege’s logic to be a
decisive advance over traditional logic, Kant has good reason to reject his own ac-
count of the logical structure of judgment-representations and adopt Frege’s view of
the logical structure of content-representations instead. But this doesn’t imply that

ut
Kant must abandon his view of judging. Nothing in the foregoing line of argument
stands in the way of Kant’s holding that acts of judging produce judgment-represent-

ey
ations from Fregean logical parts of content-representations. Of course, Kant has
h@ itho
some work to do to fit his views of the fundamental cognitive acts involved in judg-
ing with the genuine Fregean logical parts of judgment-representation, but he need
sl
not alter his fundamental view of judging.
This objection fails to do justice to Frege’s distinction between function and
sh ite w

argument. In order to understand this distinction, I first discuss an interpretive puzzle


we
about Frege’s account of it. As we have seen, Frege presents the function/argument
distinction in Begriffsschrift §9 in terms of linguistic items: by thinking of replacing
the “sign for hydrogen” in the “expression”
(8) Hydrogen is lighter than carbon dioxide
c
ie

with “signs” for oxygen, nitrogen, etc., one conceives of that “expression” as divided
or not

into a constant function component (Bestandteil) and an argument component that


may be replaced by other “signs.” Now, Frege says that the result of such a replace-
ment “changes the sense [Sinn] in such a way that ‘oxygen’ or ‘nitrogen’ enters into
the relations in which ‘hydrogen’ stood before.” Here the use of quotation marks
suggests that the relations Frege has in mind are relations in which the words ‘hy-
o
d.

drogen’, ‘oxygen’ and ‘nitrogen’ stand. But if this is what Frege means, then it’s not
:d

clear why he would also suggest that ‘oxygen’ and ‘nitrogen’ come to stand in these
relations as a result of their changing the “sense” of the sentence when they replace
‘hydrogen’. So an equally viable reading is that the relations in question are relations
aft

to the chemical compound carbon dioxide—rather than the phrase which denotes that
compound—in which the chemical elements hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen—not
nf

the words that denote them—stand. If this is right, then when Frege claims that the
Dr

constant function component of the sentence “presents” these relations, he means


that the linguistic function corresponds to some extra-linguistic relations to a chem-
sa

ical compound. Moreover, Frege also claims that the replaceable argument compo-
nent of the sentence “means [bedeutet] the object that stands in these relations”; so it
seems that linguistic arguments correspond to extra-linguistic objects. All this sug-
gests that the function/argument division of a sentence corresponds to a division of
the content-representation that the sentence expresses. In terms of Frege’s example,
32 Judgment, Modality, and Amodalism

to conceive of sentence (8) as divided into the argument ‘hydrogen’ and the function
‘ξ is lighter than carbon dioxide’ is to conceive of (8) as expressing the content-repre-
sentation that the object meant by ‘hydrogen’ stands in the relations to carbon dioxide

.e ion
presented by ‘ξ is lighter than carbon dioxide’. What then prevents us from taking
the object meant by ‘hydrogen’ to be an (extra-linguistic) argument and the relations
to carbon dioxide presented by ‘ξ is lighter than carbon dioxide’ to be a function?
In analogy with the suggestion made above that the sentence (8) is the value of the

an iss
(linguistic) function ‘ξ is lighter than carbon dioxide’ for ‘hydrogen’ as argument,

du
we can take the content-representation expressed by (8) to be the result of applying
the extra-linguistic function to the extra-linguistic object.

m
This way of understanding the function/argument distinction, however, seems to
be contradicted by what Frege goes on to say immediately after explaining it: “[t]his

per
distinction has nothing to do with conceptual content, but is only a matter of concep-
tion [Auffassung]” (1879, §9, 15).36 It’s hard to see how else to take this than as the
claim that content-representations do not divide into function and argument. Frege’s
view, then, seems to be that while sentences divide into function and argument, such

ut
a division of a sentence is no more than a way of conceiving of the content-repre-
sentation expressed by that sentence.

ey
Still, for Frege, the claim that function/argument divisions are no more than
h@ itho
ways of conceiving of content-representations is open to qualification. He writes,
sl
For us the different ways in which the same conceptual content can be taken as a function of
this or that argument has no importance so long as function and argument are fully determined.
sh ite w

But if the argument becomes indeterminate as in the judgment: ‘You can take as argument for
we
“being representable as the sum of four squares” whatever positive whole number you like:
the proposition always remains correct’, then the distinction between function and argument
acquires meaning [Bedeutung] for content. (1879, §9, 17)37

So it seems that a universal statement expresses a content-representation one of whose


components is a non-linguistic function, or at least is a non-linguistic entity corre-
c

sponding to a linguistic function. But why is it that content-representations expressed


ie

by universal statements have functions as parts but content-representations of non-


or not

universal statements do not?


The way out of this puzzle is to see that there is an ambiguity in the notion
of a part. The sense in which function and indeterminate argument are parts of the
universal content-representation is not the same as the sense in which function and
o

determinate argument are parts of the non-universal content-representation (strictly,


d.
:d

the content-representation that is an instance of the universal content).


In order to see this, let’s first go back to Frege’s explanation of the function/argument
distinction for linguistic items. A function, as Frege says, is what remains constant
when one replaces or thinks of replacing one or more occurrences of a sign in a sen-
aft

tence. I take this to mean that a (linguistic) function is a pattern common to the
sentences that result from one another through such replacements. Such a common
nf
Dr

36
Diese Unterscheidung hat mit dem begrifflichen Inhalte nichts zu thun, sondern ist allein Sache der
Auffassung.
sa

37
Für uns haben die verschiedenen Weisen, wie derselbe begriffliche Inhalt als Function dieses oder
jenes Arguments aufgefasst werden kann, keine Wichtigkeit, solange Function und Argument völlig bes-
timmt sind. Wenn aber das Argument unbestimmt wird wie in dem Urtheile: ‘du kannst als Argument für
“als Summe von vier Quadratzahlen darstellbar zu sein” eine beliebige positive ganze Zahl nehmen: der
Satz bleibt immer richtig’, so gewinnt die Unterscheidung von Function und Argument eine inhaltliche
Bedeutung. (final emphasis in original
Judgment in Begriffsschrift 33

pattern is not one of the entities out of which these sentences are constituted. A sen-
tence consists of a sequence of (occurrences of) words; a pattern is a feature of already
constituted sentences that they may have in common with other already constituted

.e ion
sentences, and so presupposes the constitution of all these sentences from words. We
might phrase the claim in this way: a sentence is an instance or an exemplification
of a pattern; it is not made up of that pattern together with some other items. Frege
calls a linguistic function a component (Bestandteil) of a sentence, so sentences are

an iss
not made up of component functions. In contrast, a sentence is made up of words;
let’s say that words are the constituents of a sentence.38

du
This view of functions coheres with what is central to Frege’s logic: the fact

m
that statements divide into function and argument in more than one way. It would
be puzzling how a single composite entity could be made up of two distinct sets

per
of entities, but not so puzzling how a composite may be divided up in two ways,
depending on two features of how it is constituted that it has in common with two
other sets of composites.
Note that this conception of function and arguments as components into which

ut
an already constituted sentence splits does not imply that this splitting is not an ob-
jective feature of that sentence. A pattern in the constitution of a sentence is not

ey
determined by how we choose to look at or think about that sentence. It is a feature
h@ itho
of the sentence whether we see it or not, whether we think of the sentence in that way
or not. sl
If we extend the function/argument distinction from expressions to the content-
representations expressed, then we may also extend the component/constituent dis-
sh ite w

tinction to those content-representations. Thus a division of a content-representation


we
C into function and argument is a division into components; in particular, the func-
tion component of C is a pattern of content-representation constituents that C has
in common with other content-representations, rather than one of the entities out of
which C is put together. So, even though a function and an argument are parts of a
non-universal content-representation, that content-representation is not produced by
c

applying that function to that argument. This conclusion shows that Frege’s view of
ie

at least non-universal content-representations differs significantly from Kant’s view


or not

that all judgment-representations are produced by putting together their logically sig-
nificant parts.
It is instructive to get at this conclusion through another line of thinking. Sup-
pose for a reductio that a content-representation is produced by function application.
o

It is plausible that (cognitive) acts of applying functions to arguments are individuated


d.

in part by the functions applied. For example, applying the arithmetical function x2 +x
:d

to the number 3 is doing something different from applying 2x + 6 to 3. Similarly, ap-


plying the function expressed by ‘ξ deceives ξ’ to Freud is doing something different
from applying a different function, the one expressed by ‘ξ deceives Freud’, to Freud.
aft

Now suppose further that, as Kant holds, judging involves producing judgment-re-
presentations out of logically significant parts. As we have emphasized, in Frege’s
nf

logic the logically significant parts of a content-representation are function and argu-
Dr

ment. So, if Kant’s conception of judgment holds of Frege’s logic, then we have to
conclude that an act of assertoric judging involves applying a function to an argument.
sa

38
In adopting this view of Frege’s linguistic functions I follow Michael Dummett: “Frege would say
that that which, in the sentence ‘Cato killed Cato’, signifies the ascription to an object of the property of
falling under the concept committed suicide is not any constituent part of the sentence, attached to a proper
name of the object, but rather that feature of the sentence which consists in its being composed by putting
the same proper name on either side of the word ‘killed’ ” (1973, 246).
34 Judgment, Modality, and Amodalism

For example, to judge assertorically that Freud deceives himself involves applying
the function ‘ξ deceives ξ’ to Freud and holding the content-representation that re-
sults to be true. But, as we have just seen, the act of applying the content function

.e ion
‘ξ deceives ξ’ to Freud is different from the act of applying the function ‘ξ deceives
Freud’ to Freud. It follows that the act of assertorically judging the content-repre-
sentation produced by applying ‘ξ deceives Freud’ to Freud is a different act from
assertorically judging the content-representation produced by applying ‘ξ deceives

an iss
ξ’ to Freud.

du
This conclusion conflicts with Frege’s solution to the problems of traditional
logic. That solution requires that a single non-universal judgment have two distinct

m
logically relevant function/argument divisions, each of which corresponds to a dis-
tinct inferential connection between this non-universal judgment and a quantifica-

per
tional judgment. But, if Kant’s conception of judgment holds of Frege’s function
and argument as parts of content-representations, then distinct function/argument di-
visions result in different judgments. But it then follows that the Fregean construal
of the argument discussed in §1.1.4, whose validity resists explanation by traditional

ut
logic, would not result in a valid argument after all, since assertorically judging that
Freud deceives himself would turn out to be different from assertorically judging that

ey
Freud deceives Freud.
h@ itho
Now, a defender of Kant’s position may respond: although these are differ-
ent acts of function application, they produce the same judgment-representation, so
sl
they do not result in distinct assertoric judgings after all. But this move, in fact,
concedes Frege’s point: the logically significant notion of judging, at least judging
sh ite w

non-universal content-representations, has nothing to do with the production of these


we
content-representations from their logically significant parts.
This doesn’t mean that for Frege the way in which a judgeable content-repre-
sentation is formed is never logically significant. The content-representations that are
combined by negation and disjunction are logically significant parts of the content-
representations that result from such combinations. Similarly, for Frege a universal
c

content results from making the argument of a function indeterminate, that is to say,
ie

by applying the universal quantifier to a function, and that function is clearly a log-
or not

ically significant part of the universal content, since the correctness of inferences to
and from a judgment of that universal content is characterized in terms of that func-
tion.
This point resolves the exegetical puzzle about Frege’s conception of the func-
o

tion/argument distinction. For Frege, the splitting of a sentence into function and
d.

determinate argument “has nothing to do with content” only in the sense that it does
:d

not reflect a division of a content-representation into its constituents. When the argu-
ment of a linguistic function is made indeterminate, however, the sentence that results
expresses a content-representation which is constituted by the content function ex-
aft

pressed by the linguistic function together with the universal quantifier. This is why
Frege says that in this case, the linguistic function has meaning for the content-repre-
nf

sentation.
Dr

However, the fact that in some cases the constituents out of which a content-re-
presentation is formed are its logically significant parts doesn’t imply that the acts of
sa

judging which constitute logical inference involves the production of such content-re-
presentations. For there are other content-representations whose logically significant
parts are not constituents out of which these contents are formed. From the fact that
there are these two types of content-representations it follows that, in general, the
Modality in Frege’s Begriffsschrift 35

logically significant structure of a content-representation need not have anything to


do with how that content-representation is produced. What this means is that the cor-
rectness of judging one content-representation on the basis of judging certain others

.e ion
does not invariably rest on the way these content-representations are formed.
This conclusion has two upshots. First, the validity of an inference is not dic-
tated by how the content-representations involved are produced, but by objective
features of those content-representations, however they are produced. Second, the

an iss
only common factor to the judging in these two types of cases is holding a content-

du
representation true. So for Frege judging doesn’t involve the logically significant
producing of content-representations, but is simply holding a content-representation,

m
no matter how produced, to be true. It follows that Frege is committed to rejecting
Kant’s view that there is a variety of types of judging corresponding to ways in which

per
judgment-representations are produced by the understanding. Judging is a single type
of cognitive act.
To conclude this section, I comment briefly on the so-called priority thesis that
has been ascribed to both Kant and Frege: judgments or thoughts are in some way

ut
prior to their parts. The foregoing reading of Frege’s differences with Kant over
judging and judgment implies that, in one way at least, a priority thesis was held

ey
by Frege but not by Kant. There is no doubt that Kant gives a certain priority to
h@ itho
judgments over concepts, in that a concept is only used in judgments. Nevertheless,
on Kant’s conception of judgment concepts are prior to judgments, in the following
sl
sense. Categorical judgment-representations are the most basic judgment-represent-
ations, and they have one of four fixed logical forms determined by the way in which
sh ite w

they are constituted by acts of ordering or unifying concepts. Thus for Kant, the
we
logical parts of a judgment-representation are prior to that judgment-representation.
For Frege, in contrast, the logical parts and the logical structure of a content-repre-
sentation are determined, not by how that content-representation is constituted, but by
the inferential relations in which that content-representation stands to other content-
representations. In particular, for Frege’s logic, it is critical that a content-represent-
c

ation may split into one set of logical parts relative to one inferential relation and a
ie

different set of logical parts relative to another inferential relation.39


or not

1.3 Modality in Frege’s Begriffsschrift


o

We turn now to Begriffsschrift §4. In this section, Frege claims to “explain, for [his]
d.

purposes, the meaning of the distinctions that are made with regard to judgments”
:d

(BS, 4)40 There is little doubt that the distinctions among judgments Frege discusses
are those of Kant’s table of judgments. The reason is this. Kant gives the titles of
the table a numerical order: 1. Quantity, 2. Quality, 3. Relation, and 4. Modality
aft

(CPR, A70/B95). In §4 Frege takes up types of judgment in the following order:


universal and particular judgments—which appears under quantity in Kant’s table;
nf

negation—negative judgment appear under quality; categorical, hypothetical, and


Dr

disjunctive judgments—which are the three types under relation; and finally apodictic
and assertoric judgments—which appear under modality.41
sa

39
This conclusion supports Heis (2014).
40
Die folgenden Bemerkungen sollen die Bedeutung der Unterscheidungen, welche man in Bezug auf
Urtheile macht, für unsere Zwecke erläutern.
41
Here I follow Wolff (1995, Anhang, 247). In this Appendix Wolff provides a detailed account of
Frege’s criticism of Kant, to which I’m indebted.
36 Judgment, Modality, and Amodalism

All of Frege’s “explanations for his purposes” presuppose his rejection of Kant’s
conception of judging as involving the production of representations, and of types of
judgment as determined by ways in the act of judging is carried out. Since for Frege

.e ion
judging is a single type of act, the only sense he can make of the classification of
types of judging in Kant’s table of judgments is that it is a classification of logically
distinct types of content-representations. And so Frege retains only those Kantian
distinctions among judgments that reflect to logically significant distinctions among

an iss
content-representations from the perspective of Frege’s logic.

du
This explains what Frege keeps from Kant’s titles of quantity and quality. Frege
accepts universality and particularity from the title of quantity. This is because cen-

m
tral to Frege’s logic is the inferential connection between a universally quantified
content-representation and the content-representations that are its instances. Clearly

per
for Frege universality is a genuine logical feature of content-representations. Frege’s
acceptance of particularity as a feature of content-representations is a little tricky,
because what he means by a “particular content” is simply an instance of a univer-
sal content-representation. These are not the particular affirmations and denials of

ut
traditional logic, which are expressed in Begriffsschrift using universal quantifica-
tion, nor are they Kant’s singular judgments, because for Frege there is higher-order

ey
quantification, so an instance of a universal content may result from instantiating the
h@ itho
variable of quantification with a first-order function sign rather than a sign for an
object. sl
From the title of quality Frege retains only negation. This is because, as we have
seen, judging is affirming a content-representations, so affirmation is not a feature of
sh ite w

content-representations at all. Negation, in contrast, is a primitive of Frege’s logic, a


we
primitive logical part of content-representations.
Frege rejects all of the distinction in the title of relation; he claims that the
distinctions among categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive judgments have “only
grammatical meaning” (BS, 4).42 The reason is this. In Begriffsschrift, hypothet-
ical judgment-representations would be expressed by connecting two expressions
c

of content-representations with the conditionality sign. But the conditionality sign


ie

would also be used to express universal affirmative (and negative) categorical judgment-
or not

representations. So the logical structures of categorical judgment-representations


in general are not completely distinct from the logical structures of hypothetical
judgment-representations: both involve conditionality. An analogous point holds
for disjunctive judgment representations, as we can see by considering the two state-
o

ments that compose one of the arguments for whose validity there is no traditional
d.

logical account:
:d

Either animals are rational or animals are irrational.


aft

Therefore, animals are either rational or irrational.

These statements express distinct judgment-representations since the first implies the
nf

second but not vice versa. So if the difference is to be expressed in traditional logic,
Dr

the first would have to be a disjunctive judgment-representation, while the second


is a categorical judgment-representation. Thus the logical structures of hypothetical
sa

judgment-representations and categorical judgment-representation may both involve


disjunction, which, as Frege shows in Begriffsschrift §7, is expressible using negation
and conditionality.
42
nur grammatische Bedeutung
Modality in Frege’s Begriffsschrift 37

When Frege comes to the title of modality, he finds himself mostly agreeing
with Kant’s views. For Kant, remember, modal distinctions “contribute (beiträgt)
nothing to the content of judgment.” Frege says almost the same thing about apodic-

.e ion
tic judgment: it “does not concern (berührt) the conceptual content of the judgment”
(BS, 4-5; emphasis in original).43 For Frege necessity, possibility, and actuality are
not required to express the norms governing deductive inference, and so do not fig-
ure as parts of the logical structure of content-representations. Kant evidently sees

an iss
matters in the same way, so Frege need not reject Kant’s modal distinctions as he

du
rejects the Kantian distinctions of quantity, quality, and relation among judgments.
However, this is not to say that Frege entirely agrees with Kant. Recall that for

m
Kant the different modalities of an act of judging consist of the adoption of different
attitudes towards the judgment-representation produced by that act: assuming the

per
judgment-representation to be true, asserting it to be true, and asserting it to be true in
virtue of following logically from other judgment-representations. Kant holds these
attitudes to be on a par, so modal differences for Kant are objective differences among
acts of judging, even though they are not differences among judgment-representations

ut
produced by these acts. But for Frege judging is one—the holding-true of content-
representations, and he accepts only one other attitude towards a content-represent-

ey
ation, namely, assuming that a content-representation is true. This view manifests
h@ itho
itself in Begriffsschrift, in which there are only two signs for expressing attitudes
towards content-representations: the content-stroke without the judgment-stroke, to
sl
express assuming-true, and the judgment-stroke, which expresses holding-true when
added to the content-stroke. So, while Frege agrees with the negative part of Kant’s
sh ite w

view of modality—modality is not a feature of content-representations, Frege’s view


we
of judging precludes him from accepting the positive part of Kant’s view of modality
as types of attitude towards content-representations.
This leaves Frege with a question of what to say about the role of modal expres-
sion in statements of ordinary language. One part of his answer is:
c

The apodictic judgment is distinguished from the assertoric in that it indicates the existence
ie

of universal judgments from which the statement can be inferred, whereas in the case of an
or not

assertoric judgment such an indication is lacking. If I designate a statement as necessary,


I thereby give a hint as to my grounds for judgment. But since this does not concern the
conceptual content of the judgment, the form of apodictic judgments has no meaning for us.
(BS, 4-5; emphases in original)44
o

Here Frege takes an apodictic judgment to be expressed by “characterizing” (beze-


d.
:d

ichnen) a statement (Satz) as necessary, that is to say, by a sentence of the form ‘it
is necessary that p’ or ‘necessarily p’, where a statement replaces p. Let’s call such
a sentence an ascription of necessity to p. Frege’s view is that the occurrence of ex-
pressions of necessity—‘it is necessary’ or ‘necessarily’—in ascriptions of necessity
aft

“indicates” (andeutet) the existence of a deductive relation between the statement p


to which necessity is ascribed and certain unspecified universal judgments. To “in-
nf

dicate” is to give “a hint” (Wink) that the judgment p is grounded in the universal
Dr

judgments from which p can be inferred.


sa

43
der begriffliche Inhalt des Urtheils nicht berührt wird
44
Das apodiktische Urtheil unterscheidet sich vom assertorischen dadurch, dass das Bestehen all-
gemeiner Urtheile angedeutet wird, aus denen der Satz geschlossen werden kann, während bei den as-
sertorischen eine solche Andeutung fehlt. Wenn ich einen Satz als nothwendig bezeichne, so gebe ich
dadurch einen Wink über meine Urtheilsgründe. Da aber hierdurch der begriffliche Inhalt des Urtheils
nicht berührt wird, so hat die Form des apodiktischen Urtheils für uns keine Bedeutung. (BS, 4-5)
38 Judgment, Modality, and Amodalism

It’s plausible that Frege derived this account from Kant’s account of apodictic
modality as the attitude of holding as true in virtue of following from other judg-
ments. Frege makes two changes to this account. First, Kant’s “following logically

.e ion
from other judgments” becomes more specific: following from universal judgments.
Second, “following from universal judgments” becomes an indication or a hint in-
stead of part of the characterization of an attitude.
Frege doesn’t explain what exactly it is to indicate or to give a hint, but in Be-

an iss
griffsschrift §7 he mentions another example of giving a hint which is close to some

du
ideas in contemporary philosophy of language:

m
The distinction between ‘and’ and ‘but’ is of the kind that is not expressed in this Begriffss-
chrift. The speaker uses ‘but’ when he wants to hint that what follows is different from what

per
one might at first expect. (BS, 13)45

The distinction between ‘and’ and ‘but’ is an oft-cited example of what is called
“implicature”:46 ‘p and q’ and ‘p but q’ are both true just in case both p and q are
true; however, if a speaker uses ‘p but q’ she conveys that there is some contrast

ut
between p and q, while the use of ‘p and q’ does not convey such a contrast. The

ey
existence of the contrast is said to be “implicated” by the use of ‘p but q’. What is
h@ itho
implicated is not part of the meaning of the implicating sentence, so if p implicates
q, the falsity of q doesn’t entail that p is false, but only that the use of p, even if
sl
true, is misleading. One of the controversies over implicature is whether there are
two types of implicature, conversational and conventional.47 For our purposes there
is no need to enter into this controversy; I will consider Frege’s view as a type of
sh ite w
we
implicature without attempting to sort out whether it makes any difference to take it
as conversational as opposed to conventional.
Frege’s account of apodictic judgment is an eliminativist account of necessity.
An ascription of necessity to a statement expresses the same content-representation as
that statement itself, so expressions of necessity may simply be deleted without loss of
c

expressive power. Thus, for example, the sentence ‘it is necessary that 7 is a product
ie

of powers of primes’ expresses the same thing as the sentence ‘7 is a product of


or not

powers of primes’. If we understand Frege’s account in terms of implicature, we may


also see it as an epistemic account of necessity: the use of an ascription of necessity
implicates the existence of a particular kind of deductive justification for making the
(non-modal) judgment to which necessity is ascribed, or the speaker’s possession of
such a justification. For example, by using the sentence ‘it is necessary that 7 is a
o
d.

product of powers of primes’ I thereby implicate that my grounds, or the grounds, for
:d

the judgment that 7 is a product of powers of primes consists in its following from
some universal judgment, perhaps the judgment that all natural numbers are products
of powers of primes.
aft

I want now to consider what Frege’s account of apodictic judgment says about
the laws of logic. A traditional view is that the laws of logic are necessary. Is this
so on Frege’s account? Since expressions of necessity don’t contribute to content, an
nf

instance of the law of non-contradiction such as ‘necessarily two is not both prime
Dr

45
Der Unterschied zwischen ‘und’ und ‘aber’ ist von der Art, dass er in dieser Begriffsschrift nicht
sa

ausgedrückt wird. Der Sprechende gebraucht ‘aber’, wenn er einen Wink geben will, dass das Folgende
von dem verschieden sei, was man zunächst vermuthen könnte.
46
This notion originated with H. P. Grice, see Grice (1991). For a survey of theories and controversies
surrounding implicature see Davis (2014).
47
The distinction is drawn by Grice; Bach (1999, 2006) argues that conventional implicature does not
exist.
Modality in Frege’s Begriffsschrift 39

and not prime’ is true because ‘two is not both prime and not prime’ is true. However,
this holds of all true statements; for example, ‘necessarily Frege was born in Wismar’
is a true statement, although it would be misleading to make it if one doesn’t hold

.e ion
that it follows from a universal judgment. Now, since according to Frege ascriptions
of necessity have implicatures, some of them may be misleading. Applying this view
to the laws of logic leads to an interesting consequence. In Begriffsschrift the laws
of logic are general judgments, so, someone who asserts ‘necessarily two is not both

an iss
prime and not prime’ on the basis of inferring the judgment that two is not both prime

du
and not prime from the law of non-contradiction makes a judgment that is both true
and not misleading. The same holds of any assertion of the necessity of a theorem of

m
logic on the basis of proving that theorem from the basic laws of logic. However, as
we will see in more detail in §4.2 below, primitive laws of logic are not justified on

per
the basis of any inference. So it would be misleading to assert that any of the basic
laws of Frege’s logic is necessary.
Let’s turn now to Frege’s account of Kantian problematic judgments. Just as
Frege takes an apodictic judgment to be expressed by “characterizing” a statement

ut
as necessary, so he takes a problematic judgment to be expressed by “presenting”
(hinstellen) a statement as possible. Thus problematic judgments are expressed by

ey
ascriptions of possibility, sentences of the form ‘it is possible that p’ and ‘possibly
h@ itho
p’. Frege holds that there are two types of ascriptions of possibility:
sl
If a statement is presented as possible, then either the speaker is refraining from judgment, by
indicating that he knows no laws from which its negation would follow; or else he is saying
sh ite w

that the statement’s negation in its universal form is false. In the latter case we have what is
we
usually called a particular affirmative judgment (see §12). ‘It is possible that the Earth will
one day collide with another heavenly body’ is an example of the first case, and ‘A cold can
result in death’ an example of the second. (BS, 5; first two emphases mine)48

The first type has a Kantian origin. Kant takes problematic judging to involve the
attitude of assuming a judgment-representation to be true. Frege of course agree that
c

there is such an attitude, and so rejects only Kant’s claim that the adoption of such
ie

an attitude is a type of judging. This rejection clearly underlies Frege’s first type
or not

of problematic judgments: by uttering an ascription of possibility a speaker refrains


from making any judgment at all. It would seem that on this account the content-
representation expressed by the utterance of an ascription of possibility is the same
as that which would be expressed by an utterance of the statement to which possi-
o

bility is ascribed. But the former utterance implicates a claim about the speaker’s
d.
:d

epistemic state: she doesn’t know of any deductive grounds, in the form of laws, for
the negation of the statement to which possibility is ascribed. So, in terms of Frege’s
example, if someone utters the sentence ‘it is possible that the Earth will one day
collide with another heavenly body’ he expresses the same content-representation as
aft

he would by uttering ‘the Earth will one day collide with another heavenly body’, but
implicates that he doesn’t know of any laws which imply ‘the Earth will not one day
nf

collide with another heavenly body’. Thus, just as in the case of necessity, Frege’s
Dr
sa

48
Wenn ein Satz als möglich hingestellt wird, so enthält sich der Sprechende entweder des Urtheils,
indem er andeutet, dass ihm keine Gesetze bekannt seien, aus denen die Verneinung folgen würde; oder
er sagt, dass die Verneinung des Satzes in ihrer Allgemeinheit falsch sei. Im letzteren Falle haben wir ein
particulär bejahendes Urtheil nach der gewöhnlichen Bezeichnung. ‘Es ist möglich, dass die Erde einmal
mit einem andern Weltkörper zusammenstösst’ ist ein Beispiel für den ersten, und ‘eine Erkältung kann
den Tod zur Folge haben’ ist eins für den zweiten Fall.
40 Judgment, Modality, and Amodalism

view of possibility as expressed by this first type of ascription is eliminativist and


epistemic.
Now, according to Frege, in uttering this ascription of possibility the speaker

.e ion
is presenting himself as not making a judgment. So one might ask, is he presenting
himself as assuming that the content-representation expressed is true? It seems to me
that Frege is not envisioning precisely this. Rather, Frege envisions something like
the following conversational context: the participants have not been considering what

an iss
follows if it is assumed that the Earth will one day collide with another heavenly body,

du
and by uttering the ascription of possibility the speaker is urging that this assumption
be made and its consequences investigated because the assumption is not known to

m
be ruled out.
Once again let’s consider what Frege’s account of ascriptions of possibility im-

per
plies about the modality of laws of logic. Another expression of the traditional view
of the necessity of logical laws is that the negations of laws of logic are impossible.
Something like this traditional view does seem to be supported by Frege’s account.
Let L be a sentence expressing a law of logic. Let’s further suppose that an ascription

ut
of possibility to the negation of L—‘it is possible that ∼L’—is of Frege’s first type.
On Frege’s view, an utterance of ‘it is possible that ∼L’ has the same content as an

ey
utterance of ‘∼L’. A law of logic is a truth, so ‘∼L’ and ‘it is possible that ∼L’ are
h@ itho
both false. Hence the negation of this ascription of possibility—‘it is impossible that
∼L’—is true. But note that, as in the case of Frege’s theory of apodictic judgments,
sl
this holds for all true statements; so, ‘it is impossible for Frege not to have written
Begriffsschrift’ is a true statement.
sh ite w

Now let’s suppose that a speaker S knows that L expresses a law of logic. In ad-
we
dition, let’s suppose that S knows that the double negation of every statement follows
logically from that statement.49 It then follows on Frege’s view that an utterance by S
of ‘it is possible that ∼L’ would be misleading because such an utterance implicates
that S knows no laws from which the negation of ∼L follows, and Frege takes the
laws of logic to be universal contents. However, again note that this result holds for
c

all true universal contents, not just laws of logic: for example, it would be equally
ie

misleading for S to say ‘it is possible for a particle with rest mass to accelerate to the
or not

speed of light’ if S knows the special theory of relativity.


Frege’s account of the second type of ascription of possibility is that by uttering
such an ascription the speaker is making a judgment, but it is not clear from what
Frege says whether the content judged is the same as the content expressed by the
o

statement to which possibility is ascribed. Frege’s example is ‘a cold can result in


d.

death’. If this is an ascription of possibility it presumably is ‘it is possible that a cold


:d

results in death’. So the statement to which possibility is ascribed is ‘a cold results


in death’. Frege gives us a fairly clear idea of what a speaker judges by uttering this
ascription of possibility. He characterizes it as the judgment that the “negation of
aft

the statement presented as possible, in its universal form, is false.” What this means
is clarified by Frege’s ensuing claim that this is a particular affirmative judgment,
nf

citing Begriffsschrift §12. In this section, Frege shows that particular affirmatives
Dr

are expressed in Begriffsschrift by we would call existential generalizations. So what


Frege means by the negation of ‘a cold results in death’ in its universal form must
sa

be ‘all colds do not result in death’, because then the claim that this latter sentence is
false is plausibly expressed by ‘it is not the case that all colds do not result in death’,
which is equivalent to the existential generalization ‘some colds result in death’. So
49
A piece of knowledge S may take herself to have even if she is an intuitionist.
Are Sense and Reference Modal? 41

the question is what content Frege thinks is expressed by ‘a cold results in death’.
We could take this to be a universal generalization: ‘all colds result in death’. But
then it doesn’t seem to make much sense to talk, as Frege does, of the negation of

.e ion
this sentence in universal form, since it already is in universal form. So it’s more
plausible to take the content of ‘a cold results in death’ to be expressed by ‘there
is a cold that results in death’, that is to say, precisely the content of the existential
generalization that is judged by the utterance of this ascription of possibility. So I

an iss
take it that this second type of ascription of possibility expresses the content of an

du
existential generalization, and utterance of such an ascription expresses judgment of
that content. That is to say, this second type of ascription of possibility works just

m
like ascriptions of necessity: expression of possibility can simply be deleted without
affecting the content judged. However, in contrast to ascriptions of necessity and the

per
first type of ascription of possibility, Frege does not appear to hold that anything is
implicated by utterances of this second type of ascription of possibility.
To sum up, Frege’s theory of modality in Begriffsschrift is:
• Modality is not an aspect of conceptual content; all occurrences of modal ex-

ut
pressions may be eliminated without changing the contents expressed.

ey
• It follows that modal distinctions are of no significance for logic.
h@ itho
• However, some utterances of sentences in which modal expressions occur may
be used to implicate claims about the epistemic states of speakers.
sl
sh ite w

1.4 Are Sense and Reference Modal?


we
The Begriffsschrift view of modality is certainly quite distant from conceptions of
modality in contemporary analytic philosophy. Nowadays modal discourse is mostly
treated as expressing different propositions or truth conditions from non-modal dis-
course. The starting point of such treatments is the idea that propositions have the
c

properties of being necessary or possible, or of being necessarily or possibly true.


ie

These properties, in turn, are often analyzed in terms of possible worlds or possible
or not

states of the world. So, a sentence of the form ⌜it is necessary that S⌝ is true if and
only if S expresses a proposition p that is necessarily true, and p is necessarily true
if and only if p is true in all possible worlds. Similarly, a sentence of the form ⌜it is
possible that S⌝ is true if and only if S expresses a proposition p that is possibly true,
o

and p is possibly true if and only if p is true in some possible world.


d.

Does Frege retain a view of modality so distant from the contemporary main-
:d

stream throughout his career?


It is widely acknowledged that the adoption of the distinction between sense and
reference represents perhaps the most significant change in Frege’s philosophy. So
aft

our question becomes: how does Frege think of modality after the sense/reference
distinction?
nf

For many contemporary philosophers, the nature and rationale of this distinction
Dr

are given in the well-known argument that opens “On Sense and Reference” (1892).
This argument is generally taken to proceed as follows. Suppose an object has two
sa

names, a and b. The statements ‘a is identical to a’ and ‘a is identical to b’ differ


in what Frege calls “cognitive value” (Erkenntniswert): the first is an instance of
the logical law of identity and knowable a priori, while empirical investigation is
required to know that the second is true. Ex hypothesi a and b don’t name different
things, so this difference in cognitive value can’t be accounted for by the object that
42 Judgment, Modality, and Amodalism

they name, which Frege calls their referent (Bedeutung). The difference must lie in
some other feature of these names, which Frege calls their senses. Thus one facet
of our question is whether this notion of sense is a modal one. In the Foreword of

.e ion
Grundgesetze Frege also says that as “a consequence of the distinction between the
sense and the reference of a sign,” the Begriffsschrift notion of conceptual content
“now splits for me into what I call thought and what I call truth-value” (1893, X).50
So another facet of our question is: do the notions of thought and truth-value involve

an iss
modality?

du
After Begriffsschrift, as noted, Frege doesn’t discuss again either apodictic judg-
ments or what is done by ascriptions of possibility. So we cannot answer our question

m
from what he explicitly says. However, some commentators have understood Frege’s
notion of sense in such a way that this notion turns out to be modal. On this under-

per
standing, senses present or determine referents is via the satisfaction or fulfillment
of a condition: senses are, or somehow involve, conditions that have to be satisfied
by an entity for that entity to be the referent of that sense.51 Some of the examples
Frege gives in introducing the notion of sense seem to involve conditions that are

ut
contingently satisfied, i.e., that would not be satisfied in non-actual circumstances
or states of the world by the entities that actually satisfy them. For example, in the

ey
much-discussed second footnote of “On Sense and Reference,” Frege writes,
h@ itho
In the case of an actual proper name such as ‘Aristotle’ opinions as to the sense may differ. It
sl
might, for instance, be taken to be the following: the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander
the Great. (1892, 158)52
sh ite w
we
Since there seem to be counterfactual circumstances in which Aristotle studied with
Speusippus rather than with Plato, the condition of being the pupil of Plato and the
teacher of Alexander the Great would not be satisfied by Aristotle in these circum-
stances. It is then tempting to conclude that, whether or not Frege realized it, senses
determine referents as a function of possible circumstances.53 If this is right about
c

sense in general, then it surely holds of the notion of thought, which is the sense of
ie

an assertoric sentence. How this would work in the case of thought is not entirely
or not

straightforward, because of Frege’s notorious view that every thought refers to one of
two truth-values, the objects he calls the True and the False. So, a thought would be a
50
[B]eurtheilbaren Inhalt … ist mir nun zerfallen in das, was ich Gedanken, und das, was ich
Wahrheitswerth nenne. Das ist die Folge der Unterscheidung von Sinn und Bedeutung eines Zeichens.
51
Some of the earliest, as well as most extensive elaborations of this idea are in the works of Michael
o
d.

Dummett, in particular (1981; 1981). The description theory of proper names, formulated and criticized
:d

in Kripke (1980), is probably the most discussed version of this idea.


52
Bei einem eigentlichen Eigennamen wie ‘Aristoteles’ können freilich die Meinungen über den Sinn
auseinandergehen. Man könnte z.B. als solchen annehmen: der Schüler Platos und Lehrer Alexanders des
Großen. (1967, 144).
53
aft

This idea is explicit in Hintikka (1973):

Frege said that the intension (Sinn) of a name must include … the way in which this reference
nf

is given (die Art des Gegebenseins …). Now the functional dependence which this phrase ‘way
Dr

of being given’ clearly means can—and must—be spelled out by specifying how the reference
depends on everything it might depend on, which in the last analysis is the whole possible
world we are dealing with. …. Here, possible-worlds semantics therefore follows as closely
sa

as one can hope in Frege’s … footsteps. I cannot but find it very strange that it apparently
never occurred to Frege that to speak of ‘die Art des Gegebenseins’ is implicite to speak of a
functional dependence of a certain sort. There does not seem to be an inkling of this idea in his
writings. (1973, 377)

See also (Hintikka, 1975, 115).


Amodalism about Truth 43

condition that has to be satisfied by the True or the False for that truth-value to be the
referent of that thought. Now, it does seem fairly clear what it is for something to be a
condition that is satisfied or not satisfied by a person; for example, Aristotle satisfies

.e ion
the condition of being the teacher of Alexander the Great, while Plato doesn’t. How-
ever, it’s not at all clear what is a condition satisfied or not by a truth-value. Still, the
following might be a plausible proposal: a condition satisfied by the True is a con-
dition that has to obtain in the world in order for that condition to be true, that is, for

an iss
the True to be the referent of the thought which is that condition. Now, it is plausible

du
that the obtaining of certain conditions is contingent: for example, the condition of
Aristotle being the pupil of Plato obtains actually, but not in certain counterfactual

m
circumstances. If so, then it seems that the truth or falsity of thoughts is a function
of actual and counterfactual circumstances. That is to says, in general thoughts may

per
be true in certain circumstances, for example, actual ones, and false in others, for
example, non-actual ones.
On the foregoing interpretation, Frege’s notion of sense has to be understood
in terms of possibility, a notion which in Begriffsschrift he sought to eliminate, and

ut
so, whether Frege realized it or not, his mature philosophy is at odds with his earlier
anti-modal position.

ey
h@ itho
1.5 Amodalism about Truth
sl
The modal interpretation of Fregean sense outlined in the last section is mistaken.
sh ite w

This is shown by Frege’s commitment, after adopting the sense/reference distinction,


we
to the following doctrine: there is no such thing as a thought that is true under certain
circumstances and false under other circumstances, or true at one time and false at
another time, or true at one place but false at another place. That is to say, the truth
and falsity of thoughts are absolute, not relative to place, time, or circumstances.
I now first show that this commitment precludes Frege from accepting that sense
c

determines reference relative to time, place, or circumstance, and then present the
ie

textual evidence for ascribing this commitment to Frege.


or not

The absoluteness of truth is incompatible with the relative determination of ref-


erence by sense because for Frege a thought is composed of senses, and the truth-
value of a thought is determined by the referents determined by the senses out of
which the thought is composed. For example, the thought expressed by ‘Theaetetus
o

flies’ is made up of the sense of the proper name ‘Theaetetus’ and the sense of the
d.

predicate ‘ξ flies’. The sense of a proper name determines an object; the sense of a
:d

predicate determines a function from objects to truth-values. Thus the truth-value of


the thought expressed by ‘Theaetetus flies’ is determined as the value of the func-
tion determined by the sense of ‘ξ flies’ for the object determined by the sense of
aft

‘Theaetetus’ as argument.
Suppose now that the sense of ‘Theaetetus’ determines different objects at dif-
nf

ferent possible worlds, and that the function determined by ‘ξ flies’ maps all flying
Dr

objects in all possible worlds to the True and all other objects in all possible worlds to
the False. Then the thought expressed by ‘Theaetetus flies’ is true with respect to any
sa

world in which the sense of ‘Theaetetus’ determines a flying object and false with re-
spect to any world in which the sense of ‘Theaetetus’ determines a non-flying object.
This result clearly contradicts the absoluteness of truth and falsity of thoughts.
44 Judgment, Modality, and Amodalism

1.5.1 Against Hilbert and Korselt


The first set of texts expressing Frege’s commitment to the absoluteness of truth is

.e ion
part of the controversy between Frege and Hilbert over the nature of axioms.54 The
controversy arose over Hilbert’s proof of the independence of Euclid’s axiom of par-
allels from the rest of Euclid’s axioms. Hilbert’s proof was first given in lectures and
subsequently published as The Foundations of Geometry (Hilbert, 1903). Frege ob-

an iss
jected to Hilbert’s proofs, and part of the objection is that Hilbert’s proofs presuppose
a conception of axioms that Frege finds incoherent.

du
Frege insists on what he takes to be the traditional Euclidean conception of ax-

m
ioms:

Traditionally, what is called an axiom is a thought whose truth stands firm without, however,

per
being provable by a chain of logical inferences. (1903, 273).55

In Euclidean Geometry certain truths have traditionally been accorded the status of axioms.
No thought that is held to be false can be an axiom, for an axiom is a truth. (1979, 168)56

ut
This view of axioms can perhaps be traced to Frege’s view of inference. In the sec-

ey
ond series of papers titled “On the Foundations of Geometry,” Frege states that “an
h@ itho
inference … is the pronouncement of a judgment made in accordance with logical
laws on the basis of previously passed judgments” (1906, 387).57 Moreover, in this
sl
paper he lays down the law that
sh ite w

if the thought G follows from the thoughts A, B, C by a logical inference, then each of the
we
thoughts A, B, C, is true.

and comments, “For we have seen that only true thoughts can be the premises of
inferences” (1906, 426).58 Perhaps this view is based on taking inference to be one
way of acquiring knowledge. Axioms are the starting points of proofs, and proofs
c

are purely inferential justifications. So unless axioms are true there is no guarantee
ie

that theorems proved are true, which would mean that there is no guarantee that proof
or not

provides knowledge of theorems. This view plausibly underlies Frege’s claim that
Hilbert confuses axioms with definitions. If an axiom statement expresses a thought,
then all expressions occurring in it must already express senses. So, an axiom cannot
be a stipulation whereby certain expressions are given senses. But definitions, for
Frege, are precisely such stipulations. Moreover, on the basis of such a view it is
o

perhaps prima facie difficult to make sense of a proof purporting to establish that the
d.
:d

axiom of parallels is not “valid” (gültig) (Hilbert, 1903, 20): since only true thoughts
count as axioms, such a “proof” would establish a thought as both true and false, that
is, as a logical contradiction.
aft

54
The following account is indebted to Antonelli and May (2000) and Tappenden (2000)
nf

55
Von alters her nennt man Axiom einen Gedanken, dessen Wahrheit feststeht, ohne jedoch durch eine
logische Schlußkette bewiesen werden zu können.
Dr

56
In der euklidischen Geometrie sind gewisse Wahrheiten als Axiome überliefert worden. Wer einen
Gedanken für falsch hält, kann ihn nicht als Axiom anerkennen; denn ein Axiom ist eine Wahrheit. (NS,
sa

183)
57
Ein Schluß … ist eine Urteilsfä1lung, die auf Grund schon früher gefällter Urteile nach logischen
Gesetzen vollzogen wird.
58
‘Wenn der Gedanke G durch einen logischen Schluß aus den Gedanken A, B, C folgt, so ist jeder der
Gedanken A, B, C wahr.’
Wir haben ja gesehen, daß nur wahre Gedanken Pramissen von Schlussen sein konnen.(1967, 320)
Amodalism about Truth 45

It is unclear that Frege had such an uncharitable and simplistic understanding


of Hilbert. Surely Hilbert is not attempting to show that the axiom of parallels, as
it stands, is false, but rather that it is false under a reinterpretation of its basic vo-

.e ion
cabulary.59 What underlies Frege’s objection to Hilbert’s procedure is not just that,
for Frege, axioms are true thoughts, but, more importantly, also that it doesn’t even
make sense to consider an axiom to be false:

an iss
The word ‘interpretation’ is objectionable, for when properly expressed, a thought leaves no
room for different interpretations. (1906, 315)60

du
[A]ccording to Mr. Hilbert an axiom now holds, and now does not. A proper statement,

m
however, expresses a thought, and the latter is either true or false; tertium non datur. A false
axiom—where the word ‘axiom’ is understood in the proper sense—is worthy of exhibition in
Kastan’s waxworks alongside a square circle. (1906, 334-5)61

per
What is the basis of this view?
One proposal is that Frege assumes a distinction between what Wittgenstein,
in the Tractatus, calls “sign” (Zeichen)—a linguistic entity, a meaningless or unin-

ut
terpreted inscription—and “symbol” (Symbol)—a sign together with a meaning or
sense (3.31-3.322).62 Axioms, on this reading, are symbols: they are expressions

ey
h@ itho
of thoughts (meanings) which Frege calls statements (Sätze) (signs). So axioms, for
Frege, are sequences of signs together with their interpretations. For Hilbert, by con-
sl
trast, axioms are uninterpreted signs. Thus, for him interpreting an axiom is giving
a meaning to a sign, and reinterpreting an axiom is giving a different meaning to a
sign to which a meaning has already been given. So there’s no mystery in the idea
sh ite w
we
of showing a true axiom to be false: it is associating a false meaning with a sign
already associated with a true meaning. For Frege, an axiom already expresses a
thought. So it makes no sense to interpret it by associating another thought with it.
Nor does it make sense to reinterpret an axiom by associating a different sense with
it, since to associate a different sense with the sign at best results in a different axiom.
From Frege’s perspective, Hilbert’s attempt to show that an axiom is false under a
c

reinterpretation amounts at best to showing a different “axiom” to be false. On this


ie

proposed reading, the dispute is primarily a verbal one: Frege and Hilbert simply
or not

mean different things by ‘axiom’.

59
In Grundlagen der Geometrie Hilbert doesn’t, in fact, use the term ‘Deutung’ that appears in Frege’s
second “Foundations of Geometry” papers and is usually translated as ‘interpretation’. It is Korselt who
o

uses that term in responding to Frege’s first “Foundations of Geometry” papers.


d.

60
Das Wort ‘Deutung’ ist zu beanstanden; denn ein Gedanke, richtig ausgedrückt, läßt für verschiedene
:d

Deutungen keinen Raum. (Frege, 1967 [henceforth cited as KS], 301)


61
[N]ach Herrn Hilbert ein Axiom bald gilt, bald nicht gilt. Ein eigentlicher Satz aber drückt einen
Gedanken aus, und dieser ist entweder wahr oder falsch; tertium non datur. Ein falsches Axiom—das Wort
‘Axiom’ im eigentlichen Sinne verstanden—ist wert, neben einem schiefen rechten Winkel in Kastans
aft

Panoptikum ausgestellt zu werden. (KS, 318-9)


62
The idea of this proposal comes from Antonelli and May (2000), but I formulate the distinction
nf

between sign and symbol in the reverse way from the way they do, in order to match the distinction fairly
Dr

explicitly drawn in the Tractatus. It’s not clear that Frege himself uses terms translatable into ‘symbol’ and
‘sign’ in any systematic way. So far as I can tell Frege uses the German term ‘Symbol’ only in the following
places: “Boole’s Logical Calculus and the Concept-script” (1880), “Comments on Sense and Reference”
sa

(1892-5), Review of Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic (1894), “A Critical Elucidation of some Points
in E. Schröder, Vorlesungen über ide Algebra der Logik” (1895), Foundations of Arithmetic (1884, §§14,
36); Basic Laws of Arithmetic (1893, §143); he uses the French term ‘symbole’ only in “Whole Numbers”
(1895)and “On Mr. Peano’s Conceptual Notation and My Own” (1897). Frege uses ‘Zeichen’ much more
frequently; in particular, he uses it to characterize the formalists’ views in, for instance, Grundgesetze vol.
2 (1903, §§86-137).
46 Judgment, Modality, and Amodalism

There is, however, a slightly different reading, on which the dispute is more
substantive.
On the preceding reading “interpreting” is giving meanings to meaningless se-

.e ion
quences of signs. However, we might take “interpreting” to be evaluating meaningful
expressions with respect to a set of circumstances. For example, we might hold that
the words ‘point’ and ‘line’ have senses, but that these senses pick out different geo-
metrical concepts depending on whether the senses are evaluated with respect to the

an iss
Euclidean plane or with respect to the surface of a sphere. Different interpretations

du
of an axiom would then be different circumstances that the thought expressed by the
axiom or statement may be taken to be about, rather than different thoughts assigned

m
to a meaningless sequence of signs.63 If Hilbert held such a conception of interpre-
tation, then he might reply to Frege by saying that an axiom in Frege’s sense, which

per
expresses a single thought, may nevertheless be true under one interpretation, for ex-
ample, interpreted as a description of the Euclidean plane, and false under another,
for example, as a description of the surface of a Euclidean sphere.64
If interpretation is understood in this way, would Frege have any objections?

ut
That the answer is yes is revealed by Frege’s response to Alwin Korselt’s attempt
to defend Hilbert again Frege’s criticisms. In the course of his defense, Korselt writes:

ey
h@ itho
It is irrelevant whether it is the axioms or the characteristics of the concepts introduced that
are said to be consistent. The former corresponds more closely to ordinary usage, according to
sl
which two statements are called ‘independent’ of one another if under certain circumstances
both, under other circumstances not both, obtain; whereas they are called ‘incompatible’ if
there are no conditions under which both are satisfied together. (1971, 42-3)65
sh ite w
we
Korselt clearly holds that one and the same statement may “obtain” or be “satisfied”
under certain circumstances or conditions and fail to do so under others. That is
to say, Korselt is operating with precisely the notion of interpretation we have just
outlined, on which an interpretation consists of circumstances or conditions under
c

which a given statement, that is, an expression of a thought, is true or false.


ie

Frege does not find these claims by Korselt to be obviously intelligible:


or not

What does ‘the statement obtains’ mean? Surely that the statement expresses a true thought.
Now a proper statement expresses a thought. The latter is either true or false: tertium non
datur. Therefore, that a proper statement should obtain under certain circumstances and not
63
o

I take it that this is what Jamie Tappenden has in mind in writing of treating “Hilbert’s ‘axioms’ [as]
d.

contentful sentences which can be reinterpreted or considered in circumstances where they fail” (2000,
:d

282). This conception of interpretation is similar to the representational semantics of John Etchemendy
(1990); such a semantics specifies the truth conditions of sentences, taking the meanings of those sentences
to be fixed but varying conditions in the world.
64
It’s not altogether implausible that such a notion of interpretation is implicit in what Hilbert writes:
aft

Man wähle die Punkte, Geraden und Ebenen der gewöhnlichen … (Cartesischen) Geometrie,
nf

soweit sie innerhalb einer festen Kugel verlaufen, für sich allein als Elemente einer räumlichen
Dr

Geometrie und vermittle die Kongruenzen dieser Geometrie durch solche linearen Transfor-
mationen der gewöhnlichen Geometrie, welche die feste Kugel in sich überführen” (Hilbert,
1903, 20).
sa

65
Es ist gleichgültig, ob man die Axiome oder die Merkmale der eingeführten Begriffe widerspruchslos
nennt. Ersteres entspricht mehr dem Sprachgebrauche, nach dem zwei Sätze voneinander ‘unabhängig’
heißen, wenn sie unter gewissen Umständen beide, unter andern Umständen nicht beide bestehen, während
sie ‘unverträglich’ sind, wenn sie unter keiner Bedingung beide erfüllt sind. (Korselt, 1903, 404)
Amodalism about Truth 47

under others could only be the case if a statement could express one thought under certain cir-
cumstances and a different one under other circumstances. This, however, would contravene
the demand that signs be unambiguous …. (1906, 398-9; emphases mine)66

.e ion
The second sentence in this passage indicates that Frege can’t make sense of one
and the same thought being true under certain circumstances or conditions and false
under others. Note that Frege doesn’t limit this claim to those thoughts expressed by

an iss
axioms. If we make the further assumption that a thought is necessarily true just in
case it is actually true and not false under any non-actual circumstances, then Frege’s

du
view implies that all true thoughts are necessarily true; on a parallel construal of

m
necessary falsity, the view implies that all false thoughts are necessarily false.
Now, it might seem, at first glance, that Frege is here ascribing to thoughts a very

per
strong modality. However, the view in fact amounts to a rejection of any distinction
between necessarily true thoughts and plainly true ones, or plainly false thoughts
and necessarily false ones. In Frege’s view, there is no special way of being true or
being false that distinguishes certain thoughts from others, that is to say, there are no
special modes of being true or being false. It follows that if necessity is a mode of

ut
truth or falsity, then necessity is not an intrinsic feature of thought. Looking at Frege’s

ey
view in this way, it appears continuous with the Begriffsschrift account of apodictic
h@ itho
judgment, on which necessity does not distinguish certain judgeable contents from
others, and so, in that sense, is not an intrinsic feature of judgeable content.
sl
1.5.2 Thoughts are not Temporal or Spatial
sh ite w
we
I turn now to the second set of texts, all dated after volume 1 of Grundgesetze, in
which Frege characterizes thoughts as non-temporal and non-spatial. A first occur-
rence is in the “Logic” manuscript standardly dated 1897:
It is of the essence of a thought to be non-temporal and non-spatial. In the case of the thought
that 3 + 4 = 7 and the laws of nature, there is hardly any need to support this. If it should
c

turn out that the law of gravitation ceased to be true from a certain moment onwards, we
ie

should conclude that it was not true at all, and put ourselves out to discover a new law: the
or not

new one would differ in containing a condition which would be satisfied at one time but not
at another. It is the same with place. If it should transpire that the law of gravitation was
not valid in the neighborhood of Sirius, we should search for another law which contained
a condition that was satisfied in our solar system but not in the neighborhood of Sirius. If
someone wished to cite, say, ‘The total number of inhabitants of the German Empire is 52 000
o
d.

000’, as a counter-example to the timelessness of thoughts, I should reply: This sentence is not
:d

a complete expression of a thought at all, since it lacks a time-determination. If we add such


a determination, for example, ‘at noon on 1 January 1897 by central European time’, then the
thought is either true, in which case it is always, or better, timelessly, true, or it is false and
in that case it is false without qualification. This holds of any particular historical fact: if it is
aft

true, it is true independently of the time at which it is judged to be true. (1897, 135)67
nf

66
Was heißt das, ‘der Satz besteht’? Doch wohl: Der Satz drückt einen wahren Gedanken aus. Nun
Dr

drückt ein eigentlicher Satz einen Gedanken aus. Dieser ist entweder wahr, oder falsch: tertium non
datur. Daß also ein eigentlicher Satz unter gewissen Umständen bestände, unter andern nicht, könnte nur
vorkommen, wenn ein Satz unter gewissen Umständen einen Gedanken ausdrücken könnte, unter andern
sa

Umständen einen andern. Dies widerspräche aber der Forderung der Eindeutigkeit der Zeichen …. Und
doch kann man sich denken, was Herr Korselt meint. Es kann sich nur um uneigentliche Sätze handeln
…. Ein Satz, der nur unter Umständen gilt, ist kein eigentlicher Satz. Wir können aber die Umstände,
unter denen er gilt, in Bedingungssätzen aussprechen und als solche dem Satze anfügen. Der so ergänzte
Satz gilt nun nicht mehr nur unter Umständen, sondern schlechthin. (1967, 313-4)
67
Gedanken … sind in ihrem Wesen unzeitlich und unräumlich. Bei dem Gedanken, dass 3 + 4 = 7 ist,
48 Judgment, Modality, and Amodalism

In the diary notes of 1906, given the title “Introduction to Logic,” Frege writes,
Now leaving myth and fiction on one side, and considering only those cases in which truth in

.e ion
the scientific sense is in question, we can say that every thought is either true or false, tertium
non datur. It is nonsense to speak of cases in which a thought is true and cases in which it
is false. The same thought cannot be true at one time, false at another. On the contrary, the
cases people have in mind in speaking in this way always involve different thoughts, and the

an iss
reason they believe the thought to be the same is that the form of words is the same; this form
of words will then be an improper statement. We do not always adequately distinguish the sign

du
from what it expresses. (1906, 186; last emphasis mine)68

m
Finally, in “Thought,” published in 1918, there appears an account of the atemporality
of thoughts almost identical to that in the 1897 “Logic”:

per
The thought we express by the Pythagorean theorem is surely timeless, eternal, unvarying.
But are there not thoughts which are true today but false in half a year’s time? The thought,
for example, that the tree there is covered with green leaves, will surely be false in half a
year’s time. No, for it is not the same thought at all. The words ‘This tree is covered with

ut
green leaves’ are not sufficient by themselves to constitute the expression of thought, for the

ey
time of utterance is involved as well. Without the time-determination thus given we have not a
complete thought, i.e. we have no thought at all. Only a statement with the time-determination
h@ itho
filled out, a statement complete in every respect, expresses a thought. But this thought, if it is
true, is true not only today or tomorrow but timelessly. (1918, 76)69
sl
In these texts, what Frege means by claiming that thoughts are neither spatial nor tem-
poral is, in the first instance, that thoughts are not the kind of entity that may be true
sh ite w
we
at one moment or place but false at some other moment or place. The view expressed
here is thus of a piece with the view expressed in criticizing Korselt, that thoughts
bei den Naturgesetzen bedarf dies kaum einer Begründung. Wenn sich z.B. herausstellen sollte, dass das
Gravitationsgesetz von einem gewissen Augenblicke ab nicht mehr wahr sei, so würden wir schliessen,
dass es überhaupt nicht wahr sei, und würden uns bemühen, ein anderes aufzufinden, das sich von ihm
c

durch eine Bedingung unterschiede, die zu einer Zelt erfüllt, zu einer anderen nicht erfüllt wäre. Ebenso
ie

beim Orte: Wenn sich zeigen sollte, dass in der Gegend des Sirius das Gravitationsgesetz nicht gelte,
so würden wir ein anderes Gesetz aufsuchen, mit einer Bedingung, die in unserem Sonnensystem erfüllt
or not

wäre, in der Gegend des Sirius dagegen nicht. Will man als Beispiel gegen die Zeitlosigkeit der Gedanken
etwa anführen, ‘Die Einwohnerzahl des Deutschen Reiches beträgt 52000000’, so antworte ich: Dieser
Satz ist gar kein vollständiger Ausdruck enes Gedankens, da die Zeitbestimmung fehlt. Fügt man diese
hinzu, z.B. den 1. Januar 1897 mittags nach mitteleuropäischer Zeit, so ist der Gedanke entweder wahr
und dann ist er immer—, oder besser, zeitlos wahr, oder er ist falsch und dann ist er es schlechthin. Das
o

gilt von jeder einzelnen geschichtlichen Tatsache: Sie ist, falls sie wahr ist, unabhängig von der Zeit der
d.

Beurteilung wahr. (1969, 146-7)


:d

68
Wenn wir nun von Sage und Dichtung absehen und nur solche Fälle in Betracht ziehen, in denen es
sich um Wahrheit im wissenschaftlichen Sinne handelt, so können wir sagen, dass jeder Gedanke entweder
wahr oder falsch ist, tertium non datur. Es ist Unsinn, von Fällen zu sprechen, in denen ein Gedanke wahr
ist und von andern, in denen er falsch ist. Derselbe Gedanke kann nicht bald wahr, bald falsch sein, sondern
aft

in den Fällen, die man bei solchen Aussprüchen im Auge hat, handelt es sich immer um verschiedene
Gedanken, und dass man denselben zu haben glaubt, liegt daran, dass man denselben Wortlaut hat, und
nf

dieser Wortlaut wird dann ein uneigentlicher Satz sein. Man unterscheidet nicht immer genug zwischen
Dr

dem Zeichen und dem, was es ausdrückt. (NS 202)


69
Der Gedanke, den wir im pythagoreischen Lehrsatz aussprechen, ist doch wohl zeitlos, ewig, un-
veränderlich. Aber gibt es nicht auch Gedanken, die heute wahr sind, nach einem halben Jahre aber
sa

falsch? Der Gedanke z.B., daß der Baum dort grün belaubt ist, ist doch wohl nach einem halben Jahre
falsch? Nein; denn es ist gar nicht derselbe Gedanke. Der Wortlaut ‘dieser Baum ist grün belaubt’ allein
genügt ja nicht zum Ausdrucke, denn die Zeit des Sprechens gehört dazu. Ohne die Zeitbestimmung, die
dadurch gegeben ist, haben wir keinen vollständigen Gedanken, d.h. überhaupt keinen Gedanken. Erst
der durch die Zeitbestimmung ergänzte und in jeder Hinsicht vollständige Satz drückt einen Gedanken
aus. Dieser ist aber, wann er wahr ist, nicht nur heute oder morgen, sondern zeitlos wahr. (KS 361)
Amodalism about Truth 49

are not the kind of entity that may be true in one set of circumstances or conditions
and false in others. So, we can express Frege’s view here as a rejection of spatial
and temporal modes of truth of thoughts: there are no thoughts that are everywhere

.e ion
or somewhere true, nor thoughts that are always or sometimes true; a thought is just
true, full stop, or false, period. More generally, Frege insists that the truth and falsity
of thoughts are absolute, not relative to time, place, case, circumstance, condition,
or anything else; he rejects, wholesale, any modalities of truth—any modes of being

an iss
true distinct from simple truth—that rest on relativization of truth.

du
Note that in all of the texts we have examined Frege doesn’t simply rejects the
relativization or modalities of truth. He also in each case offers an attempt to make

m
some sense of claims of relative truth. In the case of a thought G that is supposed to be
true relative to a circumstance or condition, Frege’s reconstruction is a thought, with

per
an absolute truth-value, expressed by a conditional statement in which a statement
expressing G appears as consequent and a statement expressing the circumstance or
condition occurs as antecedent. In the case of a thought that is supposed to be true
at some time or place, Frege’s reconstruction is a different thought with an absolute

ut
truth-value, expressed by a statement somehow incorporating a “determination” of
the time or place in question. These reconstructions will be discussed in Chapter 3.

ey
I turn now to relate Frege’s view to the debate over eternalism and temporalism
h@ itho
in contemporary philosophy of language, which will provide a further clarification of
Frege’s view.70 Consider a slight variation of the example Frege gives in the passage
sl
from “Thought” quoted above, in which I replace Frege’s demonstrative ‘that tree’
with a proper name:
sh ite w
we
(22) Yggdrasil is covered with green leaves
The dispute between contemporary eternalism and temporalism is over whether the
proposition or content expressed by the utterance of a sentence such as (22) in some
context changes its truth-value over time. A temporalist answers this question affir-
matively. An eternalist, by contrast, takes the proposition expressed by an utterance
c

of (22) to be eternal in the sense that it does not change its truth-value over time.71
ie

Now, how does Frege’s position fit into this dispute? It is tempting to take Frege
or not

to be an eternalist, for the following reason. (22) contains no explicit temporal index-
ical expressions. So, in Kaplan’s semantic framework the context of utterance does
not affect the proposition expressed by utterances of (22); that is to say, one and same
proposition would be expressed by utterances of (22) at different times. Now, intu-
o

itively utterances of this sentence at different times have different truth-values. This
d.
:d

intuition seems to dovetail with the temporalist’s position that this sentence expresses
a single proposition that varies in truth-value over time. In order to account for this
intuition, one maneuver that the eternalist can make is to hold that the verb tense in
(22) involves an implicit temporal indexical, so that (22) means the same as
aft

(23) Yggdrasil is now covered with green leaves


nf

The character of ‘now’ contributes the time at which an utterance of (22) is made
Dr

to what that utterance says, and the truth-value of this proposition evaluated with
sa

70
These positions were first formulated by David Kaplan in (1989, 503 n. 28). The names for these
positions are due, I believe, to Mark Richard (1981).
71
See Kaplan (1989, 503 n. 28). Kaplan also characterizes the temporalist as holding that the propo-
sition expressed in a context “is neutral with respect to time,” meaning that one and the same proposition
is expressed at different times, but this single proposition may have different truth-values when evaluated
at those times.
50 Judgment, Modality, and Amodalism

respect to circumstances at any time is the same as its truth-value evaluated with
respect to circumstances when it’s uttered. Note that a consequence of this maneuver
is that utterances of (22) express different propositions at different times.72 It seems

.e ion
that Frege must be an eternalist because this eternalist maneuver seems to be exactly
what he is making when he claims that the time of speaking is needed in addition to
the sentence (22) to express the thought.
But Frege’s position isn’t quite that of the contemporary eternalist. One differ-

an iss
ence is relatively minor. In the passage from “Thought” cited above, Frege appears

du
to take his opponent to hold that the thought expressed by uttering (22) is true today
but false in six months’ time, and to base her view on the fact that the utterance at

m
the later time would be false. Frege formulates his contrasting position as the claim
that the “time of utterance” “belongs to” the expression of the thought, and so the

per
later utterance of (22) doesn’t express the same thought as the earlier utterance. But
all Frege says is that the time of utterance is a factor in expressing the thought, so
it’s not obvious that the way in which it is a factor is by being the referent of an im-
plicit temporal indexical, with a sense presenting this time figuring as a component

ut
of the thought expressed. We’ll see later that this contemporary eternalist view isn’t
far from one of Frege’s positions.

ey
A more substantive difference is this. One assumption on which the eternalist
h@ itho
and the temporalist agree is that the notion of a proposition having a truth-value at
a time is coherent. The difference is over whether a proposition has the same truth-
sl
value at all times. Frege, however, says that “it is nonsense (Unsinn) to speak of
cases in which a thought is true and cases in which it is false.” This is stronger than
sh ite w

the mere denial of the temporalist’s view that some thoughts are true at some times
we
but false at others. Frege holds that it makes no sense to suppose that there is such a
thing as a thought that is true at a time, as opposed to simply true, nor a thought that
is false at a time, as opposed to simply false. So Frege would also hold that there is
no such a thing as a thought that is true at all times, thereby rejecting contemporary
eternalism. It’s not, then, that truth is eternal in the sense that a thought is always
c

true, but rather that truth is not temporal at all; this is why he says that if a thought is
ie

true it is “always, or better, timelessly true.”


or not

Thus a more apt name for Frege’s position is atemporalism, rather than eternal-
ism. Frege’s general view is that no sense is to be made of relativization of the truth
of thoughts to time, space, or circumstance, which implies that there are no modes of
truth resting on such relativization. Thus, I will call Frege’s general view amodalism
o

about thoughts. There are three particular instances of this general position. Tempo-
d.

ral amodalism or atemporalism is the view that there are no modes of truth resting
:d

on relativization of truth to times. Spatial amodalism is the view that there are no
modes of truth resting on relativization of truth to spatial locations. Metaphysical
amodalism is the view that there are no modes of truth resting on relativization of
aft

truth to possible circumstances or possible states of the world.


Earlier I said that Frege’s rejection of the relativization of truth is of a piece with
nf

the Begriffsschrift account of apodictic judgment. I would like now to point out that
Dr

this doesn’t mean that Frege’s amodalism is exactly the same view as the Begriffss-
chrift account of modality. The Begriffsschrift position is that modal expressions do
sa

not make a difference to the conceptual content of judgment. Amodalism is a po-


sition expressed in Frege’s writings after he adopted the sense/reference distinction,
and part of the significance of adopting this distinction for Frege is that the Begriff-
72
Again see Kaplan (1989, 503 n. 28).
Inadequate Grounds for Amodalism 51

sschrift notion of conceptual content is then split into the notions of thought and of
truth-value. So, a comparison of amodalism with the Begriffsschrift view of modality
involves determining whether on the later view the occurrence of a modal expression

.e ion
in an assertoric sentence makes a difference to the thought or the truth value of the
judgment expressed by using that sentence. We would have to have some account of
what, on the mature view, would be the thoughts expressed by sentences of the form
⌜It is necessary that T⌝ and ⌜It is possible that T⌝. Now, an obvious idea is that these

an iss
thoughts are respectively the thoughts that T is necessarily true and the thought that T

du
is possibly true. This is not by itself inconsistent with metaphysical amodalism. An
inconsistency arises only with the addition of analyses of being necessarily true as

m
being true with respect to all possible circumstances or worlds, and of being possibly
true as being true with respect to some possible worlds. Moreover, even if one grants

per
this assumption, one has to remember that Frege doesn’t simply reject relativization
of truth. He also advances accounts of what the supposed claims of relativization
really amount to. So, one has to consider whether Frege’s reconstruction of truth rel-
ativization affords an extension to a reconstruction of necessary and possible truth.

ut
These issues will be taken up in Chapter 3.

ey
h@ itho
1.6 Inadequate Grounds for Amodalism
sl
Our main question about Fregean amodalism is: why does Frege hold it? In this
section, I consider three fairly straightforward answers. Each identifies a doctrine
sh ite w

held by Frege as the ground for amodalism, but in each case, the doctrine isn’t quite
we
enough to support amodalism.
First, one might think that Frege’s rejection of any relativization of truth results
from an over-zealous pursuit of anti-psychologism. Consider for example the passage
from the 1897 “Logic” quoted in the last section, in which Frege claims that thoughts
are neither spatial nor temporal. The passage follows immediately after the sentence
c

“Whereas ideas (in the psychological sense of the word) have no fixed boundaries,
ie

but are constantly changing and, Proteus-like, assume different forms, thoughts al-
or not

ways remain the same” (1897, 135)73 Thus one might think that Frege’s main concern
is really to rule out the view that truth is relative to thinkers with particular psycho-
logical constitutions, but he tried to achieve this by ruling out all relativization of
truth, thereby overshooting his intended target. This view is hard to sustain. Clearly,
o

one central point of Frege’s anti-psychologism is his argument that psychologistic


d.

logic cannot account for genuine agreement and disagreement. Frege takes thoughts
:d

to be that over which we can agree or disagree, whose truth or falsity is determined
independently of the parties to the disagreement. But it’s not clear that a view on
which the truth-value of an objective, mind- and psychology-independent thought is
aft

determined by and so relative to mind-independent features of reality such as time,


place, or possible circumstances would do away with genuine disagreement. Why
nf

can there not be genuine disagreements over the truth-value of a thought relative to
Dr

time, place, and possible state of the world?


Second, one might think that Frege’s view that sense uniquely determines ref-
sa

erence explains why he holds that it is incoherent to consider a true thought as false.
Since sense uniquely determines reference, if sense S1 determines referent R1 and

73
Während die Vorstellungen (im psychologischen Sinne des Wortes) ohne bestimmte Begrenzung
zerfliessend und proteusartig veränderlich sind, bleiben die Gedanken beständig. (1969, 146)
52 Judgment, Modality, and Amodalism

sense S2 determines R2 , and R1 is different from R2 , then S1 is different from S2 . A


particular case of this general claim about sense is a claim about thoughts: if thought
T1 determines the True, and thought T2 determines the False, then, since the True is

.e ion
not the same as the False, T1 is distinct from T2 . Now, to suppose or consider a true
thought T to be false is to suppose that T determines both the True and the False. But
by what we have argued, this implies that T is not the same as T, which conflicts with
the law of identity. I have no quarrel with this line of argument, but it doesn’t seem

an iss
to me to be complete. In particular, it does not address the modal notion of sense

du
as determining references with respect to possible states of the world. Consider an
example familiar from recent philosophy:74

m
(24) The inventor of bifocals wrote an autobiography

per
On a modal conception, the sense of the definite description ‘the inventor of bifocals’
determines reference only relative to a possible world: if there is a unique individual
in a possible world satisfying the descriptive condition of inventing bifocals, then that
individual is the referent of this description. So this sense may determine a different

ut
referent in counterfactual circumstances than it does in actual circumstances. But

ey
then the thought expressed by (24) may determine the False in those counterfactual
h@ itho
circumstances and the True in actual circumstances.
Third, one might think that amodalism rests on a doctrine that can be discerned
sl
in what Frege says in “Thought” about the notion of fact: “What is a fact? A fact is
a thought that is true” (1918, 368, op. 74).75 If we take a fact to be a circumstance
that obtains, one might take Frege’s claim to mean that the notion of circumstance
sh ite w
we
is not fundamental but is analyzed in terms of thought and truth: a circumstance is
just a thought, and for a circumstance to obtain is for a thought to be true. An ar-
gument against modalism would then go as follows. To begin with, one formulation
of a general modalist position is that thoughts may be true in some circumstances
(those obtaining at some time or place, or actually obtaining) but false in others (ob-
c

taining at other times or places or counterfactually). This formulation presupposes


ie

that the truth or falsity of a thought consists in some relation of that thought to the
or not

obtaining of circumstances. To put it in contemporary terminology, the obtaining of


circumstances are truth-makers for thoughts. But, according to Frege, the obtaining
of a circumstance is nothing more than a thought’s being true. It follows that there
is no conception of truth-makers of thoughts in terms independent of the notion of
thought. Now, in order for a thought to be true at a time t or world w, there have
o
d.

to be truth-makers for that thought existing at t or w. Since for Frege there are no
:d

truth-makers for thoughts, it follows that thoughts are not true relative to times or
worlds but absolutely true.
This argument naturally raises the question why Frege would take the notion of
aft

fact to be reducible to those of thought and truth. I will argue in §2.5.8.2 below that
Frege is not committed to such a reduction; facts are not just a species of thoughts.
But, setting this issue aside, this anti-modalist argument is still problematic. The
nf

argument presupposes that the modalist’s conception of the truth of a thought at a


Dr

time or world has to be analyzed in terms of the agreement of that thought with a fact
existing or a circumstance obtaining at that time or world. But why can’t the modalist
sa

simply reject this presupposition? Here’s another way of putting the objection. The
argument assumes that on Frege’s view there’s nothing distinct from a thought that
74
The definite description occurring in this example was made popular by Saul Kripke (1980).
75
Was ist eine Tatsache? Eine Tatsache ist ein Gedanke, der wahr ist (1969, 359).
Inadequate Grounds for Amodalism 53

makes a thought true. But this view certainly seems consistent with also accepting
that there’s nothing distinct from a thought that makes that thought true at some time
or world. So, the modalist may accept Fregean conception of fact and yet still hold

.e ion
that thoughts are true or false relative to times and worlds. It’s just that the relative
truth of a thought is fundamental and constitutes the relative obtaining of a fact.

an iss
du
m
per
ut
ey
h@ itho
sl
sh ite w
we
c
ie
or not
o
d.
:d
aft
nf
Dr
sa
2

.e ion
From Judgment to Amodalism

an iss
In this chapter, I present the grounds for Frege’s claim that truth is absolute.

du
The grounds lie in Frege’s mature conceptions of judgment, truth, and thought.

m
These conceptions represent a change from the view of judgment that Frege held be-
fore adopting the sense/reference distinction. On the earlier view, which I outline in

per
§2.1, making a judgment consists of taking or holding a thought to have the property
of truth. Frege also characterizes this as recognizing or acknowledging the truth of a
thought. Frege doesn’t abandon this formulation after he adopts the sense/reference
distinction, but he means something different by it. In order to clarify the later mean-

ut
ing of this formulation, I examine a number of puzzling and controversial claims
about truth and judgment that Frege began to advance after the sense/reference dis-

ey
tinction. These claims are outlined in §§2.2 and 2.3. First, Frege claims that truth
h@ itho
and falsity are two objects, called “truth-values,” which are the referents of thoughts.
Second, he claims that judgment consists in “taking a step from a thought to a truth-
sl
value” (Frege, 1892 [henceforth cited as SR], 35).1 Third, Frege holds that ascribing
truth to a thought is in some way redundant; for example, a sentence such as ‘the
sh ite w

thought that 5 is a prime number is true’ says no more than the simple sentence ‘5
we
is a prime number’ (see SR, 34-5).2 I call this the Redundancy thesis. Finally, Frege
argues that truth is not definable; I call this the Indefinability argument.
Of these views of truth, Redundancy and Indefinability have been the most con-
troversial. Some commentators have urged that Redundancy is incompatible with
other aspects of Frege’s philosophy. Many commentators don’t find Frege’s reason-
c

ing in the Indefinability argument cogent. Other commentators have claimed that
ie

Redundancy is a reflection of the conclusion Frege meant to draw from the Indefin-
or not

ability argument: truth is not a property at all. The claim that truth and falsity are
the referents of thoughts have seemed to many readers of Frege to be outrageous. It
is prima facie not even clear what the claim that judgment is a step to a truth-value
means; in any case, it raises a question about how it squares with Frege’s other char-
o

acterization of judgment as acknowledgment of the truth of a thought. As we will see


d.

in §2.4, recently there has been substantial progress towards understanding what it
:d

means for a judgment to be a step to a truth-value. In particular, it has become clearer


that this characterization of judgment is intended as a rejection of Frege’s Begriffss-
chrift view that making a judgment consists in holding that a thought has the property
aft

of truth. However, it remains unclear what according to Frege judgment does consist
in.
nf

In §2.5 I argue for a way of accounting for these Fregean views of truth by ascrib-
Dr

ing to Frege a conception of judgment, truth, and thought. First, for Frege, a thought
represents something to be the case. The thought that 5 is prime, for example, repre-
sa

1
Urteilen kann als Fortschreiten von einem Gedanken zu seinem Wahrheitswerte gefaßt werden.
(1967, 150)
2
Man kann ja geradezu sagen: ‘der Gedanke, daß 5 eine Primzahl ist, ist wahr’. Wenn man aber
genauer zusieht, so bemerkt man, daß damit eigentlich nichts mehr gesagt ist als in dem einfachen Satze
‘5 ist eine Primzahl’. (1967, 150)
Judgment before the Sense/Reference Distinction 55

sents an object, the number 5, as falling under the concept of being a prime number.
Second, a judgment is fundamentally the recognition that what a thought represents
obtains. To make the judgment that 5 is prime is to recognize that the number 5 does

.e ion
indeed fall under the concept of being prime. Judgment is primarily knowing what is
the case, and truth is involved in judgment only secondarily: recognizing the truth of
a thought supervenes on recognizing the obtaining of what that thought represents.
By recognizing that 5 falls under the concept of being prime, one thereby also rec-

an iss
ognizes the truth of the thought that 5 is prime; alternatively, recognizing that this

du
thought has the property of truth is, at bottom, just recognizing that 5 has the property
of being prime. This supervenience view accounts for Redundancy. Note that this

m
position does not deny that truth is a property of thoughts. It only insists that truth is
not a fundamental property of thoughts. Truth is that property of thoughts which one

per
recognizes in virtue of recognizing the obtaining of what thoughts represent. I claim
that this view of truth is what Indefinability really establishes. This shows that Frege
no longer takes judgment to be constituted by taking a thought to be true. Finally, the
primary function of a thought is to be a step to the acquisition of knowledge, which

ut
is to say, to judgment. This is the meaning of Frege’s claim that judgment is taking
a step from a thought to a truth-value: making a judgment is going beyond a mere

ey
representation of what is the case, to recognizing that what is represented actually
h@ itho
obtains.
In §§2.6 and 2.7 I show how these views of judgment, truth, and thought lead to
sl
the absoluteness of truth. The basic argument goes as follows. If truth is or may be
relative, then at least some, if not all thoughts are not either true or false except with
sh ite w

respect to a time, a place, or a circumstance. Consider now one of these thoughts.


we
From Frege’s perspective, what this purported thought represents, by itself, without
a time, place or circumstance, is not something that one can recognize to obtain,
or recognize not to obtain. Hence this purported thought fails to provide what is
required for judgment; it fails to fulfill the primary function of thoughts and so is, at
best, a radically defective thought, if it is a thought at all. It is what Frege calls an
c

apparent thought (Scheingedanke). The truth and falsity of genuine thoughts, thought
ie

by grasping which we can make judgments and acquire knowledge, are absolute.
or not

2.1 Judgment before the Sense/Reference Distinction


o

In this section, I highlight three aspects of Frege’s early conception of judgment


d.

and indicate what happens to them in Frege’s mature thought, after he adopts the
:d

sense/reference distinction.
In Chapter 1 we saw that, around the time when Frege wrote Begriffsschrift,
he conceived of judgment on the basis of an intuitive contrast between, on the one
aft

hand, assuming whether something is the case or wondering whether it is, and, on the
other hand, holding, or accepting, or believing that it is the case. Frege re-describes
nf

this contrast as the distinction between grasping a content and judging that content.
Dr

Furthermore, judgment is characterized as acknowledgment of the truth of a content.


In addition, Begriffsschrift and the early “Logic” manuscript show that in this pe-
sa

riod Frege tacitly conceived of judgment in a number of other ways that he does not
distinguish from acknowledgment of the truth of a content:
• Judging is holding or taking a content to be true.
• Judging is predicating (aussagen) the property of truth of a content or ascribing
56 From Judgment to Amodalism

(beilegen) the property of truth of that content.


• Judging is predicating the property of being a fact of a circumstance.

.e ion
Another aspect of Frege’s early conception of judgment is the close connection he
discerns between judgment and science. We see this in the beginning of the early
“Logic”:

an iss
The goal of scientific striving is truth. By inwardly acknowledging something as true we
judge, and by expressing the judgment we assert. (1979, 2)3

du
m
Science strives for or aims at truth, and evidently, this striving is related to judgment
as acknowledgment of truth. But how? One way to understand what Frege has in

per
mind is in terms of his tacit view that making a judgment is taking a content to be
true. That a judger takes a content to be true doesn’t guarantee that the content judged
is true. But in making a judgment one is attempting to identify a true content. In this
sense, each act of judging strives for or aims at truth, at identifying a true content.
Science, then, is an activity of making judgments. This view may be connected with

ut
Frege’s tacit conception of judging as predicating facthood of circumstances, if one

ey
takes Frege to think that science aims at discovering facts or at determining what is
the case.
h@ itho
There is another way of thinking of the connection between judgment and knowl-
sl
edge. The word ‘acknowledge’ translates ‘anerkennen’ and ‘zuerkennen’. Both may
also be translated as ‘recognition’. One sense of the verb ‘recognize’ is factive: if
someone recognizes something to be the case then that thing is the case. Recognition
sh ite w
we
of the truth of a content, then, implies that that content is true. On this reading of
acknowledgment, acknowledgment of truth amounts to reaching, rather than merely
aiming to reach the goal of truth. The activity of science would then be, not making
judgments, but aiming to make judgments.4 However, it is not altogether clear what
an activity of aiming to make judgments might be. I will come back to this question
c

in §2.6 below.
ie

It should be noted that science for Frege seems to be more or less a stand-in
or not

for knowledge. So the connection between judgment and science may be taken to
be simply a connection between judgment and knowledge. The enterprise of knowl-
edge, as it has been called, would be a striving for truth that involves judgment. On
the non-factive view of acknowledgment, making judgments are attempts to acquire
knowledge; on the factive view, making a judgment is acquiring a piece of knowl-
o
d.

edge.
:d

Finally, judgment is closely connected to logic. This again appears in the early
“Logic.” Frege writes
aft

[T]he grounds which justify the acknowledgment of a truth often reside in other truths which
have already been acknowledged. ….
…. Logic is concerned only with those grounds of judgment which are truths. To judge
nf

because one is conscious of other truths as grounds of justification is called inferring. There
Dr

are laws for this kind of justification, and to set up these laws of correct inference is the goal
sa

3
Das Ziel des wissenschaftlichen Strebens ist Wahrheit. Indem wir etwas innerlich als wahr anerken-
nen, urteilen wir, und indem wir das Urteil äussern, behaupten wir. (1969, 2)
4
The question whether Frege has a non-factive or a factive understanding of judgment is the subject
of a debate between Ricketts (1996) and Kremer (2000).
Judgment before the Sense/Reference Distinction 57

of logic. (1979, 3)5

Thus, what logic applies to, what it governs, is a particular type of judgments, those

.e ion
which are made by inference, on the basis of other acknowledged truths. Since sci-
ence consists of judgments, if the judgments of science are ever made inferentially,
then the laws of logic are laws of scientific justification. Conversely, whatever is not
a judgment is not something to which logic applies, is nothing which logic governs.

an iss
Of these early views, only the last survives entirely intact with Frege’s adoption
of the sense/reference distinction. Throughout all phases of his writings, Frege sees

du
inferring as making a judgment justified on the basis of other judgments, and logic

m
as the laws of inferential justification.
The connection between judgment and science or knowledge also persists in

per
Frege’s mature philosophy. However, in later writings, Frege leans towards the fac-
tive construal of judgment. A compelling example is the opening of one of the last
articles he wrote, “Sources of Knowledge of Mathematics and the Mathematical Nat-
ural Sciences”:

ut
When someone comes to know something it is by his acknowledging a thought as true. For that
he has first to grasp the thought. Yet I do not count the grasping of the thought as knowledge,

ey
but only the acknowledgment of its truth, the judgment proper. (1924-25, 267)6
h@ itho
Evidently, Frege holds that knowledge is attained by making a judgment.
sl
This last quotation indicates an unsurprising change from Frege’s early view of
judgment as acknowledgment of the truth of a content. Frege takes the sense/reference
distinction to imply that judgeable content “splits” (zerfallen) into thought and truth-
sh ite w
we
value (1893, X). So, on adopting this distinction, it is the truth of a thought rather
than of a content that is acknowledged. Except for this change, the early character-
ization of judgment persists through the rest of Frege’s career. We just saw that in
1924 Frege holds “judgment proper” to be acknowledgment of the truth of a thought.
At the beginning his mature philosophy, in “On Sense and Reference,” he says that
c

“a judgment is for me not the mere grasp of a thought but the acknowledgment of its
ie

truth” (1892, 34, n. 7).7


or not

However, the other early formulations of judgment—as holding a content to


be true, and as predicating the property of truth of a content—do not survive the
sense/reference distinction. As we will see in the next five sections, Frege came to
reject an understanding of acknowledgment of truth as taking a thought to be true or
ascribing truth to a thought.
o
d.

5
Die Gründe nun, welche die Anerkennung einer Wahrheit rechtfertigen, liegen oft in anderen schon
:d

anerkannten Wahrheiten. ….
…. Die Logik hat es nur mit solchen Gründen des Urteilens zu tun, welche Wahrheiten sind. Urteilen,
indem man sich anderer Wahrheiten als Rechtfertigungsgründen bewusst ist, heisst schliessen. Es gibt
Gesetze über diese Art der Rechtfertigung, und diese Gesetze des richtigen Schliessens aufzustellen, ist
aft

das Ziel der Logik. (1969, 3)


6
Eine Erkenntnis kommt dadurch zustande, dass ein Gedanke als wahr anerkannt wird. Dazu muss
nf

der Gedanke zunächst gefasst werden. Doch rechne ich das Fassen des Gedankens nicht zur Erkenntnis,
Dr

sondern erst die Anerkennung der Wahrheit, das eigentliche Urteilen. (1969, 286)
7
Ein Urteil ist mir nicht das bloße Fassen eines Gedankens, sondern die Anerkennung seiner Wahrheit.
(1892, 34, n. 7)
sa

Here are samples of other instances of this formulation.


In “Die Verneinung”: Urteilen, kann man weiter sagen, ist etwas als wahr anerkennen. Was als wahr
anerkannt wird, kann nur ein Gedanke sein. (1918, 151 n. 13)
In “Der Gedanke”: die Anerkennung der Wahrheit eines Gedankens - das Urteilen (1918, 62)
Wenn wir einen Gedanken innerlich als wahr anerkennen, so urteilen wzr; wenn wir eine solche An-
erkennung kundgeben, so behaupten wir. (1897, 150)
58 From Judgment to Amodalism

2.2 Judgment and Truth in “On Sense and Reference”


We saw in the last chapter, in §1.4, that the first two or three paragraphs of “On Sense

.e ion
and Reference” presents a well-known argument for the sense/reference distinction.
Somewhat less well-known in contemporary philosophy is that, after this famous
opening, after discussing the sense and reference of proper names, Frege argues that
“entire assertoric sentences” also have sense and reference. The sense of such a sen-

an iss
tence is a thought, and its referent is one of two truth-values, the True or the False.
Readers of Frege have always found the second claim hard to swallow. We don’t

du
usually take sentences to refer to anything, unlike names and definite descriptions,

m
and it’s very unclear what these entities, the True and the False, might be. What’s
worse, Frege’s argument for this view in “On Sense and Reference” is puzzling. It’s

per
not even all that clear what exactly the argument is, but one line of thinking seems
to go roughly like this. Frege claims that when we adopt “an attitude of scientific
investigation”8 towards a sentence, we care whether names which occur in that sen-
tence have referents or not (SR, 33). Whether or not these names do have referents

ut
does not affect the thought expressed by the sentence, even if that thought “loses
value for us as soon as we recognize that the referent of one of its parts is missing”

ey
(SR, 33).9 So the reason why “we want every proper name to have not only a sense,
h@ itho
but also a referent” is not the thought expressed; rather, the reason is that “we are
concerned with [the] truth-value” of the sentence (SR, 33).10 The argument up to this
sl
point seems to rely on the premise that a sentence’s being true or false depends on the
names occurring in it having referents. Hence whenever we care whether sentences
sh ite w

are true or false, and not merely about the thoughts they express, we care whether
we
these names have referents. But then Frege abruptly concludes, “We are therefore
driven into accepting the truth-value of a sentence as constituting its referent” (SR,
34).11 This just doesn’t seem to follow from the preceding reasoning.
There is a fairly widely accepted interpretation of Frege’s notion of reference
that makes this argument less preposterous.12 Reference is a technical as well as an
c

intuitive notion for Frege. The reference of an expression is that feature of the expres-
ie

sion which contributes to determining sentences containing that expression as true or


or not

as false. In the case of a proper name, when that name occurs in a sentence, the truth-
value of the sentence depends on the object that we ordinarily take the name to refer
to. So, although we do not ordinarily take sentences to refer to anything, they refer in
Frege’s technical sense because if a sentence S is part of another sentence, the truth-
o

value of that other sentence depend on some feature of S. For example, ‘Theaetetus
d.

flies’ is a part of ‘If Socrates dreams, then Theaetetus flies’, and the truth or falsity
:d

of the conditional sentence depends on just the truth-value of ‘Theaetetus flies’ (and
of course on the truth-value of ‘Socrates dreams’). So, in this occurrence, the refer-
ence of ‘Theaetetus flies’ is a truth-value. The truth-value of ‘Socrates believes that
aft

Theaetetus flies’, however, depends not on the truth value of ‘Theaetetus flies’ but
on the thought it expresses; so in this occurrence the reference of ‘Theaetetus flies’
nf

is a thought.
Dr
sa

8
einer wissenschaftlichen Betrachtung
9
Der Gedanke verliert für uns an Wert, sobald wir erkennen, daß zu einem seiner Teile die Bedeutung
fehlt.
10
es uns auf seinen Wahrheitswert ankommt
11
So werden wir dahin gedrängt, den Wahrheitswert eines Satzes als seine Bedeutung anzuerkennen.
12
It originates with Dummett (1973a).
Judgment and Truth in “On Sense and Reference” 59

2.2.1 Judgment as the Step to a Truth-Value


Even less well-known than Frege’s argument for truth-values as the referents of

.e ion
thoughts is the fact that “On Sense and Reference” contains a discussion of judgment.
After presenting that argument, Frege explains that by “truth-value of a sentence” he
means “the circumstance that it is true or false,” and tells us that he will call these
circumstances “the True” and “the False” (SR, 34).13 Now, in the 1897 “Logic” Frege

an iss
states that “we do not, properly speaking, ascribe truth to the series of sounds which
constitute a sentence, but to its sense” (1897, 129).14 So the truth-values are really the

du
circumstance that a thought is true or the circumstance that it is false. Here, in “On

m
Sense and Reference,” Frege continues by connecting the truth-values to judgment:

These two objects are acknowledged, if only implicitly, by anyone who judges at all, who

per
holds something to be true—and so even by a skeptic. [S]o much should already be clear,
that in every judgment[fnte: A judgment for me is not the mere grasping of a thought, but
the acknowledgment of its truth.]—no matter how self-evident—the step from the level of
thoughts to the level of referents (the objective) has already been taken. (SR, 34)15

ut
Here judgment is characterized as “taking the step from the level of thoughts to the

ey
level of referents”; later in the essay, we see that taking this step is “advancing”
h@ itho
(gefassen) or “passing” (gelangen) from a thought to a truth-value (1892, 35).16
This passage immediately raises a question: what is the relation between this
sl
characterization of judgment and the characterization of judgment as acknowledg-
ment or recognition of the truth of a thought? Since Frege’s footnote presents the
sh ite w

acknowledgment of truth characterization, the answer seems to be that “taking a step


we
from a thought to the True” is just a different way of saying “acknowledge the truth
of a thought.”
It’s not clear, however, that this conclusion is quite right. Immediately after pre-
senting the step-to-referents characterization of judgment, Frege brings up a worry,
apparently about the earlier conclusion that the truth-values are the referents of sen-
c

tences: “One might be tempted to regard the relation of the thought to the True not
ie

as that of sense to reference, but rather as that of subject to predicate” (1892, 34).17
or not

Frege responds with an argument:

One can, indeed, say: ‘The thought that 5 is a prime number is true’. But if one looks more
closely, one notices that nothing more has been said than in the simple sentence ‘5 is a prime
number’. The assertion of truth arises in each case from the form of the assertoric sentence,
o
d.

13
Ich verstehe unter dem Wahrheitswerte eines Satzes den Umstand, daß er wahr oder daß er falsch
:d

ist. …. Ich nenne der Kürze halber den einen das Wahre, den andern das Falsche.
14
es nicht die Folge von Lauten ist, als welche sich ein Satz darstellt, sondern sein Sinn, dem wir
eigentlich Wahrheit zuschreiben. (1969, 140)
15
Diese beiden Gegenstände werden von jedem, wenn auch nur stillschweigend, anerkannt, der über-
aft

haupt urteilt, der etwas für wahr hält, also auch vom Skeptiker. [S]o viel möchte doch schon hier klar
sein, daß in jedem Urteile[fnte: Ein Urteil ist mir nicht das bloße Fassen eines Gedankens, sondern die
nf

Anerkennung seiner Wahrheit.]—und sei es noch so selbstverständlich—schon der Schritt von der Stufe
Dr

der Gedanken zur Stufe der Bedeutungen (des Objektiven) geschehen ist. (1967, 149)
16
Man gelangt durch die Zusammenfiigung von Subjekt und Prädikat immer nur zu einem Gedanken,
nie von einem Sinne zu dessen Bedeutung, nie von einem Gedanken zu dessen Wahrheitswerte. Man
sa

bewegt sich auf derselben Stufe, aber man schreitet nicht von einer Stufe zur nächsten vor.

Urteilen kann als Fortschreiten von einem Gedanken zu seinem Wahrheitswerte gefaßt werden.(1967,
150)
17
Man könnte versucht sein, das Verhältnis des Gedankens zum Wahren nicht als das des Sinnes zur
Bedeutung, sondern als das des Subjekts zum Prädikate anzusehen.
60 From Judgment to Amodalism

and when the latter lacks its usual force, e.g., in the mouth of an actor upon the stage, even the
sentence ‘The thought that 5 is a prime number is true’ contains only a thought, and indeed the
same thought as the simple ‘5 is a prime number’. It follows that the relation of the thought to

.e ion
the True may not be compared with that of subject to predicate. (1892, 34-5; emphases mine)18

Prior to the sense/reference distinction, Frege construes acknowledgment of the truth


of a thought as predicating or ascribing truth of a content. With the distinction in

an iss
place, this would become predicating truth of a thought, which one may well take to
be the view that, in a judgment, thought and truth are related as subject and predicate.

du
Henceforth I will call the claim that judgment consists of predicating the property of

m
truth of a thought the Predication Analysis of judgment. Frege’s argument in the
paragraph just cited appears then to be a rejection of his earlier construal of acknowl-

per
edgment of truth in terms of the Predication Analysis. Thus the characterization of
judgment as taking the step from a thought to a truth-value is a new alternative con-
ception of judgment.
In order to evaluate these suggestions, let’s look at Frege’s argument more closely.

ut
2.2.2 The Redundancy of Truth-Predication

ey
h@ itho
Most of Frege’s argument is taken up with a sub-argument showing that occurrences
of the word ‘true’ in assertoric sentences are neither necessary nor sufficient for utter-
sl
ances of those sentences to be assertions. That is to say, ‘true’ is redundant for making
assertions; thus I will call Frege’s conclusion Redundancy. Frege then infers, from
Redundancy, that the relation of thought to truth is not subject to predicate.
sh ite w
we
The sub-argument for Redundancy relies on the idea that making an assertion
depends on two factors. One is the use of a type of sentences, sentences which Frege
characterizes as being of “assertoric form.” The other consists of particular contexts
or circumstances, those in which utterances of assertoric sentences make assertions;
let’s call these assertoric contexts.
c

The non-necessity half of Frege’s argument rests on something that he claims


ie

“one notices”: the sentence


or not

(25) The thought that 5 is a prime number is true


in which ‘is true’ occurs as the grammatical predicate, “says no more” than
(26) 5 is a prime number
o
d.

In “Introduction to Logic” Frege makes an analogous claim about the sentential op-
:d

erator ‘it is true that’:


(27) It is true that 5 is a prime number
aft

also “says no more” than sentence (26) (1906, 194).19


nf

18
Man kann ja geradezu sagen: ‘der Gedanke, daß 5 eine Primzahl ist, ist wahr’. Wenn man aber
Dr

genauer zusieht, so bemerkt man, daß damit eigentlich nichts mehr gesagt ist als in dem einfachen Satze ‘5
ist eine Primzahl’. Die Behauptung der Wahrheit liegt in beiden Fällen in der Form des Behauptungssatzes,
und da, wo diese nicht ihre gewöhnliche Kraft hat, z.B. im Munde eines Schauspielers auf der Bühne,
sa

enthält der Satz ‘der Gedanke, daß 5 eine Primzahl ist, ist wahr’ eben auch nur einen Gedanken, und zwar
denselben Gedanken wie das einfache ‘5 ist eine Primzahl’. Daraus ist zu entnehmen, daß das Verhältnis
des Gedankens zum Wahren doch mit dem des Subjekts zum Prädikate nicht verglichen werden darf.
(1967, 150; emphases mine)
19
Frege’s actual example is ‘it is true that 2 is prime: “Im Grunde besagt ja auch der Satz ‘Es ist wahr,
dass 2 eine Primzahl ist’ nicht mehr als der Satz ‘2 ist eine Primzahl’ ” (1969, 211).
Judgment and Truth in “On Sense and Reference” 61

After making this observation Frege continues by claiming that the “assertion
of truth arises in each case from the form of the assertoric sentence.” This claim
makes clearer the sense in which sentences (25) and (27) “say no more than” (26). All

.e ion
three sentences are of assertoric form, so they may all be uttered in assertoric contexts
to make an assertion. This is already enough for the non-necessity conclusion: the
occurrence of a truth predicate or operator is not required for making an assertion
because no truth predicate occurs in (26). Frege goes further; he holds that the same

an iss
assertion would be made by utterances of (25)-(27); moreover, this one assertion is

du
that made by uttering the truth-free (26).
The insufficiency half of the argument rest on the existence of non-assertoric

m
contexts, those in which utterances of assertoric sentences do not make assertions.
Frege’s example is dramatic performance. In such a context uses of assertoric sen-

per
tences don’t have their “customary force”; as Frege would put it in later texts, they
lack “asserting force” (behauptende Kraft). In such circumstances, utterances of ⌜the
thought that p is true⌝ and ⌜it is true that p⌝, with p an assertoric sentence, are not
assertions but “contain only a thought.” Whether or not an actor believes that the

ut
thought that p is true, his utterance on the stage of ⌜it’s true that p⌝ doesn’t constitute
his (as opposed to his character’s?) asserting or purporting to assert that p. So in such

ey
contexts, in which asserting force is missing, the occurrence of a truth-predicate or
h@ itho
truth-operator in a sentence is not enough to make its utterance an assertion.
Thus occurrences of a truth predicate or operator are neither necessary nor suf-
sl
ficient for making an assertion. Rather, assertion lies in the form of the assertoric
sentence together with circumstances in which this form of sentence carries asserting
sh ite w

force.
we
The conclusion of this sub-argument is about assertion. The overall conclusion
Frege wants, however, is a conception of judgment. So our question now is: how
does assertion-Redundancy go against the Predication Analysis of judgment?
A natural idea here is that Redundancy for assertion straightforwardly implies
some form of Redundancy for judgment. Assertion, according to Frege, is used to
c

express judgments. Someone who makes an assertion either expresses a judgment


ie

or presents herself as expressing a judgment, if she is lying.20 If the addition of a


or not

truth-predicate or truth-operator does not alter the assertion that may be effected by
uttering an assertoric sentence, then surely such addition does not alter the judgment
that may be expressed.
This is certainly right, but the conclusion is merely that an utterance of ⌜S is
o

true⌝, for S an assertoric sentence, expresses the same judgment as an utterance of S.


d.

In order to get some form of Redundancy for judgment, one would have to show that
:d

the judgment expressed by an utterance of S, where no truth-predicate or -operator


occurs in S, in some way or the other doesn’t involve truth. In particular, if this
purported form of Redundancy is to provide a ground against the Predication Analysis
aft

of judgment, then the judgment expressed by uttering S must not involve predication
of truth. How does Frege reach this conclusion?
nf

One might think that Frege’s route to this conclusion goes through his accep-
Dr

tance of Redundancy for thoughts. The utterance of ‘the thought that 5 is prime is
true’ in non-assertoric contexts, as we just saw, expresses a thought. Frege claims,
sa

moreover, that it expresses the same thought as is expressed by ‘5 is prime’. In a later

20
In a footnote in “On Sense and Reference” Frege describes a lie as an assertion made by someone
convinced of the falsity of the thought he asserts (1892, 37 n.); such an assertion does not express a
judgment made by the asserter.
62 From Judgment to Amodalism

text, Frege claims that although the word ‘true’ has a sense, this sense “is such that
it does not make any essential contribution to the thought” expressed by sentences
in which it occurs (1915, 251).21 So the judgment expressed by utterances of both

.e ion
S and ⌜S is true⌝ involves a thought to which the sense of ‘true’ makes no essential
contribution.
But this conclusion is only that the thought judged doesn’t involve the sense
of ‘true’. It is not clear that this conclusion precludes taking judging this thought to

an iss
involve ascription of truth. The reason is this. The conclusion tells us that

du
• for some specific assertoric sentence S, it and ⌜S is true⌝ both express the same

m
thought T,
• sincere utterances of these sentences in assertoric contexts both express the same

per
judgment J
It’s not clear why these claims rule out that a subject who makes J does so by ascribing
the property of truth to T, but she can manifest this ascription of truth to T in either
of two ways, by uttering S or by uttering ⌜S is true⌝.

ut
So there isn’t yet a cogent argument against the Predication Analysis.

ey
Another proposal for how Frege’s argument might work is based on an ana-
h@ itho
logue for judgments of assertoric context and asserting force. The analogue comes
from Frege’s distinction between grasping and judging a thought. If a subject makes
sl
an assumption or asks herself whether something is the case, then she grasps or en-
tertains a thought, but in such a situation her grasp of the thought lacks what one
might call judging force. If she then comes to hold this something to be the case,
sh ite w
we
she entertains the thought with judging force. Redundancy for judgments can then
be understood in the following way. Merely grasping the thought that 5 is prime,
without judging force, is not to judge that 5 is prime. But, grasping the thought that
the thought that 5 is prime is true also does not amount to judging that 5 is prime.
One can grasp the latter thought without judging force when one merely assumes
c

that it’s true that 5 is prime, or wonders whether the thought that 5 is prime is true.
ie

In such contexts, the subject has not made the judgment that 5 is prime. Now, the
or not

thought that the thought that 5 is prime is true is a thought that predicates or ascribes
the property of truth to another thought. So Redundancy for judgments would, on
this proposal, be the claim that one can grasp a thought that predicates the property
of truth to another thought without judging that other thought. Judgment then cannot
consist in predicating truth of a thought, for merely entertaining such a predication,
o
d.

without judging force, is not judging.


:d

The problem with this proposed account of Redundancy for judgments is that
there are two senses of predicating a property. The thought expressed by ‘Frege was
Italian’ represents the property of being Italian as holding of Frege; in this sense, it’s a
aft

thought in which the property is predicated of or ascribed to a person. But if someone


accepts or believes what is expressed by ‘Frege was Italian’, then he holds that Frege
nf

was Italian. Now, does this subject not judge that Frege was Italian? Moreover, does
Dr

he not predicate or ascribe the property of being Italian of Frege?


Let’s call these two senses of predication weak and strong predication respec-
sa

tively. Someone who predicates weakly the property of truth of a thought T merely
entertains the thought that T is true, without judging force. Such a subject indeed
doesn’t make a judgment. But someone who predicates strongly the property of truth
21
Das Wort ‘wahr’ liefert also durch seinen Sinn keinen wesentlichen Beitrag zum Gedanken. (1969,
271)
Judgment and Truth in “On Sense and Reference” 63

of a thought T holds or accepts that T is true. Is he then not judging that T is true?
And if he does so judge, does he not further accept that T is the case, and so judge T?
Again it’s not clear that there is a compelling argument against the Predication

.e ion
Analysis.

2.2.3 Two Varieties of Redundancy

an iss
Whether or not Redundancy supports Frege’s rejection of the Predication Analysis, it
is not a passing fancy. Frege displays a commitment to it throughout his mature writ-

du
ings. But there are at least two apparently distinct formulations of Redundancy. In

m
the 1897 “Logic,” where Redundancy next appears after “On Sense and Reference,”
Frege writes,

per
What, in the first place, distinguishes [the predicate ‘true’] from all other predicates is that
predicating it is always included in predicating anything whatever.
If I assert that the sum of 2 and 3 is 5, then I thereby assert that it is true that 2 and 3 make
5. (1897, 129; emphases mine)22

ut
ey
In the earlier formulation, the claim is that a sentence in which a truth predicate is
h@ itho
present says less than that sentence appears to say, and, the thought expressed by such
a sentence is less complex than it appears to be. In the second formulation, the claim
sl
is that a predication or assertion expressed by a sentence from which a truth predicate
or operator is absent predicates or asserts more than that sentence appears to assert;
what is asserted is more complex than it appears to be. I’ll call these, respectively,
sh ite w
we
the no-more and the already-included versions of Redundancy.
In later appearances of Redundancy, the no-more version predominates. As we
saw, in “Introduction to Logic” Frege says that “at bottom the sentence ‘it is true
that 2 is prime’ says no more than the sentence ‘2 is prime’ ” (1906, 194; emphases
mine).23 In the lecture notes “Logic in Mathematics” of 1914 Frege writes, “we can
c

see that really nothing at all is added to the sense by” “the predicate true” (1914, 233;
emphases mine).24 In “Thought,” published in 1918, Frege writes, “it seems … that
ie
or not

nothing is added to the thought by my ascribing to it the property of truth” (1918,


354; emphases mine).25

2.2.4 Doubts about Redundancy


o

Some commentators hold that Frege’s commitment to Redundancy is a mistake. One


d.
:d

reason for this is that Redundancy appears to be dispensable. As mentioned above,


in “On Sense and Reference” Frege seems to hold that Redundancy is based merely
on “noticing” a feature of assertions of truth predications, namely that they don’t
“say” any more than the sentences of which truth is predicated. One might think that
aft
nf

22
Zunächst unterscheidet [das Prädikat ‘wahr’] sich von allen anderen Prädikaten dadurch, dass es
immer mit ausgesagt wird, wenn irgend etwas ausgesagt wird.
Dr

Wenn ich behaupte, dass die Summe von 2 und 3 5 ist, so behaupte ich damit, dass es wahr ist, dass 2
und 3 5 ist. (1969, 140)
sa

23
Im Grunde besagt ja auch der Satz ‘Es ist wahr, dass 2 eine Primzahl ist’ nicht mehr als der Satz ‘2
ist eine Primzahl’ (1969, 211)
24
wir erkennen, dass durch dies Prädikat [wahr] dem Sinne eigentlich gar nichts hinzugefügt wird.
(1969, 251)
25
So scheint denn dem Gedanken dadurch nichts hinzugefügt zu werden, daß ich ihm die Eigenschaft
der Wahrheit beilege (1967, 347).
64 From Judgment to Amodalism

what Frege has “noticed” is really something akin to Moore’s paradox: it makes no
sense to accept a truth predication and reject the embedded sentence, or vice versa.
If this is the only basis for Redundancy, then Frege gets to Redundancy through tak-

.e ion
ing a plausible sufficient condition for a difference in the senses expressed by two
sentences—one can rationally accept one of these sentences and reject the other—for
an implausible necessary condition.26 So Frege is better off rejecting Redundancy.
Another reason for thinking that Frege should have let go of Redundancy is that

an iss
it appears to be in conflict with other Fregean commitments. To begin with, Frege

du
holds that some thoughts are neither true nor false. According to Redundancy, at least
in the no-more version, for any assertoric sentence S, the sentence ⌜S is true⌝ says no

m
more than S. Even if “saying no more” doesn’t amount to these sentences expressing
the same thought, surely it amounts to their not differing in truth-value. But now

per
consider a sentence q that expresses a thought that is neither true nor false. Then
neither q nor that thought is true. But then, it seems, the thought expressed by ⌜q is
true⌝ is false, rather than neither true nor false. So the thoughts expressed by q and by
⌜q is true⌝ do differ in truth-value after all.27 Note that this argument depends on the

ut
assumption that a truth predication, ⌜S is true⌝ expresses a thought about the thought
expressed by S. This leads to another of Frege’s views with which Redundancy seems

ey
to conflict. If ⌜S is true⌝ expresses a thought about the thought expressed by S, then,
h@ itho
in general, the thoughts these sentences express can’t be the same, since, in general,
the thought expressed by S isn’t about itself, or about a thought. For instance, ‘Russell
sl
had a mustache’ expresses a thought about Russell and about the concept or property
of being mustached, but not about any thoughts. In contrast, the thought expressed
sh ite w

by ‘the thought that Russell had a mustache is true’ seems obviously to be about a
we
thought.28

2.2.5 Summary
The upshot of our discussion of judgment in “On Sense and Reference” is somewhat
c

disappointing. Frege clearly rejects the Predication Analysis of acknowledgment of


ie

truth. But it’s not clear that this rejection is sound. His argument seems to be based
or not

on Redundancy for assertions and for truth. However, it’s not clear that either form
of Redundancy is compelling on its own or consistent with Frege’s other views. Nor
is it clear that either form of Redundancy rules out the Predication Analysis.
Moreover, even if one rejects the Predication Analysis, it is not clear why one
o

should take acknowledgment of truth to be taking the step to a truth-value. Indeed,


d.

it’s not even clear what exactly it is to take the step to a truth-value.
:d

Next, I turn to a better argument against the Predication Analysis that may be
discerned in Frege’s writings, one which will lead to an account of judging as the step
to a truth-value. Before starting, I want to note that this account will enable us to see
aft

both why Frege is so committed to Redundancy and that Redundancy is much more
defensible that it may appear.
nf
Dr
sa

26
See Heck (2012, 47, n. 41).
27
This argument was first presented in Dummett (1959).
28
See again Heck (2012, 47, n. 41).
The Indefinability of Truth 65

2.3 The Indefinability of Truth


Some five years after “On Sense and Reference,” Frege came to formulate an ar-

.e ion
gument against definitions of truth. I will call it the Indefinability argument. It is
presented in two texts, the 1897 “Logic,” and the paper “Thought.” I focus on the
version in “Logic”:

an iss
Now it would be futile to employ a definition in order to make it clearer what is to be understood
by ‘true’. If, for example, we wished to say ‘a representation [Vorstellung] is true if it agrees

du
with reality’ nothing would have been achieved, since in order to apply this definition we must

m
in a given case decide whether a representation agrees with reality, in other words: whether it
is true that the representation agrees with reality. Thus we should have to presuppose the very
thing that is being defined. The same would hold of any definition of the form ‘A is true if and

per
only if it has such-and-such properties or stands in such-and-such a relation to such-and-such a
thing’. In a given case it would always come back to whether it is true that A has such-and-such
properties, or stands in such-and-such a relation to such-and-such a thing. Truth is obviously
something so primitive and simple that it is not possible to reduce it to anything still simpler.
(Frege, 1897a [henceforth cited as Logic1897], 128-9; emphases mine)29

ut
ey
Frege’s conclusion here is that any definition of truth presupposes truth, what is
h@ itho
supposed to be defined, and so is, as Frege puts it later in “Thought,” circular. In
“Thought” Frege also reaches a slightly different conclusion: any definition of truth
sl
generates an infinite regress: “truth does not consist in agreement of [the sense of a
sentence] with something else, for otherwise the question of truth would get reiterated
to infinity” (Frege, 1918b [henceforth cited as T], 60).30
sh ite w
we
I would like to note that Frege continues the passage from the 1897 “Logic” just
quoted by illustrating what is distinctive of the predicate ‘true’ with an example of
already-included assertion-Redundancy: “If I assert that the sum of 2 and 3 is 5, then
I thereby assert that it is true that 2 and 3 make 5.” (1897, 129)31 Similarly, three
paragraphs after Frege argues against definitions of truth in “Thought” he claims that
what is distinctive about truth is that “nothing is added to the thought by my ascribing
c
ie

to it the property of truth,” which is an expression of no-more Redundancy. That


these formulations of Redundancy follow the Indefinability argument may suggest
or not

that Indefinability in some way leads to Redundancy.


The argument for the circularity of definitions of truth rests on consideration of
what is involved in applying such a definition. We can better understand what Frege
has in mind by looking at an example of a legitimate definition that he often mentions,
o

Gauss’s definition of numerical congruence.32 In “Foundations of Geometry, II,” for


d.
:d

29
Es wäre nun vergeblich, durch eine Definition deutlicher zu machen, was unter ‘wahr’ zu verstehen
sei. Wollte man etwa sagen: ‘wahr ist eine Vorstellung, wenn sie mit der Wirklichkeit übereinstimmt’, so
wäre damit nichts gewonnen, denn, um dies anzuwenden, müsste man in einem gegebenen Falle entschei-
den, ob eine Vorstellung mit der Wirklichkeit übereinstimme, mit anderen Worten: ob es wahr sei, dass
aft

die Vorstellung mit der Wirklichkeit übereinstimme. Es müsste also das Definierte selbst vorausgesetzt
werden. Dasselbe gälte von jeder Erklärung von dieser Form: ‘A ist wahr, wenn es die und die Eigen-
nf

schaften hat, oder zu dem und dem in der und der Beziehung steht’. Immer käme es wieder im gegebenen
Falle darauf an, ob es wahr sei, dass A die und die Eigenschaften habe, zu dem und dem in der und der
Dr

Beziehung stehe. Wahrheit ist offenbar etwas so Ursprüngliches und Einfaches, dass eine Zurückführung
auf noch Einfacheres nicht möglich ist. (1967, 139-40)
sa

30
das Wahrsein [besteht] nicht in der Übereinstimmung dieses Sinnes mit etwas anderem; denn sonst
wiederholte sich die Frage nach dem Wahrsein ins Unendliche. (1967, 344)
31
Wenn ich behaupte, class die Summe von 2 und 3 5 ist, so behaupte ich damit, class es wahr ist, dass
2 und 3 5 ist.(1969, 140)
32
The following is indebted to Levine (1996), who emphasizes the role of Frege’s view of the appli-
cation of definitions in this argument.
66 From Judgment to Amodalism

instance, Frege describes how the definition of congruence modulo 3,33


a is congruent to b modulo 3 =df 3 goes evenly into (b − a),

.e ion
is “applied to a particular case”:
[I]f we posit the Gaussian definition of number-congruence, then in order to recognize that 2 is
congruent to 8 modulo 3, we need only the statements ‘8 − 2 = 3 + 3’ and ‘3 goes evenly into

an iss
3 + 3’ which neither contain the sign for congruence nor presuppose knowledge of it. (1906,
306)34,35

du
Applying the definition of ‘congruence modulo 3’ is using the definition to recog-

m
nize whether any given statement in which the term ‘congruence modulo 3’ occurs
is true. In this case, application of the definition to such a statement results in the

per
statements ‘8 − 2 = 3 + 3’ and ‘3 goes evenly into 3 + 3’. In these two statements,
the term ‘congruence modulo 3’ doesn’t occur, and we can recognize whether they
are true without knowing what ‘congruence’ means. Thus the definition is a genuine
clarification of the term of “congruent modulo 3’. What I want to emphasize here is
that, for Frege, in order to be a legitimate definition, its application to any statement

ut
containing the definiendum must satisfy two conditions:

ey
(a) it must result in statements in which the definiendum does not appear, and
h@ itho
(b) it must be possible to recognize whether those statements are true without
sl
knowledge of the meaning of the definiendum.
In the case of the definition of congruence, Frege holds that satisfaction of condition
sh ite w

(a) also guarantees satisfaction of condition (b). However, Frege argues that for def-
we
initions of truth, of phrases containing ‘true’, this is not so: even if the statements
one obtains by applying a definition of ‘true’ do not contain this term, this does not
guarantee that one can recognize whether those statements are true without knowing
the meaning of ‘true’. In order to follow Frege’s argument, let’s consider a definition
of truth for thoughts modeled on the definition of truth for representations that he
c

discusses in the passage from “Logic”:


ie

The thought that p is true =df the thought that p agrees with reality.
or not

If we apply this definition to “a given case,” for example, the statement


(4) The thought that Russell had a mustache is true
we obtain
o
d.

(5) The thought that Russell had a mustache agrees with reality
:d

(5) doesn’t contain ‘true’, and therefore satisfies condition (a) of the application of
legitimate definitions. However, and now we come to the heart of Frege’s argument,
to “decide” (entscheiden) whether the thought that Russell had a mustache agrees
aft

with reality one needs to know the meaning of ‘true’. This is because to “decide
whether a thought agrees with reality” requires “deciding whether it is true that that
nf

thought agrees with reality.” So, although statement (5) doesn’t contain ‘true’, to
Dr

decide whether it holds requires deciding whether


sa

33
Frege actually writes the definiendum on the right and definiens on the left.
34
Legen wir … die Gaußische Definition der Zahlenkongruenz zugrunde, so bedürfen wir nur der Sätze
‘8 − 2 = 3 + 3’ und ‘3 geht in 3 + 3 auf’ die das Zeichen der Kongruenz nicht enthalten, noch auch seine
Kenntnis voraussetzen, um zu erkennen, daß 2 nach dem Modul 3 der 8 kongruent ist. (1967, 292)
35
See in addition Frege (1903b [henceforth cited as FG1], 279), (1967, 267; op. 369); (1914, 230-4),
(1969, 248-52); (1980, 45), (1969, 72).
The Indefinability of Truth 67

(6) It is true that the thought that Russell had a mustache agrees with reality
holds, and to do this one needs to know the meaning of ‘true’. Thus, the application

.e ion
of the truth definition doesn’t satisfy condition (b); hence, the definition is not legit-
imate. The definition of ‘true’ presupposes the meaning of ‘true’ that it is supposed
to clarify.
We can also take this line of reasoning to show that no one can ever determine

an iss
whether a thought is true on the basis of a definition of truth. A definition of ‘true’
as predicated of expressions of thoughts is supposed to specify what the truth of a

du
thought consists in. So, to establish that a thought is true requires establishing that

m
the thought satisfies the definition. But, to establish that it satisfies the definition
requires establishing the truth of the further thought that the thought satisfies the

per
definition, and so on, ad infinitum. Since no one can establish the truth of all these
infinitely many thoughts, no one can determine the truth of any thought.
The key step in these lines of reasoning is the claim that deciding whether (5)
holds requires deciding whether (6) holds. That is to say, Frege assumes that deciding
whether a thought agrees with reality requires deciding whether it’s true that that

ut
thought agrees with reality. Since Frege takes all definitions of truth to be circular,

ey
it clear that analogues of this claim hold for “any definition of the form ‘A is true if
h@ itho
and only if it has such-and-such properties or stands in such-and-such a relation to
such-and-such a thing’.” This suggests that the key move of the argument rests on a
general principle: sl
(7) To decide whether p is the case requires deciding whether it is true that p is
sh ite w
we
the case,
where deciding whether it is true that p is the case is something separate from and
additional to deciding whether p. This last clause is needed to get an infinite regress
going.
But what justifies this assumption? Why should deciding whether Russell had
c

a mustache require deciding whether it is true that Russell had a mustache?


ie

Let’s begin by slightly clarifying the assumption. To decide whether p is either


or not

to find out that p is the case or to find out that p is not the case. For example, deciding
whether Russell had a mustache is either finding out that he had one or finding out
that he didn’t have one. Now recall that Frege takes judgment to be central in science
and in the acquisition of knowledge in general. Thus finding out that such-and-such
o

is the case is making the judgment that such-and-such. Hence, to decide whether
d.

Russell had a mustache is either to judge that he had one or to judge that he didn’t
:d

have one. It follows that assumption (7) means


(8) Judging that p requires judging that p is true.
aft

Call this the Main Assumption of the Indefinability argument.


nf

I want to note that although this assumption sounds a lot like a Redundancy
Dr

claim for judgment, in fact, it differs from both versions of judgment-Redundancy.


Redundancy for judgment is either
sa

• Judging that p is true is no more than judging that p,


or

• Judging that p is already judging that p is true.


68 From Judgment to Amodalism

But in neither case is judging that p is true an act of judging separate from and addi-
tional to the act of judging that p.
The question now is: what is Frege’s reason for accepting the Main Assumption?

.e ion
One proposal is that it follows from three claims:36
(9) Truth is a property of thoughts.
(10) Making a judgment consists of predicating or ascribing the property of truth

an iss
to a thought.

du
(11) For any property P and object o, to predicate P of o is to judge that o is or has

m
P.
(10) and (11) immediately imply:

per
(12) Judging that p consists of judging that p has the property of truth
Now, assume that

ut
(13) If doing A consists of doing B, then one can’t do A without doing B.

ey
Then (12) implies
h@ itho
(14) One can’t judge that p without judging that p has the property of truth
sl
This is just a version of the Main Assumption.
The interest of (9)-(11) isn’t merely that the Main Assumption follows from
sh ite w

them, and so they may be taken to underlie the Indefinability argument. More im-
we
portantly, (9)-(11) furnish an argument against the Predication Analysis of judgment.
(10), of course, is the Predication Analysis. That (10) and (11) imply (12) shows that
the Predication Analysis is circular: according to (10) making a judgment consists
in predicating truth of a thought, but in the presence of (11) this turns out to be the
claim that making a judgment consists in making another judgment. Call (11) the
c

Predicating is Judging Principle.


ie

(12) together with assumption (13) lead to (14). This generates an infinite regress:
or not

one can’t judge that p without judging that p is true, that is, without judging that
it’s true that p is true, etc., etc. Thus in the presence of Predicating is Judging and
assumption (13) the Predication Analysis implies that making any one judgment re-
quires making an infinite number of judgments.
o

So, if Frege is committed to the Predicating is Judging Principle as a funda-


d.

mental feature of judgment,37 then he is also committed to rejecting the Predication


:d

Analysis.
If the foregoing are Frege’s grounds for rejecting the Predication Analysis, how
then are we to understand the Indefinability Argument? This depends on what one
aft

takes Frege to conclude from the failure of the Predicational Analysis of judgment.
Some commentators hold that Frege concludes that truth is not a property of
nf

thoughts at all.38 If truth is not a property of thoughts, then judgment is not ascrib-
Dr

ing this property to thoughts. Clearly, though, although this view is consistent with
sa

36
Similar interpretations are advanced by Ricketts (1986, 1996), Heck (2007, 2012), and Heck and
May (Forthcoming).
37
Interestingly, commentators such as those mentioned in note 36 above, who take Indefinability to
be really an argument against the Predication Analysis, don’t highlight the fact that they are ascribing to
Frege this substantial commitment.
38
See in particular Ricketts (1986, 1996), Kremer (2000), and Kemp (1995, 1998, 1999).
The Indefinability of Truth 69

rejecting the Predication Analysis, it is not implied by this rejection. However, there
is textual support for this reading. As I’ve mentioned, in both the 1897 “Logic” and
“Thought” Frege moves from a presentation of the Indefinability argument to claim-

.e ion
ing Redundancy for thoughts. If truth is not a property of thoughts, then it would
seem to make sense that the predicate ‘is true’ and the operator ‘it is true that’ don’t
add anything to the thought expressed. More importantly, in “Logic in Mathemat-
ics,” after claiming that “to say of a sentence or thought that it is true” is not to “add

an iss
something essential by the predicate,” Frege states that “this consideration” shows

du
“that truth is not a property of thoughts or sentences” (Frege, 1914 [henceforth cited
as LM], 234; emphases mine).39 On this reading, the Indefinability argument is really

m
an argument against truth being a property, rather than against definitions of truth.
It’s not clear, however, how much weight should be given to Frege’s denial that

per
truth is a property in “Logic in Mathematics.” These are lectures notes, while in the
published paper “Thought” Frege is considerably more circumspect:

[I]t seems, then, that nothing is added to the thought by my ascribing to it the property of truth.
And yet is it not a great result when the scientist after much hesitation and laborious researches

ut
can finally say ‘My conjecture is true’? The meaning of the word ‘true’ seems to be altogether

ey
unique. May we not be dealing here with something which cannot be called a property in the
h@ itho
usual sense at all? In spite of this doubt I will begin by expressing myself in accordance with
ordinary usage, as if truth were a property, until some more appropriate way of speaking is
sl
found. (T, 61-62; emphases mine)40

Here clearly Frege is pulled in two directions. The Redundancy of truth ascriptions
sh ite w

suggests that truth is so unlike the ordinary run of properties that it just about isn’t a
we
property at all. Yet at least certain ascriptions of truth, such as the scientist’ arriving at
being able to say that his conjecture is true, are not undertaken arbitrarily, but only in
response, it would seem, to the thought in question having attained some non-trivial
status.
I will come back to Frege’s sense that in some ways truth is a property, but also
c

that in some ways it isn’t a full-fledged property. For now, though, I want to place the
ie

fact that Frege is himself unwilling simply to declare truth not to be a property next to
or not

the fact that the argument against the Predication Analysis is consistent with holding
that truth is a property of thoughts. All that the argument precludes is that truth be a
property such that it is by predicating it of thoughts that one makes a judgment. So, I
take the Indefinability argument to show that no definition of truth may characterize
o

truth as a property by predicating which one makes a judgment.


d.

This conclusion, however, still leaves us with two questions we raised above:
:d

• What does it mean to take judgment to be an advance from a thought to a truth-


value?
aft

39
Der Fall, dass wir von einem Sätze oder von einem Gedanken sagen, er sei wahr, ist also im Grunde
ganz verschieden etwa von dem, dass wir vom Meerwasser sagen, es sei salzig. In diesem fügen wir mit
nf

dem Prädikate etwas Wesentliches hinzu, in jenem nicht.


Dr

Diese Betrachtung … lehrt, dass die Wahrheit nicht eine Eigenschaft eines Satzes oder eines Gedankens
ist, wie man der Sprache folgend annehmen könnte. (1969, 252).
40
So scheint denn dem Gedanken dadurch nichts hinzugefügt zu werden, daß ich ihm die Eigenschaft
sa

der Wahrheit beilege. Und doch! ist es nicht ein großer Erfolg, wenn nach langem Schwanken und rnüh-
samen Untersuchungen der Forscher schließlich sagen kann ‘was ich vermutet habe, ist wahr’? Die Be-
deutung des Wortes ‘wahr’ scheint ganz einzigartig zu sein. Sollten wir es hier mit etwas zu tun haben, was
in dem sonst üblichen Sinne gar nicht Eigenschaft genannt werden kann? Trotz diesem Zweifel will ich
rnich zunächst noch dem Sprachgebrauche folgend so ausdrücken, als ob die Wahrheit eine Eigenschaft
wäre, bis etwas Zutreffenderes gefunden sein wird.
70 From Judgment to Amodalism

• Why does the failure of the Predication Analysis lead to this analysis of judg-
ment?

.e ion
I turn now to consider a proposal for explaining what Frege means by taking the step
to a truth-value.

an iss
2.4 What is a Step to a Truth-Value?

du
To reject the Predication Analysis is hold that judgment does not fundamentally in-

m
volve a judger, a thought, and the property of truth. Instead, on Frege’s view, judg-
ment involves a judger, a thought, and a truth-value, the True or the False. The
way these three elements are configured Frege characterizes as stepping or advanc-

per
ing from a thought to a truth-value.
One proposal for understanding this characterization is this. Making a judgment
consists of a judger grasping a thought, and, in addition, making an attempt or forming
an intention to refer to the True with that thought.41 Prima facie this is a non-factive

ut
account of judgment. Forming such an intention concerning a thought surely does

ey
not guarantee that that thought does refer to the True.
h@ itho
A second closely related proposal begins with the observation that predicating
the property of truth may be taken to be what is nowadays known as a propositional
sl
attitude. A subject who predicates truth of a thought holds or to recognizes that such-
and-such has the property of truth, and so stands in a cognitive relation to something
expressed by a ‘that’ clause; following Russell, this something is often called a propo-
sh ite w
we
sition. The proposal for the alternative to Predication Analysis is this. In making a
judgment a judger goes beyond merely entertaining a thought by standing in a non-
propositional cognitive relation to the object, the True, which is the referent of the
thought. According to the proposal, standing in this relation to the True is what Frege
means by “acknowledging the truth of a thought,” and coming to stand in this relation
is “taking the step to the truth-value.”42
c
ie

But what is this non-propositional cognitive relation? The proposal derives a


or not

model of this relation from a contemporary semantic theory for certain sentences
containing perceptual idioms that can be understood as about events, processes, or
states. For example43
• Mary saw Brutus stab Caesar
o
d.

• Mary saw a green light flashing


:d

• Mary saw John under the tree


According to the semantics, these sentences are to be analyzed as stating the ex-
aft

istence of a perceptual event whose subject is the perceiver and whose objects are
respectively, an event, a process, and a state.
nf

• (∃e)[Seeing(e) & Subj(e,Mary) & (∃e′ )[Stabbing(e′ ) & Subj(e′ ,Brutus) & Obj(e′ , Cae-
Dr

sar) & Obj(e,e′ )]]


sa

41
This proposal was first made by in Heck and May (2006); see also Heck (2007) and Heck and May
(Forthcoming).
42
The following is a slight variation of the pioneering account presented in Textor (2010); I depart
from his treatment principally in taking the truth-values to be circumstances or states of thoughts.
43
These examples come from Parsons (1987). Parsons’s analysis draws on Higginbotham (1983) and
Vlach (1983). Again I’m indebted to Textor (2010) for highlighting the importance of this semantic theory.
What is a Step to a Truth-Value? 71

• (∃e)[Seeing(e) & Subj(e,Mary) & (∃p)[Flashing(p) & Subj(p,a green light) & Obj(e,p)]]
• (∃e)[Seeing(e) & Subj(e,Mary) & (∃s)[ Under(s,the tree) & Subj(s,John) & Obj(e,s)]]44

.e ion
On this semantic analysis, in the perceptual event the perceiver is not related to a
proposition: what Mary saw is not that Brutus stabbed Caesar, or that a green light is
flashing, or that John is under the tree. What she saw is, rather, the stabbing of Caesar
by Brutus, the flashing of the green light, or the being under the tree of John. Further-

an iss
more, one may be able to make out a case that what Mary saw, in each case, counts

du
by Frege’s lights as an object. As we will see in more detail in §3.1 of Chapter 3, for
Frege, the ontological category of object supervenes on the logico-syntactic behav-

m
iors of expressions. To be an object is to be the referent of an expression a that plays
a particular role in certain sound inferences: primarily universal instantiation—from

per
‘everything is F’ to ‘a is F’, existential generalization—from ‘a is F’ to ‘something is
F’, and Leibniz’s Law—from ‘a is F’ and ‘a is identical to b’ to ‘b is F’. If there are
expressions for events, processes, and states that appear in sound inferences of these
forms, then there is a prima facie case that events, processes, and states are Fregean

ut
objects.
Now recall that Frege understands by the truth-value of a thought the circum-

ey
stance (Umstand) that it is true or false. We can take these circumstances to be states
h@ itho
that various thoughts are in. A truth-value then is a state that thoughts are in. A
judger’s acknowledgment of the truth of a thought would be his standing in a cogni-
sl
tive relation to a state, the state of being true, whose subject is the thought in question,
just as Mary stands in a perceptual relation to the state of being under the tree whose
sh ite w

subject is John. It is the acknowledgment of the circumstance of being true, not the
we
acknowledgment that the thought has the property of truth.45 Note that on the fore-
going model it doesn’t follow, from the assumption that p and q are distinct thoughts,
that circumstance of being true of p is distinct from the circumstance of being true of
q. Intuitively it seems that different lights can undergo the same process of flashing,
different objects can be in the same state of being under the tree. Moreover, it is
c

surely coherent to say:


ie
or not

When Mary was poor, she worked two jobs, but when John was in the same
circumstances he took to stealing.
In the same way, distinct thoughts can be in the same circumstance of being true. On
this proposal, judging is factive: just as seeing a state that something is in implies
o
d.

that that thing is in that state, so acknowledging the state of being true that a thought
:d

is in implies that that thought is in the state of being true.


I will call these Reference-Relation proposals. Both represent significant progress
in clarifying the idea of taking the step to a truth-value. But they both leave us with
aft

a puzzle. Let’s apply them to the Predicating is Judging principle: to predicate hav-
ing a mustache of Russell, to recognize that Russell has a mustache, is judging that
nf

Russell has a mustache. On the Reference-Relation proposals, both of these are cog-
Dr

nitive acts or states involving a thought and the object the True: to intend to refer
to the True with a thought one grasps, or to stand in a quasi-perceptual relation to a
sa

state of a thought one grasps. But, if I hold that Russell had a mustache, do I not hold
44
e, p, s are variables ranging over, respectively, events, processes, and states. Similarly, the relations
Obj and Subj hold of an event, a process, or a state and its object or subject.
45
It would be interesting to compare this view of acknowledging the True with Russell’s notion of
acquaintance with indefinables, among which is truth, in Russell (1903 [henceforth cited as PoM]).
72 From Judgment to Amodalism

something concerning Russell and the property of having been mustached? That is
to say, does my cognitive act not involve, first and foremost, an object and a concept,
neither of which is a thought, or the True? Similarly, if I recognize that Russell had

.e ion
a mustache, does my cognitive state not fundamentally concern this object and this
concept, rather than any thoughts or the states that they are in?
This is just to say that the proposals, combined with the Predicating is Judging
principle, has a counter-intuitive consequence; it doesn’t invalidate either proposal

an iss
as readings of Frege. But we can do better. In the next section, I outline a different

du
account of Frege’s conception of judgment, which is consistent with these proposals
but doesn’t have the counter-intuitive consequence just noted.

m
per
2.5 The Recognitional Conception of Judgment
In this section, I develop an account of what it means for judgment to be an advance
from the level of thoughts to the level of referents.

ut
2.5.1 The Supervenience of Truth-Predicating Judgments

ey
h@ itho
I begin with a different way of thinking about Frege’s rejection of the Predication
Analysis of judgment. The ground of this rejection is that the Predicating is Judging
sl
Principle implies that the Predication Analysis is either circular or leads to an infi-
nite regress. Let’s focus on the regress. What generates it is the claim that judging
sh ite w

any thought p turns out to require judging that p is true. Clearly, though, this claim
we
launches a vicious regress only if judging that p is true is not only different from
judging that p, but isn’t accomplished merely by judging that p. If, on the contrary,
by judging that p one thereby simultaneously judges that p is true, that it is true that p
is true, and so on, then the regress is not vicious.46 But how is one to accomplish this
feat of making simultaneously an infinity of judgments? A simple suggestion is to
c

appeal to the idea of supervenience.47 There are of course many notions of superve-
ie

nience. But all these agree on the following point: A is supervenient on B if A obtains
or not

in virtue of B’s obtaining, or if by doing B one thereby does A. So the suggestion for
blocking the vicious regress of judgments is to hold that
(15) By judging that p one thereby also judges that p is true.
o

Call this the Supervenience of Truth-Predicating Judgments, Supervenience for short.


d.

One way to think of this proposal is that it reverses what, according to the Predication
:d

Analysis, is the constitutive relation between judgment and predicating truth of a


thought. Instead of
aft

Judging that p consists in predicating truth of the thought that p,


we hold that
nf
Dr

Predicating truth of the thought that p consists in judging that p.


Of course, Supervenience doesn’t tell us what judgment is. Supervenience is
sa

merely a constraint on the account of judgment I will be developing. However, the


reason for working with this constraint is not only that it is a way out of the problems
46
This was noted by Dummett (1973a, Chapter 13).
47
I develop this supervenience interpretation further in Shieh (2002).
The Recognitional Conception of Judgment 73

of the Predication Analysis. Supervenience also accounts for no-more and already-
included judgment-Redundancy. This stems from another feature of the basic notion
of supervenience: if A is supervenient on B then the presence or existence of A is

.e ion
dependent on and so ultimately no more than the presence or existence of B. But, by
the same token, if A exists or is present, then B is guaranteed to exist or be present;
that is to say, B is already there, given that A is. So, if judging that p is true supervenes
on judging p, then judging that p is true is no more than judging that p, and judging

an iss
that p guarantees judging that p is true, that is to say, judging that p is already judging

du
that p is true. Part of the basis for ascribing Supervenience to Frege is that it explains
his longstanding commitment to Redundancy.

m
2.5.2 Judgment as Recognition

per
My initial proposal for a Fregean conception of judgment satisfying Supervenience
is:
A judgment is a recognition, in the factive sense, that something is the case.

ut
ey
I call this proposal the Recognitional Conception of judgment. There is no text in
h@ itho
which Frege explicitly advances this view of judgment. However, there is indirect
support for attributing it to Frege.
sl
First of all, this conception dovetails with Frege’s view of judgment in science
and of the connection between judgment and knowledge. If making a judgment is
recognizing something to be the case, where this implies that this something is the
sh ite w
we
case, then making a judgment is acquiring an item of knowledge.
Second, the proposed conception allows us to make sense of a curious formula-
tion of Frege’s in “Thought”:

we cannot recognize a property of a thing [an einem Dinge eine Eigenschaft erkennen] without
at the same time finding the thought that this thing has this property to be true. (1918, 354)48
c
ie

What does it mean to “recognize a property of a thing”? If we take this phrase to mean
or not

“recognize that a thing has a property,” then the proposed conception of judgment
enables us to construe Frege’s claim as:
We cannot judge that a thing has a property without finding the thought this
thing has this property to be true
o
d.
:d

Now, if we further take “finding” (finden) to be “judging,” then Frege’s claim reveals
itself as an expression of judgment-Redundancy.
Most importantly, the proposed conception accounts for the Predicating is Judg-
ing principle, if we assume that the notion of predicating in the principle is the factive
aft

one. On this assumption, to predicate P of o is to recognize that o is P, which, on the


proposed conception, is to judge that o is P.
nf
Dr

2.5.3 Recognition as Advance to the Level of Referents


sa

This initial proposal is obviously vague. To sharpen it one needs, for one thing,
to spell out what exactly is the something recognized as the case in any particular
48
wir an keinem Dinge eine Eigenschaft erkennen können, ohne damit zugleich den Gedanken, daß
dieses Ding diese Eigenschaft habe, wahr zu finden (1967, 347).
74 From Judgment to Amodalism

judgment. Here I appeal to Frege’s characterization of judgment as advancing from


the level of thoughts to the level of referents. It is customary in the literature to
understand this step as an advance from a thought to a truth-value. Frege, of course,

.e ion
says exactly this, so this understanding is clearly correct. However, it is not complete.
What Frege says is that by “combining subject and predicate one never gets (gelangt)
from a sense to its referent, from a thought to its truth-value.” I read this as follows.
To entertain a hypothesis or to understand a sentence one need only to grasp a thought,

an iss
and that requires only grasping the senses composing that thought. But to make a

du
judgment one has to recognize what truth-value is determined by the referents of
the senses composing a grasped thought. Thus to judge, as opposed to grasp or to

m
entertain a thought, is to “get to” the truth or falsity of a thought by “advancing to”
the referents of the components of that thought. In other words, a judgment is the

per
recognition of something that is the case concerning the referents of parts of a thought,
or of something that holds of these referents.
Here is an example to clarify this idea:
• To make the judgment that Russell had a mustache is to recognize that the person

ut
Russell has the property of having had a mustache.

ey
• What is recognized is something at “the level of referents” because
h@ itho
– the person Russell is the referent presented by the sense of the name ‘Rus-
sell’ andsl
– the property of having had a mustache is the referent presented by the sense
sh ite w

of the concept-expression ‘ξ had a mustache’.


we
• What one recognizes is that one of these referents is an object—Russell—that
has the property—having had a mustache—that is the other referent.
• That this object has this property is the “something that is the case concerning
referents” whose recognition is the particular judgment of this example.
c
ie

The foregoing is only a first approximation because one can recognize that a
or not

person has a mustache without knowing that that person is the referent presented by
the sense of ‘Russell’. In order to recognize that the referent of the sense of ‘Russell’
had a mustache, one has to recognize an object as that referent, as well as to recognize
that that object had a mustache. Similarly, one has to recognize the property, which
o

one recognizes Russell as having, as the referent of the sense of ‘ξ had a mustache’.
d.

Advancement to the level of referents is more than recognizing something to be the


:d

case concerning referents that happen to be determined by the senses that compose a
thought. It is recognizing what is the case concerning objects and concepts that are
recognized as referents determined by those senses.
aft

2.5.4 Thoughts (Gedanken) as Representations (Vorstellungen)


nf
Dr

This development of the initial proposal still doesn’t quite account for the idea of
judgment as the step to a truth-value. Nor does it tell us how judgment is the acknowl-
sa

edgment of the truth of a thought. What seems still missing from the Recognitional
Conception is an account of Frege’s insistence on a connection between judgment
and truth.
The basic idea of the account I now develop is simple. A thought states that
something is the case, in the sense of representing it as being the case. What is
The Recognitional Conception of Judgment 75

recognized as being the case in making a judgment is what the thought judged rep-
resents as being the case. That is to say, what is recognized is the obtaining of what
that thought represents as being the case. But if what is represented obtains, then the

.e ion
representation is true.
I begin to elaborate this idea with another interpretive proposal: for Frege,
thoughts are (non-psychological) representations (Vorstellungen).
As we saw in the last chapter, in Begriffsschrift, before the sense/reference dis-

an iss
tinction, Frege took judgeable contents to be representations. In 1882, before adopt-

du
ing the sense/reference distinction, Frege wrote, in a well-known letter sent to Anton
Marty:49 “That an individual falls under [fallen unter] a concept is a judgeable con-

m
tent” (1980, 101).50 So at this point Frege took some judgeable contents to represent
individuals as falling under concepts.

per
After the sense/reference distinction there is a change in terminology from ‘in-
dividual’ to ‘object’, and with this new term, Frege describes certain judgments as
judgments of objects falling under concepts. For example, in the manuscript “Com-
ments on Sense and Reference” dated 1892-5, he writes

ut
A concept is a function of one argument, whose value is always a truth-value. …. In the cases

ey
we first encounter the argument is itself an object …. [I]f we complete the name of a concept
h@ itho
with a proper name, we obtain a sentence whose sense is a thought; and this sentence has a
truth-value as its referent. To acknowledge this referent as that of the True (as the True) is to
sl
judge that the object which is taken as the argument falls under the concept. (1892-5, 119)51

In this manuscript we also see that for Frege these judgments of objects falling under
sh ite w
we
concepts are logically fundamental: “the fundamental logical relation is that of an
object’s falling under a concept: all relations between concepts can be reduced to
this” (1892-5, 118).52 In later works Frege also uses the terms “subsume under”
(subsumieren unter) for “falling under.”53 Thus, in the manuscript on Schoenflies of
1906, he writes, “In the sentence ‘Two is a prime’ we find a relation designated: that
c

of subsumption. We may also say the object falls under the concept prime” (1979,
177).54
ie
or not

Note that in both of these periods Frege would speak of falling under or sub-
sumption as a relation between concept and object and then caution against taking
this relation to be “a third item added to the concept and the object” (1979, 178)55
49
But possibly intended for Carl Stumpf, since Stumpf replied to it.
o

50
Dass nun ein Einzelnes unter [der Begriff] falle, ist ein beurteilbarer Inhalt (1969, 164)
d.

51
Der Begriff ist … eine Funktion eines Argumentes, deren Wert immer ein Wahrheitswert ist. …. In
:d

den zunächst sich darbietenden Fällen ist das Argument selbst ein Gegenstand …. Wenn wir nämlich einen
Begriffsnamen durch einen Eigennamen ergänzen, so erhalten wir einen Satz, dessen Sinn ein Gedanke ist;
und dazu gehört als Bedeutung ein Wahrheitswert. Indem wir diesen als den des Wahren (als das Wahre)
anerkennen, urteilen wir, dass der als Argument genommene Gegenstand unter den Begriff falle. (1969,
aft

129)
52
Die logische Grundbeziehung ist die des Fallens eines Gegenstandes unter einen Begriff: auf sie
nf

lassen sich alle Beziehungen zwischen Begriffen zurückführen. (1969, 128)


53
Dr

I conjecture that Frege picked up this term from Schröder’s writings, in particular Schröder (1890),
for as far as I can tell it first appears in Frege’s extant writings in the Schröder essay of 1895.
54
See also “Logic in Mathematics”: “The simplest case of the occurrence of a concept is that of a
sa

sentence whose grammatical subject is a proper name. We may say that in such a sentence an object is
subsumed under a concept, namely that object of which the grammatical subject is the proper name” (1914,
228); “Der einfachste Fall, wo ein Begriff vorkommt, ist der eines Satzes, dessen grammatisches Subjekt
ein Eigenname ist. Wir können sagen, dass hierbei ein Gegenstand unter einen Begriff subsumiert wird,
der Gegenstand nämlich, dessen Eigenname das grammatische Subjekt ist.” (1969, 246)
55
ein Drittes … , was zu dem Gegenstande und dem Begriffe hinzukomme (1969, 193).
76 From Judgment to Amodalism

My proposal is that these post-sense/reference characterizations amount to the


view that thoughts of the logically fundamental type represent an object as falling
or subsumed under a concept. Again, Frege never explicitly articulates this position.

.e ion
However, it can be discerned in a passage from “Introduction to Logic” (1906). Frege
says that the “simplest case” of analyzing “a thought into parts none of which are
thoughts” is

an iss
splitting a thought into two parts. The parts are different in kind, one being unsaturated, the
other saturated (complete). The thoughts we have to consider here are those designated in

du
traditional logic as singular judgments. In such a thought something is stated of an object [von

m
einem Gegenstande etwas ausgesagt]. …. But we can’t say that an object is part of a thought
as a proper name is part of the corresponding sentence. Mont Blanc with its masses of snow
and ice is not part of the thought that Mont Blanc is more than 4000 m. high; all we can say

per
is that to the object there corresponds, in a certain way that has yet to be considered, a part of
the thought. (1906, 187; first two emphases in original)56

According to this passage, a sentence like

ut
(16) Mont Blanc is more than 4000 m high

ey

h@ itho
expresses a thought that is analyzed as split into an unsaturated part and a satu-
rated part;


sl
“in that thought” something is stated (aussagen) of an object, but
that object is not part of the thought.
sh ite w
we
This passage raises a number of questions:
• What does it mean to claim that a thought divides into an object-determining
and a concept-determining sense?
• What is Frege’s ground for taking (16) to express such a thought?
c

• Why are these kinds of thoughts logically fundamental?


ie
or not

• What does this thought “state” of the object?


• What is it to “state” something of an object?
For present purposes I discuss just the last two; the others I take up in §3.1 of Chapter
3.
o
d.

The answer to the first of these two questions lies in some well-known Fregean
:d

views. The parts of the thought expressed by (16), on this analysis, are:
The same phrasing occurs in the letter to Marty: where judgeable content is that an individual falls
under a concept, so that the concept, as we saw “appears as” predicate, and “the subject is an individual,
aft

the relation of subject to predicate is not a third thing added to the two” (1980, 101); “wo das Subjekt ein
Einzelnes ist, ist die Beziehung von Subjekt und Prädikat nicht ein Drittes, das zu beiden hinzukommt“
(1969, 164).
nf

56
Dr

Erst hier werden wir verlasst, einen Gedanken in Teile zu zerlegen, von denen keiner ein Gedanke
ist. Der einfachste Fall ist der der Zweiteilung. Die Teile sind ungleichartig: der eine ungesättigt, der
andere gesättigt (abgeschlossen). Man muss dabei solche Gedanken in Betracht ziehen, die von der herge-
sa

brachten Logik als singuläre Urteile bezeichnet werden. In einem solchen wird von einem Gegenstande
etwas ausgesagt. …. Aber man kann nicht sagen, dass der Gegenstand Teil des Gedankens sei wie der
Eigenname Teil des entsprechenden Satzes. Der Montblanc mit seinen Schnee- und Eismassen ist nicht
Teil des Gedankens, dass der Montblanc mehr als 4000 m hoch ist, sondern man kann nur sagen, dass dem
Gegenstande in einer gewissen noch zu betrachtenden Weise ein Teil des Gedankens entspricht (1969,
203-4).
The Recognitional Conception of Judgment 77

• the sense of the proper name ‘Mont Blanc’, which is saturated or complete,
• the sense of the concept-expression ‘ξ is more than 4000 m high’, which is un-
saturated or incomplete.

.e ion
The referents determined by these senses are, respectively, an object and a concept;
these are also, respectively saturated and unsaturated. For our purposes, we do not
need an account of the saturated/unsaturated distinction.57 We need only see that

an iss
since the thought expressed by (16) “states something” about an object, this object
is surely the referent determined by the sense of ‘Mont Blanc’; moreover, what this

du
thought states about this object surely has something to do with the concept that is

m
the referent determined by the sense of ‘ξ is more than 4000 m high’. So, what is
stated by (16) is that

per
the referent determined by the sense of ‘Mont Blanc’ falls under the referent
determined by the sense of ‘ξ is more than 4000 m high’
Frege’s view, then, is that a thought whose parts are the sense of a proper name and

ut
the sense of a first-level concept-expression states something to be the case about the
referents of those component senses.

ey
We move to the second question: what is “stating”? Frege’s text doesn’t yield
h@ itho
any definitive answer. I propose to draw on an aspect of our ordinary understanding of
what it is to state something. Suppose I state that Russell had a mustache. Intuitively:

sl
It doesn’t follow that Russell indeed had a mustache.
sh ite w

• If Russell did have a mustache, then I made a true statement.


we
• If Russell did not have a mustache, then I made a false statement.
We can re-describe these intuitions using the vocabulary of “representing”:
• The statement I made represents something to be the case concerning Russell
and the property of having been mustached.
c
ie

• The representation does not guarantee that what is represented is indeed the case.
or not

• If what is represented is the case, then the representation is true.


• If what is represented is not the case, then the representation is false.
So, I take Frege’s “stating” to be “representing.”
Now, consider a thought T composed of a sense that presents an object o and a
o
d.

sense expressed by ‘ξ is P’ that presents a concept, call it Pξ. The view of thoughts
:d

from the “Introduction to Logic” passage then becomes:


• T represents something as being the case concerning o and ξ is P, namely, that
o falls under ξ is P.
aft

• T is true if what it represents is the case, that is to say, if o falls under ξ is P.


nf

• T is false if what it represents is not the case, if o does not fall under ξ is P.
Dr

The foregoing holds only for the logically simplest case of thoughts analyzed
into parts that are not thoughts. One step up in complexity are thoughts analyzed
sa

into parts presenting two or more objects and a relation, and representing those ob-
jects as standing in that relation. As is well-known, Frege holds that there is a hier-
archy of concepts and relations. Objects fall under first-level concepts and stand in
57
See for an account of the distinction see Heck and May (2013).
78 From Judgment to Amodalism

first-level relations. First-level concepts fall within second-level concepts; first-level


concepts stand within second-level relations. Frege also envisions what he calls “un-
equal level” relations in which an object may stand to a concept. In general, Frege’s

.e ion
view is that concepts and relations subsume, or are “saturated by,” objects and lower-
level concepts and relations. Thus the more complex thoughts are those analyzed into
senses presenting objects, concepts, and relations of various levels. Such a thought
represents one of the concepts or relations presented as subsuming, or being satu-

an iss
rated by, the remaining concepts and objects presented. For our present purpose of

du
understanding Frege’s mature conception of judgment, all that we need is the claim
that thoughts are representations of what is the case concerning the referents of its

m
component senses. I won’t go into the nature and rationale of the hierarchy of lev-
els of concepts and relations in terms of which the logical complexity of thoughts is

per
characterized.58

2.5.5 Recognition and the Constitution of the Step to a Truth-Value

ut
According to the Recognitional Conception, the judgment that o is P is the recogni-
tion that the object determined by the sense of ‘o’ falls under the concept determined

ey
by the sense of ‘ξ is P’. So, if a subject makes this judgment, then it is the case that
h@ itho
the object determined by the sense of ‘o’ falls under the concept determined by the
sense of ‘ξ is P’. That is to say, what is represented by the thought that o is P is the
sl
case. Hence the thought that o is P is true.
This, however, is hardly a surprising result. All it amounts to, it seems, is that
sh ite w

judgment is factive: there is no judgment that p if the thought that p is not true. Is
we
this all that Frege’s formulations—‘acknowledge the truth of a thought’ and ‘taking
the step from thought to truth-value’—amount to?
No. The significance of these Fregean formulations lies in the following. If a
thought represents something as the case, what does the truth of that thought consist
in? A natural answer is: the truth of a thought consists in the obtaining of what it
c

represents or in what it represents being the case. Central to my interpretation of


ie

Frege’s conception of judgment and truth is to take the “consists in” in this natu-
or not

ral answer to mean “is constituted by.” The truth of a thought is nothing over and
above the obtaining of what it represents. This is another supervenience claim: for
any thought T, the truth of T consists in the obtaining of what T represents. Call this
Truth-Supervenience. It follows that, in recognizing that the referent of ‘o’ falls un-
o

der the referent of ‘ξ is P’, one not only recognizes that what is represented by the
d.

thought expressed by ‘o is P’ is the case, but one thereby recognizes—that is to say,


:d

acknowledges—the truth of that thought.


For Frege, the True is the circumstance that a thought is true. It is the state of
being true of a thought, the truth of a thought. So I take a thought’s referring to the
aft

True to consist in the being true of that thought, which is to say, in the truth of that
thought. On the interpretation I’m developing, the truth of a thought consists in the
nf

obtaining of what it represents. Hence a thought’s referring to the True consists in


Dr

the obtaining of what that thought represents. That is to say, referring to the True
also supervenes on the obtaining of what a thought represents. Thus, in recognizing
sa

that the referent of ‘o’ falls under the referent of ‘ξ is P’, one thereby recognizes the
thought that o is P as referring to the True. This is what it means for judgment to be
the step from a thought to a truth-value. Recognition of what is the case or of what
58
See for an account of the rationale for the hierarchy of levels see Heck and May (2013).
The Recognitional Conception of Judgment 79

is not the case constitutes advance to a truth-value.


I want to emphasize that this view is not a denial that truth is a property of
thoughts. Truth is not fundamentally a property of thoughts the recognition of which

.e ion
constitutes judgment.59 Recognition of what is the case in the realm of reference
is fundamental to judgment. The property of truth consists of something common
to thoughts that are judged, that is to say, common to thoughts such that what they
represent is (recognized to be) the case. Nor is the view a type of deflationism about

an iss
truth on which truth is, in some way, not a substantial property. Whatever exactly

du
being a substantial property might amount to, the obtaining of what is the case in the
realm of reference surely counts as substantial; it is, after all, what is known when

m
we have knowledge, and what science aims to discover. That truth of thoughts is
a property supervenient on the obtaining of what thoughts represent, then, does not

per
make truth any less of a substantial property in this sense.
Moreover, the idea of truth as a supervenient property accounts for Frege’s hes-
itation over whether truth is a property. It is not an “ordinary” property because its
possession by a thought rests on something else. It is, however, not simply not a

ut
property. This is because, as Frege points out, a claim that a thought possess the
property of truth, made, for example, is objective and not made arbitrarily. Such a

ey
claim is responsible to what science aims to accomplish: the discovery of what is the
h@ itho
case.
How does falsity fit into the foregoing?
sl
What is represented by a thought T may fail to obtain. To recognize that what T
represents fails to obtain is to recognize the falsity of T. Frege takes the recognition
sh ite w

of a thought as false to be a judgment, a judgment of the “opposite” of that thought:


we
When we pass judgment … we either acknowledge [a thought] as true or we reject it as false.
…. Properly understood, there is no difference at all between the two cases. To hold one
thought to be false is to hold a (different) thought to be true—a thought which we call the
opposite of the first. In the German language we as a rule state a thought as false by inserting
c

the word ‘not’ into the predicate. …. [T]o each thought there corresponds an opposite. Here
ie

we have a symmetrical relation: If the first thought is the opposite of the second, then the
second is the opposite of the first. (1897, 149)60
or not

For example, consider the thought expressed by ‘81 is prime’. It is not the case that
the referent of ‘81’ falls under the referent of ‘ξ is prime’. To recognize that this
is not the case is to judge that 81 is not prime. The thought judged, in this case, is
o

the opposite of the thought expressed by ‘81 is prime’; usually, of course, this is the
d.
:d

thought expressed by ‘81 is not prime’.


In either case, judgment is, in the first instance, recognition of what is, or is not,
the case concerning the referents of parts of a thought. This recognition is what the
step to a truth-value consists in. To recognize that what a thought represents as the
aft

case is the case is to acknowledge the truth of the thought. This is to acknowledge the
circumstance that the thought is true, which is to acknowledge the True as the referent
nf
Dr

59
See Heck (2007) and Heck and May (Forthcoming) for a similar conclusion.
60
Wenn wir über [ein Gedanke] urteilen, so erkennen wir ihn entweder als wahr an oder wir verwerfen
sa

ihn als falsch. …. Eigentlich besteht gar kein Unterschied zwischen diesen Fällen. Indem ich einen
Gedanken für falsch halte, halte ich einen [anderen] Gedanken für wahr, und von diesem sagen wir dann,
er sei jenem entgegengesetzt. In der deutschen Sprache erklären wir einen Gedanken in der Regel dadurch
für falsch, dass wir beim Prädikate das Wort ‘nicht’ einschieben. …. [Es gibt] zu jedem Gedanken einen
entgegengesetzten. Wir haben hier eine umkehrbare Beziehung: Wenn der erste Gedanke dem zweiten
entgegengesetzt ist, so ist auch der zweite dem ersten entgegengesetzt. (1969, 161)
80 From Judgment to Amodalism

of that thought. This is a step from that particular thought to one of the truth-values.
Similarly, to recognize that what a thought represents as the case is not the case is to
acknowledge the falsity of the thought. This is to acknowledge the circumstance that

.e ion
the thought is false or the False as the referent of that thought, and to take the step
from that particular thought to the other truth-value.
I would like to consider what two familiar Fregean views amount to from the
perspective of the present interpretation.

an iss
First, for Frege, a sense determines or presents a referent. A thought is the sense

du
of an assertoric sentence and a truth-value its referent. How is it, then, that a thought
determines or presents a truth-value? The answer is this. A thought is composed of

m
senses which determine referents. A thought also represents something as the case
concerning these referents; one might say a thought represents how these referents

per
stand with respect to one another. If the referents do so stand with respect to one
another, then the thought is true. This, as we saw above, is what it is for the True
to be the referent of the thought. In other words, the referents’ standing with respect
to one another as the thought represents them as standing determines the True as the

ut
referent of that thought. Similarly, the referents’ not standing with respect to one
another as the thought represents them as standing constitutes the thought’s referring

ey
to the False, which is to say, determines the False as the referent of that thought. In
h@ itho
sum, a thought determines a truth-value in virtue of
(a)
(b)
sl
being composed of senses determining referents, and,
what is the case concerning these referents determining one of the truth-values
sh ite w

as the referent of that thought.61


we
Second, Frege took concepts to be functions from objects to truth-values. How
is this so on the Recognitional Conception? In the letter to Marty mentioned above
Frege says that he “regard[s] it as essential for a concept that the question whether
something falls under it has a sense” (1980, 101).62 Not only does the question make
c

sense, but for each object there is an answer, yes or no. So, given a concept, for every
ie

object a:
or not

• either it is the case that a falls under Fξ,


• or it is the case that a doesn’t fall under Fξ
But,
o
d.

• For a to fall under the concept Fξ is for the True to be the referent of the thought
:d

that a is F.
• For a not to fall under the concept Fξ is for the False to be the referent of the
thought that a is F.
aft

So a concept determines, for every object, either the True as the referent of a thought
nf

or the False as the referent of a thought. We can take this determination to be func-
Dr

tional determination: given a concept, the True or the False is determined as a func-
tion of each object. This is what it means for the concept to be a function from objects
sa

to the True or the False.


61
Textor (2010, at 646-647) gives a similar account of how every thought is a mode of determination
of a truth-value.
62
Als das Wesentliche für den Begriff sehe ich an, dass die Frage, ob etwas unter ihn falle, einen Sinn
hat.(1969, 164)
The Recognitional Conception of Judgment 81

2.5.6 The Recognitional Conception and Redundancy


In this subsection, I present two arguments for Redundancies based on the Recogni-

.e ion
tional Conception of Judgment. First, from this Conception to the Supervenience of
Truth-Predicating Judgments:
1. To make the judgment that a is F is to recognize that a falls under the concept

an iss
ξ is F.
2. The truth of the thought that a is F consists in a’s falling under ξ is F.

du
3. Hence, to make the judgment that a is F is to recognize the truth of the thought

m
that a is F.
4. To recognize the truth of the thought that a is F is to recognize that the thought

per
that a is F has the property of being true.
5. To recognize that the thought that a is F has the property of being true is to
judge that the thought that a is F is true.

ut
6. Hence, to make the judgment that a is F is to judge that the thought that a is
F is true.

ey
h@ itho
As I showed above, both versions of Redundancy for judgments follow from the
Supervenience of Truth-Predicating Judgments.
sl
What about Redundancy for thoughts? The argument requires an additional
assumption: if T and T′ are thoughts that represent the same thing concerning the
referents of the same senses as being the case, then T and T′ are the same thought.
sh ite w
we
The underlying idea is that if T and T′ both represent an object o as falling under a
concept Pξ, but T and T′ either represents o as the referent of distinct senses or Pξ as
the referent of distinct senses, then T and T′ are distinct thoughts.63
1. Let T be the thought expressed by ‘a is F’.
c

2. T represents o, the referent of a, as falling under Pξ, the referent of ‘ξ is F’.


ie

3. For T to fall under the concept expressed by ‘ξ is true’ is for what T represents
or not

to be the case.
4. So, for T to fall under the concept expressed by ‘ξ is true’ is for it to be the
case that o falls under Pξ.
5. Let T′ be the thought expressed by ‘the thought that a is F is true’ or ‘T is
o
d.

true’.
:d

6. T′ represents T as falling under the concept expressed by ‘ξ is true’.


7. By 4., T′ represents that o falls under Pξ.
aft

8. By 2. and 7., T and T′ represents the same thing as being the case, and so are
the same thought.
nf

9. Hence ‘the thought that a is F is true’ expresses the same thought as is ex-
Dr

pressed by ‘a is F’.
sa

63
Compare the notion of intensional isomorphism in Carnap (1947, Chapter I).
82 From Judgment to Amodalism

2.5.7 Nugatio ab Omnia Nævo Vindicatus


We can now answer the criticisms of Redundancy described above. Consider first the

.e ion
alleged incompatibility between truth-value gaps and Redundancy. Frege’s standard
examples of thoughts without truth-values are those expressed by sentences in which
occur proper names without bearers. For example,

an iss
(17) Costaguana is a monarchy
is neither true nor false because the sense of ‘Costaguana’ fails to present a referent.

du
On my interpretation of Frege’s conception of the property of truth, what it is for

m
a thought to be true is for what it represents concerning the referents of its components
to be the case. If sentence (17) expresses a thought, its components are the sense of

per
‘Costaguana’ and the sense of ‘ξ is a monarchy’. This thought—call it T—represents
an object, call it c, that is the referent of the sense of ‘Costaguana’ as falling under
the concept, call it Mξ, that is the referent of the sense of ‘ξ is a monarchy’. What it is
for T to be true, then, is for it to be the case that c falls under Mξ. But there is no such
thing as c. Hence there is no such thing as it’s being the case that c falls under Mξ.

ut
This means that there is no such thing as T’s being true. Nor, by parity of reasoning,

ey
is there such a thing as it’s being the case that c fails to fall under Mξ. Hence there is
h@ itho
no such thing as T’s being false. It is neither the case that T has the property of truth
nor the case that T has the property of falsity.
sl
Now, the thought expressed by
(18) It is true that Costaguana is a monarchy
sh ite w
we
represents T as having the property of truth. Let’s call the thought expressed by (18)
T′ . What it is for T′ to be true is for it to be the case that T has the property of truth;
what it is for T′ to be false is for it to be the case that T has the property of falsity.
Neither of these is the case, hence T′ is neither true nor false. What this means is
that it doesn’t follow, from (17)’s expressing a truth-value gap, that (18) expresses
c

a falsehood. Rather, (18) also expresses a truth-value gap. One might say that on
ie

my interpretation, the thought that T is true, despite appearances, isn’t fundamentally


or not

about the thought T, so the truth of the former isn’t determined by the state of truth
of the latter.
This brings us to the other objection, that ⌜the thought that T is true⌝, for T
an assertoric sentence, is surely about a thought, while in general T is not. What
fuels this objection is that ⌜the thought that T is true⌝ seems to be about the thought
o
d.

that T in the same way that ‘S believes that T’ is about that thought. But there is,
:d

from a Fregean point of view, a clear difference between the two. The context ‘the
thought that ξ is true’ is not indirect. Substitution of co-referential names in any
sentence that replaces ‘ξ’ preserves truth-value, as do substitutions of co-extensive
aft

concept expressions. The context ‘S believes that ξ’ is indirect. Substitutions of


co-referential names or co-extensive concept expressions in this context do not in
nf

general preserve truth-value. As we will see in more detail in §3.2.2.2 of Chapter 3,


Dr

it is this phenomenon that motivates Frege’s doctrine of direct and indirect senses and
references. The reference of any expressions occurring in the belief sentential context
sa

is its customary sense, so the reference of an assertoric sentence occurring in that


context is a thought. Hence the sentence that results from filling the placeholder in the
belief sentential context with an assertoric sentence is about that thought. But, since
there is substitution, salva veritate, of co-referential and co-extensive expression in
the truth context, the Fregean view is that the referents of expressions occurring in
The Recognitional Conception of Judgment 83

those contexts are their customary referents, or, at least, there is no reason to take
these referents not to be the customary ones. The referent of an assertoric sentence
occurring in the truth predication context, then, is a truth-value, not a thought. It is a

.e ion
truth-value determined by the referents of the components of the thought expressed
by that assertoric sentence. So, the thought expressed by ⌜the thought that T is true⌝
isn’t, after all, about the thought expressed by T. It is about the referents of the
components of that thought, and so about the truth-value of that thought.

an iss
du
2.5.8 Two Worries

m
2.5.8.1 Aren’t Vorstellungen Psychological?

per
The main reason in favor of the proposal that after the sense/reference distinction
Frege takes thoughts to be representations is that it enables us to make sense of a
number of Frege’s views. However, it may be objected that Frege actually explicitly
rules out taking thoughts to be representations, for the following reason.
‘Representation’ is the translation I have uniformly adopted for ‘Vorstellung’.

ut
But, in Frege’s polemics against psychologism, he uses ‘Vorstellung’ for psycho-

ey
logical, subjective entities. Now, Frege insists that thoughts are objective, mind-
h@ itho
independent entities. It thus seems to follow that Frege would not take thoughts to
be Vorstellungen or representations.
sl
To address this worry, let’s first note that in the Preface of Grundlagen Frege
writes, “I have used the word ‘representation’ [‘Vorstellung’] always in the psycho-
logical sense” (1884, X).64 That is to say, he explicitly chooses to use ‘Vorstellung’
sh ite w
we
for subjective psychological entities. In the Preface of Grundgesetze he makes it clear
that this choice is made to combat psychologism:
Everyone has his own representations which cannot also belong to another. Here, of course, I
understand ‘representation’ in the psychological sense. The vacillating use of the word causes
unclarity and helps the psychological logicians conceal their weakness. (1893, XVII-XIX;
c

emphases mine)65
ie
or not

Evidently, Frege holds that there are non-psychological senses of ‘Vorstellung’. This
is also suggested in the 1897 “Logic”:
We often speak as if one and the same representation occurred to different men, but that is
false, at least if the word ‘representation’ is used in the psychological sense: each man has his
o

own representation. (1897, 130)66


d.
:d

[R]epresentations (in the psychological sense of the word) have no fixed boundaries
(1897, 135; emphases mine)67

But what are the non-psychological senses of ‘Vorstellung? Here there are no
aft

firm answers, but we can make a conjecture. In 1910 Philip Jourdain sent to Frege a
paper containing a long section on Frege’s works, seeking comments and criticism.
nf

64
[I]ch [habe] das Wort ‘Vorstellung’ immer im psychologischen Sinne gebraucht
Dr

65
Jeder hat seine Vorstellungen, die nicht zugleich die eines Andern sind. Hier verstehe ich natürlich
‘Vorstellung’ im psychologischen Sinne. Der schwankende Gebrauch dieses Wortes bewirkt Unklarheit
sa

und hilft den psychologischen Logikern ihre Schwäche verbergen.


66
Man spricht oft so, als ob eine und dieselbe Vorstellung mehreren Menschen zukäme, aber das ist
falsch, wenn man einmal das Wort ‘Vorstellung’ im psychologischen Sinne gebraucht: jeder hat seine
eigene. (1969, 141)
67
die Vorstellungen (im psychologischen Sinne des Wortes) [sind] ohne bestimmte Begrenzung (1969,
146)
84 From Judgment to Amodalism

Frege commented at length, and among the comments is one on the word ‘Vorstel-
lungsverbindung’ occurring in §2 of Begriffsschrift:68

.e ion
‘Vorstellungsverbindung’. I now simply say ‘Gedanke’. The word ‘Vorstellung’ is used now
in a psychological, now in a logical sense. Since this creates obscurities, I decided not to use
it at all in logic. (1969, 119; emphases mine) 69

an iss
Thus there is a logical sense of ‘Vorstellung’. What this sense might be we can try to
guess from a letter Frege wrote to Russell dated 24 May 1903:

du
m
I still do not quite share your opinion about sense and meaning. I should like to say the fol-
lowing about them. In all cases, both representation and judgment have an object: what I call
a ‘proposition’ can be the object of judgment, and it can be the object of representation. There

per
are therefore two ways in which we can think of an object, in case this object is a complex: we
can represent it, or we can judge it; yet the object is the same in both cases (e.g., when we say
‘the cold wind’ and when we say ‘The wind is cold’). To me, the judgment stroke therefore
means a different way of being directed towards an object. (1980, 159)70

ut
Frege here distinguishes judgment from representation, and claims that what he calls

ey
a “proposition” can be the “object” of both judgment and representation. Since Frege
h@ itho
is so steadfast in taking judgment to be the acknowledgment of the truth of a thought,
it is reasonable to take “proposition” here to mean thought. In fact, it seems that
sl
this use of “proposition” is not so much Frege’s own as his attempt to accommodate
his notion of thought to Russell’s thinking since around 1903 Russell took what he
calls propositions to be the objects of belief and judgment. Now, another constant in
sh ite w
we
Frege’s thinking is the contrast between grasping a thought or content and judging
that thought or content. So I take Frege to having in mind, by saying that a proposition
can be the object of representation, his view that a thought may be merely grasped.
Thus, in trying to explain himself to Russell, Frege here formulates the notion of the
grasp of a thought without judging in terms of a representation whose object is that
c

thought. A thought, Frege repeatedly insists, is not a psychological entity—grasping


ie

a thought may be a mental act, but what is grasped is not anything mental. So the
or not

sense in which a representation whose object is a thought is the grasp of that thought
is this: a subject who grasps a thought has a representation, and what is represented,
the content of that representation is the thought grasped. Having a representation is
psychological, but not the representation had. A representation in the logical sense,
then, is something grasped whose content is a thought; alternatively, a thought is what
o
d.

a logical representation represents.


:d
aft

68
Jourdain translated and published most of Frege’s comments as footnotes to the first 23 sections of
Jourdain (1912).
nf

69
‘Vorstellungsverbindung’. Ich sage jetzt dafür einfacher ‘Gedanke’. Das Wort ‘Vorstellung’ wird
Dr

bald in einem psychologischen, bald in einem logischen Sinne gebraucht. Da daraus Unklarheiten entste-
hen, habe ich mich dafür entschieden, es in der Logik überhaupt nicht zu gebrauchen. (1969, 119).
70
Über Sinn und Bedeutung bin ich noch immer nicht ganz Ihrer Meinung. Darüber möchte ich folgen-
sa

des sagen. Vorstellung und Urtheil haben beide in allen Fällen einen Gegenstand: was ich eine ‘Proposi-
tion’ nenne kann Gegenstand eines Urtheils sein, kann ebensowohl Gegenstand einer Vorstellung sein. Es
giebt also zwei Weisen auf denen man an ein Gegenstand denken kann, falls dieser Gegenstand ein Kom-
plex ist: man kann ihn vorstellen, oder man kann ihn urtheilen; doch ist der Gegenstand in beiden Fällen
derselbe (z.B. wenn man sagt ‘der kalte Wind’ und wenn man sagt ‘der Wind ist kalt’). Also bedeutet für
mich der Urtheil[s]strich eine verschiedene Weise des Gerichtetseins auf ein Objekt. (1969, 242)
The Recognitional Conception of Judgment 85

2.5.8.2 Isn’t the Recognitional Conception a Correspondence Theory of


Truth?

.e ion
It may well seem that the conception of thoughts and their truth I have attributed to
Frege amounts to a correspondence theory of truth. According to this conception,
thoughts are representations and their truth consists in the obtaining of what they
represent. Is this not to say that the obtaining of what a thought represents makes

an iss
that thought true? Is the obtaining of what a thought represents not the obtaining of a
fact, which is what in contemporary philosophy is often called a truth-maker? So is

du
the view not that a thought is true in virtue of the existence of a fact that agrees with

m
or corresponds to that thought?
If so, then ascription of this view to Frege is ruled out by at least two doctrines

per
that he explicitly advances. First, as we saw in §1.6 above, Frege claims that a “fact
is a thought that is true” (1918, 74).71 This appears to be a rejection of facts as entities
distinct from thoughts that make thoughts true, that is to say, truth-makers of thoughts.
Second, the Indefinability argument in “Thought” is directed against defining “truth
as the agreement of a representation with something real” (1918, 60).72 Thus Frege

ut
rejects a correspondence theory of truth.

ey
Let’s start with the characterization of fact as true thought. The context of this
h@ itho
characterization in “Thought” is:

sl
That someone thinks it has nothing to do with the truth of a thought. ‘Facts, facts, facts’ cries
the scientist if he wants to bring home the necessity of a firm foundation for science. What is
a fact? A fact is a thought that is true. But the scientist will surely not acknowledge something
sh ite w
we
to be the firm foundation of science if it depends on men’s varying states of consciousness.
The work of science does not consist in creation, but in the discovery of true thoughts. (T,
74)73

Here Frege is engaged in a polemic against idealism and psychologism, specifically,


against the view that thoughts are psychological entities and someone’s taking a
c

thought to be true makes it true. Against this view, he argues


ie
or not

• Facts are the foundation of science.


• Facts are true thoughts.
• A property whose instantiation depends on mental states is not one that can be
a foundation of science.
o
d.

The implicit conclusion is that the property of truth cannot depend on particular men-
:d

tal states. The important thing to see, for our purposes, is that the characterization of
facts as true thoughts is made alongside the characterization of facts as the foundation
of science. The sense in which they are, I hold, is that science aims at the discovery
aft

of facts. This means that science aims at attaining knowledge of what is the case. A
fact, then, is something which is the case.
nf
Dr

71
Eine Tatsache ist ein Gedanke, der wahr ist.(KS, 359)
72
die Wahrheit als Übereinstimmung einer Vorstellung mit etwas Wirklichem. (KS, 344)
sa

73
Zum Wahrsein eines Gedankens gehort nicht, daB er gedacht werde. ‘Tatsachen! Tatsachen! Tat-
sachen!’ ruft der Naturforscher aus, wenn er die N otwendigkeit einer sicheren Grundlegung der Wis-
senschaft einschärfen will. Was ist eine Tatsache? Eine Tatsache ist ein Gedanke, der wahr ist. Als
sichere Grundlage der Wissenschaft aber wird der Naturforscher sicher nicht etwas anerkennen, was von
den wechselnden Bewußtseinszuständen von Menschen abhängt. Die Arbeit der Wissenschaft besteht
nicht in einem Schaffen, sondern in einem Entdecken von wahren Gedanken. (KS, 359)
86 From Judgment to Amodalism

If this is so, then Frege’s argument clearly depends on a connection between


what is the case and truth. The Recognitional Conception gives us a way of spelling
out the connection. According to this conception, the recognition of what is the case

.e ion
that constitutes judgment is the recognition of what is the case concerning the entities
presented by the senses that compose a thought. I take it that for Frege there is no
discovery of what is the case that is not a judgment. Thus, the discovery of what is
the case in the realm of referents is “mediated” by the realm of senses. Another way

an iss
of putting this point is: the identity of anything that may be discovered in science is

du
fixed by a thought because what is the case is what is represented as so by a thought.
It is only by grasping a thought that a scientist comes to be in a position to discover

m
something.
So, Frege’s claim that a fact is a true thought is not the claim that facts are a

per
special species of thoughts, the true ones. What is the case in the realm of reference
are distinct from thoughts; however, neither is independent of the other. On the one
hand, there is no being the case that isn’t what is represented by some thought. On
the other hand, there is never anything more to the truth of a thought than the holding

ut
of what it represents.
We can make Frege’s view clearer by contrasting it with a view he rejects. That

ey
is the view that a fact is, as it were, a thought-free item in the world such that we
h@ itho
first recognize one of these items as obtaining, and then, independently of this first
recognition, further recognize that this item stands in a relation of agreement with a
sl
thought, and thereby come to recognize that the thought has the property of being true.
This is, of course, the picture underlying one version of the correspondence theory
sh ite w

of truth. Truth-makers are entities independent of truth-bearers. Truth-bearers are


we
made true by standing in some relation to truth-makers. Finally, we recognize that a
truth-bearer is true by recognizing the presence of the truth-maker and by, separately,
recognizing that the truth-maker stands in the relation in question to the truth-bearer.
It is this version of the correspondence theory that Frege sets his face against. Frege’s
view is that there is no such distance between truth-makers and truth-bearers to be
c

bridged by the obtaining of a relation between the two. The obtaining of a truth-maker
ie

is the being true of a truth-bearer, and the recognition of the former is the recognition
or not

of the latter. But this rejection doesn’t rule out the Recognitional Conception; rather,
it is based on the Recognitional Conception.
We can now say what the Indefinability argument comes to on our interpretation.
The target of this argument isn’t really definitions of truth, but rather conceptions of
o

truth that envision a distance between fact and true thought that has to be bridged by
d.

the obtaining of a relation between fact and thought, which is a further fact. Given
:d

such a distance, the recognition of what is the case concerning referents of a thought
is always something less than recognition of the truth of that thought. This disparity is
ruled out by Frege’s insistence that judgment be simultaneously recognition of what
aft

is the case and recognition of the truth of a thought.


nf

2.5.9 The Recognitional Conception and the Reference-Relation


Dr

Proposals
sa

I turn now to compare the foregoing interpretation with the Reference-Relation pro-
posals outlined in §2.4 above. Like my interpretation, those proposals start from the
rejection of the Predication Analysis, that is to say, from accepting that judgment is
fundamentally different from ascribing truth to a thought. On those proposals, the
The Recognitional Conception of Judgment 87

basic conception of judgment remains a cognitive relation to truth, it’s just that truth
is construed as an object rather than a property, so judgment consists in a relation—
acknowledgment—to this object. It is the switch to the acknowledgment of objects

.e ion
that extricates judgment from the regress that dooms the Predication Analysis.
On my interpretation, in contrast, what Frege came to realize, starting in “On
Sense and Reference,” is that judgment is fundamentally not a matter of truth at all.
Rather, at the most basic level, judgment is recognition of what is the case in the realm

an iss
of reference. Many commentators have seen that for Frege recognition of what is the

du
case counts as judgment, and so have ascribed the Predicating is Judging principle to
Frege. My interpretation differs principally in, as it were, expanding this principle to a

m
biconditional—not merely all case of recognition are cases of judging, but in addition,
all cases of judging are cases of recognition—and taking the result to be the base

per
notion of judgment in Frege’s later philosophy. But Frege clearly doesn’t abandon
the idea that judgment does, in some way, have to do with truth. On my reading,
Frege retains this idea through the Supervenience of Truth and of Truth-Predication.
All the Fregean characterizations of judgment as involving truth—acknowledgment

ut
of the truth of a thought, taking the step from a thought to the True, recognizing that
a thought is true—are supervenient on the Recognitional Conception: judgment as

ey
recognition of what is the case concerning referents of a thought. An alternative way
h@ itho
of putting this point is: recognition of what is the case constitutes all these Fregean
varieties of the involvement of truth in judgment. On my interpretation, the regress of
sl
truth-predicating judgments that fells the Predication Analysis is disarmed, because
it turns out to be harmless for the Recognitional Conception: although any judgment
sh ite w

involves an infinity of truth-predicating judgments, those are, not separate and further
we
judgments required to make the initial judgment, but rather supervenient on the initial
judgment.
It should be clear that my interpretation and the Reference-Relation proposals
are not mutually incompatible. On my view, judgment for Frege is indeed a cognitive
relation to an object, the True or the False; it’s just that what it is to stand in this
c

relation is to recognize the obtaining of what a thought represents or to recognize


ie

that the failure to obtain of what a thought represents. Moreover, my reading is also
or not

compatible with taking judgment to be predication. I hold that for Frege judgment is
recognizing or acknowledging that a thought has the property of truth, it’s just that
what it is to attain this recognition is to recognize the obtaining of what a thought
represents. The present interpretation is opposed to the Predication Analysis, but
o

not to judgment as predication of truth: judgment is predicating truth, but it doesn’t


d.

consist in predicating truth.


:d

One final point. My reading avoids the puzzle generated by Reference-Relation


proposals. When applied to the Predicating is Judging principle these proposals im-
ply, for example, that to recognize that Russell has a mustache would be
aft

• to form an intention involving an object that isn’t either Russell or the property
nf

of having been mustached, or


Dr

• to stand in some perception-like relation to a state of a thought


sa

But intuitively it seems that this recognition involves, at the most basic level, a person
and a property, rather than a thought and some third object. On my reading, Frege’s
fundamental conception of judgment conforms exactly to this intuition.
88 From Judgment to Amodalism

2.5.10 Recognition and Acknowledgment


In this subsection, I comment on the relationship between my reading and the ques-

.e ion
tion of what Frege meant by his uses of the verb ‘anerkennen’. This verb was intro-
duced in the sixteenth century to disambiguate two meanings of ‘erkennen’, which
previously had legal and epistemic meanings. Among the legal meanings of ‘erken-
nen’ are to recognize a claim, a decision, or demand. The epistemic meanings include

an iss
recognizing or re-identifying an object and acquisition of propositional knowledge.
‘Anerkennen’ was introduced to take over the legal meanings, while ‘erkennen’ kept

du
the epistemic meanings. In addition, ‘anerkennen’ has the meaning ‘valuing’ or ‘hon-

m
oring’, responding to a value of a thing.74 So the meanings of ‘anerkennen’ do not
match either that of ‘to recognize’ or that of ‘to acknowledge’: both ‘recognize’ and

per
‘acknowledge’ have epistemic, legal, and evaluative meanings, although it is per-
haps less usual to understand ‘acknowledge’ in an epistemic sense.75 Thus I have
followed a practice that is increasingly adopted of uniformly rendering ‘anerkennen’
as ‘acknowledge’ and ‘erkennen’ as ‘recognize’.
It’s not clear that Frege uses ‘anerkennen’ in either of these standard legal and

ut
evaluative meanings. Some five constructions involving ‘anerkennen’ appear in Frege’s

ey
writings:76
h@ itho
1. Acknowledging something as F, or as an F, or as the F. For example,
sl
“When someone comes to know something it is by his acknowledging a thought
as true,” “Eine Erkenntnis kommt dadurch zustande, dass ein Gedanke als
sh ite w

wahr anerkannt wird,” in “Sources of Knowledge,” cited on page 57 above.


we
2. Acknowledging the F-ness of something. For example,
“A judgment for me is not the mere grasping of a thought, but the acknowledg-
ment of its truth,” “Ein Urteil ist mir nicht das bloße Fassen eines Gedankens,
sondern die Anerkennung seiner Wahrheit,” in a footnote in “On Sense and
c

Reference,” cited on page 59 above.


ie

3. Acknowledging the being F of something. For example,


or not

“the acknowledgment of the being true of a thought,” “Die Anerkennung des


Wahrseins eines Gedankens,” in “Negation” (1918, 145).
4. Acknowledging Fs, or an F, or the F. For example,
o

a. “We must acknowledge logically primitive elements that are indefin-


d.

able,” “Wir müssen logische Urelemente anerkennen, die nicht definier-


:d

bar sind,” in “Foundations of Geometry, II” (1906, 301).


b. “These two objects [the True and the False] are acknowledged, if only
implicitly, by anyone who judges at all,” “Diese beiden Gegenstände
aft

werden von jedem, wenn auch nur stillschweigend, anerkannt, der


überhaupt urteilt, der etwas für wahr hält, also auch vom Skeptiker,”
nf

in “On Sense and Reference,” cited on page 59 above.


Dr

5. Acknowledging that p. For example,


sa

74
See Trübners Deutsches Wörterbuch (Mitzka et al., 1956) under the entry ‘anerkennen’, Inwood
(1992, 245), and Textor (2010, 626-627). See Stepanians (1998, 83ff) and Kremer (2000, Section 4) for
discussion of ‘anerkennen’ in the philosophical literature of Frege’s time.
75
See Inwood (1992, 245).
76
I follow Künne (2013). Künne (2010) give a full list of examples.
The Recognitional Conception of Judgment 89

“In this instance, the thought is the sense of a statement and the truth-value
is its referent. In addition, there is the acknowledgment that the truth-value
is the True,” “In diesem Falle ist der Sinn des Satzes der Gedanke und seine

.e ion
Bedeutung der Wahrheitswerth. Dazu kommt dann noch die Anerkennung,
dass der Wahrheitswerth das Wahre sei,” in Foreword of Grundgesetze (1893,
X).

an iss
There is a spectrum of views on, and some scholarly controversies over, how
these Fregean uses of ‘anerkennen’ should be understood. To begin with, note that

du
construction 4 doesn’t appear to express either a legal or an evaluative sense. Rather,

m
it seems to express something like accepting the existence of certain entities, or, in
philosophical terminology, accepting these entities into one’s ontology. So one may
term this the ontic sense of acknowledgment.77 Those proponents of the Reference-

per
Relation proposals who take acknowledgment to be a non-propositional relation to
objects clearly rely on this ontic sense of acknowledgment. They also take the simi-
larity of construction 4 to construction 2 to support taking the ontic sense of acknowl-
edgment to be basic for Frege’s conception of judgment. Construction 1 obviously

ut
suggests that acknowledgment of a thought as true is at least required for acquisi-

ey
tion of knowledge. Some commentators take this to support the claim that for Frege
h@ itho
judgment is the acquisition of knowledge.78 This reading may appear to amount to
taking Frege to use ‘anerkennen’ in the epistemic sense of ‘erkennen’; certainly, it is
sl
unclear how, on this reading, ‘anerkennen’ has either a legal or an evaluative sense.79
Some commentators take Frege’s ‘anerkennen’ to have the legal meaning of accept-
ing a claim, specifically, the claim to truth made by all thoughts.80 Finally, some
sh ite w
we
commentators take Frege’s ‘anerkennen’ to have an evaluative meaning similar to
one explicitly adopted by some of Frege’s contemporary neo-Kantian philosophers:
acknowledgment of truth of a thought is a response to its having a property—truth—
that has a positive value that consists of approval or endorsement of the thought.81
There is something to be said in favor of all of these approaches, however, I will
c

not provide a detailed evaluation of them. Instead, I will outline how Frege’s uses
ie

of ‘anerkennen’ appear from the vantage of the present interpretation, and note how
or not

this perspective incorporates elements of some of these approaches.


On my reading, Frege’s base conception of judgment is expressed in terms of
‘erkennen’, as in the passage from “Thought” discussed on page 73 above: “to rec-
ognize a property of a thing.” As I pointed out above, on this conception making a
judgment is acquiring an item of knowledge. To this extent, my reading agrees with
o
d.

the epistemic reading. However, I’m not committed to holding that ‘anerkennen’
:d

for Frege means the same as ‘erkennen’. Rather, on my view, Frege’s characteri-
zations of judgment in relation to truth draws on both an ontic and a legal sense of
‘anerkennen’.
aft

The ontic sense lies in what I pointed out above: to recognize what a thought
represents as obtaining is also to stand in a cognitive relation to an object, the True.
nf

The legal sense is as follows. To say that a thought represents something about
Dr

77
Following Textor (2010).
78
For example, Ricketts (1996).
sa

79
See Textor (2010, 627-628) for an argument that the legal sense of ‘anerkennen’ does not support an
epistemic construal of construction 2.
80
See Stepanians (1998). For criticism see Textor (2010, 627-628)
81
See Gabriel (1984, 2001, 2003, 2013) for the evaluative interpretation of Frege’s theory of judgment,
as well as accounts of the evaluative theory of judgment in Lotze (1880), Rickert (1892), and Windelband
(1920). For criticism see Textor (2010, 631-633) and Künne (2013, 62).
90 From Judgment to Amodalism

its referents is to say that a thought is a claim about its referents. To recognize what
a thought represents as obtaining, then, is to acknowledge the validity of the claim
which is that thought. This is consistent with an example of a standard use of ‘an-

.e ion
erkennen’ given in Grimms Deutsches Wörterbuch: ‘Das ganze Land erkannte den
König an’, “the whole country acknowledged the king.” Here a person makes a
claim to a title, that of king, and what the country acknowledges is the validity of
that person’s claim to the title. This is not to say that acknowledging the truth of

an iss
a thought is exactly like acknowledging a claim made by a person. A person who

du
makes a claim, say to a title, has a ground to complain and to criticize those that do
not honor the claim, provided that the claim is valid. In contrast, a thought does not

m
make a claim; it is a claim. Moreover, acknowledging the truth of a thought is not
honoring the thought, it is accepting the correctness of that thought. So if someone

per
fails to acknowledge the truth of a thought, say because of lack of interest in what
the thought represents, there is no sense in which that thought would be justified
in lodging a complaint against her. Now, of course, sometimes one recognizes that
what a thought represents does not obtain. On Frege’s view, as we saw above, this

ut
is to acknowledge the truth of the opposite thought. In terms of the legal meaning of
‘anerkennen’, this is to acknowledge the validity of the claim which is that opposite

ey
thought.
h@ itho
Perhaps one might even discern a relation between the legal and the ontic senses.
One might say that to acknowledge the validity of a person’s claim to the title of king
sl
is to acknowledge the title of being king itself, as applying to that person. So to
acknowledge the validity of a thought’s claim to the title of being true is to acknowl-
sh ite w

edge the title of being true itself, as applying to that thought. This would explain how
we
constructions 1-3 may be understood as drawing on the legal sense of ‘anerkennen’.

2.6 Judgment, Judging, Factivity, and Apparent


Thoughts
c
ie

The Recognitional Conception of judgment implies that judgment is factive, because


or not

recognition is factive.82 To make the judgment that p is to recognize that p is the


case, which implies that p is the case. But p’s being the case is what the truth of the
thought that p consists in. Thus, there is no judgment that p unless the thought that p
is true. In terms of the construal of judgment as the acknowledgment of truth, there
o

is no such thing as the acknowledgement of truth of a thought that is not true. The
d.
:d

same holds of falsity. There is no recognition that p is not the case unless p is not
the case. The falsity of the thought that p consists in p’s not being the case. So there
is no judgment that not p, and no acknowledgment of falsity of p, unless the thought
that p is false.
aft

This consequence seems counter-intuitive. It is obvious that we form false be-


liefs and arrive at mistaken conclusions. If these are judgments, then is it not obvious
nf

that there are false judgments, and so judgment is not factive? Does Frege really op-
Dr

pose this intuitive view of judgment? A number of claims Frege makes about judg-
ment throughout his writings suggest that the answer is no, and therefore that the
sa

Recognitional Conception is not, in fact, Frege’s view of judgment.83


82
On this point I agree with Ricketts (1996), Textor (2010), and May (Forthcoming), all of whom take
Frege to accept the factivity of judgment.
83
Kremer (2000) presents a detailed historically-informed argument against the factivity of judgment.
Judgment, Judging, Factivity, and Apparent Thoughts 91

In this section, I first argue that these claim do not undermine the claim that for
Frege judgment is factive, but rather support ascribing to Frege a distinction between
our practice of judging, which is not factive, and judgment, which is factive and is the

.e ion
constitutive aim of judging. I then show how this view of judgment leads to Frege’s
commitment to a doctrine of apparent thoughts (Scheingedanke), thoughts which fail
to fulfill one of the main functions of thought and are not governed by logic.

an iss
2.6.1 Against the Factivity of Fregean Judgment

du
To begin with, throughout his writings Frege seems to equate judging (urteilen) with

m
holding a thought to be true (eine Gedanke fürwahrhalten).
In the early “Logic” Frege argues for a distinction between those “grounds on

per
which we make a judgment” which “justify our acknowledging it as true” and those
grounds which “merely lead or determine us to judging, without containing a justi-
fication” (1979, 2)84 The non-justifying grounds are then characterized as “causes
[Ursachen] which merely give rise to judging” and “are just as capable of leading

ut
to error as of leading to truth” (1979, 2; emphasis mine).85 Frege gives an example
of such causes leading to judging: how a farmer comes to believe that the weather

ey
is connected with the phases of the moon, and then says “[c]learly such an account
h@ itho
of how men have come to hold something to be true [etwas für wahr angenommen]
is no proof” (1979, 3; emphases mine).86 So here Frege appears to equate “causes
sl
which lead to judging” with “how men have come to hold something to be true,” and
to hold that some cases of judging are in “error,” which presumably means that they
sh ite w

result in falsehoods.
we
Similar claims appear in later texts. In the passage from “On Sense and Refer-
ence” quoted on page 59 above Frege writes that the two truth-values are acknowl-
edged by “anyone who judges at all, who holds something to be true.” In his polemics
against psychologism in the Foreword of Grundgesetze Frege claims that for psycho-
logical logicians “truth is reduced to the taking to be true (Fürwahrhalten) of indi-
c

viduals” (1893, V),87 and specifies his difference from psychological logicians as
ie

follows: “For me, truth is something objective, independent of the judging subject,
or not

for psychological logicians, it is … only a general acknowledgement by those who


judge …” (1893, XVII-XVIII).88 This suggests that judging consists in “acknowl-
edgment of truth,” which in turn is “taking to be true.”89 Finally in “Thought” Frege
o
d.

In the following, I am very much indebted to this paper, even though I do not agree with Kremer’s con-
:d

clusions.
84
Die Grunde unseres Urteilens können zur Anerkennung der Wahrheit berechtigen; sie können uns
aber auch nur zum Urteilen veranlassen oder bestimmen, ohne eine Rechtfertigung zu enthalten. (1969,
2)
aft

85
Die zum Urteilen nur veranlassenden Ursachen tun dies nach psychologischen Gesetzen; sie können
ebenso wohl zum Irrtum wie zur Wahrheit führen ….(1969, 2)
nf

86
Offenbar ist eine solche Erzahlung, wie es zugegangen ist, dass Menschen etwas für wahr angenom-
men haben, kein Beweis …. (1969, 3)
Dr

87
So wird … dieWahrheit auf das Fürwahrhalten der Einzelnen zurückgeführt.
88
Für mich [das Wahre] ist es etwas Objectives, von dem Urtheilenden Unabhängiges, für psycholo-
sa

gische Logiker ist es … nur eine allgemeine Anerkennung der Urtheilenden ….


89
See also the 1897 “Logic,” in which Frege claims that on a psychological conception the laws of
logic are “laws in accordance with which judging, at least in normal cases, takes place, can be nothing but
laws for holding something to be true, not laws of truth.” (1979, 146); “Gesetze, nach denen das Urteilen,
wenigstens normalerweise, vor sich geht, können immer nur Gesetze des Fürwahrhaltens sein, nicht aber
Gesetze des Wahrseins” (1969, 158).
92 From Judgment to Amodalism

states that thoughts act on us by “being grasped and held true [für wahr gehalten]”
(1918, 76).90 He illustrates this claim with an account of how acknowledgment of
the Pythagorean theorem as true affects one’s actions, which, he says, is “how our

.e ion
actions are usually led up to by thinking and judging [Urteilen]” (1918, 77).91
Moreover, in texts after the early “Logic” Frege also appears to characterize
certain judgments as erroneous or incorrect, and so false. In “Thought” Frege urges
that we should “venture to judge about things in the external world … even at the risk

an iss
of error if we do not want to fall into far greater dangers. (1918, 73).92 In “Sources

du
of Knowledge” he writes,

m
A sense impression is not in itself a judgment, but becomes important in that it can lead us
to judging. Then mistakes can occur, sense-illusions. [B]ut we no longer let ourselves by

per
deceived, because there are at our disposal a diversity of means for correcting the judgment
gained from the first impression. (1979, 267-268; emphases mine)93

There is another set of texts that seem to point away from factivity. It is well-known
that Frege stresses the independence of truth from the acknowledgment of truth. In

ut
the Foreword of Grundgesetze, he says, “being true is independent of being acknowl-
edged by anyone” (1893, XVI).94 In “Thought” he writes, “[w]hat I acknowledge as

ey
true, I judge to be true quite apart from my acknowledging its truth or even thinking
h@ itho
about it. That someone thinks it has nothing to do with the truth of a thought” (1918,
74).95
sl
What is significant for our purposes is that Frege appears at times to argue for
this independence on the basis that we can make mistakes. For example, in the early
sh ite w

“Logic” he writes, “What is true is true independently of our acknowledgment. We


we
can make mistakes” (1979, 2).96 And in the 1897 “Logic” Frege says, “truth is in-
dependent of our acknowledgment as true …. With truth error is possible” (1979,
131-132; emphases mine).97 If judgment is the acknowledgment of truth and is also
factive, then acknowledgment of truth is not fully independent of truth: acknowledg-
ment of truth implies truth. So the independence on which Frege insists would have
c

to be: that a thought is true does not imply that anyone acknowledges it as true. But
ie

this seems to be a matter of our being ignorant, not our making mistakes.
or not

2.6.2 For the Factivity of Fregean Judgment


However, there is also textual evidence that for Frege judgment is factive.
o

First of all, Frege tends to use ‘anerkennen’ and ‘Urteil’ in the case of truths
d.

and ‘fürwahrhalten’ in the case of falsehoods or possible falsehoods. An instance is


:d

90
Wie wirkt ein Gedanke? Dadurch, daß er gefaßt und für wahr gehalten wird.
91
So werden unsere Taten gewohnlich durch Denken und Urteilen vorbereitet.
92
Dennoch ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit auch hierbei in vielen Fallen von der Gewißheit kaum zu unter-
aft

scheiden, so daß wir es wagen konnen, über die Dinge der Außenwelt zu urteilen. Und wir müssen das
sogar wagen auf die Gefahr des Irrtums hin, wenn wir nicht weit großeren Gefahren erliegen wollen.
93
nf

Der Sinneseindruck ist noch kein Urteil, wird aber dadurch wichtig, dass er uns zu Urteilen veran-
lasst. Dabei können Fehler vorkommen, Sinnestäuschungen. [A]ber wir lassen uns nicht mehr tauschen,
Dr

weil uns mannigfaltige Mittel zur Berichtigung des durch den ersten Eindruck gewonnenen Urteils zu
Gebote stehen. (1969, 286-287)
sa

94
das Wahrsein unabhängig davon ist, dass es von irgendeinem anerkannt wird
95
Was ich als wahr anerkenne, von dem urteile ich, daß es wahr sei ganz unabhängig von meiner
Anerkennung seiner Wahrheit, auch unabhängig davon, ob ich daran denke.
96
Was wahr ist, ist wahr unabhängig von unserer Anerkennung. Wir können irren. (1969, 2)
97
das Wahre unabhängig von unserer Anerkennung wahr ist …. Beim Wahren ist ein Irrtum möglich
…. (1969, 143)
Judgment, Judging, Factivity, and Apparent Thoughts 93

Frege’s discussion in the early “Logic” of non-justifying and justifying grounds for
a judgment, which we considered above. Recall that Frege gives an example of how
“judging” is merely caused and so may lead to error, and then apparently equates

.e ion
this “judging” with “holding something to be true.” Frege continues by mention-
ing the type of justifying grounds that concerns logic: “the grounds which justify
the acknowledgment of a truth often reside in other truths which have already been
acknowledged” (1979, 3; emphasis mine)98

an iss
Second, recall from 1.5 that Frege holds that one can only draw inferences from

du
true premises and that an inference consists of making a judgment on the basis of
having made other judgments. So to infer is to acknowledge a thought as true on

m
the basis of acknowledging other thoughts as true. These views appear to require the
factivity of judgment. Suppose that judgment is not factive, so that there is such a

per
thing as acknowledging a false thought as true. It follows that it is open for there
to be acknowledgments of thoughts as true based on previous acknowledgments as
true of false thoughts. But such acknowledgments would be inferences from false
premises, which Frege rules out.

ut
Finally, as we saw above, in “Sources of Knowledge” Frege claims that acquir-
ing knowledge is achieved by “acknowledging a thought as true.”

ey
h@ itho
2.6.3 Judging vs. Judgment; Holding True vs. Acknowledgment of
Truth sl
The texts we have examined suggests that Frege is operating with two distinct if
sh ite w

closely related notions of judgment and of acknowledgment.


we
I propose to disambiguate these Fregean notions using in terms of two distinc-
tions: between judgment and judging, and between acknowledgment and acknowl-
edging or holding as true.99 I do not claim that Frege observes this distinction strictly;
rather, I claim that it makes sense of the fact that Frege appears sometimes to take
judgment as factive and sometimes not.
c

Judging is a cognitive act performed by particular subjects with thoughts that


ie

they grasp. An act of judging consists in attempting to recognize the obtaining or not
or not

obtaining of what a grasped thought represents; it is thus an attempt to acknowledge


the truth or the falsity of that thought. Such an attempt consists in the judger’s holding
that what that thought represents obtains, or fails to obtain. Hence it is the judger’s
holding that thought as true.
o

An act of judging is an attempt, and so it has a goal: recognition of the obtain-


d.
:d

ing or otherwise of what a grasped thought represents. Hence the goal also is the
acknowledgment of the truth or the falsity of a thought. This goal constitutes the
activity of judging: nothing counts as such a cognitive act unless it aims at reaching
the goal. The performance of an act of judging does not imply that that act succeeds
aft

in reaching the goal. If it does, then the judger has made a judgment. That is to say,
she has attained an acknowledgment of a thought as true.
nf

The judging/judgment and the holding true/acknowledgment distinctions go some


Dr

way to account for Frege’s tendency to use ‘anerkennen’ and ‘Urteil’ in the case of
truths and ‘fürwahrhalten’ in the case of falsehoods or possible falsehoods. In gen-
sa

98
Die Grunde nun, welche die Anerkennung einer Wahrheit rechtfertigen, liegen oft in anderen schon
anerkannten Wahrheiten.(1969, 3)
99
I owe the former distinction to Robert May, who develops it in much more detail in a forthcoming
book on Frege. Closely connected distinctions are also proposed in Ricketts (1996) and Textor (2010).
94 From Judgment to Amodalism

eral, to mention acts of judging by particular subjects, Frege tends to use the verb
‘urteilen’, the verbal noun ‘das Urteilen’, the verb ‘fürwahrhalten’, and, less fre-
quently, the verb ‘anerkennen’. In contrast, he tends to use the nouns ‘das Urteil’

.e ion
and ‘das Anerkennung’ to refer to cases of judgment or acknowledgment, that is to
say, of success in judging or in holding as true. There is, however, an exception to the
latter tendency: constructions such as ‘unser Anerkennung’, which implies a relation
to cognitive subjects, are sometimes used to refer to acts of judging.

an iss
If an act of judging fails to attain its goal, then the judger has, of course, failed to

du
make a judgment; but, it doesn’t follow that she has not judged. She will have, rather,
made a mistake in judging; she will have performed an act of judging that counts as a

m
failure when evaluated with respect to the norm—recognizing what is the case—that
defines the activity of judging. This accounts for the cases in which Frege seems

per
to take judgment to be non-factive. These are cases of judging, acknowledging, or
holding as true performed by particular subjects, and so they may be mistaken; when
these mistakes occur the thought judged, acknowledged or held as true is false.
It may be useful to compare the activity of judging with a description of archery.

ut
The goal of that activity is to hit the target with an arrow by shooting it at the target.
Put differently, the goal is the hitting of the target by shooting an arrow at it. Each

ey
act of an archer aims at that goal, at being a hitting of the target. But it doesn’t follow
h@ itho
that archers don’t miss. A miss is obviously not a hitting of the target, but it remains
an act of archery, an act that counts as a failure when evaluated with respect to the
sl
norm—hitting the target by shooting an arrow—that defines the activity of archery.100
The judging/judgment distinction enables us to answer the question raised in
sh ite w

§2.1 above: what is an activity of aiming to make judgments? It is the activity of


we
judging, and so for Frege what it means for science to strive for truth is that science
is a goal-directed activity aimed at recognizing what is the case.

2.6.4 The Independence of Truth from Acknowledgment of Truth


c

I now turn back to consider Frege’s linking error with the independence of truth from
ie

our acknowledgment as true. As I have already noted, there are cases of erroneous
or not

judging, but no cases of erroneous judgment. So, from the existence of error, it fol-
lows that judging does not imply truth. Indeed, the existence of error is a ground for
holding that judging doesn’t imply judgment. If we look at Frege’s texts again, we
see that in both the early and the 1897 “Logic” he connects error with the indepen-
o

dence of truth from our acknowledgment, that is to say, from our acts of judging.
d.

Now, the fact of our ignorance means that a thought’s representing something that is
:d

the case doesn’t imply that we even attempt to recognize that it is the case. So acts
of judging are two-way independent of truth, while judgment is only not implied by
truth.
aft

I want to mention one further way of reading these passages on error. A fuller
context of the 1897 passage is this:
nf
Dr

[T]ruth is independent of our acknowledgment as true, but beauty is only for the one who ex-
periences something as beautiful. What is beautiful for one person is not necessarily beautiful
sa

for another. There is no disputing tastes. With truth error is possible, but not with beauty.
Something is beautiful for me by the very fact that I hold it to be beautiful. But something

100
A comparison between judgment and hitting a target is also developed, but in a rather different way,
in Kremer (2000).
Judgment, Judging, Factivity, and Apparent Thoughts 95

need not be true by the fact that I hold it to be true; and if it is not true in itself, it is not true
for me either. (1979, 131-132; emphases mine)101

.e ion
In this passage, Frege isolates a distinctive feature of truth by contrast to beauty.
Something’s being beautiful is, on Frege’s account, constituted by it’s being taken
to be beautiful by someone.102 This constitution claim clearly means that beauty is
not independent of being held beautiful: if something is beautiful, then it is held to

an iss
be so by someone, and if someone holds it to be beautiful, then it is beautiful. But
the constitution claim also leads to two further claims about the beautiful: (a) no

du
subject is ever mistaken in holding something to be beautiful, and (b) no subject is

m
ever ignorant about the beauty of anything. Frege holds that this constitution claim
fails for truth. A thought’s being true does not consist in its being held as true by

per
anyone. This clearly means that we may hold false thoughts as true. It also means
that there may be thoughts that are true without anyone taking them to be true, and
so, by the same token, anyone successfully taking them to be true. That is to say, the
failure of the constitution claim for truth underlies erroneous judgings and the limited
reach of judgments, which is what our ignorance consists in.

ut
ey
2.6.5 A Letter to Jourdain
h@ itho
In this sub-section, I apply the judging/judgment distinction to a particularly puzzling
text of Frege’s. sl
This occurs in a draft of a letter to Jourdain, who in 1914 had sent Frege some
questions along with a request for permission to translate parts of the Grundgesetze.
sh ite w
we
One question is clearly prompted by Wittgenstein, in whose “Notes on Logic” we
find: “The assertion-sign is logically quite without significance. It only shows, in
Frege and Whitehead and Russell, that these authors hold the propositions so indi-
cated to be true” (1979, 103, Third Manuscript). Jourdain asks Frege “whether you
now regard assertion ( ) as merely psychological” (1980, 78). Frege replies:
c

Certainly judging (or acknowledging as true) is an inner mental process; but that something
ie

is true is independent of the recognizing subject (das Erkennenden), is objective. If I assert


or not

something as true, I do not want to talk about myself, about a process in my mind. And in order
to understand it one does not need to know who asserted it. Whoever understands a sentence
uttered with asserting force adds to it his acknowledgment of the truth. If a sentence uttered
with asserting force expresses a false thought, then it is logically useless and strictly speaking,
incomprehensible (unverständlich). (1980, 78-79; emphases mine)103
o
d.

Frege’s response is quite puzzling. He seems to claim that to understand someone


:d

who makes an assertion one has to do much more than grasp the thought expressed
101
das Wahre unabhängig von unserer Anerkennung wahr ist, dass aber das Schöne nur für den schön
ist, der es als solches empfindet. Was dem Einen schön ist, ist es nicht notwendig dem Anderen. Über
aft

den Geschmack ist nicht zu streiten. Beim Wahren ist ein Irrtum möglich, nicht aber beim Schönen. Eben
dadurch, dass ich etwas für schön halte, ist es für mich schön. Darum aber, dass ich etwas für wahr halte,
nf

braucht es nicht wahr zu sein; und wenn es nicht an sich wahr ist, ist es auch nicht für mich wahr. (1969,
Dr

143)
102
I am of course here not concerned to evaluate this claim about beauty, which I find questionable.
103
Gewiss ist das Urteilen (das als wahr Anerkennen) ein innerer seelischer Vorgang; aber dass etwas
sa

wahr ist, ist unabhängig vom Erkennenden, ist objektiv. Wenn ich etwas als wahr behaupte, will ich nicht
von mir sprechen, von einem Vorgange in meiner Seele. Und um es zu verstehen, braucht man nicht zu
wissen, wer es behauptet. Wer den Satz, der mit behauptender Kraft ausgesprochen wird, versteht, der fügt
seine Anerkennung der Wahrheit hinzu. Wenn ein Satz, der mit behauptender Kraft ausgesprochen wird,
einen falschen Gedanken ausdrückt, so ist er logisch unbrauchbar und, genau genommen, unverständlich.
(1969, 126-127)
96 From Judgment to Amodalism

by the sentence used to make the assertion. One has to adopt the speaker’s attitude
towards the thought, namely, acknowledge it as true. And, the thought has to be true.
So it seems that according to Frege I cannot understand your assertion if it is false.

.e ion
We can make better sense of Frege’s response by beginning with the fact that
he is replying to Wittgenstein’s charge that Frege’s assertion sign expresses nothing
more than someone’s holding a thought to be true. Frege’s reply is that although
judging is a psychological process, recognition of the truth of a thought is objective,

an iss
which means that recognition of truth is independent of the subject who recognizes.

du
We can read this in terms of the acknowledgment/holding true distinction. What
Frege here calls recognition of truth is acknowledgment of truth, a state that may be

m
attained by any subject, but it is not attained merely by a subject’s taking a thought
to be true. I take Frege to be claiming here that this is a state that exists even if no

per
subject attains it. So if acknowledgment of truth is expressed by assertion, and to
understand an assertion is to know what acknowledgment of truth it expresses, then
to understand an assertion one does not have to know who made the assertion, only
the subject-independent acknowledgment expressed. Now suppose

ut
• NN utters an assertoric sentence S,

ey
• I grasp the thought T that sentence expresses,
h@ itho
• I take the context of utterance to be assertoric (i.e., NN is sincere, this is not a
sl
stage performance, etc., so utterances of assertoric sentences are apt for making
assertions), but,
• I take T to be false.
sh ite w
we
Then I am precluded from taking NN’s speech act to express recognition of the truth
of T. I have to take NN to have held T as true, rather than recognized T to be true.
Understanding this speech act requires taking it to express something having to do
with the psychological processes of a specific subject, NN. So I am precluded from
taking NN’s speech act to express a judgment. But we take the utterance of an asser-
c

toric sentence in an assertoric context to be an assertion, and an assertion to express


ie

a judgment. That is to say, in trying to understand NN I’m pulled in two directions:


or not

on the one hand, the falsity of T implies that NN’s utterance of S does not express a
judgment; on the other hand, utterances of S in assertoric contexts are expressions of
judgments. This is why Frege says that “strictly speaking” I don’t understand NN’s
speech act.
o
d.
:d

2.6.6 Apparent Thoughts


The Recognitional Conception of judgment, together with its distinction from judg-
ing, lead to the main basis of amodalism: Frege’ view of “apparent thoughts” (Schein-
aft

gedanken). In “On Sense and Reference” he claims that a “thought loses value for
us as soon as we recognize that the reference of one of its parts is missing” (1892,
nf

163).104 In the 1897 “Logic” he calls singular terms expressing senses without ref-
Dr

erents “apparent proper names” (Scheineigenname). About such names, Frege says
that they
sa

fail to fulfil the usual role of a proper name, which is to name something, [and] may be called
apparent proper names [Scheineigenname]. Although the tale of William Tell is a legend and
104
Der Gedanke verliert für uns an Wert, sobald wir erkennen, daß zu einem seiner Teile die Bedeutung
fehlt. (KS 149)
Judgment, Judging, Factivity, and Apparent Thoughts 97

not history and the name ‘William Tell’ is an apparent proper name, we cannot deny it a sense.
But the sense of the sentence ‘William Tell shot an apple off his son’s head’ is no more true
than is that of the sentence ‘William Tell did not shoot an apple off his son’s head’. I do not

.e ion
say, however, that this sense is false either, but pronounce it fiction [Dichtung]. ….
Instead of speaking of ‘fiction’, we could speak of ‘apparent thoughts’ [Scheingedan-
ken]. Thus if the sense of an assertoric sentence is not true, it is either false or fictitious, and
it will generally be the latter if it contains an apparent proper name. The writer [Dichtkunst]

an iss
… has his eye on appearance [den Schein]. Assertions in fiction are not to be taken seriously:
they are only apparent assertions. Even the thoughts are not to be taken seriously as in the

du
sciences: they are only apparent thoughts. ….

m
The logician does not have to bother with apparent thoughts, just as a physicist, who sets
out to investigate thunder, will not pay any attention to stage-thunder. (1897, 130)105

per
The Recognitional Conception of judgment underlies this view of apparent thoughts.
Let’s consider the simpler example given earlier, the sentence
(17) Costaguana is a monarchy

ut
If this sentence expresses a thought, its components are the sense of ‘Costaguana’

ey
and the sense of ‘ξ is a monarchy’. This thought then represents the object, call it c,
h@ itho
that is the referent of Costaguana as falling under the concept, call it Mξ, that is the
referent of ‘ξ is a monarchy’. To make the judgment that Costaguana is a monarchy
sl
is to recognize that c falls under Mξ. But there is no such thing as c. Hence there is
no such thing as c’s falling under Mξ, and so no such thing as recognizing that c falls
under Mξ. That is to say, there is no such thing as making the judgment that Costa-
sh ite w
we
guana is a monarchy, and so no such thing as recognizing the truth of the thought
that Costaguana is a monarchy. By parity of reasoning, there is no such thing as
recognizing that c fails to fall under Mξ, that is to say, no making the judgment that
Costaguana is not a monarchy, nor recognizing the falsity of the thought that Costa-
guana is a monarchy. There is no judgment of the thought expressed by (17), nor a
c

judgment of the opposite of this thought. Since for Frege logic, the laws of truth,
ie

essentially govern judgments, these unjudgeable thoughts are not governed by logic.
or not

In the 1897 “Logic” Frege goes further than these conclusions. There he claims
that these “thoughts” are only apparently thoughts. They are really no more thoughts
than stage-thunder is thunder. This suggests that for Frege, to qualify as a thought,
something would have to be judgeable, have to be within the governance of logic. A
composition of senses expressed by a sentence which fails to determine a truth-value,
o
d.

and so is not judgeable, may seem exactly like a thought, but isn’t, in fact, a thought
:d

at all. The consequence of these conclusions for the distinction between judging and
judgment is that while we can indulge in acts of judging apparent thoughts, such acts
105
Namen, die den Zweck verfehlen, den ein Eigenname zu haben pflegt, nämlich etwas zu benennen,
aft

mögen Scheineigennamen heissen. Obwohl die Erzählung von Tell eine Sage und keine Geschichte ist,
und der Name ‘Tell’ ein Scheineigenname ist, können wir dieser doch nicht jeden Sinn absprechen; aber
nf

der Sinn des Satzes ‘Tell schoss seinem Sohne einen Apfel vom Kopfe’ ist ebensowenig wahr wie der des
Dr

Satzes ‘Tell schoss nicht seinem Sohne einen Apfel vom Kopfe’. Aber ich sage auch nicht, dass der Sinn
falsch sei, sondern erkläre ihn für Dichtung. ….
Statt ‘Dichtung” könnten wir auch ‘Scheingedanke’ sagen. Wenn der Sinn eines Behauptungssatzes also
sa

nicht wahr ist, so ist er entweder falsch oder Dichtung, und dies letzte ist er im Allgemeinen, wenn ein
Scheineigenname darin vorkommt. Die Dichtkunst hat es … auf den Schein abgesehen. Die Behauptungen
sind in der Dichtung nicht ernst zu nehmen: es sind nur Scheinbehauptungen. Auch die Gedanken sind
nicht ernst zu nehmen wie in der Wissenschaft: es sind nur Scheingedanken. ….
Um die Scheingedanken braucht sich die Logik nicht zu kümmern, wie auch der Physiker, der das
Gewitter erforschen will, das Bühnengewitter unbeachtet lassen wird. (1969, 141-2)
98 From Judgment to Amodalism

never succeed. There are no judgments of apparent thoughts, only of truth-valued


thoughts.
This text is the place where Frege comes closest to explicitly denying that com-

.e ion
positions of senses that fail to determine truth-values are thoughts. In “Introduction to
Logic” he merely expresses doubt that such compositions are thoughts: “A sentence
containing a proper name without reference is neither true nor false; if it expresses a
thought at all, then that thought belongs to fiction” (1906, 194).106 Elsewhere Frege

an iss
emphasizes that these thoughts have no value for science and are not of concern to

du
logic. Frege is pulled in different directions by two roles played by the notion of
thought. On the one hand, acts of judging require grasp of thoughts. If so, it seems

m
hard to deny that two acts of judging, one of which involves a component sense with-
out reference and the other doesn’t, both require grasp of a thought, even if one act

per
can succeed in a judgment and the other cannot. On the other hand, there is no judg-
ment of a composition of senses or of the “opposite” of such a composition if it does
not determine a truth-value. These compositions of senses are then not governed by
logic. So I take the Apparent Thoughts Thesis to be that if a composition of senses

ut
fails to determine a truth-value, then it’s radically defective as a thought: it fails to
fulfill one of the main roles played by thoughts, even if it does fulfill the other main

ey
role.107
h@ itho
I would like to note that the route to this thesis does not depend on the so-called
“object-dependent” view of sense.108 Our argument isn’t committed to the claim that
sl
senses are ways of thinking of objects and concepts, so that in the absence of an ob-
ject or concept there is no way of thinking of one and so no sense. Frege does not say
sh ite w

that apparent names don’t have senses; he doesn’t even say that they express only
we
apparent senses. He only says that they fail to fulfill the “usual role” of names. This
role is to contribute to determining truth-values for those compositions of senses ex-
pressed by sentences containing those names. That is to say, this role is to contribute
to the expression of genuine thoughts. Names without referents fail to play a role
in determining a truth-value for the composition of senses expressed by sentences
c

containing them, compositions of which their senses are parts. In failing to play this
ie

role, these names and their senses ensure that these compositions of senses are not
or not

genuine thoughts. It is for this reason that they are merely apparent names. One
might, indeed, think of this as yet another aspect of Frege’s Context Principle: only
in the context of a sentence, in the context of the expression of a judgeable thought,
can an expression be a name; an expression that fails to contribute to the expression
o

of a judgeable thought may look just like a name, but is at best a defective one, if it
d.

is a name at all.
:d

2.7 The Basic Argument for Amodalism


aft

The simplest version of the argument is a straightforward application of the Apparent


nf

Thoughts Thesis. The basis of the Thesis is that thoughts, properly speaking, have to
Dr

be judgeable. A genuine thought has to be such that, by grasping it, one is in a position
to aim at recognizing what it represents as obtaining, or as not obtaining. But now, if
sa

106
Ein Satz, der einen bedeutungslosen Eigennamen enthält, ist weder wahr noch falsch; der Gedanke,
den er etwa ausdrückt, gehört der Dichtung an. Frege (NS, 211)
107
I’m grateful to Warren Goldfarb for pressing me to clarify my conception of the Apparent Thoughts
Thesis.
108
See Evans (1982)
The Basic Argument for Amodalism 99

something which is supposed to be a thought does not represent anything that obtains
or anything that fails to obtain, then there is no such thing as achieving the constitutive
aim of judging by grasping such a purported thought. Hence compositions of senses

.e ion
that don’t determine truth-values on account of containing components that don’t
determine references are apparent thoughts, structures of senses that are graspable
like genuine thoughts but lack an essential feature of proper thoughts. We can judge
these defective thoughts, but there are no judgments of them. But if a purported

an iss
thought is true or false only relative to a time, place, or possible world, then by itself

du
it fails to determine a truth-value. It follows that it a defective apparent thought.
We can elaborate this simple argument by considering the temporalist’s view of

m
the thought expressed by

per
(6) France is a monarchy
The temporalist position is that this thought, call it T, is at present false but was true
in 1788. Now, what are the components of T? To discuss this matter, I introduce a bit
of notation: two signs, ‘╒ ’ and ‘╕ ’, modeled on quotation marks. I’ll write ╒ France╕

ut
to refer to the sense of the proper name ‘France’ and ╒ ξ is a monarchy╕ to refer to

ey
the sense of the concept-expression ‘ξ is a monarchy’.109
h@ itho
The temporalist presumably takes these to be the only components of T. He
presumably also holds that
• ╒


sl
France╕ determines an object, call it f, as its referent.
• ξ is a monarchy╕ determines a concept, call it Mξ, as its referent.
sh ite w
we
From Frege’s perspective the temporalist holds:
• T represent f as falling under Mξ.
• T is true in 1788, and this consists in f’s falling under Mξ in 1788
c

• T is false in 2016, and this consists in f’s not falling under Mξ in 2016
ie

• T is not either true or false except with respect to a time


or not

From Frege’s perspective, what the last claim amounts to is


Except with respect to a time, there is no such thing as f’s falling under Mξ or
f’s not falling under Mξ.
o
d.

But, according to the temporalist, f and Mξ are the referents of the only senses that
:d

make up T. It follows that T, by itself, fails to represent anything whose obtaining


may be recognized and, equally, fails to represent anything whose failure to obtain
may be recognized. There is then no judgment of T, nor judgment of the opposite of
aft

T.
It follows that T, as the temporalist conceives of it, has exactly the same features
nf

as the composition of senses, call it T′ expressed by


Dr

(17) Costaguana is a monarchy


sa

109
This notation is adapted from Kaplan (1969, 214): “Let us symbolize Frege’s understanding of quota-
tion marks by using forward and backward capital F’s. (Typographical limitations have forced elimination
of the center horizontal bar of the capital F’s.)” Not faced with the same typographical limitations, I have
restored the center horizontal.
100 From Judgment to Amodalism

Neither T nor T′ have component senses that enable them to represent anything that
can obtain or fail to obtain. So temporalism implies that sentences such as (6) express
apparent thoughts. Temporalism, that is to say, implies that (6) is fiction. But (6) is

.e ion
not fiction. Hence temporalism about (6) is mistaken. (6) does not express a thought
that has a truth-value only relative to a time. Rather, Frege holds, the genuine, non-
fictional thought that (6) expresses has more than f and Mξ as components. This is
why Frege claims about sentences like (6) that “without a time indication we have no

an iss
complete thought,” adding, “i.e., we have no thought at all.”

du
The foregoing argument does not, however, show that senses, in general, do not
determine referents relative to time, place, or circumstance.110 In order to reach that

m
more general conclusion, we appeal to a part of Frege’s theory of how the truth-value
of a thought is determined by the senses out of which that thought is composed. We’ll

per
consider only those thoughts which Frege characterize as “something is asserted of
an object” (1906, 187). According to Frege, the “sentence expressing such a thought
is composed of a proper name—and this corresponds to the complete part of the
thought—and a predicative part, which corresponds to the unsaturated part of the

ut
thought” (1906, 187). Each of these parts of the sentence expresses a sense. The
sense of the proper name presents the object that the thought is about; the sense of

ey
the predicative part presents a concept, which is a function from objects to truth-
h@ itho
values. The truth-value of the thought is determined as the value of this function for
the object as argument.
sl
Let’s apply this theory to our variation on Frege’s example, the sentence
sh ite w

(22) Yggdrasil is covered with leaves


we
Suppose that the proper name part of (22) is ‘Yggdrasil’, and the predicative part
of (22) is the incomplete expression ‘ξ is covered by leaves’. According to Frege’s
theory, the truth-value of this thought is the value of the function presented by ╒ ξ is
covered by leaves╕ for the tree presented by ╒ Yggdrasil╕ as argument.
Now, how are we to understand the temporalist’s claim that the thought ex-
c

pressed by (22), call it TY , has different truth-values at different times? TY is com-


ie

posed of ╒ Yggdrasil╕ and ╒ ξ is covered by leaves╕ , and TY ’s truth-value is deter-


or not

mined as the value of the function determined by ╒ ξ is covered by leaves╕ for the
argument that is the object determined by ╒ Yggdrasil╕ . Now, a function has no more
than one value for each argument. Hence, in order for TY to be true at one time and
false at another, at least one of ╒ Yggdrasil╕ and ╒ ξ is covered by leaves╕ has to
o

determine different referents at different times. Let’s say that at least one of these
d.
:d

senses has a time-varying-reference, with the variation of reference determined by a


temporal parameter or index. For the sake of definiteness let’s suppose that it’s the
predicative sense ╒ ξ is covered by leaves╕ that has a time-varying reference. Now,
given that this sense doesn’t determine a function independent of a time, a structure
aft

of senses consisting of ╒ Yggdrasil╕ and ╒ ξ is covered by leaves╕ doesn’t determine


a truth-value independent of a time. Hence, by Frege’s Apparent Thoughts Thesis,
nf

this composition of senses does not qualify as a genuine thought. It is, at best, an
Dr

apparent thought. Indeed, no proper thoughts, only apparent thoughts, are composed
of time-varying-reference senses. Once again, on Frege’s view, there is no genuine
sa

thought at all without a time indication. So the temporalist is under an illusion when
she supposes that there is a single thought, TY , with different truth-values at different
times; no genuine thought has this feature.
110
I’m grateful to Gary Ebbs for urging me to make clear why the following argument is needed.
A Concluding Remark 101

The extension of this argument to metaphysical amodalism is straightforward.


Suppose that a structure of senses contains a sense with a world-varying reference,
so the variation of the arguments or the function denoted by that sense depends on a

.e ion
possible (state of the) world index. Then, just as in the temporal case, this structure of
senses doesn’t by itself determine a truth-value, and so is not a genuine thought. There
are of course all sorts of questions about what a possible world is, and about whether
the world index on which reference depends is the world containing the utterer, or the

an iss
world the utterer is describing. But no matter how these issues are sorted out, so long

du
as a thought is conceived of as a composition of senses which together determine the
truth-value of that thought, if the references of these senses vary across worlds, then a

m
composition of these senses does not determine a truth-value and so is not a genuine
thought. There is no such thing as a single genuine thought, a judgeable, that is true

per
with respect to some worlds and false with respect to others, and the metaphysical
modalist who supposes that there are such thoughts is as much under an illusion as
the temporalist is. If moreover, we adopt the analysis of being necessarily true as
being true with respect to all possible worlds, then we may conclude that there is no

ut
distinction between true thoughts and necessarily true ones; given a parallel analysis
of necessary falsity, there is no distinction between false thoughts and necessarily

ey
false ones.
h@ itho
In terms of this argument, we can rehabilitate the third unsuccessful argument
for amodalism discussed at the end of §1.6. That argument relies on the claim that
sl
for Frege circumstances are not truth-makers of thoughts because they are nothing
more than true thoughts, and fails because this claim is consistent with taking the
sh ite w

truth of thoughts to be relative. From our present vantage point, we can see that
we
although Frege isn’t opposed to taking the obtaining of circumstances to constitute
the truth of thoughts, nevertheless the modalist assumption that circumstances obtain
or fail to obtain relative to time, place, or possible world is mistaken. From Frege’s
perspective, this is not a coherent conception of circumstances.
The notion of circumstance is constrained by a connection with judgment and
c

thought: whatever circumstances might be, it is by recognition of the obtaining of


ie

the circumstance represented by a thought that one makes a judgment, which to say,
or not

acquires a piece of knowledge about the referents of that thought. On the modalist
conception a circumstance may obtain at one time but not another, so the thought that
represents this circumstance as obtaining is true at one time but false at another. But
the circumstance represented involves the referents of parts of that thought. So for
o

the circumstance to obtain or fail to obtain only relative to a time is for the thought,
d.

by itself, to fail to represent a circumstance about the referent of its parts that either
:d

obtains or fails to obtain. Hence there is no such thing as recognizing that this circum-
stance obtains or that it doesn’t. Thus there is no such thing as making a judgment or
acquiring a piece of knowledge about the referents of that thought. It follows that the
aft

modalist’s conception of relatively obtaining circumstances goes against a defining


constraint on the notion of circumstance.
nf
Dr

2.8 A Concluding Remark


sa

The interpretation advanced in this chapter of Frege’s insistence on the absoluteness


and amodality of truth rests on three hypotheses about his philosophical commit-
ments:
102 From Judgment to Amodalism

• The Recognitional Conception of judgment


• The Supervenience Conception of truth

.e ion
• The Judgment/Judging distinction
These are hypotheses since, as I have emphasized, Frege never explicitly espouses
them in his writings. However, these hypotheses together account for a number of

an iss
doctrines which Frege in his mature philosophy clearly and firmly advances:

du
• The Redundancy of truth

m
• Judgment as acknowledgment of a thought as true, conceived of as a step to a
truth-value, rather than predication of truth

per
• The Indefinability of truth argument
• The Apparent Thoughts Thesis
These doctrines have puzzled readers of Frege. It is clear that he accepts them, but it
has been opaque why he does. Unsurprisingly, there has been a considerable amount

ut
of interpretive controversy over them. One main claim I make for my interpretation

ey
is that it shows how these puzzling doctrines make sense, for they reflect a coherent
h@ itho
conception of the nature of judgment, its place in science and knowledge, and its
connection to thought and truth. I am not claiming that Frege ever articulated to
sl
himself this conception in the form I have developed it here. I am claiming that this
conception makes coherent a number of views in which Frege is invested, and so there
sh ite w

is good reason to ascribe it to Frege. At the very least it is a Fregean conception. Two
we
claims for this interpretation are less important: (a) it accounts for Frege’s apparent
vacillation over the factivity of judgment, and (b) it sheds some light on the Fregean
view which has persistently stumped his readers: thoughts refer to the True or the
False. The claim I want to stress the most is that this interpretation shows that Frege’s
commitment to the absoluteness and so the amodality of truth derives from positions
c

that are at the center of his mature philosophy.


ie
or not
o
d.
:d
aft
nf
Dr
sa
3

.e ion
Fregean Amodalism

an iss
Frege doesn’t simply reject modalism. In the case of temporal modalism, he sees

du
that there are intuitions about linguistic phenomena that seem to show that truth is

m
relative to time. This gives him reason to provide an amodalist explanation of these
intuitions. The case of metaphysical modalism is somewhat different. Frege does not

per
seem to see any intuitive grounds for taking truth to be relative to circumstance; for
him, Korselt’s talk of truth in various circumstances is simply incoherent. However,
he also holds that Korselt is trying to express something with this talk, and gives
an amodalist account of it. In this chapter, I expound Frege’s accounts of temporal

ut
modalist intuitions (§3.2) and of metaphysical modalist talk (§3.3). These accounts
have a common basic form. Where a modalist takes a single thought T to be true

ey
relative to one time or circumstance and false relative to another, Frege holds that in
h@ itho
fact there are two thoughts T1 and T2 such that


sl
one of T1 and T2 is absolutely true and the other absolutely false, and,
each of T1 and T2 contains a component sense that presents or expresses the time
sh ite w

or circumstance relative to which the purported single thought T is supposed to


we
be true or to be false.
One might put Frege’s view in this way: time and circumstance are in some sense
embedded in every thought, whether or not we realize it.
In the temporal case, there is actually an argument available to Frege for his
c

position, albeit not one that he gives. I present this argument in §3.2.2. It relies
ie

on the Redundancy of truth, which I discussed in the last chapter, and on Frege’s
or not

conception of the parts of thoughts, which I discuss in §3.1.

3.1 Parts of Thoughts


o

In §2.5.4 we saw that for Frege the logically fundamental kind of thought is
d.
:d

• composed of a sense that determines an object and a sense that determines a


concept, and
• represents that object as falling under that concept.
aft

I had raised and left unanswered three questions about this view:
nf
Dr

• What does it mean to claim that a thought divides into an object-determining


and a concept-determining sense?
sa

• What is Frege’s ground for taking a statement like ‘Mont Blanc is more than
4000 m high’ to express such a thought?
• Why are these kinds of thoughts logically fundamental?
104 Fregean Amodalism

In this section, I answer these questions, by outlining the development of Frege’s


conception of parts of thoughts.
The starting point of this development is Frege’s view, in Begriffsschrift, of

.e ion
statements and the conceptual contents they express as divided into function and ar-
gument.
We saw in §1.1.4 that the advance of Frege’s logic over traditional logic depends
on two factors:

an iss
• For any given statement or content there may be more than one division into

du
function and argument.

m
• For a content C to divide into function and argument is for C to be an instance
of a general content to which C is logically connected.

per
Another way of stating the second factor is that the criterion for taking a content
to be divided into function and argument is logical: each such division rests on or
corresponds to a deductive relation in which that content stands to a more general
content.

ut
This early view of the logically significant division of statement or content into

ey
function and argument evolves into the later view of the fundamental logical division
h@ itho
of thought into object-determining and concept-determining senses. As we will see,
one aspect of the early view persists into the later view: the criteria for a division of
sl
a thought into parts are logical connections between that thought and others.
sh ite w

3.1.1 Between Begriffsschrift and the Sense/Reference Distinction


we
The first step of the evolution results from Frege’s response to Ernst Schröder’s ver-
sion of the logic of George Boole.1 In 1880 Schröder published a review of Begriff-
sschrift in which he, despite adopting a mostly positive tone, took Frege’s logic to be
no more than a different way of capturing one part of Boole’s logic. In reply, Frege
c

argues that not only is the Begriffsschrift capable of capturing all of Boole’s logic,
ie

but it can give an account of certain valid inferences which Boole’s logic cannot rep-
or not

resent at all. The characterization of judgment in terms of concept and object grows
out of these arguments.
Boole and Schröder are two main figures of the algebra of logic tradition. The
basic idea of this tradition is to solve problems in logic by converting them into prob-
lems of algebra. The premises and conclusions of arguments are “expressed,” as
o
d.

Boole puts it, by algebraic equations and inequalities, and the validity or otherwise
:d

of the argument is determined by algebraic manipulations of these algebraic formulas


similar but not identical to usual algebraic techniques, e.g., solving for an unknown
or unknowns in a system of equations.
aft

Boole divides propositions into two classes, primary and secondary. Primary
propositions are said to express “a relation among things,” but as Boole goes along it
nf

emerges that primary propositions really express relations among “classes or collec-
Dr

tions” of things that are “defined,” in various ways, from “names or qualities com-
mon to” various classes of “individuals.” Thus they can be taken to express relations
sa

among classes of things denoted by the terms of Aristotelian propositions. Secondary


propositions are truth-functionally compound propositions; Boole takes a secondary
proposition to express “a relation among propositions” (1854, 52).
1
This view of the genesis of Frege’s concept-object distinction is first advanced in Heck and May
(2011). I mostly follow their account.
Parts of Thoughts 105

The basics of the expression of primary propositions in the algebra go like this.
The algebraic terms that express the English terms of primary propositions are formed
from variables, x, y, z, etc., together with certain algebraic signs, ‘1’, ‘0’ ‘⋅’, ‘–’,

.e ion
‘+’. The variables correspond to the unanalyzed terms of the primary propositions of
English and express the class of individuals of which the English term is true. ‘1’ is
the universe of discourse, ‘0’ the empty set, ‘⋅’ set-theoretic intersection, ‘+’ union,
and ‘–’ set-theoretic difference. So, ‘x ⋅ y’ corresponds to conjunctive terms such as

an iss
‘English logician’, ‘1 − x’ to negative terms such as ‘not dry’, ‘x + y’ to disjunctive
terms such as ‘animal or mineral.2 With this apparatus one can translate the universal

du
affirmation ‘all Xs are Ys’ to the equation ‘x ⋅ y = x’.3

m
Boole aimed to express secondary propositions in the same way. In his later
work he claimed that an “undoubted meaning of” “the conditional proposition, ‘If

per
the proposition X is true, the proposition Y is true’ … is, that the time in which the
proposition X is true, is time in which the proposition Y is true” (1854, 162-3). Thus
the propositions that are components of secondary propositions are expressed by vari-
ables, x, y, z, etc, which “denote” “portions” of time in which these component propo-

ut
sitions are true. ‘1’ now denotes the totality of time (for the discourse in question),
and ‘0’ the empty class of times; the remaining algebraic signs retain their meaning

ey
as applied to primary propositions. On this scheme, the conditional secondary propo-
h@ itho
sition ‘if Y is true, then X is true’ can be expressed by ‘x ⋅ y = x’, the same equation
that expresses ‘all Xs are Ys’.4,5
sl
Boole doesn’t mention concepts. The German term ‘Begriff’ appears in Schröd-
er’s version of Boole. Schröder calls the theory of primary propositions the “calculus
sh ite w

of concepts” (Rechnung mit Begriffen), that of secondary propositions the “calculus


we
of judgments” (Rechnung mit Urtheilen) (see, e.g., 1880, 87). For Schröder, logic
is based on an account of the construction of and relations among concepts, since
the propositions of deductive inference express relations among concepts. Schröder
extends Boole with a “propaedeutic,” a “purely mathematical discipline” called the
“calculus of identity of domains of a manifold” (Calcul der Identität von Gebieten
c

einer Mannigfaltigkeit) (1972, 221).6 This calculus is, roughly, a theory of sub-
ie

sets (“domains”) of a class (“manifold”). The calculus of concepts results from tak-
or not

ing the domains of a manifold to be “‘classes’ of those individuals which fall un-
der the concepts to be investigated, hence which constitute their extension” (1972,
223).7 Schröder thus takes the relations among classes of things that Boole takes
primary propositions to express to be relations among classes of things that “belong
o

to” concepts, i.e., that are extensions of concepts; in this way primary propositions
d.
:d

2
This is actually false of Boole; like the Stoics and Kant, who worked with exclusive disjunction,
Boole thinks that the English disjunctive construction ‘either … or’ is exclusive.
3
One can, but in fact Boole didn’t. He interpreted the old Aristotelian chestnut, ‘All men are mortal’,
as ‘All men are some mortal beings’ and to translate this into algebra he sought to first express the predicate
aft

‘some mortal beings’ with the help of a rather odd maneuver: “Represent then by v, a class indefinite in
every respect but this, viz., that some of its members are mortal beings, and let x stand for ‘mortal beings,’
nf

then will vx represent ‘some mortal beings.’ Hence if y represent men, the equation sought will be y = vx.”
(1854, 63)
Dr

4
Of course Boole actually expresses it with ‘y = vx’; see previous note.
5
In effect Boole interprets sentential connectives as expressing set-theoretic operations on sets of
sa

times. These operations determines a Boolean algebra, so classical sentential logic governs Boole’s sec-
ondary propositions.
6
Als eine Propädeutik des Logikcalculs kann man den Calcul der Identität von Gebieten einer Man-
nigfaltigkeit hinstellen. Dieser ist eine rein mathematische Disciplin …. (1880, 84)
7
bezüglich die ‘Classen’ derjenigen Individuen versteht, welche zu der Kategorie der zu untersuchen-
den Begriffe gehören, mithin deren Umfang ausmachen. (1880, 86)
106 Fregean Amodalism

for Schröder express relations among concepts. Schröder also accepts Boole’s reduc-
tion of secondary propositions to primary ones, but as just one way of accounting for
secondary propositions.

.e ion
Schröder claims that “Frege’s ‘Begriffsschrift’ actually has almost nothing in
common with the Boolean calculus of concepts,” although “it certainly does have
something in common with … the Boolean calculus of judgments” (1972, 224).8
From Frege’s perspective primary propositions are general propositions; so, in order

an iss
to answer this charge, Frege undertook to explain his function-argument conception

du
of generality in terms comprehensible to Schröder, that is to say, in terms of concepts
and of individuals’ belonging to concepts or the extensions of concepts. Those pri-

m
mary propositions corresponding to Aristotle’s universal affirmations are expressed
as universally quantified conditionals. For example, “such a judgement as ‘Every

per
square root of 4 is a fourth root of 16’ ” is, in the terminology of Begriffsschrift, the
judgment that the value of the function ‘ξ2 = 4 ⊃ ξ4 = 16’ is true, no matter what is
taken as its argument (1880, 14).9 To phrase this in Schröder’s Boolean terminology,
Frege takes functions to express concepts, arguments to express objects, and that a

ut
value of a function for an argument is true to express that an object falls under a
concept.

ey
But there is, in Frege’s view, a critical difference between his and Boole’s con-
h@ itho
struals of this judgment. Boole begins with basic concepts, construct complex con-
cepts from them, and takes a primary proposition to describe relations among these
sl
concepts. The notion of individuals falling under concepts comes in to specify these
relations among already given or constructed concept in terms of relations among
sh ite w

their extensions. Frege begins with a judgment, then analyzes it into object(s) falling
we
under a concept, then considers (one of) the object(s) as replaceable by other objects,
and then forms the general judgment that all objects fall under the concept, which
finally yields Boole’s primary proposition.
This difference is critical because it enables Frege to account for inferential con-
nections between primary and secondary propositions for which there is no account
c

in Boolean logic. For example, the primary proposition


ie
or not

(7) Animals are either rational or irrational


is implied by the secondary proposition
(8) Either animals are rational or animals are irrational.
o
d.

Schröder takes both propositions to express a relation among concepts. The concepts
:d

expressed in the conclusion, (7), are


(9) being an animal
aft

(10) being either rational or irrational.


nf

Presumably, physical entities fall under the concept (9) and entities in general fall un-
Dr

der the concept (10). Since the premise, (8), is a secondary proposition, the concepts
expressed in it are concepts under which moments or portions of time fall; specifi-
sa

cally:
8
Mit dem eben charakterisirten Theil des Logikcalculs, d.i. der Boole’schen Rechnung mit Begriffen,
hat nun Frege’s ‘Begriffsschrift’ in der That fast Nichts gemein. Wohl aber mit dem zweiten Theile , der
Boole’schen Rechnung mit Urtheilen. (1880, 86-7)
9
ein Urteil wie ‘jede Quadratwurzel aus 4 ist 4te Wurzel aus 16’ (1969, 15)
Parts of Thoughts 107

(11) being a time at which it is true that animals are rational


(12) being a time at which it is true that animals are irrational.

.e ion
But then how does the fact that the union of the extensions of (11) and (12) is the class
of all times entail that the relation of subordination holds between (9) and (10)?10
Frege takes the conclusion of this valid inference to be the generalization of an
analysis of some Boolean secondary proposition, for example,

an iss
(13) If Roscoe is an animal then either Roscoe is rational or Roscoe is irrational

du
m
into an expression of a concept
(14) If ξ is an animal then either ξ is rational or ξ is irrational

per
and an expression of an object
(15) Roscoe.

ut
Moreover, he understands both disjuncts of the premise in the same way. Thus

ey
(16) Animals are rational
h@ itho
is the generalization of the analysis of, for instance
(17)
sl
If Roscoe is an animal, then Roscoe is rational
sh ite w

into concept
we
(18) If ξ is an animal, then ξ is rational
and object
(15) Roscoe.
c
ie
or not

10
This is what Frege has in mind in claiming that the two parts of Boole’s logic stand “in no organic
relation” to one another, because Boole

does not use the equations of the first part as constituents of equations of the second part, and,
if you hold strictly to their meanings, cannot so use them. For in the first part A = B is a
judgment, whereas if it were made a constituent of an equation of the second part, as say in
o
d.

(A = B) C = D
:d

A = B would mean the class of time instants at which the content of the judgment ‘A = B’ was
to be affirmed. (1880, 15-6)
Bei Boole laufen die beiden Teile nebeneinander her, sodass der eine gleichwie ein Spiegel-
aft

bild des anderen ist, eben deswegen aber in keiner organischen Verbindung mit ihm steht.
(1969, 15)
Dass aber auch Boole durch seine Auffassung die beiden Teile in keine organische
nf

Verbindung setzt, sieht man daraus, dass er die Gleichungen seines ersten Teiles nicht als Be-
Dr

standteile von Gleichungen des zweiten Teiles verwendet und bei strenger Festhaltung ihrer
Bedeutung auch nicht verwenden kann. Denn im ersten Teile ist A = B ein Urteil, während als
Bestandteil einer Gleichung des zweiten Teiles genommen wie etwa in
sa

(A = B) C = D
A = B die Classe von Zeitmomenten bedeuten würde, in welchen der Inhalt des Urteils ‘A = B’
zu bejahen wäre. (1969, 17)
108 Fregean Amodalism

Seeing the two propositions in this way reveals the basis of their logical connec-
tion. (17) implies (13); and, any proposition that an object falls under (18) implies
the proposition that that object falls under (14). These implications are logical con-

.e ion
nections between Boole’s secondary propositions, but they are not conceived of as
expressing relations among concepts of times. This is one factor underlying Frege’s
account of the validity of the argument. The other factor is Frege’s construing each
of (13) and (17) as expressing the falling of an object under a concept, and so as an

an iss
instance of a universal generalization, logically related to that generalization. This is

du
why for Frege the falling of objects under concepts is logically fundamental.
What I want to emphasize about the foregoing is that, in an important respect,

m
it does not represent a substantial departure from Begriffsschrift. There is, naturally,
a change in terminology, from function and argument to concept and object. And

per
there is a new emphasis on the logical centrality of contents divided into object and
concept. Nevertheless, just as in Begriffsschrift, the identification of the component
parts of a content, or a statement expressing a content, remains keyed to the inferential
connection between that content or statement and its generalizations. To analyze the

ut
content (17) as composed of a concept part, (18), and an object part, (15), is to see
(17) as an instance of the universal content (16). Thus, the criterion for a part of a

ey
statement to be the expression of a part of the content expressed by that statement
h@ itho
remains logical: a statement S divides into object part a and concept part C(ξ) if S
follows logically from the universal statement (∀x)C(x).
sl
In Grundlagen Frege adds to this logical criterion for parts of contents. He
characterizes numbers as “independent, re-identifiable objects” (1884, §56, 68).11
sh ite w

But he also insists that:


we
The independence that I am claiming for number is not to be taken to mean that a number
word designates something when not in the context of a statement, but I only intend by this to
exclude the use of a number word as a predicate or attribute, which rather changes its meaning.
(1884, §60, 72)12,13
c
ie

Thus the “independence” of numbers rests on the fact that numerical expressions are
or not

not used as predicates or attributes. Now, what is it to use an expression as a predi-


cate? We saw that in the letter to Marty Frege characterizes the logically fundamental
judgeable content as “an individual falls under a concept.” He continues by claiming
that in this content “the concept appears as a predicate and is always predicative”
(1980, 101).14 This relates to what we have just considered: the use of an expression
o
d.

occurring in a statement consists of, or at least includes, its use in inference. For an
:d

expression a to be used as a name in a statement S(a) containing it is for S(a) to be an


instance of, and inferentially connected to, the generalized statements (∀x)S(x) and
(∃x)S(x).
aft

However, Frege takes number to be not merely an “independent” object, but also
a “re-identifiable” one. If independence lies in the uses of numerical expressions just
nf

11
selbständige, wiedererkennbare Gegenstände
Dr

12
Die Selbständigkeit, die ich für die Zahl in Anspruch nehme, soll nicht bedeuten, dass ein Zahlwort
ausser dem Zusammenhange eines Satzes etwas bezeichne, sondern ich will damit nur dessen Gebrauch
sa

als Praedicat oder Attribut ausschliessen, wodurch seine Bedeutung etwas verändert wird.
13
This means that the “independence” of an object is to be understood in terms of Frege’s famous
Context Principle: “never to ask for the reference of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a
statement”; “nach der Bedeutung der Wörter muss im Satzzusammenhange, nicht in ihrer Vereinzelung
gefragt werden” (1884, xxii).
14
der Begriff [er]scheint … als Prädikat und ist immer prädikativ.(1969, 164)
Parts of Thoughts 109

sketched, in what uses of numerical expression does the re-identifiability of numbers


consist? The answer is: uses of expressions in inferences involving statements of
identity. One central form of such inferences is Leibniz’s Law: a statement of identity

.e ion
a = b, together with a statement S(a) in which a occurs, imply the statement S(b)
which results by uniformly replacing all occurrences of a in S(a) with b. Thus the
logical criteria identifying parts of contents now include both inferences involving
generality and inferences involving identity.15

an iss
du
3.1.2 After the Sense/Reference Distinction

m
In §1.4 above we looked briefly at Frege’s account, in “On Sense and Reference,” of
the ground for introducing the sense/reference distinction: the epistemic difference

per
between statements of the forms ⌜a = a⌝ and ⌜a = b⌝. Here I sketch a slightly
different rationale for this distinction. Consider the following two arguments:

Alexis Leger was born in Guadeloupe

ut
Saint-John Perse is identical to Alexis Leger
Saint-John Perse was born in Guadeloupe

ey
h@ itho
Alexis Leger was born in Guadeloupe
Alexis Leger is identical to Alexis Leger
sl Saint-John Perse was born in Guadeloupe
sh ite w

Suppose that the content of the judgment made by affirming


we
(19) Saint-John Perse is identical to Alexis Leger
is that the object named ‘Saint-John Perse’ falls under the concept expressed by ‘ξ
is identical to Alexis Leger’. Now, ‘Alexis Leger’ also names this object. Thus the
content of the judgment made by affirming
c
ie

(20) Alexis Leger is identical to Alexis Leger


or not

is also that this object falls under the concept expressed by ‘ξ is identical to Alexis
Leger’. That is to say, these judgments have the same content. But according to the
Begriffsschrift view, the conceptual contents of judgments are supposed to determine
the correctness and incorrectness of inference, of making judgments on the basis of
o
d.

having made other judgments. Since the two arguments differ only in that (19) is a
:d

premise in one while (20) is a premise in the other, if (19) and (20) have the same
content, the arguments do not differ in correctness. But they do: the first is valid and
the second not. So acknowledging the truth of what is expressed by (19) must be a
aft

different judgment from acknowledging the truth of what is expressed by (20).


The conclusion Frege draws from this is that there is more to the contents of
nf

these judgments, to the identity of what is judged, than that some object falls under
Dr

a concept. The difference between the contents of the judgments of (19) and (20)
rests on a difference in the ways in which the one object named ‘Alexis Leger’ and
sa

‘Saint-John Perse’ is given to us. These distinct ways of being given are the senses of
these two names, and the difference in the contents, which now Frege calls thoughts,
of (19) and (20) results from their having different component senses.
15
For further logical criteria for object and concept parts of content see Dummett (1981a), Wright
(1983), and Hale (1987).
110 Fregean Amodalism

If this is the rationale for the introduction of sense, it does not imply that the
logically fundamental type of judgment is not that an object falls under a concept. It
implies, rather that the thought acknowledged to be true in making such a judgment

.e ion
is that an object given in some particular way falls under a concept given in some
particular way.16 So the sense-reference distinction does not alter the logical criteria
governing the analysis of thoughts into parts.
The criteria for the analysis of a thought into an object-giving part and a concept-

an iss
giving part remain, inter alia, that that thought is an instance of a general thought

du
implied by that general thought, and that it together with a suitable statement of iden-
tity implies another instance of that general thought. We see this in “Introduction to

m
Logic” in which Frege begins the section titled “Generality” by saying, “It is only
at this point that the need arises to analyze a thought into parts none of which are

per
thoughts” (1906, 187; emphasis in original).17
So the answers to the questions posed at the beginning of this section are as
follows. The thought expressed by ‘Mont Blanc is more than 4000 m high’ analyzes
into a part that determines an object and part that determines a concept because it

ut
is implied by ╒ Everything is more than 4000 m high╕ , and by ╒ Monte Bianco is
4000 m high╕ together with ╒ Mont Blanc is identical with Monte Bianco╕ . Thoughts

ey
analyzable into these parts are logically fundamental because it is by through this type
h@ itho
of analysis of thoughts that Frege’s logic is capable of accounting for inferences that
neither traditional nor the new Boolean logic can account for.
sl
3.1.3 Multiple Analyses
sh ite w
we
There remains one further issue. The existence of multiple analyses of a thought
suggests that the identification of a part of a thought as presenting an object is always
relative to that thought’s being an instance of a generalization. So there is no such
thing as, e.g., the part of a singular thought that presents an object. This is connected
to a controversy in the interpretation of Frege. We have seen that Frege insists on
c

multiple analyses of thoughts. However, Frege also speaks of “building blocks of


ie

thoughts” (1914, 225)18 suggesting to some that there is a unique final analysis of
or not

thoughts into their constituents. The controversy is over whether these two strands
of Frege’s thinking are compatible, and, if so, which represents Frege’s considered
view.19 I will urge that one need not insist on there being a unique ultimate analysis
of thoughts in order to justify claiming that some analyses are more fundamental than
o

others and so supports a univocal identification of parts of thoughts.20


d.

Consider again a case of multiple analysis, of


:d

16
I here ignore the thoughts expressed by sentences containing indexicals and demonstratives. In the
case of those thoughts, an interpretation that I find compelling is May (2006): the sense of an indexical
aft

does not present an object but rather constrains which of the objects that are present counts as the referent.
So grasp of the thought expressed by such a sentence is grasping that a present object, constrained in some
nf

way, falls under a concept given in some way.


17
Erst hier werden wir veranlasst, einen Gedanken in Teile zu zerlegen, von denen keiner ein Gedanke
Dr

ist. (1969, 203)


18
Gedankenbausteinen (1969, 243)
sa

19
Dummett (1981; 1981; 1991) takes the apparent tension to be resolvable in favor of the building
blocks view. Geach (1975) and Bell (1979) takes the tension to be genuine but holds that Frege ought to
have rested with the multiple analyses view. Levine (2002) argues for a resolution of the tension in favor
of multiple analyses.
20
My argument for this second point is a slight development of the interpretation of Frege’s view of
predication advanced by Dummett (1981b, Chapter 15) and Rumfitt (1994).
Fregean Accounts of Temporal Modalism 111

(21) Jung deceives Freud


One analysis has ╒ Jung╕ presenting an object, ╒ ξ deceives Freud╕ presenting a con-

.e ion
cept. This analysis rests on (21) being an instance of and so implied by, the general-
ization
(22) Everyone deceives Freud

an iss
Another analysis has ╒ Freud╕ presenting an object, ╒ Jung deceives ζ╕ a concept,
based on (21) being an instance of

du
m
(23) Jung deceives someone
Relative to the first analysis, the thought expressed by (21) is not that the object given

per
by ╒ Freud╕ falls under a concept, so the sense of ╒ Freud╕ is not an object-presenting
part of the thought expressed by (21); but, relative to the second analysis the thought
expressed by (21) is that the object given by ╒ Freud╕ falls under a concept. So it
seems wrong to claim that ‘Freud’, as it occurs in (21), expresses an object-presenting

ut
part of the thought expressed by (21), period.

ey
This conclusion, however, ignores the fact that there are valid polyadic quan-
h@ itho
tificational arguments expressed by sentences in which ‘deceives’ occurs. A proto-
typical example is
• sl
Someone is deceived by everyone
• Therefore, everyone deceives someone
sh ite w
we
To display the validity of this argument, using Frege’s Begriffsschrift procedure, (21)
has to be analyzed as the value of a function of two arguments, ‘Freud’ and ‘Jung’.
But then we are in a position to see the one-argument functions of the first two anal-
yses as derived from this two-argument function. Thus, the two-argument analysis is
more fundamental than the one-argument analyses in this sense: given the analysis
c

into two arguments and the two-argument function, we can explain the availability of
ie

the one-argument analyses in terms of operations on the two-argument function. In


or not

Frege’s later terminology, the more fundamental analysis of (21) is as expressing the
thought that the object given by ╒ Jung╕ stands in the relation given by ╒ ξ deceives
ζ╕ to the object given by the sense of ╒ Freud╕ . The concepts involved in the two ear-
lier object-concept analyses are both relational concepts, and what objects fall under
them is determined by what objects stand in the relation determined by ╒ ξ deceives
o
d.

ζ╕ . Specifically, an object falls under the concept determined by ╒ ξ deceives Freud╕


:d

just in case it stands in the relation determined by ╒ ξ deceives ζ╕ to the object deter-
mined by ╒ Freud╕ ; an object falls under the concept determined by ╒ Jung deceives
ζ╕ just in case the object determined by ╒ Jung╕ stands in the relation determined by
aft


ξ deceives ζ╕ to it.
nf

3.2 Fregean Accounts of Temporal Modalism


Dr
sa

Temporalism seems to be supported by an intuitive difference between sentences such


as
(24) Yggdrasil is covered with leaves
and
112 Fregean Amodalism

(25) Odysseus was set ashore while asleep


Knowing that ‘Odysseus’ has no referent, it’s not obvious that (25) is either true or

.e ion
false. By contrast, it seems correct to take (24) to be true in the summer but false
in winter.21 Moreover, if someone utters (24) on 1 July 1896, it would be natural
to take her to have said something true, and also to think that what she said wasn’t
true in January 1896, and won’t be true on 1 January 1897. Similarly, someone else

an iss
who utters (24) on 1 January 1897 says something false, but what he says would
have been true on 1 July 1896. Furthermore, it seems obvious that these people said

du
the same thing. All this suggests that utterances of (24), made at different times, do

m
express a single judgeable, a single genuine thought, but a thought that has different
truth-values at different times.

per
Frege’s rejection of temporalism would not be fully compelling unless he can
give an account of these intuitions that is consistent with amodalism. As we have
seen earlier, Frege accepts that utterances of (24) do not express apparent thoughts.
But amodalism precludes taking the thought or thoughts expressed to have different
truth-values at different times. So, that we assess utterances of (24) at different times

ut
as having different truth-values has to be explained by holding that these utterances

ey
express different (genuine) thoughts with different (absolute) truth-values. The ques-
h@ itho
tion, then, is: what are these distinct thoughts? Of what senses are they composed?
In “Thought” Frege claim that the “time of utterance” is involved in the expression
sl
of these thoughts, so the time of utterance plays some role in determining the senses
that compose these thoughts. I see in Frege’s writings two suggestions for what this
sh ite w

role might be. These lead to two accounts of the composition of the genuine thoughts
we
expressed by assertions of (24) at different times, and so two amodalist accounts of
the intuitive phenomena that seem to support the temporal relativization of truth.

3.2.1 Senses Expressed as a Function of Time


c

One account derives from §46 of Grundlagen. In this section, Frege considers an
ie

objection to his claim that statements of number are ascription to concepts. The ob-
or not

jection is that “a concept like ‘inhabitant of Germany’ would then have … a property
which varied from year to year” (1884, 59). Frege replies,
The concept ‘inhabitant of Germany’ contains time as a variable component, or, to express
myself mathematically, is a function of time. For ‘a is an inhabitant of Germany’ we can say
o

‘a inhabits Germany’ and this uses the present point in time as a reference. Thus in the concept
d.

itself there is already something fluid. In contrast, to the concept ‘inhabitant of Germany at
:d

the beginning of the year 1883’ belongs the same number for all eternity. (1884, 59-60)22

One way of understanding Frege’s reply is that he is claiming that at each point of
aft

time a different concept is expressed by the predicate ‘ξ is an inhabitant of Germany’.


The concept expressed by that predicate at a time t is also expressed by ‘ξ is an
nf

inhabitant of Germany at t’, but this latter predicate expresses the same concept at all
Dr

21
Most ash trees are deciduous.
22
[E]in Begriff wie z.B. ‘Angehöriger des deutschen Reiches’ … eine von Jahr zu Jahr wechselnde
sa

Eigenschaft haben wurde …. Der Begriff ‘Angehöriger des deutschen Reiches’ enthalt … die Zeit als
veränderlichen Bestandtheil, oder, um mich mathematisch auszudrucken, ist eine Function der Zeit. Für
‘a ist ein Angehöriger des deutschen Reiches’ kann man sagen: ‘a gehört dem deutschen Reiche an’ und
dies bezieht sich auf den gerade gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt. So ist also in dem Begriffe selbst schon etwas
Fliessendes. Dagegen kommt dem Begriffe ‘Angehöriger des deutschen Reiches zu Jahresanfang 1883
berliner Zeit’ in alle Ewigkeit dieselbe Zahl zu. (1884, 59-60)
Fregean Accounts of Temporal Modalism 113

times. This view appears before the sense/reference distinction, but it seems a related
view is compatible with the distinction: the predicate ‘ξ is an inhabitant of Germany’
express a different sense at each point in time.

.e ion
How would this view be applied to yield an amodalist explanation of the differ-
ent truth-values of utterances of (24) at different times? An obvious idea is to hold
that an utterance of (24) expresses a thought whose predicative component is the sense
that ‘ξ is covered with leaves’ expresses at the time of utterance. So utterances of (24)

an iss
at different times express different thoughts, some absolutely true, some absolutely

du
false; although note that neither the times of utterance nor senses presenting these
times are parts of these thoughts.23

m
3.2.2 Another Argument against Temporal Modalism

per
The second account is based on the following remark from “On Sense and Refer-
ence”: “Places, instants, stretches of time, logically considered, are objects; hence
the linguistic designation of a definite place, a definite instant, or a stretch of time is
to be regarded as a proper name” (1892, 42).24 My elaboration of this second sug-

ut
gestion begins with an argument against temporal modalism distinct from the basic

ey
argument for amodalism.
h@ itho
Let’s consider, from a Fregean perspective, the nature of the temporalist’s po-
sition. Temporalism accounts for our different assessments of the truth-values of
sl
(utterances or inscriptions of) (24) at different times by claiming that (24) expresses
a single thought that has different truth-values at those times. Let’s call the thought
sh ite w

expressed by (24) TY , as we did in Chapter 1. Let’s suppose that we intuitively take


we
(24) to be true on 1 July 1896 and false on 1 January 1897. The temporalist would
then hold that TY is true on 1 July 1896 and false on 1 January 1897. This means that
she judges that TY is true on 1 July 1896, and judges that TY is false on 1 January
1897. As we saw in Chapter 2, it follows that she takes herself to have made two
judgments. These judgments may be manifested by assertions of the sentences
c
ie

(26) The thought that Yggdrasil is covered with leaves is true on 1 July 1896
or not

and
(27) The thought that Yggdrasil is covered with leaves is false on 1 January 1897
Let’s call these judgments J1 and J2 respectively. From now on I will also use ‘t′ ’
o

as an abbreviation of ‘1 July 1896’, and ‘t′′ ’ as an abbreviation of ‘1 January 1897’.


d.
:d

The temporalist is committed to conceiving of J1 and J2 in a particular way:


• J1 is a judgment about TY ,

• J1 is the acknowledgment of the truth of a thought TY ,
aft


• TY has a component sense presenting the time t′ , but,
nf

• that sense is not a component of TY ;


Dr

• J2 is also about TY ,
sa

′′
• J2 is the acknowledgment of the truth of a thought TY ,
23
Perhaps something like this view is suggested by Tyler Burge (1979, 216).
24
Orter, Zeitpunkte, Zeiträume sind, logisch betrachtet, Gegenstände; mithin ist die sprachliche Beze-
ichnung eines bestimmten Ortes, eines bestimmten Augenblicks oder Zeitraums als Eigenname aufzu-
fassen.
114 Fregean Amodalism

• J2 has a component sense presenting t′′ , but,


′′
• that sense is not a component of TY .

.e ion
′ ′′
For Frege, the question is, what are these thoughts TY and TY , both putatively about
TY , that the temporalist acknowledges as true? The Fregean argument against tempo-

ralism aims to show that while the temporalist’s thought TY does have as a component

an iss

a sense determining t′ , TY neither is about the thought TY nor has the thought TY as
′′
a component sense. Similarly, although TY has a component sense determining t′′ ,

du
′′
TY neither is about TY nor has TY as a component sense. The temporalist, that is to

m
say, is under an illusion about the very judgments, embodying the commitments of
temporalism, that she takes herself to make. She takes herself to acknowledge the

per
truth of two thoughts about a single thought’s truth-values at distinct times; but, in
fact, these two thoughts are not about a single thought, even if they are about distinct
times.
The argument has two parts. The first part begins by noting that (26), the sen-

ut
tence expressing TY , ascribes truth to TY using a truth predicate, but relativized to a
time. Given Frege’s commitment to Redundancy, the truth-ascriptions

ey
(28)
h@ itho
The thought that Yggdrasil is covered with leaves is true,
and
(29)
sl
It is true that Yggdrasil is covered with leaves
sh ite w
we
express the same thought as that expressed by
(24) Yggdrasil is covered with leaves
This thought, of course, is TY . The basic idea underlying the first part of the argument
may be characterized as a temporalization of Redundancy: if we relativize the truth
c

ascriptions of (28) and (29) to time, by, e.g., adding the temporal phrase ‘t′ ’, the result
ie

expresses no more than the thought expressed by adding that phrase to (24):
or not

(30) On t′ Yggdrasil is covered with leaves


So, when the temporalist takes herself to judge that TY is true on t′ , what she is really
judging is the thought expressed by (30). Now, the judgment that TY is true on t′ is
o

J1 . So the thought acknowledged as true in J1 is the thought expressed by (30). That


d.


:d

is to say, TY is the thought expressed by (30). A parallel line of reasoning shows that
′′
TY , the thought acknowledged as true in J2 , is the thought expressed by
(31) On t′′ Yggdrasil is not covered with leaves
aft

The second part of the argument rests on an investigation of the composition of


nf

the thoughts expressed by (30) and by (31). One part of this investigation reaches
Dr

a negative conclusion: there are reasons against taking these thoughts to be about the
thought TY . This conclusion contradicts the temporalist conception of the thoughts
sa

′ ′′
TY and TY . It follows that the temporalist’s purported relativization of the truth and
falsity of a thought to times turns out to involve distinct thoughts neither of which
is about that purported thought. The other part of the investigation yields a positive
conclusion. Given Frege’s conception of the parts of thoughts, the senses of temporal
phrases such as ‘on 1 July 1896’ and ‘on 1 January 1897’, as they occur in sentences
Fregean Accounts of Temporal Modalism 115

such as (30) and (31), present objects that are represented as falling under the con-
cepts presented by the remainder of such sentences. This result leads to the second
account of the genuine thoughts expressed by utterances of (24) at different times:

.e ion
each of these genuine thoughts has a component presenting the time of utterance.
This is the way in which, as Frege puts it, the “time of utterance is involved in the
expression of the thought” expressed by an utterance of (24).

an iss
3.2.2.1 Redundancy and Temporalism

du
We begin the first part of the argument by asking: what sentences plausibly express

m
temporalizations of truth ascriptions? Adding ‘on t′ ’ to (24) results in (30). The truth
ascription of (28) is effected by a truth predicate, so adding ‘on t′ ’ to it plausibly

per
yields just
(26) The thought that Yggdrasil is covered with leaves is true on t′ ,
the assertion of which I have taken to express the temporalist’s position, namely judg-

ut

ing the thought TY . Now, there is no reason to think the temporalist can’t express her

ey
position by using a truth operator rather than predicate, that is to say, by adding ‘on
t′ ’ to (29). But there seem to be at least three ways of doing this:
h@ itho
(32) It is true that on t′ Yggdrasil is covered with leaves
(33)
sl
It is true on t′ that Yggdrasil is covered with leaves
(34) On t′ it is true that Yggdrasil is covered with leaves
sh ite w
we
We now apply Redundancy to these sentences, (26) and (32)-(33), to show that they
all express the same thought as expressed by (30).
The application of Redundancy to (32) is straightforward and yields the conclu-
sion that (32) expresses the same thought as (30). But it is doubtful that (32) captures
what the temporalist has in mind since it seems to be the application of a plain truth
c

operator to a sentence that incorporates a temporal expression, rather than the appli-
ie

cation of a temporally relativized truth operator.


or not

Consider next (33). One position that would block the equivalence of (33) and
(30) is the view that in (33) ‘it is true on t′ that ξ’ is a different sentential operator
from the truth operator, and moreover, not analyzable into the truth operator and ‘on
t′ ξ’. A Fregean objection to this view is based on Frege’s conception of truth as the
o

aim of the activity of judging. If ‘it is true on 1 July 1896 that ξ’ is an unanalyzable
d.
:d

operator, then presumably so is ‘it is true on 20 January 2017 that ξ’, and, indeed,
so is ⌜it is true at t that ξ⌝ for any designation of time t. But then it seems that there
would be many aims of judgment, one for each time. Which of these should a thinker
attempt to reach? Might there be conflicts between acknowledging the truth at t1 of
aft

a thought and rejecting the truth at t2 of that very thought? In short, it’s unclear that
on this view there is a coherent set of norms for the practice of judging, and hence
nf

no coherent norms for science.


Dr

There remains (26). To begin with, I merely isolate what is required to show that
(34) expresses the same thought as (30).
sa

By Redundancy,
(29) It is true that Yggdrasil is covered with leaves
and
116 Fregean Amodalism

(24) Yggdrasil is covered with leaves


express the same thought. These two sentences are embedded in, respectively,

.e ion
(34) On t′ it is true that Yggdrasil is covered with leaves
and

an iss
(30) On t′ Yggdrasil is covered with leaves

du
That is to say, (34) and (30) are the results of filling the placeholder ‘ξ’ in the sentential

m
context
(35) On t′ ξ

per
with respectively (29) and (24). Alternatively, they are the results of completing (35)
with (29) and (24).
Assume now that

ut
(*) the thoughts expressed by completions of context (35) by sentences are com-

ey
posed of the sense of (35) and the thoughts expressed by those sentences.
h@ itho
It follows that if two sentences express the same thought, then the completion of (35)
with those sentences express the same thought. But by Redundancy (28) and (24)
sl
express the same thought. Hence, (34) and (30), which are completions of (35) with
(28) and (24), express the same thought.
sh ite w

The temporalist has no obvious reason to oppose assumption (*). Since a con-
we
sequence of temporalism is that sentence (34) may be assertible, he presumably takes
(34) to represent an entity, TY , as falling under the concept, call it Tξ, denoted by the
truth predicate, at a specific (period of) time. Now, consider the sub-sentence (29)
of (34). Does it not represent TY as falling under Tξ? It’s not clear what objection
the temporalist would have to this view. So, more generally, there seems to be no
c

obvious temporalist objection to holding that in a sentence of the form ⌜on t a is F⌝,
ie

where a is a name and ⌜ξ is F⌝ is a concept-expression, the sub-sentence ⌜a is F⌝


or not

represents the object denoted by a as falling under the concept denoted by ⌜ξ is F⌝.
From Frege’s perspective, this amounts to taking ⌜a is F⌝ to express the thought that
the object denoted by a falls under the concept denoted by ⌜ξ is F⌝. So, even more
generally, a sentence S occurring in ⌜on t S⌝ expresses a thought representing certain
o

concepts or objects as falling under or within a concept, and the containing sentence
d.

⌜on t S⌝ expresses the thought representing this falling under or within at t. If another
:d

sentence, S′ , expresses the same thought as S, then S′ represents the same concepts
or objects as falling under or within the same concept. So ⌜at t S′ ⌝ also represents
this falling under or within at t. That is to say, ⌜on t S′ ⌝ expresses the same thought
aft

as ⌜on t S⌝ , which means that assumption (*) holds.


An analogous argument shows that
nf
Dr

(2) ξ on t′
sa

is a sentential context that works in the same way as does (35). (26) and (30) are the
completions of (2) by respectively (28) and (24). It follows that since by Redundancy
(28) and (24) express the same thought, so do (26) and (30).
We have now shown that all of (26) and (32)-(33) express the same thought as

is expressed by (30), which is not a truth ascription. TY , the thought involved in
Fregean Accounts of Temporal Modalism 117

temporalist’s judgment of the relativization of the truth of TY , has at bottom no sense


component which presents the property of truth.
′′
Finally, a parallel line of argument applies to TY , the thought involved in the

.e ion
temporalist’s relativization of the falsity of TY to time. This uses the supervenience of
ascriptions of falsity to thoughts on judgments of the opposite thoughts, expressible
′′
by negations of the thoughts in question. The conclusion is that TY is the thought
expressed by

an iss
(31) On 1 January 1897 Yggdrasil is not covered with leaves

du
m
and so has at bottom no sense component that presents the property of falsity.

per
3.2.2.2 Propositional Attitudes or Compound Thoughts?
What we have established thus far is that, given Redundancy, what seems to be a
thought that represents another thought as true at a time is fundamentally not a rep-
resentation that involves the property of truth at all. Fundamentally, there are no

ut
representations of thoughts being true or false relative to time. But this does not fully

ey
rule out temporalism.
h@ itho
Here is the reason why. On Frege’s account, the thoughts expressed by
(26) The thought that Yggdrasil is covered with leaves is true on 1 July 1896
(27)
sl
The thought that Yggdrasil is covered with leaves is false on 1 January 1897
sh ite w

are really the thoughts expressed by, respectively


we
(30) Yggdrasil is covered with leaves on 1 July 1896
(31) Yggdrasil is not covered with leaves on 1 January 1897
But what are the thoughts expressed by (30) and (31)? These sentences obviously
c

have in common the sub-sentence


ie
or not

(24) Yggdrasil is covered with leaves


So, the temporalist urges, even if (30) and (31) do not express thoughts about truth
and falsity, nevertheless they express representations about a single thought, namely,
the thought expressed by (24), which is TY . Moreover, it seems clear that each of
o
d.

(30) and (31) expresses a thought about a time. So, the thought expressed by (30),
:d


which we have been calling TY , represents something as holding of the thought TY
′′
and t′ , while the thought expressed by (31), namely TY , represents something else as
′′
holding of TY and t . In the temporalist’s view, we can say more precisely what these
aft

“something” and “something else” are:



TY represents that what TY represents obtains at t′
nf
Dr

′′
TY represents that what TY represents fails to obtain at t′′
sa

Now, Redundancy, as we know, is a supervenience view: the truth of a thought su-


pervenes on the obtaining of what that thought represents, the falsity of a thought
supervenes on the failure of it represents to obtain. Thus,

TY is true at t′ supervene on TY what represents
118 Fregean Amodalism

′′
TY is false at t′′ supervene on what TY represents
But this result is a temporalist view of the truth and falsity of TY .

.e ion
The key assumption of this maneuver to reinstate temporalism is that since (24)
is a sub-sentence of (30) and (31), (30) and (31) both expresses a thought about TY ,
the thought expressed by (24). I now turn to cast doubt on this assumption.
To begin with, we have to specify what it means for a thought to be about another

an iss
thought. In a Fregean framework, there are two relatively clear ways of specifying
this aboutness. The first derives from Frege’s account of belief and other proposi-

du
tional attitudes. On Frege’s view a sentence such as

m
(3) Fricka believes that Yggdrasil is covered with leaves

per
represents a person as standing in a relation to the thought TY expressed by (24). This
representation is composed of a sense that refers to Fricka and a sense that refers to
TY . We might then say that one way in which a thought T is about another thought
′ ′
T is that T contains a component sense that refers to T . The second derives from

ut
Frege’s view of the thought expressed by a truth-functionally compound statement
such as

ey
h@ itho
If Yggdrasil is covered with leaves then Gullinkambi does not crow

sl
is composed of senses that refer to the negation and the conditionality functions, and
the thoughts expressed by its antecedent and consequent sub-sentences; the thought
expressed by the antecedent is, of course, TY . We might then say that another way in
sh ite w


we
which a thought T is about another thought T is that T contains a component sense

that is T . I now argue that, from a Fregean perspective, there are no obvious reasons
for holding that the thoughts expressed by (30) and (31) are about TY in either of these
ways.
Let’s start with the model of propositional attitude ascription. Frege’s reason
for taking (3) to represent something concerning the thought TY , rather than the tree
c
ie

named ‘Yggdrasil’ or the concept denoted by ‘ξ is covered by leaves’ is familiar.


Suppose that (3) is true and that ‘Mímameiðr’ is another name of Yggdrasil not known
or not

to Fricka. Then one intuition we have is that the result of substituting ‘Mímameiðr’
for ‘Yggdrasil’ in (3),
(4) Fricka believes that Mímameiðr is covered with leaves
o
d.

is false, because, not knowing the name ‘Mímameiðr’ at all, Fricka has no beliefs she
:d

would express with it.25 If (3) expresses a representation concerning Fricka, the tree,
and the concept of being covered by leaves, then, since ‘Mímameiðr’ and ‘Yggdrasil’
both refer to the tree, (3) and (4) express the same representation. However, since
aft

(3) and (4) differ in truth-value, they don’t express the same representation. Hence
neither sentence expresses a representation of the tree. Now, if we suppose that (3)
nf

and (4) are representation of, respectively the thoughts expressed by (24) and by
Dr

(5) Mímameiðr is covered with leaves


sa

then we can account for the difference in the representations effected by (3) and
(4): ‘Mímameiðr’ and ‘Yggdrasil’ differ in sense, so (24) and (5) express different
25
Ever since Quine (1956), it is widely accepted that there is a way of understanding (4), as the claim
that Fricka believes, of the tree (called, unbeknownst to her) Mímameiðr, that it is covered with leaves, on
which it is true.
Fregean Accounts of Temporal Modalism 119

thoughts, composed of different senses. So, the ground for taking (3) and (4) to ex-
press thoughts with parts that refer to the thoughts expressed by (24) and (5) is the
differenc in truth-value between (3) and (3).

.e ion
This line of reasoning doesn’t apply to the substitution of ‘Mímameiðr’ for ‘Yg-
gdrasil’ in the sentential context ‘ξ on t′ ’:

(30) Yggdrasil is covered with leaves on t′

an iss
(6) Mímameiðr is covered with leaves on t′

du
m
have the same truth-value. We thus have no grounds for taking these sentences to
express different representations. So there is no reason to seek an explanation for
why they express different thoughts. This undermines the justification of

per
• The thought expressed by (30) contains a part that refers to the thought expressed
by (24), which is TY
• The thought expressed by (6) contains a part that refers to the thought expressed

ut
by (5), which is distinct from the thought expressed by (24)

ey
on the ground that these claims explain why (30) and (6) have different truth-values.
h@ itho
This shows that there are no obvious Fregean grounds for taking the thought ex-
pressed by (30) to be about TY in virtue of containing a sense that refers to TY .
sl
Since substitution of ‘Mímameiðr’ for ‘Yggdrasil’ in (31) also does not induce
a change of truth-value, there is equally no obvious Fregean ground for taking the
sh ite w

thought expressed by (31) to be about TY .


we
We turn now to the model of compound thoughts. Frege conceives of a com-
pound thought as composed of other thoughts, and he takes the truth-value of a com-
pound thought to be determined truth-functionally, by the truth-values of the compo-
nent thoughts, and the functions from truth-values to truth-values that are the referents
of the negation and conditionality signs.
c

The other Fregean model is to take the sentential context ‘on t′ ξ’ to work like a
ie

negation operator, such as ‘it is not the case that ξ’ in English or ‘ ξ’ in the language
or not

of Grundgesetze. The latter expresses a sense that determines a function whose value
is one of the two truth-values. When ‘ ξ’ is completed by putting the expression
of a thought in the placeholder ‘ξ’, the result expresses what Frege calls a compound
thought, a thought with other thoughts as component senses.
o

The truth-value of these compound thoughts is determined as the value of the


d.

negation function for the truth-value of the component thought as argument. If the
:d


thought TY expressed by (30) is such a compound thought, then one may claim to
vindicate temporalism by holding that T′Y is about TY in the sense of containing TY as
a component sense.
aft


It follows that if TY is a compound thought and TY is a component thought of
′ ′
TY , then TY must determine a truth-value. Otherwise TY is a composition of senses
nf


Dr

that seems to be a thought but isn’t a genuine one. Thus, in order for TY to be about
TY in the present sense of aboutness, TY must determine a truth-value.
But according to temporalism, sentences like (24) express thoughts which by
sa

themselves, independent of a time, do not have truth-values. So, from Frege’s per-
spective, this proposal is ruled out by the basic argument for amodalism.
What if a temporalist modifies his position by holding that thoughts like TY , on
their own, determine truth-values? It’s hard to see that anything like temporalism
120 Fregean Amodalism

remains on this modification, but in any case the modification is problematic, for the
following reason.
To begin with, if ‘on t′ ξ’ is a truth-functional sentential operator like ‘ ξ’, then

.e ion
it would seem that for any expression t which denotes a time, the sentential context
⌜on t ξ⌝ is also a sentential operator that denotes a truth-function. Consider now a
pair of sentences formed from such operators:

an iss
(30) On t′ Yggdrasil is covered with leaves

du
(7) On t′′ Yggdrasil is covered with leaves

m
Suppose that (30) is true and (7) is false. ‘On t′ ξ’ and ‘on t′′ ξ’ are both names of truth-
valued functions; let’s say they name ft′ (ξ) and ft′′ (ξ) respectively. The completions

per
of these function names in (30) and (7) express the same thought, supposedly the
thought expressed by (24), i.e. TY . We now abbreviate ‘the True’ by ‘⊤’ and ‘the
False’ by ‘⊥’. Suppose TY denotes ⊤. Then,
ft′ (⊤) = ⊤

ut
ft′′ (⊤) = ⊥.

ey
h@ itho
Consider now a different pair of completions of these temporal function names
(8)
(9)
sl
On t′ Yggdrasil is more than 1 meter tall
On t′′ Yggdrasil is more than 1 meter tall
sh ite w
we
Let’s suppose that both of these sentences express truths. Now let’s ask, what truth-
value is denoted by the thought expressed by the embedded sentence, call it TM ? Let’s
call this truth-value vM . We first figure out whether vM is ⊤ or ⊥:
• The truth-value of (9) is the value of ft′′ (ξ) for vM as argument.
• (9) is true.
c
ie

• So ft′′ (vM ) = ⊤.
or not

• As we have seen, ft′′ (⊤) = ⊥.


• If vM = ⊤, then both ft′′ (⊤) = ⊥ and ft′′ (⊤) = ⊥, which is incompatible with
ft′′ (ξ) being a function.
• Hence vM = ⊥.
o
d.

Now, (8) is true, and its truth-value is the value of ft′ (ξ) for vM as argument. Hence
:d

ft′ (⊥) = ⊤. But, as we have seen, ft′ (⊤) = ⊤. That is to say, ft′ (ξ) maps every truth-
value to the True. It follows that every completion of ‘on t′ ξ’ with the expression of
a truth-valued thought is true. This means that for every sentence S that expresses a
aft

thought, ⌜on 1 July 1986 S⌝ is true.


Now suppose TY denotes ⊥. Then
nf
Dr

ft′ (⊥) = ⊤
ft′′ (⊥) = ⊥
sa

As we have seen, given the assumption that (9) is true, ft′′ (vM ) = ⊤. Thus, unless
vM = ⊤, ft′′ (ξ) is not a function. Now, again as we have seen, ft′ (vM ) is the truth-
value of (8), which is true. Hence ft′′ (⊤) = ⊤, and so, once again, ft′ (ξ) maps every
truth-value to the True, and every sentence ⌜on 1 July 1986 S⌝ is true.
Fregean Accounts of Temporal Modalism 121

The foregoing of course doesn’t definitively establish that there is no construal


of the thoughts expressed by sentences like (30) and (31) that both conforms to Fregean
principles and sustains some version of temporalism. It should be emphasized, how-

.e ion
ever, that it is hard to see how a position can count as temporalist unless it takes the
thoughts expressed by (30) and (31) to concern a single thought, expressed by (24).
So, it would not do, for example, to construe t′ as referring to a time that (30) repre-
sents as falling under a concept denoted by (24). The reason is that neither concepts

an iss
nor senses denoting them not judgeables, and so do not count as thoughts for Frege.

du
m
3.2.3 Senses presenting Times as Parts of Thoughts
I move now to a positive Fregean proposal for how ‘on t′ ’ contributes to the com-

per
position of the thought expressed by (30): in (30) this temporal expression is an ob-
ject name of a time or a period of time. The judgment expressed by asserting (30)
represent this object, together with other objects or concepts, as subsumed under a
(first-level) concept. This proposal is the second Fregean amodalist account of the

ut
supposed temporal relativization of truth.
To see why ‘on t′ ’ denotes an object, recall, to begin with, that Frege’s crite-

ey
rion for an expression to express an object-referring part of a content or thought is
h@ itho
logico-syntactic. Now, note that while it is unclear that there is generalizing from the
negation stroke, the conditionality stroke, or the horizontal, and equally unclear that
sl
there is generalizing from attitude ascription phrases like ‘Fricka believes that’, there
is, much more clearly, generalizing from expressions like ‘on t′ ’. From (30) one can
sh ite w

infer
we
At some time Yggdrasil is covered with leaves
which arguably expresses the same thought as
Yggdrasil is sometimes covered with leaves
c
ie

And, (30) is rightly deduced from


or not

At all times Yggdrasil is covered with leaves


which arguably expresses the same thought as
Yggdrasil is always covered with leaves
o
d.

Moreover, from (30) and


:d

1 July 1896 is the 183rd day of 1896


we can validly infer
aft

On the 183rd day of 1896, Yggdrasil is covered with leaves


nf
Dr

So, with respect to these inferences, the senses of temporal expressions are object-
determining parts of the thoughts expressed.
sa

In addition, there is generalization from ‘Yggdrasil’ in (30) That is, from (30)
we may correctly judge
Something is covered with leaves on 1 July 1896
And we have noted already the correctness of inferring
122 Fregean Amodalism

On 1 July 1896 Mímameiðr is covered with leaves


from (30) and

.e ion
Mímameiðr is Yggdrasil
Finally, note that generalizations from ‘1 July 1896’ and ‘Yggdrasil’ can be nested.
On the basis of judging that

an iss
Something is covered with leaves at all times

du
m
One may correctly judge that
At all times something is covered with leaves

per
It follows that at a (relatively) fundamental level of analysis, the senses of ‘Yggdrasil’
and of ‘1 July 1896’ are saturated parts of the thought expressed by (30), and each
denotes an object. That is to say, at this level of analysis the truth-value of (30) is
determined as the value of the function denoted by ‘on ξ ζ is covered with leaves’ for

ut
the arguments that are the objects denoted by ‘Yggdrasil’ and of ‘1 July 1896’.

ey
So, the second Fregean reconstruction of purported temporal relativization of
h@ itho
truth is this. What seems to be the claim that a thought T is true at a time t is, in fact,
the assertion of a thought T′ in which a sense determining t is a component. From a
sl
Fregean perspective, this reconstruction is preferable to the first reconstruction sug-
gested in Grundlagen because it reflects the inferential connections among sentences
sh ite w

involving temporal expressions that we have just examined.


we
Let’s go back to the intuitions that seem to support temporalism, such as the
intuition that an utterance of (24) in July is true, while an utterance of (24) in January
is false. On the account we have just given of temporalism, an utterance of (24) in
July expresses a thought in which occur a sense determining the time of utterance.
This thought is true simpliciter. Our intuition that what is said by this utterance will
c

be false in January is now explained as: the thought expressed by an utterance of (24)
ie

in January, a thought having as a part a sense that determines the time of utterance in
or not

January, is false, period.


Finally, I want to consider the issue raised at the end of §1.5: how does amodal-
ism differ from Frege’s Begriffsschrift view of modal judgments? Note, to begin
with, that it’s not the case, even on the Begriffsschrift view, that there is no differ-
o

ence between an apodictic judgment and the corresponding assertoric judgment: the
d.

apodictic judgment implicates a particular type of ground for the assertoric judgment,
:d

an implicature that is missing in the assertoric judgment. Where they do not differ
is conceptual content. So the question, as pointed out above, is whether amodalism
implies that there is no difference in truth-value or thought between modalized sen-
aft

tences and their non-modalized counterparts. We can now give an answer for the
case of temporal modality. The basic argument for amodalism implies that what is
nf

expressed by ⌜it is always the case that S⌝ is not the thought that TS , the thought ex-
Dr

pressed by S, is true at all times. So ⌜it is always the case that S⌝ does not express
the thought that TS is eternally true, if the eternal mode of truth is analyzed as truth
sa

relative to all times. Similarly, what is expressed by ⌜it is sometimes the case that
S⌝ is not the thought that there exists a time at which TS is true, nor that TS is oc-
casionally true, on the corresponding analysis of the occasional mode of truth. But
the present Fregean rational reconstruction of a thought’s being true at a time sug-
gests that one may take the thought expressed by ⌜it is always the case that S⌝ to be
Fregean Accounts of Metaphysical Modalism 123

the general thought expressed by ⌜at all times S⌝, and the thought expressed by ⌜it
is sometimes the case that S⌝ to be the general thought expressed by ⌜at some time
S⌝. These general thoughts are of course distinct from each of their instances. But

.e ion
these instances are the thoughts expressed by utterances of S at various times. So,
in contrast to the Begriffsschrift view, the present reconstruction of temporal rela-
tivization of truth yields an account of sentences containing expressions of temporal
modality such that the thoughts they express and their (absolute) truth-values differ

an iss
from utterances of the corresponding non-temporalized sentences.

du
m
3.3 Fregean Accounts of Metaphysical Modalism

per
As I mentioned at the outset of this chapter, there is no sign that Frege sees the pur-
ported relativization of truth to circumstances as anything other than confusion. How-
ever, we are nowadays accustomed to the view that there are intuitions supporting
metaphysical modalism. For example, an utterance of

ut
(10) The inventor of bifocals wrote an autobiography

ey
from §1.5 seems to us to be true as a description of the actual world, but false as a de-
h@ itho
scription of, for example, non-actual circumstances in which the inventor of bifocals
was illiterate and never sought to record the events of his life. Frege would be con-
sl
strained by his amodalism to hold that such intuitions are not to be accounted for by
taking the thought expressed by such an utterance of (10) to be true relative to actual
sh ite w

circumstances but false relative to the counterfactual circumstances just described.


we
Instead, these intuitions would have to be explained in terms of an amodalist account
of what the supposed truth of thoughts relative to possible circumstances really con-
sists in. In this section, I discuss three Fregean proposals for such an account. Each
of these construes what seems to be a claim that some thought T is true in circum-
stance C as really the claim that a thought T′ , which has a component that in some
c

way “incorporates” C, is absolutely true.


ie
or not

3.3.1 A Parallel to Temporal Modalism


The first account attempts to understand metaphysical modalism as exactly parallel
to temporal modalism. So there are in fact two varieties of such an account.
o

The first transposes to metaphysical modality the view, broached in §3.2.1, that
d.

predicates express different senses at different times, so that utterances at different


:d

times of a single sentence containing a predicate express different thoughts contain-


ing distinct predicative sense components. The idea would then be that a predicate
like ‘ξ wrote an autobiography’ expresses different senses in different possible cir-
aft

cumstances, and so utterances in different possible circumstances of a single sentence


containing a predicate express different thoughts.
nf

Unfortunately, from the perspective of contemporary metaphysical modalism,


Dr

this account fails to do justice to the intuition that (10) is true as a description of
the actual world, but false as a description of some non-actual circumstances. The
sa

intuition is not that, if (10) were uttered in different circumstances, then what (10)
would express in those circumstances would be false. It is rather that what an actual
utterance of (10) expresses would be false if circumstances were different.
The other variant of an account parallel to the temporal account goes as follows.
First, apply Redundancy to statements of relativization of truth to circumstances or
124 Fregean Amodalism

worlds, to reach the conclusion that the thoughts they express are at bottom no more
than what are expressed using statements involving no truth ascriptions. Thus, letting
‘I’ be an abbreviation of ‘circumstances in which the inventor of bifocals was illiterate

.e ion
and never sought to record the events of his life’, each of
(11) In I, it is false that the inventor of bifocals wrote an autobiography
(12) In I, the thought that the inventor of bifocals wrote an autobiography is false

an iss
fundamentally expresses the same thought as is expressed by

du
(13) In I the inventor of bifocals did not write an autobiography.

m
Similarly, letting ‘A’ abbreviate ‘actual circumstances’,

per
(14) In A, it is true that the inventor of bifocals wrote an autobiography
(15) In A, the thought that the inventor of bifocals wrote an autobiography is true
fundamentally expresses the same thought as is expressed by

ut
(16) In A, the inventor of bifocals wrote an autobiography.

ey
h@ itho
Thus the modalist claim that an utterance of (10) expresses a thought false in counter-
factual circumstances and true in actual circumstances turns out to amount to judg-
sl
ments of two distinct thoughts, those expressed by (13) and (16) respectively.
The amodalist account then continues by arguing that neither of these thoughts
either contains or is about the thought expressed by (10). The argument aims to show
sh ite w
we
that phrases of the form ⌜in C⌝, where an expression describing a circumstance re-
places the variable ‘C’, functions neither like an attitude ascription nor a compound-
thought-forming connective, because
• the contexts ⌜in C ξ⌝ are transparent,
c

• there are generalizations from ⌜in C S⌝, with a statement replacing ‘S’, that are
ie

inferentially connected with those statements, and,


or not


• statements of identity of circumstances ⌜C = C ⌝ license inferences between

⌜in C S⌝ and ⌜in C S⌝.
This would show that circumstances or worlds, “logically considered,” are, like times
and places, objects, and the “linguistic designations” of circumstances are Fregean
o
d.

proper names. Moreover, it would show that circumstances are not entities with re-
:d

spect to which thoughts are true or false, but rather entities determined by components
of thoughts which are absolutely true or false.
Perhaps the most questionable part of such an argument would be the claim that
there are statements of the identity and difference of circumstances. The existence of
aft

generalizations from ⌜in C S⌝ that are inferentially connected with S is perhaps more
plausible. For example, perhaps it’s relatively plausible that from (13) one can infer
nf
Dr

In some possible circumstances, the inventor of bifocals did not write an auto-
biography
sa

which perhaps expresses the same thought as


It is possible that the inventor of bifocals did not write an autobiography
And, (13) follows from
Fregean Accounts of Metaphysical Modalism 125

In all possible circumstances, the inventor of bifocals did not write an autobiog-
raphy

.e ion
which might express the same thought as
It is necessary that the inventor of bifocals did not write an autobiography
If these inferential connections hold, we may conclude that I and ‘the inventor of

an iss
bifocals’ express object-determining parts of the thought expressed by (13). Both

du
of these expressions denote objects that are represented as standing in the relation
determined by ╒ in ξ ζ writes an autobiography╕ .

m
Just as in the temporal case, the deductive connections just outlined supports
an account of modal statements. ⌜It is possible that S⌝ and ⌜it is necessary that S⌝

per
express generalizations over possible circumstances. The thoughts they express are
then different from that expressed by S, and, in some cases, their truth-values also
differ. So, this Fregean reconstruction of metaphysical modalism results in a position
different from the Begriffsschrift position that modal expressions do not contribute

ut
to conceptual content.
I would like to note in passing that the foregoing account is, prima facie, compat-

ey
ible with David Lewis’s well-known conception of possible worlds as mereological
h@ itho
fusions or sums of all the “concrete” entities it contains. Such a fusion is simply an
object whose parts are these entities, and so suitable to be the references of saturated
sl
parts of thoughts expressed by sentences like (13).26
Note that the present account also affords a reconstruction of the modal concep-
sh ite w

tion of sense. The sense of, e.g., ‘in ξ ζ writes an autobiography’ in (13) determines
we
a single two-argument function, call it f(ξ, ζ), not different functions in different cir-
cumstances. But, for each circumstance C, there is a one-argument function deter-
mined by f(ξ, ζ) and C, namely, f(C, ζ). So one can explicate ‘the sense of “ζ writes
an autobiography” determines a function from objects to truth values in circumstance
C’ as ‘The function f(C, ζ), where f(ξ, ζ) is the function determined by ╒ in ξ ζ writes
c

an autobiography╕ , is a function from objects to truth values’.


ie
or not

3.3.2 Circumstances as Thoughts


Although it’s not clear that any of Frege’s views preclude the account of metaphysical
modalism just given, there is reason to think that it would not be Frege’s account.
o

Let’s go back to Frege’s reply to Korselt discussed in §1.5 above. After insisting
d.

against Korselt that no “proper statements obtain [bestehen] under certain circum-
:d

stances and not under others,” Frege offers a “guess” as to what Korselt means:

A statement that holds [gilt] only under certain circumstances [Umständen] is not a proper
aft

statement. However, we can express the circumstances under which it holds in antecedent
statements [Bedingungssätzen] and add them as such to the statement. So supplemented, the
nf

statement will no longer hold only under certain circumstances but will hold quite generally.
Dr

(1906, 399)

This suggests that, for Frege, circumstances are not objects designated by proper
sa

names but rather thoughts expressed by statements.27 This is confirmed by Frege’s


26
See in particular D. K. Lewis (1986). Note that in section 1.7 of this book Lewis expresses some
reservations about the term ‘concrete’.
27
Similar views have appeared in throughout the subsequent history of analytic philosophy. Some of
126 Fregean Amodalism

mature conception of fact, discussed in §2.5.8.2, and by three views present in Be-
griffsschrift, outlined in §1.2. In “Thought” Frege states that a fact (Tatsache) is a
true thought, where this means that a fact is the obtaining of what a thought repre-

.e ion
sents, and also that in which the truth of that thought consists. In Begriffsschrift Frege
holds:

• A judgeable content is a representation (Vorstellung) that is a circumstance (Um-

an iss
stand).

du
• Judging is predicating the property of being a fact (Thatsache) of a circumstance
and

m
• Judging is predicating the property of truth of a content.

per
In Frege’s later view, judging is no longer fundamentally predicating truth of a thought
or content, but is rather the recognition of the obtaining of what a thought represents.
However, the view is not that judging simply isn’t predicating the property of truth
of a thought at all. Rather, predicating truth of a thought supervenes on recognizing

ut
the obtaining of what that thought represents. Thus on the mature view judgment is
also recognition of the being a fact of what a thought represents. I have argued that a

ey
thought, like a judgeable content, is a representation. Given that judgeable contents
h@ itho
are circumstances, thoughts also are circumstances. So a fact is the obtaining of a
circumstance. A counterfactual circumstance, then, is a thought such that what it
sl
represents does not obtain—that is to say, a false thought.
Thus, although for Frege there is ultimately no such thing as relativization of
sh ite w

truth, he also sees a difference between the two illusions of temporal and of meta-
we
physical relativization of truth. In the temporal case, that to which truth appears to
be relativized turns out to be objects, members of the realm of reference; in the meta-
physical case, that to which truth appears to be relativized turns out to be thoughts,
members of the realm of sense.
This difference clearly has consequences for how the items of relativization
c

are “incorporated” into the genuine thoughts that underlie the illusions of relative
ie

truth. Genuine thoughts corresponding to so-called thoughts supposedly true rela-


or not

tive to times are not compound thoughts but incorporate senses determining times.
In contrast, Frege’s guess about what Korselt means shows that genuine thoughts
corresponding to purported thoughts supposedly true relative to circumstances are
compound thoughts: they are conditional thoughts whose antecedents are the circum-
o

stances in question and whose consequents are the supposed relatively true thoughts.
d.

Thus, a metaphysical modalist claim like (13) is to be reconstructed as


:d

If the inventor of bifocals was illiterate and never sought to record the events of
his life, then the inventor of bifocals did not write an autobiography
aft

More generally, the view suggested is this. There is no such thing as


nf

A thought T being true in circumstances C.


Dr

At best there is the plain truth of the thought expressed by the conditional
sa

the best-known instances are Wittgenstein’s view of the world as the totality of existing combinations of
objects depicted by elementary propositions in the Tractatus and Carnap’s explication of possible worlds as
collections of sentences called “state-descriptions” in Meaning and Necessity (1947). Some contemporary
instances are propositions in Adams (1974) and states of affairs in Plantinga (1979).
Fregean Accounts of Metaphysical Modalism 127

If SC then ST
where SC is a statement expressing the circumstances C and ST is a statement express-

.e ion
ing the thought T.
It is not entirely obvious what account of modal statements is supported by this
account of metaphysical modalism. But a fairly straightforward proposal is this. We
start within the basic metaphysical modalist framework and take ⌜it is necessary that

an iss
S⌝ to express a truth just in case the thought expressed by S is true in all possible
circumstances. On the reconstruction just given, this condition holds just in case all

du
the thoughts expressed by conditionals of the form

m

(17) If S then S,

per
where S expresses a circumstance, are true. Now the key question is: how do these
conditionals function? What thoughts do they express, and what are their truth-
values? If these conditionals are expressed with the sign of conditionality in Begriff-
sschrift and Grundgesetze, then each with a false antecedent is true. It now follows
that ⌜it is necessary that S⌝ is true just in case S itself is true. The reason is this.

ut
The traditional view is that ⌜it is necessary that S⌝ is true just in case S is true in

ey
all circumstances, actual and counterfactual. Counterfactual circumstances, we saw,
h@ itho
are false thoughts. So, if S⊥ expresses a counterfactual circumstance then ‘if S⊥ then
S’ is true. Actual circumstances are facts or true thoughts. So if S is true, then ‘S⊤
sl
then S’ is true whenever S⊤ expresses an actual circumstance. So if S is true, then all
conditionals (17) are true, and so ⌜it is necessary that S⌝ is true. If S is false, then ‘S⊤
sh ite w

then S’ is false whenever S⊤ expresses an actual circumstance, so not all conditionals


we
(17) are true, and so ⌜it is necessary that S⌝ is false.
Again staying within the basic metaphysical modalist framework, we would take
⌜it is possible that S⌝ to express a truth just in case the thought expressed by S is true
in at least one possible circumstance. That is to say, if at least one of the conditionals

of the form (17) is true. This is so if any of the S expresses a falsehood. That is to
c

say, for any statement S, ⌜it is possible that S⌝ is true if there are any counterfactual
ie


circumstances at all. If there are no counterfactual circumstances, then all S are true,
or not

hence there is a true conditional of form (17) only if S is true. In such a case, ⌜it is
possible that S⌝ is true if and only if S is true.
This account of statements of necessity is closer to the account of apodictic judg-
ment in Begriffsschrift. In that account, an apodictic judgment and the corresponding
o

assertoric one do not differ in content, and so do not differ in truth-value. The present
d.

account does not directly specify the thoughts expressed by ⌜it is necessary that S⌝,
:d

but merely specifies the truth-conditions of these statements of necessity. So, it’s
not clear whether the thought expressed by these statements are different from those
expressed by S. However, whatever thoughts these statements of necessity do ex-
aft

press, they do not differ in truth-value from the thoughts expressed by the non-modal
statements they contain.
nf

However, the present account of statements of possibility is different from the


Dr

two Begriffsschrift accounts of possibility. The first of these, recall, is that calling a
statement possible is not expressing a judgment at all; but this refraining from judg-
sa

ment does not alter the content or the truth-value of the statement in question. The
second Begriffsschrift account is that in calling a statement S possible one is really
judging an existential generalization of S, say ⌜∼(∀v)∼S⌝, which evidently differs in
content from S. If S is true so is ⌜∼(∀v)∼S⌝, but if S is false there is no constraint on
the truth-value of ⌜∼(∀v)∼S⌝. The present account again does not specify directly
128 Fregean Amodalism

the thoughts expressed by ⌜it is possible that S⌝, so it’s not clear whether they are
different from those expressed by S. However, whatever thoughts these statements
of possibility do express, if there are any false circumstances then they are all true, no

.e ion
matter what is the truth-value of the thoughts expressed by the corresponding non-
modal statements.
In one respect, however, the present account of modal statements is like the
Begriffsschrift account of modal judgments: they are both quite alien from the con-

an iss
temporary view of modality on which statements of necessity and possibility differ

du
in truth conditions and truth-values from non-modal statements. The present view
of statements of possibility is perhaps the most surprising: if there are any counter-

m
factual circumstances then all statements of possibility, including ones which embed
contradictions, are true.

per
It should be noted that these consequences of the present account which distance
it from contemporary views depend, unsurprisingly, on construing the conditionals
reconstructing truth relative to circumstances in terms of the conditionality sign of
Frege’s two formulations of logic. So one question this raises is: can Frege consis-

ut
tently accept a different, primitive counterfactual conditional? There are two reasons,
neither decisive, against this. First, how are judgments of counterfactuals explained?

ey
Much contemporary work on counterfactuals specify their truth conditions in terms
h@ itho
of truth relative to possible worlds, so Frege’s rejection of all relativization of truth
forecloses this account of counterfactual conditionals. Second, how are counterfac-
sl
tuals established? One well-known answer is that it is on the basis of causal laws.
Since Frege thinks that causal laws are, from the standpoint of logic, expressible by
sh ite w

his universally quantified conditionals, he would see no reason to adopt a conditional-


we
ity sign with a sense different from that specified in Begriffsschrift and Grundgesetze.
Obviously, this is a statement and not a defense of what might be Frege’s position.28

3.3.3 Fregean Rational Reconstructions of Hilbert on Geometry


c

The foregoing Fregean account of metaphysical modalism rests on a fairly superfi-


ie

cial reading of Frege’s response to Korselt’s talk of a statement obtaining in some


or not

circumstances and not in others. A more accurate view of this response has to take
into consideration the context of this passage in Frege’s attempt to understand Hilbert
and Korselt.
We start by making clearer what Frege means by the contrast between proper
o

and improper statements.


d.
:d

What I call a statement tout court or a proper statement is a group of signs that expresses a
thought; however, whatever has only the grammatical form of a statement I call an improper
statement. Examples of the latter are often to be found as antecedent and consequent statements
aft

of conditional statement compounds. …. Let us consider the statement ‘If something is greater
than 1, then it is a positive number’! ‘Something’ and ‘it’ refer to one another. If we break this
connection by separating the statements, each of them becomes senseless. …. We can also
nf

express this thought by utilizing the letter ‘a’ as in arithmetic:


Dr

If a > 1, then a > 0.


sa

Here the letter ‘a’ only indicates, as did the words ‘something’ and ‘it’ above. The generality
extends to the content of the whole statement compound, not to the antecedent statement by
itself nor the consequent statement by itself. Since neither the former nor the latter by itself
expresses a thought, neither of them is a proper statement. The whole statement compound is
28
Thanks to Paddy Blanchette for prompting me to think about this issue.
Fregean Accounts of Metaphysical Modalism 129

one; it expresses a single thought which cannot be divided into component thoughts. (1906,
308-9)29

.e ion
The central case of improper statements on which Frege focuses is connected with
universally quantified conditionals, statements which are expressed in Begriffsschrift
by occurrences of the same Latin letters in the antecedent and consequent. These
letters may be understood as variables bound by tacit initial universal quantifiers, al-

an iss
though in Begriffsschrift they are the fundamental device for expressing (universal)
quantification. The improper statements that concern Frege result from detaching

du
the antecedent or consequent from such conditionals. When this is done, either the

m
variables no longer express generality or the generality they do express fails to cap-
ture the generality of the original colloquial statements that are paraphrased by these

per
conditionals.
Frege focuses on this type of improper statement because he attempts to make
sense of Hilbert’s and Korselt’s conceptions of axioms and theorems as precisely this
type of improper statements. To begin with, he claims that “in Hilbertian geometry
[the words ‘point’, ‘straight line’, ‘lies in’, ‘lies on’, ‘lies between’, etc.] do not des-

ut
ignate anything at all. …. [These words] are used here like letters” (1906, 316-7).30

ey
He then goes on to give a rational reconstruction of what a purported proof in Hilber-
h@ itho
tian geometry really amounts to. First, he reformulates Hilbert’s axioms explicitly
with variables: “Instead of ‘the point A lies in the plane α’, let us say, ‘A stands in
sl
the p-relation to α’. Instead of ‘the point A lies on the straight line a’, let us say ‘A
stands in the q-relation to a.’ Instead of ‘A is a point’, let us say, ‘A is a Π’” (1906,
sh ite w

319),31 and so on. Note that these variables are second-level, so in Begriffsschrift
we
they would be German letters; they range over first-level concepts and relations. With
this reformulation, one sees explicitly that Hilbert’s axioms are improper statements,
and Frege calls them ‘pseudo-axioms” (Pseudoaxiome). A “proof” in Hilbertian ge-
ometry looks like a sequence of inferences from Hilbert’s axioms but is, in fact, a
sequence of improper statements which do not express thoughts. However,
c
ie

although improper statements by themselves do not express thoughts, nevertheless they may
or not

be constituents of a whole that does have a sense. We cannot treat our pseudo-axioms as
independent statements that contain true thoughts and hence can serve as the foundations of

29
Ich nenne Satz schlechtweg oder eigentlichen Satz eine Gruppe von Zeichen, die einen Gedanken
o

ausdrückt; was aber nur die grammatische Form eines Satzes hat, nenne ich uneigentlichen Satz. Solche
d.

finden sich oft als Bedingungs- und Folgesätze in hypothetischen Satzgefügen. …. Betrachten wir den
:d

Satz : ‘Wenn etwas größer als 1 ist, so ist es eine positive Zahl’! ‘Etwas’ und ‘es’ weisen hier aufeinander
hin. Zerreißen wir diesen Zusammenhang, indem wir die Sätze trennen, so wird jeder von ihnen sinn-
los. …. Wir können jenen Gedanken auch ausdrücken, indem wir uns des Buchstabens ‘a’ wie in der
Arithmetik bedienen :
aft

‘Wenn a > 1, so ist a > 0.’


Der Buchstabe ‘a ’ deutet hier nur an, wie vorhin die Wörter ‘etwas’ und ‘es’. Die Allgemeinheit erstreckt
nf

sich auf den Inhalt des ganzen Satzgefüges, nicht auf den des Bedingungssatzes für sich und auf den des
Dr

Folgesatzes für sich. Da weder dieser noch jener einzeln einen Gedanken ausdrückt, so ist keiner von
ihnen ein eigentlicher Satz. Das ganze Satzgefüge ist ein solcher; es drückt einen einzigen Gedanken aus,
der nicht in Teilgedanken zerlegt werden kann.
sa

30
[D]ie Wörter ‘Punkt’, ‘Gerade’, ‘Ebene’, ‘liegt in’, ‘liegt auf’, ‘liegt zwischen’ usw … bezeichnen …
nichts in der Hilbertschen Geometrie. …. [Diese Wörter] werden hier wie Buchstaben gebraucht.(1969,
302)
31
Statt ‘der Punkt A liegt in der Ebene α’ wollen wir sagen: ‘Α steht in der p-Beziehung zu α’ . Statt
‘der Punkt Α liegt auf der Geraden a’ wollen wir sagen: ‘Α steht in der q-Beziehung zu a’. Statt ‘Α ist ein
Punkt’ wollen wir sagen: ‘Α ist ein Π’.(1969, 305)
130 Fregean Amodalism

our logical constructions; rather, we must carry them along as improper antecedent statements.
(1906, 322)32

.e ion
That is, each improper statement that is a step of a “proof” is reconstructed as a univer-
sally quantified conditional whose antecedent is a conjunction of Hilbert’s pseudo-
axioms and whose consequent is the improper statement that originally appears at
that step in the “proof.” Hilbert claims to prove theorems from sets of axioms, but,

an iss
as Frege see it, Hilbert does no such thing. At best the sequences of improper state-
ments Hilbert produces may be reconstructed as sequences of universally quantified

du
conditionals.

m
It is in terms of this understanding of Hilbert and Korselt that Frege attempts
to make sense of Korselt’s talk of “interpretations” of “principles.” Frege uses “the

per
term ‘principle’ for any statement that expresses an axiom” (Frege, 1906b [henceforth
cited as FG2], 315, n. 2),33 and an axiom is a true thought, so he finds Korselt’s claim,

‘Arithmeticized’, or better, ‘rationalized’ mathematics merely arranges its principles in such a


way that certain known interpretations are not excluded. (1971, 40)34

ut
ey
to be confused. As we saw in §1.5.1, Frege objects to the term ‘interpretation’ be-
h@ itho
cause, “when properly expressed, a thought leaves no room for different interpreta-
tions.” But, he continues,
sl
On the basis of our understanding of the nature of Mr. Korselt’s purely formal system it is easy
to guess what Mr. Korselt means by ‘interpretation’. When we proceed from the general theo-
sh ite w

rem ‘If a > 1, then a2 > 1’ to the particular one ‘If 2 > 1, then 22 > 1’ by means of an inference,
we
then the improper statement ‘a > 1’ corresponds to the proper statement ‘2 > 1’. According to
Mr. Korselt’s usage, ‘2 > 1’ or the thought of this statement will be an interpretation of ‘a >
1’. As if the general statement were a wax nose which we could turn now this way, now that.
In reality, we have not an interpretation but an inference. (1906, 315-6)35
c

Here Frege tries to make some sense of Korselt’s use of the term ‘interpretation’
ie

(Deutung) by taking an instance of a generalized conditional to be an interpretation


or not

of that conditional. In such an instance names replace the variables of quantification,


so, as Frege’s example ‘If 2 > 1, then 22 > 1’ shows, the antecedent and consequent
of an instance are proper rather than improper statements, and so may express truth-
valued thoughts.
Given this Fregean account of Korselt’s “interpretations,” we are in a position
o
d.

to attain a more accurate view of how Frege attempts to understand Korselt’s idea of
:d

statements obtaining (bestehen) in some circumstances and not in others. Frege starts
32
uneigentliche Sätze zwar einzeln keine Gedanken ausdrücken, daß sie aber Teile eines sinnvollen
Ganzen sein können. Wir dürfen unsre Pseudoaxiome nicht als selbständige Sätze behandeln, die wahre
aft

Gedanken enthalten und so als Grundsteine unsres logischen Aufbaues dienen können, sondern wir müssen
sie als uneigentliche Βedingungssätze mitführen.(1969, 307-8)
nf

33
Ich nenne Grundsatz einen Satz, der ein Axiom ausdrückt. (1969, 301)
34
Dr

Die ‘arithmetisierte’, besser gesagt: ‘rationalisierte’ Mathematik richtet ihre Grundsätze nur so ein,
daß gewisse bekannte Deutungen nicht ausgeschlossen sind. (Korselt, 1903, 403)
35
Was Herr Korselt mit ‘Deutung’ meint, ist auf Grund unserer Auffassung des Korseltschen reinen
sa

Lehrbegriffes leicht zu erraten. Wenn wir durch einen Schluß von dem allgemeinen Lehrsatze ‘Wenn a >
1, so ist a 2 > 1’ zu dem besondern ‘Wenn 2 > 1, so ist 22 > 1’ übergehen, so entspricht der uneigentliche
Satz ‘a > 1’ dem eigentlichen ‘2 > 1’. Nach Herrn Korselts Redeweise wird ‘2 > 1’ oder der Gedanke
dieses Satzes eine Deutung von ‘a > 1’ sein. Als ob der allgemeine Satz eine wächserne Nase wäre, die
man bald so, bald anders drehen könnte. In Wahrheit liegt keine Deutung, sondern ein Schluß vor. (1969,
301-2)
Fregean Accounts of Metaphysical Modalism 131

by arguing that the idea of a statement obtaining under certain circumstances makes
no sense, whether the statement in question is proper or improper. To begin with,
“ ‘the statement obtains’ mean[s] that the statement expresses a true thought” (1906,

.e ion
398). A proper statement expresses a thought. However, there is no relativization
of the truth of thoughts to circumstances (or anything else). Hence there is no such
thing as a proper statement obtaining under a circumstance. An improper statement
expresses no thought at all, so there is no such thing as its obtaining, either absolutely

an iss
or under a circumstance. Frege then “imagines” (sich denken) what Korselt means:

du
It can concern only improper statements, and here comes Mr. Korselt once again with his

m
interpretations. He interprets a statement like this, and it obtains; he interprets it otherwise,
and it does not obtain. He turns the wax nose now to the right, now to the left, just as he pleases.

per
For example, let us take the statement ‘On a straight line there are at least two points’! Now
let us interpret the word ‘point’ as foot, the words ‘straight line’ as worm, and the words ‘there
are’ as has. We then interpret our statement thus: A worm has at least two feet. Almost
as easily as we have here obtained something false, can we obtain something true from this
statement by means of different interpretations. We now see how right Mr. Korselt is when

ut
he says that a statement may hold under some circumstances, but not under others; it simply

ey
all depends upon the interpretation. But let us stop joking. A statement that holds only under
certain circumstances is not a proper statement. However, we can express the circumstances
h@ itho
under which it holds in antecedent statements and add them as such to the statement. So
supplemented, the statement will no longer hold only under certain circumstances but will
sl
hold quite generally. The original statement appears in it as a consequent statement; and as an
improper statement at that. (1906, 398-9; emphases mine)36
sh ite w
we
In this passage Frege starts out by applying his reconstruction of Korselt’s ‘interpre-
tation’ to understand Korselt’s talk of statements ‘obtaining under a circumstance’.
To obtain under a circumstance is to be true in a circumstance, and that really mean
to have a true interpretation. Only an improper statement, containing variables, is
true under an interpretation, and what that means is that a result of instantiating the
c

variables occurring in that statement is true. Similarly, for an improper statement to


ie

be false under a circumstance is for a result of instantiating the variables occurring


or not

in that statement to be false. For example, the sentence


(18) On a straight line there are at least two points
is really an improper statement containing second-level variables in the guise of ‘ξ is
o

a straight line’, ‘ξ is a point’, and ‘ξ lies on ζ’. Instantiating these variables with the
d.

first-level concept and relation expressions ‘ξ is a foot’, ‘ξ is a worm’, and ‘ξ has ζ’


:d

yields a false proper statement, which is what it is for this improper statement to fail
to obtain under a circumstance.
36
Und doch kann man sich denken, was Herr Korselt meint. Es kann sich nur um uneigentliche Sätze
aft

handeln; und da wird Herr Korselt wieder mit seinen Deutungen kommen. Er deutet einen Satz so; dann
besteht er; er deutet ihn anders; dann besteht er nicht. Er dreht die wächserne Nase rechts; er dreht sie
nf

links, ganz nach Belieben. Nehmen wir z. B. den Satz: »Auf einer Geraden gibt es wenigstens zwei
Dr

Punkte«! Nun deuten wir das Wort ‘Punkt’ als Full, das Wort ‘Gerade’ als Wurm, und die Worte ‘es gibt
auf’ deuten wir als hat. So deuten wir unsern Satz so: Ein Wurm hat wenigstens zwei Füße. Fast ebenso
leicht, wie wir hier etwas Falsches erhalten haben, können wir durch andere Deutungen etwas Wahres aus
sa

dem Satze gewinnen. Nun sehen wir, wie recht Herr Korselt hat, wenn er meint, ein Satz könne unter
Umständen bestehen, unter Umständen nicht; es kommt eben ganz auf die Deutung an. Doch kehren wir
zum Ernste zürück! Ein Satz, der nur unter Umständen gilt, ist kein eigentlicher Satz. Wir können aber
die Umstände, unter denen er gilt, in Bedingungssätzen aussprechen und als solche dem Satze anfügen.
Der so ergänzte Satz gilt nun nicht mehr nur unter Umständen, sondern schlechthin. Der ursprüngliche
Satz erscheint in diesem als Folgesatz, und zwar als uneigentlicher. (1967, 314)
132 Fregean Amodalism

But Frege doesn’t in the end accept this account of what Korselt might mean by
a statement obtaining in a circumstance, for he concludes the account by saying he
had been “joking.” The account that he ends up proposing is in the passage discussed

.e ion
in the last subsection:

[W]e can express the circumstances under which [an improper statement] holds in antecedent
statements and add them as such to the statement. So supplemented, the statement will no

an iss
longer hold only under certain circumstances but will hold quite generally. (1906, 399)

du
Now that we have the context for this proposal, we can see that Frege is not offering

m
an account of any statement whatsoever being true under a circumstance, but only
of improper statements (tacitly) containing variables. Exactly how Frege’s proposed
account is supposed to work is hard to determine, for he doesn’t spell out precisely

per
what it is to add expressions of circumstances in which an improper statement holds as
antecedents of conditionals whose consequents are those improper statements. How-
ever, it is clear that when such improper statements are embedded in universally
quantified conditionals, the variables express generality.

ut
So I suggest that Frege has in mind the following sort of account of what it is

ey
for a(n improper) statement of Hilbertian geometry to hold under a circumstance.
h@ itho
Consider the sentence (18). On Frege’s view, it is, in Hilbert’s geometry, an improper
statement containing second-level variables, which expresses no thought on its own.

(19)
sl
We can make this explicit by rewriting it, in contemporary notation, as
(∀x)(Λx ⊃ (∃y)(∃z)(Πy . Πz . y ≠ z . Ωyx . Ωzx))
sh ite w
we
where ‘Λξ’ is the second-level variable corresponding to ‘ξ is a line’, ‘Πξ’ corre-
sponds to ‘ξ is a point’, and ‘Ωξζ’ corresponds to ‘ξ lies on ζ’. Let’s abbreviate this
improper statement as S(Λ, Π, Ω). Let Ax(Ξ1 , ..., Ξn ) be a conjunction of Hilbertian
pseudo-axioms, where the second-level variables Λ, Π, Ω are among the second-level
variables Ξ1 , ..., Ξn . (Strictly speaking, the second-level variables should be written
c

with indications of placeholders for first-level arguments, but in the following I ig-
ie

nore this complication.) Ax(Ξ1 , ..., Ξn ) is also an improper statement that expresses
or not

no thought. However, the universally quantified conditional


(20) (∀Ξ1 , ..., Ξn )(Ax(Ξ1 , ..., Ξn ) ⊃ S(Λ, Π, Ω))
does express a thought. From an instance, i.e., an interpretation, of such a generalized
o

conditional,
d.
:d

Ax(K1 , ... , Kn ) ⊃ S(Λ0 , Π0 , Ω0 ),


where K1 , ... , Kn are second-level concept- and relation-expressions, and Λ0 , Π0 , Ω0
are among the K1 , ... , Kn , one can infer the corresponding interpretation of the
aft

Hilbertian improper statement,


nf

S(Λ0 , Π0 , Ω0 )
Dr

provided that the corresponding interpretation of the antecedent, which is the con-
sa

junction of Hilbertian pseudo-axioms


Ax(K1 , ... , Kn )
is true. The improper statement of Hilbertian geometry S(Λ, Π, Ω) is true or holds in
circumstance C just in case
Fregean Accounts of Metaphysical Modalism 133

• A true statement SC expressing C is an instance of the pseudo-axioms Ax(Ξ1 , ...,


Ξn ), and
• the generalized conditional (20) is true.

.e ion
Taking the foregoing as a model, we now sketch a Fregean account of what it
is for an arbitrary improper statement to hold under a circumstance. An arbitrary
improper statement S(v1 , ... , vn ), where v, ... , vn are variables of arbitrary levels, is

an iss
true or holds in circumstance C just in case

du

• A true statement SC that expresses C is an instance of an improper statement

m

S (v′1 , ... , v′m )
• v1 , ... , vn are among v′1 , ... , v′m

per

• the generalized conditional (∀v′1 , ... , v′m )(S (v′1 , ... , v′m ) ⊃ S(v1 , ... ,vn )) is true.
Now let’s proceed to Fregean accounts of the modal statements ⌜it is necessary that S⌝
and ⌜it is possible that S⌝. Since we are starting from the truth under interpretations

ut
of improper statements containing (expressions understood as) free variables, which

ey
don’t by themselves express any thoughts, we have to adapt the basic metaphysical
h@ itho
modalist framework slightly. S(v1 , ... , vn ) doesn’t express a thought, hence it doesn’t
express a true or a false thought. But the Fregean account specifies the conditions
sl
under which S(v1 , ... , vn ) is true in a circumstance C. So we give conditions for ⌜it is
necessary that S(v1 , ... , vn )⌝ to be true, not in terms of the truth of the thoughts that
S(v1 , ... , vn ) expresses in all circumstances, but rather in terms of S(v1 , ... , vn ) being
sh ite w
we
true in C for all circumstances C. Specifically, ⌜it is necessary that S(v1 , ... , vn )⌝ is
true just in case

• For every true instance of every improper statement S (v′1 , ... , v′m ), where v1 , ... , vn

are among v′1 , ... , v′m , (∀v′1 , ... , v′m )(S (v′1 , ... , v′m ) ⊃ S(v1 , ... , vn )) is true.
c

Similarly, we take ⌜it is possible that S(v1 , ... , vn )⌝ to express a truth just in case
ie

S(v1 , ... , vn ) is true in at least one circumstances C, which holds if


or not


• For some true instance of some improper statement S (y1 , ... , ym ), where v1 , ... , vn

are among y1 , ... , ym , (∀v′1 , ... , v′m )(S (v′1 , ... , v′m ) ⊃ S(v1 , ... , vn )) is true.
Let’s restrict our attention to the case where all the variables of the improper
o
d.

statements are first-level: x1, … , xn . It is not hard to see that, on this account, ⌜it is
:d

necessary that S(x1 , ... , xn )⌝ is true just in case the universal closure of S(x1 , ... , xn )
is true:
• Suppose that ⌜it is necessary that S(x1 , ... , xn )⌝ is true.
aft

• All instances of the improper statement x1 = x1 & x2 = x2 & ... & xn = xn are
nf

true.
Dr

• Hence (∀x1 , ... , xn )(x1 = x1 & x2 = x2 & ... & xn = xn ⊃ S(x1 , ... , xn )) is true.
• But then (∀x1 , ... , xn )S(x1 , ... , xn ) is true.
sa

• Suppose conversely that (∀x1 , ... , xn )S(x1 , ... , xn ) is true.



• Then obviously for any S (y1 , ... , ym ), where x1 , ... , xn are among y1 , ... , ym ,

(∀y1 , ... , ym )(S (y1 , ... , ym ) ⊃ S(x1 , ... , xn )) is true.
134 Fregean Amodalism

Similarly, ⌜it is possible that S(x1 , ... , xn )⌝ is true just in case S(x1 , ... , xn ) has a true
instance:

.e ion
• Suppose S(a01 , ... , a0n ) is a true instance of the improper statement S(x1 , ... , xn ).
• Then, since (∀x1 , ... , xn )(S(x1 , ... , xn ) ⊃ S(x1 , ... , xn )) is true, so is ⌜it is
possible that S(x1 , ... , xn )⌝.

an iss
• Suppose conversely that ⌜it is possible that S(x1 , ... , xn )⌝ is true.
′ ′
• Then there is a true instance S (b01 , ... , b0m ) of some improper statement S (y1 , ... , ym )

du

such that x1 , ... , xn are among y1 , ... , ym and (∀y1 , ... , ym )(S (y1 , ... , ym ) ⊃

m
S(x1 , ... , xn )) is true.

• Instantiate (∀y1 , ... , ym )(S (y1 , ... , ym ) ⊃S(x1 , ... , xn )) with b01 , ... , b0m for

per
y1 , ... , ym .

• We than obtain a conditional statement S (b01 , ... , b0m ) ⊃ S(c01 , ... , c0n )), where
c01 , ... , c0n are among b01 , ... , b0m .

ut
• The antecedent of this statement is true ex hypothesi, hence the consequent is a
true instance of S(x1 , ... , xn ).

ey
h@ itho
This account, to repeat, applies to improper statements. However, one might extend
it to proper statements in a fairly natural way:
sl
⌜It is necessary that S⌝ is true iff there is an improper statement S(x1 , ... , xn )
such that
sh ite w
we
• S is an instance S(a1 , ... , an ) of S(x1 , ... , xn ), and
• ⌜it is necessary that S(x1 , ... , xn )⌝ is true
⌜It is possible that S⌝ is true iff there is an improper statement S(x1 , ... , xn ) such
that
c
ie

• S is an instance S(a1 , ... , an ) of S(x1 , ... , xn ), and


or not

• ⌜it is possible that S(x1 , ... , xn )⌝ is true


Again restricting our attention to the case first-level variable improper statements, we
may conclude that ⌜it is necessary that S⌝ is true iff the universal generalization of S
with respect to all object names occurring in it is true, and ⌜it is possible that S⌝ is true
o

iff S has a true substitution instance. So any instance of a true universal generalization
d.

counts as expressing a necessary truth. Thus the present account remains distant from
:d

the contemporary view of modality.


In a fuller investigation one should consider at least two extensions of the simple
account just considered. First, one should consider improper statements in which oc-
aft

cur variables of arbitrarily high level. Second, one should consider what accounts
of modal statements result from restricting the antecedent improper statements—
nf


S (y1 , ... , ym )—to various subsets of all improper statements, analogous to the Hilber-
Dr

tian restriction to the improper axioms of geometry.


sa

3.4 Concluding Remark


We have seen a number of differences between the account of modality articulated in
Begriffsschrift and the accounts of modality based on Frege’s mature views. I will end
Concluding Remark 135

by noting two unities that underlie these differences. In the early view, what is done
with modal discourse, that is, presenting a statement as necessary or as possible, does
not reflect any aspect of conceptual content. Thus, what is done with modal discourse

.e ion
is of no concern to logic. In the later view, what is expressed by modal discourse
does not reflect any aspect of truth. Truth is supervenient on the constitutive aim of
judging, and the achievement of this aim, judgment, is the principal concern of logic.
Thus, in both periods Frege sees modality as extrinsic to what is philosophically

an iss
fundamental, namely, logic. But, neither period does Frege simply reject modality:

du
the supposed modalities of judgment and the supposed temporal and metaphysical
modalities of truth are reconstructed from materials that are indeed intrinsic to logic.

m
per
ut
ey
h@ itho
sl
sh ite w
we
c
ie
or not
o
d.
:d
aft
nf
Dr
sa
4

.e ion
Frege on the Nature of Logic

an iss
In the first three chapters, we saw that Frege’s opposition to modalities of truth is

du
grounded in conceptions of judgment, truth, and thought fundamental to his philoso-

m
phy. Frege is thus precluded from conceiving of logic in modal terms, thereby parting
company with the long tradition of thinking about logic going back to Aristotle.

per
This conclusion leads naturally to the topic of this chapter: how does Frege
conceive of logic? I begin in §4.1 with some characteristics that have regularly been
associated with logic in the history of Western philosophy: apriority and analyticity.
The idea of the a priori is that of something knowable independent of the senses or

ut
of empirical evidence. It was made prominent by Kant but is in play in one form or
the other from Plato to the present day. The basic truths of logic, it has been claimed,

ey
are a priori truths. The idea of analyticity is that of a proposition whose truth rests on
h@ itho
its structure; a prominent example is Leibniz’s view that propositions are composed
of subjects and predicates, and are true if the subject is “contained” in the predicate.
sl
It has been claimed that the basic truths of logic are analytic; indeed, it has been
claimed that what makes a truth logical lies in part in its analyticity.
sh ite w

But for Frege, neither apriority nor analyticity makes a truth logical. It is well-
we
known that, in Grundlagen, Frege explicitly formulates his own version of Kant’s
analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions. We will see in §4.1 that for
Frege these distinctions, like necessity and possibility, are explained in terms of log-
ical notions, so that the nature of logic is not characterized in terms of analyticity or
apriority, but rather the other way around.
c

Kant famously held that there are synthetic a priori truths, and so the a priori/a
ie

posteriori and analytic/synthetic distinctions do not line up with one another. It has
or not

furthermore become more or less received wisdom in contemporary philosophy to


question whether these two distinctions line up with the distinction between necessary
and contingent truths, following Kripke’s argument for the existence of necessary a
posteriori and contingent a priori truths. We will see in §4.1 that, on Frege’s view,
o

these three distinctions also do not line up with one another: his account allows not
d.

only for synthetic a priori truths, but also necessary a posteriori and contingent a
:d

priori truths.
The remainder of this chapter is an attempt to isolate Frege’s conception of the
nature of logic. In §4.2 I present the principal characterizations of logic in Frege’s
aft

writings. There is little doubt that Frege takes logic to be a system of truths that
constitutes the standards of correctness for all judgment. Frege clearly also takes
nf

logic to divide into completely general primitive truths which comprise the axioms
Dr

or basic laws of a formulation of logic, and logical truths justified on the basis of
primitive logical truths. Thus the question of how Frege conceives of the nature of
sa

logic becomes the question of how he conceives of the primitive truths of logic.
Now, it is generally acknowledged that there are completely general truths that
are not truths of logic, whether primitive or derived.1 This takes us to the main ques-
1
See Heck (2007, 37).
Analyticity, Apriority, and Modality 137

tion of this chapter: what else has to hold of a completely general truth for it to qualify
as a primitive truth of logic? We will see in §4.2 that Frege appears to hold that what
makes a thought a primitive logical truth is that it provides its own justification. It

.e ion
is not justified by any other truths, nor by sense-perception, nor by pure intuition of
space. I call this feature justificational self-sufficiency or self-justification.
Whatever exactly justificational self-sufficiency consists in, the axioms of Be-
griffsschrift and the basic laws of Grundgesetze are surely supposed to have this prop-

an iss
erty. Yet Frege seems, in these books, to give arguments for these axioms and basic

du
laws. What could these arguments be, if they are not justifications of the basic laws
on the basis of other truths?

m
I address this question in §4.3. Frege’s arguments have been the focus of an
interpretive dispute over whether he formulated semantic theories and attempted to

per
demonstrate the soundness of his formulations of logic with respect to these semantic
theories. In 4.3.1 I briefly survey this controversy, reaching the conclusion that the
textual evidence does not conclusively decide in favor of either side. However, it’s
prima facie unclear how a soundness argument for a logical law may be understood

ut
as something other than a justification of that law. In §§4.3.2 and 4.3.3 I discuss
a proposal for a non-justifying semantic interpretation of Frege’s arguments. The

ey
proposal rests on the hypothesis that, for Frege, a thought counts as justificationally
h@ itho
self-sufficiency just in case the ground for the justification of that thought is, in some
sense or the other, the logical aspects of that thought. The proposal then is that Frege’s
sl
arguments are intended to demonstrate, not the truth of the basic laws, but the claim
that their truth is grounded on the logical aspects of the thoughts that they express.
sh ite w

Thus, these arguments appear as arguments for the justificational independence of


we
these thoughts, and so for their being primitive logical truths. In §4.3.4 I raise an
objection to this interpretation by showing that Frege’s arguments cannot furnish a
non-question-begging demonstration of the primitive logical status of any truth. If
we know that some thought is a primitive logical truth, this piece of knowledge is not
justified by inference. I propose that for Frege our justification of such knowledge
c

is analogous to sense-perception or pure intuition of space: it is the exercise of a


ie

perception-like capacity. I conclude with the hypothesis that Frege’s “arguments”


or not

are intended to provide his readers with the occasion to exercise this capacity with
respect to the thoughts that are Frege’s basic logical laws.

4.1 Analyticity, Apriority, and Modality


o
d.
:d

In one of the most well-known passages of Grundlagen, Frege recasts Kant’s ana-
lytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions:
aft

[T]hese distinctions between a priori and a posteriori, synthetic and analytic, concern, as I see
it,{footnote: By this I do not, of course, mean to assign a new sense to these terms, but only to
nf

meet what earlier writers, Kant in particular, have meant} not the content of the judgment but
the justification [Berechtigung] for making the judgment. …. When a proposition is called a
Dr

posteriori or analytic in my sense, this is … a judgment about the deepest ground upon which
rests the justification for holding it to be true.
sa

This means that the question is removed from the sphere of psychology, and assigned, if
the truth concerned is a mathematical one, to the sphere of mathematics. The problem becomes,
in fact, that of finding the proof of the proposition, and of following it up right back to the
primitive truths. If, in carrying out this process, we come only on general logical laws and
on definitions, then the truth is an analytic one, bearing in mind that we must take account
138 Frege on the Nature of Logic

also of all propositions upon which the admissibility of any of the definitions depends. If,
however, it is impossible to give the proof without making use of truths which are not of a
general logical nature, but belong to the sphere of some special science, then the proposition

.e ion
is a synthetic one. For a truth to be a posteriori, it must be impossible to construct a proof of it
without including an appeal to facts, i.e., to truths which are unprovable [unbeweisbare] and
not general, since they contain assertions about particular objects. But if, on the contrary, its
proof can be derived exclusively from general laws, which themselves are neither capable nor

an iss
in need of proof [eines Beweises weder fähig noch bedürftig sind], then the truth is a priori.
(1884, §3, 3-4; emphases mine)2

du
m
Frege’s reformulation of Kant’s distinctions is in effect a categorization of judgments
or truths by type of justification. The type of the justification of a judgment is given
by the “deepest grounds” involved; in the case of mathematical judgments, these

per
deepest grounds are identified as the “primitive truths” appearing in the proof of the
proposition. The classification is given in logical terms: the justificational category
of a truth depends on the logical notion of generality and on the identity of the laws of
logic. Analytic truths are those whose justification rests on general primitive truths

ut
that are logical laws, as well as definitions. Thus what counts as an analytic truth is

ey
determined by what the laws of logic are. The justification of synthetic truths requires
h@ itho
ultimately either non-logical or non-general primitive truths. Apriority is defined in
terms of the generality of primitive grounds, aposteriority in terms of requiring non-
sl
general primitive grounds.
Analytic a posteriori truths are ruled out because being a posteriori requires
ultimate justification from non-general primitive truths, and that is incompatible with
sh ite w
we
analyticity’s requirement of grounding in general truths of logic. However, Frege’s
account leaves room for synthetic a priori truths provided that there are primitive
truths that are simultaneously general—hence not a posteriori—and not logical—
hence not analytic. Frege agrees with Kant in holding that the primitive truths on
which geometrical proofs rest are grounded in pure intuition of space, and so are
non-logical, but also general. Thus on Frege’s account, aposteriority and analyticity
c

are contraries, not contradictories.


ie

How do these distinctions line up with Frege’s account of modal judgments in


or not

Begriffsschrift?
An apodictic judgment, recall, is expressed by an ascription of necessity to a
non-modal statement suitable for expressing an assertoric judgment. The content of
o

2
d.

Jene Unterscheidungen von apriori und aposteriori, synthetisch und analytisch betreffen nun nach
:d

meiner{note: Ich will damit natürlich nicht einen neuen Sinn hineinlegen, sondern nur das treffen, was
frühere Schriftsteller, insbesondere Kant gemeint haben} Auffassung nicht den Inhalt des Urtheils, son-
dern die Berechtigung zur Urtheilsfällung. …. Wenn man einen Satz in meinem Sinne aposteriori oder
analytisch nennt, so urtheilt man … darüber, worauf im tiefsten Grunde die Berechtigung des Fürwahrhal-
tens beruht.
aft

Dadurch wird die Frage dem Gebiete der Psychologie entrückt und dem der Mathematik zugewiesen,
wenn es sich um eine mathemathische Wahrheit handelt. Es kommt nun darauf an, den Beweis zu finden
nf

und ihn bis auf die Urwahrheiten zurückzuverfolgen. Stösst man auf diesem Wege nur auf die allgemeinen
Dr

logischen Gesetze und auf Definitionen, so hat man eine analytische Wahrheit, wobei vorausgesetzt wird,
dass auch die Sätze mit in Betracht gezogen werden, auf denen etwa die Zulässigkeit einer Definition
beruht. Wenn es aber nicht möglich ist, den Beweis zu führen, ohne Wahrheiten zu benutzen, welche nicht
sa

allgemein logischer Natur sind, sondern sich auf ein besonderes Wissensgebiet beziehen, so ist der Satz ein
synthetischer. Damit eine Wahrheit aposteriori sei, wird verlangt, dass ihr Beweis nicht ohne Berufung
auf Thatsachen auskomme; d.h. auf unbeweisbare Wahrheiten ohne Allgemeinheit, die Aussagen von
bestimmten Gegenständen enthalten. Ist es dagegen möglich, den Beweis ganz aus allgemeinen Gesetzen
zu führen, die selber eines Beweises weder fähig noch bedürftig sind, so ist die Wahrheit apriori. (1884,
§3, 3-4)
Analyticity, Apriority, and Modality 139

the apodictic judgment is the same as the content of that assertoric judgment, but
the judger implicates that her grounds for that assertoric judgment are general judg-
ments. Now, suppose that the implicature is true so that the assertoric judgment of

.e ion
the non-modal content of the apodictic judgment is justified by general judgments.
It certainly seems that this assertoric judgment is not a posteriori, but may also be
analytic or synthetic a priori. Since the apodictic judgment has the same content
as this assertoric judgment, it surely also is not a posteriori but may be analytic or

an iss
synthetic a priori. So it may seem that no apodictic judgment is a posteriori. But

du
it’s not clear that this is so. The characterization of apodictic judgment mentions jus-
tification, not deepest justification. Thus, suppose that the content of an apodictic

m
judgment is an instance of a general statement of physics, yet the justification of the
general physical statement is traced ultimately to facts. In that case, the ultimate jus-

per
tification of the content of that apodictic judgment includes non-general truths. So
the assertoric judgment of that content counts as a posteriori, and hence so does the
apodictic judgment itself. Thus, according to Frege’s explicit views, there are neces-
sary a posteriori judgments. Another way of characterizing this conclusion is that,

ut
according to Frege, some ascriptions of necessity to statements are a posteriori. If the
contents of those statements are true, then those contents are necessary a posteriori

ey
truths.
h@ itho
Frege has two accounts of judgments of possibility. On one account they are
not judgments at all but indications of refraining from judging a content because of
sl
ignorance of laws from which the negation of the content follows. Since the speaker
hasn’t made a judgment and so a fortiori hasn’t made a judgment justified on the basis
sh ite w

of other judgments, the analytic/synthetic and the a priori/a posteriori distinctions


we
don’t apply at all.
On the other account, certain judgments of possibility, in fact, express existen-
tial generalizations. Now for Frege, all the versions of the law of excluded middle are
certainly general logical laws. One version is (∀F)(∀x)(Fx ∨ ∼Fx). From this claim,
the existential generalization (∃F)(∃x)(Fx ∨ ∼Fx) follows. So there are analytic ex-
c

istential generalizations. If ‘someone was born in Wismar’ is justified by ‘Frege was


ie

born in Wismar’, then there are a posteriori existential generalizations. Finally, the
or not

theorems of Euclidean geometry are synthetic a priori. Many Euclidean theorems


are universally generalized conditionals and so, together with an appropriate exis-
tential claim, imply their corresponding existential generalizations. For example, the
claim that there exist line segments, together with Euclid’s first Proposition, imply
o

the existential generalization that there is a line segment such that there is an equi-
d.

lateral triangle with that segment as base. But the claim that there are line segments
:d

is a primitive general truth of geometry. So there are synthetic a priori existential


generalizations. Thus, on Frege’s second account, judgments of possibility may be
analytic, synthetic a priori, or a posteriori.
aft

How do Frege’s analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions line up


with the three Fregean amodalist accounts of modal discourse sketched in Chapter
nf

3?
Dr

On the first account, the thought expressed by ⌜it is necessary that S⌝ is a uni-
versal generalization over possible circumstances, and that expressed by ⌜it is pos-
sa

sible that S⌝ is an existential generalization over possible circumstances. We have,


however, no account of the justification of such generalizations, and so no basis for
applying Frege’s justificational categories to them.
On the second account, ⌜it is necessary that S⌝ expresses a thought that is true
140 Frege on the Nature of Logic

just in case for every statement C that expresses a circumstance ⌜if C then S⌝ is true.
Since this account doesn’t provide a direct account of what the thought expressed
by ⌜it is necessary that S⌝ is, there is no direct account of the justification of that

.e ion
thought. However, given that that thought is true just in case, for every circumstance-
expressing C, ⌜if C then S⌝ is true, it is reasonable to take any justification for the truth
of all of ⌜if C then S⌝ to counts as a justification of ⌜it is necessary that S⌝. Clearly,
however, if ‘if … then’ is expressed by Frege’s conditionality sign, any justification

an iss
of S is also a justification of ⌜if T then S⌝ for any T. So any justification of S is a
justification of ⌜it is necessary that S⌝. It follows that ⌜it is necessary that S⌝ may be

du
analytic, synthetic a priori, or a posteriori according to the justificational status of S.

m
Similarly, it is reasonable to count any justification of the truth of any one con-
ditional ⌜if C then S⌝ as a justification of ⌜it is possible that S⌝. If S itself has a

per
justification, then the preceding line of argument shows that ⌜it is possible that S⌝
has a justification of the same category. Now, if S has a justification, then its nega-
tion doesn’t. However, as we saw, if T expresses any counterfactual circumstance,
then T is false, and so ⌜if T then S⌝ is true for any statement S. It follows that even if S

ut
has a justification and so ⌜not-S⌝ doesn’t, still ⌜if T then not-S⌝ is true provided that
T expresses a counterfactual circumstance. Suppose now that we understand contin-

ey
gency in the standard metaphysical modalist way: a thought is contingent if it is true
h@ itho
with respect to actual circumstances but false with respect to some counterfactual
circumstance. Then, on the second account, a justification of the thought expressed
sl
by ⌜it is contingent that S⌝ requires no more than:
sh ite w

• a justification of S, and
we
• a justification of ⌜not-C⊥ ⌝, for some C⊥ expressing a counterfactual circum-
stance, since, for any S and T, ⌜not-S⌝ implies ⌜if S then T⌝.
The category of this justification is then determined by the categories of the justifi-
cations of S and of ⌜not-C⊥ ⌝. In the following situation the justificational category
c

of both are a priori:


ie

• S is an instance of a law of logic, and so has an a priori justification, and


or not

• C⊥ is the negation of a theorem of Euclidean geometry, so ⌜not-C⊥ ⌝ has a syn-


thetic a priori justification.
So, both S and ⌜not-C⊥ ⌝ have a priori justifications. It follows that ⌜it is contingent
o

that S⌝ is a priori. Hence S, by this second account, counts as a contingent a priori


d.

truth.
:d

On the third account, ⌜it is necessary that S⌝, for S a proper statement containing
object names and functions name of no higher than first-level, expresses a thought
that is true if and only if the thought expressed by universally generalizing on all the
aft

objects names occurring in S is true. If, as in the case of the second account, we count
a justification of this universal generalization as a justification of ⌜it is necessary
nf

that S⌝, then a statement of necessity of this form is analytic, synthetic a priori, or
Dr

a posteriori just in case the universal closure of S has, respectively, one of these
justificational statuses. So the account is consistent with a statement of necessity
sa

being a posteriori, and hence with the existence of necessary a posteriori truths. For
example, if a universal generalization of physics is justified a posteriori, on factual
grounds, then an ascription of necessity to any instance of this generalization is also
justified a posteriori. Any of these instances would then be a necessary a posteriori
truth.
Frege’s Main Characterizations of Logic 141

On the third account, ⌜it is possible that S⌝, for S containing only object and
first-level function names, is true if and only if S has a true object name substitution
instance, a statement that results from S by replacing some object name in S with an-

.e ion
other object name. Once more counting a justification of such a substitution instance
as a justification of ⌜it is possible that S⌝, the justificational status of the ascription
of possibility is inherited from that of the substitution instance.
Consider now a true arithmetical statement that Frege, given his commitment to

an iss
logicism, would take to be justified a priori: “two is an even prime.” This statement

du
would count as contingently true if “it is possible that two is not an even prime” is
true. This latter ascription of possibility, in turn, is true if ⌜n is not an even prime⌝

m
is true for some name n is true. ‘Eight’ is such a name. Moreover, “eight is not an
even prime” is also, by Frege’s lights, justified a priori. Hence “it is contingent that

per
two is an even prime” is a priori true, and so “two is an even prime” is a contingent
a priori truth.
In sum, Frege’s “meeting” of what Kant “meant” in fact involves a reversal of
Kant.3 For Kant apriority is philosophically fundamental, while necessity (Notwendigkeit)

ut
and universality (Allgemeinheit) are no more than “secure indications of an a priori
cognition” (CPR, B4).4 For Frege, in contrast, the logical notion of generality (All-

ey
gemeinheit) is fundamental, while both apriority and necessity are explained in terms
h@ itho
of generality.

4.2
sl
Frege’s Main Characterizations of Logic
sh ite w
we
In this section, I survey Frege’s principal characterizations of logic.

4.2.1 Generality or Universality (Allgemeinheit)


The laws of logic are the standards of correctness governing all thinking, no matter
c

what subject matter. A representative expression of this view is in the Foreword of


ie

Grundgesetze:
or not

In one sense [a law] says what is, in the other it prescribes what ought to be. Only in the latter
sense can the logical laws be called laws of thought, in so far as they legislate how one ought
to think. [Logical laws] deserve the title ‘laws of thought’ only if thereby it is supposed to be
said that they are the most general laws, prescribing how to think wherever there is thinking
o
d.
:d

3
It is not the case, however, that Frege fails altogether to meet Kant’s meaning. In particular, Frege’s
account of analyticity arguably respects one aspect of Kant’s conception: an analytic truth may be shown
to be true on the basis of logic and analysis of concepts. For more discussion see my (2008).
4
In fact it’s not mere universality but “strict” or “strong” universality that Kant takes to be a secure
aft

indication of apriority: “Notwendigkeit und strenge Allgemeinheit sind also sichere Kennzeichen einer
Erkenntnis a priori” (Kant, 1956 [henceforth cited as KrV], B4). A strictly universal proposition allows of
nf

no possible exceptions, in contrast to a “comparatively” universal proposition, which claims merely that
Dr

no exceptions have so far been experienced:

Erfahrung gibt niemals ihren Urteilen wahre oder strenge, sondern nur angenommene und kom-
sa

parative Allgemeinheit …, so daß es eigentlich heißen muß: soviel wir bisher wahrgenommen
haben, findet sich von dieser oder jener Regel keine Ausnahme. Wird also ein Urteil in strenger
Allgemeinheit gedacht, d. i. so, daß gar keine Ausnahme als möglich verstattet wird …. (KrV,
B3-4)
142 Frege on the Nature of Logic

at all. (2013, XIV-V)5

Logic consists of norms prescribing how to reach truth, and these prescriptions do

.e ion
not depend on the “objects” of any particular area of knowledge:
Like ethics, logic can also be called a normative science. How must I think in order to reach
the goal, truth? We expect logic to give us the answer to this question, but we do not demand of

an iss
it that it should go into what is particular to each area of knowledge and its objects; rather, the
task we assign logic is only to state the most general of what is valid for all areas of thinking.
(1897, 128)6

du
m
This view was expressed as early as Begriffsschrift, where Frege characterizes “the
purely logical” way of proof as “disregarding the particular characteristics of things,”

per
and as depending on “laws of thought, which transcend all particulars” (1879, III-
IV).7
What is it to disregard or transcend particulars? We get an answer from “On
Formal Theories of Arithmetic,” where Frege presents a prima facie argument for
the logical nature of arithmetic:

ut
ey
[T]he basic statements [Grundsätze] on which arithmetic is based cannot relate merely to a lim-
h@ itho
ited area whose peculiarities they express in the way in which the axioms of geometry express
the peculiarities of what is spatial; rather, these basic statements must extend to everything
that can be thought. And surely we are justified in ascribing such most general statements to
logic. (1885, 95)8
sl
In this text, logic consists of statements. The statements, or basic statements, of logic
sh ite w
we
“transcend all particulars” by not referring to the objects or properties of any particu-
lar area of knowledge. This contrasts with the statements of geometry, which mention
spatial objects such as points and lines and spatial relations such as congruence and
intersection. In more recent terminology, the statements of logic are topic-neutral
or employ topic-neutral vocabulary. The basic laws of Begriffsschrift and Grundge-
c

setze are supposed to achieve this topic-neutrality by generalizing over all objects,
ie

properties, and relations.


or not

4.2.2 Logical Laws are Truths


Although for Frege the laws of logic are norms, it seems that he does not take them
to be fundamentally prescriptions. We can see this by looking at what I left out from
o
d.

5
In dem einen Sinne besagt [Gesetz] was ist, in dem andern schreibt es vor, was sein soll. Nur
:d

in diesem Sinne können die logischen Gesetze Denkgesetze genannt werden, indem sie festsetzen, wie
gedacht werden soll. [Logischen Gesetze] verdienen den Namen ‘Denkgesetze’ …, wenn damit gesagt
sein soll, dass sie die allgemeinsten sind, die überall da vorschreiben, wie gedacht werden soll, wo über-
haupt gedacht wird. (1893, XV)
aft

6
Wie die Ethik kann man auch die Logik eine normative Wissenschaft nennen. Wie muss ich denken,
um das Ziel, die Wahrheit, zu erreichen? Die Beantwortung dieser Frage erwarten wir von der Logik, aber
nf

wir verlangen nicht von ihr, dass sie auf das Besondere jedes Wissensgebietes und deren Gegenstande
Dr

eingehe; sondern nur das Allgemeinste, was für alle Gebiete des Denkens Geltung hat, anzugeben, weisen
wir der Logik als Aufgabe zu. (1969, 139)
7
Die festeste Beweisführung ist offenbar die rein logische, welche, von der besondern Beschaffen-
sa

heit der Dinge absehend, sich allein auf die Gesetze gründet … die Gesetze des Denkens, die über allen
Besonderheiten erhaben sind. (1879, III-IV)
8
[D]ie Grundsätze, auf denen sich die Arithmetik aufbaut, sich nicht auf ein engeres Gebiet beziehen
dürfen, dessen Eigentümlichkeit sie so zum Ausdruck bringen wie die Axiome der Geometrie die des
Raumlichen; sondern jene Grundsätze müssen sich auf alles Denkbare erstrecken; und einen solchen all-
gemeinsten Satz zählt man doch wohl mit Recht der Logik zu. (1967, 103)
Frege’s Main Characterizations of Logic 143

the passage from the Foreword of Grundgesetze quoted above; after stating that the
laws of logic “legislate how one ought to think,” Frege writes,

.e ion
Every law stating what is the case can be conceived as prescriptive, one should think in accor-
dance with it, and in that sense it is accordingly a law of thought. This holds for geometrical
and physical laws no less than for the logical. (1893, XV)9

an iss
And then Frege concludes that the laws of logic are the most general laws prescrib-
ing how to think. Thus the laws of logic, just like geometrical and physical laws,

du
state what is the case, but can be conceived as prescribing how one should think in

m
accordance with them. This fits with Frege’s characterization, later in the Foreword
of logical laws as non-psychological:

per
By logical laws I do not understand psychological laws of taking to be true, but laws of being
true. …. If being true is … independent of anyone’s acknowledgment, then the laws of being
true are not psychological laws either but boundary stones which are anchored in an eternal
ground, which our thinking may wash over but yet cannot displace. And because of this they
set the standards for our thinking if it wants to attain the truth. (1893, XVI; emphasis mine)10

ut
ey
That is to say, the laws of logic state what is the case concerning being true, and
h@ itho
thereby set the standards for the attainment of truth in thinking. The generality of
the laws of logic, then, is that they state what is the case concerning truth simpliciter,
sl
not truth limited to thought about spatial or physical objects and properties. So the
laws of logic are true statements about being true, and this accords with the early
sh ite w

“Logic” manuscript, in which Frege states that the “laws of logic are themselves
we
truths” (1879-91, 6).11
On this view, the laws of logic seem to be about a special property—being true—
of a special domain of entities—thoughts. Is this consistent with the universality of
logic?
It is, if the universality logic means that logic comprises topic-neutral standards
c

of correctness of judging and if judging aims at the acknowledgment of the truth of


ie

thoughts.
or not

On the view that logic consists of true statements about being true, a law of
logic describes what thoughts have the property of truth, given the truth of certain
other thoughts, regardless of what these thoughts are about. It then follows, given
the assumption that judging is acknowledging the truth of a thought, that what a law
o

of logic describes determines which judgings, which acknowledgments of the truth of


d.

thoughts, are correct, given certain other correct judgings, independent of the subject
:d

matter of these judgings.


However, as we saw in Chapter 2, after the sense/reference distinction Frege
came to hold that judgment is not fundamentally recognizing that thoughts have the
aft

property of truth. Rather, judgment is fundamentally the recognition of what is the


case. How should one conceive of the truths that the laws of logic are, on this new
nf

9
Dr

Jedes Gesetz, das besagt, was ist, kann aufgefasst werden als vorschreibend, es solle im Einklange
damit gedacht werden, und ist also in dem Sinne ein Denkgesetz. Das gilt von den geometrischen und
physikalischen nicht minder als von den logischen.
sa

10
Ich verstehe unter logischen Gesetzen nicht psychologische Gesetze des Fürwahrhaltens, sondern
Gesetze des Wahrseins. …. Wenn so das Wahrsein unabhängig davon ist, dass es von irgendeinem an-
erkannt wird, so sind auch die Gesetze des Wahrseins nicht psychologische Gesetze, sondern Grenzsteine
in einem ewigen Grunde befestigt, von unserm Denken überfluthbar zwar, doch nicht verrückbar. Und
weil sie das sind, sind sie für unser Denken maassgebend, wenn es die Wahrheit erreichen will.
11
Die logischen Gesetze sind selber Wahrheiten (1969, 6)
144 Frege on the Nature of Logic

conception of judgment? One answer is that these laws describe what is the case,
given certain other things being the case, irrespective of what particular objects, prop-
erties, and relations are involved in these being the case. We can get a sense of what

.e ion
such a description might be by going back to the Foreword of Grundgesetze. We saw
Frege insisting that the laws of logic are non-psychological laws of being true rather
than taking to be true. He then contrasts the psychological and non-psychological
“readings” of the principle of identity as follows:

an iss
How, then, is the principle of identity to be read? Is it like this: ‘It is impossible for humans

du
in the year 1893 to acknowledge an object as being different from itself’? Or like this: ‘Every

m
object is identical to itself’? …. The latter is a law of being true; the former one of human
taking to be true. (1893, XVII)12

per
Here what Frege identifies as a law of being true is a statement that mentions neither
thoughts nor the property of truth. It is, rather, simply a general statement of what
is the case. Thus I take it that, on Frege’s post-sense/reference-distinction view of
judgment and truth, a law of logic is fundamentally not a description of thoughts

ut
and the property of truth, but rather just a statement of what is the case that achieves

ey
topic-neutrality by generalizing away all mention of specific objects, concepts, and
relations.
h@ itho
However, it is very doubtful that being a true unrestricted generalization can be
sl
any more than a necessary condition for being a law of logic. That there are at least
two objects is surely true and expressible without mentioning objects or relations of
any special sciences, but is it a law of logic? It is hard to see that it is, and so this
sh ite w
we
raises the question that will preoccupy us for the remainder of this chapter: does
Frege have an account of what else has to hold of a true topic-neutral generalization
for it to qualify as a law of logic?

4.2.3 The Justification of Logical Laws


c
ie

Apart from claiming that logical laws are truths, Frege in the early “Logic” manuscript
or not

makes a number of further points about logic. In order to set up the laws of infer-
ence, one has to “detach the logical” from natural language expressions; but even
after doing this, Frege writes,

our task is still not complete. The logical that we obtain will generally turn out to be complex;
o

we have to analyze this, for here as elsewhere we only attain full insight by pressing forwards
d.

until we arrive at the simplest. In this respect, too, logic, because of its attachment to language
:d

and grammar, has fallen short in a number of ways. The laws of logic are themselves truths
and here again there arises the question of the justification of judgments. If it is not justified
in terms of other truths, then logic doesn’t need to bother itself with it any further. If, on the
aft

other hand, a law of logic can be traced back [zurückführen] to other laws by inference, then
it is evidently the task of logic to carry out this tracing back; for only thus can one achieve an
nf

overview of the inventory of logical laws, without counting the same law as many. (1879-91,
6; emphases mine)13
Dr

12
Wie lautet nun eigentlich der Grundsatz der Identität? etwa so: ‘Den Menschen ist es im Jahre 1893
sa

unmöglich, einen Gegenstand als von ihm selbst verschieden anzuerkennen’ oder so: ‘Jeder Gegenstand
ist mit sich selbst identisch’? …. Dieses ist ein Gesetz des Wahrseins, jenes eines des menschlichen
Fürwahrhaltens.
13
Aber auch wenn wir das Logische aus einer sprachlichen Form oder Wendung oder Verbindung rein
abgesondert haben, ist unsere Aufgabe noch nicht beendet. Das Logische, was wir erhalten, wird sich
im allgemeinen als zusammengesetzt erweisen; wir müssen es zerlegen, denn hier wie überall gelangt
Frege’s Main Characterizations of Logic 145

In this passage, Frege appears to go from the view that the laws of logic are truths to a
question about how acknowledgment of these truths, i.e., their judgment, is justified.

.e ion
(1) There are two cases of justification of logical truths, according to whether or
not a given logical law is justified by “tracing it back” “by inference” to other,
presumably also logical, laws.
(2) Some laws are in some way logically “complex,” and are traced back to, and

an iss
thus inferentially justified by, logical laws that are in some way “the simplest.”

du
(3) If there is no inferential justification of a logical law, then “logic need not

m
bother with” the justification of that law. A similar view is expressed in
Grundgesetze:

per
As to the question, why and with what right we acknowledge a logical law to be true,
logic can respond only by tracing it back to other logical laws. Where this is not
possible, it can give no answer. (2013, XVII; emphases mine)14

ut
Here Frege does not speak of justification, but the question he mentions asks

ey
for the right (Recht) with which one acknowledges a logical law’s truth, that is
h@ itho
to say, the right with which one judges that law, and the word for justification
in the earlier “Logic” is ‘Berechtigung’.

(4)
sl
If a law can be traced back others, then it is a task for logic to trace it back,
because this tracing back shows that the law in question is in some sense not
sh ite w
we
really distinct from the ones to which it is traced.
(5) Frege does not say that there is no justification for those logical laws that are
not justified by inferential tracing back to other logical laws; he only claims
that logic cannot answer, and need not bother with, the question how such
laws are justified.
c
ie

One puzzling feature of these claims is Frege’s invocation of the notions of simplicity
or not

and complexity: in what way are some truths simpler than others, and how are some
truths the simplest? Setting this puzzle aside, the main question raised by these claims
is: what is Frege’s notion of justification?
Frege says relatively little about what justification consists in, and most of his
remarks occur in the early “Logic”:
o
d.
:d

The grounds on which we make a judgment may justify our acknowledging it as true; they
may, however, merely give rise to our making a judgment, or make up our minds for us, with-
out containing a justification for our judgment. Although each judgment we make is causally
conditioned, it is nevertheless not the case that all these causes are grounds that afford a justi-
aft

fication.
man zur vollen Einsicht nur durch das Vordringen bis auf das Einfachste. Auch in dieser Hinsicht hangen
nf

der Logik von Sprache und Grammatik her noch manche Mängel an. Die logischen Gesetze sind selber
Dr

Wahrheiten, und es erhebt sich hier wieder die Frage nach der Berechtigung des Urteils. Wenn diese nicht
auf Wahrheiten beruht, so braucht sich die Logik nicht weiter darum zu kümmern. Wenn dagegen ein
logisches Gesetz durch Schlüsse auf andere zurückführbar ist, so ist es offenbar Aufgabe der Logik, diese
sa

Zurückführung auszuführen; denn nur so kann man dahin gelangen, den Bestand an logischen Gesetzen
zu übersehen, ohne dasselbe mehrfach zu rechnen. (1969, 6-7)
14
Die Frage nun, warum und mit welchem Rechte wir ein logisches Gesetz als wahr anerkennen, kann
die Logik nur dadurch beantworten, dass sie es auf andere logische Gesetze zurückführt. Wo das nicht
möglich ist, muss sie die Antwort schuldig bleiben.
146 Frege on the Nature of Logic

[T]he grounds which justify the acknowledgment of a truth often reside in other truths
which have already been acknowledged. But if there are any truths cognized by us at all, this
cannot be the only form that justification takes. There must be judgments whose justification

.e ion
rests on something else, if they stand in need of justification at all.
…. Logic is concerned only with those grounds of judgment which are truths. To make a
judgment because we are conscious of other truths as providing a justification for it is known
as inferring. There are laws governing this kind of justification, and to set up these laws of

an iss
valid inference is the goal of logic. (1979, 2-3)15

du
From these remarks we see that for Frege justification is a relation between a judg-

m
ment, which is an acknowledgment of the truth of a thought, and its grounds. If
the grounds for a judgment are other judgments, other truths which have been ac-
knowledged, then the justification relation between this judgment and its grounds is

per
governed by logic.
We can read this text in terms of the distinction between judgment and judging
I attributed to Frege in 2.6. Justification is a relation between a judgment, not an act
of judging, and the grounds of that judgment. In some cases, the grounds are also

ut
judgments, not mere judgings. Let’s say that if ground G justifies judgment J, then

ey
G is the referent of the relation of justification and J is the relatum of this relation.
h@ itho
Clearly, the relation of justification is asymmetric: that G justifies J does not imply
that J justifies G. The relation is also multigrade: some judgments are justified by
sl
one ground, other judgments are justified by two, or three, or more grounds. From
what Frege writes it’s not clear whether he admits justification by an infinite number
of grounds.
sh ite w
we
Corresponding to the distinction between judgment and judging is a distinction
between inference and inferring. Inference is a sub-relation of the relation of justifica-
tion: it is justification restricted to grounds that are judgments. Inferring, in contrast,
is something we do: it occurs when we judge a thought because we are “conscious
of,” i.e., take, other judgings to be grounds of, to justify, acknowledging the truth of
c

that thought. Logic “sets up” the laws of valid inference in that logic specifies the
ie

relation of inference, and thereby determines whether in any given act of inferring the
or not

thought judged is indeed justified by the judgments taken by the inferer to be grounds
of the truth of that thought.
Frege’s division of logical laws then comes to this. One class of laws are such
that their judgments stand in the relation of inference to grounds that are judgments
of other laws of logic. Another class of laws of logic consists of those laws whose
o
d.

judgments are not the relata of the relation of inference. We see from the passages
:d

from “Logic” just quoted that Frege expresses some doubt whether logical laws of
this second class need have grounds at all since he does not say whether there are
there are justifying grounds for logical laws of this class that are not judgments.
aft

15
Die Gründe unseres Urteilens können zur Anerkennung der Wahrheit berechtigen; sie können uns
nf

aber auch nur zum Urteilen veranlassen oder bestimmen, ohne eine Rechtfertigung zu enthalten. Obwohl
Dr

jedes unserer Urteile ursächlich bedingt ist, so sind doch nicht alle diese Ursachen rechtfertigende Gründe.
Die Gründe … welche die Anerkennung einer Wahrheit rechtfertigen, liegen oft in anderen schon an-
erkannten Wahrheiten. Wenn aber überhaupt Wahrheiten von uns erkannt werden, so kann dies nicht die
sa

einzige Art der Rechtfertigung sein. Es muss Urteile geben, deren Rechtfertigung auf etwas anderem
beruht, wenn sie überhaupt einer solchen bedurfen.
…. Die Logik hat es nur mit solchen Gründen des Urteilens zu tun, welche Wahrheiten sind. Urteilen,
indem man sich anderer Wahrheiten als Rechtfertigungsgrunden bewusst ist, heisst schliessen. Es gibt
Gesetze über diese Art der Rechtfertigung, und diese Gesetze des richtigen Schliessens aufzustellen, ist
das Ziel der Logik.
Frege’s Main Characterizations of Logic 147

4.2.4 Primitive and Dependent Truths


The idea of a tracing back or reduction whereby certain truths or judgments are jus-

.e ion
tified by others is a recurrent theme in Frege’s writings. In Begriffsschrift §13, for
instance, Frege says,

It seems natural to derive the more complex … judgments from simpler ones, not in order to

an iss
make them more certain, which would be unnecessary in most cases, but in order to let the
relations of the judgments to one another emerge. Merely to know the laws is obviously not

du
the same as to know them together with the connections that some have to others. In this
way we arrive at a small number of laws in which, if we add those contained in the rules, the

m
content of all the laws is included, albeit in an undeveloped state. …. Since in view of the
boundless multitude of laws that can be enunciated we cannot list them all, we cannot achieve

per
completeness except by searching out those that, by their power, include all of them. (1879,
§13, 25; emphases mine)16

Note how the contents of the “boundless multitude” of laws are “included” in the
“small number” of laws.

ut
The picture is slightly different in Grundlagen. In §2 Frege characterizes the

ey
“aim of proof” as
h@ itho
not merely to place the truth of a statement beyond all doubt, but also to afford us insight
into the dependence of truths upon one another. …. The further we pursue these enquiries,
sl
the fewer become the primitive truths [Urwahrheiten] to which we trace everything; and this
simplification is in itself a goal worth pursuing. (1884, §2, 2)17
sh ite w
we
Assuming that “proof” here corresponds to the “derivations” of Begriffsschrift, the
relation among judgments revealed by proof or derivations is the dependence of the
truth of the proved truths on the truth of the premises. The “small number” of laws
of Begriffsschrift corresponds to the “primitive truths” here. The view here is that
proof, if carried out far enough, reveals the “primitive truths” on which the truth of
c

non-primitive statements depends.


ie

Moreover, we see, from the exposition of the analytic/synthetic and a priori/a


or not

posteriori distinctions in Grundlagen §3 examined above, that this relation of depen-


dence of truth is a relation of justification. Recall that Frege’s classification of judg-
ments is in terms of the “deepest grounds” of justification or the “primitive truths”
of proof. So the truth of a statement depends ultimately on the primitive truths that
are the deepest grounds of its justification.
o
d.

Recall also that the primitive truths are said to be “neither capable nor in need of
:d

proof.” Exactly what it is for a truth to have this characteristic will preoccupy us in
4.2.6 below. For now, note that general non-logical laws also have this characteristic,
16
Es liegt nahe, die zusammengesetzteren … Urtheile aus einfacheren abzuleiten, nicht um sie gewisser
aft

zu machen, was meistens unnöthig wäre, sondern um die Beziehungen der Urtheile zu einander her-
vortreten zu lassen. Es ist offenbar nicht dasselbe, ob man blos die Gesetze kennt, oder ob man auch
nf

weiss, wie die einen dureh die andern schon mitgegeben sind. Auf diese Weise gelangt man zu einer kleinen
Dr

Anzahl von Gesetzen, in welchen, wenn man die in den Regeln enthaltenen hinzunimmt, der Inhalt aller,
obschon unentwickelt, eingeschlossen ist. Und auch dies ist ein Nutzen der ableitenden Darstellungsweise,
dass sie jenen Kern kennen lehrt. Da man bei der unübersehbaren Menge der aufstellbaren Gesetze nieht
sa

alle aufzählen kann, so ist Vollständigkeit nicht anders als durch Aufsuchung derer zu erreichen, die der
Kraft nach alle in sich schliessen. (1879, §13, 25)
17
Der Beweis hat eben nicht nur den Zweck, die Wahrheit eines Satzes über jeden Zweifel zu erheben,
sondern auch den, eine Einsicht in die Abhängigkeit der Wahrheiten von einander zu gewähren. …. Je
weiter man diese Untersuchungen fortsetzt, auf desto weniger Urwahrheiten führt man Alles zurück; und
diese Vereinfachung ist an sich schon ein erstrebenswerthes Ziel. (1884, §2, 2)
148 Frege on the Nature of Logic

while facts are only said to be “unprovable.” Presumably. this means “not capable
of proof.” Are they in need of proof? I assume that they are not. That is to say, I
assume that primitiveness goes with “neither need nor capable of proof.”

.e ion
In terms of this distinction between primitive and dependent truths, we can char-
acterize the two types of logical laws discussed in 4.2.3 as follows. The inferential
tracing back mentioned there is proof. The laws without inferential grounds for judg-
ment are the primitive truths of logic, and these laws are neither capable nor in need

an iss
of proof.

du
m
4.2.5 Logical and other Sources of Knowledge
Before discussing the notion of being neither capable nor in need of proof, I want to

per
relate Frege’s classification of justifications in Grundlagen §3 to a view about sources
of knowledge (Erkenntnisquellen) that first appears in the letter to Marty:

[T]he area of the numerable is as wide as that of conceptual thought, and a source of knowl-
edge more restricted in scope, like spatial intuition or sense perception, would not suffice to

ut
guarantee the general validity of arithmetical propositions. (1980, 99-100)18

ey
h@ itho
Here Frege explicitly specifies two sources: spatial intuition and sense perception; a
third source, “conceptual thought,” is implied.
sl
In Frege’s essay on Peano he states the motivation for logicism in terms of find-
ing the source of knowledge from which the “science” of mathematics draws:
sh ite w
we
I was looking for the basic statements or axioms upon which the whole of mathematics rests.
Only after this question is answered can it be hoped to track down successfully the sources of
knowledge from which this science draws. (1897, 235)19

The source of knowledge of a science is to be determined from the axioms of that


science, and we see, from a letter to Hilbert, the suggestion that this is done by de-
c

termining how we know the axioms without proof


ie
or not

I call axioms [of geometry] statements that are true but are not proved, because our knowledge
of them flows from a source very different from the logical source, a source which might be
called spatial intuition. (1980, 37)20

Here the third source of knowledge, earlier linked to “conceptual thought,” is ex-
o

plicitly called “the logical” source.21 The three sources of knowledge thus line up
d.
:d

with the Grundlagen §3 classification in the following way. Sense-perception is the


source of our knowledge of facts, particular unprovable primitive truths, and so of
synthetic a posteriori truths. Pure intuition of space is the source of our knowledge
aft

18
[D]as Gebiet des Zählbaren soweit wie das des begrifflichen Denkens, und es würde eine Erken-
ntnisquelle von beschränkterem Umfange, etwa räumliche Anschauung, sinnliche Wahrnehmung, nicht
nf

genügen, die allgemeine Geltung der arithmetischen Sätze zu verbürgen. (1969, 163-4)
19
Dr

[I]ch nach den unbeweisbaren Grundsätzen oder Axiomen fragte, auf denen die ganze Mathematik
beruht. Erst nach Beantwortung dieser Frage kann man mit Erfolg den Erkenntnisquellen nachzuspüren
hoffen, aus denen diese Wissenschaft schöpft. (1969, 221)
sa

20
Axiome nenne ich Sätze, die wahr sind, die aber nicht bewiesen werden, weil ihre Erkenntnis aus
einer von der logischen ganz verschiedenen Erkenntnisquelle fliesst, die man Raumanschauung nennen
kann. (1969, 63)
21
For other discussions of sources of knowledge see Frege (T, 369), the essay “Sources of Knowledge
of Mathematics and mathematical Natural Sciences” (1924-25), and the last two texts in Nachgelassene
Schriften (1969, 297-99).
Frege’s Main Characterizations of Logic 149

of primitive non-logical general truths of geometry, and so of these synthetic a priori


truths. The logical source yields knowledge of primitive general truths of logic, and
so of the analytic a priori truths of logic.

.e ion
4.2.6 Primitive Truths, Axioms and Justificational Independence
What is it for a truth to be neither capable nor in need of proof?22 To a contemporary

an iss
philosopher, “not capable of proof” appears as a modal term, equivalent to “unprov-
able,” and “cannot be proved.” But given Frege’s amodalism, this is not what he

du
means. What he means by taking a truth to be “not capable of proof” is that there

m
exists no proof of it. On hearing this the contemporary philosophical reflex is to re-
spond: but even if there is no proof, there might have been one. Frege would not be

per
entirely unmoved by such a reflex; he would say: what you have in mind is that our
not knowing that there is a proof is consistent with the existence of one.
It is important to note, at this point, that proof is inferential justification: a proof
is a justification for making a judgment on the basis of grounds that are other judg-

ut
ments. So, if there are no proofs of a truth T, then no judgments are justifying grounds
of T. But it doesn’t follow that there are no justifying grounds for T. Thus, although

ey
there are no proofs of those primitive truths that are facts, there are grounds for judg-
h@ itho
ments of facts, namely, episodes of sense-perception. Similarly, although there are
no proofs of those primitive truths that are the axioms of geometry, pure intuitions
sl
of space are grounds for their judgment. What about the primitive truths of logic?
There are no proofs of these truths. But are there grounds for their judgment? I will
sh ite w

set this question aside until the next sub-section, and go on to the question what it is
we
not to need a proof.
I’ll approach this question by first looking at an apparent inconsistency or change
in Frege’s view of the provability of axioms. In the second “Foundations of Geom-
etry” papers Frege explicitly says that “an axiom is a thought whose truth is certain
without … being provable,” and that “[l]ogical laws are also of this nature” (1903,
c

319).23 However, in the later “Logic in Mathematics” lecture notes he writes,


ie
or not

Axioms are truths as are the theorems, but they are truths for which no proof can be given in our
system, and for which no proof is needed. It follows from this that there are no false axioms,
and that we cannot accept a thought as an axiom if we are in doubt about its truth; for it is
either false and hence not an axiom, or it is true but stands in need of proof and hence is not an
axiom. Not every truth for which no proof is required is an axiom, for such a truth might still
o
d.

be proved in our system. Whether a truth is an axiom depends therefore on the system, and it
:d

is possible for a truth to be an axiom in one system and not in another. (1914, 205; emphases
mine)24
aft

22
The following is indebted to Burge (2005)
23
Von alters her nennt man Axiom einen Gedanken, dessen Wahrheit feststeht, ohne jedoch durch eine
nf

logische Schlußkette bewiesen werden zu können. Dieser Art sind auch die logischen Gesetze. (1969,
Dr

264)
24
Die Axiome sind Wahrheiten wie die Theoreme, aber solche, welche in unserem Systeme nicht be-
wiesen werden, eines Beweises auch nicht bedürftig sind. Daraus folgt, class es falsche Axiome nicht
sa

gibt, dass wir auch keinen Gedanken als Axiom anerkennen konnen, dessen Wahrheit uns zweifelhaft ist;
denn dann ist er entweder falsch und deswegen kein Axiom, oder er ist zwar wahr, aber eines Beweises
bedürftig und deswegen kein Axiom. Nicht jede Wahrheit, welche keines Beweises bedarf, ist ein Axiom,
denn sie konnte immerhin in unserem System bewiesen werden. Ob eine Wahrheit ein Axiom sei, hangt
also auch von dem Systeme ab; und es ist moglich, class eine Wahrheit in einem System ein Axiom ist, in
einem andern nicht. Frege (NS, 221-2)
150 Frege on the Nature of Logic

Here unprovability is a system-relative property of truths: in any given system the


axioms are unprovable because axioms are the ultimate starting points of all proofs,
and no truth provides a proof of itself. But the axioms of one system may be provable

.e ion
in another system. Evidently, this view applies to the systems that are Frege’s formu-
lations of logic. We see this in Begriffsschrift §13, where, after declaring his aim to
isolate laws of pure thought from which all such laws can be derived, Frege writes,
“There is perhaps another series of judgments from which … all laws of thought

an iss
could likewise be deduced” (1879, 25).25

du
But now notice that according to Frege while the axioms of any system have to
be true, not just any truth can be chosen as an axiom. The further property required

m
of what can be chosen as an axiom is that which we’re trying to understand, that of
not needing proof. The key to understanding this property is Frege’s remark that “it

per
belongs to the concept of an axiom that it can be acknowledged as true independently
of other truths” (1979, 168; emphases mine).26 A truth that does not need a proof is
a thought whose acknowledgment as true does not require justification on the basis
of grounds consisting of other thoughts acknowledged as true.

ut
We can now see in what sense an axiom, A, a truth that does not need proof, can
nevertheless be given a proof in a system in which it is not an axiom. That proof of

ey
A from the axioms of another system does not justify acknowledging A as true on the
h@ itho
grounds of those axioms. Let’s call a proof that provides the grounds for judging a
thought a “justifying proof.” Frege’s considered view is that there are no justifying
sl
proofs of those thoughts that may be chosen as axioms of a system, and furthermore,
no justifying proof is needed for acknowledging the truth of those thoughts. If not
sh ite w

chosen as an axiom for a system, such a thought may nevertheless be given a non-
we
justifying proof from the axioms of that system.
This account of not needing proof, I want to emphasize, does not imply that there
are no justifications of axioms. Again, the point is that proof is inferential justifica-
tion, and there are other kinds of justification, from grounds which are not judgments.
Thus, although a geometrical axiom may be acknowledged as true independent of
c

other truths, it doesn’t follow that it can be acknowledged as true independent of


ie

pure intuitions of space. Similarly, a fact can also be acknowledged as true without
or not

a justifying proof, but it doesn’t follow that it can be judged as true without sense-
perceptual grounds. Again this brings us to the primitive truths of logic. Like facts
and geometrical axioms, they can be acknowledged as true without a justifying proof.
But are they also like facts and geometrical axioms in requiring non-inferential jus-
o

tification? Or does the judgment of primitive logical truths require no justification,


d.

no grounds, at all?
:d

To sum up. Frege’s view of primitive truths as neither capable nor in need of
proof means that
aft

• there are no justifications of a primitive truth on grounds of other truths, but


• a primitive truth may be acknowledged as true without such a justification.
nf
Dr

For two classes of primitive truths—facts and geometrical axioms—acknowledg-


ments of their truth do require justifying grounds, in sense perception and pure intu-
sa

ition of space.
25
Es giebt vielleicht noch eine andere Reihe von Urtheilen, aus denen ebenfalls … alle Denkgesetze
abgeleitet werden können.
26
[Es] gehort … zum Begriffe des Axioms, dass man zur Anerkennung seines Wahrseins nicht anderer
Wahrheiten bedarf. (1969, 183)
Frege’s Main Characterizations of Logic 151

We turn next to the third class of primitive truths, those of logic, to show that
on Frege’s view, judgments of these truths do have justifying grounds, but these are
quite special grounds, since each such truth provides its own justifying ground.

.e ion
4.2.7 Self-Evidence and Self-Sufficiency
Another characteristic that Frege often associates with axioms and with logic is ex-

an iss
pressed by a set of terms—‘selbstverständlich’, ‘einleuchtend’, ‘unmittelbar klar’—
generally translated as “self-evidence” and its cognates.27 Here are some instances:

du
m
[N]umerical formulae, such as 2+3=5, … are held by some philosophers to be unprovable and
immediately self-evident [unmittelbar klar] like axioms. (1884, §5, 5)28

per
Schröder does not include [the sentence that one may interchange two sides of an equation,
and that equals may always be substituted for equals] among his thirteen axioms, although
there is no justification for leaving them out, even if one regards them as self-evident [selb-
stverständliche] logical statements. (1880, 39)29

ut
[A]ny assertion that is not completely self-evident [ganz selbstverständliche] must actually be

ey
proven. (2013, vol. II, §60, 73)30
h@ itho
I have never concealed from myself that [my basic law (V)] is not as self-evident [einleuchtend]
as the others nor as must properly be required of a logical law. (2013, vol. II Afterword, 253)31
sl
From these texts, it’s not clear that Frege systematically uses each of these terms in
sh ite w

a way distinct from the others. Nevertheless, one may discern three conceptions of
we
self-evidence in Frege’s use of these terms.
(1) On one conception self-evidence is a subjective characteristic, possessed by
statements, assertions, or thoughts relative to a particular thinker’s finding
the statement, assertion, or thought obviously true. Consider, for example,
Frege’s description of the deleterious effect of not giving “gapless” proofs,
c

proofs in which “no step is taken which does not conform to some one of a
ie

small number of forms of inference acknowledged as purely logical” (1884,


or not

90, 102):32

[T]he mathematician rests content if every transition to a fresh judgment is self-evidently


correct [richtig einleuchtet], without enquiring into the nature of this self-evidence
o

[Einleuchtens], whether it is logical or intuitive. A single such step is often very com-
d.

plex and equivalent to several simple inferences, among which something from intu-
:d

ition can slip in. One advances by jumps, and from this arises the apparent excessively
27
I’m indebted to Jeshion (2001) and Burge (1998) for highlighting the importance of these notions.
Unlike Jeshion, I do not hold that there are systematic differences among Frege’s uses of these German
aft

terms.
28
[D]ie Zahlformeln, die wie 2+3=5 … werden von einigen Philosophen für unbeweisbar und unmit-
nf

telbar klar wie Axiome gehalten. (1884, §5, 5)


29
Schröder fuhrt [der Sätze, dass die beiden Seiten einer Gleichung vertauschbar sind, und dass man
Dr

Gleiches durch Gleiches überall ersetzen darf] unter seinen dreizehn Axiomen nicht auf, obgleich kein
Grund ist, sie auszulassen, wenn man doch einmal selbstverständliche logische Sätze aufzählt. (1969,
sa

43-4)
30
[J]ede nicht ganz selbstverständliche Behauptung wirklich bewiesen werde. (1903, §60, 73)
31
Ich habe mir nie verhehlt, dass [mein Grundgesetz (V)] nicht so einleuchtend ist, wie die andern,
und wie es eigentlich von einem logischen Gesetze verlangt werden muss. (1903, Nachwort, 253)
32
[L]ückenlose Schlusskette [] kein Schritt geschieht, der nicht einer von wenigen als rein logisch
anerkannten Schlussweisen gemäss ist.
152 Frege on the Nature of Logic

rich variety of types of inference in mathematics; for the bigger the jump, the more
diverse are the combinations it can represent of simple inferences with axioms derived
from intuition. Often, nevertheless, the correctness of such a transition is immediately

.e ion
self-evident to us [leuchtet uns unmittelbar ein], without our ever becoming conscious
of the subordinate steps condensed within it; whereupon, since it does not obviously
conform to any of the acknowledged types of logical inference, we are prepared to
accept its self-evidence [Einleuchten] forthwith as intuitive …. (1884, 90, 102-3)33

an iss
Here Frege speaks of the correctness of certain transitions in proofs being

du
“immediately self-evident to us.” Clearly, he means that mathematicians find

m
these transitions obviously correct. For the argument is that if we find a tran-
sition in a proof immediately self-evident without realizing that it is a “combi-

per
nation” of simple inferences, and if the transition is also not an acknowledged
logical type of inference, then we are inclined to reach the mistaken conclu-
sion that our knowledge of the correctness of the transition derives from the
intuitive rather than the logical source.

ut
Perhaps this subjective conception of self-evidence makes sense of Frege’s
talk of “complete self-evidence,” and of Frege’s writing, in the wake of Rus-

ey
sell’s Paradox, “I have never concealed from myself that [basic law (V)] is
h@ itho
not as self-evident [einleuchtend] as the others nor as self-evident as must
properly be required of a logical law” (1903, 253).34 These remarks suggest
sl
that self-evidence comes in comparative degrees, and it is plausible that we
find certain thoughts more obviously true than others.
sh ite w
we
(2) Another conception of self-evidence is objective, non-psychological, and tied
to justificational independence. Consider Frege’s account of self-evidence in
connection with the use of definitions:

In mathematics, what is called a definition is usually the stipulation of the reference


c

of a word or sign. …. Once a word or sign has been given a reference by a defini-
ie

tion, we may form from this definition a self-evident [selbstverständlichen] statement,


or not

which may then be used in constructing proofs in the same way in which we use prin-
ciples.{footnote: What I here call a principle is a statement whose sense is an axiom.}
For example, let us suppose that the references of the plus-sign, the three-sign, and the
one-sign are known; we can then assign a reference to the four-sign by means of the
definitional equation ‘3+1=4’. Once this has been done, the content of this equation is
o
d.

true from itself [von selbst wahr] and no longer needs proof. (1903, 319-20; emphases
:d

mine)35

33
[D]er Mathematiker zufrieden ist, wenn jeder Uebergang zu einem neuen Urtheile als richtig ein-
leuchtet, ohne nach der Natur dieses Einleuchtens zu fragen, ob es logisch oder anschaulich sei. Ein solcher
aft

Fortschritt ist oft sehr zusammengesetzt und mehren einfachen Schlüssen gleichwerthig, neben welchen
noch aus der Anschauung etwas einfliessen kann. Man geht sprungweise vor, und daraus entsteht die
nf

scheinbar überreiche Mannichfaltigkeit der Schlussweisen in der Mathematik; denn je grösser die Sprünge
Dr

sind, desto vielfachere Combinationen aus einfachen Schlüssen und Anschauungsaxiomen können sie
vertreten. Dennoch leuchtet uns ein solcher Uebergang oft unmittelbar ein, ohne dass uns die Zwischen-
stufen zum Bewusstsein kommen, und da er sich nicht als eine der anerkannten logischen Schlussweisen
sa

darstellt, sind wir sogleich bereit, dies Einleuchten für ein anschauliches ….
34
Ich habe mir nie verhehlt, dass es nicht so einleuchtend ist, wie die andern, und wie es eigentlich von
einem logischen Gesetze verlangt werden muss.
35
Definitionen nennt man in der Mathematik wohl allgemein die Festsetzung der Bedeutung eines
Wortes oder Zeichens. …. Nachdem einem Worte oder Zeichen durch eine Definition eine Bedeutung
gegeben ist, kann man aus der Definition einen selbstverständlichen Satz machen, der nun wie ein Grund-
Frege’s Main Characterizations of Logic 153

For Frege definitions are, strictly speaking, stipulative: they stipulate the ref-
erence of some sign. Such stipulations, as Frege’s example here shows, are
equations, statements of identity. Here he claims that these statements are

.e ion
self-evident in the same way that statements expressing axioms are. In addi-
tion, Frege characterizes the “content” of a self-evident definitional stipula-
tion as “true from itself” and “not needing proof.” Thus a definitional stipula-
tion is justificationally independent. This provides a further characterization

an iss
of justificational independence. The truth of a self-evident content in some

du
way rests on the content itself. Hence the truth of the content does not depend
on the truth of any other contents, which is why it does not need grounding

m
proof and is justificationally independent. Since Frege claims that these defi-
nitional equations can be used in the same way as expressions of axioms, this

per
suggests that the justificational independence of axioms and primitive truths
also consists in their being true from themselves. Frege’s notion of justifica-
tional independence is an ontological notion. Hence the identification of the
justificational independence of contents with their self-evidence shows that

ut
the notion of self-evidence in this passage is an entirely objective ontological
notion.

ey
(3)
h@ itho
There is, finally, a non-psychological epistemological notion of self-evidence.
Consider this passage from Frege’s last published essay, “Compound Thoughts”:
sl
Let ‘O’ be a sentence which expresses a particular instance of a logical law, but which
is not presented as true. Then it is easy for ‘not O’ to seem nonsensical, but only
sh ite w
we
because it is thought of as uttered assertorically. The assertion of a thought which
contradicts a logical law can indeed appear, if not nonsensical, then at least absurd;
for the truth of a logical law is immediately evident [unmittelbar einleuchtet] from
itself [aus ihm selbst], from the sense of its expression. (1923, 51; emphases mine)36

The argument is as follows. The negation of an expression of a logical law


c

seems to be an assertion. What this assertion seems to express is an acknowl-


ie

edgment of the falsity of that logical law. This seems nonsensical or absurd
or not

because the truth of a logical law is evident from “the sense of its expression.”
I take this to mean that one can acknowledge the truth of a logical law merely
by grasping the thought that is that law. Since merely understanding ‘O’ yield
acknowledgment of the thought it expresses, the apparent acknowledgment
o

of its falsity appears contrary to the very sense of ‘O’, making it nonsensical
d.

or absurd.
:d

We can now answer the question posed in the last subsection about the justification of
primitive logical truths. Like facts and geometrical axioms, primitive logical truths
aft

satz{Fußnote: Ich will hier Grundsatz einen Satz nennen, dessen Sinn ein Axiom ist.} in der Beweis-
führung gebraucht werden kann. Nehmen wir z .B. an, das Pluszeichen, das Dreizeichen und das Einsze-
nf

ichen seien ihrer Bedeutung nach bekannt, so konnen wir dem Vierzeichen durch die Definitionsgleichung
Dr

‘3+1 = 4’ eine Bedeutung geben. Nachdem dies geschehen, ist nun der Inhalt dieser Gleichung von selbst
wahr und bedarf keines Beweises mehr.
sa

36
Es sei ‘O’ ein Satz, in dem ein besonderer Fall eines logischen Gesetzes ausgedriickt aber nicht als
wahr hingestellt wird. Dann erscheint ‘nicht O’ leicht als unsinnig, aber nur dadurch, daß man es mit
behauptender Kraft ausgesprochen denkt. Das Behaupten eines Gedankens, der einem logischen Gesetze
widerspricht, kann in der Tat, wenn nicht unsinnig, so doch widersinnig erscheinen, weil die Wahrheit
eines logischen Gesetzes unmittelbar aus ihm selbst, aus dem Sinne seines Ausdrucks einleuchtet. (1967,
393)
154 Frege on the Nature of Logic

are justified, but not inferentially, not grounded on other truths. Sense perception and
pure intuition of space are the grounds for the justification of facts and geometrical
axioms. Thus, something external to the thought that is a fact or a geometrical axiom

.e ion
is required to provide the grounds for their justification. Moreover, something more
than a grasp of that thought is required for acknowledging the truth of that thought. In
contrast, nothing external to the thought that is a primitive truth of logic is required
to ground the justification of that thought, and nothing more than a grasp of that

an iss
thought is needed to acknowledge its truth. Let’s say that primitive logical truths are

du
justificationally self-sufficient. On might say that, in a sense, primitive logical truths
are self-justifying.

m
The following table summarizes Frege’s conception of the nature of the justifi-
cation of dependent truths and of the three types of primitive truths, in terms of two

per
classifications of grounds that cut across one another:

External to thought Internal to thought

ut
Inferential Dependent Truths

ey
Facts
h@ itho
Non-inferential Primitive Truths of Logic
Primitive Truths of Geometry

sl
The last two, objective, notions of self-evidence suggest an account of what is
sh ite w

distinctive about the justification of logical truths: their truth is grounded in some
we
way in themselves, in the thoughts that they are. Moreover, for this reason, one can
acknowledge their truth merely from a grasp of the thoughts that they are.
We can relate this conception to the three sources of knowledge as follows. The
sensory and intuitive sources provide grounds additional to grasp of those thoughts
that are facts and primitive geometrical truths required to acknowledge the truth of
c

those thoughts. The logical or purely conceptual source of knowledge is the capac-
ie

ity to acknowledge the truth of primitive logical thoughts merely by grasping those
or not

thoughts.
So far we have not discussed primitive logical rules of inference. Frege’s dis-
cussion of rules of inference in Grundlagen §90 is not conclusive but certainly sug-
gests that there are primitive rules of inference “condensed in” other rules. This
suggests that those rules of inference which count as logical are justificationally self-
o
d.

sufficient as well. What, though, is it for a rule of inference to be justificationally


:d

self-sufficient? I suggest that it amounts to: the claim that each conclusion of an
instance of the rule is true if the corresponding instances of the premises are true is
non-inferentially justified on grounds that are, in some way or the other, not external
aft

to the thoughts that make up that instance.


To sum up, Frege’s conception of logic comprises the following elements:
nf

1. Logic consists of a system of truths that provide the standards of correctness


Dr

for all inference.


sa

2. The truths of logic divide into two types:

(a) Primitive completely general logical truths.


(b) Dependent logical truths derived from and inferentially justified by
(some) primitive logical truths.
The Constitution of Justificational Self-Sufficiency 155

3. Primitive logical truths are the core of logic; dependent logical truths are in a
sense not fully different from the primitive truths.
4. A primitive truth is

.e ion
(a) justified,
(b) but not inferentially, on grounds consisting of other truths.

an iss
5. Primitive truths include not only logical truths but also facts and primitive
geometrical truths.

du
m
6. What is distinctive of primitive logical truths is that they are justificationally
self-sufficient or self-justifying:

per
(a) The ground of their justification lies in the thoughts that they are, and,
(b) nothing more than a grasp of such these thoughts is required to ac-
knowledge their truth.

ut
4.3 The Constitution of Justificational Self-Sufficiency

ey
h@ itho
Primitive logical truths are justificationally self-sufficient. The basic laws of Grundge-
setze are surely supposed to be primitive logical truths. Frege says that there are other
sl
logical laws he could have chosen, but the aim of logicism is to prove, i.e., justify, the
truths of arithmetic from some set of logical justificationally self-sufficient axioms.
sh ite w

Yet, Frege seems to argue for the truth of at least some of these basic laws. For
we
example, in §18 Frege writes,
According to §12
Γ ⊃ (Δ ⊃ Γ)
would be the False only if both Γ and Δ were the True while Γ was not the True. This is
c

impossible; therefore [also]


ie

a ⊃ (b ⊃ a)
or not

(2013, 34)37

‘ a ⊃ (b ⊃ a)’ is Basic Law (I) (hereafter I follow Frege’s practice of referring to


the basic laws by Roman numerals in round brackets). Now, in §12 Frege says,
o
d.

I introduce the function with two arguments


:d

ξ⊃ζ
by means of the specification [Bestimmung] that its value shall be the False if the True is taken
as the ζ-argument, while any object that is not the True is taken as ξ-argument; that in all other
aft

cases the value of the function shall be the True. (2013, 20)38
37
Nach §12 wäre
nf
Dr

Γ ⊃ (Δ ⊃ Γ)
nur dann das Falsche, wenn Γ und das Wahre wären, während Γ nicht das Wahre wäre. Dies ist unmöglich;
sa

also

a ⊃ (b ⊃ a)

38
[F]ühre ich die Function mit zwei Argumenten
156 Frege on the Nature of Logic

So, what Frege seems to be doing in §18 is giving an argument whose conclusion,
signaled by “therefore,” is the judgment of (I), i.e., the acknowledgment of the truth
of (I), on the basis of the specification, in §12, of the function denoted by the condi-

.e ion
tionality stroke. We’ll come back to consider exactly what this argument might be,
but for now, the question is, is Frege actually giving an argument in this passage? If
so, is the argument supposed to be a justification of (I), i.e., to provide the grounds
for acknowledging the truth of (I)? How could it be such a justification, if basic laws

an iss
are supposed to be justificationally independent?

du
A similar set of questions arise about Frege’s discussion of the first mode of
inference (Schlussweise) of Grundgesetze, in §14:

m
From the propositions [Sätzen] ‘ Γ ⊃ Δ’ and ‘ Δ’ one can infer: ‘ Γ’; for if Γ were not the

per
True, then, since Δ is the True, Γ ⊃ Δ would be the False. (2013, 25)39

This also seems to be an argument, for the conclusion that judging the consequent
of a conditional is justified on the basis of judging that conditional and judging its
antecedent, i.e., for the correctness of modus ponens. If this is intended to be an ar-

ut
gument that justifies modus ponens, then it goes against the suggestion we advanced,

ey
that for Frege the simplest rules of inference are justificationally self-sufficient.
h@ itho
These are not the only passages in Grundgesetze in which Frege seems to argue
for the truth of basic laws and the correctness of methods of inference. He seems to
sl
give similar arguments for three rules of inference in §§12 and 15,40 and Basic Laws
(IV), (VI), (IIa), (III), (IIb) in §§18, 20, and 25.41 Indeed, in Begriffsschrift Frege also
gives similar accounts of the one rule inference, modus ponens, in §6, and the nine
sh ite w
we
axioms, in §§ 14, 16-19, 20, 22. (V) is special since it is inconsistent, as shown by
Russell’s Paradox. Frege appears to give detailed arguments for (V) in §§10, 20, and
33. What exactly these arguments are, and what they are intended to show, are highly
controversial questions.42 I will not discuss (V) since it is not clear that Frege was
ever entirely free of doubt that it is a primitive truth of logic. In contrast, there is no
c

sign that Frege entertained any doubts about whether the remaining laws and rules of
ie

inference are logical. Some of these have come to be rejected by Frege’s successors:
or not

some of the most salient are Wittgenstein’s rejection of identity,43 Brouwer’s rejection
of the law of excluded middle,44 and Quine’s rejection of higher-order logic.45 But
these forms of dissent do not touch (I) or Frege’s first mode of inference, so perhaps
o

ξ⊃ζ
d.
:d

durch die Bestimmung ein, dass ihr Werth das Falsche sein soll, wenn als ζ-Argument das Wahre und als
ξ-Argument irgendein Gegenstand genommen wird, der nicht das Wahre ist; dass in allen andern Fällen
der Functionswerth das Wahre sein soll.
aft

39
Aus den Sätzen ‘ Γ ⊃ Δ’ und ‘ Δ’ kann geschlossen werden: ‘ Γ’; denn, wäre Γ nicht das Wahre,
so wäre, da das Δ Wahre ist, Γ ⊃ Δ das Falsche.
40
nf

Only the ones in §15 are explicitly called “modes of inference” (Schlussweise). The rules of inference
of Grundgesetze are the first eleven rules in the Summary of the rules, §48; for most of these Frege gives
Dr

no argument.
41
For an account of the Basic Laws and rules of inference of Grundgesetze see Cook (2013).
sa

42
See, inter alia, A. W. Moore and Rein (1986), Schroeder-Heister (1987), Ricketts (1997), Weiner
(2002), Linnebo (2004), Wehmeier and Schroeder-Heister (2005), and Heck (2012).
43
See, e.g., Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) 5.5301: “Dass die Identität keine Relation zwis-
chen Gegenständen ist, leuchtet ein,” “That identity is no relation between objects is self-evident.”
44
Beginning with Brouwer (1908).
45
See Quine (1986, 66), where higher-order logic is asserted to be “Set theory in sheep’s clothing.”
The Constitution of Justificational Self-Sufficiency 157

most contemporary philosophers would also accept these as logical.46


I will thus focus on investigating the nature of the arguments Frege gives for
(I) and the first mode of inference. My aim is to attempt to determine what these

.e ion
arguments show about Frege’s conception of the thoughts and the forms of inference
that he (and we) most clearly take to be primitively logical.47

an iss
4.3.1 Semantics and Soundness Arguments
Frege’s seeming arguments for (I) and modus ponens have figured in a recent con-

du
troversy over the interpretation of Frege. On one side of the dispute are those com-

m
mentators, perhaps most prominently Michael Dummett,48 who take Frege to have
elaborated semantic theories for his formal language, the Begriffsschrift, and to have

per
conceived of logic in fundamentally semantic terms. On the other side are inter-
preters, beginning with Jean van van Heijenoort (1967b), who argue that Frege has
philosophical commitments that are incompatible, or at least in tension, with con-
ceiving of the nature of logic in semantic terms; Frege has, rather, a “universalist”

ut
conception of logic that in some way precludes “meta-logical” theorizing about logic,
which explains why he did not consider such notions as the soundness and the com-

ey
pleteness for his formulation of logic.
h@ itho
Some semantical interpreters have taken Frege’s discussion of (I) and modus
ponens to express semantical arguments aimed at establishing the soundness of the
sl
axioms and rules of inference of Frege’s logical systems.49 Anti-semantical inter-
preters resist such an account of Frege’s seeming arguments. They take these texts
sh ite w

to express “elucidations” (Erläuterungen), attempts to convey to Frege’s readers an


we
understanding of the unfamiliar formal language Begriffsschrift; they constitute “for-
eign language instruction”50 and have no justificatory force.51

4.3.1.1 Soundness Arguments


c

I begin with an account what a soundness proof is supposed to be and to accomplish.


ie

Dummett’s account of Frege’s philosophy of logic is a paradigm of semantic


or not

readings. According to Dummett, Frege’s claim to being the founder of modern logic
rests on the following grounds:

Logic began with Aristotle’s discovery that the validity of an argument could be characterised
by its being an instance of a valid argument-schema, where an argument-schema is like an
o
d.

argument save for containing schematic letters at certain places instead of actual words or
:d

expressions, and is valid if every instance with true premises has a true conclusion, an instance
being obtained by replacing each schematic letter with an actual expression of the appropriate

46
Given C. I. Lewis’s rejection of material implication, he would not take (I) to be a primitive truth of
aft

logic, but he would not dispute that it is a logical truth, because it, or more precisely Russell’s equivalent
j2.02, is derivable from theorem 3.45 of the Survey system (1918, 303), and is theorem 15.21 of S1 in
nf

Symbolic Logic (C. I. Lewis and Langford, 1932, 143).


47
It should also be noted that Frege’s arguments for the remaining axioms and (some of the) rules of
Dr

the intuitionistic first-order Grundgesetze sub-system without identity—consisting of (I), (IIa), and rules
1-7 and 9 of §48—are not substantially different from the arguments for (I) and for modus ponens.
sa

48
See, inter alia, Dummett (1973a, 1981b) and the relevant chapters of Dummett (1978).
49
The view that Frege argues for the soundness of his logic is suggested by Dummett (1973a, 1978);
for more details, see below. Stanley (1996) and Tappenden (1997) attack anti-semantical interpretations
by reading Frege’s arguments for (I) and modus ponens as soundness arguments.
50
Ricketts (1986)
51
For this reading of the notion of elucidation see Weiner (1990, 2002, 2004, 2006)
158 Frege on the Nature of Logic

logical category. This pre-semantic notion of an interpretation of a schema by replacement


was the only one that logic had to operate with until Frege. Frege supplied us for the first time
with a semantics, that is to say, an analysis of the way in which a sentence is determined as

.e ion
true or otherwise in accordance with its composition out of its constituent words. (1975, 118;
first emphasis in original)
Once we have such a semantics, we can substitute for our notion of an interpretation
by replacement that of a semantic interpretation, under which make a direct assignment to the

an iss
schematic letters of the semantic values of expressions of the appropriate categories, bypassing
the expressions themselves. (1975, 118)

du
m
Moreover, on the basis of semantic interpretations,

there was for the first time … the possibility, not merely of specifying certain rules of inference

per
as valid, but of demonstrating their validity in the sense of yielding true conclusions from true
premises. (Dummett, 1981a, 82; emphases mine)

Although Dummett mentions only valid arguments and rules of inference, it’s clear
that his view also applies to valid or logically true statements. The simple case of clas-

ut
sical sentential logic offers an illustration. A statement like ‘either Scotland secedes

ey
unless Britain rejoins the EU, or neither Scotland secedes nor Britain rejoins the EU’
h@ itho
qualifies as a logical truth if the schema of which it is an instance, ‘(p ∨ q) ∨ (∼p.∼q)’,
has only true instances.52 On the supposed Aristotelian view, the only way to figure
sl
out whether this schema does have all true instances is to consider the truth-values of
all the statements that result from replacing ‘p’ and ‘q’ in the schema with statements.
sh ite w

A Fregean semantics, in contrast, is based on the claim that the truth-values of con-
we
junctions, disjunctions, and negations of statements depend only on the truth-values
of the statements conjoined, disjoined, or negated. Thus there is no need to consider
the vast range of all instances of the schema; one has only to consider the four combi-
nations of assignments of truth-values to the letters p and q. Each such combination
is a semantic interpretation of the schema, and one can easily demonstrate that the
c

schema is true in each of these interpretations, and hence has only true instances.
ie

More generally, a semantic interpretation of a schema is a collection of seman-


or not

tic features of expressions of a language—truth-values of statements, extensions of


predicates, referents of names—sufficient to determine the truth-value of any state-
ment that is an instance of that schema. A schema is semantically valid if and only
if it is true under all interpretations. So all instances of a semantically valid schema
are true statements. A rule of inference is semantically valid if and only if under any
o
d.

interpretation either all the premise-schemata are false or the conclusion-schema is


:d

true. If a rule of inference is semantically valid then the conclusion-schema is also


said to be a semantic consequence of the premise-schemata. If a rule of inference is
semantically valid, then every instance of that rule whose premises are all true has a
aft

true conclusion.
A soundness proof for a formulation of logic with respect to a semantics for the
nf

language in question, then, consists of:


Dr

• A demonstration that all axiom schemata are true in all interpretations based on
the semantics.
sa

• A demonstration that all rules of inference preserve truth from premises to con-
clusion in all such interpretations.

52
Both the example and parts of the subsequent discussion are adapted from Burgess (2011).
The Constitution of Justificational Self-Sufficiency 159

Dummett describes a particular conception of soundness proofs in connection with


“the standard practice of logicians,” clearly logicians after Gödel and Tarski:

.e ion
The standard practice of logicians, in treating of any well-defined fragment of logical theory,
is to seek to define two parallel notions of logical consequence, one syntactic and the other
semantic ….
[T]he semantic notion always has a certain priority: the definition of the syntactic relation

an iss
is required to be responsible to the semantic relation …. The syntactic relation is defined by
devising a set of primitive rules of inference, and a corresponding notion of a formal deduction.

du
If a semantic notion can be defined with respect to which a soundness proof can be given, we
then have a reason for regarding the primitive rules of inference as valid: until then, we have

m
only an intuitive impression of their validity. ….
A soundness … proof thus appears in the light of a justification of the definition of syn-

per
tactic consequence. By means of a soundness proof, we demonstrate that the primitive rules
of inference are in fact valid …. (1973, 290-1; emphases mine)

The view is this. Previous to a Fregean semantics all that logicians could do is specify
forms of inference about which they have no more than “an intuitive impression” that

ut
all instances with true premises have true conclusions, i.e., are logically valid. And

ey
this means that they don’t have any reason, independent of such an impression, to take
h@ itho
that intuition to be correct. A soundness proof supplies such a reason. It demonstrates
that indeed all instances with true premises have true conclusions, that the form of
sl
inference is indeed logically valid. Similarly, a soundness proof demonstrates that the
schematic form of a statement has, in fact, all true instances, and so supplies a reason
for holding that form of statement to be logically valid. This is why a soundness
sh ite w
we
proof is “mandatory”: in order to be justified in taking a statement to be a logical
truth or an inference logically valid, one has to furnish a soundness proof. Logical
validity is what a soundness proof justifies.
It would be foolhardy to make any generalizations about how contemporary
philosophers conceive of the soundness proofs of logic, but it seems to me that the
c

foregoing conception is held by at least some contemporary philosophers. For ex-


ie

ample, in a recent paper chosen more or less at random, we read that “Prior to the
or not

development of ... model theory several proof procedures ... had been introduced.….
model theory provides a criterion for the acceptability of proof procedures. A pro-
cedure is called sound if every demonstrable formula is valid ….” (2011, 119-21;
last emphases mine). This is evidently an attitude to soundness very close to what
Dummett finds in the practice of logicians.
o
d.
:d

4.3.1.2 Frege and Soundness Arguments


It seems that the conception of soundness arguments just outlined has two presuppo-
sitions:
aft

• Logical properties and relations are primarily properties and relations of schemata,
nf

and only secondarily properties and relations of statements or thoughts.


Dr

• Schemata have the properties of truth and falsity relativized to interpretations.


sa

So, the two main types of criticism of Dummett’s semantical interpretation of Frege
are based on arguing against ascribing these presuppositions to Frege.
The first type of criticism rests on the fact that every sentence of Begriffsschrift,
including the basic laws, is supposed to express a thought. As we have established
in Chapter 2, Frege is committed to holding that there is no such thing as a thought
160 Frege on the Nature of Logic

that is true or false relative to anything, as opposed to true or false, period. Hence,
the Begriffsschrift sentences that are the basic laws of Frege’s logic are not schemata,
which are true or false in various interpretations.

.e ion
Dummett acknowledges that Frege “cannot concern himself with a variety of
interpretations of a formula or set of formulas, since he does not officially recognize
any such thing as a schematic letter” (1981, 151). So he concedes that it would be
anachronistic to take Frege to have the semantical conception of soundness of post-

an iss
Fregean logic. However, he claims that Frege’s work, in particular, the “theory of

du
reference,” “provides precisely the framework within which the notion of a semantic
interpretation can be defined” (1981, 151). Indeed, Dummett takes it that Frege’s

m
“specification of the references of the primitive expressions of his system constitutes
… a stipulation of the one intended interpretation of the system” (1981, 151).

per
Some semantical interpreters have developed this last claim made by Dummett
into a slightly different account of Frege’s the arguments for (I) and modus ponens:
they are not full-fledged contemporary soundness proofs, but they aim to demonstrate
soundness with respect to the intended interpretation of Begriffsschrift.53 The claim

ut
for which Frege argues in Grundgesetze §14 would then be that if a Begriffsschrift
conditional and its antecedent are both true in the intended interpretation then so

ey
is the consequent of that conditional. That is to say, modus ponens is a form of
h@ itho
inference that preserves truth from premises to conclusion with respect to the intended
interpretation. This claim then justifies the acceptance of modus ponens as a valid
sl
rule of inference with respect to the intended interpretation. Similarly, Grundgesetze
§18 would be understood as showing that (I) is true in the intended interpretation.
sh ite w

As it stands, this semantical reading is problematic. Frege rejects any relativiza-


we
tion of truth, even if there is only one item with respect to which thoughts are sup-
posed to be true or false. However, it seems easy to get around this problem. All we
need do is take Frege to be arguing that (I) is true absolutely and that modus ponens
preserves absolute truth from premises to conclusion. Let’s say that such arguments
are modified Fregean soundness arguments.
c

The second type of criticism focuses on the fact that on semantical interpreta-
ie

tions Frege’s arguments require the use of a truth predicate, whether of Begriffsschrift
or not

sentences or of the thoughts they express. One anti-semantical line of criticism rests
on taking Frege’s Indefinability argument to show that truth is not a property at all.
It follows that Frege is precluded from using an ineliminable truth predicate.54 An-
other related line of attack rests on the fact that the predicates that Frege actually uses
o

in §§14 and 18 are ‘ξ is the True’ and ‘ξ is the False’. These predicates, according
d.

to this argument, are not truth predicates, whether of sentences or of thoughts. The
:d

reasoning goes as follows. Each of these predicates express identity with one of the
truth-values. That is to say, ‘ξ is the True’ is ‘ξ = the True’ and ‘ξ is the False’ is ‘ξ
= the False’. A truth-predicate applies to sentences, so if ‘ξ = the True’ is a truth-
aft

predicate (only) the results of filling its argument place with names of true sentences
are true statements. Thus
nf
Dr

‘Frege was born in Wismar’ = the True


‘Russell was born in Trellech’ = the True
sa

would both be true. But these resulting sentences are statements of identity, so from
them, we can infer
53
In particular, Stanley (1996) and Tappenden (1997).
54
See Ricketts (1986, 79).
The Constitution of Justificational Self-Sufficiency 161

‘Frege was born in Wismar’ = ‘Russell was born in Trellech’


which is false, because the names that flank the identity sign refer to distinct sen-

.e ion
tences. So at least one of the premises is also false. But a truth predicate must be true
of all true sentences. Hence ‘ξ = the True’ is not a truth predicate.55
Neither line of attack is decisive. First, as we have seen in Chapter 2, the Inde-
finability Argument shows only that truth is not a fundamental property of thought,

an iss
not that it isn’t a property of thoughts at all; the property of truth is supervenient on
the obtaining of what a thought represents. Second, although ‘ξ = the True’ is not

du
a truth predicate, ‘ξ refers to the True’ is: all and only the results of filling in the

m
argument place of this predicate with a name of a true statement or a true thought
are true. Moreover, the result of filling in the argument place of ‘ξ = the True’ with

per
a name is true just in case the result of filling the argument place of ‘ξ denotes the
True’ with a name of that name, or with a name of the sense expressed by that name,
is true. That is to say, for every object name n,
⌜n = the True⌝ is true

ut
iff

ey
h@ itho
⌜‘n’ refers to the True⌝ is true
iff sl
⌜╒ n╕ refers to the True⌝ is true.
sh ite w
we
So it is clear that Frege’s actual words can be re-written using one of the above two
Fregean truth-predicates salva veritate. For example, §18 may be re-written as:
‘ Γ ⊃ (Δ ⊃ Γ)’ would refer to the False only if both ‘Γ’ and ‘Δ’ referred
to the True while ‘Γ’ did not refer to the True. This is impossible; therefore
c

a ⊃ (b ⊃ a).
ie

It is not clear why this re-writing does not amount to a modified Fregean soundness
or not

argument.
Of course, Frege doesn’t in fact use a truth-predicate in his discussion, and this
provides a prima facie ground for thinking that he wanted to avoid such uses. But
then the question is why. If Frege held that truth is not a property, that would provide
o

a reason; but, as we saw in Chapter 2, there is no decisive reason to think that he did.
d.

Another reason that has been suggested is that if the basic laws of logic were
:d

justified on the basis of facts about a particular property—truth—of a special class


of entities—thoughts, then they would not have the universality required of logic.
But the universality in question is universal governance of inference. If all inference,
aft

no matter what about, is the acknowledgment of the truth of a thought on the basis
of acknowledgments of the truth of other thoughts, then the universal governance of
nf

logic would depend on precisely a particular property of truth of the particular class
Dr

of entities that are thoughts.


The conclusion so far, then, is that neither semantical nor anti-semantical inter-
sa

pretations are ruled out by Frege’s texts.


However, the only plausible semantical understanding of Frege’s arguments for
(I) and modus ponens is that they are modified Fregean soundness arguments. The
55
This argument is due to Weiner (2005, 329-332).
162 Frege on the Nature of Logic

problem noted at the beginning of this section then becomes acute. What is it to
argue that (I) is true, except to justify the judgment of (I) on the basis of certain
premises? What is it to argue that modus ponens is truth-preserving, except to jus-

.e ion
tify the judgment of truth-preservation on the basis of certain premises? Is this not
contrary to the justificational self-sufficiency of primitive logical truths and forms of
inference? This problem doesn’t arise on the anti-semantical view of Frege’s argu-
ments as non-justificatory elucidations. Hence, so far it seems that if there is a clear

an iss
reason for favoring the anti-semantical reading, it is that it avoids this conflict with

du
Frege’s view of the justificational self-sufficiency of logic.
I now turn to the question whether there is a semantical interpretation of Frege’s

m
arguments that also avoids this conflict.

per
4.3.2 Soundness Arguments as Logicality Arguments
Let’s begin with a well-known puzzle about justifying logical laws. Any justifica-
tion, it seems, has to involve reasoning. But if the forms of inferences employed

ut
in that reasoning are incorrect, then it fails as a justification; put in another way, a
justification requires correct reasoning. The laws of logic, of course, constitute the

ey
standards of correctness governing all reasoning. So a form of inference is correct
h@ itho
only if it conforms to the laws of logic. But to justify a logical law is surely to show
that the forms of inference that conform to it are indeed correct. So it seems that any
sl
attempt to justify a law of logic is going to run into a circle or an infinite regress. If
the reasoning involved in the attempt employs forms of inference that conforms to
sh ite w

the law in question, then the law will have to be justified already in order for the rea-
we
soning to constitute a justification. If the reasoning involved in the attempt employs
forms of inference conforming to other logical laws, then those other laws will have
to be justified already in order for the reasoning to constitute a justification of the
first law. It seems then that one can never give a justification of the laws of logic as
a totality to anyone who doubts or suspends judgment on their correctness.56
c

In “The Justification of Deduction” Dummett suggests a different way of think-


ie

ing about the justification of logical laws: “Our problem is not to persuade anyone,
or not

not even ourselves, to employ deductive arguments: it is to find a satisfactory expla-


nation of the rôle of such arguments in our use of language” (1973, 296). But what
exactly is it to explain the role of deductive reasoning, and how is such an explana-
tion related to a justification of deduction? In this paper Dummett proposes a fairly
o

complex answer;57 I will formulate a different one, in relation to Dummett’s account


d.

of soundness proofs discussed above.


:d

Suppose someone is convinced that modus ponens is a correct form of inference


in the sense that whenever an instance of it has true premises, the conclusion of that
instance is also true. Suppose in addition that the only reason she has to be convinced
aft

of this correctness is that all instances of modus ponens she has come across with true
nf

56
Dr

My account of this problem, as well as the following discussion of how to resolve it, are indebted to
Dummett (1973b), and to Heck (2007), in which it is formulated as a version of the Cartesian Circle.
57
One of the roles of deductive argument is to enable us to gain new knowledge, in the form of the
sa

conclusion, based on knowledge of the truth of the premises; in Dummett’s terms this is to say that deduc-
tive argument is fruitful. This role, however, seems to conflict with the validity of deductive arguments.
Validity seems to demand that “the process of recognising the premises as true must already have accom-
plished whatever is needed for the recognition of the truth of the conclusion” (Dummett, 1973b, 297). So
Dummett sees the justification of deduction as providing a philosophical explanation of how a valid form
of reasoning may also be fruitful, rather than demonstrating that that form of argument is valid.
The Constitution of Justificational Self-Sufficiency 163

premises also have true conclusions. Then she may have no reason to doubt that if
any conditional statement and its antecedent are both true, then the consequent of the
conditional is also true, and so no reason to doubt that it would be correct to infer that

.e ion
consequent from knowledge or belief in the truth of the conditional and its antecedent.
But although she firmly believes that truth is preserved from conditionals and their
antecedents to their consequents, and so is not in the least skeptical of the correctness
of inferring in this way, she would have no nothing to say as to why this is so.

an iss
An explanation of this truth preservation might go as follows. The only fea-

du
tures of the antecedent and consequent of any conditional required to determine the
truth or falsity of that conditional are their truth-values. How the truth-values of the

m
antecedent and consequent determine the truth-value of the conditional is of course
given by the truth function expressed by the conditional connective. The arguments

per
and values of this truth function determine that an arbitrary conditional statement
whose antecedent is true is itself true only if its consequent is also true. This is why
truth is preserved from any conditional and its antecedent to its consequent.
But this explanation is just a soundness argument for modus ponens. The premises

ut
of this soundness argument are specifications of how each statement of some schematic
form is determined as true or false in terms of the only features of its sub-statements

ey
required for this determination. The conclusion of a soundness argument for a form
h@ itho
of inference is that that form is truth-preserving. Given that the conclusion is reached
from these premises, the soundness argument shows, not just that the form is truth-
sl
preserving, but that the ground of its truth-preservation consists of the way in which
statements that have a particular logical structure are determined as true or false.
sh ite w

Similarly, a soundness argument for a form of statement shows not only that that
we
form has only true instances, but that the ground of its having only true instances
consists in the way in which statements of that form are determined as true or false.
These arguments explain truth or truth preservation by giving its source or ground.
A soundness argument understood in this way Dummett calls “non-suasive”; it is not
intended to persuade a logical skeptic of the correctness of using modus ponens. That
c

attempt at persuasion is hopeless, but the present argument merely aims to explain,
ie

by identifying the ground of correctness, not to persuade.


or not

Moreover, one can argue that having this source or ground makes these forms
of inference or of statement logically truth-preserving or logically true. Reasoning
in all subject matters is carried out or expressed by, e.g., statements of conditional
form. Furthermore, the only features of sub-statements of a conditional required to
o

determine the truth-value of the conditional abstracts from differences in the subject-
d.

matters of those sub-statements. The same holds for statements constructed from
:d

conjunction, disjunction, negation, and quantification. That is to say, a soundness


proof displays the grounds for the truth-preservation of a form of inference, or the
grounds for the truth of a statement, as topic-neutral and so logical.58 Let’s say that
aft

soundness arguments, conceived in this way, are arguments for the logicality of truths
or of forms of inference.
nf
Dr
sa

58
Note that on this account the notion of soundness is not soundness with respect to an intended in-
terpretation. This suggests that whether or not Stanley (1996) is right to take the Contested Passages to
advance arguments for soundness with respect to the intended interpretation, that type of soundness would
not succeed in displaying a form of inference as logical.
164 Frege on the Nature of Logic

4.3.3 Is Frege giving Logicality Arguments?


I now give an account of how Frege’s argument in §18 can be interpreted as a sound-

.e ion
ness argument of the sort just outlined, i.e., as an argument showing that the ground of
truth of (I) is such that (I) is a logically primitive truth.59 In the next sub-section I will
argue that the argument of §18, understood on this interpretation, fails to show that
(I) is logically primitive, i.e., fails to achieve the aim that this interpretation ascribes

an iss
to Frege.
Here’s Frege’s argument again:

du
m
According to §12
Γ ⊃ (Δ ⊃ Γ)

per
would be the False only if both Γ and Δ were the True while Γ was not the True. This is
impossible; accordingly
a ⊃ (b ⊃ a)

The argument starts with a reference to §12 where Frege specifies the function de-

ut
noted by the conditionality stroke; here are Frege’s words again:

ey
h@ itho
I introduce the function with two arguments
ξ⊃ζ
sl
by means of the specification [Bestimmung] that its value shall be the False if the True is taken
as the ζ-argument, while any object that is not the True is taken as ξ-argument; that in all other
sh ite w

cases the value of the function shall be the True. (2013, 20)
we
It should be clear that this specification simultaneously fixes what the values of this
function are for every pair of arguments, and fixes Begriffsschrift expressions for
referring to this function and to its values: the conditionality stroke together with
argument places—‘ ξ ⊃ ζ’—denote the function, and the results of filling these
c

argument places with names denote the values of the function. Frege continues the
ie

argument by using a Begriffsschrift expression constructed from the conditionality


or not

stroke and the capital Greek letters ‘Γ’ and ‘Δ’. Frege explains his use of these letters
in footnote 3 of §5:

I here use the capital Greek letters as if they were names referring to something, without stating
their reference. Proceeding within concept-script itself, they, just as ‘ξ’ and ‘ζ’, will not occur.
o

(2013, 9; emphases mine).60


d.
:d

So ‘Γ’ and ‘Δ’ are not signs of the Begriffsschrift, but signs used as unspecified
names of arbitrary objects, objects for which there may be no Begriffsschrift names;
call these “auxiliary names.”61 ‘ Γ ⊃ Δ’ then is the result of filling in the argument
aft

places of the conditionality stroke with two unspecified names of arbitrary objects,
and this expression refers to the value of the conditionality function for the object
nf

59
Dr

My account draws on Burge (1998) and Heck (2007); I want to stress that I’m not claiming that
the following represents either Heck’s or Burge’s view. In particular, Burge holds that Frege’s arguments
are intended to display how to grasp of the sense of (I) is to acknowledge its truth, and how to grasp the
sa

thoughts expressed by an instance of the premises of modus ponens is to see that to acknowledge the truth
of these thoughts is also to acknowledge the truth of the conclusion.
60
Ich gebrauche hier die grossen griechischen Buchstaben als Namen so, als ob sie etwas bedeuteten,
ohne dass ich die Bedeutung angebe. In den Begriffsschriftentwickelungen selbst werden sie ebenso wenig
wie ‘ξ’ und ‘ζ’ vorkommen. (1893, 9, n. 3)
61
This terminology is due to Heck (2012, 58ff).
The Constitution of Justificational Self-Sufficiency 165

denoted by ‘Γ’ as the ξ-argument and the object denoted by ‘Δ’ as the ζ-argument.
So, moving now to the material mode, the displayed Begriffsschrift expression in
Frege’s argument refers to the value of the conditionality function for Γ as the ξ-

.e ion
argument and Γ ⊃ Δ as the ζ-argument. The argument also makes tacit use of
one of Frege’s explanations of the first-level universal quantifier, in §8:

Let us understand ‘Φ(x)’ as the True, if the value of the function Φ(ξ) is the True for every

an iss
argument; otherwise it shall refer to the False. (2013, 11) 62

du
Here is a step-by-step reconstruction of the argument:

m
• According to the specification of the conditionality function in §12, if Γ⊃
(Δ ⊃ Γ) is the False, then Γ is the True and Γ ⊃ Δ is not the True.

per
• According to the specification of the conditionality function in §12, if Γ⊃Δ
is not the True, then Δ is the True and Γ is not the True.
• Hence, if Γ ⊃ (Δ ⊃ Γ) is the False, then Γ is the True and Δ is the True and

ut
Γ is not the True.

ey
• It is not the case that Γ is both the True and not the True.
h@ itho
• Hence Γ ⊃ (Δ ⊃ Γ) is not the False.
• According to the specification of §12, the conditionality function has only two
sl
values, the True or the False.
• Hence Γ ⊃ (Δ ⊃ Γ) is the True.
sh ite w
we
• Γ and Δ are arbitrary objects, hence the value of the function ξ ⊃ (ζ ⊃ ξ) for
every pair of ξ- and ζ-arguments is the True.
• Hence, according to the initial “definition,” in §8 (1893, 11), of when a Be-
griffsschrift expression of generality containing Latin letters denotes the True,
a ⊃ (b ⊃ a) is the True.
c

• Thus we may express our acknowledgment of the truth of the thought expressed
ie

by ‘ a ⊃ (b ⊃ a)’: a ⊃ (b ⊃ a)
or not

This reconstruction of Frege’s argument may be seen as a demonstration of the truth


of the thought expressed by (I) on the basis of only logical aspects of that very
thought.
o

The main idea here is that a thought “contains” a way in which a truth-value
d.

is determined. This way or manner of determination is a way of being the value of


:d

the functions and arguments determined by components of that thought. An example


may make this clearer. Consider ‘Russell does not have a mustache’. The referent
of this expression is determined as the value, which is a truth-value, of the negation
aft

function, the function presented by ‘ ξ’, for the argument determined by the thought
expressed by ‘Russell has a mustache’. Its sense, the thought it expresses, is the
nf

thought that this referent is the True, that is, the thought that the True is the value of the
Dr

function presented by ‘ ξ’ for the argument determined by the thought expressed


by ‘Russell has a mustache’. The referent of this latter expression is determined as
sa

the value of the function presented by ╒ ξ has a mustache╕ for the argument presented
by ╒ Russell╕ . So the thought expressed by ‘Russell does not have a mustache’ is the

62
Unter ‘Φ(x)’ werde das Wahre verstanden, wenn der Werth der Function Φ(ξ) für jedes Argument
das Wahre ist; sonst bedeute es das Falsche.(1893, 11)
166 Frege on the Nature of Logic

thought that the True is the value of the function presented by ‘ ξ’ for the argument
that is the value of the function presented by ╒ ξ has a mustache╕ for the argument
presented by ╒ Russell╕ . The value that the negation function has for each argument

.e ion
is a part or aspect of the way in which the truth-value of this thought is determined.
Let’s apply this idea to Basic Law (I).
This thought “contains” the way in which its truth-value is determined. What
is this way? Since (I) is a generality expressed by Latin letters, its truth-value is

an iss
determined, according to Frege’s explanations in §8, as True if the truth-values of all

du
its instances, including those formed using auxiliary names, are all the True, and as
the False otherwise. This way in which the truth-value of a generality is determined

m
by the truth-values of its instances is thus a part or aspect of the thought that is (I). As
in the case of ‘Russell doesn’t have a mustache’, the ways in which the truth-values

per
of these instances are determined are then also parts or aspects of the way in which
the truth-value of (I) is determined.
Each instance of (I) is constructed in the same way from the conditionality stroke
and a pair of auxiliary names Γ, Δ; let’s call this way in which they are constructed

ut
their common logical structure. The function specified in §12, the conditionality
function, is, of course, the referent of the two-argument function expression com-

ey
posed from the conditionality stroke. The referent of any expression constructed
h@ itho
from the conditionality stroke and a pair of names is determined as the value of the
conditional function for the objects denoted by those names as arguments; it follows
sl
that this referent is always a truth-value. Given the common logical structure of each
instance of (I), its truth-value is determined as the value of the conditional for, as the
sh ite w

ζ-argument, the object denoted by Γ, and, for the ξ-argument, the value of the condi-
we
tional function for the object denoted by Δ as the ζ-argument and the object denoted
by Γ as the ξ-argument.
The values of the conditional function for each pair of arguments is thus part of
the way in which the truth-value of each instance of (I) is determined, and so of the
way in which the truth-value of (I) is determined.
c

What Frege’s argument shows is that it follows from the fact that the truth-value
ie

of an instance i of (I) is determined in the way just specified that, no matter what
or not

objects are denoted by the names occurring in i, i denotes the True. That is to say, the
ways in which the referents of the names occurring in i are determined are irrelevant
to the truth of i. The only aspect of the thought expressed by i on which i’s truth
depends is the conditionality function. Hence the only aspects of the way the truth-
o

value of (I) is determined relevant to (I)’s truth are the conditionality function and
d.

the way in which the truth-value of a generality is determined by the truth-values of


:d

its instances. That is, according to Frege’s argument the truth of (I) follows merely
from these two aspects of the thought that is (I).
Frege’s argument thus does not merely yield the conclusion that (I) is true, but,
aft

more importantly, displays that the grounds on which this conclusion rests are not
external to the thought that is (I). It then is consistent with the status of (I) as a prim-
nf

itive truth that Frege’s argument provide justificational grounds for it, because these
Dr

justificational grounds are not other truths. This argument shows, in the words of
“Compound Thoughts,” that the truth of (I) derives from itself, from the sense of its
sa

expression. Now, if to grasp the thought expressed by (I) requires grasping the condi-
tionality and the generality aspects of how that thought is determined as true or false,
then Frege’s argument also shows how a grasp of that thought is sufficient for ac-
knowledging the truth of (I). In sum, on the present reading, Frege’s argument shows
The Constitution of Justificational Self-Sufficiency 167

that (I) is justificationally self-sufficient and therefore a primitive truth of logic.


There is an analogous interpretation of Frege’s argument for modus ponens in
§14. The argument shows that the grounds for an instance of the conclusion of this

.e ion
form of inference to be true, given the truth of the corresponding instance of the
premises consist merely of the logical aspect of the thought which is the conditional
premise. For that logical aspect is the way in which the truth-value of that thought
is determined by the conditionality function. Thus the justificational grounds for

an iss
any instance of this form of inference to be truth-preserving is not external to the

du
thoughts that constitute this instance. Hence this form of inference is justificationally
self-sufficient and so logically primitive.

m
To conclude this sub-section, I re-examine Frege’s three types of primitive truths
corresponding to three sources of knowledge from the perspective of the interpreta-

per
tion just sketched.
In §4.2.7 we saw that factual primitive truths are justified by sense-perception
and geometrical primitive truths by pure spatial intuition. I claim that what under-
lies this is the component senses of factual and geometrical thoughts. Consider first

ut
the claim in Grundlagen §14 that “[f]or purposes of conceptual thought we can al-
ways assume the contrary of some one or other of the geometrical axioms, without

ey
involving ourselves in any self-contradictions when we proceed to our deductions,
h@ itho
despite the conflict between our assumptions and our intuition. (1884, §14, 20-1)63 ”
The denial of geometrical truths is consistent, in contrast to the denial of (I) (note
sl
that the argument for (I) consists of reasoning to a contradiction from denying (I)).
Acknowledgment of the truth of a geometrical thought thus depends on more than
sh ite w

seeing that its denial leads to a contradiction. What is this more? The answer comes
we
from a passage in the third essay of “Foundations of Geometry, II”:

If we take the words ‘point’ and ‘straight line’ in Mr. Hilbert’s so-called Axiom II.1 in the
proper Euclidean sense, and similarly the words ‘lie’ and ‘between’, then we obtain a proposi-
tion that has a sense, and we can acknowledge the thought expressed therein as a proper axiom.
c

Let us designate it by ‘[II.1]’. Let [II.2] emerge in a similar way from Mr. Hilbert’s II.2. Now
ie

if one has acknowledged [II.1] as true, one has grasped the sense of the words ‘point’, ‘straight
or not

line’, ‘lie’, ‘between’; and from this the truth of [II.2] immediately follows, so that one will be
unable to avoid acknowledging the latter as well. (1906, 423; emphases mine)64

Thus the “more” required for acknowledging of the truth of a geometrical thought
is a grasp of the senses of specifically geometrical terms. We can put the difference
o

in terms of “how much” of the thought “comes into play” in acknowledgment of its
d.
:d

truth. In the case of any instance of (I), only the roles of the conditional and the
universal generality functions in determining the truth of the thought are required.
In the case of geometrical truths, the specific concepts and relations expressed by
the primitive terms of geometry are required. The role of spatial intuition in the
aft
nf

63
Für das begriffliche Denken kann man immerhin von diesem oder jenem geometrischen Axiome
Dr

das Gegentheil annehmen, ohne dass man in Widersprüche mit sich selbst verwickelt wird, wenn man
Schlussfolgerungen aus solchen der Anschauung widerstreitenden Annahmen zieht. (1884, §14, 20-1)
64
Nehmen wir in dem Hilbertschen sogenannten Axiome II l die Wörter ‘Punkt’ und ‘Gerade’ im
sa

eigentlichen Euklidischen Sinne und dementsprechend auch die Wörter ‘liegen’ und ‘zwischen’, so er-
halten wir einen sinnvollen Satz, und den in ihm ausgedriickten Gedanken können wir als eigentliches
Axiom anerkennen. Bezeichnen wir ihn durch ‘[II l]’. Ebenso gehe [II 2] hervor aus dem Hilbertschen II
2. Wenn man nun [II l] als wahr anerkannt hat, so hat man den Sinn der Wörter ‘Punkt’ ‘Gerade’ ‘liegen
zwischen’ erfaßt, und aus diesem fließt unmittelbar die Wahrheit von [II 2], so daß man sich auch deren
Anerkennung nicht wird entziehen können.(1969, 318)
168 Frege on the Nature of Logic

justification of primitive geometrical truths is to enable one to acknowledge the truth


of these thoughts on the basis of a grasp of these geometrical concepts and relations.
We can now spell out why the way in which the truth of (I) depends on the

.e ion
thought that it is makes it a primitive logical truth. The truth of (I) depends on only
those aspects of the thought that it is—those component senses denoting the condi-
tional function and the universal generality function—which are maximally general
in being aspects of thoughts involved in reasoning about any subject matter what-

an iss
soever. These senses are the logical aspects of all thought. The logical source of

du
knowledge enables one to acknowledge the truth of those thoughts whose truth de-
pends only on these logical aspects of all thought, merely by grasping those aspects.

m
The upshot of this interpretation is that for Frege what makes a thought a prim-
itive logical truth is, ontologically, that its truth rests only upon its logical aspects,

per
and, epistemologically, that one can acknowledge its truth merely by grasping these
logical aspects of all thought.

4.3.4 A Problem for Logicality Arguments

ut
The key point of the foregoing interpretation is that Frege’s argument for (I) shows

ey
(I) to be a logical primitive truth by showing that the truth of (I) is grounded on only
h@ itho
the logical aspects of the sense of (I).
We begin with a puzzle about this reading: what does “grounded on” mean?
sl
Whatever it means, it is presumably shown by the line of reasoning Frege advanced
in §18. Prima facie, this line of reasoning reaches the judgment of (I) from what
sh ite w

seems to be three premises:


we
• a statement of the arguments and the values of the conditionality function,
• a statement of the arguments and values of and the first-level generality function
for their arguments, and,
c

• a statement of the logical structure of (I).


ie

So, prima facie, these three premises are the grounds of a justification of (I) by this
or not

line of reasoning. But then Frege’s reasoning appears to be an inferential justification


of (I) from three truths, contrary to the claim that (I) is a primitive truth and so not
amenable to inferential justification.
An interpretation of (I)’s being justified from itself, from the thought that it
o

expresses: The logical aspects of the sense of (I) are the grounds that justifies (I).
d.

The premises are these logical aspects. So we can’t really take the argument to be a
:d

non-justifying proof of a primitive truth in a system in which it is not an axiom.


Perhaps, though, there is a simple resolution to this puzzle: if a thought T is in-
ferential justified by truths about T, then the justification of T doesn’t rest on grounds
aft

outside of T, and so T still counts as justificationally self-sufficient.


Let us note that, just as in the case of justification and inference, the notion of line
nf

of reasoning or argument can be understood in two ways. One way is to take them to
Dr

be a set of inferences, i.e., a set of justifications, each of which consists of a judgment


standing in the relation of justification to judgments that are its grounds. Understood
sa

in this way an argument is independent of our knowledge or belief. Another way is


to take a line of reasoning to be a sequence of inferrings from judgings of thoughts to
judgings of thoughts; that is to say, a sequence of cognitive acts that we can perform,
and the performance of which can be recorded, as is done in Grundgesetze §18. It is
The Constitution of Justificational Self-Sufficiency 169

by performing such a sequence of cognitive acts correctly that we succeed in making


a judgment of (I) justified by judgments of its grounds.
We now go on to a more substantial difficulty. We are assuming the following

.e ion
about Frege’s argument:
• is non-suasive, not intended to remove doubts about the truth of (I),
• the truth of (I) is not in doubt, and,

an iss
• the three “premises” are not grounds for the truth of (I) external to (I) itself.

du
Nevertheless, the inferential transitions from step to step in this argument surely have

m
to be from truths to truths, otherwise, a true conclusion would not have been attained
from the true premises. The transitions, that is, have to be truth-preserving. Again,

per
the assumed non-suasive nature of the argument implies that we are in no doubt that
these transitions are indeed truth-preserving. But now I want to raise a question: do
these truth-preserving transitions have to be logically truth-preserving, in order for
the argument to show that (I) is logically true?

ut
Before addressing this question, I argue first that, on the hypothesis that the
transitions have to be logically truth-preserving, there is a threat of circularity or

ey
infinite regress in our supposed Fregean argument for the logicality of (I). Suppose
h@ itho
that Φ1 … Φn are the forms of inference to which the transitions in the argument
for (I), call it Π, conform. According to the hypothesis in force, Π shows that (I) is
sl
logically true only if Φ1 … Φn are all logically truth-preserving forms of inference.
By the Fregean account of the nature of logical forms of inference, what makes any
sh ite w

Φi logically truth-preserving is that the truth of any instance of the conclusion of


we
Φi has to depend on or follow from the logical aspects of the corresponding true
instances of the premises of Φi . “Follow” or “depend on” here also amount to the
existence of a line of reasoning, call it Π′ , from premises about the logical structures
of true thoughts that are instances of the premises of Φi to the conclusion that the
corresponding instance of the conclusion of Φi is true. Again our hypothesis dictates
c

that all the forms of inference occurring in Π′ have to be logically truth-preserving if


ie

Φi is to be logically truth-preserving. And so we have an infinite regress.


or not

This regress is on the ontological side, but there is a corresponding regress on


the epistemological side.
The hypothesis here is that to know that (I) is logically true one has to be able
to acknowledge its truth on the basis of logical aspects of (I) by an argument whose
o

transitions are known to be logically truth-preserving. So, in order to know that (I) is
d.

logically true one has to know that Φ1 … Φn are logically true forms of inference. To
:d

have the latter knowledge one has to know that it is logically truth preserving, which
requires arguments based on logical aspects of instances of the premises of the forms,
and knowledge that the transitions in those arguments are logically truth-preserving.
aft

And now there is a regress.


The question, then, is why would the transitions in these arguments have to be
nf

logical? One way to see that Frege has reason to require this is by considering a
Dr

representative statement of his logicist project, in the essay on Peano:


sa

I was looking for the basic statements or axioms upon which the whole of mathematics rests.
Only after this question is answered can it be hoped to trace successfully the springs of knowl-
edge upon which this science thrives. …. In order to test whether a list of axioms is complete,
we have to try and derive from them all the proofs of the branch of learning to which they
relate. And in doing this it is imperative that we draw conclusions only in accordance with
170 Frege on the Nature of Logic

purely logical laws, for otherwise something might intrude unobserved which should have been
laid down as an axiom. …. For an investigation such as I have in mind here it is not sufficient
for us just to convince ourselves of the truth of a conclusion, as we are usually content to do

.e ion
in mathematics; on the contrary, we must also be made aware of what it is that justifies our
conviction, and upon what primitive laws it is based. (1897, 235; emphases mine)65

Frege’s aim is to identify the sources of knowledge on which “the whole of mathemat-

an iss
ics” rests, by identifying the basic statements or axioms of mathematics. Specifically,
the idea is to isolate, for each “branch” of mathematics, all, i.e., the “complete” set,

du
of axioms required for proofs of the theorems of that branch; the source for knowing

m
the axioms then pinpoints the source of knowledge of that branch. The critical point
for us is that in order to identify the required axioms, one has to restrict the means of
proof to “purely logical laws.” Otherwise, something intuitive or sense-perceptual

per
might “intrude” unnoticed. The upshot is that even if a truth follows from logical
axioms, but not by logical forms of inference, then, in fact, it is not a logical truth
but an intuitive or sense-perceptual one, dependent not just on the logical axioms but
on the truths in accordance with which the non-logical inferences are drawn. Our

ut
knowledge of its truth then issues not from the logical source, but from the intuitive

ey
or the sense-perceptual sources of knowledge.
h@ itho
On the logicality interpretation, Frege’s argument in §18 aims at showing that
(I) is a primitive truth of logic, by showing that its truth rests on logical aspects of
sl
its sense. But now, if the forms of inference in accordance with which (I) is inferred
from these grounds are not all logical, then by Frege’s lights, (I) wouldn’t count as a
logical truth at all, much less a primitive law of logic. So the forms of inference occur-
sh ite w
we
ring in the argument for (I) have to logically truth-preserving. Hence the attempted
justification of the logicality of (I) leads to the infinite regress of justifications set out
above and so does not succeed.

4.3.5 An Alternative to the Logicality Interpretation?


c

Truth in virtue of logical structure is supposed to be a property such that one can
ie

demonstrate that thoughts have this property, thereby demonstrating that these thoughts
or not

are primitively logical. What we have shown is that no such demonstration is avail-
able. It follows that there is no justification, by inference, of any belief that a thought
is primitively logical. That is to say, if a thought L is a primitive logical truth, then
there is no inferential knowledge that L is a primitive logical truth.
o

Now, according to Frege, the justification of facts, of primitive truths of geome-


d.
:d

try, and of primitive logical truths are all non-inferential. In each case, we start with
the grasp of a thought and end with the recognition of its truth, but what comes in be-
tween is not inference. I suggest that what comes in between is the exercise of some
capacity. This may be relatively uncontroversial in the case of facts, for the justifica-
aft

tion of a fact by sense-perception. That is to say, once one grasps the thought, what
nf

65
[I]ch nach den unbeweisbaren Grundsätzen oder Axiomen fragte, auf denen die ganze Mathematik
Dr

beruht. Erst nach Beantwortung dieser Frage kann man mit Erfolg den Erkenntnisquellen nachzuspüren
hoffen, aus denen diese Wissenschaft schöpft. …. Will man erproben, ob ein Verzeichnis von Axiomen
vollständig sei, so muß man versuchen, aus ihnen alle Beweise des Zweiges der Wissenschaft zu führen,
sa

um den es sich handelt. Und hierbei muß man genau darauf achten, die Schlüsse nur nach rein logischen
Gesetzen zu ziehen; denn sonst würde sich unmerklich etwas einmischen, was als Axiom hätte aufgestellt
werden müssen. …. Bei einer Untersuchung, welche ich hier im Auge habe, kommt es aber nicht nur
darauf an, daß man sich von der Wahrheit des Schlußsatzes überzeuge, womit man sich sonst in der Math-
ematik meistens begnügt; sondern man muß sich auch zum Bewußtsein bringen, wodurch diese Oberzeu-
gung gerechtfertigt ist, auf welchen Urgesetzen sie beruht. (1969, 221)
The Constitution of Justificational Self-Sufficiency 171

is required to recognize its truth is the use of the senses, the exercise of our capacity
for sense-perception. I take this to be a model for primitive geometrical and logical
truths as well. In the case of the former, exercises of the capacity for pure intuition

.e ion
of space are required in addition to a grasp of the thoughts. In the case of the latter,
what are required are exercises of the capacity that is, or is associated with, the logical
source of knowledge.
My interpretive hypothesis is that this type of justification applies also to thoughts

an iss
to the effect that some thought is primitively logical. Let me clarify. Suppose, for

du
instance, that Frege’s basic law (I) is a primitive logical truth. Then we justify (I)
itself, that is, the claim that (∀a)(∀b)(a ⊃ (b ⊃ a)), by exercising the logical source

m
of knowledge. My hypothesis is that we justify the claim that (I) is a primitive log-
ical truth also by exercising the logical source of knowledge. In other words, our

per
knowledge that (I) is a basic law of logic is a piece of knowledge that we attain by
exercising a capacity that is like sense-perception in being non-inferential.
What of Frege’s arguments for his basic laws and modes of inference? I suggest
that Frege takes them to be the means for transferring his knowledge that his basic

ut
laws are primitive logical truths to his readers. The “argument” for (I) does two
things: it explains Frege’s grasp of the thought that (I) is, and it displays Frege’s use

ey
of the logical source of knowledge to move from that grasp to a recognition of the
h@ itho
truth of (I). That this move is not a justification of the truth of (I) is a part of the
logicality interpretation. But, while the logicality interpretation goes on to claim that
sl
Frege’s move to the truth of (I) provides a demonstration, an inferential justification,
of the claim that (I) is primitively logical, I suggest that Frege’s move is a display
sh ite w

that provides the opportunity for his reader to use the logical source of knowledge to
we
arrive, non-inferentially, at the knowledge that (I) is a primitive logical truth.
c
ie
or not
o
d.
:d
aft
nf
Dr
sa
Dr
aft
sa :d
nf o
or not
d. c
sh ite w
ie
h@ itho Part II
we ut
Russell
sl per
ey m
an iss
.e ion
du
Dr
aft
sa :d
nf o
or not
d. c
sh ite w
ie
h@ itho
we ut
sl per
ey m
an iss
.e ion
du
5

.e ion
The Idealist Origins of Logicism

an iss
In this chapter, I discuss Russell’s views of necessity and logic in his idealist period,

du
roughly between 1897 and 1899. During this time he was under the influence of

m
F. H. Bradley, one of the last British idealists. In particular, it is Bradley’s concep-
tion of Bradley’s theory that all necessity lies in the necessary connection between

per
premises and conclusions in logical inferences that played a major role in Russell’s
philosophical development. I discuss Bradley’s theory of necessity in §5.1.
Russell’s own views went through three phases. The first phase, discussed in
§5.2, consists of Russell’s first book in philosophy, An Essay on the Foundations of

ut
Geometry (1897). Here Russell defends a Kantian theory of geometry as a body of
non-empirical, non-logical, necessary truths. I emphasize two aspects of Russell’s

ey
defense. First, Russell formulates a transcendental argument to show that geometry
h@ itho
is justified on the basis of certain conditions of possibility of experience. Second,
Russell holds that this transcendental argument also demonstrates the necessity of
sl
geometry; here, as we will see, he relies on Bradley’s account of necessity.
In the second phase, discussed in §5.3, Russell begins to move away from the
sh ite w

Kantianism of Foundations. He comes to think that transcendental arguments can-


we
not ultimately demonstrate the necessity of any judgment, and that the necessity of
some judgments, in particular mathematical ones, has to be simply perceived “as one
perceives that the sky is blue” (1898).
In the third phase, discussed in §5.4, Russell’s view of mathematics is deter-
mined by two main factors. The first is Russell’s increasing conviction that the theory
c

of classes is a central part of mathematics because it is used in all mathematical theo-


ie

ries. The second is again Bradley’s theory of necessity, which now prompts Russell
or not

to take the necessity of fundamental mathematical axioms to be the necessity of in-


ference. As a result, Russell attempts to formulate a theory of classes whose axioms
are rules of logical inference. This is a logicist theory of classes, that is, a position
even farther from Kant, who insists that mathematical justification is never purely
o

logical.
d.

Russell’s exploration of this logicism shows, however, that it faces a substantial


:d

difficulty: unless the axioms of logic are true but not necessary, they do not entail
theorems about classes that are intuitively correct. This difficulty doesn’t arise for the
full-blown logicism that Russell adopts after rejecting idealism because, as we will
aft

see in the next chapter, with this rejection Russell also comes to hold that there is
no distinction between truth and necessary truth. Russellian logicism then becomes
nf

non-modal: the axioms of logic are simply true, not necessarily so. All that would
Dr

then remain of Russell’s early views is the non-empirical status of mathematics.


I would like to emphasize that my account is by no means the full story of Rus-
sa

sell’s idealist philosophy of mathematics. My focus is on modality and logic, and I


intend my interpretation to complement rather than displace existing scholarship on
this period of Russell’s philosophy.
Bradley’s Theory of Modality 175

5.1 Bradley’s Theory of Modality


In this section, I outline Bradley’s theory of necessity and possibility as presented in

.e ion
The Principles of Logic.
This theory depends on Bradley’s theory of hypothetical judgments. To under-
stand the latter theory, we need some account of Bradley’s conception of judgment.
For present purposes we need only three points:

an iss
• A judgment is a mental act in which we represent the existence of an object,

du
property, or a fact in reality, by ascribing to reality an idea that is a sign of that

m
object, property, or fact.
• An idea that functions as a sign is not a particular mental state of a specific

per
individual but rather what Bradley calls a “universal meaning” that applies to
recurrent aspects of reality.
• Bradley uses a number of terms interchangeably with ‘ascribe’: ‘affirm’, ‘as-
sert’, and ‘predicate’.

ut
In chapter 6, §6.2 I will give a more extended account of Bradley’s theory of judg-

ey
ment.
h@ itho
5.1.1 Hypothetical Judgments
sl
For Bradley hypothetical judgments are expressed by conditional statements, includ-
sh ite w

ing counterfactual conditionals. They pose a prima facie difficulty for Bradley’s
we
view of judgment, a difficulty which may be most easily illustrated with Bradley’s
own example (1883, 87):
(1) If you had not destroyed our barometer, it would now forewarn us.
Suppose I make this statement. I am then specifically ruling out the truth of the
c

antecedent:
ie
or not

You did not destroy our barometer


as well as the truth of the consequent:
Our barometer now forewarns us
o
d.

This means that I am not asserting the existence in reality of either of the state of af-
:d

fairs expressed by the antecedent and the consequent statements. A similar difficulty
arises even if the conditional is not counterfactual. Consider a well-worn example.
Consider the statement
aft

(2) If it rains, then the patio will be wet


nf

Now suppose it doesn’t rain, and the patio stays dry. Would the statement be false?
Dr

The answer is surely no. As Bradley puts it, this statement “seems just as true without
facts as with them,” but then, he asks, “what fact can it possibly assert?” (1883, 46).
sa

To resolve this difficulty, Bradley first considers the proposal that what condi-
tionals assert of reality is a “necessary connection,” between the antecedent and con-
sequent. But he rejects this proposal because “you can not assert the existence of the
connection, for how can a connection remain as a fact when no facts are connected?”
(1883, I.ii.49, 86). What underlies this rejection is the assumption that there cannot
176 The Idealist Origins of Logicism

be a “connection” in reality unless what are connected are also aspects of reality.
Now, Bradley grants that in making a hypothetical judgment one “appears to assert a
necessary connection, which holds between ideas within my head but not outside it”

.e ion
(1883, I.ii.48, 85). But Bradley insists that judgments are representations of reality,
not of the ideas which represent reality. For example, judgment (2) is surely about
rain and the patio, not about our judgments about rain and the patio. So an assertion
of a necessary connection between ideas “can not be a judgment at all” (ibid.)

an iss
Bradley’s solution begins from noting that hypothetical judgments are expressed

du
using the word ‘if’, and this word expresses a “supposal.” A supposal is

m
an ideal experiment. It is the application of a content to the real, with a view to see what
the consequence is, and with a tacit reservation that no actual judgment has taken place. The

per
supposed is treated as if it were real, in order to see how the real behaves when qualified thus
in a certain manner. (1883, I.ii.48, 86; emphasis mine)

Bradley’s use of the word “consequence” here points to his account of inference in
Book III of Principles: “Inference is an experiment, an ideal experiment which gains

ut
fresh truth” (1883, III.vi.33, 452). So a hypothetical judgment is associated with

ey
an inference from the supposition of the truth of the antecedent to the truth of the
h@ itho
consequent. But the inference is based not only on this supposition. About the coun-
terfactual judgment (1) Bradley writes,
sl
In this judgment we assert the existence in reality of such circumstances, and such a general
law of nature, as would, if we suppose some conditions present, produce a certain result. But
sh ite w

assuredly those conditions and their result are not predicated, nor do we even hint that they
we
are real. …. It is the diminution of pressure and the law of its effect, which we affirm of the
actual world before us. (1883, I.ii.50, 87)

Bradley’s view is this. The inference associated with (1) moves from three premises:
c

(3) the supposed, counterfactual, antecedent, “you had not destroyed our barom-
ie

eter,”
or not

(4) certain existing circumstances, the “diminution of atmospheric pressure,” and


(5) the “law of the effect of diminution of pressure”
to the counterfactual consequent
o
d.

(6) “our barometer would now forewarn us.”


:d

As we have already seen, the counterfactual antecedent and consequent are not as-
serted of reality. Moreover, we saw that Bradley assumes that there is no connection
in reality if in reality there are not, or might not be, features for a purported connec-
aft

tion to connect. Hence the inferential transition from the premises to the conclusion
is also not asserted of reality. Thus, if hypotheticals assert anything of reality at all,
nf

it can only be what the non-counterfactual premises of the expressed inference assert
Dr

of reality. In the case of our example, the hypothetical judgment (1) asserts, neither
the antecedent (3), nor the consequent (6), nor the inferential connection from (3)-(5)
sa

to (6), but (4) and (5), the circumstances and the laws of nature. Bradley puts it in
this way: “What is affirmed is the mere ground of the [inferential] connection; not
the actual existing behaviour of the real, but a latent quality of its disposition” (1883,
Bradley’s Theory of Modality 177

I.ii.50, 87; emphasis mine).1 He also calls this ground the “categorical basis” of the
inferential connection (see, e.g., 1883, I.vii.20, 192).
One question that Bradley doesn’t raise here is whether the inference from the

.e ion
antecedent and the categorical grounds to the consequent purely logical? That is,
are only logical forms of reasoning used to reach the consequent? As we will see,
Bradley’s theory of necessity suggests that only logical inference is involved.
Now, I have been using the phrase “associated with” to refer to the relation be-

an iss
tween a hypothetical judgment and the inference from its antecedent to its consequent

du
which it does not assert of reality. Bradley never explains what this relation is, but
it is surely essential to the hypothetical judgment that it stands in this relation to an

m
inference, because what the judgment does assert of reality is determined by what
is required, in addition to the antecedent, for the inference to the consequent to go

per
through. So I will henceforth attempt to capture this fact by saying that a hypothetical
judgment expresses this inference and asserts the categorical ground of this inference.
Note that this is not the same thing as the more common use of ‘express’ in which a
statement expresses a judgment.

ut
The foregoing is not a full account of hypothetical judgment because Bradley
holds that the laws of science are universal hypothetical judgments: “The end of sci-

ey
ence … is the discovery of laws; and a law is nothing but a hypothetical judgment.
h@ itho
…. It is universal and abstract” (1883, I.ii.57, 92) So each law expresses an inference
from supposed antecedents, together with additional grounds, to possibly counterfac-
sl
tual consequents. Among the additional categorical grounds of any particular law L
may be more fundamental laws. If so, then a hypothetical judgment which expresses
sh ite w

an inference that has L as premise must be taken as asserting the more fundamental
we
laws. Clearly, the same point holds of the more fundamental laws, and so there is a
regress of laws. If the regress is not to be vicious it has to stop at some point. So
some laws, the most fundamental ones, assert something, which is not a law, of re-
ality. Bradley has no further account of this something than that it is some “occult
or latent” quality of reality (1883, I.ii.52, 88). Thus every hypothetical judgment,
c

ultimately, asserts the existence of some such quality.


ie

We can now provide a formulation of Bradley’s theory. A hypothetical judgment


or not

is expressed by a conditional statement, in either indicative or subjunctive mood, of


the form
If C1 and … and Cn , then P
o

which
d.
:d

• express an inference whose premises are


– the (ideas expressed by the) antecedent statements C1 , … , Cn , together
with
aft

– the (ideas expresses by) grounds (or occult qualities) G1 , … , Gm ,


nf

and whose conclusion is (the idea expressed by) P, and


Dr

• attributes G1 , … , Gm to reality.
(Henceforth I write C̄ and Ḡ to abbreviate, respectively, C1 , … , Cn and G1 , … , Gm .)
sa

1
By the second edition of Principles Bradley became aware of a problem with this characterization
stemming from his taking dispositions to be analyzed as conditionals; in Additional Note 41 to Chapter
II he writes, “If ‘disposition’ is used to explain ‘conditional,’ then obviously, since the very meaning of
‘disposition’ involves a standing ‘if,’ the explanation is circular …” (1922, 111-112). See Allard (2004,
87).
178 The Idealist Origins of Logicism

5.1.2 Judgments of Necessity and Possibility


We are now in a position to outline Bradley’s view of judgments of necessity and of

.e ion
possibility. His account of judgments of necessity has one source in an apparently
idiosyncratic view of the meaning of the term ‘necessity’:

A thing is necessary if it is taken not simply in and by itself, but by virtue of something else

an iss
and because of something else. Necessity carries with it the idea of mediation, of dependency,
of inadequacy to maintain an isolated position and to stand and act alone and self-supported.

du
A thing is not necessary when it simply is; it is necessary when it is, or is said to be, because
of something else. (1883, I.vii.7, 183)

m
This view is contrary to two traditional ideas of necessity: (a) necessary truth is a

per
grade of truth that does not depend on contingent features of the world, (b) necessary
existence, in particular the necessary existence of God, is existence not dependent
on the existence of anything else. What we see in the passage just cited is that for
Bradley necessity is tied to explanation. When we take a thing or fact to exist because

ut
of something else, we are taking that other something to explain or be the reason for
the existence of the thing or fact. Moreover, for Bradley explanation is tied to logical

ey
inference:
h@ itho
in logic ‘because’ does not stand for a real connection in actual fact; we must allow that ne-
sl
cessity is not a bond between existing things. For logic what is necessary is nothing beyond
a logical consequence. Necessity is here the force which compels us to go to a conclusion, if
we start from premises. (1883, I.vii.9, 184)
sh ite w
we
So Bradley’s view is that when we take a thing or a state of affairs to be necessary, we
not merely take it to exist, but we take its existence to follow logically from something
that gives a reason for its existence. Once we put it in this way, the Kantian origins
of the view become visible. As we saw in §1.1.2, for Kant what makes a judgment
apodictic is that we take it to represent how certain concepts or judgments must be
c

ordered, in virtue of being inferred from other true judgments.


ie

As in Kant’s case, we may speculate that this conception of necessity derives


or not

from the Aristotelian conception that the truth of the conclusion of a valid logical
inference follows of necessity from the supposing the premises to be true. Kant and
Bradley, one might say, think of the necessity of judgments as resting on or transferred
from the necessity of logical consequence.
o

Now, as we have just seen, hypothetical judgments also involve inferences from
d.
:d

premises to conclusions. Thus Bradley holds that the “possible and the necessary are
special forms of the hypothetical” (1883, I.vii.5, 183). He makes a relatively specific
proposal about judgments of necessity or, to use Kant’s name for them, apodictic
judgments:2
aft

‘p is a necessary truth’ means ‘p follows from something else.’ (1883, I.vii.20, 192)
nf
Dr

Perhaps the sense in which the right-hand side above is a hypothetical judgment is
that it abbreviates
sa

There is a judgment q, different from p, such that if q is true then so is p

2
Bradley appears to use ‘S — P’ as a variable ranging over meaning ideas that can be used in judgment;
in the following quotations I replace it with the more familiar ‘p’.
Bradley’s Theory of Modality 179

So far, however, it’s not clear that there is any difference between judgments of ne-
cessity and hypothetical judgments in general. However, we can see what is distinc-
tive about judgments of necessity by looking at Bradley’s account of judgments of

.e ion
possibility:

for p to be possible all the conditions which make p necessary must be supposed, but only a
part of them need be assumed to exist. …. Take a judgment such as this, Given abcd then E

an iss
must follow. Add to it the judgment, or the supposition (§15), that ab exists, while cd is not
known to exist, and we get the possible. E is now a possibility. (1883, I.vii.12, 187)

du
m
So the contrasting judgments of necessity involve “adding” to a hypothetical judg-
ment the judgment or supposition that all of the conditions of the antecedent of the
hypothetical exist in reality.

per
Let’s illustrate this theory with an example derived from Bradley’s comment that
“arsenic poisons, but if at the moment no dose is operating, … it poisons nothing”
(1883, I.ii.3, 42, n.*). Suppose that Hercule says,

ut
(7) Roger must have been poisoned.

ey
Then Hercule makes an apodictic judgment. On Bradley’s view, this judgment really
h@ itho
involves some hypothetical judgment such as
(8) sl
If Roger had been given arsenic, and he did not take an antidote in time, then
he would have been poisoned.
sh ite w

Note that this hypothetical judgment has two antecedent conditions:


we
(9) Roger was given arsenic,
and
(10) Roger did not take an antidote in time.
c
ie

According to the theory of hypothetical judgments, (8) expresses a necessary infer-


or not

ential connection from the two antecedents, (9) and (10), together with the laws of
chemistry and of (mammalian?) physiology, to the conclusion
(11) Roger was poisoned
o

According to Bradley, Hercule’s judgment of necessity, (7), consists really of the


d.

hypothetical judgment (8) together with judgments of both antecedent conditions (9)
:d

and (10), and judgments of the laws of chemistry and of physiology. If Hercule had
made a judgment of possibility instead, such as
aft

(12) Roger might have been poisoned,


What he would have really done is something like judging the hypothetical (8), the
nf

antecedent (9), and the laws of chemistry and of physiology, but not the antecedent
Dr

(10).
So Bradley’s general theory of modal judgments is this. What seems to be a
sa

single apodictic judgment, expressed by a statement of the form

‘P is a necessary truth’, or ‘P is necessarily true’, or ‘necessarily P’, or ‘it is necessary that P’

is, in fact, a set of judgments:


180 The Idealist Origins of Logicism

• one is a hypothetical judgment, expressed by “if C1 and … and Cn , then P,”


and
• the remaining are all the judgments expressed by C.̄

.e ion
Similarly, what appears to be a single judgment of possibility,

‘P is a possible truth’, or ‘P is possibly true’, or ‘possibly P’, or ‘it is possible

an iss
that P’

du
is, in fact, a set of judgments:

m
• one is a hypothetical judgment, expressed by “if C1 and … and Cn , then P,”
and

per
• the remaining are is a proper subset of the judgments expressed by C.̄
One question we have not yet considered is: what according to Bradley do modal
judgments ascribe to reality? Since hypothetical judgments ascribe the ground or

ut
categorical basis of the inferences that they express, one would expect that judgments
of necessity and possibility, which really consist in hypothetical judgments, to do the

ey
same. This is indeed what Bradley’s view. After giving his analysis of apodictic
h@ itho
judgments in terms of hypothetical ones, he writes:
sl
We can not say ‘In fact p really is a necessary consequence as such.’ But, the connection
[between p and that something else] being hypothetical, it on the other hand demands a basis
sh ite w

which is categorical. All necessity affirms a real ground explicit or implicit. It thus so far has
we
actual existence, not in itself, but indirectly and simply in its ground. (1883, I.vii.20, 192)

Thus, Hercule’s judgment of necessity affirms of reality the laws of chemistry and of
physiology together with three facts about Roger: he was given arsenic, did not take
an antidote in time, and was poisoned.
c

Now it seems that the only necessity that appears in this account is the necessity
ie

of logical consequence, which is “the force which compels us to go to a conclusion, if


or not

we start from premises.” This takes us to the last issue I want to consider: is Bradley’s
theory of necessity a reductionist one?
It may seem that Bradley’s theory is very much like Hume’s account of causal
necessity. The necessity of an apodictic judgment appears to rest in the necessity
of the logical connection expressed by the hypothetical judgment that is part of that
o
d.

judgment of necessity. Now, Bradley holds that hypothetical judgments appear to as-
:d

sert a necessary connection among our ideas, but there are no necessary connections
in reality. Is this not exactly analogous with Hume’s view that when we take one
object to cause another, we might think that these objects are necessarily connected,
aft

but in fact, there are no necessary connections among objects? Bradley holds, in ad-
dition, that what a hypothetical judgment really asserts of reality is only the ground of
nf

a logical inference. Is this not analogous with Hume’s “skeptical” view of causation,
Dr

that what we take to be necessary connections are only our feeling of movements of
our minds habituated by impressions of constant conjunction? From this perspec-
sa

tive, it might seem that the main difference between Bradley and Hume is what they
reduce necessity to: for Hume, it is a feature of our minds, but for Bradley, it the
categorical ground of an inference, and so is a feature of reality.
It is not clear to me, however, that this is entirely right. For while Bradley insists
that there are no necessary connections in reality, he also affirms that the logical
Geometry, Logic, and Necessity 181

connection between premises and conclusion is necessary, it’s just that this necessary
connection “holds between ideas within my head.” So it is open to interpret Bradley
as holding that logical consequence is an irreducible form of necessary connection,

.e ion
indeed, the only genuine type of necessary there is.

5.2 Geometry, Logic, and Necessity

an iss
In this section, I examine Russell’s conceptions of necessity and logic in Foundations

du
of Geometry.

m
The overall project of this book is to defend a Kantian view of geometry. The
view is Kantian, rather than Kant’s, for two reasons. First, following a number of

per
philosophers and mathematicians of the time, Russell thinks that non-Euclidean ge-
ometries pose a problem for Kant’s theory of geometry, and Russell’s goal is to
modify Kant’s theory to circumvent these problems. Second, Russell’s allegiance
to British idealism led him to accept a number of criticisms of Kant which also re-
quire modifications in the theory of geometry.

ut
I now elaborate these two reasons.

ey
h@ itho
5.2.1 Kant on Geometry and the Problem of Non-Euclidean
Geometries sl
Russell takes Kant to hold that the truths of geometry have four distinguishing fea-
sh ite w

tures:
we
• They are necessary; as Russell put it, they have “apodeictic certainty” (1897,
§1, 1).
• They are known “independent of experience,” (1897, §1, 1).
• They are not known on the basis of “the principle of contradiction” of formal
c

logic alone (1897, §55, 57).


ie

• And yet they are “about the real world” (1897, §1, 1).
or not

This is a reasonable account of Kant’s famous characterization of geometry as syn-


thetic a priori knowledge of the world.3 The apriority of geometry means that geo-
metrical knowledge is not justified empirically, on the basis of sense-experience. he
o

syntheticity of geometry amounts to the claim that geometrical propositions are not
d.

known on the basis of analysis of concepts and the formal logical principle of non-
:d

contradiction. Finally, Kant, as we saw in §4.1 above, took necessity to be a “sure


sign” of apriority.
This characterization tells us how geometrical knowledge is not justified: nei-
aft

ther by formal logic nor by sense-experience. One of the few things that is relatively
uncontroversial about how, according to Kant, geometrical knowledge is justified is
nf

that it has something to do with what Kant calls the spatial form of human sensibility
Dr

or the human cognitive subject’s pure intuition of space.


As Russell sees it, in the metaphysical exposition4 of space in the B edition of
sa

the Critique of Pure Reason Kant gives an argument for this package of views about
3
What exactly Kant means by this, what exactly his analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori dis-
tinctions amount to, have, of course, been the subject of much controversy as soon as the first Critique was
published. For helpful contemporary discussions see, for example, Kitcher (2006) and Proops (2005).
4
“Erörterung”, rendered by Russell as “deduction.”
182 The Idealist Origins of Logicism

geometry (see Russell, 1897 [henceforth cited as FG], §53, 55-6). The argument
starts from the claim that geometrical truths are necessary. From this premise, Kant
infers that they are a priori, because sense-experience provides evidence only for how

.e ion
things are, not for how they must be.5 Kant then concludes that they are justified on
the basis of the subject’s pure intuition of space. For reasons that we will get to later,
Russell takes Kant to go on to the further conclusion that “space is subjective.” Note
that here Russell omits any mention of Kant’s claim that geometry is not justified by

an iss
formal logic.

du
Non-Euclidean geometries pose a problem for this argument. Kant is in a posi-
tion to maintain the premise that geometrical truths are necessary only because ge-

m
ometry for Kant is the geometry of Euclid. Non-Euclidean geometries were just be-
ginning to be seriously investigated when Kant developed his critical philosophy, but

per
by the latter half of the nineteenth century, they were an established if not philosoph-
ically uncontroversial part of mathematics. The same terms—‘point’, ‘line’, ‘paral-
lel’, ‘intersect’, etc.—appear in formulations of both non-Euclidean and Euclidean
geometries. So some axioms and theorems of non-Euclidean geometries appear to

ut
be claims about space that are incompatible with Euclidean and other non-Euclidean
axioms and theorems. The stock example is an equivalent of Euclid’s fifth postulate

ey
in Book I of Elements: “through a given point only one parallel can be drawn to a
h@ itho
given straight line.”6 In hyperbolic geometry this would be replaced by the axiom
“through a given point at least two distinct parallels can be drawn to a given straight
sl
line”; in elliptic geometry, it is replaced by the axiom “through a given point no par-
allel can be drawn to a given straight line.” Not all of these statements can be true
sh ite w

about space, so it’s an open question which system of geometry is true of “the real
we
world.” It follows that it’s an open question which system of geometry consists of
necessary truths. As Russell puts it, the “apodeictic certainty of Euclid” cannot be
taken to rest on “purely geometrical grounds” (1897, §54, 56).
Russell’s aim is to maintain a Kantian view of geometry that resolves this diffi-
culty.
c

In fact, Russell sees Kant himself as showing the way to a solution. According to
ie

Russell, in the B edition transcendental exposition of space, Kant gives an argument


or not

for his view of geometry that, as it were, proceeds in the reverse direction from the ar-
gument of the metaphysical exposition. The metaphysical exposition argument starts
by assuming that geometry consists of necessary truths and argues for the existence
of pure intuition of space. The transcendental exposition starts with an argument for
o

the existence of pure intuition of space, and then goes on to an argument that this pure
d.

intuition somehow provides non-empirical and non-logical justification of a system


:d

of necessarily true claims about space (see, again, FG, §53, 55-6).
Russell’s basic strategy in Foundations is a version of this transcendental expo-
sition argument. The implementation of this strategy requires (a) an account of pure
aft

intuition of space or some analogue of pure intuition of space, (b) an account of how
one is show that there is such a thing, and (c) an account of how this thing provides
nf

justification of geometrical claims. The exact details of Russell’s implementation of


Dr

5
See B3: “Erfahrung lehrt uns zwar, dass etwas so oder so beschaffen sei, aber nicht, dass es nicht
sa

anders sein könne” (KrV, 38).


6
The quoted statement is a translation of Proclus’ formulation in his commentary on Book I of the
Elements (Heath, 1908, 220). It is equivalent, given the rest of Euclid’s postulates, to Euclid’s fifth pos-
tulate: “That, if a straight line falling on two straight lines make the interior angles on the same side less
than two right angles, the two. straight lines, if produced indefinitely, meet on that side on which are the
angles less than the two right angles” (Heath, 1908, 202).
Geometry, Logic, and Necessity 183

this strategy are not important for our purposes, so I will provide a mere sketch in
§5.2.3 below. For now, note that the form of the transcendental exposition argument
leaves it open what system of claims about space is justified from pure intuition of

.e ion
space. Kant, of course, aims to show that it is the Euclidean system that is justi-
fied. Russell, in contrast, attempts to show that it is a system of geometrical claims
common to Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries, namely, projective geometry.
Before sketching Russell’s argument, let’s look at Russell’s disagreements with

an iss
Kant.

du
m
5.2.2 Differences with Kant: Syntheticity, Apriority, and Necessity
As I mentioned, Russell accepts a number of British idealist criticisms of Kant. Two

per
of these are of minor importance for the theory of geometry.
First, Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet reject the analytic/synthetic distinction
and hold that all judgments are both analytic and synthetic. But the significance of
syntheticity in Kant’s theory of geometry is that geometrical claims are not justified

ut
by formal logic and analysis of concepts. Since Russell does accept that geometrical
knowledge isn’t based only on the principle of non-contradiction of formal logic, his

ey
view that syntheticity is not distinctive of geometry is a fairly small departure from
h@ itho
Kant.
Second, as we saw, Russell takes Kant’s argument in the metaphysical expo-
sl
sition of space to go from the necessity of geometry to the conclusion that space is
“subjective.” This comes from Russell’s understanding of Kant’s notion of the spatial
sh ite w

form of human intuition or our pure intuition of space: these are features of the psy-
we
chological makeup of human beings. Russell takes Kant to assume that whatever is
not justified by sense-experience is caused by some features of our mental states. As
Russell puts it, for Kant “à priori and subjective were almost interchangeable terms”
(1897, §2, 2), and apriority applies to “mental state[s] whose immediate cause lies
… within the limits of the subject” (1897, §2, 2). The problem with this view, as
c

the British idealists point out, is that the psychological causes of someone’s belief
ie

do not provide a justification for that belief, even if the belief is true. So Russell
or not

modifies what he takes to be Kant’s theory by seeking a non-psychological account


of the justification of a priori non-logical claims, that is, claims that are not justified
empirically or formal logically.
This departure from Kant is again of minor significance.
o

Russell’s account of the justification of a priori non-logical claims, it turns out,


d.

relies on a notion of “logical presupposition” (see, inter alia, FG, §2, 2). A priori
:d

non-logical claims are justified because they are “logically presupposed” in experi-
ence or by knowledge. Russell never gives a clear explanation of logical presupposi-
tion; however, he does characterize as a priori those “postulates which are required
aft

to make knowledge possible at all” (1897, §3, 3). So Russell’s view turns out to be
just a version of the Kantian idea that the justification of a priori non-logical claims
nf

rests on conditions of possibility of experience or of knowledge. In particular, Rus-


Dr

sell’s version of the transcendental exposition argument starts with certain aspects of
experience, what Russell calls a “branch of experience” (1897, §7, 5), and attempts
sa

to show that what makes this type of experience possible justifies the claims of pro-
jective geometry. Now, a case can be made out that Kant takes the spatial form of
intuition to be one of the conditions of possibility of experience.7 So it may be that
7
There is a tradition of anti-psychologistic readings of Kant from the Marburg School of neo-
184 The Idealist Origins of Logicism

the idealist criticism of Kant as confusing cause with justification is based on a mis-
reading of Kant.
The final disagreement with Kant is important for our purposes.

.e ion
Russell claims that for Kant the “à priori … stood for the necessary or apodeictic
element in knowledge” (1897, §6, 4), in the sense that necessity is a “criterion” of
apriority, so that any necessary truth qualifies as a priori. This view Russell rejects
on the basis of accepting Bradley’s theory of judgments of necessity. As we saw in

an iss
§5.1, on Bradley’s theory a judgment of necessity “P is necessarily true” is, in fact,
a package of judgments: a hypothetical judgment “if C1 and … and Cn , then P,”

du
together with all the judgments expressed by C.̄ The hypothetical judgment expresses

m
a necessary inferential connection from C̄ to P, but ascribes to reality only the ground
of that connection. Russell puts it this way:

per
[M]odern logic has shown that necessary propositions are always, in one aspect at least, hypo-
thetical. There may be, and usually is, an implication that the connection, of which necessity
is predicated, has some existence, but still, necessity always points beyond itself to a ground
of necessity, and asserts this ground rather than the actual connection. As Bradley points out,

ut
‘arsenic poisons’ remains true, even if it is poisoning no one. (1897, §6, 4)

ey
h@ itho
Russell goes on to argue that this view of necessity implies that necessity is not suf-
ficient for apriority:
sl
If, therefore, the à priori in knowledge be primarily the necessary, it must be the necessary on
some hypothesis, and the ground of necessity must be included as à priori. But the ground
sh ite w

of necessity is, so far as the necessary connection in question can show, a mere fact, a merely
we
categorical judgment. Hence necessity alone is an insufficient criterion of apriority. (Ibid.)

Russell’s reasoning here is opaque. I take the problem he is here pointing out to be
that some hypothetical propositions are justified empirically, but whatever apriority
consists in, a priori propositions are not justified on the basis of experience. Recall
c

our sample judgment of necessity:


ie
or not

(7) Roger must have been poisoned.


On Bradley’s view, this seems to be a single apodictic judgment but is, in fact, several
judgments, one of which is a hypothetical judgment. Our example was:
(8) If Roger had been given arsenic, and he did not take an antidote in time, then
o
d.

he would have been poisoned.


:d

This hypothetical judgment asserts of reality the laws of chemistry and physiology
which ground the necessary inferential connection from antecedent to consequent.
The question is: what counts as a justification of an apodictic judgment? An
aft

incomplete answer is: a justification for all the judgments that the apodictic judg-
ment actually consists of. This answer raises another question: what is a justification
nf

of a hypothetical judgment? Since such a judgment ascribes a categorical basis to


Dr

reality, it would be true if that categorical basis exists in reality. A justification for a
judgment surely provides reasons for that judgment to be true. So a justification for a
sa

hypothetical judgment provides reasons for the categorical ground to exist in reality.
That is to say, it is a justification for the categorical ground. Hence a justification for
Kantianism to Allison (1983).
Geometry, Logic, and Necessity 185

a judgment of necessity must include a justification for the categorical ground of the
hypothetical judgment that the judgment of necessity actually includes.
Now, the categorical ground of the hypothetical (8) are the laws of chemistry

.e ion
and physiology, and these laws are justified empirically. So, the apodictic judgment
(7) is justified empirically rather than a priori. Indeed, if one equates empirical with
a posteriori, this would be a necessary a posteriori judgment. Hence necessity is not
a criterion of apriority.

an iss
Russell’s response is that Kant’s criterion has to be supplemented. Given Bradley’s

du
theory of necessity, the problem for Kant is how to distinguish empirical hypotheti-
cal judgments from non-empirical ones. Russell’s solution is that the distinction lies

m
in the nature of the categorical ground of the inferential connection expressed by the
hypothetical judgment whose consequent appears in the judgment of necessity. Only

per
if the categorical ground is justified on the basis of the conditions of possibility of
experience is the necessary truth also a priori.
What I want to emphasize in the foregoing is that, in accepting Bradley’s the-
ory of necessity, Russell tacitly accepts two things. First, one may demonstrate

ut
that some judgment P is necessarily true, by justifying the apodictic judgment “it
is necessary that P.” Second, the justification of such an apodictic judgment consists

ey
of justifications of all the antecedent conditions of some hypothetical judgment “if
h@ itho
C1 and … and Cn , then P,” together with justifications of the grounds Ḡ which, when
added to C,̄ enables an inference to P.
sl
5.2.3 The Transcendental Justification of Projective Geometry
sh ite w
we
I now sketch Russell’s version of the argument that he sees Kant making in the tran-
scendental exposition of space.
The argument is a transcendental one, starting from the premise that we have a
certain type of experience, and moving to the conclusion that if this type of experience
is to be possible, space must have exactly those characteristics that make the axioms
c

of projective geometry true, and basic forms of proof in projective geometry correct.
ie

The type of experience from which Russell starts is the experience of distinct
or not

objects outside of a subject’s mind. In Russell’s terms, this is “consciousness of a


world of mutually external things” (1897, §58, 61). In order to have such experience,
one must be able to distinguish things outside one’s mind from one another, or, as
Russell puts it, “distinguish between different presented things” (1897, §58, 61).
o

The next move in the argument is to note that we distinguish such objects by
d.

their spatial properties and relations. For example, we may experience A as distinct
:d

from B by perceiving that A and B occupy different parts of space. In order for this
to be possible, space has to have distinct parts that objects occupy.
Russell generalizes this observation, and claims that there is a unique answer
aft

to the following question: what features must space have so that we can distinguish
objects by perceiving their spatial properties? This unique answer includes the fol-
nf

lowing: space has to have parts that are distinguished only in being outside one an-
Dr

other, these parts have to be continuous and infinitely divisible, space has to contain
points, any two points must determine a unique straight line, and any three points
sa

must determine a unique plane. Russell argues, further, that these features of space
186 The Idealist Origins of Logicism

are precisely those that would make the axioms of projective geometry true.8,9
We have now reached the non-empirical and non-logical justification of projec-
tive geometry. The axioms of projective axioms are justified on the basis that they

.e ion
have to be true if space is to have features by the perception of which experience of
distinct objects outside our minds is possible. Now, Russell follows Kant in taking
proof in geometry to require construction. So, he holds that in order for proof of pro-
jective theorems to provide a priori justification of those theorems, the operations

an iss
of construction in projective proofs have to have a priori justification. However, he

du
appears to think that projective operations are justified on the basis of the projec-
tive axioms.10 Hence proofs of theorems of projective geometry transfer the a priori

m
non-logical justification of the axioms to the theorems.
What about other geometries? A geometry is a system of representations of

per
space. On the basis of Felix Klein’s demonstration that a variety of non-Euclidean
geometries can be defined as extensions of projective geometry,11 Russell holds that
Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries are not competitors of projective geome-
try. None of these other geometries represent space as have features incompatible

ut
with those represented by projective geometry, even though, as we have seen, they
include spatial representations that are incompatible with one another. Since these

ey
other geometries are extensions of projective geometry, they ascribe features to space
h@ itho
in addition to projective features. But, since projective features of space suffice for
us to distinguish objects, these other additional representations of space are not jus-
sl
tified on the basis of conditions of possibility of experience. This means that they
are not justified a priori. Russell leaves it open that some of them may be justified
sh ite w

empirically, which would then provide a basis for deciding among the incompatible
we
8
Actually Russell takes more than just projective geometry to be a priori: “In metrical Geometry, …
the axioms … common to Euclidean and non-Euclidean spaces … will be found … necessary properties of
any form of externality with more than one dimension. They will, therefore, be declared à priori” (1897,
§9, 6).
9
The fact that Russell’s transcendental argument requires such a close connection between features
c

of space and our capacities for distinguishing objects in experience partly explains why the three axioms
ie

of projective geometry that he specifies are so different from the axioms that appear in modern axioma-
or not

tizations of geometry. Compare, for example, Russell’s first axiom—“We can distinguish different parts
of space, but all parts are qualitatively similar, and are distinguished only by the immediate fact that they
lie outside one another” (1897, §122, 132; emphases mine)—with the first two axioms of incidence in
H. M. S. Coexeter’s Non-Euclidean Geometry—“There are at least two points,” and “Any two points are
incident with just one line” (Coxeter, 1942, 20).
10
Russell claims that all reasoning in projective geometry depends on establishing “the projective
o
d.

equivalence of two figures” (1897, §45, 47). Establishing projective equivalence turns on the “two mathe-
:d

matically fundamental things in projective Geometry[:] anharmonic ratio, and the quadrilateral construc-
tion. Everything else follows mathematically from these two” (1897, §111, 122). Anharmonic ratio,
Russell shows, depends on the quadrilateral construction, and, by examining the latter, Russell isolates
two fundamental operations for establishing projective equivalence:
aft

(1) To project the points A, B, C, D … from a centre O, is to construct the straight lines OA, OB, OC,
OD
(2)
nf

To cut a number of straight lines a, b, c, d … by a transversal s, is to construct the points sa, sb,
sc, sd …
Dr

Applying 1. and then 2. transforms a figure of points into another figure of points projectively equivalent
to the first. Applying 2 and then 1 transforms a figure of lines into a projectively equivalent figure of lines
sa

(1897, §114, 126-7). The three “axioms” of projective geometry are then supposed to be the fundamental
assumptions about space presupposed by these operations.
For an admirably clear account of the basic ideas of the projective geometry that Russell takes to be
philosophically significant, see Gandon (2012, Chapter 1). For a fuller account of Russell’s argument see
Griffin (1991, Chapter 5).
11
For more details see Griffin (1991, chapter 5).
The Ultimate Indemonstrability of Necessity 187

claims about space that they make.


We conclude with what for us is the crucial issue about Russell’s theory of ge-
ometry: the necessity of projective geometry.

.e ion
As we saw, by accepting Bradley’s theory of necessity Russell is committed to
holding that one can demonstrate the necessity of a true judgment p by providing a
justification of the apodictic judgment “p is necessarily true.” Let’s consider first the
necessity of a projective theorem T.

an iss
On the assumption that projective theorems are proven from projective axioms

du
by projective operations, T is inferred by projective reasoning from some subset of
the projective axioms A1 , … , An , abbreviated A.̄ Thus the apodictic judgment “T is

m
necessarily true” is, in fact, a set of judgments consisting of

per
• a hypothetical judgment “if A1 , and … , and An then T” and
• the judgments Ā
The justification of “T is necessarily true” consists of

ut
• a justification of the categorical grounds Ḡ of the inference from Ā to T, and

ey
• justifications of the A.̄
h@ itho
From a contemporary perspective, the proof of a mathematical theorem is generally
taken to consist of purely logical inferences from some subset of the axioms of the
sl
mathematical theory in question, and so there wouldn’t be any additional grounds
for the inference from Ā to T. Another way of thinking of this is that the hypothet-
sh ite w

ical judgment is a logical truth, and so not in need of further justification. Thus the
we
justification of the apodictic judgment would consist simply in justifications of the
axioms A.̄ Now, Russell’s view is that the axioms are justified by his transcendental
argument, so on the view of proof under consideration, it is the transcendental ar-
gument that justifies the necessity of T. This conclusion can also be sustained from
the perspective of Russell’s conception of geometric proof. On that conception, the
c

proof of T from Ā depends on projective operations. But, as we saw, these operations


ie

are also justified by the transcendental argument. If this is right, then, prima facie,
or not

the necessity of T depends ultimately on the premises of the transcendental argument.


Moreover, it’s not clear that there is any premise other than the claim that we experi-
ence distinct objects outside our minds. So it’s this claim about what we experience
that ultimately supports the necessity of T.
o

Finally, how about the necessity of the projective axioms? The necessity of an
d.

axiom A would be demonstrated by justifying the apodictic judgment “A is necessar-


:d

ily true”. Now, the axioms are, of course, justified by the transcendental argument.
So this apodictic judgment really consists of the hypothetical judgment ‘if C then A’,
where are the premises of the transcendental argument. The justification of this apo-
aft

dictic judgment would then require justification of the premises of the transcendental
argument. Since the only premise seems to be that we experience distinct objects, it
nf

seems that to justify the necessity of the axioms one has to justify that we experience
Dr

distinct objects. But is there such a justification?


sa

5.3 The Ultimate Indemonstrability of Necessity


Two years after Russell published Foundations of Geometry, Moore wrote a critical
notice of it for Mind (1899), in which Moore advances a number of criticisms. Soon
188 The Idealist Origins of Logicism

after this critical notice appeared, Russell wrote to Moore to say that “on all important
points I agreed with [your review].”12
One of the points on which Russell agreed with Moore is an objection to Rus-

.e ion
sell’s attempt to establish the necessity of the axioms of projective geometry by a
transcendental argument. That argument, as we saw in the last section, starts from
our experience of distinct objects and goes through the claim that for this to be pos-
sible space must have a set of features—must, as Russell puts it, constitute a “form

an iss
of externality”—that verify the projective axioms. Moore’s objection is that if it is a

du
contingent fact that we experience distinct things, then this form of argument cannot
show that the projective axioms are necessarily true. As Moore puts it:

m
to show that a ‘form of externality’ is necessary for the possibility of experience, can only

per
mean to show that it is presupposed in our actual experience. And this can never prove that no
experience would be possible without such a form, unless we assume that our actual experience
is itself necessary, i.e., that no other experience is possible. (1899, 399)

It is useful to think of this objection in terms of the medieval distinction between

ut
the necessity of consequence and the necessity of the consequent. According to the

ey
Aristotelian notion of logical consequence, if B follows logically from A, then it is
h@ itho
necessary that if A is true then so is B. But this doesn’t mean that B is necessarily
true. As we saw, Bradley may be taken to have transferred the necessity of logical
sl
consequence to a judgment which follows logically from others. Moore’s objection
is, in effect, that this transference confuses the necessity of the consequent with the
necessity of the consequence.
sh ite w
we
Understood in this way, it becomes clear that Moore’s objection doesn’t depend
on the fact that Russell is giving a transcendental argument for the necessity of pro-
jective axioms. No argument for the truth of a judgment can establish the necessity
of that judgment unless the premises of the argument are themselves necessarily true.
That Russell agrees with this objection is made clear by an argument that he
gives in “Les axiomes propre à Euclide, sont-ils empiriques?” (1898).13 Russell
c

aims to establish two conclusions:


ie
or not

(1) The idea of necessity is “ultimate and unanalyzable,” and there is no “univer-
sal criterion” of necessity.14
(2) Necessity is known by an analogue of sense perception: “we perceive that a
proposition is necessary, as we perceive that the sky is blue” (1898, 770)15
o
d.

The basis for these claims is that


:d

(3) At least some ascriptions of necessity “cannot be proved.”


Russell argues for this basis from two assumptions:
aft

(4) Any proof of the necessity of a judgment requires that that judgment be a
nf

logical consequence of premises that are necessary.


Dr

12
Russell to Moore (18 July 1899), quoted in Griffin (1991, at 134).
13
Thus Russell had himself arrived at Moore’s objection a year before Moore published his objection.
sa

14
Il n’y a, en général, pas de preuve du vrai, et pas de preuve du nécessaire. Les deux idées sont ultimes
et inanalysables. …
….
Du nécessaire il n’existe pas, autant que je puis m’en rendre compte, de criterium universel. (1898,
770)
15
Nous percevons qu’une proposition est nécessaire, comme nous percevons que le ciel est bleu ….
The Ultimate Indemonstrability of Necessity 189

(5) Any proof of the necessity of a judgment requires the necessity of logical
consequence, which is not proved.16

.e ion
Russell’s assumption (4) is precisely the Moorean objection to Foundations we just
discussed. Russell can argue for the unprovability of some ascriptions of necessity
from (4) alone. The argument is a regress. A proof gives the grounds or the reasons
for accepting the truth of the judgment proved. These grounds are the truth of the

an iss
premises of the proof. There is no reason to accept the conclusion unless there are
reasons to accept the premises. If the reason for accepting the premises are further

du
proofs, then the ground for the conclusion are the premises of those further proofs.

m
This leads to an infinite regress unless there are some premises that are acceptable but
not on the basis of further proofs. By (4) proof cannot demonstrate the necessity of a

per
judgment unless the premises of the proof are necessary. So there can be no proofs
of the necessity of judgments unless there are judgments whose necessary truth is not
grounded on proofs from other necessary truths.
It is not entirely clear what Russell’s assumption (5) means. I take it to reflect
the Aristotelian view of logical consequence I have mentioned: B is a logical conse-

ut
quence of A just in case it is necessary that if A is true then so is B. An argument from

ey
premises P to conclusion C shows the truth of P to be the ground for the truth of C
h@ itho
only if C follows logically from P. So, not only the truth of P but also the necessary
truth of the hypothetical judgment that if P are true then C is true are required as the
sl
ground of the truth of C. Thus, the point of assumption (5) is that while a proof of a
necessary truth requires the necessity of the premises, any proof whatsoever requires
the necessity of the hypothetical judgment that reflects the logical consequence from
sh ite w
we
the premises of the proof to its conclusion. Furthermore, since logical consequence
consists in the necessary truth of a hypothetical judgment, the argument based on as-
sumption (4) now shows that some forms of logical consequences cannot be proven,
just as the necessity of some truths cannot be proven.
Now that we have established (3), the unprovability of some necessities, from
c

assumptions (4) and (5), let examine how Russell obtains (1) and (2) from (3). (1) is
ie

the claim that there is no analysis or universal criterion of necessity. What Russell
or not

means by an analysis or a universal criterion of necessity is some set S of properties


of propositions such that
• possession of S by a proposition is independent of that proposition’s being nec-
essarily true
o

• any proposition p’s being necessarily true is constituted by its possessing S.


d.
:d

If there is such a criterion, then the judgment that p has properties S would ground
p’s being necessarily true, so that there would be a proof of p’s necessity from the
judgment that p has the properties S, contradicting (3).
aft

The argument for claim (2), that ultimately necessity has to be simply perceived,
depends on the view that if there is no proof that a proposition has a property, then
nf

our knowledge that it has the property must be based either on sense-perception or
Dr

on something like sense-perception. In the case of the necessity of propositions of


geometry, since Russell continues to hold that these propositions are not known em-
sa

pirically, the basis of the knowledge is merely like sense-perception.


Russell’s conclusion that some necessities are not provable of course doesn’t
rule out all proofs of necessity. In particular, it doesn’t preclude what Russell calls
16
la nécessité ne peut être prouvée que par rapport à une conséquence de ce qui est nécessaire, et cela
même implique la nécessité non prouvée de la consecution logique …. (1898, 771-772)
190 The Idealist Origins of Logicism

“subordinate proofs of necessity,” which demonstrate the necessity of a proposition p


by showing p to be a “consequence or necessary condition” of certain other necessary
propositions.17

.e ion
The example that Russell gives of such a subordinate proof is, interestingly, very
close to the transcendental argument that Russell gives in Foundations. Russell’s
argument rests on a set of mathematical propositions that he takes to be necessary
and non-logical; one example is expressed by a (generalized) conditional statement:

an iss
(6) If A > B, then B < A.

du
m
Presumably, he holds that the necessity of such a claim is perceived, not demon-
strated. Russell continues to accept Bradley’s view that the hypothetical judgment
expressed by such a statement expresses a necessary connection, and characterizes

per
this necessary connection as holding between “contents.” Thus the necessity that we
perceive is the necessity of such connections among contents. So far it’s not clear
what a necessary connection among contents amounts to. But this becomes clear
when Russell makes the key move of this argument: he claims that these contents

ut
represent distinct entities, A and B, and so depends, as he puts it, on “a diversity of

ey
logical subjects,” or a “plurality of existents.” Hence, Russell holds, a plurality of
h@ itho
entities is a necessary condition of these necessary connections among contents. We
can reconstruct Russell’s reasoning here as follows.

‘B < A.”
sl
Let C1 be the content expressed by “A > B” and C2 the content expressed by
sh ite w
we
• A necessary connection holds from C1 to C2 just in case it is necessary that if
C1 is true then C2 is true.
• C1 can be true or false only if the entities it represents—the relation >, A, and
B—exist.
• Similarly, C2 can be true only if the entities it represents—the relation <, A, and
c

B—exist.
ie
or not

• Hence there can be a necessary connection from C1 to C2 only if distinct entities


A and B exist.
• Hence a “plurality of existents” is a condition of possibility of the necessity of
the mathematical proposition (6).
o
d.

The starting point of this transcendental argument is no longer certain types of ex-
:d

perience, but rather certain mathematical truths. The advantage of this new starting
point is that it seems to dodge Moore’s objection: it perhaps seems reasonably plau-
sible that we might not experience distinct things, but it is surely far less plausible
aft

that A might be greater than B without B being less than A. From this starting point
onwards, however, the new argument runs pretty much as the old one did: the start-
nf

ing point wouldn’t hold unless certain conditions of possibility are satisfied, hence
Dr

propositions which describe these conditions have to be true, and this reason for their
having to be true shows that they are justified a priori. Russell does note further that
sa

the new transcendental argument doesn’t show that the distinct entities that have to
be are necessarily spatio-temporally distinguished from one another, only that they
17
preuves subordonnées de la nécessité. Par exemple, si une proposition est la conséquence ou la
condition nécessaire d’une autre proposition ou série de propositions qui sont nécessaires, elle-même est
alors nécessaire. (1898, 770)
Necessity and Logicism 191

have to be distinguished from one another in some way; as Russell puts it, the ar-
gument show that some “form of exteriority,” is a priori, not that space or time is a
priori.18

.e ion
Thus, at this point, Russell thus remains a Kantian in holding that some transcen-
dental justifications work. More importantly, Russell’s thinking about mathematics
remains largely within a Kantian framework. The issue for him is still to show that
pure mathematics is non-empirical and non-logical knowledge of necessary truths,

an iss
where non-empirical and non-logical justification is transcendental justification. The

du
main shift in is that certain mathematical truths replace experience as the ground of
transcendental justification.

m
The move to taking necessity to be ultimately indemonstrable and knowable by
an analogue of sense-perception, however, puts pressure on Russell’s Kantianism.

per
For, as we saw, he accepts that logical consequence is necessary, and so it is unclear
how the indemonstrable necessity of mathematics differs from that of logic.

5.4 Necessity and Logicism

ut
ey
In this section, I discuss the last phase of Russell’s philosophy of mathematics in
h@ itho
which he still retains some vestiges of a Kantian framework. I focus on a manuscript,
“An Analysis of Mathematical Reasoning,” written at roughly the same time as “Les
sl
axiomes propres à Euclide.” In “Les axiomes,” as we just saw, Russell presents the
idea of subordinate transcendental arguments that rest on non-logical mathematical
sh ite w

propositions whose necessity is perceived rather than demonstrated. “Analysis” is


we
an extended discussion of the fundamental axioms of mathematics and the nature of
their necessity.

5.4.1 Main Features of Axioms


c

The stated aim of “Analysis” is to discover the “fundamental conceptions” and “fun-
ie

damental axioms” of all pure mathematics (1898, 163). We will in due time be able
or not

to give some examples of what Russell takes to be fundamental conceptions and ax-
ioms, but for now, I want to focus on some of their general features.
What Russell calls “conception” is close to Bradley’s notion of idea or univer-
sal meaning: something which applies to recurrent aspects of experience or real-
ity. Russell also calls conceptions “contents.” Russell divides conceptions into two
o
d.

classes. One class conceptions both are abstracted from sense-experience and ap-
:d

18
Here is how Russell characterizes his example of a “preuve subordonée de la nécessité”:

Certaines propositions mathématiques, par exemple que, si A = B, B=A, ou que si A > B, alors
aft

B < A … semblent être nécessaires et synthétiques. [T]ous ces jugements dépendent d’une
diversité de sujets logiques: ils ne se bornent pas à affirmer une connexion nécessaire des con-
nf

tenus, ils affirment que, si A a un adjectif, B doit en avoir un autre, ou d’autres assertions plus
Dr

compliquées du même type. Bref, ils dépendent tous de relations qui impliquent une diversité
matérielle, c’est-à-dire une pluralité d’êtres existants. Si donc ces jugements sont vraiment
nécessaires, la possibilité de plusieurs êtres est aussi nécessaire; et cette condition semble sat-
sa

isfaite, dans notre monde actuel, par l’espace et le temps. Mais nous ne pouvons déclarer
pour cette raison que l’espace et le temps sont a priori; nous pouvons seulement déclarer que
quelque forme d’extériorité, suffisante pour les jugements a priori des Mathématiques, est a
priori. (1898, 770-771)
192 The Idealist Origins of Logicism

ply to sense-experience; for example, “red, sweet, hot, etc.” (1898, 164); let’s call
these empirical conceptions. There is another important feature of empirical concep-
tions. Russell says that two or more empirical conceptions may be “connected,” and

.e ion
“their connexion with other contents … must be sought by an investigation of the
given [sense-data], i.e. by what are called empirical methods” (1898, 164). Russell
means two things here. First, on particular occasions we experience something as,
for example, both sweet and hot. Second, in experience, we find that whenever some

an iss
conception applies so do certain other conceptions. But both of these cases of con-

du
nection among empirical contents can be established only on the basis of having the
experiences in question.

m
The other class of conceptions, by contrast, are not abstracted from sense-experience,
even though they do apply to sense-experience.19 Moreover, connections among such

per
conceptions are not established on the basis of the experiences to which they apply; as
Russell puts it, “since [they] are not abstracted from other data, they must be studied
in themselves, and not by a study of the things to which they may apply—i.e. they
must be studied by what may be called à priori methods” (1898, 164). Russell calls

ut
this second class “pure conceptions.” The fundamental conceptions of mathematics
are pure conceptions. They have one further distinguishing characteristic: they are

ey
not definable and can “be merely indicated,” “as though they were data of sense”
h@ itho
(1898, 163).
The importance of connections among conceptions is that the fundamental ax-
sl
ioms of mathematics are such connections. Fundamental axioms, Russell says,
sh ite w

form the rules of inference … of arguments which use the fundamental conceptions. These
we
will consist, broadly speaking, of necessary connexions between different conceptions, being
generally of one of two forms, namely: (1) If a thing is A, it is B, and (2) If one thing has
an adjective A referring to another thing, then the other thing has an adjective B referring to
the first thing. …. Their truth must, for a successful study, be intuitively apprehended; but it
must not be supposed that their truth depends upon such apprehension. On the contrary, if they
c

are truly fundamental, no reason whatever can be given for their truth. (1898, 163; emphases
ie

mine)
or not

From this characterization we see that fundamental axioms have the following fea-
tures:
(1) Axioms are rules of inference.
o

(2) Axioms are (or express) necessary connections between different concep-
d.

tions.
:d

(3) The main forms of necessary connections are expressed by conditional state-
ments.
aft

19
Russell’s rejection of abstraction as the origin of pure conceptions is a tacit rejection of a central as-
pect of Bradley’s theory of judgment: as we will see in §6.2 below, Bradley holds that universal meanings
nf

ascribed to reality in judgments are abstracted from the contents of mental states. It is possible that Rus-
Dr

sell’s opposition to abstraction in “Analysis” was influenced by conversations with Moore in the summer
of 1898 when Moore was writing his second Trinity Fellowship dissertation and Russell was working on
“Analysis.” As we will see in §6.3 below, in “The Nature of Judgment” Moore argues against Bradley’s
sa

abstractionist view of judgment, and that article was extracted from the portions of the second disserta-
tion added to the first dissertation (See the editors’ Introduction to G. E. Moore, 2011, xii-lxxxv, esp.
lxii-lxxxii). See (Griffin, 1991, Chapter 7) and the editors’ Introduction in Russell (1990) for details of
the interaction between Russell and Moore and an account of its relation to “Analysis.” Neither Griffin
nor the editors see anti-abstractionism as a possible Moorean influence, for they do not discern it in “The
Nature of Judgment.”
Necessity and Logicism 193

(4) The truth of axioms has to be intuitively apprehended.


(5) “No reason whatever” can be given for their truth.

.e ion
The first three features derive from Bradley’s view of necessity. As we saw in §5.1
above, a hypothetical judgment, expressed by a conditional statement, expresses an
inference from the supposition of the antecedent idea to the necessarily following
consequent idea. Thus, axioms in “Analysis,” as in Foundations, involve necessity.

an iss
The fourth and fifth features show that Russell’s conception of necessity here is

du
of a piece with that of “Les axiomes.” To understand these features, note that since
axioms express necessary connections, for an axiom to be true is for a necessary con-

m
nection to exist. So the fourth feature is that the necessary connections of the axioms
have to be intuitively apprehended, and the fifth feature is that these necessary con-

per
nections are not established by argument. So, just as in “Les axiomes,” Russell here
holds that certain necessities, namely those of the fundamental axioms, are unprov-
able. As I argued in the last section, this position represents the rejection of a part
of the Kantianism of Foundations. If no reason can be given for the truth of the ax-

ut
ioms, then the axioms are not true for transcendental reasons, not true because they
have a subject matter logically presupposed by some branch of experience.20 The

ey
justification of mathematical axioms is not transcendental reasoning but something
h@ itho
analogous to sense-perception.
However, Russell’s view here also differs from that of “Les axiomes.” In “Les
sl
axiomes,” Russell identifies two types of unprovable necessity: the necessity of ul-
timate premises and the necessity of logical consequence. Here, however, Russell
sh ite w

further specifies the type of unprovable necessity of premises. Fundamental axioms


we
are the ultimate premises on which all mathematical proof rest, and they are, as we just
saw, unprovable. Now, Russell claims that these axioms are rules of inference of ar-
guments involving fundamental conceptions. In §5.4.2.2 we will try to get clearer on
what exactly rules of inference concerning fundamental conceptions are. It is, how-
ever, clear now that for Russell the unprovable necessity of ultimate mathematical
c

premises is the necessity of inferential connections among fundamental conceptions.


ie

It may seem that this difference between “Analysis” and “Les axiomes” is minor.
or not

However, if inferential connections between conceptions are connections of logical


consequence, then Russell’s position would be that in mathematics the only unprov-
able necessity is that of logical consequence. This position would then be very close
to a version of logicism. The claim would not yet be that the fundamental axioms of
o

mathematics are propositions of logic, but only that the necessity of these axioms is
d.

logical.
:d

So there are two crucial questions:


• Are inferential connections among conceptions connections of logical conse-
aft

quence?
• If so, are the fundamental axioms logical axioms?
nf
Dr

In the remainder of this section, I will argue that in “Analysis” Russell aimed for pos-
itive answers to both of these questions with respect to the fundamental axioms of
sa

the branch of mathematics that is most general and presupposed by the rest of mathe-
matics. But the fundamental axioms of other branches of mathematics, of arithmetic
in particular, are not logical rules of inference.

20
Here I disagree with Griffin (1991, 272).
194 The Idealist Origins of Logicism

5.4.2 The Logical Calculus and Analysis of Manifolds


Russell begins his project of identifying the fundamental conceptions and axioms of

.e ion
mathematics with “the most general, the logically first,” branch of mathematics, a
subject “presupposed” by “more special subjects” (1898, 165). This is “the general
theory of the extension of concepts, dealt with by the Logical Calculus,” and its “main
ideas are … The Manifold and addition” (1898, 165).

an iss
The mere fact that this branch of mathematics is called “the logical calculus”
doesn’t mean that it is logic. For one thing, since its main ideas are manifold and

du
addition, it seems to be a theory about a special set of entities together with an op-

m
eration on them, and this doesn’t fit with the idea that logic governs reasoning about
all subject matters.

per
This is reinforced by the fact that there is considerable evidence that “Analysis”
is strongly influenced by Whitehead’s Universal Algebra (1898). In 1898 Russell
came to think that the concept of a manifold was fundamental throughout mathemat-
ics.21 Manifolds are classes or sets, and all mathematical theories appear to make
claims about classes of various mathematical entities. Universal Algebra is an at-

ut
tempted unification of a large part of contemporary mathematics starting from a the-

ey
ory of manifolds subject to general algebraic laws. This initial theory of manifolds
h@ itho
comprise the “general principles of any branch of Universal Algebra” (1898, §12,
18);22 other mathematical theories are formulated as “special algebras” that extend
sl
the basic algebraic theory with additional axioms.
Now, in this book Whitehead writes that the “justification of the rules of infer-
sh ite w

ence in any branch of mathematics is … the business of experience or of philosophy”


we
(1898, vi). So it is tempting to take Russell’s aim in “Analysis” to be giving a philo-
sophical foundation for Universal Algebra.23 If so, then Russell’s logical calculus is
perhaps the basic algebraic theory of manifolds set out in Chapter III of Universal
Algebra.
It is not clear that this is right. One of Whitehead’s special algebras is the “alge-
c

bra of symbolic logic,” a fairly standard axiomatization of Boolean algebra. It has two
ie

primitive operations, addition, expressed by ‘+’, and multiplication, expressed by ‘⋅’,


or not

a relation called “equivalence,” expressed by ‘=’, two defined designated elements,


the null element ‘0’ and the “Universe” ‘i’, and a defined operation, supplementa-
tion, expressed by ‘′ ’. ‘0’ is defined by the equation ‘a + 0 = a’, ‘i’ by ‘a ⋅ i = a’.
There are nine axioms. Addition and multiplication are commutative, associative,
and idempotent:
o
d.
:d

a + b = b + a, (a + b) + c = a + (b + c), a + a = a
a ⋅ b = b ⋅ a, (a ⋅ b) ⋅ c = a ⋅ (b ⋅ c), a ⋅ a = a
aft

Multiplication distributes over addition: c⋅(a+b) = c⋅a+c⋅b, (a+b)⋅c = a⋅c+b⋅c.


Finally, the law of absorption: a + ab = a. (See Whitehead, 1898, §23, 35-36.)
nf

Now, Whitehead specifically states that the results of this special algebra are not
Dr

21
See, e.g., Russell (1896-8, 25-6)
22
The fundamental principles of Whitehead’s universal algebra govern an operation of addition that is
sa

associative and commutative, an operation of subtraction, a null element that is an identity for addition,
and an operation of multiplication that distributes over addition but is not assumed to be either associative
or commutative. If one uses subtraction and the null element to define additive inverses, then Whitehead’s
fundamental principles are the axioms of the theory of non-associative rings.
23
For an interpretation of “Analysis” along these lines see (Griffin, 1991, Chapter 7) and the editors’
Introduction in Russell (1990).
Necessity and Logicism 195

required for the rest of the book (1898, ix). Russell was very familiar with Universal
Algebra, having helped to proof-read it. So it would seem somewhat odd for him
to call Whitehead’s basic algebraic theory of manifolds “logical calculus.” A more

.e ion
likely hypothesis is that Russell’s logical calculus is Whitehead’s algebra of symbolic
logic, but Russell disagrees with Whitehead in taking this algebra to be presupposed
by all mathematics. For the remainder of this section, I adopt this hypothesis and
take Russell’s logical calculus to be Whitehead’s axiomatization of Boolean algebra.

an iss
This conclusion does not show that Russell’s logical calculus is logic. Recall

du
from §3.1.1 that Schröder’s version the algebra of logic rests on a purely mathemati-
cal discipline, the calculus of domains of a manifold, and the algebra is a way of using

m
this mathematical discipline to solve problems in logic, and not a way of founding
the mathematics of domains and manifolds on logic.

per
So the question is, how does Russell conceive of his logical calculus? I will now
show that in “Analysis” Russell at the very least considers taking the fundamental
axioms of his logical calculus to be rules of logical inference.

ut
5.4.2.1 Manifolds, Judgments, and Predicates

ey
Russell begins his discussion of the logical calculus with an analysis of the idea of
h@ itho
manifold in terms of judgment. First, he takes a manifold to be an entity consisting of
parts unified in some way.24 Then he explains what these parts are and how they are
sl
unified in terms of judgments. Russell distinguishes seven types of judgments, five
of which consist of one or more logical subjects and predicates. Note that Russell
sh ite w

also calls logical subjects “terms.” Two of these five types of judgment are relevant
we
to the analysis of manifolds:
(3) Judgments in which two or more subjects are united by a common predicate, as ‘These are
red’, or ‘2 and 3 are prime’.

(5) Judgments of extension, asserting that two or more subjects have that kind of unity which
c

is found where subjects have a common predicate, i.e. that together they form one subject, as
ie

‘These form a class (or a manifold)’. (1898, 173; emphases mine)


or not

So, on Russell’s analysis, a manifold is a whole composed of logical subjects uni-


fied by possessing a common predicate. In terms of judgment, this analysis may be
rephrased as: a manifold is a whole composed of terms unified by being subjects of
true judgments in which occur a common predicate.
o
d.

Given this initial analysis, Russell goes on to explain operations on manifolds in


:d

terms of operations on predicates. The operation on predicates that Russell explicitly


discusses is synthesis, and it is founded on two types of judgments:
(2) Judgments in which two or more predicates are united in one subject, as ‘This is red and
aft

hard’, ‘2 is even and prime’.


nf

(4) Judgments of intension, asserting that two or more predicates have that kind of unity which
Dr

is found when both are predicated of one subject, i.e., that together they form one predicate,
as ‘Winged horse is a predicate’. (1898, 173)
sa

Russell’s view is this. A predicate synthesized from a set of predicates is expressed


by conjoining expressions of those predicates. A predicate synthesized from a set of
24
Note that at this point Russell doesn’t distinguish between the notion of a part of a whole and the
notion of a member or element of a class.
196 The Idealist Origins of Logicism

predicates holds of a subject just in case that subject has all predicates of that set.
Alternatively, a judgment that ascribes to a subject the predicate synthesized from a
set of predicates is true just in case all the judgments which ascribe a predicate from

.e ion
that set to this subject are true. The manifold consisting of subjects unified by a syn-
thesized predicate is then the intersection of the manifolds unified by the predicates
synthesized. Intersection is an operation on manifolds that Russell doesn’t mention
in his initial characterization of the ideas of the logical calculus. However, the first

an iss
interpretation Whitehead outlines for his algebra of logic takes the elements of the

du
calculus to be regions of space and the operation of multiplication to be intersection
of regions. So, one may take Russell’s view to be that the operation of multiplication

m
on manifolds is analyzed in terms of the synthesis of predicates.
What about the operation of addition or union of manifolds? This is explained,

per
unsurprisingly, in terms of an operation of forming predicates expressed by what
Russell calls “the disjunctive form ‘a or b’ ” (1898, 185). Russell doesn’t give a
name to this operation of predicate formation, but let’s call it disjunction.
I want to underline three points about Russell’s analysis of manifolds so far.

ut
First, a manifold is essentially a whole united by a predicate. Second, this does not
entail that manifolds are predicates. The reason is that two predicates may apply

ey
to exactly the same terms, and since Russell nowhere insists that the way in which
h@ itho
terms are unified makes any difference to the whole that they compose, a single man-
ifold may have more than one unifying predicate. However, finally, operations on
sl
manifolds are determined by operations on their unifying predicates.
sh ite w
we
5.4.2.2 The Analysis of Equivalence, Axioms, and Rules of Inference
Apart from the primitive operations of addition and multiplication, the logical calcu-
lus has a primitive relation of equivalence, expressed by ‘=’. Equivalence is critical
for understanding Russell’s conception of the logical calculus because all the axioms
and definitions of the calculus are equivalences. So, Russell’s analysis of equivalence
c

should supply answers to three questions:


ie
or not

• How are the axioms of the logical calculus supposed to be or to express neces-
sary connections among pure conceptions?
• In what sense are these axioms rules of inference?
• How do we achieve non-empirical intuitive apprehension of these necessary
o

connections?
d.
:d

Russell’s analysis of equivalence begins from the seventh type of judgment that he
identifies in Chapter I of “Analysis”:
aft

(7) Judgments asserting necessary connections of contents

(a) When the contents may be predicates of the same subject, as ‘human implies mortal’,
nf

‘triple implies numerical’ ….


Dr

(1898, 173; emphases mine)


sa

So, necessary connection is the relation of implication which holds between predi-
cates that may be of the same subject. What this means is made clearer by Russell’s
claim that “if a implies b, any term which has the predicate a has also the predicate
b” (1898, 188). Russell’s failure to mention necessity here is evidently an oversight.
His view of predicate implication then is: a predicate P implies a predicate Q just in
Necessity and Logicism 197

case for any subject a, it is necessary that if a has P then a also has Q. This passage
also shows that where conceptions are predicates, a necessary connection between
conceptions holds when one conception implies the other, that is, when it is impossi-

.e ion
ble for one of the conceptions to hold of a subject without the other conception also
holding of that subject. What follows from this for manifolds unified by predicates is
that if P implies Q, then each subject that is part of the manifold unified by P is also a
part of the manifold unified by Q. That is, the manifold of Ps is a sub-manifold of the

an iss
Qs. So implication among predicates analyzes the relation of sub-manifold. Now, I

du
take it that Russell thinks of equivalence of manifolds in the way that identity of sets
is conceived of in contemporary mathematics: if a set x is a subset of a set y and y

m
is also a subset of x, then x is the same set as y. So for Russell two manifolds are
equivalent if each is a sub-manifold of the other. Hence what analyzes the relation of

per
equivalence among manifolds is the relation of mutual implication among predicates.
Let’s pause to note the upshot of Russell’s analysis of manifolds, now that we
have his analysis of equivalence. Earlier we saw that a manifold is essentially a whole
united by a predicate and that the primitive operations on manifolds are determined

ut
by operations on their unifying predicates. Now we see that whether the primitive
relation of equivalence holds between manifolds is determined by whether their uni-

ey
fying predicates imply one another. So, every truth about the primitive operations
h@ itho
and relation of manifolds is determined by a truth about operations and relation on
predicates. But all the axioms of the logical calculus are truths about primitive or
sl
defined operations and relations on manifolds. So their truth is determined by what
holds of operations and relations on predicates.
sh ite w

Given this analysis, we answer the question how the axioms of the logical cal-
we
culus are necessary connections. The axioms are statements of equivalence between
manifolds. Equivalence of manifolds is analyzed in terms of mutual implication of
predicates. This means that the holding of an equivalence between manifolds is de-
termined by two predicates implying each other. But each implication is a necessary
connection from one predicate to the other. Hence the truth of each axiom is deter-
c

mined by a pair of necessary connections.


ie

Moreover, this analysis also answers the question how the axioms are rules of
or not

inference. Each axiom holds in virtue of a pair of predicate implications. Now as-
sume that a predicate P implies a predicate Q. Let also assume that the judgment
that
o

(6) a is P
d.
:d

is true. The truth of this judgment requires that a does indeed have the predicate P.
But according to the account of predicate implication, the assumption that P implies
Q means that for any term t it is necessary that if t has the predicate P then t also has
aft

Q. So, necessarily a has Q. This means that the judgment that

(7) a is Q
nf
Dr

is true. So, if P implies Q then necessarily if judgment (6) is true then so is judgment
(7). That is to say, the inference from (6) to (7) is correct. Thus, if the predicates
sa

P and Q are necessarily connected by implication, then a rule governing a form of


inference holds: for every term t it is correct to infer the judgment that t is Q from
the judgment that t is P.
198 The Idealist Origins of Logicism

5.4.2.3 Non-Empirical Intuition of Axioms


We now turn to the question how the necessary connections underlying the axioms

.e ion
are immediately and non-empirically apprehended. We start from one of Russell’s
discussions of predicate formation:
with the understanding that ‘a or b’ is a single predicate, we have two methods of forming a

an iss
single predicate from two. We have the predicate implying both, which is their synthesis, and
we have the predicate which both imply, which is ‘a or b’. (1898, 188)

du
In this passage, Russell presents four (types of) judgments of implication between

m
predicates. Writing ‘ab’ (in analogy with winged horse) for the synthesis of predi-
cates a and b, and ‘(a or b)’ for the “disjunctive form,” they are:

per
• ab implies a • a implies (a or b)
• ab implies b • b implies (a or b)
It is clear that in each of these cases the antecedent and consequent predicates may

ut
hold of the same subject. So these are judgments of necessary connections between
predicates.

ey
Let’s now ask, how do we acquire knowledge of such implications? What is
h@ itho
required to know, for example, that if Secretariat has the predicate winged horse,
then it must also have the predicate horse? One doesn’t have to know anything about
sl
Secretariat, nor anything about either of the predicates winged or horse. That is, no
empirical knowledge is required. One has only to grasp the nature of the operation
sh ite w

of predicate synthesis. Seeing that it is necessary for any term which has a predicate
we
ab synthesized from any predicates a and b to have also the predicate a is immediate
from grasping what synthesis of predicates is. Put slightly differently, to grasp the
nature of predicate synthesis is to grasp what an arbitrary synthesized predicate es-
sentially is, and from this grasp one immediately sees the necessary connection from
a synthesized predicate to either of the predicates from which it is synthesized. I take
c

it that for Russell there is a non-epistemic ground for this non-empirical immediate
ie

apprehension of necessary connection: the necessary connection apprehended holds


or not

in virtue of the nature of predicate synthesis. More generally, any implications be-
tween predicates that one can know merely by grasping the natures of operations of
predicate formation are necessary connections of predicates that may be immediately
and non-empirically apprehended.
o

So we can now specify how it is that, for example, the commutative law of mul-
d.

tiplication is supposed to be immediately and non-empirically apprehended. We can


:d

do so because we can know, merely by grasping the operation of synthesis, that the
predicate synthesized from any predicates a and b applies to every subject to which
the predicate synthesized from b and a applies, and vice versa. That is, we know that
aft

these predicates imply one another, and therefore that the manifolds they define are
equivalent. These manifolds are the products A ⋅ B and B ⋅ A of arbitrary manifolds A
nf

and B. Hence we know that the commutative law of multiplication holds merely by
Dr

grasping the operation of synthesis, that is, by immediate and non-empirical appre-
hension.
sa

5.4.2.4 The Logical Calculus as Modal Logicism


We are now in a position to see why the rules of inferences underlying the axioms
of the logical calculus are logical rules of inference. As we just saw, the reason
Necessity and Logicism 199

why the axioms are non-empirically immediately apprehended is that the necessary
connections among predicates on which they rest hold in virtue of only the nature
of operations of predicate formation. The basic operations of predicate formation

.e ion
involved in Russell’s analyses of the logical calculus are synthesis and disjunction.
These operations apply to all predicates whatsoever. So the classes of correct infer-
ences supported by the necessary connections grounded on these operations are not
restricted to judgments concerning any specific subject matters. That is to say, they

an iss
are logically correct inferences.

du
As we saw earlier, the truth of the axioms of the logical calculus is determined by
what holds of operations and relations on predicates. We now see that, in particular,

m
that the relations among predicates involved are relations of valid logical inference.
So, the axioms of the logical calculus are truths about manifolds that hold in virtue

per
of logical truths. we can put it this way: Russell’s logical calculus rests on axioms of
logic each of which describes a class of logically valid inferences from judgments to
judgments.25 This position is a form of logicism. Manifolds, on this conception of
the logical calculus, are logical entities in the sense that their properties and relations

ut
are determined by logic.
It should be emphasized that the type of logicism that we have just outlined dif-

ey
fers in two ways from Russell’s mature logicism, embodied in Principles and Prin-
h@ itho
cipia. First, it is only the axioms of the logical calculus that are logical. Russell
does say that the logical calculus is the most general branch of mathematics, presup-
sl
posed by all others. But this means only that all branches of mathematics use the
idea of manifold, in judgments about manifolds of various types of mathematical en-
sh ite w

tities, and so all mathematics make use of the theorems about manifolds proven in
we
the logical calculus. It does not mean that the fundamental ideas of all branches of
mathematics are reducible to the ideas of manifold, addition, and multiplication. In
particular, Russell insists in “Analysis” that “the idea of number or of numbers … are
fundamental and simple, incapable of analysis or derivation” (1898, 196). Second,
the logicism contemplated in “Analysis” is modal: the axioms of logic are necessary
c

truths. As we will see in the next chapter, by Principles Russell has completely re-
ie

jected the distinction between truth and necessary truth, and so the axioms of logic
or not

are simply true, not necessarily so.

5.4.2.5 The Logicism of As If


o

The interpretation just presented is subject to a significant qualification.


d.

In “Analysis” Russell holds that the analysis of the notion of manifold in terms of
:d

predicates is at best partially successful. The problem is that not all manifolds have
a defining predicate. Russell arrives at this conclusion starting from his accepting
that number applies to any collection of subjects, no matter how heterogeneous. But
aft

number applies to manifolds, so any collection of subjects is a manifold. Now, if


for any logical subject there is a predicate that applies truly only to it, then even a
nf

completely heterogeneous collection of subjects would be unified by being subjects


Dr

that have the predicate resulting from applying the disjunction operation on each of
the predicates that apply uniquely to one of the subjects. But for some unspecified
sa

reason, Russell doesn’t think that every subject has a predicate that holds only of it.
As a result, Russell holds that “[w]e must not … define the manifold as all the terms

25
In one way this is not surprising, given the close relationship between Boolean algebra and classical
sentential logic.
200 The Idealist Origins of Logicism

which have some given predicate”; all that he commits himself to is the cautious claim
that a “manifold … is a collection of terms having that kind of unity and relation
which is found associated with a common predicate” (1898, 179; emphasis mine).

.e ion
Manifolds without defining predicates Russell calls “assemblages,” and those with
defining predicates “classes” (1898, 180).
Russell’s admission of assemblages is one reason why I had characterized him
only as considering a conception of his logical calculus as logic. Because of his

an iss
acceptance of assemblages, he does not end up simply adopting this conception.

du
However, it’s also not clear that Russell simply rejects this conception. Since an
assemblage lacks a defining predicate, it can only be specified by “enumeration of its

m
terms” (1898, 180). But then, in Russell’s view, it would not be “a significant judg-
ment to assert that a term belongs to” an assemblage significant judgment to assert

per
that a term belongs to. Moreover, Russell also holds that the notion of a manifold
would not “have any importance” if there were no significant judgments asserting
that a term belongs to a manifold (1898, 180).
In this situation Russell’s attitude, I take it, is the following. Given that some

ut
manifolds are assemblages, it can’t be essential to manifolds that they are unified by
predicates. So a class is not essentially a whole unified by a predicate. What follows

ey
from this is that the truth of judgments about the primitive operations and relations
h@ itho
on classes is not determined by operations and relations on predicates. However,
true judgments about primitive operations and relations on classes do follow from
sl
axioms governing predicates. Moreover, no significant judgments can be made about
manifolds that lack a defining predicate. So it’s not clear how one could obtain a
sh ite w

theory of manifolds of any importance without deriving judgments about classes from
we
axioms governing predicates. One might put it this way: the only presently available
option for developing a theory of manifolds of any importance is to treat manifolds
as if they were essentially unified by predicates, that is to say, as if they were logical
objects whose properties and relations were determined by logical axioms.
c
ie

5.4.3 The Main Problem of Russell’s Account of the Logical


or not

Calculus
Even if one sets aside assemblages, Russell’s analysis of classes runs into a significant
difficulty. The problem arises because Russell subscribes to the principle that if two
classes are composed of the same terms, then they should count as equivalent, if not
o

the same. This is a version of the familiar contemporary set-theoretic criterion of


d.
:d

identity of sets. Call it the class equivalence principle. Now, according to Russell,
the terms that have the predicate featherless bipeds are exactly those terms that have
the predicate men. So by the class equivalence principle, the class composed of the
terms have one of these predicates is equivalent to the class composed of the terms
aft

that have the other predicate.


However, it is a contingent fact that there are no featherless bipeds except men.
nf

This means that it is not necessary for something that is a featherless biped to be
Dr

a man or vice versa. That is to say, neither predicate implies the other. But then,
according to Russell’s analysis of equivalence of manifolds as mutual implication
sa

of predicates determining the manifolds, the classes determined by these predicates


are not equivalent. That is to say, this analysis conflicts with the class equivalence
principle.
Russell doesn’t quite see this as a problem. He puts it thus:
Concluding Summary 201

Equivalence in the Logical Calculus, when our terms are predicates, may be interpreted in two
ways. It may mean that each of our predicates implies the other, or it may mean that each
defines the same class. The latter definition is wider, since it includes empirical propositions.

.e ion
‘Man is the featherless biped’ is a type of such propositions. We cannot say that featherless
biped implies man, but only that there happen to be no featherless bipeds except men. Unless
we wish seriously to limit the scope of the Logical Calculus, we shall have to give equivalence
the wider meaning. (1898, 191)

an iss
But to give the “wider meaning” to equivalence is to rule in favor of the class equiv-

du
alence principle. It is to admit that equivalence among classes is not analyzable in

m
terms of the relation of mutual implication among predicates.
The root of the problem is that mutual implication between predicates is a modal
notion but equivalence or identity between classes is not. What this problem makes

per
clear is that, if Russell is to continue to hold the class equivalence principle, then his
options for preserving an account of the theory of classes in logical terms seem to
come down to these:

ut
• Classes are not analyzed in terms of defining predicates, or,

ey
• The relation of sub-class is not analyzed in terms of a relation of implication
h@ itho
among predicates, or,
• The relation of implication among predicates is not modal, that is, it does not
sl
consist in a necessary connection between possessing one predicate and pos-
sessing another.
sh ite w
we
We will see in chapter 8 that Russell eventually adopts a version of the last option.
He continues to analyze classes in terms of a generalization of the notion of predi-
cate, namely, the notion of a propositional function, and he continues to analyze the
relation of sub-class in terms of a generalization of the relation of implication among
predicates, namely, the notion of formal implication. But the notion of formal im-
c

plication is explained in terms of a relation of implication between propositions, and


ie

this relation of implication is not modal.


or not

5.5 Concluding Summary


Our account of Russell’s idealist conception of mathematics focused exclusively on
o

its relation to Kant.26 Russell initially agrees with Kant that the judgments of math-
d.

ematics are
:d

(1) not justified on the basis of sense experience


(2) nor justified on the basis of conceptual analysis and the law of non-contradiction,
aft

i.e., formal logic,


nf

(3) necessary, and,


Dr

(4) justified transcendentally on the basis of logical presuppositions of experi-


ence.
sa

The influence of Bradleyan idealism on this conception consists of two initial depar-
tures from Kant:
26
Russell’s conception is also indebted to Hegel. See Griffin (1991) and Hylton (1993) for details on
Russell’s Hegelian heritage.
202 The Idealist Origins of Logicism

(5) interpreting Kant’s notion of the a priori as psychologistic, and to be replaced


by the notion of logical presupposition,
(6) rejecting the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments.

.e ion
As well as

(7) taking all necessity to lie in the inferential connection expressed by hypothet-

an iss
ical judgments, but grounded in the categorical basis of the connection.

du
These departures are of minor significance. (5) might be a misreading of Kant. The

m
significance of the syntheticity of mathematics for Kant is merely (2), its non-logical
justification, with which Russell doesn’t disagree. Finally, although (7) allows for
necessary a posteriori judgments, which disrupts Kant’s identification of the neces-

per
sary and the a priori, Russell neither doubts that mathematic is both a priori and
necessary nor differs from Kant over (4), that is, Russell accepts that the a priori
justification of mathematics is transcendental justification.
Russell’s more substantial drift away from Kant begins when he came to hold

ut
that (3), the necessity of mathematics, can’t ultimately be grounded in transcendental

ey
logical presuppositions of experience. Russell’s response is to reject (4), but keep (1)-
h@ itho
(3). At this point, he accepted that there are two types of necessity that can be only
perceived but not justified: that of ultimate premises and that of logical consequence.
sl
Russell came to contemplate an even further step away from the Kantian frame-
work as a result of Bradley’s view that all necessity lies in logical inference. To
begin with, Russell followed Bradley to the extent of holding that the necessity of
sh ite w
we
the fundamental axioms of mathematics is the necessity of inference, leaving it open
whether the inference is logical. But when Russell applied this idea to his analysis
of the theory of classes, he considered at some length the position that this theory
is founded on axioms which are logical rules of inference. This position is a modal
form of logicism, in which the axioms of logic are necessary inferential connections.
c

Had Russell adopted this position, he would have rejected (2), the non-logical nature
ie

of mathematics, for the theory of classes if not the remainder of mathematics. Russell
or not

would then be left with just two planks of the Kantian framework: (1), mathematical
justification is non-empirical, and (3), mathematics is necessary.
In view of Russell’s later rejection of necessity, it is ironic that he comes to
consider moving to a logicism about classes as a result of attempting to account for
the necessity of mathematics.
o
d.

But Russell did not take the final step to logicism, for a reason that does not
:d

appear compelling. So, at the end of Russell’s idealist period he holds:


(8) The fundamental axioms of mathematics are necessary truths.
aft

(9) Their necessity consists in their being rules of inference.


(10) These rules of inference are or rest on necessary connections between con-
nf

ceptions.
Dr

(11) Necessary connections are implications between conceptions.


sa

Had Russell taken the step to modal logicism about classes, he would have ended up
with modifications of two of these positions:

(12) The necessity of the axioms of the theory of classes consists in their being
logical rules of inference.
Concluding Summary 203

(13) Necessary connections are logical implications between conceptions.


In addition, Russell would have run into a difficulty: the incompatibility between

.e ion
the principle of class equivalence and the modal nature of the relation of implication
used to analyze class equivalence.
When Russell finally embraces logicism this difficult doesn’t arise, since he then
lets go of necessity, that is, of (3) and (7). At that point, all that is left of the Kantian

an iss
framework is (1), the non-empirical nature of mathematical justification.

du
m
per
ut
ey
h@ itho
sl
sh ite w
we
c
ie
or not
o
d.
:d
aft
nf
Dr
sa
6

.e ion
The Rejection of Modality

an iss
This chapter examines how Russell came to reject modality on the basis of his rejec-

du
tion of idealism.

m
Russell and Moore’s rejection of idealism is a complex philosophical transition,
but it is generally agreed that it has two principal components. One is the rejection

per
of the thesis that all relations are “internal” to the entities that they relate. The other
is a theory of propositions as the objects of judgment and belief.
I begin in §6.1 by elaborating the concept of internal relation, in order to see
whether Russell’s abandonment of modal distinctions may be based on the rejection

ut
of internal relations. I will argue that the most promising version of such an argument
does not square with Russell’s texts. In the remainder of the chapter, I show that

ey
Russell’s animus against modality comes from the theory of propositions and their
h@ itho
truth that he adopted when he and Moore rejected Bradley’s monistic idealism. The
focus of this rejection is Moore’s criticisms of Bradley’s theory of judgment. In §6.2
sl
I outline Bradley’s theory of judgment. Moore’s arguments against Bradley have
not, in general, been found very persuasive.1 But, in §6.3 I show that, in fact, they
sh ite w

present a challenge to Bradley’s overall conception of judgment that he has reason to


we
take seriously.
In §6.4, I sketch Moore’s alternative theory of judgment. According to this the-
ory each judgment has an object, which Moore calls a proposition, that is a complex
of generally mind-independent entities that the judgment is about.
In §6.6 I show how Moore uses this theory of propositions to argue, against
c

Kant, that all true propositions are necessarily true. In §6.7 we will see that Russell
ie

takes Moore’s argument slightly differently from the way Moore does. For Russell,
or not

it demonstrates that there is no distinction between truth and necessary truth, nor
between truth and possible truth. That is to say, Russell concludes that there are no
modes of truth, which, as we saw in chapter 1, is precisely Frege’s amodalism about
truth.
o

Although it should be obvious, I would like to emphasize that although there


d.

are some small disagreements between the ensuing account and existing readings of
:d

Russell and Moore’s rejection of idealism, I have mostly built on these readings, in
order to bring out the role of the rejection of idealism in the overall argument of this
book.2
aft
nf
Dr

1
For example, one of the most careful and extensive discussions of Moore’s philosophy, T. Baldwin
(1990), these arguments are taken to be “very obscure,” and based on misunderstandings of Bradley (see
sa

in particular 1990, 14).


2
In particular, I will be relying heavily on the pioneering studies of Russell and Moore’s rejection of
idealism by Peter Hylton (1990; 1990) and Nicholas Griffin (1991), as well as works on early analytic phi-
losophy not exclusively focused on this issue such as T. Baldwin (1990), Francisco Rodríguez-Consuegra
(1991), Stewart Candlish (2007), Ivor Grattan-Guinness (2011), Sébastien Gandon (2012), and a number
of essays of James Levine (1998; 1998; 2001; 2002; 2008).
The Path to the Rejection of Modality 205

6.1 The Path to the Rejection of Modality


Russell completed the manuscript of “Analysis” in July 1898.3 He continued to

.e ion
endorse the view of “Analysis,” that axioms express necessary connections, in a
manuscript, “Fundamental Ideas and Axioms of Mathematics,” on which he stopped
working in August 1899 (see Russell, 1899b [henceforth cited as FIAM], 291-2).
No trace of this modal characterization of axioms remains in the 1899-1900 draft

an iss
of Principles, begun soon after Russell abandoned “Fundamental Ideas.” Indeed,
with the exception of the unpublished paper “Leibniz’s Doctrine of Substance as De-

du
duced from his Logic,” read to the Aristotelian Society in February 1900, there is no

m
mention or discussion of modality in Russell’s writings until late 1900. Moreover, in
“Leibniz’s Doctrine” Russell’s focus is mostly on the interpretation of Leibniz’s view

per
of substance, and so he presents what he takes to be Leibniz’s views of necessity and
contingency without critical discussion.4
By the second half of 1900, however, we find a substantial change in Russell’s
attitude to necessity. The first signs of it appear in A Critical Examination of the Phi-

ut
losophy of Leibniz, whose published Preface is dated September 1900. As Russell
reads him, Leibniz holds that the necessary/contingent distinction lines up exactly

ey
with the analytic/synthetic distinction. As we saw in the last chapter, in Foundations
h@ itho
of Geometry Russell merely rejects the analytic/synthetic distinction, on the authority
of Bradley and Bosanquet, but in Leibniz, Russell gives an argument against it. The
sl
argument is that the propositions Leibniz identifies as analytic are all either “tautol-
ogous, and so not properly propositions at all” (1900, 17), or are in fact synthetic
sh ite w

because of synthetic presuppositions. Examples of the first are “A is A,” and “I shall
we
be what I shall be,” which “assert nothing” (1900, 17). The simplest version of the
second horn of the dilemma is this. An analytic proposition is supposed to be one
whose denial runs afoul of the Law of Contradiction. But the reason why e.g., “A
is a round square” is self-contradictory is that it implies both “A is round” and “A
has four angles,” and these two propositions are incompatible. This incompatibility,
c

in turn, rests on “the incompatibility of [the] constituents [of the idea round] with
ie

the possession of angles” (1900, 20-21). Thus, without “this synthetic relation of
or not

incompatibility, no negative proposition would occur, and therefore there could be


no proposition involved which would be directly contradictory to the definition of a
square” (1900, 21).
The question whether this line of argument is cogent doesn’t concern us. The
o

important point for our purposes is what Russell infers from the conclusion. Since all
d.

“proper” propositions are synthetic, “if there are to be any necessary propositions at
:d

all there must be necessary synthetic propositions” (1900, 23; emphasis mine). The
important question for Russell is whether the converse is true, whether necessity, like
syntheticity, applies to all propositions, or whether there is a distinction “between
aft

the necessary and the contingent” (1900, 23). In attempting to answer this question
Russell first claims, as he did in “Les axiomes propres à Euclide,” that “necessity is
nf

ultimate and indefinable” (1900, 23). However, in contrast to “Les axiomes,” Russell
Dr

doesn’t go on to claim that we have non-inferential perceptual knowledge of the ne-


cessity of propositions. The reason is that at this point Russell has come to entertain
sa

doubts about whether there is such a property as necessity distinct from truth:
Leibniz and Kant both held that there is a fundamental distinction between propositions that
3
See the Editors’ introduction to Russell (1898a [henceforth cited as AMR]) in Russell (1990, 155-61).
4
See Russell (1899-1900, 520-4).
206 The Rejection of Modality

are necessary, and those that are contingent …. It may be questioned whether this distinction is
tenable, whether, in fact, there is any sense in saying, of a true proposition, that it might have
been false. As long as the distinction of analytic and synthetic propositions subsisted, there

.e ion
was some plausibility in maintaining a corresponding distinction in respect of necessity. But
Kant, by pointing out that mathematical judgments are both necessary and synthetic, prepared
the way for the view that this is true of all judgments. …. [I]t must be confessed that, if all
propositions are necessary, the notion of necessity is shorn of most of its importance. (1900,

an iss
23-4; emphases mine)

du
Here Russell merely questions whether the claim that a true proposition might have
been false makes any sense. This becomes an assertion, albeit made somewhat tenta-

m
tively, in the paper “L’idée d’ordre et la position absolue dans l’espace et le temps,”
which was published in March 1901 but parts of which was read to the International

per
Congress of Philosophy in Paris in August 1900:
[I]l paraît qu’il n’y a aucune proposition vraie dont on peut dire qu’elle aurait pu être fausse.
On pourrait tout aussi bien dire que le rouge aurait pu être un goût au lieu d’être une couleur.
Ce qui est vrai, est vrai; ce qui est faux, est faux, et il n’y a rien de plus à dire. La nécessité

ut
semble être une notion plutôt psychologique que logique. (1901, 274-5)

ey
h@ itho
So, sometime between late 1899 and the second half of 1900 Russell came to think
that there is no significant difference between truth and necessary truth, and thereby
sl
to reject the philosophical and logical importance of modality. Since Russell’s break
with idealism also took place at roughly the same time, a natural question to raise is:
what relation, if any, is there between this rejection of modality and the rejection of
sh ite w
we
idealism?
As I mentioned at the outset of this chapter, two principal components of Russell
and Moore’s rejection of idealism are the rejection of internal relations and a theory
of propositions. It is thus natural to hypothesize that if Russell’s rejection of modality
is philosophically connected to the rejection of idealism, it derives from one of these
components. I now show that although there may be a viable route from the rejection
c
ie

of internal relations to a rejection of modality, it is not Russell’s.


First, let’s try to clarify the notion of internal relation. Here is a way of drawing
or not

the contrast between external and internal relations. A relation is internal if its holding
between things is somehow fixed by the things themselves. A relation is external if its
holding between things is in some way independent of these things.5 Here is a stock
sort of example. Take the statement ‘El Capitan is taller than North Dome’. On one
o

view what makes it true are three entities, the two mountain peaks and the relation of
d.
:d

being taller than, where the relation is distinct from the peaks because after all Clouds
Rest also stands in this relation to Sentinel Rock. This would be to take the relation
of being taller than as external to the peaks which it relates. In contrast, one might
think that El Capitan’s being taller than North Dome is determined by the height of
aft

El Capitan (7,569 feet) and the height of North Dome (7,543 feet), because given the
heights of the peaks it isn’t possible for El Capitan not to be taller than North Dome.
nf

This would be to take being taller than as an internal relation.


Dr

About this example, one may well think that each of El Capitan and North Dome
might have had a height different from what they do in fact have. And if, say, El Cap-
sa

itan had been 7519 feet high while North Dome were 7533 feet high, then El Capitan
would not have been taller than North Dome. However, in contemporary philosophy
we are accustomed to considering a different sort of example: could Queen Elizabeth
5
See MacBride (2016) for more on the internal/external contrast.
The Path to the Rejection of Modality 207

II of England have remained exactly who she is, if she had not been the daughter of
Lady Elizabeth Bowes-Lyon?6 If the answer is no, then the relation of being a daugh-
ter of is internal to Elizabeth II in a different sense from that in which taller than is

.e ion
internal to El Capitan: Elizabeth II would not exist if she did not stand in the daughter
of relation to Lady Elizabeth Bowes-Lyon. In other words, it is essential to Elizabeth
II that she stand in this relation to her mother, or, it is necessary for her so to stand.
Let’s say that taller than is a type one internal relation, and daughter of is a type two

an iss
internal relation.
Type two internality is a modal one.7 If two entities a and b are internally related

du
by a type two internal relation R, then a would not exist without bearing R to b, or

m
b wouldn’t exist without being borne R by a. Hence, if the claim that a stands in R
to b is true, then it would be not merely true, but necessarily true. In contrast, if R is

per
a type one internal relation, then it doesn’t follow, from a true claim that a stand in
R to b, that necessarily a stands in R to b. Nor would such an inference go through
if the relation in question is not internal at all. Hence, if there are type two internal
relations as well as either type one internal relations or external relations, then some

ut
true relational claims are necessarily true while others are not. There would then be
a distinction between truth and necessary truth.

ey
Now, suppose that no relation is internal. Then the inferences from true claims
h@ itho
about entities standing in type two internal relations to the necessary truth of those
claims wouldn’t go through. Hence at least one ground for distinguishing mere truth
sl
from necessary truth of some claims would lapse. Call this the internality argument.
I do not insist that Russell never subscribed to something like the internality
sh ite w

argument. However, there are three reasons against taking it to be the basis of the
we
anti-modal views expressed in Leibniz and in “L’idée d’ordre.” The first and rela-
tively minor problem is that the internality argument applies only to relational propo-
sitions, whereas Russell’s view seems to apply to all propositions. Now, it is the case
that in the period of Russell’s development in which these two texts are written he
held that all propositions are relational. For example, in “The Classification of Rela-
c

tions,” in which Russell first argues in detail that “all relations are external” (1899,
ie

143), he also insists that “[e]very proposition expresses one or more relations” (ibid.,
or not

145). However, by Principles Russell no longer rules out non-relational proposi-


tions,8 while he continues to reject any distinction between truth and necessary truth,
repeating almost verbatim the formulation in “L’idée d’ordre”:
there seems to be no true proposition of which there is any sense in saying that it might have
o
d.

been false. One might as well say that redness might have been a taste and not a colour. What
:d

is true, is true; what is false, is false; and concerning fundamentals, there is nothing more to
be said. (1903, §430, 454)9

The second problem is that from “Classification” to Principles Russell’s characteri-


aft

zation of internal relations differs from that which figures in the internality argument.
nf

6
See Sprigge (1962, 202) for an early version of this example. The example was subsequently taken
up and discussed in Kripke (1980, 110ff).
Dr

7
This second conception is due to G. E. Moore (1919), though Moore formulates it in terms of re-
lational properties that is more faithful to our example of Elizabeth II and the relational property she has
sa

of being the daughter of Lady Elizabeth Bowes-Lyon: “in the case of every relational property, it can
always be truly asserted of any term x which has that property, that any term which had not had it would
necessarily have been different from x” (1919, 47).
8
See Levine (1998b) for an account of Russell’s reasons for this change of mind.
9
These words, as Russell says in the footnote on (1903, 445), were first published in Russell (1901a,
316).
208 The Rejection of Modality

The account in Principles is clearest. Russell distinguishes between two views of in-
ternal relations, the “monadistic,” ascribed to Leibniz and Lotze, and the “monistic,”
ascribed to Spinoza and Bradley:

.e ion
Given, say, the proposition aRb, where R is some relation, the monadistic view will analyse
this into two propositions, which we may call ar1 and br2 , which give to a and b respectively
adjectives supposed to be together equivalent to R. The monistic view, on the contrary, re-

an iss
gards the relation as a property of the whole composed of a and b, and as thus equivalent to a
proposition which we may denote by (ab)r. (1903, §212, 221)

du
m
Both views are reductionist or eliminativist; each analyzes away any supposed case
of entities standing in a relation into a case of the possession of properties by these
entities, either separately or as a whole. So either standing in a relation consists in

per
no more than possessing properties, or there is really no such thing as standing in a
relation.10 But neither reductionist view implies that the possession of the properties
constituting the reduction base is necessary or essential to the entities or to the whole
that they compose. In other words, the monadistic and the monistic views are both

ut
theories of type one internal relations.

ey
Finally, the most serious difficulty is that the conclusion of the internality argu-
h@ itho
ment is better described as the view that no true relational proposition is necessarily
true, while Russell’s anti-modalist position is that all true propositions are necessar-
sl
ily true. Indeed, on the conception of internal relation that figures in the internality
argument, it’s hard to see what would qualify a relation as not internal except that
the entities it relates could be exactly what they are even if they did not stand in that
sh ite w
we
relation. But then it has to make sense to think that a true proposition stating that
this relation holds of such-and-such entities might not have been true, contrary to
Russell’s claim that it makes no sense to think that true propositions might not be
true.
So, in the remainder of this chapter I will look for the grounds of Russell’s rejec-
c

tion of modality in the theory of propositions that comes from Moore’s criticism of
ie

Bradley’s theory of judgment, a criticism most likely first propounded in Moore’s sec-
ond fellowship dissertation, but first published in “The Nature of Judgment” (1899).11
or not

I start with a sketch of Bradley’s theory of judgment.

6.2 Bradley’s Theory of Judgment


o
d.

Bradley begins The Principles of Logic with an account of judgment:


:d

Judgment … does not exist where there exists no knowledge of truth and falsehood; and, since
truth and falsehood depend on the relation of our ideas to reality, you can not have judgment
aft

proper without ideas. …. Not only are we unable to judge before we use ideas, but, strictly
speaking, we can not judge till we use them as ideas …, signs of an existence other than
nf

themselves. (1883, I.i.2, 2)


Dr

10
Russell is sometimes accused of misunderstanding Bradley by taking Bradley to hold that all relations
are internal, when Bradley, in fact, rejects both external and internal relations as ultimately unreal. See,
sa

e.g., Bradley himself (1911, 312). But Russell’s formulation of the monistic view of internal relations as a
reductionist or eliminativist view does not seem very far from a doctrine of the unreality of relations tout
court. If there is misunderstanding here it lies in Russell’s not making it clear that for Bradley properties
are no more real than relations.
11
“Most likely” because the manuscript of the dissertation is lost. See Editors’ Introduction of (G. E.
Moore, 2011).
Bradley’s Theory of Judgment 209

Judgment, that is to say, are representations of reality effected by “using ideas as


ideas” or as “signs.” What this means depends on Bradley’s account of signs or sym-
bols. The account is best presented by reference to one of the very rare occurrences

.e ion
of (relatively) specific examples in Bradley:
[E]very flower exists and has its own qualities, but not all have a meaning. Some signify
nothing, while others stand generally for the kind which they represent, while others again go

an iss
on to remind us of hope or love. But the flower can never itself be what it means. (1883, 3-4)
A particular flower, say a chrysanthemum, has a set of specific characteristics-–the

du
colors, shapes, and sizes of its petals, stem, pistil, etc, and their arrangement—that

m
distinguish it from other chrysanthemums, and indeed from all other things. Bradley
calls these particular characteristics the “content” of this particular chrysanthemum.

per
Suppose now that this chrysanthemum is in a botanical garden. By being placed
there, this specific flower is being used as a sign. The content of this flower is no
longer just the set of its distinguishing characteristics; rather, it is taken to be char-
acteristics by possessing which something belongs to the botanical species or kind
Chrysanthemum morifolium. So, in being used in this way, the content of this flower

ut
has a representative function; it now “means” or “stands for” a universal, namely this

ey
botanical kind.
h@ itho
The story I’ve just given is obviously inaccurate in one respect: by putting this
flower in the botanical garden we clearly don’t intend that to be a chrysanthemum
sl
requires, having petals of exactly the number, color, shape, and size of this particular
flower, or being located in exactly the place where this flower is located. We set aside
sh ite w

some of the specific characteristics that are the content of this flower. Bradley calls
we
this “cutting off a part of the original content” of the flower (see 1883, 4). Only after
this cutting off do we obtain from the original content a meaning or a universal for
which the flower is a sign. To use the flower as a sign, therefore, requires performing
a mental act on contents.
Now suppose that we took a photograph of this chrysanthemum and put it next to
c

“truth” in a book on “the language of flowers.” It may be said that in so doing, we are
ie

still using this particular chrysanthemum as a sign, meaning the quality of truth. But
or not

it’s not the content of this chrysanthemum, its distinguishing characteristics, nor the
result of some “cutting off” operation that we performed on this content, that signifies
truth. This is because by this use of the flower we are certainly not intending that in
order for something to be truthful it has to a flower with such-and-such characteristics.
o

So, in this case, the meaning of the flower used as a sign is not part of the original
d.

content but an “extension” of that content.


:d

In terms of this general theory of signs, we can spell out what it is for ideas to
be used as signs. Again let’s use an example suggested by Bradley (see 1883, 9).
Suppose I have an experience of seeing a boiled lobster. This particular experience,
aft

like the particular chrysanthemum, has a set of distinguishing characteristics. Now,


I can “cut off” every characteristic of this experience except the visual experience of
nf

the color of the lobster, and take the result to be how something has to be like, or
Dr

how something has to be experienced by us, for it to be colored red. Then I am using
my experience as a sign: I am taking the cut off part of the content of my experience
sa

as signifying something, and what it signifies, its meaning, is a universal, a property


that aspects of reality other than the one involved in this particular experience may
have.
Subsequent to this particular experience I can “predicate” (1883, 8), “attribute”
(1883, 9), “refer” (1883, 10), or “assert” (1883, 12) this universal meaning of or to
210 The Rejection of Modality

another aspect of reality. For example, I can attribute this universal of redness to
an aspect of reality that I experience as a rose. Such a predication, attribution, or
reference is a judgment.

.e ion
I want to highlight two points about Bradley’s view.
First, the initial experience I have Bradley characterizes as a “psychical state”
or a “fact in my mind” that is “unique” to me. Sometimes Bradley calls such a unique
individual mental state an “idea.” Bradley insists that the universal or meaning that I

an iss
use my mental state to signify is not a psychological state at all, no part of any indi-

du
vidual’s mind. Unfortunately, Bradley sometimes also calls these meanings “ideas”;
even more confusingly, he claims that “it is better to say, the idea is the meaning”

m
(1883, 6). Let us disambiguate and call these, respectively, “mental idea” and “mean-
ing idea.” Bradley’s view then is that we use mental ideas as signs of meaning ideas.

per
Second, the meaning idea is produced by my mental activity on the content of
my initial mental state. So far we have been Bradley calling this activity “cutting
off.” However, at one point Bradley also states that to arrive at such universal ideas
one “must … abstract from the existence and external relations” of “particular mental

ut
imagery” (1883, 7; emphases mine).
I turn now to discuss the nature of the abstraction by which meaning ideas are

ey
formed from mental ideas. Bradley is strongly opposed to the following account
h@ itho
of abstraction. Consider our example of the visual experience of a boiled lobster.
According to this account, this experience is made up of a set of mental items, among
sl
which is an experience of redness. Thus, abstracting the meaning idea of redness
consists of isolating a component part of the visual experience.
sh ite w

Bradley characterizes the view of mental states underlying this account of ab-
we
straction as the claim that mind is “composed” of “units of feeling” (1883, 96).
Bradley evidently has in mind the classical British empiricists; for example, Locke
holds that our minds are “furnish’d” with sensations and with ideas ultimately de-
rived from sensations (1689, II.ii.2). Bradley conceives of these units as primitive
mental entities with no parts, from which all other mental contents are composed.
c

Call this view psychological atomism.


ie

Bradley takes psychological atomism to be is thoroughly mistaken. He holds, in


or not

contrast, that our experiences of reality are fundamentally single unified wholes, not
complex states made up of simpler components. So the production of meaning ideas
out of a mental idea is not the discovery of mental items that are objective constituents
of an experience but the imposition of a manufactured division on something that
o

is intrinsically without parts. As Bradley puts it, a universal meaning “is neither
d.

presented nor given but is taken” (1883, 8). Here is how Bradley phrases the view,
:d

in terms of his doctrine of “feeling”:12

[T]he immediate unity which comes in feeling … is ultimate … in the sense that no relational
aft

thinking can reconstitute it ….


Judgement, on our view, transcends and must transcend that immediate unity of feeling
nf

…. Judgement has to qualify the Real ideally. And the word ‘idea’ means that the original unity
Dr

has so far been broken. …. For ideas cannot qualify reality as reality is qualified immediately
in feeling. (1909, 230-1)
sa

I want to stress that Bradley’s view is not a flat denial that mental contents have parts.
It is only a denial that mental contents result from putting parts together, i.e., that the
parts of a mental content are prior and independent of that content. Bradley puts it
12
For more on Bradley’s notions of “feeling” and “immediate experience” see Hylton (1990a, 47-9).
Moore’s Critique of Bradley’s Theory of Judgment 211

in this way: “the units and the relation between them are fictions of the mind, mere
distinctions within a single reality” (1883, 96; emphasis mine). Thus a mental content
has parts only in the sense that the mind imposes divisions on a fundamentally unified

.e ion
content, so that the parts result from this activity of the mind.13
I want to note two things about Bradley’s rejection of psychological atomism.
First, he holds an analogous view of reality itself: it is not composed of distinct enti-
ties standing in relations to one another but is fundamentally a single unified whole.

an iss
Thus judgments which represent reality as composite are invariably mistaken. Sec-

du
ond, Bradley doesn’t simply assert that experience is not composed of constituent
psychological states, or that reality is not composed of entities connected by rela-

m
tions. Rather, he argues for the former claim in Chapter II of PL, and for the latter in
Appearance and Reality. I will discuss these arguments in §7.2 of chapter 7.

per
To sum up, Bradley’s conceives of judgment as follows:
• Judgment involves two mental acts:

– abstracting non-psychological universal meanings from particular mental

ut
states, and

ey
– referring these meanings to reality.
h@ itho
• The abstraction of a universal meaning is
sl
– not the identification of a part out of which an immediate experience is
composed, but rather
sh ite w
we
– the imposition of a division on a fundamentally undivided immediate ex-
perience.

6.3 Moore’s Critique of Bradley’s Theory of Judgment


c
ie

Moore starts “The Nature of Judgment” with an exposition of the main features of
or not

Bradley’s view of judgment (1899, 176), that we canvassed in the last section. Moore
accepts from Bradley that the ideas ascribed to reality in judgments are not mental
states but universal meanings (1898, 176). But Moore objects to Bradley’s “final de-
scription of the ‘idea, as meaning,’ ” on the ground that it is “infected by the same er-
ror as” psychologism (1898, 176). In particular, Moore intends to show that Bradley’s
o
d.

meaning idea “is not a part of the content of our ideas, nor produced by any action
:d

of our minds, and that hence truth and falsehood are not dependent on the relation of
our ideas to reality” (1898, 176).
Moore’s target is a three-part view:
aft

(1) Mental ideas are particular states, objects, or events individuated by their con-
tents.
nf
Dr

(2) A meaning idea, a “universal meaning,” is simply a part of the content of


some mental idea.
sa

(3) This universal-meaning-constituting part of the content is “produced by some


action of our minds.”

13
See Allard (2004, 65).
212 The Rejection of Modality

Moore likens this Bradleyan view to Kant’s view that “it is the ‘analytical unity
of consciousness’ which makes a ‘Vorstellung’ or ‘idea’ into a ‘conceptus commu-
nis’ or ‘gemeinsamer Begriff ’.” So Moore proposes ‘concept’ as a replacement for

.e ion
Bradley’s ‘universal meaning’ ” (1898, 177).14 Moore characterizes his intention as
rejecting the view of “a concept as an ‘abstraction’ from ideas” (1898, 177). Clearly
“abstraction” here means the action or actions, whatever they are, by which meaning
ideas are supposed to be produced.

an iss
The arguments Moore advances certainly lead him to the conception of proposi-

du
tions that is generally associated with Russell’s and Moore’s complete break with ide-
alism. Most readers of “The Nature of Judgment,” starting in particular with Bradley,

m
have found these arguments neither clear nor persuasive. I don’t dispute their unclar-
ity; but I will propose a reading on the basis of which one of them is, at the very least,

per
not based on a misunderstanding, and, at best, a substantial challenge to Bradley’s
position.
An immediate unclarity is whether Moore presents two arguments for his con-
clusion or a two-part argument for it. The first, better known, and clearer argument

ut
or part is a fairly simple infinite regress:

ey
[M]y question [for Bradley’s view] is, whether we can thus cut off a part of the character of
h@ itho
our ideas, and attribute that part to something else, unless we already know, in part at least,
what is the character of the idea from which we are to cut off the part in question. If not, then
sl
we have already made a judgment with regard to the character of our idea. But this judgment,
again, requires, on Mr. Bradley’s theory, that I should have had an idea of my idea, and should
have already cut off a part of the content of that secondary idea, in order that I may make a
sh ite w
we
14
The passage to which Moore refers is in a footnote in §16 of the B edition Transcendental Deduction.
Here Kant, in fact, takes the synthetic unity of apperception, rather than the analytic unity of consciousness,
to be that which underlines the combination of Vorstellungen of common concept:

Die analytische Einheit des Bewusstseins hängt allen genmeinsamen Begriffen, als solchen, an,
z.B. wenn ich mir roth überhaupt denke, so stelle ich mir dadurch eine Beschaffenheit vor, die
c

(als Merkmal) irgend woran angetroffen oder mit anderen Vorstellungen verbunden sein kann;
ie

also lour vermöge einer vorausgedachten möglichen synthetischen Einheit kann ich mir die
or not

analytisehe vorstellen. Eine Vorstellung, die als verschiedenen gemein gedacht werden soll,
wird als zu solchen gehörig angesehen, die ausser ihr noch etwas Verschiedenes an sich haben,
folglich muss sie in synthetischer Einheit mit anderen (wenngleich nur möglichen Vorstel-
lungen) vorher gedacht werden, ehe ich die analytische Einheit des Bewusstseins, welche sie
zum conceptus communis macht, an ihr denken kann. Und so ist die synthetische Einheit der
Apperception der höchste Punkt, an dem man allen Verstandesgebrauch, selbst die ganze Logik,
o

und, nach ihr, die Transzendental-Philosophie heften muss, ja dieses Vermögen ist der Verstand
d.

selbst. (KrV, B133-4, 143b; underlining mine)


:d

The Guyer and Wood translation is:

The analytical unity of consciousness pertains to all common concepts as such, e.g., if I think
aft

of red in general, I thereby represent to myself a feature that (as a mark) can be encountered
in anything, or that can be combined with other representations; therefore only by means of an
nf

antecedently conceived possible synthetic unity can I represent to myself the analytical unity.
Dr

A representation that is to be thought of as common to several must be regarded as belonging to


those that in addition to it also have something different in themselves; consequently they must
antecedently be conceived in synthetic unity with other (even if only possible representations)
sa

before I can think of the analytical unity of consciousness in it that makes it into a conceptus
communis. And thus the synthetic unity of apperception is the highest point to which one
must affix all use of the understanding, even the whole of logic and, after it, transcendental
philosophy; indeed this faculty is the understanding itself. (CPR, 247; underlining mine)
Moore’s Critique of Bradley’s Theory of Judgment 213

judgment with regard to the character of the primary idea that is in question. …. And so on ad
infinitum. The theory would therefore seem to demand the completion of an infinite number
of psychological judgments before any judgment can be made at all. But such a completion is

.e ion
impossible; and therefore all judgment is likewise impossible. It follows, therefore, if we are
to avoid this absurdity, that the ‘idea used in judgment’ must be something other than a part of
the content of any idea of mine. (1898, 177)

an iss
It’s clear that what generates the regress here is the specific construal of the abstrac-
tion by which meaning ideas are produced that Moore attributes to Bradley. If to

du
make a judgment requires abstracting a meaning idea from a mental idea, but to ab-

m
stract a meaning idea requires making a judgment, then it’s clear that we will get a
circle or an infinite regress. But why should one understand abstraction in this way?

per
Bradley himself makes this point in a letter to Moore:

[Your first argument] seems to be that the separation of meaning from existence required for
judgment presupposes a previous judgment. Well certainly it may do so—a psychological
judgment, that is, but then again it may not and often does not …. I suppose that my phrase

ut
‘cut off’ etc. has been taken to imply a going about to cut off and therefore a previous idea. I
never meant this …. But I admit my language was loose.15

ey
h@ itho
Of course here all we have is a pair of contrary assertions; to answer Moore satisfac-
torily Bradley has to say what exactly his phrase ‘cut off’ amounts to, what exactly
sl
a meaning-idea-producing abstraction is, if not a judgment or a “going about to cut
off” a content. Still, it’s clear that Moore’s reasoning as it stands doesn’t constitute a
sh ite w

compelling criticism.
we
Let’s move on to what Moore says next, which might be a separate argument.
How this works is considerably more obscure:16

Mr. Bradley’s theory presupposes that I may have two ideas, that have a part of their content in
common; but he would at the same time compel us to describe this common part of content as
c

part of the content of some third idea. But what is gained by such a description? If the part of
ie

content of this third idea is a part only in the same sense, as the common part of the other two
is a part of each, then I am offering an explanation which presupposes that which was to be
or not

explained. Whereas if the part, which is used in explanation, is a part in the only sense which
will make my explanation significant, i.e., an existent part, then it is difficult to see how that
which belongs to one idea can also come to belong to other ideas and yet remain one and the
same. In short, the idea used in judgment is indeed a ‘universal meaning’; but it cannot, for
o

that very reason, be described as part of the content of any psychological idea whatever.
d.
:d

Bradley is certainly committed to holding that the meaning idea abstracted from one
mental idea may be also the meaning idea abstracted in another mental idea, and so
these two mental states have a part of their content in common. For example, Bradley
aft

describes a situation in which we have a true idea that roses are red, and yet our idea
of “redness may have been that of a lobster” (1883, 9). The claim here is surely that
nf

the idea of redness is part of both the idea that roses are red and the idea that this
Dr

lobster is red.
But Moore further claims that Bradley is also committed to “describing” this
sa

common part of the content as part of the content of some third idea. But he doesn’t
15
Quoted in T. Baldwin (1990, 14) and the Editors’ Introduction of (G. E. Moore, 2011, at xxix).
Bradley’s letter is preserved in the Moore archive at Cambridge University Library: Add. MS 8830
8B/21/1.
16
As Baldwin notes (1990, 14).
214 The Rejection of Modality

tell us why. Moreover, in his letter to Moore Bradley specifically disavows such a
commitment.17 But we should not simply dismiss this claim. Let’s first try to get a
sense of how Moore’s argument works.

.e ion
Moore’s argument begins with the question, “But what is gained by such a de-
scription?” He goes on to suggest that this “description” is supposed to be offered
as some sort of explanation. Moore’s objection seems to be that there are only two
ways of construing Bradley’s “description” as the appropriate sort of explanation,

an iss
and these form two horns of a dilemma each of which leads to unacceptable conse-

du
quences. This raises two questions:

m
• What is supposed to be explained?
• How is “describing the common part” of the contents of two ideas as part of the

per
content of a third idea supposed to be an explanation?
The way to answer these questions and make sense of Moore’s reasoning begins
from seeing that his target is not simply Bradley’s view of the meaning idea figuring
in judgment, but the combination of this view with Bradley’s psychological anti-

ut
atomism. Moore’s criticism is that this combination of views cannot account for

ey
the possibility of distinct judgments asserting the same meaning idea, or asserting
h@ itho
meaning ideas that have a part in common.
The aspect of Bradley’s anti-atomism relevant to Moore’s argument is the view
sl
that an immediately experienced mental content has parts only in the sense that the
mind imposes divisions on a fundamentally unified content so that the parts result
sh ite w

from this activity of the mind. It is not entirely clear that the abstraction of a universal
we
meaning idea from the content of a mental state is such an imposition of divisions on
an immediately experience mental state; for Bradley describes the abstraction in the
following terms:

Each [idea] exists as a psychical fact, and with particular qualities and relations. It has its
c

speciality as an event in my mind. It is a hard individual, so unique that it not only differs from
ie

all others, but even from itself at subsequent moments. …. I have the ‘idea’ of a horse, and
or not

that is a fact in my mind, existing in relation with the congeries of sensations and emotions and
feelings, which make my momentary state. It has again particular traits of its own, which may
be difficult to seize, but which, we are bound to suppose, are present. It is doubtless unique, the
same with no other, nor yet with itself, but alone in the world of its fleeting moment. But, for
logic, [t]he ‘idea’ has … become an universal …. That connection of attributes we recognize
o

as horse, is one part of the content of the unique horse-image, and this fragmentary part of the
d.

psychical event is all that in logic we know of or care for. Using this we treat the rest as husk
:d

and dross …. (1883, I.i.6, 5-6)

Here Bradley talks of an idea as a mental fact existing “in relation with” other items
aft

“making” one’s momentary mental state, and he takes this idea to have “traits of its
own” that “are present,” presumably in that mental state. All this suggests that, in
nf

this case, the immediately experienced mental state is made up of, inter alia, an idea
Dr

with certain properties. But this is obviously not compatible with an anti-atomistic
view of parts of immediate experiences. So we have to conclude that either there is an
sa

inconsistency already between Bradley’s anti-atomism and his account of meaning


ideas, or, in order to ascribe a coherent position to Bradley, we have to take his con-
sidered view of the formation of meaning ideas anti-atomistically, as the imposition

17
See T. Baldwin (1990, 14).
Moore’s Critique of Bradley’s Theory of Judgment 215

of divisions not originally present on a fundamentally unified immediate experience,


divisions between a meaning idea, its traits, and the rest of the experience.
Here’s an analogy to further illustrate Bradley’s anti-atomistic view of the ab-

.e ion
straction of meaning ideas. Consider a pair of more or less commonsensical views.
A pizza is not made up of slices; rather, a slice results from cutting the pie, i.e., some-
thing is a slice of a pizza only in virtue of being the result of cutting that pizza. In
contrast, a jigsaw puzzle is made up of puzzle pieces; one can remove one or more

an iss
pieces from a puzzle, but those pieces are not pieces of the puzzle in virtue of being

du
removed from the whole. On (a consistent version of) Bradley’s view, meaning ideas
abstracted from immediately experienced mental states are analogous to pizza slices,

m
not to jigsaw puzzle pieces.
We are now in a position to reconstruct Moore’s argument. Bradley’s view of

per
meaning ideas, as Moore understands them, consist of two theses. First, the thesis of
abstraction of universal meanings:
(AB) Every universal meaning idea U is the product of an abstraction action A
performed on the (total) content of some immediate experience E.

ut
ey
Second, the thesis of the anti-atomism of abstraction:
h@ itho
(AA) No universal (meaning idea) U or its parts is a part of the content of an
experience E independent of U’s resulting from performing some abstraction
sl
A on E; E is not composed of U and other parts.
sh ite w

What has to be accounted for is the possibility that:


we
(∗) A universal U (or a part of U) is part of an immediate experience E and also
of a distinct immediate experience E′.
I want to approach how Moore conceives of the problem of accounting for (∗) on the
basis of (AB) and (AA) by considering the parallel case of pizza slices. Here we want
c

to account for
ie
or not

(∗P ) Some slice σ is part of a pizza π and also of a distinct pizza π′ .


on the basis of a common-sense view of pizza slices:
(ABP ) Every slice σ is the product of a cutting κ of some pizza π.
o
d.

(AAP ) Nothing is a slice σ of a pizza π independent of σ’s resulting from some


:d

cutting κ of π.

The problem, intuitively, is simple. A slice of pizza results from cutting a pizza;
aft

one and the same physical object can’t be cut from two pizzas. Hence no single
physical object can be one and the same slice of two pizzas. A somewhat more
nf

detailed version of the argument goes like this. Any cutting κ of a pizza is a particular
Dr

dateable action performed with particular physical objects and resulting in particular
physical objects. Hence, κ is distinct from any action A performed at some other time,
sa

with other physical objects. Moreover, whatever results from κ is spatio-temporally


distinct from the results of any such A. Now, in order for (∗P ) to be true, there must be
some slice σ that is part of a pizza π and also part of a distinct pizza π′ . By (ABP ) and
(AAP ), slice σ is part of a pizza π in virtue σ’s resulting from performing some cutting
κ on π, and σ is part of π′ in virtue σ’s resulting from a cutting κ′ of π′ . Since π and
216 The Rejection of Modality

π′ are physically distinct pizzas, κ is a spatio-temporally distinct action from κ′ . So


anything that results from κ is spatio-temporally distinct from anything that results
from κ′ . Hence if σ results from κ, then σ does not result from κ′ , contradicting (∗P ).

.e ion
The obvious response here is to say that, although the results of the two spatio-
temporally distinct actions, called them σ and σ′ , are spatio-temporally distinct phys-
ical objects, still σ and σ′ count as a single slice of π and π′ because they share certain
properties, maybe something like geometric properties such as being hexagonal and

an iss
having a part closest to the center that is less than two inches from the center.

du
Let’s now transpose the line of reasoning we have just considered to the case of
anti-atomistic abstraction of meaning ideas. We first use the parallels between (∗P )

m
and (∗), (ABP ) and (AB), and (AAP ) and (AA), and the form of reasoning exemplified by
the pizza argument against the possibility that a single universal results from distinct

per
abstractions performed on distinct contents.
Let’s assume that
• E1 and E2 are temporally distinct immediate experiences, so they have distinct
characters C 1 and C 2 .

ut
• A1 and A2 are temporally distinct acts of abstracting from, respectively, C 1 and

ey
C2 .
h@ itho
• A1 and A2 result in, respectively, universals U 1 and U 2 that are, respectively,
sl
parts of C 1 and C 2 .
and ask
sh ite w
we
• Is it possible for U 1 to be the same universal as U 2 ?
The critical step in the pizza argument consists of inferring, from (ABP ) and (AAP ),
that slices of pizza are fundamentally individuated in terms of the pizzas from which
they are cut. Given this fundamental principle of individuation, one and the same
slice cannot be cut out of distinct pizzas. So, if the products of two cuttings are to
c

count as one slice, that would have to be based on some non-fundamental principle
ie

of individuation, specifically, the sharing of properties.


or not

Given the parallel principles (AB) and (AA), there is no notion of a part of a
content independent of an action performed on that content. So, content parts are
fundamentally individuated in terms of the contents from which the parts are ab-
stracted. Hence the fundamental principle of individuation of content parts at the
o

very least doesn’t afford a basis for taking a single content part to be the result of
d.
:d

distinct abstractions performed on distinct contents. In more detail:


(1) By (AB) and (AA), a universal U is a part of a content C only in virtue of U’s
resulting from performing some A on that very C, not on a different content.
aft

(2) By our assumptions, U 2 results from performing A2 on C 2 .


nf

(3) Hence, if U 1 is the same universal as U 2 , then U 1 is a part of C 2 , and is such


Dr

a part in virtue of resulting from performing A2 on C 2 .


(4) By our assumptions, U 1 results from performing A1 on C 1
sa

(5) By step 1, U 1 is not a part of C 1 if U 1 results from performing A1 on a content


different from C1 .
(6) But by our assumptions, A1 and A2 are distinct, as are C 1 and C 2 .
(7) Hence if U 1 is a part of C 1 , then it does not result from A2 performed on C2 .
Moore’s Critique of Bradley’s Theory of Judgment 217

(8) From steps 3 and 7 it follows that U 1 is not the same universal as U 2 .
This result corresponds to the second horn of the dilemma in Moore’s second argu-

.e ion
ment: “if the part used in explanation [of how two ideas can have a common ab-
stracted part] is an existent part, then it is difficult to see how that which belongs to
one idea can also come to belong to other ideas and yet remain one and the same.”
Now one can reply to this conclusion, just as in the case of the pizza argument,

an iss
that the products of the two abstractions count as a single universal on the basis of
some non-fundamental principle of individuation. For example, one could, just as

du
in the pizza argument, appeal to the sharing of properties. But then the question is:

m
what is it for distinct parts of contents to share certain properties? Consider the fol-
lowing answer: it consists in these content parts having a part or parts in common.

per
This answer, in essence, explains how two immediate experiences can share an ab-
stracted part by the claim that distinct parts abstracted from distinct experiences can
have parts in common. But anti-atomism implies that the parts of the universals ab-
stracted from immediate experience also result from the mind’s imposing distinctions
on the fundamentally unified immediate experience. So this “explanation” simply

ut
assumes what is to be explained, how two abstracted parts of distinct experiences,

ey
which are individuated by the experiences on which the abstractions are performed,
h@ itho
can share a single abstracted part. This conclusion corresponds to the first horn of
Moore’s dilemma. Now, this conclusion does not show that there is no account of
sl
how two abstracted parts of contents can have certain properties in common. So what
is achieved by this reconstruction of Moore’s argument is a challenge to Bradley to
sh ite w

come up with a coherent anti-atomistic abstractionist account of judgment.


we
It should be noted that nothing in this reconstruction turns on taking the mecha-
nism of abstraction to be the forming of a judgment. So it survives Bradley’s repudi-
ation of such a mechanism in his letter to Moore. It also survives some suggestions
Bradley makes about the mechanism. For example, in the letter to Moore Bradley
suggests that abstraction could be some mental act not involving the formation of an
c

idea previous to a judgment. For another example, in an Additional Note added in the
ie

second edition of Principles of Logic Bradley disavows his original characterization


or not

of a meaning idea as a part of content “cut off by the mind,”: “The words in the text,
‘cut off, etc.’ are also incorrect. There are no ideas before or apart from their use,
and that at first is unconscious” (1922, 38), thereby suggesting that universal mean-
ings are formed by some unconscious mental act taking place concurrently with or
through judgment. But, so long as universals are, not independently existing enti-
o
d.

ties out of which immediate experience is composed, but products of some activity
:d

on immediate experience, and thus not individuated independently of such activity,


we get Moore’s challenge: in virtue of what do parts of distinct contents of distinct
immediate experiences count as one?18
aft

18
Baldwin defends Bradley in this way:
nf

the phrase ‘part of the content of an idea’ just means, for Bradley, some of its properties, and his
Dr

theory is explicitly designed to allow that distinct ideas may have the same meaning by treating
the meaning of a sign as one among its properties. This is precisely the point of Bradley’s
criticism of the empiricist accounts of universals (cf. in particular The Principles of Logic p.
sa

309). The only way I can make sense of Moore’s argument is by supposing him to take Bradley
to be advancing a conceptualist theory of universals, such that for any two things (including
ideas) to have a property in common is for them to be judged to be similar in some respect.
(1990, 14-5).

This assessment misses the point of Moore’s argument. Moore’s challenge to Bradley, in effect, is this: can
218 The Rejection of Modality

6.4 Moore’s Metaphysics of Judgment and Propositions


We turn now to the theory of judgment that Moore develops following his rejection

.e ion
of Bradley’s account of judgment. In “Nature of Judgment” the theory is stated as
follows:
When … I say ‘This rose is red,’ I am not attributing part of the content of my idea to the

an iss
rose, nor yet attributing parts of the content of my ideas of rose and red together to some third
subject. What I am asserting is a specific connexion of certain concepts forming the total

du
concept ‘rose’ with the concepts ‘this’ and ‘now’ and ‘red’; and the judgment is true if such

m
a connexion is existent. Similarly when I say ‘The chimera has three heads,’ the chimera is
not an idea in my mind, nor any part of such idea. What I mean to assert is nothing about my
mental states, but a specific connexion of concepts. If the judgment is false, that is not because

per
my ideas do not correspond to reality, but because such a conjunction of concepts is not to be
found among existents. (1898, 179)

In order to understand this theory, and how it constitutes a response to the problems
Moore sees in Bradley’s theory, we begin with some general features of Moore’s

ut
conception of judgment. First, Moore takes judgment and belief to be more or less

ey
the same notions; in “Nature of Judgment” Moore speaks of judgment, in a slightly
h@ itho
later paper, “Truth and Falsity,”19 he writes of belief. Second, in judging or believing
there is always something that one judges or believes; Moore calls it the “object of a
sl
belief” or a judgment (1901, 717). This is a view shared by Bradley, who holds that in
judging one refers a meaning idea to reality; thus for Bradley the meaning idea is the
object of judgment. Moore and Russell call the object of a judgment a proposition.20
sh ite w
we
Neither Bradley nor Moore, as far as I can see, provide any explicit reasons for taking
judgments to have objects. Perhaps one reason is the more or less intuitive idea that
if, e.g., Socrates and Zeno both judge that Parmenides smiles, then they judge the
same thing. The claim that they judge the same thing seems to amount to there being
an entity which they both judge, and that entity is the object of their beliefs. Russell
c

does explicitly argue for the view, on a somewhat different basis: “If I believe that
ie

A is the father of B, I believe something; the subsistence of the something, if not


or not

directly obvious, seems to follow from the fact that, if it did not subsist, I should
be believing nothing, and therefore not believing” (1904, 510). Third, judgments or
beliefs are involved in reasoning, and “[i]dentity of content is presupposed in any
reasoning” (G. E. Moore, 1898, 179). The significance of this point is that the object
of judgment has to have parts. If, on the basis of judging this lobster to be red and
o
d.

judging that rose to be red, I conclude correctly that this lobster and that rose have the
:d

same color, then the first two propositions judged must share something, expressed
by, say, ‘is red’. But neither proposition is exhausted by whatever is expressed by ‘is
red’, else they wouldn’t be distinct propositions. So each has what’s expressed by ‘is
aft

red’ and something else as different parts.


one simultaneously hold an anti-atomist view of judgment and a “non-conceptualist” view of universals?
nf

The anti-atomism requires that judgment be, not the putting together of independently existing ideas,
Dr

but the imposition of distinctions on an originally unitary experience. It’s hard to see what this talk of
“imposition” can amount to except that the distinctions are not there, in the original unitary experience,
but manufactured by the mind’s activity. But then it’s hard to see how to avoid conceptualism about
sa

universals present in experience.


19
This is one of Moore’s entries in Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (1901).
20
For more details about the Moore-Russell theory of propositions see Griffin (1980), Hylton (1990a),
and Cartwright (2003); the following exposition is indebted in many ways to these authors, but I emphasize
the role of Moore’s criticism of Bradley more than they do.
Moore’s Metaphysics of Judgment and Propositions 219

In terms of these general features, we can characterize what Moore sees as prob-
lematic in Bradley’s views, in particular why they remain psychologistic.
Bradley, as we saw, rejects the view that judgment is about our mental states.

.e ion
This is the core of his opposition to psychologism and a view that Moore accepts. As
we just pointed out, Bradley takes judgments to have objects. From Moore’s perspec-
tive, Bradley’s intention is to conceive of these objects non-psychologistically, for he
takes them to be universal meaning ideas, rather than particular mental states. Unfor-

an iss
tunately, the fulfillment of this intention is blocked by Bradley’s theory of universals.

du
The failure of this intention results from the interaction of three commitments. First,
Bradley takes meaning ideas to be produced by the mental activity of abstraction

m
from the character of particular mental states. Second, Bradley accepts that meaning
ideas have parts which can recur in other meaning ideas, as evidenced by his exam-

per
ple of the redness of a rose and a lobster. But, finally, on the basis of his rejection of
psychological atomism, Bradley is committed to taking meaning ideas and their parts
to have no existence independent of being products of an abstraction that divides up
immediately experienced states of mind. Our reconstruction of Moore’s argument in

ut
the last section presents a problem for these commitments to form a coherent view
of meaning ideas as capable of having parts in common, i.e., as objects of judgment

ey
or belief.
h@ itho
This problem suggests that a coherent theory of the objects of judgment should
reject one or more of these commitments. Moore’s theory rests on rejecting the first of
sl
Bradley’s commitments: the objects of judgment are formed by some activity of the
mind from particular mental states. This Moore sees as a residual psychologism that
sh ite w

Bradley did not succeed in realizing or overcoming. If we reject this commitment,


we
we don’t have to have an account of how the mind forms the objects of judgment
from mental materials, so the problems for such an account raised by Bradley’s anti-
atomism are simply irrelevant.
The objects of judgment, propositions, are mind-independent entities, neither
formed from aspects of the mind nor formed by mental activity. Because of the in-
c

volvement of judgment in reasoning, propositions have parts. If we take propositions


ie

to be made up of their parts, which are individuated independently of their making


or not

up propositions, then there is, prima facie, no difficulty about how one and the same
part can occur in distinct propositions.
Moore keeps the term ‘concept’ that he proposed to use for what Bradley takes to
be the objects of judgment to stand for the parts of propositions. Later, in Principles,
o

Russell calls them “terms.”


d.

The view so far is compatible with various characterizations of propositions and


:d

their parts. One could take propositions to be Fregean, mind-independent, thoughts


whose parts are mind-independent senses. One could take them to be Wittgensteinian,
mind-independent pictures, composed of arrangements of mind-independent picto-
aft

rial elements. Moore chooses neither of these options. Instead, he takes concepts
to be parts of the world, and propositions to be complexes composed of concepts
nf

standing in specific connections or relations to one another.


Dr

This choice makes Moore’s propositions non-representational. The object of


Socrates’ belief that Parmenides smiles is not something that represents a purported
sa

state of affairs in the world involving the person Parmenides and the action of smiling.
Rather, that object is the person Parmenides, a part of the world, connected with the
action of smiling, also a part of the world. Now if the object of Socrates’ belief is
about Parmenides and smiling, then a Moorean proposition doesn’t represent what
220 The Rejection of Modality

it’s about; it contains what it’s about.


Given such a conception of propositions as containing worldly entities, it is un-
clear what it would mean for a proposition to correspond to or agree with facts or

.e ion
with reality, and so Moore holds that the truth of a proposition does not depend “on
its relation to reality” (1899, 179). If truth is not correspondence to reality, what is
it? In the passage quoted at the beginning of this section, Moore says that the judg-
ment that this rose is red is true if a certain specific connexion among concepts “is

an iss
existent,” and the judgment that the chimera has three heads “is false because such a

du
conjunction of concepts is not to be found among existents.” This makes it sound as
if a proposition is true if its component concepts are actually connected, and false if

m
its component concepts are not actually connected. But this can’t be Moore’s view.
For, if a proposition just is a specific connection of concepts, then if a set of concepts

per
are not connected, then surely they don’t compose a proposition at all, much less a
false one. Perhaps, though, Moore means that a proposition is true if its constituent
concepts all have the property of existence, and false if some of its constituent con-
cepts don’t have that property? Intuitively, this can’t be right either. Intuitively, the

ut
Earth, the Sun, and the relation of revolving around all exist, but the proposition that
the Sun revolves around the Earth is false. So it would be difficult for Moore to take

ey
the quoted passage to express a view of truth and falsity that he can accept.
h@ itho
Moore’s considered position is that truth and falsity consist, not in the presence
or absence of connection among the constituent concepts of a proposition, nor in the
sl
nature of those constituent concepts, but rather in the nature or kind of the connection:
sh ite w

A proposition is constituted by any number of concepts, together with a specific relation be-
we
tween them; and according to the nature of this relation the proposition may be either true or
false. What kind of relation makes a proposition true, what false, cannot be further defined,
but must be immediately recognised. (1899, 180)

Truth and falsity, then, are primitive and indefinable ways in which concepts are
connected to form a proposition; they are kinds of propositional constitution.
c
ie

Truth and falsity are fundamental; other notions are analyzed in terms of them.
The notion of existence, for example, is “logically subordinate to truth”:
or not

When I say ‘This paper exists,’ I must require that this proposition be true. [I]f it is true, it
means only that the concepts, which are combined in specific relations in the concept of this
paper, are also combined in a specific manner with the concept of existence. (1899, 180)
o
d.

That is, for something to exist is for it to be a constituent of a true proposition in


:d

which the concept of existence also occurs as a constituent.


For another example, the notion of reality is reduced to truth and existence:

truth denotes exactly that property of the complex formed by two entities and their relation, in
aft

virtue of which, if the entity predicated be existence, we call the complex real—the property,
namely, expressed by saying that the relation in question does truly or really hold between the
nf

entities. (1901, 717)


Dr

To be real, then, is to be a constituent of a true proposition in which the concept of


sa

existence is the only other constituent.


For the purpose of understanding Moore’s and Russell’s views of modality, the
crucial notion explained in terms of truth is that of fact. Moore doesn’t explicitly
analyze it, but Russell does. Russell claims that if there is a coherent notion of fact, or
of the obtaining of a state of affairs, it would “appear[] to be merely a true proposition”
Russell’s Metaphysics of Propositions 221

(1904, 523); “we must admit that things may really have relations; that their real
relations are facts, and that these facts are the objects of our judgments when the
objects of our judgments are true” (1905, 495). This characterization of fact is clearly

.e ion
akin to Frege’s view, examined in Chapter 3 above, that a fact is a true thought.

6.5 Russell’s Metaphysics of Propositions

an iss
Russell hardly ever passes up an opportunity to acknowledge his indebtedness to

du
Moore’s conception of propositions, but in Russell’s hands the notion becomes rather

m
more elaborate than it is in “Judgment.” In this section, before discussing Moore’s
critique of Kant’s doctrine of necessity in “Judgment,” I survey some features of

per
Russell’s elaborations. These are not central to our present concerns, but provide
background for our later investigations of Russell’s views.

6.5.1 Terms, Being, and Existence

ut
I’ve already mentioned that Russell calls the constituents of proposition “terms”

ey
rather than concepts. Terms are “[w]hatever may be an object of thought, or may
h@ itho
occur in any true or false proposition, or can be counted as one”; Russell claims to
“use [term]”
sl
as synonymous with [] the words unit, individual and entity. The first two emphasize the fact
that every term is one, while the third is derived from the fact that every term has being, i.e. is
sh ite w

in some sense. (1903, I.iv.47, 43)


we
The “being” that all terms have is distinct from existence. Being “belongs to ev-
ery conceivable term, to every possible object of thought—in short to everything
that can possibly occur in any proposition, true or false, and to all such propositions
themselves” (1903, §427, 449). Let’s for now set aside the question what Russell
might mean by “conceivable” term, or “possible” object of thought, or “possible”
c
ie

occurrence in a proposition, and note that Russell has an argument for this view of
being:
or not

‘A is not’ must always be either false or meaningless. For if A were nothing, it could not be said
not to be; ‘A is not’ implies that there is a term A whose being is denied, and hence that A is.
Thus unless ‘A is not’ be an empty sound, it must be false—whatever A may be, it certainly is.
Numbers, the Homeric gods, relations, chimeras and four-dimensional spaces all have being,
o
d.

for if they were not entities of a kind, we could make no propositions about them. (1903, §427,
:d

449)
Russell also picks up from Alexius Meinong the expression ‘subsistence’ as an alter-
native for ‘being’ and ‘subsists’ for ‘has being’ (and ‘is’ in the passage just quoted)
aft

(see 1904, 210).


In contrast to denials of being, denials of existence are not self-undermining.
nf

Moore, as we saw, takes existence to be an entity, a particular concept. Russell fol-


Dr

lows suit: to “exist is to have a specific relation to existence” (1903, §427, 449). To
deny, e.g., that Homeric gods or chimeras exist is to deny the propositions in which
sa

these terms stand in this specific relation to the concept of existence. In addition to
this basic notion of existence, Russell also claims that “for my part, inspection would
seem to lead to the conclusion that, except space and time themselves, only those
objects exist which have to particular parts of space and time the special relation of
occupying them” (1904, 209).
222 The Rejection of Modality

6.5.2 Things, Concepts, and Modes of Occurrence


Russell divides terms into two kinds, “things and concepts,” and explains the distinc-

.e ion
tion initially in linguistic terms: things “are the terms indicated by proper names,”
concepts “those indicated by all other words” (1903, §48, 44). Concepts are then
sub-divided into “those indicated by adjectives and those indicated by verbs”; the
“former will often be called predicates or class-concepts; the latter are always or

an iss
almost always relations” (1903, §48, 44).
The thing/concept distinction is then re-characterized in terms of two “ways” in

du
which terms “occur” in propositions:

m
The proposition ‘humanity belongs to Socrates’, … is equivalent to ‘Socrates is human’, …
but it is a distinct proposition. In ‘Socrates is human’, the notion expressed by human occurs

per
in a different way from that in which it occurs when it is called humanity, the difference being
that in the latter case, but not in the former, the proposition is about this notion. This indicates
that humanity is a concept, not a thing. (1903, §48, 45)

The ‘This’ in the last sentence refers to the fact that the term “called” by both of the

ut
words ‘human’ and ‘humanity’ occurs in different modes in these two propositions.

ey
Rather confusingly, Russell decides to call a term that occurs in a proposition as
h@ itho
what that proposition is about a “term of that proposition”; he also calls such term-
occurrences the “subjects” which “that proposition is about” (1903, §48, 45). We
sl
might also call this mode of occurrence “occurrence in subject position.” Russell
doesn’t officially give a name to the other mode of occurrence, the way in which
sh ite w

what is expressed by ‘human’ occurs in the proposition expressed by ‘Socrates is


we
human’. For the moment I’ll just call it the non-subject mode of occurrence. What
makes something a concept, then, is that it occurs in some propositions in subject
mode and in other propositions in non-subject mode. What makes something a thing,
in contrast, is that it occurs only in subject mode or position: “Socrates is a thing,
because Socrates can never occur otherwise than as a term in a proposition: Socrates
c

is not capable of that curious twofold use which is involved in human and humanity”
ie

(1903, §48, 45).


or not

Russell argues that all terms occur in some proposition as subject. The form of
the argument is similar to that for the claim that all terms have being: the attempt to
deny subject-occurrence to some term is self-refuting. Here is how Russell puts it:

if there were any adjectives which could not be made into substantives without change of
o
d.

meaning, all propositions concerning such adjectives (since they would necessarily turn them
:d

into substantives) would be false, and so would the proposition that all such propositions are
false, since this itself turns the adjectives into substantives. But this state of things is self-
contradictory. (1903, §49, 46)
aft

We can reconstruct the argument as follows:


nf

• Suppose that some term t does not occur as subject in any proposition.
Dr

• Let p be a proposition. The supposition implies that t does not as subject in p.


• But what is implied is a proposition, expressed by the sentence ‘t doesn’t occur
sa

as subject in p’.
• But in this proposition t occurs as subject.
• So there exists at least one proposition in which t occurs as subject, contradicting
our supposition.
Russell’s Metaphysics of Propositions 223

The self-undermining claim in both cases is a denial, and Russell’s argument in each
case trades on presuppositions of denying some property of a thing. In the first case,
the presupposition is that there is a thing to fail to have the property; in the present

.e ion
case, the presupposition is that the thing in question is what the denial is about.

6.5.3 The Unity of the Proposition

an iss
So far as I know Russell doesn’t explicitly give any argument for why things do not
occur in non-subject position while concepts do. However, he does explicitly take

du
non-subject occurrences of concepts to account for what he calls “the unity of the

m
proposition”:

per
Consider, for example, the proposition ‘A differs from B.’ The constituents of the proposition, if
we analyze it, appear to be only A, difference, B. Yet these constituents, thus placed side by side,
do not reconstitute the proposition. The difference which occurs in the proposition actually
relates A and B, whereas the difference after analysis is a notion which has no connection with
A and B. …. A proposition, in fact, is essentially a unity, and when analysis has destroyed

ut
the unity, no enumeration of constituents will restore the proposition. The verb, when used

ey
as a verb, embodies the unity of the proposition, and is thus distinguishable from the verb
h@ itho
considered as a term, though I do not know how to give a clear account of the nature of the
distinction. (1903, §54, 49-50)
sl
In this passage, Russell doesn’t spell out why an “enumeration” or “placing side by
side” of the constituents of a proposition is distinct from that proposition. It perhaps
sh ite w

seems obvious that a list or set of items is not a proposition,21 but in fact, as we will
we
see in 7.4 below, Russell’s reason for this distinction is that in general more than one
proposition can be constituted from a single set of terms.
As Russell admits, he doesn’t have an account of how a verb “used as a verb” is
different from a verb occurring as term, or how such a “use” of a verb “embodies the
unity of the proposition.” But he insists that one “verb, and one only, must occur as
c

verb in every proposition” (1903, §55, 52), presumably to unify the constituents into
ie

that proposition. Now Russell also claims that the difference between verb “as actual
or not

verb and as verbal noun” “may be expressed … as the difference between a relation
in itself and a relation actually relating” (1903, §54, 49). So it’s customary to call the
non-subject mode of occurrence of relations “occurrence as relating,” and relations
in such occurrences “relating relations.” One might also term predicates occurring
o

in non-subject mode “predicating predicates.”


d.
:d

6.5.4 Denoting Concepts


One important addition that Russell makes to Moore’s doctrine of propositions is the
aft

notion of denoting concepts. They are introduced to account for propositions about
infinitely many terms, which of course seem to occur regularly in mathematics. What
nf

are the constituents of, e.g., the proposition expressed by


Dr

(9) All primes greater than two are odd?


sa

Since this proposition seems to be about all of the infinitely many prime numbers, it
seems that all of these numbers are its constituents. Russell, in a surprising appeal to
21
Sometimes nothing more than this obviousness is offered as the reason why there is a problem of the
unity of the proposition.
224 The Rejection of Modality

common sense, holds that since we are finite beings, it is not obvious that we would
be able to stand in any mental or perceptual relation to such an infinitely complex
proposition.

.e ion
So he introduces a non-linguistic notion called “denoting.” Denoting is a rela-
tion in which certain concepts—not words—stand to terms, and denoting concepts
constitute a major exception to the basic Moorean theory of propositions as contain-
ing the entities they are about, because a “concept denotes when, if it occurs in a

an iss
proposition, the proposition is not about the concept, but about a term connected in

du
a certain peculiar way with the concept” (1903, §56, 53).
Our grasp of propositions about infinity is then accounted for in terms of denot-

m
ing concepts:

per
With regard to infinite classes, say the class of numbers, it is to be observed that the concept
all numbers, though not itself infinitely complex, yet denotes an infinitely complex object.
This is the inmost secret of our power to deal with infinity. An infinitely complex concept,
though there may be such, certainly cannot be manipulated by the human intelligence; but
infinite collections, owing to the notion of denoting, can be manipulated without introducing

ut
any concepts of infinite complexity. (1903, §72, 73)

ey
h@ itho
That is, there is a term, a denoting concept, corresponding to the phrase ‘all primes
greater than two’ which occur in the proposition expressed by (9). This concept de-
sl
notes all the infinitude of primes but is a single concept, so the proposition expressed
by (9) has finite complexity. Perhaps it has only two constituents:
sh ite w

(10) « all primes greater than two, is odd »22


we
Yet it is about infinitely many entities, namely the odd primes.
Russell uses the idea of denoting concepts in a number of ways that are not rel-
evant to our concerns: accounting for propositions expressed using definite descrip-
tions, by statements that seem to assert non-existence, and by statements of identity.
c

However, we will see in the next chapter how it figures in one of Russell’s attempts
ie

to give an account of general propositions.


or not

6.6 Moore’s Critique of Kant’s View of Necessity


The critique of Bradley and the exposition of the theory of propositions occupy
o

roughly the first half of “Nature of Judgment.” In the remainder of that paper, Moore’s
d.
:d

concern is with the consequences of the theory of propositions for Kant’s distinction
between a priori and empirical judgments. It is here that Moore argues for the thesis
that all truths are necessary.
Moore begins from Kant’s
aft

two marks by which an a priori judgment may be distinguished. ‘A proposition,’ he says,


nf

‘which is thought along with its necessity is an a priori judgment.’ And it is absolutely a
Dr

priori only if it be not deduced from any proposition, that is not itself a necessary proposition.
The second mark of the a priori is strict universality. (1899, 184)
sa

22
I use double angle-brackets to mention Moore-Russell propositions. It’s not clear whether for Moore
and Russell in this period terms occur in a proposition in any specific order. So, one should not assume
that the occurrences of commas inside these brackets serve to indicate order in addition to separating
propositional constituents.
Moore’s Critique of Kant’s View of Necessity 225

Moore attempts to show that neither criterion succeeds in distinguishing between a


priori and empirical judgments. One set of arguments aim at showing that

.e ion
(1) All bodies are heavy.
which Moore takes to be empirical rather than a priori, is both universal and neces-
sary. The argument that (1) is strictly universal I will set aside since it’s not relevant

an iss
to our purposes. The argument for the necessity of (1) is rather implausible. Moore
claims that (1) “must be resolved into” singular ascriptions of heaviness to “[t]his

du
body, and that body, and that body, ad infinitum,” but each of these “presupposes …

m
that ‘Body is a thing,’ and that ‘Heaviness is an attribute,’ ” and these two “would
seem to be necessary propositions” (1899, 185). The problem is that even if we accept
this conclusion, it seems to tell in favor of the necessity of (1) only if one accepts the

per
principle that whenever a proposition presupposes necessary propositions, it is itself
necessary. Unfortunately, Moore gives us no explanation of the notion of presuppo-
sition at play. Hence it’s clear neither what this principle is nor what reasons we have
for accepting it.

ut
The next set of arguments is far more interesting. On the basis of the con-

ey
clusion that (1) is necessary, Moore holds that any empirical propositions that are
h@ itho
not necessary must “not involve the notions of substance and attribute” (1899, 186).
Moore claims that propositions satisfying this condition are “purely existential propo-
sitions”: sl
These alone can be truly taught us by experience, if experience ‘cannot teach us that a thing
sh ite w

could not be otherwise’ (p. 34).23 And even these are free from necessity, only if they are
we
understood to assert something with regard to an actual part of actual time. They must involve
necessity as soon as the distinction between ‘This is’ and ‘This was’ is disregarded. It would
seem, in fact, to be a mark of the sort of existence which they predicate that it is in time. (1899,
186)
c

The claim is that a proposition shown to be true by experience could “be otherwise”
ie

than true because that proposition is about some actual part of actual time. But why?
or not

The answer comes a little later:

The necessity of a proposition … lies merely in the fact that it must be either true or untrue,
and cannot be true now and untrue the next moment; whereas with an existential proposition
it may be true that this exists now, and yet it will presently be untrue that it exists. (1899, 188)
o
d.

These passages reveal Moore’s conception of necessity and contingency. A true


:d

proposition is contingent, involves no necessity, if although it is true now, it could


be false at some other time, and similarly, a false proposition is not necessary if al-
though it is false now it could be true at some other time. That is to say, the notion of
aft

“could be otherwise” applied to propositions is “could be otherwise than true (false)”;


let’s say that a true proposition is necessary if there is no alternative to its being true,
nf

contingent if there are such alternatives. Call this the no-alternatives conception of
Dr

necessity. Moore’s model for alternatives to the truth of a proposition is clearly tem-
poral: the alternatives consist of that proposition’s being false at other times. This is
sa

evidently the notion of the temporal relativity of truth that we discussed in connec-
tion with Frege’s amodalism in chapter 1. Moore in effect assumes that the contingent
23
Kant’s actual words at B3 are: “Erfahrung lehrt uns zwar, dass etwas so oder so beschaffen sei, aber
nicht, dass es nicht anders sein könne”; that is, experience does not, not cannot, teach us that something
could not be constituted differently from how it is constituted.
226 The Rejection of Modality

truth or falsity of a proposition, the existence of alternatives to its being true or false,
requires temporal relativization. Pure existential propositions are contingently true
because what “experience teaches us” is always changing, e.g., we see red at some

.e ion
times (for example, during department meetings) but not at others. In Moore’s terms,
the proposition ‘red exists’ is true at some times but not true at others, i.e. the truth
of this proposition is temporally relative.
From this conclusion Moore proposes an improvement on Kant’s definition of

an iss
empirical propositions: they are propositions containing empirical concepts, defined

du
as concepts “which can exist in parts of time” (1899, 187). But Moore finds this
proposal ultimately unsatisfactory as well, and the grounds for his dissatisfaction

m
reveals his grounds for the necessity of all truths:

per
even existential propositions … are absolutely necessary.
The distinction of time was said to be ultimate for an existential proposition. …. If now
we take the existential proposition ‘Red exists,’ [i]t is maintained that, when I say this, my
meaning is that the concept ‘red’ and the concept ‘existence’ stand in a specific relation both
to one another and to the concept of time. I mean that ‘Red exists now,’ and thereby imply a

ut
distinction from its past and future existence. And this connexion of red and existence with

ey
the moment of time I mean by ‘now,’ would seem to be as necessary as any other connexion
h@ itho
whatever. If it is true, it is necessarily true, and if false, necessarily false. (1899, 189-90)

In this passage, Moore makes two moves. First, he claims that for an existential
sl
proposition such as “Red exists,” what he earlier described as its being true now is,
in fact, a “connexion of red and existence with the moment of time I mean by ‘now’.”
sh ite w

Second, he claims that this connection is necessary, hence this existential proposition
we
is also necessary.
The question that underlies Moore’s first move is: what is temporal relativity of
truth? What, in terms of Moore’s example, is it for
(2) «Red, exists»
c

to be true now, at noon, but false later, at 1 pm? One account Moore would surely
ie

reject is that (2) is true at noon in virtue of a state of affairs consisting of the concepts
or not

red and existence joined together at noon, and false at 1 pm in virtue of the failure of
this state of affairs to obtain at that time. The reason is that this account is based on
defining the truth of a proposition as the obtaining of a state of affairs. Suppose, then,
that we take truth and falsity to be indefinable. What would the temporal relativity
o

of truth consist in? One proposal is that (2) is true at noon in virtue of the proposition
d.

consisting of the concepts red and existence having the indefinable property of truth at
:d

noon, and false at 1 pm in virtue of this very same proposition having the indefinable
property of falsity at 1 pm.
Moore has two arguments against this account. First, recall that in “Nature of
aft

Judgment,” although truth and falsity are indefinable, Moore does claim that a propo-
sition is true or false according to the nature of the relation among its constituents;
nf

what is not definable is the kind of relation that makes a proposition true and the kind
Dr

that makes one false. One can take this to mean that truth and falsity are distinct
“specific” relations among propositional constituents, call them the truth and falsity
sa

relations. But then (2) is true at noon in virtue of the concepts red and existence stand-
ing in the truth relation at noon, and standing in the falsity relation at 1 pm. That is
to say, there is no single complex entity that can be identified as the proposition (2)
having distinct properties at distinct times. There are, rather, distinct complexes at
distinct times:
Moore’s Critique of Kant’s View of Necessity 227

«red, truth, existence» at noon


«red, falsity, existence» at 1 pm

.e ion
This conclusion affords an interpretation of Moore’s claim that (2) “means” that “the
concept ‘red’ and the concept ‘existence’ stand in a specific relation both to one
another and to the moment of time meant by ‘now’.” Since according to Moore a

an iss
“proposition is constituted by any number of concepts, together with a specific re-
lation between them,” these complexes are propositions. But then there is, in fact,

du
no such thing as the temporal relativity of truth; there are no propositions true at

m
one time and false at another. Now the step to the necessity of all true pure existen-
tial propositions is straightforward, given that the contingency of true propositions
requires temporal relativity of their truth.

per
Suppose, though, that we don’t take the specific truth- and falsity-constituting
relations among propositional constituents to be themselves parts of propositions.
Suppose, instead, that truth and falsity are indefinable properties of propositions such
that a single proposition can possess one of them at one time and the other at other

ut
times. According to the proposed account of temporal relativity, the proposition (2)

ey
has the indefinable property of truth at noon. But surely this means that according
h@ itho
to this account it is a fact that proposition (2) is true at noon. However, a fact, an
obtaining or existing state of affairs, is nothing other than the truth of a proposition.
sl
Thus, according to the proposed account, that (2) is true at noon is a true proposition.
What are the constituents of this proposition? One constituent seems to have to be
the proposition (2), consisting of red and existence. One could take the only other
sh ite w
we
constituent to be an indefinable and unanalyzable property, being true at noon. But
since we can presumably see red at times other than noon, (2) would be true at those
other times as well. So it seems the remaining constituents are the concept truth and
the concept noon. That is,
(3) « « red, existence », truth, noon »
c
ie

that has the property of truth. Similarly, according to this account the proposition
or not

(4) « « red, existence », falsity, 1 pm »


has the property of truth. But the truth of these propositions is not temporally rela-
tivized. Thus, at bottom, there is no temporal relativization of truth. It seems to us
o

that one and the same proposition, (2), is true at noon and false at 1 pm; but ultimately
d.

what makes this the case is the (unrelativized) truth of distinct propositions (3) and
:d

(4).
Now this second line of argument does not do away with temporal relativiza-
tion but merely reduces temporally relativized propositions to non-relativized ones.
aft

So one might say that, on this view, there is such a thing as one proposition being
true at one time and false at another. However, this is explained in terms of the
nf

non-relativized truth of two related propositions. So fundamentally there is no rela-


Dr

tivization of truth. As Russell puts it, “what is true, is true; what is false, is false; and
concerning fundamentals, there is nothing more to be said.”
sa

I want to highlight two points about this argument. First, it does not trade on any
features peculiar to purely existential propositions but applies against the temporal
relativization of any propositions. Second, it’s not essential to the argument that the
purported relativization it treats be temporal. Suppose one holds that the contingency
of a true proposition requires that it be false in non-actual possible states of the world.
228 The Rejection of Modality

On Moore’s view of propositions, it remains that there is no genuine modal relativiza-


tion of truth. The claim that a single proposition is true at one possible world and false
at another turns out either to be distinct propositions true at these worlds or distinct

.e ion
non-modally relative true propositions in which these worlds are constituents. Modal
reality, like temporal reality, is explained in terms of true propositions.
The contingency of truth requires the existence of alternatives to a proposition’s
being true. Nowadays the alternatives are often spelled out in terms of truth-makers

an iss
such as possible states of the world. The rejection of the correspondence theory of

du
truth, and more generally, the non-representational view of propositions, rules out this
account. We are left then with relativization of indefinable properties or relations of

m
truth and falsity. If these indefinables are internal constituents, then there is no single
proposition that has distinct relativized truth-values. If they are external properties,

per
then the states of affairs consisting of a proposition’s supposed possession of these
properties relative to truth-makers are reduced to the non-relativized truth of distinct
propositions. In neither case are there any contingent truths.

ut
6.7 Russell’s Amodalism

ey
h@ itho
Moore’s argument against what he takes to be Kant’s view of necessity is the fun-
damental basis of Russell’s rejection of modality. The position that Russell reaches
sl
is slightly different from Moore’s conclusion that all propositions, even existential
ones, are necessarily true if true, necessarily false if false. This conclusion leaves it
sh ite w

open that there is a coherent contrast between being merely true and being necessarily
we
true, in terms of the presence or absence of alternatives to truth. It just so happens,
however, that for no true proposition is there any alternative to its truth. Russell, re-
call, formulates his anti-modal view as the claim that “there is no sense in saying that
a true proposition might have been false.” That is to say, Russell takes pains to rule
out the very idea of alternatives to the truth of a proposition. Fundamentally, there
c

is no such thing as being true or false relative to time, place, or circumstance, so no


ie

such thing as alternatives to truth or falsity; there are only truth and falsity, full stop.
or not

This, of course, is just to say that at bottom Russell’s rejection of modality is nothing
other than Frege’s amodalism, the rejection of any modes of truth.
So far we have focused on the rejection of necessity as a mode of truth. What
about possibility? What are the consequences of holding that there is no such thing
o

as possible truth or falsity as opposed to plain truth or falsity? One consequence is


d.

that there is no such thing as contingency: no such thing as a true proposition that
:d

might have been false, or a false proposition that might have been true. In part I of
“Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions,” for example, Russell writes,
aft

I cannot help suspecting that the whole feeling of necessity and contingency has been derived
from the fact that a sentence containing a verb in the present tense—or indeed in the past or
nf

the future, unless with mention of a particular time—changes its meaning continually as the
present changes, and thus stands for different propositions at different times, and as a rule
Dr

sometimes for true ones, sometimes for false ones. (1904, 209)
sa

None of these different propositions is true at some times and false at others. Given
that a fact is a true proposition, Russell expresses this conclusion as, “I cannot see
that temporal facts differ from others in any way that could be called contingency”
(1904, 209).
Russell’s Amodalism 229

In the same essay, Russell makes an analogous claim about possible existence:
“we must hold if we reject the traditional distinctions of modality” that “only what
does exist, has existed, or will exist, is capable of existence” (1904, 211). This posi-

.e ion
tion derives from Russell’s and Moore’s conception of existence: “only those objects
exist which have to particular parts of space and time the special relation of occu-
pying them” (1904, 211). It follows that the phrases ‘does exist’, ‘has existed’, and
‘will exist’, when applied to a term, mean that this term exists and that it occupies,

an iss
respectively, the present instant, some instant before the present, and some instant

du
after the present.
Russell’s view, then, is that a statement of the form ‘A does not exist’ is ambigu-

m
ous. One proposition it may express is that A does not have the property of existence
at all because A does not occupy any parts of space and time. Another proposition it

per
may express is that A does not occupy a part of space at the present time, but does
occupy some part or parts of space at some time or times distinct from the present
instant. What this statement does not express is that A doesn’t stand in the occupying
relation to any parts of space and time, but might have done so. In this sense, there

ut
are no merely possible existents, because there is, in the end, no notion of possible
existence distinct from existence. Of course, ultimately, the foregoing claims are

ey
cashed out in terms of propositions. If a proposition composed of a term and exists is
h@ itho
true, then a proposition composed of that term, the relation occupy and some part of
time is also true. But there is no such thing as a false proposition composed of a term
sl
and exists that is possibly true. (Note that, given Russell’s rejection of possibility, his
use of the phrase “capable of existence” means “has the property of existence.”)
sh ite w

The foregoing consists of Russell’s rejection of possible existence as distinct


we
from existence. Now, existence is a property that some terms lack, but, as we saw
in §6.5.1 above, all terms have “being.” I turn now to consider what Russell would
say about the idea of possible being. This is pressing since Russell’s characterization
of being is full of modal language: what distinguishes “being” from existence is that
being “belongs to every conceivable term, to every possible object of thought—in
c

short to everything that can possibly occur in any proposition, true or false, and to
ie

all such propositions themselves” (1903, §427, 449; emphases mine). Does Russell
or not

then admit terms, objects, and propositional constituents with the modal properties
of conceivability and possibility?
There are two ways to read Russell charitably, as being consistent with his gen-
eral anti-modal stance. One is to take him to be claiming no more than that every
o

term, every object of thought, and every constituent of every proposition subsist.
d.

The other way is more interesting. Russell continues the passage in which he as-
:d

cribes being to “all possible terms” with an argument for this position. The argument
is that statements denying being are self-refuting:
aft

‘A is not’ must always be either false or meaningless. For if A were nothing, it could not be
said not to be; ‘A is not’ implies that there is a term A whose being is denied, and hence that A
nf

is. Thus unless ‘A is not’ be an empty sound, it must be false—whatever A may be, it certainly
Dr

is. (1903, §427, 449)

Russell then immediately goes on to underline this conclusion by ascribing being to


sa

terms that don’t have existence:


Numbers, the Homeric gods, relations, chimeras and four-dimensional spaces all have being,
for if they were not entities of a kind, we could make no propositions about them. (1903, §427,
449)
230 The Rejection of Modality

So, we may take it that by ‘all possible terms’ Russell means all terms, including
those that don’t exist. If so, then ‘possible’ doesn’t mean ‘is or might be’, but rather
‘existent or not existent’. It follows that although Russell’s fundamental position

.e ion
is that there are no merely possible terms in the sense of terms that don’t exist but
might have, he occasionally uses ‘possible’ in a different sense, such that a “merely
possible” term is just a non-existent one.
Given these construals of Russell’s language, we can conclude that for Russell

an iss
there is no such a thing as a term that subsists or has being but might not have subsisted

du
or had being. What about terms that don’t subsist but might have? These are ruled
out the nature of being: there are no terms that don’t have being and so, a fortiori, no

m
terms that don’t subsist but might have.
One final note about Russell’s rejection of possibility. We have, it seems, in-

per
tuitions about certain combinatorial possibilities of language. Take a sentence like
‘Socrates was born before Plato’. It seems obvious that if one substituted any En-
glish noun phrase for ‘Socrates’ the result would be a possible grammatical sentence
of English, although many of these possible sentences have not, and perhaps will not,

ut
ever be produced in speech or writing. Similarly, if we take this sentence to express
the Moore-Russell proposition «Socrates, born before, Plato», it seems that the result

ey
of replacing the term Socrates with any other term is a possible proposition.24 If one
h@ itho
accepts that there is fundamentally no difference between truth and possible truth,
what is one to do with such intuitions? The answer is that all of these “possible”
sl
sentences subsist, but only those that are produced in speech or writing exist. This
claim is consistent with the fundamental position that there are no merely possible
sh ite w

sentences, neither merely possibly subsistent nor merely possibly existent ones. Rus-
we
sell makes a similar move with respect to propositions: “[i]t is a characteristic of the
terms of a proposition that any one of them may be replaced by any other entity with-
out our ceasing to have a proposition” (1903, §48, 45). The claim is not that given a
possible substitution of some term t′ for a term t occurring in a proposition P there
would then be a merely possible proposition P′ in which t′ occurs where t occurs in
c

P. Rather, all that Russell is saying is that for any term t occurring in a proposition P
ie

there subsists a proposition P′ in which t′ occurs wherever t occurs in P. The “result”


or not

of such a “substitution” is not a merely possible but non-actual proposition; it just is


a proposition.
o
d.
:d
aft
nf
Dr
sa

24
The same would not hold of born before, given Russell’s doctrine that only concepts are relating
relations in propositions.
7

.e ion
Completing the Rejection of Idealism

an iss
The topic of this chapter is how Russell’s rejection of modality completes his criticism

du
of Bradleyan idealism. In §7.1 I discuss Russell’s argument against the reductionist

m
views about relations which he calls the doctrine of internal relations. I show that
although Russell is right in arguing that this view leads to unacceptable consequences,

per
this by itself is not a fully satisfying criticism of Bradley’s idealism. This is because
Russell’s argument doesn’t show what exactly is wrong with Bradley’s arguments
against the reality of relations.
In §7.2 I analyze Bradley’s arguments to show that they rest on a tacit principle

ut
of sufficient reason: if a set of entities form a whole, but it is possible for them not
to have formed that whole, then there must be an explanation of why they did in fact

ey
form that whole.
h@ itho
In §7.3 I argue that in 1905-7 Russell became quite aware of this unacknowl-
edged ground of Bradley’s arguments. Since Bradley’s principle of sufficient reason
sl
presupposes the coherence of a distinction between the actual and the merely pos-
sible, Russell uses his rejection of this modal distinction to undermines Bradley’s
sh ite w

arguments against the reality of relations. In this way, Russell’s rejection of modal-
we
ity completes his rejection of idealism.

7.1 Russell against Internal Relations


c

The most well-known of Russell’s criticisms of the notion of internal relations is


ie

presented in Chapter XXVI, “Asymmetrical Relations” of Principles (1903, §§212-6,


or not

221-6). As we saw in chapter 6, §6.1 above, Russell attributes to Bradley a “monistic”


view of internal relations. Here is Russell’s account of the view:
Given, say, the proposition aRb, where R is some relation, the … monistic view … regards the
relation as a property of the whole composed of a and b, and as thus equivalent to a proposition
o

which we may denote by (ab)r. (1903, §212, 221)


d.
:d

So all relations, on this view, are explained away in terms of properties of composite
entities made up of relata.
Russell’s argument against monistic reductionism about relations is that it can’t
aft

account for asymmetrical relations such as greater than:


nf

The proposition ‘a is greater than b’, we are told, does not really say anything about either a
or b, but about the two together. …. Now to this statement … there is a special objection in
Dr

the case of asymmetry. (ab) is symmetrical with regard to a and b, and thus the property of the
whole will be exactly the same in the case where a is greater than b as in the case where b is
sa

greater than a. (1903, §215, 225)

Clearly what makes this objection work is the assumption that both a’s being greater
than b and b’s being greater than a can only be explained away as the possession
of one and the same property by the whole (ab). So, it has been suggested that a
232 Completing the Rejection of Idealism

Bradleyan monist might respond to Russell’s argument by denying this assumption.


A monistic reductionist might insist that the reduction base consist of complex prop-
erties somehow involving, say, the meanings or connotations of the expressions (as

.e ion
opposed to entities) ⌜a⌝, ⌜b⌝, and ‘greater than’.1 On this account, the property as-
cribed to (ab) by the statement ⌜a is greater than b⌝ would be something like the
complex property of being a whole consisting of a being greater than b, while the
property ascribed to (ab) by the statement ⌜b is greater than a⌝ is a different complex

an iss
property, that of being a whole consisting of b being greater than a.

du
However, this response actually concedes the point to Russell. This is because
it’s hard to see how the difference between these complex properties can be charac-

m
terized except in terms of a difference in how the meanings of ⌜a⌝ and of ⌜b⌝ stand in
some relation R to the meaning of ‘greater than’. What though is this talk of “stand-

per
ing in relation to”? Given monistic reductionism about relations, is this talk not to be
cashed out in terms of different properties of the (unordered) whole consisting of the
meaning of ⌜a⌝, the meaning of ⌜b⌝, and the meaning of ‘greater than’? What are
these different properties? On the present account it seems that the difference is to be

ut
explained in terms of how the meaning of ⌜the meaning of ‘a’⌝, the meaning of ⌜the
meaning of ‘b’⌝, the meaning of ‘the meaning of “greater than” ’, and the meaning

ey
of ⌜R⌝ are related to one another. An infinite regress looms. So it’s hard to see how
h@ itho
this envisaged response would work unless the differences in the complex properties
of wholes that supposedly eliminate relations rest on irreducible relations.
sl
Thus, prima facie, Russell’s argument presents a persuasive case against the
monistic reduction of asymmetrical relations to properties.
sh ite w

Now, if this argument is all that Russell has to say against Bradleyan idealism,
we
then it would seem that Russell takes Bradley’s idealism to consist in no more than the
monistic doctrine of internal relations. This impression is reinforced by the fact that
Russell sometimes associates Bradley with an “axiom of internal relations” (1907,
37; emphases in original). This makes it seem as if there is really no more to Bradley’s
philosophy than the view that all relations are reducible to properties, because he
c

doesn’t have any argument for that view.


ie

If this is indeed Russell’s conception of Bradley’s philosophy, he does it a se-


or not

rious injustice. For one thing, Bradley does not hold that there are only internal
relations but rejects the reality of all relations, internal or external, as well as the re-
ality of properties.2 For another, Bradley provides a number of arguments, including
the well-known regress argument, against the reality of relations. Even if Bradley
o

had argued only for monistic reductionism about relations, a demonstration that this
d.

reductionism has unacceptable consequence does not, by itself, amount to a fully


:d

satisfactory criticism of Bradley. One has, in addition, to give an account of what’s


wrong with Bradley’s argument. Hence, without an account of how Bradley’s actual
arguments against relations fail, it is not at all clear that Russell’s argument in Chapter
aft

XXVI of Principles constitutes a satisfactory case against Bradley’s idealism.


It may be that at the time Russell wrote Principles he did not see this point.
nf

However, I will show in §7.3 below that Russell eventually came to provide a diag-
Dr

nosis and critique of Bradley’s arguments.3 In order to understand this diagnosis and
sa

1
Something like this reply is suggested by T. L. S. Sprigge (1979, 152), but too few details are given
by Sprigge for me to be sure if the present sketch does justice to his views.
2
See, inter alia, Hylton (1990a) and Candlish (2007) for discussion of this and other misconceptions
about what Bradley actually thought. Candlish shows that some of these misunderstanding persists to the
present day.
3
It seems to me that, in fact, Russell read Bradley more carefully than it might seem, and although he
Bradley on Metaphysics and the Composition of Wholes 233

critique, we begin with an account of Bradley’s arguments.

.e ion
7.2 Bradley on Metaphysics and the Composition of
Wholes

an iss
In this section, I examine Bradley’s arguments against psychological atomism and
for the unreality of relations. But, before getting to that argument, I want to look

du
at how Bradley himself characterizes the metaphysical inquiry which includes these

m
arguments. Bradley came to do so in response to the idea, suggested by Russell, that
Bradley assumes and doesn’t argue for the internality of relations:

per
There is an idea that [writers like myself] start, consciously or unconsciously, with certain
axioms, and from these reason downwards. This idea to my mind is baseless. The method
actually followed may be called in the main the procedure used by Hegel, that of a direct ideal
experiment made on reality. What is assumed is that I have to satisfy my theoretical want,
or, in other words, that I resolve to think. And it is assumed that, if my thought is satisfied

ut
with itself, I have, with this, truth and reality. But as to what will satisfy I have of course no

ey
knowledge in advance. My object is to get before me what will content a certain felt need, but
h@ itho
the way and the means are to be discovered only by trial and rejection. The method clearly is
experimental. (1911, 311)
sl
We have seen, in Bradley’s theory of hypothetical judgments, that “ideal experi-
ments” are thought experiments, consisting of drawing inferences from suppositions.
sh ite w

So Bradley’s metaphysical method consists in such inferences. Obviously, this is not


we
enough of a characterization of the method. For one thing, we don’t know what are
the suppositions from which inferences are drawn. For another, we don’t know how
this inferential procedure is related to “thought’s satisfaction with itself.”4
We can surmise answers to these questions by considering what Bradley says
immediately after the passage just quoted:
c
ie

Speaking from this point forwards simply for myself, I find an object which is plural. I do not
or not

of course mean that it is only plural, but I mean that it has maniness. Now how am I to take
this object ideally so as to satisfy my mind? If I try to take the object as merely many, it is
forthwith dissipated and is lost. Therefore the object is not a mere many. (1911, 311)

Bradley’s starting point is thus somehow “finding an object which is plural,” where
o

being “plural” isn’t being “only plural,” but is having “maniness.” He then raises
d.
:d

for himself the question how he is to “take this object ideally.” I take this to be the
question: what is an intellectually satisfactory conception of this “plural object”? The
next two sentences illustrate the roles of thought experiment and intellectual satisfac-
tion in Bradley’s attempt at answering this question. Bradley tries out a conception
aft

of the plural object: he supposes that it is “merely many.” He then infers from this
supposition that the object is “dissipated and lost.” I take the inferential move to be
nf

something like this: from the assumption that an object is “merely many,” it some-
Dr

how follows that it is not an object, or not a plural object. In either case, the inferred
consequence contradicts the attempted conception of the plural object. This is a state
sa

of intellectual dissatisfaction, and so, to satisfy his mind, he reaches what in the next
made mistakes about Bradley’s views, these mistakes are less extreme than it might appear. See note 10
above.
4
This paragraph is indebted to Candlish (2007).
234 Completing the Rejection of Idealism

sentence of the paragraph he calls a “result”: a rejection of the attempted conception


of the plural object as “mere many.” But the intellectual satisfaction attained in this
result is limited since the result is negative. It rules out one conception of the object

.e ion
as incoherent, but the original question of a satisfactory, that is to say, a coherent
conception remains open. And so Bradley goes on to try out another conception of
the plural object: “Let me now, starting from this result, try to take the object as a
mere conjunction of terms and external relations” (1911, 311).

an iss
I won’t pursue further Bradley’s description of his metaphysical progress in

du
“Some Aspects,” because the general form of his procedure should now be clear.
The aim of the procedure is to find a coherent conception of some entity or phe-

m
nomenon that Bradley encounters. The procedure is to try out various conceptions
by supposing them to be coherent and seeing if consequences deduced from them

per
engender contradictions. If so then the trial conception is ruled incoherent, and the
search for a coherent conception continues.
But the details of the instance of the procedure we just looked at raise a number
of questions. Bradley doesn’t tell us what exactly is an object that is plural, but not

ut
only plural. Nor does he tell us what the contrast he draws between “only plural” and
“has maniness” amounts to. We also don’t know what it means to be “merely many,”

ey
and so the central inferential move of the ideal experiment, from a conception of the
h@ itho
plural object as “merely many” to some sort of contradiction, remains a puzzle.
For the moment I will merely make a couple of preliminary conjectures about
sl
what Bradley might have in mind, reserving a fuller discussion for later. I take it that
an object that is plural is an entity, or perhaps a fact, that consists of or is composed
sh ite w

of a number of parts. So Bradley’s initial question is: what is a coherent conception


we
of an entity composed of many parts? I conjecture also that for Bradley “only plural”
and “merely many” are more or less equivalent; these terms refer to the distinct parts
of which the entity is composed. So Bradley’s initial trial conception is that an entity
composed of a number of parts is nothing other than those parts. And so Bradley’s
central inference in this thought experiment amounts to the claim that it is incoher-
c

ent to conceive of an entity composed of parts as just those parts. Of course, this
ie

doesn’t resolve the puzzle, for we still have no account of why such a conception is
or not

incoherent.
Before attempting to resolve the puzzle, I want to show that Bradley’s central
inference, and the claim that underlies it, appear in different guises in two arguments
that are crucial for Bradley’s monism: the argument against psychological atomism,
o

and the much more famous regress argument against relations.


d.
:d

7.2.1 The Argument against Psychological Atomism


Before getting started, I want to say something about the nature of Bradley’s argu-
aft

ments and about the aim of my discussion of them.


Both of Bradley’s arguments proceed at an extremely abstract level. There have
nf

been attempts to clarify them by starting with relatively intuitive examples, and, in
Dr

fact, I will mention one such example in the next section. However, this sort of
approach doesn’t get at what for my purposes is the heart of those arguments. What
sa

I aim to show is that Bradley’s philosophizing, as exhibited in the abstractness of


these arguments, is driven by a puzzle about the very idea of a whole composed of
parts, rather than problems concerning any particular (kinds of) composite entities.
This is because I will demonstrate, in §7.3 below, that Russell’s deepest criticism
Bradley on Metaphysics and the Composition of Wholes 235

of Bradley flows from an attempt to dissolve this puzzle, to show that what gets
Bradleyan idealism going is an illusion. So in my upcoming discussion, I will not
attempt to formulate the most philosophically compelling readings of the arguments,

.e ion
but rather to isolate their unacknowledged presuppositions.
Recall that psychological atomism is the view that the mind is “composed” of
“units of feeling” (1883, 96), which are primitive mental entities with no parts, and
from which all other mental contents are composed. Bradley’s argument against this

an iss
view goes as follows:5

du
[I]t is clear that these units by themselves are not all the ‘composition,’ we are forced to

m
recognize the existence of relations. But this does not stagger us. We … say, Oh yes, we have
here some more units, naturally not quite the same as the others, and—voilà tout. But when

per
a sceptical reader, whose mind has been warped by a different education, attempts to form an
idea of what is meant, he is somewhat at a loss. If units have to exist together, they must stand
in relation to one another; and, if these relations are also units, it would seem that the second
class must also stand in relation to the first. If A and B are feelings, and if C their relation
is another feeling, you must either suppose that component parts can exist without standing

ut
in relation with one another, or else that there is a fresh relation between C and AB. Let this
be D, and once more we are launched on the infinite process of finding a relation between D

ey
and C–AB; and so on for ever. If relations are facts that exist between facts, then what comes
h@ itho
between the relations and the other facts? The real truth is that the units on one side, and on
the other side the relation existing between them, are nothing actual. They are fictions of the
sl
mind, mere distinctions within a single reality …. (1883, 96; emphasis mine)

Let’s divide the argument into three parts. In the first part, expressed by just the first
sh ite w
we
sentence of the quotation, Bradley begins with the premise that
• The composition of a mental content out of units of feeling requires more than
these units by themselves
and infers that psychological atomism is forced to accept that
c

• a mental content is composed of relations in addition to units of feeling


ie
or not

Call this the initial conclusion. The inference is relatively unproblematic if we take
it that what Bradley means by “relations” at this points is just the something more,
whatever exactly it is, that according to the premise composes the mental content
together with units of feeling. But why should we accept the premise? Why can’t a
o

content be composed out of no more than units of feeling?


d.

Bradley evidently assumes, without explanation, that the composition of a men-


:d

tal content out of units of feeling requires more than just these units. What Bradley
takes to be “clear,” then, is just that a plural mental object is not merely a number of
parts. So our (or my) puzzle about why Bradley takes this premise to be obvious is a
aft

version of the puzzle concerning Bradley’s general metaphysical procedure: why is


it incoherent to conceive of an entity composed of parts as just those parts?
nf

Now, psychological atomism is supposed to be a classical British empiricist


Dr

doctrine. This suggests that the reason why a whole composed of mental units is more
than those units may have something to do with Hume’s view that all “our particular
sa

perceptions … are different, and distinguishable, and … may exist separately” (1738,
5
There is another way of understanding the following argument, according to which it is intended to
show that the meaning idea referred to reality in a judgment is not composite. See, for instance Allard
(2004, 59-66). Although my account of this argument is indebted to Allard I don’t see that it is directed at
meaning ideas rather than immediate experience.
236 Completing the Rejection of Idealism

Book I, Appendix; emphasis mine). We will see later that something very close to this
suggestion is indeed correct. For now, let me note a question about this suggestion:
why does it follow, from the claim that mental units can exist separately, that they do

.e ion
not in fact exist together to compose, by themselves, a mental content?
From the initial conclusion, Bradley goes on to consider a Humean response,
actually made by T. H. Huxley (1879): these “relations” are just additional mental
units. This response opens the second part of the argument. If the “something more”

an iss
that is added to feelings to compose a content is itself just a unit of feeling, then it

du
and the original units are just another bunch of feelings. By the initial conclusion,
this second bunch can’t compose the content without something more, viz., without

m
another relation. Since this Humean response holds that this other relation is just
another feeling, a regress is launched. Note that the regress only gets going on the

per
basis of the initial conclusion, and so rests on the puzzling premise on which this
conclusion is based.
But Bradley doesn’t explicitly claim an infinite regress at this point; instead, he
presents a more specific line of reasoning to a regress. This is the third part of the

ut
argument. It begins with an assumption:

ey
• A and B are feelings, and they are related by C, which is another feeling.
h@ itho
Then comes a puzzling move, which seems to be in the form of a dilemma:

sl
Either A, B, and C can exist without standing in relation with one another or
they cannot.
sh ite w
we
The second alternative is evidently the generator of the regress since Bradley says
that either the first alternative holds, or else
• There is a fresh relation, D, between C and AB.
The same dilemma applies to D, C, A, and B, requiring additional fresh relations ad
c

infinitum. On the basis of this regress, Bradley concludes that mental contents are
ie

not composed of units bound together by relations.


or not

There are two puzzles about the regress that Bradley actually presents. First, in
order for the regress to continue, at each step, the first horn of the dilemma has to
be rejected. Now, the first horn in any given step is that the “fresh” relation and the
units generated by that step can exist without standing in relation with one another.
o

But this seems to be just the Humean assumption that all mental contents are separate
d.

existences, so it seems that it would be embraced rather than rejected by atomism.


:d

Second, the rejection of a first horn amounts to acceptance, e.g., that C, A, and B
cannot exist without standing in relation with one another. But if so, why is a fresh
relation between C and AB required? We will see how to resolve these puzzles in
aft

§7.3 below.
nf

7.2.2 The Regress Argument against the Relations


Dr

Before examining Bradley’s regress argument, I sketch how Bradley’s general meta-
sa

physical procedure fits with the skeptical arguments of Part I of Appearance and
Reality (1893). The fundamental skeptical arguments presented in chapters II and
III may be taken to be a connected series of attempts to form coherent conceptions
of a plural object, from each of which Bradley infers contradictory consequences.
Here is a very sketchy outline of these attempts. Bradley begins, in chapter II, with
Bradley on Metaphysics and the Composition of Wholes 237

conceiving of the parts of the plural object as a substance and a number of quali-
ties of that substance. He argues that the idea that a substance has, unconditionally,
many different qualities is incoherent. In response to this incoherence, he tries out

.e ion
the hypothesis that a plural object is a set of qualities rather than a thing that has these
qualities. This leads to the question: what is a collection of qualities? Bradley con-
siders the view that a number of qualities form a collection when they stand in some
relation to one another. But then the question is: what it is for properties to be related

an iss
to one another? One account to be tried is that standing in a relation is a property

du
of the entities related, either of one or the other of the relata, or of all the relata to-
gether. But in either of these cases, the account has turned into another version of the

m
thing-quality conception and the contradictions that afflict that conception reappears
in a different form. The alternative is to take relations to be, like the qualities, entities

per
capable of independent existence. From this conception, Bradley derives one version
of the regress and concludes that there is no coherent conception of qualities related
by independently existing relational entities.
In Chapter III the focus shifts slightly, to the question how to conceive coher-

ut
ently of qualities and relations, the notions with which Bradley had been employing to
attempt to understand plural objects. Here he argues that neither notion is coherently

ey
thinkable without the other, but, unfortunately, nor is either coherently conceivable in
h@ itho
terms of the other. Qualities are not conceivable without thinking of them as standing
in some relation to one another. But, when we try to think of qualities as standing in
sl
relations to one another we infer further contradictions. Relations without relata are
not conceivable. But, and herein occurs Bradley’s most well-known regress, he ar-
sh ite w

gues that there is also no coherent conception of relations with relata. I now consider
we
this regress in more detail.
Bradley’s text runs as follows:

[H]ow the relation can stand to the qualities is, of the other side, unintelligible. If it is nothing
to the qualities, then they are not related at all …. But if it is to be something to them, then
c

clearly we now shall require a new connecting relation. For the relation hardly can be the mere
ie

adjective of one or both of its terms; or, at least, as such it seems indefensible. And, being
or not

something itself, if it does not itself bear a relation to the terms, in what intelligible way will
it succeed in being anything to them? But here again we are hurried off into the eddy of a
hopeless process, since we are forced to go on finding new relations without end. The links
are united by a link, and this bond of union is a link which also has two ends; and these require
each a fresh link to connect them with the old. The problem is to find how the relation can
o

stand to its qualities; and this problem is insoluble. If you take the connection as a solid thing,
d.

you have got to show, and you cannot show, how the other solids are joined to it. And, if you
:d

take it as a kind of medium or unsubstantial atmosphere, it is a connection no longer. (1893,


28-9)
aft

Perhaps because he takes himself to have ruled out the conception of plural objects
as substances with qualities, Bradley formulates the problem that leads to the regress
nf

as forming a coherent conception of relations with qualities. But nothing is lost if the
Dr

argument is read as treating relations with any sort of relata, not just with qualities.
Indeed, as Bradley goes on, he switches to talking of terms rather than qualities, and
sa

that’s how I will discuss the argument.


Bradley appears to start with the assumption that there are only two possibilities
for thinking of relations with terms:
• A relation is “nothing to” these terms
238 Completing the Rejection of Idealism

• A relation is “something to” them


Bradley claims that if the first conception is assumed, then it follows that the terms

.e ion
are not related at all. Presumably Bradley takes this consequence to contradict the
idea of a relation with terms because that idea amounts to the terms being related
by that relation. Bradley then goes from the second conception to a sub-argument.
This starts with the claim that if a relation is “something to” terms, then there are two

an iss
possibilities for conceiving of how the relation is “something to” terms:

du
• It is a “mere adjective” of one or both of the terms

m
• It is not a mere adjective of the terms, which means that it is “something itself”
The first possibility Bradley rules out, it seems, by alluding to one of the arguments

per
of Chapter II, which attempts to show that a relation between qualities cannot be
understood as a quality of the qualities it relates. The second possibility, that the
relation is something to terms by being “something itself,” is the assumption that
generates the regress. But all that Bradley says to explain how the regress gets going

ut
is that on this assumption the relation can intelligibly “be something” to the terms

ey
only if it bears a relation to these terms.
h@ itho
An initial, perhaps minor, difficulty in understanding this argument is figuring
out what Bradley means by a relation being “nothing to” or “something to” terms.
sl
What Bradley says after announcing “the eddy of a hopeless process” suggests an
account. He says, “[t]he links are united by a link, and this bond of union is a link
which also has two ends; and these require each a fresh link to connect them with
sh ite w
we
the old.” This elucidation or reformulation of the regress suggests that a relation’s
being “something to” terms means that relation’s linking or relating the terms. So the
first step of the argument is that there are two ways of conceiving of a relation with
terms: either it relates them, or it doesn’t. The latter is then the obvious incoherence
Bradley takes it to be.
c

In order to grasp the next step of the argument, the two possibilities for how a
ie

relation relates terms, one has to see what Bradley means by the contrast between be-
or not

ing a “mere adjective” and being “something itself.” Clearly, a grasp of this contrast
is also required to make any headway to understanding the critical claim or infer-
ence that Bradley makes to generate the regress: if a relation relates terms by being
“something itself,” then it relates by standing in additional relations to those terms.
One clue to the notion of “something itself” is its contrast, “mere adjective.”
o
d.

Chapter II is titled “Substantive and Adjective,” and this, together with the charac-
:d

terization of “adjective” as “mere,” suggests an allusion to a traditional distinction


between substances, which are capable of independent existence, and accidents or
attributes, whose existence depends on substances which have them. Since being
aft

“something itself” contrasts with being a “mere,” dependently existing, adjective,


being “something itself” means being independently existing.
nf

The crucial inference that generates the regress in Appearance and Reality thus
Dr

goes from the supposition that a relation exists or is real independently of the terms it
supposedly relates, to the conclusion that it can relate terms only by standing in addi-
sa

tional relations to those terms. This connects the Appearance and Reality regress to
the anti-atomism regress discussed above. For, recall the conjecture we made about
why a composite mental content cannot simply be a bunch of units of feeling: be-
cause these units, in Hume’s words, may exist separately. We are now in a position
to see how these regress arguments, together with the very first step of Bradley’s
Bradley’s Regresses, the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and Modality 239

metaphysical journey, depends on a single assumption, call it Bradley’s master as-


sumption:

.e ion
• The composition of a whole from parts capable of independent existence—be
these units of feeling or relations and terms—requires more than those parts.
Of course, we still have no account of the meaning or ground of the master assump-
tion. To this issue we now turn.6

an iss
du
7.3 Bradley’s Regresses, the Principle of Sufficient

m
Reason, and Modality

per
In §7.1 above I pointed out problems with Russell’s argument against the monistic
theory of internal relations, considered as a criticism of Bradley’s idealism. In par-
ticular, however cogent Russell’s argument may be, it does not address Bradley’s
arguments against relations, especially the regress argument.

ut
There is no doubt that, after Russell parted company with idealism at the turn

ey
of the twentieth century, he tended in his writings to adopt dismissive tone towards
h@ itho
idealism and to present simplistic formulations of idealist views.7 In light of all this
anti-idealist rhetoric, one may well be tempted to think that Russell didn’t think it
sl
really necessary to deal with Bradley’s arguments.
But in fact, Russell is not as dismissive of Bradley as his prose makes him sound.
Already, at the end of “The Classification of Relations,” Russell admits that the view
sh ite w
we
of relations as irreducible to properties
raises a very difficult question. When two terms have a relation, is the relation related to each?
To answer affirmatively would lead at once to an endless regress; to answer negatively leaves
it inexplicable how the relation can in any way belong to the terms. (1899, 146)
c

This is clearly a reference to Bradley’s regress arguments. Moreover, after Principles


ie

Russell makes a number of attempts to diagnose and criticize the grounds of monistic
or not

relational reductionism. In the rest of this section, I show that one can discern, in
these attempts, an argument that engages with the fundamental bases of Bradley’s
regresses.
We begin with three papers Russell wrote in 1905-7 in which he discusses re-
ductionism about relations.8 In these texts, Russell identifies two related grounds for
o
d.

relational reductionism. One is what Russell calls the “law of sufficient reason”:
:d

6
Bradley has another argument for monism, based on the claim that our judgments are “incapable of
absolute truth,” because, as he puts it in “On Appearance, Error, and Contradiction,”
aft

[O]ur truth fails to reach beyond generality, and hence the opposite of our truth becomes also
tenable. ‘Caesar crossed the Rubicon,’ we say ‘or not’; but this ‘either-or’ is only true if you
are confined to a single world of events. If there are various worlds, it may be also true that
nf

Caesar never saw the Rubicon nor indeed existed at all. And, with this, obviously our truth
Dr

has ceased to be absolute. (1910, 261-2)


sa

For a discussion of the intricacies of this argument see Levine (1998c); see also Allard (2004). I cannot
here do full justice to this line of thought, but for our present purposes, it is enough to point out that it
relies crucially on the modal idea of a plurality of non-actual possible worlds. See note 9 in §7.3, p. 244
below, for an indication of how Russell, post-Idealism, would respond to this argument.
7
For an extended catalogue of examples, see Candlish (2007, chapter 1).
8
In the first and third of these papers, Russell (1905b) and Russell (1907), Russell explicitly associates
240 Completing the Rejection of Idealism

• [E]verything must have a reason for being as it is and not otherwise. (1906,
532; emphases mine),

.e ion
or,
• [N]othing can be just a brute fact but must have some reason for being thus and
not otherwise. (1907, 40; emphases mine)

an iss
The law operates to motivate reduction of relations in the following way:

du
[T]here remains an appearance of arbitrariness in merely affirming that [] two terms have [a]
relation, without accounting for the fact by the nature of the terms. (1905, 501; emphases

m
mine)

per
So the “nature” of the terms is supposed to be the reason, the explanation, of why they
stand in the relation that they stand in. How, though, is an appeal to the nature of the
terms supposed to accomplish the explanation? Russell claims that “ ‘nature’ seems
to be merely the old ‘essence’ ” (1905, 501). The idea, then, is that one explains why
the terms stand in the relation in question, shows that it’s not arbitrary that they do, by

ut
the claim that it is essential to the terms to stand in that relation. At this point, Russell

ey
considers an objection: “Why should not the[] nature [of the terms] be different from
h@ itho
what it is?” (1905, 502). I take this to mean: why is it essential to the terms to
stand in that relation? And this brings Russell to the second ground for relational
sl
reductionism. He takes the reductionist to argue thus:
If A and B are related in a certain way, … you must admit that if they were not so related
sh ite w
we
they would be other than they are, … consequently there must be something in them which is
essential to their being related as they are. (1907, 41)

If we accept this argument, then we are taking the reason or ground for the terms’
standing in a relation to be no more than the natures of the terms. No appeal to any
entity distinction from and independent of the terms and their essences is required,
c

and so there is at least no need to posit relations independent of terms as ultimate


ie

aspects of reality.
or not

In the three papers against Joachim, it is this second ground that Russell attacks.
The main point he makes is that the premise of the second ground,
• If A and B are related, then if they were not so related they would be other than
they are
o
d.

is “a fallacious form of statement,” and doesn’t justify any claim about the essences
:d

of A and B. For what the premise really amounts to is


If A and B are related in a certain way, then anything not so related must be other than A and
B (1907, 41)
aft

But
nf
Dr

this only proves that what is not related as A and B are must be numerically diverse from A or
B; it will not prove difference of adjectives, unless we assume the axiom of internal relations.
(1907, 41)
sa

Bradley with relational reductionism. The second paper, Russell (1906a), doesn’t mention Bradley. How-
ever Russell (1906a) and Russell (1907) both criticize the “monistic view of truth” advanced by Harold
Joachim (1906) by attacking what Russell takes to be its ground, a reductionism about relations that in
(1907, 35, 38) Russell explicitly attributes to Bradley.
Bradley’s Regresses, the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and Modality 241

Russell’s objection depends on a distinction between intrinsic non-relational proper-


ties and extrinsic relational ones. It is undeniable that if A stands in R to B, but C
does not stand in R to B, then A is distinct from C. Moreover, it is equally undeniable

.e ion
that A has a property that C doesn’t, namely the property of standing in R to B. But
this is a relational property, so it’s consistent with this conclusion to hold that A and
C have exactly the same intrinsic properties. To the extent that we can make sense
of the notion of nature or essence, it must consist of properties intrinsic to an entity.

an iss
So although A differs from C, the difference is not intrinsic, and so is not at the level

du
of their natures.
In these papers Russell doesn’t argue against the law or principle of sufficient

m
reason (henceforth ‘PSR’); all he does is claim that certain “facts,” e.g., that “the
same man, in the strictest sense of the word ‘same,’ should be both the son of one

per
man and the brother of another,” does “not seem to me to call for any explanation”
(1906, 532). However, in “Some Explanations in Reply to Mr. Bradley,” a response
to Bradley’s criticisms of Principles, Russell links the PSR to modality and claims
that his disagreements with Bradley turn on his rejection of modality:

ut
The view which I reject holds (if I understand it aright) that the fact that an object x has a

ey
certain relation R to an object y implies complexity in x and y, i.e., it implies something in the
h@ itho
‘natures’ of x and y in virtue of which they are related by the relation R. It seems to be held
that otherwise all relations would be purely fortuitous, and might just as well have been other
sl
than they are, and this, it is thought, would be intolerable.
This opinion seems to rest upon some law of sufficient reason, some desire to show that
every truth is ‘necessary’. I am inclined to think that a large part of my disagreement with Mr.
sh ite w

Bradley turns on a disagreement as to the notion of ‘necessity’. I do not myself admit necessity
we
and possibility as fundamental notions: it appears to me that fundamentally truths are merely
true in fact, and that the search for a ‘sufficient reason’ is mistaken. (1910, 373-4)

At first glance, Russell’s reasoning is this. Clearly, he equates the PSR with a “de-
sire” to demonstrate the necessity of every truth. But since he doesn’t think that any
c

proposition is necessarily true, as opposed to just true, he doesn’t think that one can
ie

show any truth to be necessary.


or not

If this is Russell’s argument it hardly seems compelling. To begin with, it’s not
clear why the rejection of “brute” or “purely fortuitous” facts should be, or should
imply, the view that every truth is necessary. Indeed, as we saw, in a way Russell
accepts that every truth is necessary, in the sense that for no true proposition is there
any time, place or circumstance in which it is false. But, most importantly, it’s unclear
o
d.

that Bradley assumes, or bases his regresses on, any such interpretation of the PSR.
:d

In fact, Bradley explicitly disavows assuming that all objects, events, or facts have an
explanation or ground. In “Some Aspects of Truth” Bradley characterizes the “axiom
of ground,” as he calls the PSR, thus:
aft

The ‘axiom’ holds only so far as a thing is not complete in itself …. The demand for the
making good of such imperfection, not as real but as ideal, the completion of the thing in idea
nf

so as to satisfy us theoretically, is what we mean by the search for a ‘why’ and ‘how’. (1911,
Dr

312)
sa

That is, for Bradley the demand for an explanation is operative only when we find
ourselves without a coherent conception of some phenomenon.
We can, however, discern in Russell’s words a more subtle argument. In order
to do so, we begin by attempting to get clearer on what Russell’s PSR amounts to, by
turning to his interpretation of the principle of sufficient reason in Leibniz. Russell
242 Completing the Rejection of Idealism

ascribes two PSRs to Leibniz, “one general, and applying to all possible worlds, the
other special, and applying only to the actual world” (1900, §14, 30). The general
“metaphysically necessary” principle “asserts all events to be due to design”:

.e ion
[W]hichever of the possible worlds God had created, he would always necessarily have had
some design in doing so, though his design might not have been the best possible. And simi-
larly volition, in free creatures, must have a motive, i.e. must be determined by some prevision

an iss
of the effect. (1900, §15, 36)

du
The special principle, “which applies only to actuals,”

m
is the principle that designs are always determined by the idea of the good or the best. God
might have desired any of the possible worlds, and his desire would have been a sufficient rea-

per
son for its creation. But it is a contingent fact that he desired the best, that the actual sufficient
reason of creation was the desire for the maximum of good, and not for anything that the other
possible worlds would have realised. (1900, §15, 36)

This second principle enables us to understand the connection that Russell sees be-

ut
tween a commitment to modal notions and certain demands for an explanation. The
idea of a possible world is the idea of a series of things or events that do not run afoul

ey
of the principle of non-contradiction. So, as far as non-contradiction is concerned,
h@ itho
there is no difference between possible worlds; all, one might say, are equally possi-
ble. What demands explanation is why one of these equally possible worlds is actual
sl
and not the others. I want to stress that the source of the demand for an explanation is
not merely the actual existence of some object or the actual occurrence of some event,
sh ite w

or the actual obtaining of some fact. The source is, rather, a contrast between what
we
actually exists, occurs, or obtains, and what equally might have existed, occurred, or
obtained.
That Russell has this modal version of the PSR in mind in his account of the
grounds of relational reductionism is borne out by how he characterizes that for which
the principle demands a reason or explanation:
c
ie

• a thing’s being as it is and not otherwise


or not

• a fact’s being thus and not otherwise


What requires explanation is why one among possible states of a thing, or one among
possible states of affairs, is actual.
Our question now is: (how) does this modal PSR figure in Bradley’s regress
o

arguments? To answer this question, recall first from 7.2 Bradley’s master assump-
d.
:d

tion, the single assumption underlying the anti-atomism and anti-relation regresses,
as well as the very first step of Bradley’s metaphysical progress as chronicled in
“Some Aspects of Truth”:
aft

• The composition of a whole from parts capable of independent existence—be


these units of feeling or relations and terms—requires more than those parts.
nf

(See page 239 above.)


Dr

Bradley portrays his movement towards intellectual satisfaction as impelled merely


by failures to find coherent conceptions of what he finds in experience. But consider
sa

again the very first failure he presents:


I find an object which is plural. I do not of course mean that it is only plural, but I mean that
it has maniness. Now how am I to take this object ideally so as to satisfy my mind? If I try to
take the object as merely many, it is forthwith dissipated and is lost. (1911, 311)
Bradley’s Regresses, the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and Modality 243

From Russell’s perspective, in the supposed failure of intelligibility expressed in the


last sentence just quoted the decisive move in the conjuring trick has already been
made. Bradley finds that the conception of a plural object as merely many is incoher-

.e ion
ent. As I noted above, Bradley never spells out wherein the incoherence lies. Is it just
something that we’re supposed to see? A Russellian would say no. What underlies
Bradley’s conclusion is a sense that a particular composition of distinct things into
an object is something quite different from just that bunch of different things. Why

an iss
would one think this? A Russellian suggestion is the following tacit line of think-

du
ing. What does it mean for a bunch of things to be really distinct? There are two
interpretations of this view. First, it may mean that these very things are capable of

m
composing a whole and equally capable of not composing a whole. Second, it may
mean Cartesian real distinction: each is capable of existing independently of one an-

per
other. Then, for each, there is a possible situation in which it exists and none of the
others do. But each of these possible situations is one in which this bunch of things
is not unified into a whole. So, whichever of these notions of being really distinct is
at play, it’s possible that the really distinct things are unified into a whole, and it’s

ut
equally possible that they’re not. Given that we have a plural object, they actually
are unified. But we’ve just said that they could equally well have failed to be unified,

ey
and this raises a “natural” question: why are they in fact unified? There must surely
h@ itho
be some explanation, some reason why unification is the possibility that is actualized
for this bunch of things, given that non-unification is equally possible. Without a
sl
reason, the actualization would be, in Russell’s words, “purely fortuitous.” Here we
see the modal PSR at work. Once we reach this conclusion, we seem forced to go
sh ite w

on to the further conclusion that the reason has to be some factor additional to the
we
natures of this bunch of things. These natures can’t determine that they are unified as
opposed to not unified; if they could, then it wouldn’t be an option for them not to be
unified. This is why for Bradley the plural object can’t just consist in these distinct
things, why there has to be something additional to the bunch of things that accounts
for their actual unification.
c

Once we see how the modal PSR operates here, it’s easy to detect its operation
ie

in the regresses we examined in §7.2 above. The crucial premise of Bradley’s ar-
or not

gument against psychological atomism is: if a mental state is composed of Humean


units of feeling, it does not simply consist of these units. The tacit line of think-
ing underlying this premise is as follows. Suppose that impressions and ideas are
capable of independent existence. Then it is equally possible for a set of mental con-
o

tents to exist apart and for them to exist together. If in fact they exist together, then
d.

there must surely be something additional to them that accounts for why they exist
:d

together, something that binds them together into a single mental state. The reason-
ing underlying the regress of relations in Appearance and Reality is exactly parallel.
Suppose that a relation is real, capable of existing independently of relating the terms
aft

it actually relates. Then the fact that the relation actually relates, when it is equally
possible for it not to relate, need explanation, and the explanation must be something
nf

additional to that relation and its terms.


Dr

Indeed, we can now also resolve the puzzles we encountered in the anti-atomism
argument. Recall that Bradley begins from Huxley’s Humean assumption:
sa

• A and B are feelings, and they are related by C, which is another feeling,
and then seems to produce a dilemma that’s supposed to generate a regress:
you must either suppose that component parts can exist without standing in relation with one
244 Completing the Rejection of Idealism

another, or else that there is a fresh relation between C and AB. Let this be D, and … we are
launched on the infinite process of finding a relation between D and C–AB …. (1883, 96)

.e ion
The puzzles are these. The first horn of the dilemma, that A, B, and C can exist
without standing in relation with one another seems to be just the Humean assumption
that all mental contents are separate existences, so why would a psychological atomist
reject it? Moreover, the other horn of the dilemma is surely that C, A, and B cannot

an iss
exist without standing in relation with one another. But if so, why is a fresh relation
between C and AB required?

du
The solution to these puzzles is that, in fact, Bradley is not presenting a dilemma.

m
His argument, rather, is this. Huxley’s Humean assumption amounts to an explana-
tion of how it is that A and B composes a whole mental state: the addition of the

per
relational unit of feeling, C, to A and B, accounts for this composition. Now, re-
member that, at this point of the argument, “relation” for Bradley is just a place-
holder for whatever it is, in addition to units, that makes the units compose a whole.
So, what appear to be the first horn of a dilemma—C, A, B can exist without stand-
ing in relation—is simply the claim that they can exist without composing a whole.

ut
This represents a commitment of the Humean psychological atomist. But then, once

ey
again, we’re in a situation in which it is equally possible for these units to compose a
h@ itho
whole and not to compose a whole. So if they do in fact compose a whole, something
has to explain why this possibility rather than the other is realized. What this means,
sl
though, is that positing C has failed to explain how A and B compose a whole. And
this leads to the regress because, for Huxley’s Hume, there is no option but to appeal
sh ite w

to some further relational unit of feeling to account for how C binds A and B into a
we
whole mental state.
We are now in a position to see how a rejection of modality supports the rejec-
tion of idealism. Given that Bradley’s master assumption depends on the modal PSR,
all of his arguments and positions presuppose that there’s a coherent contrast between
the actual and the merely possible: with respect to the existence of objects, the oc-
c

currence of events, or the obtaining of a state of affairs. But, on the Moore-Russell


ie

metaphysics of propositions, existence, occurrence, and fact are all explained in terms
or not

of the truth of propositions. So Bradley’s argument presupposes the coherence of a


distinction between actual and merely possible truth, i.e., the coherence of the no-
tion of a proposition that is true but might not have been. According to Russellian
amodalism, however, there are no such things as modes of truth, that is, no coherent
o

distinction between actual and merely possible truth, no such thing as a proposition
d.

that is true but might not have been. So, there is equally no such thing as a range of
:d

possible facts, states of affairs that might have obtained but didn’t, in addition to any
fact that does obtain.9 A fortiori, it is not coherent to ask for an explanation for why
the fact that actually obtains does so when there are all these other equally possible
aft

facts that fail to obtain. And if the modal PSR makes no sense, then neither does
any of the tacit lines of thinking underlying the various versions of Bradley’s master
nf

assumption on which his arguments for idealism depend.


Dr

9
If there are no possible facts, there is, equally, no clear conception of a non-actual possible (state
sa

of the) world. Russell would thus block the first step of Bradley’s argument for monism mentioned in
note 6 in §6, p. 239 above. That argument is based on the claim that our judgments are not absolutely true
because they might be false with respect to non-actual possible worlds. But if it makes no sense to suppose
that there are “various worlds,” then there is no sense to the claim that Caesar might never have seen the
Rubicon or existed at all, and hence there are no coherent grounds against the truth of the “either-or” of
“ ‘Caesar crossed the Rubicon,’ ‘or not’.”
Parts and Wholes in Principles 245

With this critique of Bradley Russell is finally in a position to conclude, not only
that reductionism about relations cannot account for asymmetrical relations, but also
that there is no reason for thinking that relations are unreal, and have to be explained

.e ion
away.

7.4 Parts and Wholes in Principles

an iss
Is he really?

du
A potential worry stems from the fact that Russell propounds a doctrine of

m
parts and wholes in Principles, and it may seem that the foregoing undermining
of Bradley’s master argument is not consistent with this doctrine. In this section,

per
I defuse this worry.

7.4.1 Russell’s Doctrine


In Principles Russell holds that whatever is not composite is a term. Apart from sim-

ut
ple terms, Russell countenances, roughly, three sorts of composite items,10 of which

ey
two are distinct types of wholes. Russell distinguishes two conceptions of classes:
h@ itho
“class as many” and “class as one.” A class, Russell holds, “is essentially … either
a single term, or that kind of combination of terms which is indicated when terms
sl
are connected by the word and” (1903, §79, 80). Let us set aside both the minor
use-mention infelicity in this formulation and the question what exactly is the com-
bination of terms Russell has in mind. The important point is that this combination
sh ite w
we
of terms that is a class
is distinct from the whole composed of its terms, for the latter is only and essentially one, while
the former, where it has many terms … the very kind of object of which many is to be asserted.
(1903, §71, 68; emphasis mine)
c

This sort of combination of terms is a class as many; it is one fundamental kind


ie

of item that isn’t simple. Russell decides to call them collections, even though the
or not

“strict meaning of collection is the whole composed of many, … since a word is


needed to denote the many themselves”; “so that a collection, according to the usage
here adopted, is many and not one” (1903, §130, 134) Since collections are many
rather than one, they are not terms, and so, on the supposition that Russell takes his
words to express propositions about collections, the idea of collections gives the lie
o
d.

to Russell’s claim that whatever may be an object of thought is a term. (The fact that
:d

collections are not terms is the reason why I said that Russell countenances “roughly”
three sorts of composite items distinct from simple terms: if a collection is not one,
is it an “item”? Is it “composed” of the many terms combined?) Russell buries in
aft

a footnote his decision to “use the word object in a wider sense than term, to cover
both singular and plural,” and confesses that the “fact that a word can be framed with
a wider meaning than term raises grave logical problems” (1903, §58, 55n).11
nf
Dr

Collections are not wholes. A class as one, in contrast, is a basic type of whole:
[W]e regarded the class as formed by all the terms, but usage seems to show no reason why
sa

the class should not equally be regarded as the whole composed of all the terms in those cases
10
I use ‘item’ here even though ‘entity’ is perhaps more idiomatic because Russell explicitly takes
‘entity’ to be synonymous with ‘term’, and one sort of the ‘items’ to be discussed below, collections, are
not terms.
11
I owe this reference to Proops (2007).
246 Completing the Rejection of Idealism

where there is such a whole. The first is the class as many, the second the class as one. Each
of the terms then has to the whole a certain indefinable relation, which is one meaning of the
relation of whole and part. The whole is, in this case, a whole of a particular kind, which I

.e ion
shall call an aggregate …. (1903, II xvi.135, 139; first emphases mine)

Let’s call the indefinable relation of terms to aggregates they compose “element of.”
The distinguishing characteristic of an aggregate is that it is

an iss
completely specified when all its simple constituents are specified; its parts have no direct

du
connection inter se, but only the indirect connection involved in being parts of one and the
same whole. (1903, §136, 140; emphasis mine)

m
Another type of part-whole relation is that of subclass, or, more precisely, sub-aggregate:

per
“the relation to [an] aggregate of aggregates containing some but not all the terms of
[that] aggregate” (1903, II.xvi.135, 139). But this part-whole relation is not funda-
mental. It is reducible to the element of relation through implication (more precisely,
formal implication—see 8.1 below): A is a sub-aggregate part of B just in case for
every term x, x is an element of A implies x is an element of B.

ut
The other fundamental type of whole Russell calls a unity. A unity “is always a

ey
proposition”; the corresponding fundamental type of part-whole relation is that which
h@ itho
terms bear to propositions composed of those terms.
As we saw in §6.5.3 above, in Principles §54 Russell claims that the constituents
sl
of a proposition obtained by analyzing it “do not reconstitute the proposition,” ap-
parently because any “enumeration” or “placing side by side” of the constituents of a
sh ite w

proposition is distinct from that proposition. I pointed out that Russell doesn’t spell
we
out why this is so. But in his discussion of unities in Principles §136 he gives the
reason:
propositions are not completely specified when their parts are all known. Take … the propo-
sition ‘A differs from B’, where A and B are simple terms. The simple parts of this whole are
A and B and difference; but the enumeration of these three does not specify the whole, since
c

there are two other wholes composed of the same parts, namely the aggregate formed of A and
ie

B and difference, and the proposition ‘B differs from A’. (1903, §136, 140)
or not

Russell’s example here is not well-chosen since it’s not clear why the proposition
expressed by ‘A differs from B’ is different from that expressed by ‘B differs from
A’. He gives a better one at the end of §136:
o

the parts A, greater than, B, may compose simply an aggregate, or either of the propositions ‘A
d.
:d

is greater than’, ‘B is greater than A’. (1903, §136, 141)

Here the propositions expressed are contradictories, and so are clearly different.
What we now see is that the ultimate ground for the distinction between propo-
aft

sitions or unities and aggregates is the existence of asymmetrical relations: given


such a relation and relata, more than one proposition can be composed. The problem
nf

of the unity of the proposition, then, is the problem of accounting for the difference
Dr

between these propositions, given that there is no difference in their constituents.


In sum, Russell’s doctrine is that there are three types of entities that are not
sa

simple:
• Collections: these are not wholes
• Aggregates: these are wholes, and a set of constituents compose only one ag-
gregate whole
Parts and Wholes in Principles 247

• Unities or Propositions: these are also whole, but a set of constituents may com-
pose more than one propositional whole.

.e ion
We can now formulate more clearly the worry. Collections are many rather than one;
they are pluralities rather than wholes. So, is Russell not agreeing with Bradley that
a “mere many” cannot form a whole? Put in another way, is Russell not claiming that
something more than a bunch of constituents is required to explain why they form an

an iss
aggregate or a unity?

du
7.4.2 Aggregates

m
To answer these questions we have to have a better account of the natures of aggre-

per
gates and unities. We start with aggregates. The first thing I want to point out is much
of the doctrine of part and whole in Principles is already present in the 1899-1900
draft of Principles. However, there are two salient differences between the draft and
the published Principles.
First, in the draft, Russell advances two apparently distinct views on the question

ut
whether the parts of an aggregate are “connected” to one another. In Part II, Chapter

ey
I, “The Meaning of Whole and Part,” we have (word-for-word) the same doctrine as
h@ itho
in Principles:

sl
an aggregate [is] a whole [that] is completely specified when all its simple constituents are
specified: its parts have no direct connection inter se, but only the indirect connection involved
in being parts of one and the same whole. (1899-1900, 37; emphasis mine)
sh ite w
we
However, in Part I, Chapter I, “Collections,” Russell writes,

the following general statement seems irrefutable: If A is one without being simple, then A is
other than all its constituents together: it is a whole, which, in virtue of the relations contained
in it, is different from all the parts of which it consists. (1899-1900, 16; emphasis mine)
c
ie

Here the suggestion is that parts of an aggregate compose that whole in virtue of
or not

being bound together by relations. But in Principles this suggestion disappears; the
view that wins out is that the parts of an aggregate “have no direct connection inter
se.”
Second, in Part II Chapter I Russell characterizes the difference between simple
and complex terms modally:
o
d.
:d

it is plain to begin with that every complex term presupposes the being of the simple terms
which compose it. Any one of these simple terms might be, without the complex term being;
but if the complex term is, then the simple terms also are. (1899-1900, 36; emphases mine)
aft

In Principles this modal characterization of what makes terms parts of a whole—


parts “might be, without the whole having being”—disappears.
nf

Thus, what Russell deletes from the final version of Principles is precisely the
Dr

Bradleyan idea that a plurality of terms capable of independent existence has to be


bound together by relations in order to form a whole. Russell writes as if he simply
sa

refuses to see anything problematic, anything needing explanation, about the claim
that there are certain “combinations” of terms and certain wholes composed of the
terms of such pluralities.
Bradley, of course, finds the conception of aggregate, of class as one, incoherent:
248 Completing the Rejection of Idealism

The class is One, but the One is not something outside the members. The members even seem
to be members because of what each is internally. And this apparent quality in each cannot be
a relation to something outside the class. …. On the other hand, a quality merely internal to

.e ion
each member seems to leave the class without any unity at all. The unity, therefore, not being
external, must be taken as itself a member of the class. And since this seems once more to be
senseless, the class appears to be dissolved. (1914, 284)

an iss
From Russell’s perspective, the key assumption in this line of thinking is the claim
that “a quality merely internal to each member seems to leave the class without any

du
unity at all.” Why not? Because then there is nothing to tie the members together.

m
And why must there be something to tie them together? Because otherwise there’s no
accounting for why they are unified, given that they might not have been. As Russell

per
sees it, the only answer to the question, what unifies terms into an aggregate, is that
each stands in the relation that I called element of to that aggregate. Bradley would
naturally press the question: what makes it the case these terms stand in the element
of relation to the aggregate, given that they might not have done so? But Russell
rejects the modal PSR that underlies this question. Without a distinction between the

ut
actual and the merely possible, there is no coherent question to be taken seriously.

ey
h@ itho
7.4.3 Unities
sl
The distinctive nature of unities is that they are not uniquely determined by their
constituents. This is what makes the “unity of the proposition” a problem.
As we have seen, the problem is to explain what, apart from their constituents,
sh ite w
we
differentiates the distinct propositions that can be composed of these constituents,
and these propositions from an aggregate formed of those constituents. In Principles
Russell notes that the explanation cannot be “that the parts stand in certain relations
which are omitted in the analysis; for in the above case of ‘A differs from B’, the
relation was included in the analysis” (1903, §136, 140). He claims that the prob-
c

lem shows that “a relation is one thing when it relates and another when it is merely
ie

enumerated as a term in a collection” (1903, §136, 140), or that the “verb [of a propo-
or not

sition], when used as a verb, embodies the unity of the proposition, and is thus dis-
tinguishable from the verb considered as a term” (1903, §54, 50). But Russell also
finds “certain fundamental difficulties in” the view that a relation when it relates is
different from that very relation when it is a term in a collection (1903, §136, 140); he
doesn’t “know how to give a clear account of the nature of the distinction” between
o
d.

a relation as term and a relating relation (1903, §54, 50).


:d

Now it may well seem that the reason why Russell takes this problem so se-
riously is that it seems to bear out the Bradleyan idealist claim that a diversity of
entities cannot by themselves form a whole: something more than the constituents
aft

of a proposition makes those constituents into a propositional whole. It certainly


seems that this problem prompts Russell to make a partial concession to the idealist
nf

view that “analysis is falsification” (1903, §138, 141). The analysis of a proposition
Dr

identifies its (simple) parts, the (simple) terms from which it is composed. But the
specification of the parts is not enough to specify the proposition: the “constituents
sa

[of a proposition], thus placed side by side, do not reconstitute the proposition” (1903,
I.iv.54, 49).
But the problem of unities does not invalidate Russell’s critique of Bradley’s
master argument. The problem of the unity of the proposition is not a problem about
how terms can coherently compose wholes. There is no issue about how terms com-
Parts and Wholes in Principles 249

pose aggregates. The problem about propositional unities arises from the fact that a
set of terms make up a number of distinct wholes. The question then is to explain
what makes these wholes distinct. It is quite plausible that some principle of sufficient

.e ion
reason underlies this question. But it’s not a modal PSR: the terms “make up,” not
“can make up,” distinct wholes. The reason is this. As we saw in §6.7 above, Rus-
sell rejects, along with his rejection of possibility as a fundamental mode of truth,
any merely possible propositions. So, although Russell says, “the parts A, greater

an iss
than, B, may compose either of the propositions ‘A is greater than’, ‘B is greater

du
than A’,” his considered position is not that both of these propositions are possible
but only one subsists. Rather, both subsist, although of course at most one is true.

m
All propositional unities have being, and there is no coherent thought expressed by
‘such-and-such terms don’t in fact compose a proposition but might have done so’.

per
Thus the appeal to a PSR for seeking an explanation of how distinct propositions are
composed of the same terms is parallel to the ground for seeking an explanation for
why phenylthiocarbamide tastes bitter to some people but not to others: we want an
explanation of differences among what is the case, not among what might be the case.

ut
It is a coherent demand even if there are no modes of truth.
This is why Russell’s concession to the idealist position on the falsification of

ey
analysis is partial. What he concedes is that analysis “can never give us the whole
h@ itho
truth” (1903, §138, 141). He does not, however, have any doubts that “analysis gives
us the truth, and nothing but the truth” (1903, §138, 141). That is, Russell sees no
sl
problem in the position that, by identifying the constituents of aggregates and unities,
analysis yields true claims of the forms ‘such-and-such terms compose an aggregate’
sh ite w

and ‘such-and-such terms compose a proposition’. These are the sorts of “claims”
we
that Bradley takes his master argument to demonstrate to be ultimately incoherent.
But Russell takes Bradley’s master argument to be itself based on incoherent modal
distinctions, so he takes these claims to be simply true. They are, however, not the
whole truth because they do not suffice to distinguish the wholes that are formed from
these constituents.
c

Thus, the rejection of modality completes the rejection of idealism.


ie

One concluding note. None of this is to say that the unity of the proposition does
or not

not ever become a serious problem for Russell. In Volume II of this book, I will show
that the problem of distinguishing between propositions formed from asymmetrical
relations and their relata transforms itself, when Russell came to reject propositions
as entities, into a fundamental difficulty for Russell’s non-modal metaphysics.
o
d.
:d
aft
nf
Dr
sa
8

.e ion
Logic and Implication

an iss
In this chapter, I examine the non-modal conception of logic figuring in Russell’s

du
mature logicism, as developed in Principles and Principia. I focus on three main

m
topics.
First, Russell characterizes the axioms of logic as rules of inference that in-

per
corporate the relation of implication. In §8.1 I show that this conception evolved
from Russell’s conception of axioms in the manuscript “An Analysis of Mathemat-
ical Reasoning,” which we discussed in chapter 5, §5.4. In “Analysis,” implication
and rules of inference both involve necessity. As a result of the rejection of modal-

ut
ity, Russell replaces necessity with generality: the axioms of logic are generalizations
stating which propositions stand in the relation of implication. These generalizations

ey
are rules of inference in virtue of determining which inferences from propositions to
h@ itho
propositions are logically valid. In Principles, however, Russell’s view of general
propositions faces certain difficulties that I will outline in §8.3.
sl
Second, Russell takes logic to be in some sense maximally general. This sense
of the generality of logic, I show in §8.2, is distinct from the generality of logical
sh ite w

axioms. It turns out to be the familiar notion of topic-neutrality: logic governs all
we
valid deductive reasoning, no matter what about.
Third, Russell ascribes to implication a number of notoriously counter-intuitive
features, the most prominent of which are: “false propositions imply all propositions,
and true propositions are implied by all propositions” (1903, 15). Nowadays these
claims are often labeled the “paradoxes of material implication,” and they have re-
c

ceived well-known criticisms from C. I. Lewis and W. V. Quine. In §8.4 I show that
ie

Russell’s acceptance of these “paradoxes” is linked to his view in Principles that im-
or not

plication is not definable. I argue that what Russell means is that there is no analysis
of what implication consists in. I reconstruct a Russellian argument for this posi-
tion, which also yields a reply to Quine’s criticisms. (I discuss Lewis’s criticisms in
Volume II.)
o

In §8.5 I discuss a critical upshot of the unanalyzability of implication: there


d.

is ultimately no non-circular demonstration that propositions stand in the relation of


:d

implication. Ultimately we can only perceive what propositions imply what others,
by reflecting on what forms of inference are indispensable in deductive reasoning.
Russell’s embrace of the “paradoxes,” I will show, are grounded in such reflection.
aft

Russell appears to change his mind on the definability of implication between


Principles and Principia, since the very first definition in Principia is of implication
nf

(see 1910, 94). However, in §8.6 I show that the change is in fact over what counts as
Dr

a definition. In Principia a definition is not an analysis of what a notion consists in,


but rather a precise substitute for a vague or intractable notion that is useful for certain
sa

purposes. Thus, Russell never rejects the unanalyzability of implication. However,


reflection on our practice of deductive reasoning enables us to detect certain indis-
pensable features of implication. Russell holds that for the purpose of obtaining a
simpler formulation of logic we can replace implication with an ersatz that has these
Inference and Formal Implication 251

features of implication.
This Principia conception of definition indicates the presence of a pragmatic
element in Russell’s thought. In Volume II I will show that there are other prag-

.e ion
matic elements in Russell’s philosophy and that this pragmatic dimension of Russell’s
thought is the basis of C. I. Lewis’s critique of Russell’s logic.

an iss
8.1 Inference and Formal Implication

du
Two constant themes in Russell’s characterizations of logic from Principles to Prin-

m
cipia are the notions of implication and rule of inference.
Implication is central in logic. The propositional calculus, the first of the three

per
parts of logic that Russell presents in Principles, “studies the relation of implication
between propositions” (1903, 14). In Principia Russell states that “every deductive
system must contain among its premisses as many of the properties of implication
as are necessary to legitimate the ordinary procedure of deduction” (1910, 90). The
centrality of implication in logic is due to its being the relation that underlies valid

ut
inference. As Russell puts it in Principles, the “relation in virtue of which it is possi-

ey
ble for us validly to infer is what I call material implication” (1903, 33). In Principia
h@ itho
Russell says that when “a proposition q is a consequence of a proposition p, we say
that p implies q,” hence “deduction depends upon the relation of implication” (1910,
90; emphases mine). sl
Logic contains or consists of rules of inference. In Principles Russell says that
sh ite w

“symbolic logic … investigate[s] the general rules by which inferences are made”
we
(1903, §12, 11); note that Russell doesn’t “distinguish between inference and de-
duction” (1903, §12, 11n). In Principia he states that the primitive propositions are
“principles of deduction,” and a “principle of deduction gives the general rule ac-
cording to which [an] inference is made” (1910, 106).
In order to understand fully these views of the axioms of logic, we first go back to
c

Russell’s view of axioms of mathematics in “Analysis of Mathematical Reasoning.”


ie

In chapter 5 we saw that in this manuscript Russell held that:


or not

• The fundamental axioms of mathematics are necessary truths.


• Their necessity consists in their being rules of inference.
• These rules of inference are or rest on necessary connections between concep-
o

tions.
d.
:d

Inference is not restricted to logical inference. However, as we saw, Russell con-


sidered the idea that the rules of inference that are the axioms of the logical calculus
are logical. In addition, in the logical calculus, the conceptions that are necessarily
aft

connected are predicates, and a necessary connection from one predicate to another
consists of the first predicate standing in the relation of implication to the second.
nf

So here implication is a logical and modal relation among predicates. Implication


Dr

between predicates leads to rules of inference in the following way. If a predicate P


implies a predicate Q, then for any term x, necessarily if x has P, then x has Q. Hence,
sa

if a judgment which represents x as having P is true, then necessarily the judgment


that x has Q is also true. This means that, for any x, it is correct to infer the judgment
that x is Q from the judgment that x is P.
In sum, on the “Analysis” view, the correctness of a set of inferences is founded
on a necessary connection from the truth of one representation to the truth of another,
252 Logic and Implication

that is, on the obtaining of a modal relation between the truth of two representations.
Clearly, this “Analysis” view appears to agree with the later view on the claim
that axioms involve implication and are rules of inference. But the agreement is in

.e ion
part merely verbal; Russell later has different conceptions of implication and of rule
of inference than he held in “Analysis.”
One main factor in the evolution of these conceptions from the “Analysis” view
is the rejection of modality. and the Moore-Russell view of propositions. With this

an iss
rejection, Russell no longer accepts that there are any necessary relations. But Russell

du
retains the same view of inference and of what make an inference correct. Inference
for Russell is largely what it is for Frege: making a judgment on the basis of having

m
made a set of other judgments. What makes an inference correct is the obtaining of
some relation between the objects of those judgments. In Russell’s idealist phase, the

per
objects of judgments are Bradleyan universals that represent reality, and the relation
between two such universals that makes an inference correct is a necessary connec-
tion from the truth of one to the truth of the other. After the rejection of idealism and
modality, the objects of judgment are Moore-Russell non-representational proposi-

ut
tions, and the relation between two propositions that makes an inference correct is
what Russell calls (material) implication.1

ey
So far nothing prevents Russell from thinking that the relation of implication
h@ itho
holds in virtue of the truth of propositions. But, as I mentioned above, Russell has
an argument against that view. Thus, Russell lands in the position that implication is
sl
a non-modal relation between propositions whose holding does not rest on the truth
of propositions.
sh ite w

Note that from the perspective of the Moore-Russell theory of propositions,


we
propositions are themselves entities, and the relation of implication is just one rela-
tion among others, distinguished only by the fact that its relata are only propositions;
as Russell says, “whatever is not a proposition implies nothing” (1903, 15), and pre-
sumably is implied by nothing. What this means is not that there are no propositions
in which non-propositional terms are connected by the relation of implication. As
c

we saw in 6.6, if in, e.g., the proposition «p, implies, q», where implies is the relating
ie

relation, the propositions p and q occurring in subject position are replaced by any
or not

terms, the result is a proposition. But when the replacements are non-propositional
terms the resulting propositions are all false.
Note also that on Russell’s view an inference that we draw is correct just in
case the propositions that are the premises of that inference do in fact stand in the
o

relation of implication to the proposition that is its conclusion. But a fact, as we saw
d.

in §6.4, is a true proposition, so “we validly infer” just in case the proposition that
:d

the premise-propositions imply the conclusion-proposition is true.


This conclusion might suggest that for Russell a rule of inference is just such a
proposition in which propositions stand in the relation of implication to other propo-
aft

sitions. However, this position is not Russell’s view of rules of inference. There is
another aspect of the “Analysis” view of rules of inference that Russell retains: if a
nf

predicate P implies a predicate Q, then for every term x, the inference from a judg-
Dr

ment that x has P, to the judgment that x has Q is correct. Put differently, necessary
connection underlies a type of generality: every inference of a certain form is cor-
sa

rect. The common form of these inferences is: the premise is a judgment that some
term has the predicate P, and the conclusion is the judgment that that term also has
1
It is plausible that Russell’s calling this relation implication indicates a lingering effect of the “Anal-
ysis” view that predicate implication is the relation that underlies correct inference.
Inference and Formal Implication 253

the predicate Q. Russell retains the idea that a rule of inference has this kind of gen-
erality. As we just saw, a single inference from a particular judgment to another is
correct if the propositions in question stand in the relation of implication. So a rule

.e ion
of inference is, as Russell puts it, a class of implications between propositions. But
clearly not just any class of implications will do. The implications belonging to the
class has in some sense to have the same form. The notion that Russell employs to
capture this idea of a class of implications of the same form is formal implication.

an iss
In order to understand Russell’s notion of formal implication, we begin with the

du
fact that Russell has generalized and transformed the “Analysis” notion of predicate
to the Principles notion of propositional function. Exactly what Russellian proposi-

m
tional functions are is a difficult and controversial question. For our purposes Rus-
sell’s initial account of propositional functions in Principles is sufficient. This ac-

per
count is given in terms of what Russell calls “assertions”:

every proposition may be divided, some in only one way, some in several ways, into a term
(the subject) and something which is said about the subject, which something I shall call the
assertion. (1903, §43, 39)

ut
ey
We can think of an assertion as the result of removing (Russell’s term is ‘omitting’)
h@ itho
a term other than the relating relation from a proposition. When another term is put
in place of the removed term the result is another proposition. That other proposi-
sl
tion and the original one are values of the propositional function. The places from
which the term is removed are the argument places of the propositional function. The
argument places of a propositional function may be filled with a variable. Exactly
sh ite w
we
what variables are in Principles is another vexed issue. However, let’s take it that
a variable functions like a denoting concept; a proposition in which it occurs as a
constituent is not about it, but about the terms which it denotes. The terms denoted
by the variable are the values of the variable.
Russell introduces the notion of formal implication in this passage:
c

For the technical study of Symbolic Logic, it is convenient to take as a single indefinable the
ie

notion of a formal implication, i.e. of such propositions as ‘x is a man implies x is a mortal,


or not

for all values of x’—propositions whose general type is: ‘ϕ(x) implies ψ(x) for all values of x’,
where ϕ(x), ψ(x), for all values of x, are propositions. (1903, §12, 11)

Here ‘ϕ(x)’ and ‘ψ(x)’ indicate the results of putting the variable expressed by ‘x’
in the argument place of two arbitrary propositional functions. If any of the terms
o
d.

denoted by x is taken as the argument of the propositional function, then the result is
:d

a proposition. The proposition of formal implication

ϕ(x) implies ψ(x) for all values of x


aft

“asserts” a class of implications of the same form: every implication from a proposi-
tion that is the value of the propositional function ϕ( ) for an argument a that is a value
nf

of the variable x to the proposition that is the value of the propositional function ψ( )
Dr

for the very same argument a. It follows that every inference from the judgment that
ϕ(a) to the judgment that ψ(a), where a is a value of the variable x, is correct. Thus
sa

“formal implication … is involved in all the rules of inference” (1903, §45, 40).
It seems fairly clear that a proposition of formal implication is a generalization
of propositions of particular implications.2 Indeed, in Principle Russell attempts to
2
Russell’s notation for formal implication is implicitly a quantifier sign. He got his notation for both
254 Logic and Implication

formulate quantificational logic using formal implication as the sole quantifier.3


Although every rule of inference is a formal implication, not every formal im-
plication is a rule of inference. The reason is that Russell takes the variable(s) in

.e ion
general propositions to be unrestricted:

in every proposition of pure mathematics, when fully stated, the variables have an absolutely
unrestricted field: any conceivable entity may be substituted for any one of our variables with-

an iss
out impairing the truth of our proposition. (1903, §7, 7)

du
Only propositions are related truly by implication, hence, if the consequent of a for-

m
mal implication is a single variable, as in Russell’s example in PoM §41,

‘p implies q’, together with p, implies q (1903, 37)

per
then when that variable—here q—is replaced by, say, a plum-pudding, the resulting
instance of the formal implication is false, and so the formal implication is also false.
So rules of inference are the subclass of formal implications asserting a class of im-

ut
plications from propositions to propositions, as opposed to any class of implications.
We can think of them as restricted generalizations about implication whose universe

ey
of discourse is the class of propositions. Given Russell’s unrestricted variable and
h@ itho
the nature of implication, the restriction to propositions has in certain cases to be
made explicit in the hypothesis of a formal implication whose consequent asserts the
sl
desired generalization about implications among propositions. So, in the case of the
above example, the rule of inference would be
sh ite w
we
“p implies p and q implies q” implies “p implies q”, together with p, implies q[, for all p and
q] (1903, §41, 37)

The fact that for Russell rules of inference are propositions suggests a worry. Rus-
sell’s view seems to imply that, in order to reach a conclusion from some set of
c

implications, formal and material, from Peano. For formal implication Russell starts with Peano’s sign ‘⊃’
ie

for material implication and then adds to it a subscripted variable or (comma separated) list of variables.
or not

These are variables of quantification. So, where Φ(x1 , ..., xn ) and Ψ(x1 , ..., xn ) contain x1 , ..., xn free,
Φ(x1 , ..., xn ) ⊃x1 ,… ,xn Ψ(x1 , ..., xn )
is a formula that expresses what nowadays we express with
(∀x1 ) … (∀xn )(Φ(x1 , ..., xn ) ⊃ Ψ(x1 , ..., xn )).
o
d.
:d

3
What Russell calls the calculus of propositions in Principles is in fact not just our truth-functional
or sentential logic but includes quantification. Formal implication is the only logical constant of this
calculus. This leads to a well-known technical difficulty first pointed out by Michael Byrd (1989, 355-8).
aft

Russell has to define negation in terms of formal implication alone. This appears possible because formal
implication is a quantifier. Russell’s idea is to define negation by ex falso quodlibet; the negation of a
proposition p is to be the proposition that p implies all propositions:
nf
Dr

∼p =df (r ⊃ r) ⊃r (p ⊃ r)
But, this only works if there are false propositions. Otherwise, since a true proposition is materially implied
sa

by all propositions, the definiens,


(r ⊃ r) ⊃r (p ⊃ r)
is true no matter what p is. In particular, for any proposition p, the definiens is true for both p and ∼p.
That is to say, the negation of a true proposition is also a true proposition.
Byrd also shows that Russell was aware of the difficulty and for that reason chose to take negation as a
primitive idea in (Russell, 1906b, 201).
Inference and Formal Implication 255

premises, one would have to take the rules of inference involved to be additional
premises. If that were the case, then Russell’s view would be vulnerable to the sort
of regress that Lewis Carroll (1895) made vivid. But in fact, Russell is very much

.e ion
aware of this threat. In Principles, he observes that “in a particular inference, the rule
according to which the inference proceeds is not required as a premise,” and that if
the rule had to be used as a premise we would be faced with a regress (1903, 41). A
similar point is made in Principia:

an iss
[A] principle of deduction gives the general rule according to which the inference is made, but

du
is not itself a premise in the inference. If we treated it as a premise, we should need either

m
it or some other general rule to enable us to infer the desired conclusion, and thus we should
gradually acquire an increasing accumulation of premises without ever being able to make any

per
inference” (1910, 106).

How then does Russell conceive of reasoning in accordance with a rule? In Principles
Russell conceives of reasoning according to a rule of inference to be governed by
axiom (4):

ut
ey
A true hypothesis in an implication may be dropped, and the consequent asserted. This is a
principle incapable of formal symbolic statement, and illustrating the essential limitations of
h@ itho
formalism (1903, 16; emphasis mine)

sl
I take Russell to have in mind the following picture. In order to make an inference,
we have to judge or believe a proposition of formal implication. But this proposition
sh ite w

is not a premise in the inference we make. Rather, we adopt an attitude towards the
we
proposition: we treat it as a permission, allowing us to act in a certain way. The way
in question is: if we have judged the proposition that is the implying proposition of
any instance of the proposition of formal implication, then we may correctly judge the
corresponding implied proposition of that instance. This way of acting is inferring in
accordance with the rule of inference. It is permission to act in this way that Russell’s
c

axiom (4) describes. It’s not capable of formal statement because Russell thinks of
ie

formal statements as descriptions of what is the case, but a permission to act in a


or not

certain way is not something which is the case.


To sum up, the conception of rules of inference as formal implications com-
pletes the transformation of the “Analysis” view of axioms. With the elimination of
necessity, there are no longer two aspects to axioms: necessary connections, which
o

then support rules of inference. Instead, an axiom is just a proposition of formal im-
d.

plication, which is also a rule of inference whose instances are particular implications
:d

licensing particular inferences. One way to think of this change is that with the re-
moval of modality, generality now plays the role formerly played by necessity in the
conception of an axiom.
aft

Before continuing, let us note how the conception of axioms as non-modal for-
mal implications leads to a resolution of the problem for the logicism of “Analysis”
nf

discussed in §5.4.3 above. The problem is that the modal relation of mutual im-
Dr

plication between two predicates fails to match the relation of equivalence between
classes. In Principles, classes are analyzed in terms of propositional functions, as
sa

aggregates of terms satisfying a propositional function. The second axiom of the


calculus of classes is:

[I]f ϕx and ψx are equivalent propositions for all values of x, then the class of x’s such that ϕx
is true is identical with the class of x’s such that ψx is true. (1903, §24, 20)
256 Logic and Implication

Here “equivalent propositions” means “propositions each of which stands in the rela-
tion of implication to the other.” So the axiom states that mutual formal implication
involving two propositional functions exactly parallels identity of the class defined

.e ion
by the two propositional functions. The notion of identity of classes is not the same
as the notion of identity of terms that Russell defines:
x is identical with y if y belongs to every class to which x belongs, in other words, if ‘x is a u’

an iss
implies ‘y is a u’ for all values of u. (1903, §24, 20)

du
It is, rather, having the same terms as members:

m
With regard to the primitive proposition itself, it is to be observed that it decides in favour of
an extensional view of classes. Two class-concepts need not be identical when their extensions

per
are so: man and featherless biped are by no means identical, and no more are even prime and
integer between 1 and 3. These are class-concepts, and if our axiom is to hold, it must not be
of these that we are to speak in dealing with classes. We must be concerned with the actual
assemblage of terms, not with any concept denoting that assemblage. (1903, §24, 20)

ut
Note that the propositional functions that are class-concepts are intensional entities
merely in the sense that distinct propositional functions may be true of the same terms

ey
and so have the same extension. It doesn’t follow from this that the relation of formal
h@ itho
equivalence is a modal one. So, whereas in “Analysis,” with the modal notion of
predicate implication, Russell concludes that we “cannot say that featherless biped
sl
implies man, but only that there happen to be no featherless bipeds except men”
(1898, 191), in Principles, with the non-modal conception of formal implication, he
sh ite w

is in a position to hold that x is a featherless biped implies x is a man for all values of
we
x.

8.2 The Generality of Logic


c

Russell, as I mentioned, regularly associates logic with generality. For example, in


ie

Chapter II of Principles, he writes that “Symbolic or Formal Logic” is “the study of


or not

the various general types of deduction,” and is “essentially concerned with inference
in general” (1903, 10). Moreover, he describes Part I of Principia, the very beginning
of that book, dealing “with such topics as belong traditionally to symbolic logic … in
virtue of their generality” (1910, 87). Generality, it seems, distinguishes logic from
o

other subjects.
d.

We have now seen that rules of inference are formal implications, and so are gen-
:d

eral propositions. But is what makes logic general the fact that the axioms of logic
are general propositions? Or that the axioms of logic are in some sense more general
than propositions appearing in other subjects? It’s not clear how either of these sug-
aft

gestions would distinguish logic from any discipline which comprises general propo-
sitions. Clearly other subjects, for instance, astronomy, include general claims. Now
nf

it might be thought that while the general claims of astronomy generalize only over
Dr

heavenly bodies, the axioms of logic generalize over absolutely everything. But this
suggestion conflicts with the fact that, as we saw, Russell takes the variable to be
sa

unrestricted, so, every formal implication generalizes over all terms. This holds of
the general propositions of astronomy no less than it holds of the general proposition
of logic. So it seems that what distinguishes logic from astronomy is neither the fact
that logic has general propositions which astronomy does not, nor any difference in
the types of generality of logical and astronomical propositions.
The Generality of Logic 257

In order to understand the generality of logic for Russell, let’s begin by asking,
compared to what is logic general? The answer we find in Principles is a scale of
generality along which logic and mathematics are placed:

.e ion
Symbolic Logic is … distinguished from various special branches of mathematics mainly by
its generality. Neither mathematics nor symbolic logic will study such special relations as (say)
temporal priority, but mathematics will deal explicitly with the class of relations possessing

an iss
the formal properties of temporal priority—properties which are summed up in the notion
of continuity. …. But symbolic logic, in the narrower sense which is convenient, will not

du
investigate what inferences are possible in respect of continuous relations …; this investigation

m
belongs to mathematics, but is still too special for symbolic logic. What symbolic logic does
investigate is the general rules by which inferences are made …. (1903, 11)

per
Here the suggestion is that mathematics is more general than the theory of temporal
priority because it “deals with” the formal properties of the relation of temporal pri-
ority. But what are the formal properties of a relation? For an answer consider §8:
“The process of transforming constants in a proposition into variables leads to what

ut
is called generalization, and gives us, as it were, the formal essence of a proposition”
(1903, 7). The view, then, is this. The relation of temporal priority holds of events

ey
but not of, for example, spatial positions. Hence there is no ground to think that a
h@ itho
theory of temporal priority, a specification of the rules governing inferences among
propositions about the relation earlier than, has any application to propositions about
sl
spatial relations. But consider a rule of inference governing propositions of temporal
priority
sh ite w
we
(5) x is earlier than y and y is earlier than z imply x is earlier than z, for all events
x, y, z
It is easy to see that this rule clearly has something in common with certain rules of
inference governing propositions concerning other relations. For example, proposi-
tions about a spatial relations among line segments like shorter is governed by
c
ie

(6) x is shorter than y and y is shorter than z imply x is shorter than z, for all
or not

segments x, y, z
Mathematics “studies” this common property by abstracting from the particular spa-
tial or temporal nature of these relations and their relata. The abstraction is accom-
plished by generalization, replacing the specific relations mentioned in these rules
o
d.

by a variable, and their relata by unrestricted variables, in order to reach the more
:d

general rule of inference stating the transitivity of an arbitrary relation R:


(7) xRy and yRz imply xRz, for all x, y, z.
aft

The formal properties of particular relations such as temporal priority are thus certain
features common to deductive relations governing that relation and deductive rela-
nf

tions governing other relations. Temporal priority has other formal properties, and
Dr

one set of these formal properties together defines the formal property of continuity
of a relation.
sa

The mathematical theory of continuous relations “investigates inferences in re-


spect of” these relations. What exactly this means we’ll come back to, but for now
let’s take it to mean that this mathematical theory yields an account of the correct-
ness of inferences concerning continuous relations, in the sense of a set of formal
implications among propositions about continuous relations. This account applies
258 Logic and Implication

to propositions about any relation having the formal properties defining continuity,
no matter what sort of entities—events, line segments, etc.—it relates. The relative
generality of various mathematical theories thus consists of the applicability of their

.e ion
accounts of correct inference to a greater range of subject matters than the theories
of those subjects from which mathematics abstracts.
It’s clear that according to Russell logic goes farther than mathematics along
this abstractive dimension of generality; indeed the quoted passage suggests that logic

an iss
goes as far as possible along this dimension. It is fairly clear what Russell has in mind.

du
Deductions concerning the relation of friendship don’t share the formal property of
transitivity with deductions concerning temporal priority, for

m
(8) x is a friend of y and y is a friend of z imply x is a friend of z, for all persons

per
x, y, z
is false. But both
(9) x is earlier than y and y is earlier than z imply x is earlier than y, for all events

ut
x, y, z

ey
and
h@ itho
(10) x is a friend of y and y is a friend of z imply x is a friend of y, for all persons
x, y, z sl
are true rules of inference. Indeed, each instance of these rules have something in
sh ite w

common with material implications among non-relational propositions such as that


we
expressed by
(11) Socrates is Greek and Plato is Greek imply Socrates is Greek
To abstract from the different subject matters here one would generalize, not on things
or relations, but on whole propositions, to reach
c
ie

(12) If p implies p and q implies q, then p and q implies p, for all p, q


or not

i.e., axiom (5) of Principles. This rule of inference is more general than the rules of
the mathematics of continuity because it governs reasoning not just about transitive
relations but also intransitive relations and non-relational propositions. Indeed, it
plausibly governs all reasoning; it is, as Russell puts it, one of “the general rules by
o

which inferences are made.” The maximal generality of logical rules of inference
d.

thus consists of their being norms governing all reasoning, no matter what about.
:d

That is to say, the generality of logic for Russell is nothing other than its universal
governance of all reasoning.4,5
Note that I ascribed universal governance merely to the rules of inference of
aft

logic, not to all propositions of logic. The reason is that not all propositions of logic
nf

4
In Principia, of course, the theory of types imposes type restrictions on the variables and propo-
Dr

sitional functions that can appear in logical axioms, and this may be thought to limit the applicability of
such axioms. But this doesn’t affect the view in the text, which concerns the propositional calculus.
5
I have in effect shown that in Russell’s major works in logic, Principles and Principia logic is con-
sa

ceived as maximally general in the specific sense of governing reasoning on any subject matter whatso-
ever. Thus, despite the fact that many of the objections to the “universalist” interpretation of Russell’s
logic presented in, for instance, Proops (2007), in particular, the unclarity of the notion of universality, are
well-taken, they fail to show that Russell is not a “universalist” about logic. But, it should be clear that
I’m not claiming that in this respect Russell’s position is significantly different from any contemporary,
or for that matter any viable, conception of logic.
Problems of Formal Implication 259

are rules of inference; some are not formal implications at all. In §4 Russell claims
that by “ten principles of deduction and ten other premisses of a general logical na-
ture (e.g. ‘implication is a relation’), all mathematics can be strictly and formally

.e ion
deduced” (1903, 4). In §30 Russell specifies another primitive proposition of logic
that is not a principle of deduction: the class membership relation, ε, is a relation (26).
But logic as a whole, or at least the propositional calculus, is maximally general in
virtue of the universal governance of its rules of inference.

an iss
du
8.3 Problems of Formal Implication

m
In this section, I discuss two philosophical difficulties with formal implication.

per
8.3.1 The Composition of Propositions of Formal Implication
The first philosophical difficulty arises from a natural question about how formal
implication fits into the Moore-Russell metaphysics of propositions: what exactly are

ut
the constituents of a proposition in which formal implication is supposed to figure?6

ey
What, for instance, are the constituents of the proposition expressed by
h@ itho
(13) x is a man implies x is mortal, for all values of x?
sl
In particular, is formal implication a relation in which the remaining terms of propo-
sition (13) stand? That is, is it the relating relation of (13)? If so, what are the terms
sh ite w

that it relates?
we
Here is one tempting view. The ancestor of the notion of formal implication is
the notion of rules of inference in “Analysis,” which is based on implications between
predicates. Since propositional function generalizes predicate, one might think that
formal implication is a relation between propositional functions.
However, Russell argues that proposition (13) is not composed of the proposi-
c

tional function (expressed by) “x is a man” standing in the relation of formal impli-
ie

cation to the propositional function “x is mortal” (1903, §42, 38). The reason comes
or not

from Russell’s initial account of propositional functions as assertions, which are the
results of removing terms from a proposition. If “x is a man” is the result of “omit-
ting” a term from some proposition, then, it is, “as it stands, not a proposition at all,”
and so “does not imply anything” (1903, §42, 38). The best that we can do, to make
o

sense of the idea of a propositional function implying another, is that the implica-
d.

tion relates the propositions that result from putting a variable in the argument places
:d

of the two propositional functions. This would be “first [to] vary our x in ‘x is a
man’, and then independently vary it in ‘x is a mortal’ ”; unfortunately the result is
“the proposition that ‘everything is a man’ implies ‘everything is a mortal’, which,
aft

though true, is not what was meant” (1903, §42, 38). This is because the truth and
falsity of this proposition and of (13) are differently related to the truth and falsity of
nf

the propositions that are the values of the assertion expressed by ‘… is a man’ and
Dr

‘… is mortal’.
Another proposal Russell considers is that, to “obtain our formal implication,”
sa

namely proposition (13),


we should start from the whole proposition ‘Socrates is a man implies Socrates is a mortal’,
and vary Socrates in this proposition as a whole. Thus our formal implication asserts a class
6
My account of this problem is indebted to Hylton (1990a, 212-8)
260 Logic and Implication

of implications, not a single implication at all. We do not, in a word, have one implication
containing a variable, but rather a variable implication. (1903, §42, 38)

.e ion
In other words, a formal implication is a generalization, by means of a variable, of a
propositional function that results from omitting the same term from the propositions
related by implication.
Unfortunately, this suggestion doesn’t work, if propositional functions are as-

an iss
sertions. The problem stems from the logic of propositions involving multiple gen-
erality. Russell points to it in an argument from Principles §93, where he rejects the

du
view that the variable is the denoting concept any term:

m
x is, in some sense, the object denoted by any term; yet this can hardly be strictly maintained,
for different variables may occur in a proposition, yet the object denoted by any term is, one

per
would suppose, unique … . Thus variables have a kind of individuality. This arises … from
propositional functions. When a propositional function has two variables, it must be regarded
as obtained by successive steps. If the propositional function ϕ(x, y) is to be asserted for all
values of x and y, we must consider the assertion, for all values of y, of the propositional

ut
function ϕ(a, y), where a is constant. This does not involve y, and may be written ψ(a). We then
vary a, and assert ψ(x) for all values of x …. The individuality of variables is thus explained. A

ey
variable is not any term simply, but any term as entering into a propositional function. (1903,
§93, 94)
h@ itho
sl
The argument is clearer if we take ϕ(x, y) to be of the form ϕ(x) ⊃ ψ(y) and use the
universal quantifier as well as Russell’s sign of formal implication. The steps Russell
describes are really these:
sh ite w
we
(1) Start with ϕ(a) ⊃ ψ(b), where a and b constant terms.
(2) Generalize on b first to obtain ϕ(a) ⊃ (∀y)ψ(y)
(3) Then generalize on a to reach (∀x)(ϕ(x) ⊃ (∀y)ψ(y)).
Reversing the order of generalization of steps 2 and 3 would yield (∀y)((∀x)ϕ(x) ⊃
c

ψ(y)), which is a different proposition, with different truth conditions.


ie

Now, ϕ(a) ⊃ ψ(b) is an instance of the multiply general proposition (∀x)(ϕ(x) ⊃


or not

(∀y)ψ(y)). But this instance is obtained in stages:


(1) Obtain an instance of the generalization with the variable x
(2) Then obtainan instance of the generalization with the variable y.7
o
d.

Clearly, at the second stage, one can instantiate y with a rather than b to obtain ϕ(a) ⊃
:d

ψ(a), which is an instance of the formal implication ϕ(x) ⊃x ψ(x). Now, the fact that
ϕ(a) ⊃ ψ(a) is an instance both of ϕ(x) ⊃x ψ(x) and of (∀x)(ϕ(x) ⊃ (∀y)ψ(y)) underlies
the fact that the formal implication follows logically from the multiple generalization.
aft

If (∀x)(ϕ(x) ⊃ (∀y)ψ(y)) is true, then whenever the propositional function ϕ(…) is


satisfied by a term a, the propositional function ψ(…) is satisfied by all terms, which
nf

guarantees that it is satisfied by a. Hence all instances of ϕ(x) ⊃x ψ(x) are true and
Dr

thus so is ϕ(x) ⊃x ψ(x).


But, the fact that ϕ(a) ⊃ ψ(a) is an instance both of ϕ(x) ⊃x ψ(x) and of
sa

(∀x)(ϕ(x) ⊃ (∀y)ψ(y)) also shows that the notion of an assertion as the result of “omit-
ting” terms from a proposition fails to account for the notion of a propositional func-
tion. A complex of terms and argument places, such as ϕ(…) ⊃ ψ(…), that results
7
Actually the second instantiation may require a number of steps, depending on the rules of the system
in question.
Problems of Formal Implication 261

from omitting terms from a proposition does not give a unique propositional func-
tion without a specific way of filling the argument places to yield the propositions
that count as values of the propositional function. These different ways of filling

.e ion
in the argument places also correspond to different general propositions, different
assertions of all values a propositional function. The logical relation we have just
observed between different general propositions turns on the fact that a single propo-
sition can be the value of different propositional functions, different ways of filling

an iss
in argument places.

du
Now, if a propositional function isn’t an assertion, what is it? And, if a formal
implication isn’t composed of a variable and an assertion, what is composed of? In

m
Principles Russell doesn’t seem to have worked out answers to these questions. In
§82 Russell reiterates the claim that a formal implication is the assertion of all in-

per
stances of a propositional function, and adds that although these instances “have a
certain constancy of form,” it is not “possible to analyse the propositions [that are
these instances] into a constant and a variable factor” (1903, §82, 85). In §89 he
suggests the following:

ut
We have, to begin with, a class of true propositions, each asserting of some constant term that

ey
if it is an a it is a b. …. [This is] a class of implications not containing variables, and we
h@ itho
consider any member of this class. If any member is true, the fact is indicated by introducing
a typical implication containing a variable. This typical implication is what is called a formal
sl
implication: it is any member of a class of material implications. (1903, §89, 92)

But what exactly is this “typical implication”? It’s not clear that it is a proposition
sh ite w
we
since Russell seems to have nothing to say about its composition. The claim that it
is “any member of a class of material implications” suggests that it is like a denoting
concept that stands in some unanalyzable relation to those material implications.

8.3.2 The Inferential Justification of Formal Implications


c

The second problem with Russell’s conception of formal implications has to do with
ie

the conditions under which they may legitimately be inferred by generalization from
or not

their instances. The problem arises from the materiality of implication:

[I]t may be asked, how comes it that Socrates may be varied in the proposition ‘Socrates is a
man implies Socrates is mortal’? In virtue of the fact that true propositions are implied by all
o

others, we have ‘Socrates is a man implies Socrates is a philosopher’; but in this proposition,
d.

alas, the variability of Socrates is sadly restricted. …. (1903, §42, 38-9)


:d

If generalizing from Socrates in


(3) Socrates is a man implies Socrates is a philosopher
aft

is legitimate, then, by parity of reasoning, we can show that every class is a sub-class
nf

of any non-empty class. If a class defined by a propositional function ϕ(…) is non-


Dr

empty, then there is some term a such that the value ϕ(a) of ϕ(…) is a true proposition.
Since a true proposition is implied by all propositions, it is in particular implied by
sa

any value ψ(a) of any propositional function ψ(…). If we may generalize on a in


this implication, then we can obtain the formal implication ψ(x) ⊃x ϕ(x) which by
definition is the proposition that the class of ψ’s is a sub-class of the class of ϕ’s. So
Russell evidently needs some way of distinguishing between legitimate and illegiti-
mate generalizations to formal implications from terms in material implications.
262 Logic and Implication

It should be noted, to begin with, that the distinction can’t be based on the fact
that the material implication (3) is obtained by the principle that a true proposition is
implied by all propositions. For, this principle allows one to obtain

.e ion
Socrates is a philosopher implies Socrates is a philosopher
and

an iss
Socrates is a Greek philosopher implies Socrates is a philosopher

du
from

m
Socrates is a philosopher

per
But the formal implications resulting from generalizing on Socrates in these material
implications are surely both true.
Now, Russell initially responds to this problem by claiming that it “seems to
show that formal implication involves something over and above the relation of im-

ut
plication, and that some additional relation must hold where a term can be varied”
(1903, §42, 39). And he proposes to spell out this additional relation using the notion

ey
of assertion. Specifically, he proposes that one can generalize from Socrates in (3)
h@ itho
because “there is a relation between the two assertions ‘is a man’ and ‘is a mortal’,
in virtue of which, when the one holds, so does the other” (1903, §44, 39).8 If we
sl
recall that in §82 Russell came to take the notion of assertion to be an attempt, al-
beit a failed one, to capture a “constancy of form” among propositions which result
sh ite w

from restoring the omitted terms to the assertion, we can see that what is moving
we
Russell here is the ancient idea that the deductive validity of an argument rests in
its logical form. A material implication from one proposition to another is general-
izable just in case it holds in virtue of some relation between the logical forms of
these propositions. However, we have just seen that neither propositional functions
nor formal implications can be analyzed in terms of assertions or relations between
c

assertions. So Russell seems to be left, in the end, with no account of generalizable


ie

and non-generalizable implications.


or not

Given that Russell has no account of the composition of propositions of formal


implication, in referring to formal implications we won’t be able to list propositional
components. So, while I will continue to use the double-brackets notation to men-
tion Moore-Russell propositions of formal implication, within the bracket I will only
o

write an English sentence, possibly supplemented with Peano’s notation for formal
d.

implication.
:d

8.4 The Materiality and Indefinability of Implication


aft

A mere fifteen pages into Principles, Russell tells us that “false propositions imply all
nf

propositions, and true propositions are implied by all propositions” (1903, 15). These
Dr

8
In fact this is just one of two proposals Russell considers. The other is “we may analyse the whole
proposition ‘Socrates is a man implies Socrates is a mortal’ into Socrates and an assertion about him, and
sa

say that the assertion in question holds of all terms” (1903, §44, 39). He decides against this other proposal
because “the suggested analysis of ‘Socrates is a man implies Socrates is a mortal’ seems scarcely possible.
The proposition in question consists of two terms and a relation, the terms being ‘Socrates is a man’ and
‘Socrates is a mortal’; and it would seem that when a relational proposition is analysed into a subject and
an assertion, the subject must be one of the terms of the relation which is asserted” (1903, §44, 39). It’s
not clear to me why Russell takes this to be an objection.
The Materiality and Indefinability of Implication 263

claims persist into Principia: the explanation of theorem j2.21, “∼p ⊃ (p ⊃ q),” is “a
false proposition implies any proposition” and that of theorem j2.02, “p ⊃ (q ⊃ p),”
is “a true proposition is implied by any proposition” (1910, 99).

.e ion
As mentioned above, in both Principles and Principia Russell holds that a false
proposition implies every proposition and a true proposition is implied by every
proposition. In Principles Russell also makes the further claim that “of any two
propositions there must be one which implies the other,” to follow from the thesis

an iss
that ‘p implies q’ is “strictly equivalent to” “q is true or p false” (1903, 15). I will

du
call this the equivalence thesis.
In general, the reaction to these Russellian views about implication has been

m
some version of the “incredulous stare” David Lewis had to confront;9 this, of course,
is why these features ascribed by Russell to implications are now more or less stan-

per
dardly known as the “paradoxes of material implication.” In this section we will be
talking a lot about these Russellian claims, so let’s call the first, that false propositions
imply all propositions, the negative “paradox” and the second, that true propositions
are implied by all propositions, the positive “paradox.” For reasons that will appear,

ut
I retain the scare quotes on “paradox” throughout.
The “paradoxes” of material implication are as well-known as Quine’s diagnosis

ey
of how Russell ended up facing the incredulous stare. The problem, Quine claims, is
h@ itho
a use-mention confusion:
sl
‘Implies’ [is] best viewed as [a] general term[,] to be predicated of sentences by predicative
attachment to names of sentences. … ‘if-then’ [is not a term but an operator] attachable to
the sentences themselves. Whitehead and Russell, careless of the distinction between use and
sh ite w
we
mention of expressions, wrote ‘p implies q’ (in the material sense) interchangeably with ‘If p
then q’ (in the material sense). (1960, 196)
Whitehead and Russell, that is, failed to distinguish between conditionals, in which
the antecedent and consequent sub-statements are used, from implications, which are
predicated of mentioned statements. Because of this confusion, the unexceptionable
c

fact that a material conditional is true if either its antecedent is false or its consequent
ie

true is confounded with an extraordinary view of logical consequence.


or not

This bit of philosophical grammar by Quine has seemed to many to be uncon-


vincing. For one thing, it certainly appears that some ordinary uses of conditional
statements are not easily interpreted as simply truth-functional. Moreover, it is cer-
tainly arguable that in philosophical grammar ‘implies’ can legitimately function
as an object-language relational expression, provided that appropriate nominaliz-
o
d.

ing transformations are made.10 But these disputes over Quine’s sharp distinction
:d

between implication and conditional are really directed at straw-men, for Quine’s
accusation of use-mention confusion isn’t—or, less tendentiously put, needn’t be—
Quine’s considered criticism. We should not be taken in by Quine’s rhetoric, and
aft

miss his deeper point, for Quine himself relates “logical implication” to a type of
conditional:
nf

The relation of implication in one fairly natural sense of the term, viz., logical implication, is
Dr

readily described with the help of the auxiliary notion logical truth. A statement is logically
true if it is not only true but remains true when all but its logical skeleton is varied at will ….
sa

Now one statement may be said logically to imply another when the … conditional which has
the one statement as antecedent and other as consequent is logically true. (1981, 28)
9
See D. K. Lewis (1973, 86) and D. K. Lewis (1986, 133)
10
See “Grammatical Propadeutic,” Anderson and Belnap (1975, Appendix, 473-92) for a protracted
argument to this effect.
264 Logic and Implication

Quine takes it that all true conditionals have either a false antecedent or a true con-
sequent, or, equivalently, no true conditional has a true antecedent and a false conse-
quent. Let’s say that in such a case truth is preserved from antecedent to consequent.

.e ion
But the true conditionals associated with logical consequence are, in some way, not
merely truth-preserving. Quine’s account of this “way” is that these conditional re-
main truth-preserving when their non-logical expressions are suitably replaced by any
other non-logical expressions; one might say that they are logically truth-preserving.

an iss
A merely truth-preserving conditional with a false antecedent may fail to be truth-

du
preserving on some substitutions, and so would not be logically truth-preserving.
Thus not all false statements imply all statements. Similarly, a true antecedent may

m
turn false on some substitution that turns its antecedent true, so not all true statements
are implied by all statements. By Quine’s own lights, Russell’s mistake lies, not in a

per
use-mention confusion, but in a failure to distinguish materially true, that is to say,
merely true conditionals from logically true ones.
I want to emphasize that Quine’s view begins with the acknowledgment of a
distinction between material and logical conditionals. Quine then accounts for the

ut
distinction in terms of preservation of truth under appropriate substitutions. But this
is not the only way of accounting for the distinction. As we will see in Volume II,

ey
C. I. Lewis in effect advances a modal account: a conditional is logically true in
h@ itho
virtue of truth being necessarily preserved from its antecedent to its consequent, or
in virtue of the impossibility of its antecedent being true and its consequent being
sl
false. Given Russell’s rejection of modality this account is not open to him; nor is it
open to Quine, who is no friendlier to modality than Russell. So the question is: did
sh ite w

Russell, as Quine insinuates, simply fail to notice a distinction between two types of
we
(propositions expressed by) conditionals? Or did he have principled reasons against
Quine’s way of accounting for such a distinction?
I will now argue for the second option. The basis of my case is Russell’s argu-
ment for his claim, in Principles, that “a definition of implication is quite impossible”
(1903, §16, 14). This argument, we will see, provides reasons against analyzing the
c

relation Quine calls logical implication, i.e., the converse of logical consequence, as
ie

a special type of truth-preserving relation between propositions.


or not

Let’s start with an ancestor of the Principles argument, presented in the manuscript
“Fundamental Ideas and Axioms of Mathematics,” one of the last things Russell
wrote while retaining some allegiance to idealism:
o

‘If A is true, B is true’ implies ‘If B is false, A is false’. But ‘If A is true, B is true’ seems to
d.

mean ‘A implies B’. Here A and B are propositions. ‘A implies B’ seems to be an ultimate form
:d

of proposition, from which is inferred ‘A’s truth implies B’s truth’ and ‘B’s falsehood implies
A’s falsehood’. (1899, 292; emphases mine)

In order to make sense of Russell’s line of reasoning here, one can take his target to be
aft

something like an analysis of implication in terms of truth and falsity. Specifically,


the target is the claim that what it is for A to imply B is for B to be true if A is.
nf

Russell’s objection is that the hypothetical proposition “if A is true then B is true”
Dr

means “A implies B,” and so the analysis is circular. That this is Russell’s reasoning
is borne out by what he does next after presenting this argument. He argues that there
sa

“is a vicious circle in Moore’s account of logical priority” (1899, 293). It’s not clear
from the manuscript what Russell took Moore’s account to be, but this doesn’t matter.
What matters is the reasoning on the basis of which Russell criticizes Moore:
‘A implies B’ cannot mean ‘A’s truth implies B’s truth’; for here a simpler case of implication
The Materiality and Indefinability of Implication 265

is explained by one which is more complex. ‘A implies B’ implies ‘A’s truth implies B’s truth’
and also implies ‘B’s falsehood implies A’s falsehood’. But ‘A implies B’ applies to A and B
simply as propositions, and quite independently of their truth or falsehood. (1899, 292)

.e ion
‘A implies B’ has no essential reference to truth and falsehood …. (1899, 293)

Whatever Moore’s doctrine is, it’s hard to believe that he thought that the claim that
‘A implies B’ means ‘A’s truth implies B’s truth’ could provide a non-circular expla-

an iss
nation of the meaning of ‘implies’. So most likely the Moorean view under attack is
an analysis of “A implies B” as if “A is true so is B”.

du
The indefinability argument in Principles runs as follows:

m
[A] definition of implication is quite impossible. If p implies q, then if p is true q is true, i.e.
p’s truth implies q’s truth; also if q is false p is false, i.e. q’s falsehood implies p’s falsehood.

per
Thus truth and falsehood give us merely new implications, not a definition of implication. If
p implies q, then both are false or both true, or p is false and q true; it is impossible to have q
false and p true, and it is necessary to have q true or p false. In fact, the assertion that q is true
or p false turns out to be strictly equivalent to ‘p implies q’; but as equivalence means mutual

ut
implication, this still leaves implication fundamental, and not definable in terms of disjunction.
(1903, §16, 14-5; emphases mine)

ey
The relation in virtue of which it is possible for us validly to infer is what I call material
h@ itho
implication. We have already seen that it would be a vicious circle to define this relation as
meaning that if one proposition is true, then another is true, for if and then already involve
sl
implication. The relation holds, in fact, when it does hold, without any reference to the truth
or falsehood of the propositions involved. (1903, §37, 33; underlining mine)
sh ite w
we
Two things are relatively clear from these passages. First, some sort of “vicious
circle” stands in the way of a definition of implication. Second, definition is different
from “strict equivalence.” Let’s begin by trying to figure out what Russell means by
definition here, and how it is different from strict equivalence.
It is easier to grasp Russell’s conception of definition from the “Fundamental
Ideas” version of the argument. As we saw, what Russell rejects there is an analysis of
c

implication, a specification of what the holding of this relation between propositions


ie

consists in, by “reference to the truth or falsehood of the propositions involved.”


or not

Thus the difference between definition and strict equivalence is that strict equivalence
is no more than sameness of extension, without any claim that either side of the
equivalence specifies the nature of the other. Specifically, Russell holds that when,
and only when, a proposition p stands in the implication relation to a proposition q, the
o

truth-values of p and q are in one of the three states compatible with “the assertion that
d.
:d

q is true or p false”: “both are false or both true, or p is false and q true.” But it’s not
in virtue of the propositions having one of these three combinations of truth-values
that implication holds from one to the other. This is why there is strict equivalence
without definability.
aft

It’s clear that Russell’s argument turns on the assumption that “if and then al-
ready involve implication,” so that, e.g., the claim that “if p is true q is true” amounts
nf

to the claim that “p’s truth implies q’s truth.” Given this assumption, to take p’s im-
Dr

plying q to consist in q’s being true if p is true is to analyze what implication consist
in as the holding of an implication, from p’s truth to q’s truth. The vicious circularity
sa

of the analysis is evident.


Prima facie, this assumption simply begs the question against the Quinean claim
that some conditionals are not logical implications. But, on the basis of given cer-
tain features of the Moore-Russell metaphysics of propositions, we can reconstruct
266 Logic and Implication

an argument underlying the claim that “truth and falsehood give us merely new im-
plications” which doesn’t beg the question against a view very close to Quine’s. The
position that I will present as the target of Russell’s indefinability argument is related

.e ion
to Quine’s view in the following way. Quine’s account of logical truth is an expli-
cation of the idea that logical truth is truth in virtue of nothing more than the logical
structure or logical form of a statement, independent of any of the non-logical vocab-
ulary occurring in that statement. The view that I take the indefinability argument to

an iss
attack rests on a transposition of this idea of truth in virtue of logical form into the
Moore-Russell metaphysics of propositions.11

du
A preliminary before we begin. The reconstruction applies, not to Principles

m
as it stands, but to a somewhat idealized version of the views of this book. As we
have seen, in Principles Russell tried but failed, both technically and philosophi-

per
cally, to get by with formal implication as the only logical constant in the calculus
of propositions. Nevertheless, it’s clear that Russell conceived of propositions in
general as composed of logical constants together with other propositions and propo-
sitional functions. So I will consider a version of Principles based on Russell’s “The

ut
Theory of Implication,” written before Russell had rejected propositions as entities, in
which at least the technical difficulty has been overcome. In this paper, the primitive

ey
ideas are ★1∙1, assertion, ★1∙2, the logical constant material implication, ★1∙3, the
h@ itho
variable, ★1∙4, propositional function, ★1∙5, the logical constant negation, and, ★7∙0,
the logical constant universal quantifier (1906, 161-4, 194). I will also assume that
sl
disjunction and conjunction have been defined as Russell does in ★4 (1906, 175-6), so
that subsequent mention of these relations can be eliminated using those definitions.
sh ite w

Finally, I will use the notation of Principia.


we
Given Russell’s acceptance of the equivalence thesis, it is clear that for him if
p stands in the relation of material implication to q then truth is preserved from p
to q. According to the view that the indefinability argument attacks, the relation of
material implication is not the relation of logical implication. That relation is a sub-
relation of material implication, consisting of material implications that hold between
c

propositions in virtue of the logical structures or forms of those propositions.


ie

In order to define this notion of holding in virtue of logical structure, we begin


or not

with the notion of the logical form or structure of a Russellian proposition. This
consists of the way in which the proposition is composed of logical constants, propo-
sitional functions, and other propositions. For example, the proposition expressed
by
o
d.

Desdemona does not love Cassio


:d

is composed of the logical entity of negation and a complex of terms making up the
proposition expressed by
aft

Desdemona loves Cassio.


nf

The propositions expressed by other statements of negation are all composed in the
Dr

same way, from the negation constant and another proposition. This common way
of propositional composition is the logical structure of these propositions of nega-
sa

tion. That a Russellian proposition has the logical form it has is a fact about that
proposition.

11
I claim no originality here; no one familiar with Almog (1989) will be surprised by the following
sketch.
The Materiality and Indefinability of Implication 267

Now, although Russellian propositions are intensional entities, there is no rea-


son to think that their truth and falsity are not determined by their logical structures
and the truth or falsity of their component propositions and the propositions that are

.e ion
the values of their component propositional functions. For example, propositions
composed of negation and another proposition is true just in case the other proposi-
tion is false. Facts like these are about how the truth or falsity of certain propositions
is determined. The propositions in question are composed of a logical constant and

an iss
propositional functions or other propositions. Their truth or falsity is fixed by the

du
truth or falsity of those other propositions or values of propositional functions. Let’s
call such facts (logical) structural truth conditions of a logical constant.

m
A Russellian proposition p is true in virtue of its logical structure just in case
the logical structure of p, together with the structural truth conditions of the logical

per
constants that occur in p, suffice to determine p as true.
Here then is the analysis of logical implication against which Russell advances
the indefinability argument:

ut
A proposition p logically implies a proposition q

ey
consists in
h@ itho
The proposition that p materially implies q is true in virtue of its logical structure
sl
The intuitive idea underlying this analysis is that what it is for p to be related by
logical implication to q is for truth to be, not merely preserved from p to q, but
sh ite w
we
preserved on logical grounds, in virtue of the logical forms of p and q.
Here is an example of how this analysis is supposed to work. Obviously
(4) Socrates is not a sophist
is a logical consequence of
c

(5) Socrates is neither Spartan nor a sophist


ie
or not

In virtue of what does this logical implication hold? According to the analysis, it
holds because of the following four facts:
(1) The proposition expressed by (5),
o
d.

«∼, « «Socrates, is Spartan», ∨, «Socrates, is a sophist»»»


:d

is composed of negation and disjunction from


aft

(1) «Socrates, is Spartan», and


(2) «Socrates, is a sophist».
nf

This is the logical form of (5).


Dr

(2) The proposition expressed by (4),


sa

«∼, «Socrates, is a sophist»»,

is composed of negation from


268 Logic and Implication

«Socrates, is a sophist».

This is the logical form of (4).

.e ion
(3) For any proposition p, «∼, p» is true if and only if p is false.
This is the structural truth conditions of negated propositions.

an iss
(4) For any propositions p and q, «p, ∨, q» is false if and only if p is false and q
is false.

du
This is the structural truth conditions of disjunctive propositions.

m
The logical implication is supposed to hold because these four facts together deter-
mine that the material implication

per
««∼, ««Socrates, is Spartan», ∨, «Socrates, is a sophist»»»,⊃, «∼, «Socrates, is a sophist»»»

is true.

ut
The indefinability argument depends on two assumptions.

ey
(1) A fact is a true proposition.
h@ itho
(2) A fact is determined by a set of facts just in case the true proposition that is
the first fact is logically implied by the true propositions that are the other
facts.
sl
sh ite w

The basic idea underlying our reconstruction of the indefinability argument is simple.
we
The analysis of logical implication is truth in virtue of logical structure. But truth in
virtue of logical structure is the determination of the truth of a proposition by facts
about its logical structure. Since determination is logical implication, the analysis is
a circular specification of what logical implication consists in.
Slightly more precisely, the argument goes like this.
c
ie

(1) By assumption (1), the logical forms of propositions and the structural truth
or not

conditions of logical constants are propositions.


Now we introduce a bit of notation to state the analysis under attack somewhat more
perspicuously. For any propositions p and q, let π(p, q) be the proposition of the
material implication of q by p, i.e., «p, ⊃, q». Let σ(p) be the proposition stating the
o

logical structure of the proposition p. Let τ(κ) be the proposition stating the structural
d.

truth condition of the logical constant κ.


:d

(2) The analysis is then that p logically implies q holds in virtue of


aft

σ(π(p, q)).τ(κ1 ). … .τ(κn ) determining that π(p, q) is true.


nf

(3) But, by assumption (2), determination is logical implication


Dr

(4) Hence the analysis is that p logically implies q holds in virtue of


sa

σ(π(p, q)).τ(κ1 ). … .τ(κn ) logically implies the proposition «π(p, q), is true»

(5) That is, according to this analysis, the holding of any logical implication con-
sists in … the holding of another implication.
Whence Material Implication? 269

So the definition is “viciously circular,” and thus truth preservation in virtue of logical
structure is not the ground of, does not define, implication.
The critical assumption is (2): determination in the analysis of implication is

.e ion
logical implication. There are two bases for this assumption. First, given assump-
tion (1)—a fact is a true proposition, what it is for a set of facts to determine that
something is the case is for the truth of some proposition to be determined by the
truth of a set of propositions. Determination, then, has to be a relation from true

an iss
propositions to a true proposition. It is, in other words, a truth-preserving relation

du
among propositions. Now, logical implication is, of course, a truth-preserving re-
lation among propositions. So what would it mean for determination to be a non-

m
logical truth-preserving relation? It would mean that the relation of implication, in
fact, consists in a non-logical truth-preserving relation among propositions. But if

per
so, it’s not clear that how Russell could justify claiming that rules of inference based
on implication are logical. We come now to the other basis for the assumption. In
Principles Russell claims that “[w]hat is essential, from the logical point of view” to
Kant’s view of mathematics “is that the a priori intuitions [of space and time] supply

ut
methods of reasoning and inference which formal logic does not admit” (1903, §433,
456-7). What logicism aims to show is that mathematical theorems which seem to

ey
demand such non-logical methods of inference for their proof are in fact provable by
h@ itho
purely logical inferences. So it is critical for Russell’s logicism for the axioms based
on implication, by means of which Russell intends to demonstrate the theorems of
sl
mathematics, to be logical. If the notion of determination that lies at the basis of
implication is not logical implication, it’s unclear how Russell can justify logicism
sh ite w

against Kantian views of mathematics.


we
Here is how our reconstruction reflects Russell’s words. We saw that, as he
presents the indefinability argument in Principles, it turns on the premise that “if and
then already involve implication.” Now, one may well reject the view that ‘if … then’
invariably involves logical implication. However, on the present reconstruction, the
analysis of p logically implies q may be phrased thus: given the logical structures
c

of p and of q, if p is true, then q is true as well. That is to say, even if one rejects
ie

Russell’s premise for conditionals in general, it holds for the particular conditionals
or not

occurring in the analysis of logical implications, which is why this analysis fails.

8.5 Whence Material Implication?


o
d.

The indefinability argument shows why Russell would reject a Quinean notion of
:d

truth in virtue of logical structure as the ground of logical implication. However, this
conclusion leaves us with a question: why does Russell take implication to have these
“paradoxical” properties? This is an instance of a general question about the episte-
aft

mology of implication in Principles. The indefinability argument commits Russell


to accepting that knowledge of the holding of the relation of implication is not ulti-
nf

mately based on knowledge of the logical structural truth conditions of propositions.


Dr

But then the question is: how is knowledge of implication achieved? Since impli-
cation is one of the indefinables of logic, this question is itself an instance of the
sa

question of how we come by our knowledge of indefinables.


In Principles Russell’s answer to this question is couched in terms of a concep-
tion of mental perception:

The discussion of indefinables … is the endeavour to see clearly, and to make others see clearly,
270 Logic and Implication

the entities concerned, in order that the mind may have that kind of acquaintance with them
which it has with redness or the taste of a pineapple. (1903, xv)

.e ion
In Principles §37 Russell expressly states that “the mind” perceives the relation of
implication “in inference” exactly as “passively” as “in perception of sensible ob-
jects.” It seems that according to Russell we have something like a quasi-perceptual
faculty by which we are acquainted with, and so gain epistemic access to, entities

an iss
such as implication. As we saw in §5.3, before he rejected modality Russell held a
variant of this view with respect to necessity: the necessity of some judgments has to

du
be simply perceived “as one perceives that the sky is blue.” Here in Principles Russell

m
appears to specify how the mental perception is achieved: it is by “discussion” that
one attempts to “see indefinables clearly.” But how does “discussion” accomplish

per
this? How, in particular, does “discussion” enable one to “see” such properties of
implication as the “paradoxes” of material implication?
I don’t know of any place where Russell discusses this issue explicitly. How-
ever, we can conjecture an account in terms of Kurt Gödel’s well-known view that
“[d]espite their remoteness from sense experience, we do have something like a per-

ut
ception also of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the fact that the axioms force

ey
themselves on us as being true” (1964, 271).12 Gödel’s ground for claiming that we
h@ itho
have “something like a perception” of abstract objects is our acceptance of the axioms
of set theory. One can extend this further: the perception of set-theoretic objects op-
sl
erates via doing set theory—thinking about the axioms and reasoning to the theorems.
I take it that Russell has an analogous conception how “discussion” leads to seeing
sh ite w

the properties of implication. Recall that in Principia he writes, “every deductive sys-
we
tem must contain among its premisses as many of the properties of implication as are
necessary to legitimate the ordinary procedure of deduction” (1910, 90). This means
that we discover the properties of implication by examining “the ordinary procedure
of deduction.” In light of the indefinability argument, Russell must take knowledge
of properties of implication to be based ultimately, not on structural truth conditions
c

of propositions, but on reflection on our inferential practices. On this reading, then,


ie

Russell’s grounds for the “paradoxical” features of material implication would con-
or not

sist of forms of inference that we accept as valid.


But what about the equivalence thesis? What would be Russell’s grounds for
holding that p implies q is equivalent to either p is false or q is true? I take the answer
to be this. We start by identifying features of the relation of implication, on the basis
o

of reflecting on inferential practice. Then, from these features of implication, we


d.

infer facts about truth-values of propositions that stand in the relation of implication.
:d

This procedure is what Russell is describing in “Fundamental Ideas” when he writes,


“ ‘A implies B’ seems to be an ultimate form of proposition, from which is inferred
‘A’s truth implies B’s truth’ and ‘B’s falsehood implies A’s falsehood’ ” (1899, 292).
aft

Moreover, we can now understand better the third sentence of Principles §16:
nf

If p implies q, then both are false or both true, or p is false and q true; it is impossible to have
Dr

q false and p true, and it is necessary to have q true or p false.

This sentence expresses a line of reasoning from deductive practice to truth-values.


sa

If we take q to be implied by p, then we also take it to be ruled out, to be impossible,


that q is false and p true. For a proposition to be impossible is for it to be necessarily
12
This attempt to understand Russell through Gödel is partly justified by Gödel’s extensive interest in
Russell, as evidenced by the Max-Phil Notebooks; see in particular Floyd and Kanamori (2015).
Whence Material Implication? 271

false. But Russell does not distinguish necessity from truth, so for the proposition
that q is false and p true to be necessarily false is simply for it to be false, that is, for
it not to be the case that q is false and p true. Given that every proposition is either

.e ion
true or false, it follows that either p is false or q is true. But this gives us just half
of the equivalence thesis, from implication to truth-preservation. Russell is aware
of this. Following the sentence we just examined, he immediately says, “[i]n fact,
the assertion that q is true or p false turns out to be strictly equivalent to ‘p implies

an iss
q’,” and he concludes the paragraph by saying “these are results to be demonstrated”;

du
that is, at this point the equivalence thesis has not yet been “demonstrated.” So the
question is, what is the demonstration of the other half of the equivalence—if p is

m
false or q true, then p implies q?
As far as I can tell, in Principles Russell doesn’t argue for this half of the equiva-

per
lence. On the interpretation just outlined, one would expect that if Russell gives such
an argument, it would rest on inferential practices. This expectation is met in the
only discussions of the equivalence thesis between Principles and Principia known
to me, in “Necessity and Possibility” (1905) and “The Theory of Implication” (1906).

ut
In “Necessity and Possibility” Russell writes,

ey
[T]he doctrine of implication, according to which ‘p implies q’ … is equivalent to ‘p is not
h@ itho
true or q is true’ … is rendered unavoidable by various considerations, such, for example, as
the following. Suppose p, q, r to be such that if p and q are true, then r is true. It follows that
sl
if p is true, then if q is true, r is true. (For example, if a person is male and married, he is a
husband; hence if a person is male, then if he is married he is a husband.) Now if p and q are
true, then p is true. Hence, by the above principle, if p is true, then if q is true, p is true; that is,
sh ite w
we
if p is true, then q implies p; that is, a true proposition (p) is implied by every proposition (q).
I shall not pursue the arguments in favour of this view of implication; I shall content myself
by pointing out that it is accepted (though without a full realization of its consequences) by
Shakespeare and Mr. Bradley in the following passage (Logic, p. 121):
Speed. But tell me true, will’t be a match?
c

Launce. Ask my dog: if he say ay, it will; if he say no, it will; if he shake his tail
ie

and say nothing, it will.


or not

On the strength of these authorities, therefore, I shall henceforth assume that ‘p implies q’ is
equivalent to ‘p is not true or q is true’. (1905, 514; emphases mine)

It’s clear that Russell is here arguing that the equivalence thesis is “unavoidable,”
and equally clear that the basis of the argument consists of two forms of inference to
o

whose validity Russell evidently takes us to be committed. These are in fact, in order
d.
:d

of appearance in this passage, axioms (8) and (5) of Principles §18:


(8) pq. ⊃ .r ∶ ⊃p,q,r ∶ p. ⊃ .q ⊃ r Exportation
(5) pq.⊃p,q .p Simplification
aft

Russell begins by applying Exportation to Simplification to yield the positive “para-


nf

dox” of material implication: if a proposition q is true, then any proposition p, whether


Dr

true or false, implies q; this is the point of the quotation from Two Gentlemen of
Verona. Russell then moves immediately from the positive “paradox” to the equiva-
sa

lence thesis, but this is surely too fast. The conclusion at this point tells us only what
implications a true proposition q stands in; it doesn’t tell us what implications a false
proposition p stands in, and so we can’t yet conclude that if either p is false or q is
true, then p implies q. But what I want to emphasize is the way in which Russell
argues: from forms of inference we accept to the consequences of the truth-values
272 Logic and Implication

of propositions for the implications in which those propositions stand. This is ex-
actly the form of argument that, according to the present interpretation of Russell’s
Principles epistemology of implication, Russell would use.

.e ion
The discussion of implication in “Theory of Implication” involves certain in-
teresting complexities we will come to shortly. For now, I want to point out that
Russell repeats, almost verbatim, the argument from “Necessity and Possibility” for
the positive “paradox”:

an iss
[P]aradoxes result from restricting the meaning of implication. For example, it will be admit-

du
ted that ‘if p and q are true, then r is true’ is equivalent to ‘if p is true, then if q is true, r is

m
true’, i.e. to ‘if p is true, then q implies r’. Also it will be admitted that if p and q are true, then
p is true. Hence, by the above admission, if p is true, then q implies p …. Hence, unless a true

per
proposition p is to be implied by every entity q, one at least of the above obvious propositions
will have to be denied. (1906, 162; emphasis mine)

And, importantly, Russell claims that it’s rejecting what we’ve been calling the pos-
itive “paradox” that would lead to genuinely paradoxical results, because to reject

ut
the positive “paradox” is to reject one or the other of (5) and (8), but these are two

ey
intuitively indispensable principles of inference. This is why I have used scare quotes
h@ itho
on “paradox” throughout.
One final point. Russell could complete the argument for the equivalence the-
sl
sis by establishing the negative “paradox” of material implication—if a proposition
p is false, then it implies any proposition q, whether true or false—from features of
implication. So far as I know, Russell never explicitly provides such an argument be-
sh ite w
we
tween Principles and Principia. In Principles the negative “paradox” is incorporated
into the definition of ∼p as (r ⊃ r) ⊃r (p ⊃ r), i.e., p implies every proposition;13
however, not only is this move question-begging but, as we saw, this definition of
negation is problematic. We can, however, construct an argument for the negative
“paradox” on the basis of an argument for the principle that a contradiction implies
every proposition given by C. I. Lewis (1932, 250). The argument is based on five
c

principles about implication, which I formulate using Russell’s material implication


ie

sign:
or not

(1) p.q ⊃ p and p.q ⊃ q


A conjunction implies each of its conjuncts
(2) p⊃p∨q
o
d.

Any proposition implies its disjunction with any other


:d

(3) p ⊃ (q ⊃ p.q)
Two propositions imply their conjunction
aft

(4) ∼p.(p ∨ q) ⊃ q
If one disjunct of a true disjunction is false then the other disjunct is true
nf
Dr

(5) (p.q ⊃ r) ⊃ (p ⊃ (q ⊃ r))


Exportation, used in the positive “paradox”
sa

13
An actual derivation of the negative “paradox” in the system of Principles, assuming that it allows
derivations from non-logical premises, is fairly straightforward. Assume (1) that ∼p, i.e. (r ⊃ r) ⊃r (p ⊃ r)
and (2) that q is a proposition, i.e., q ⊃ q. Universal instantiation of r with q in (1) yields (q ⊃ q) ⊃ (p ⊃ q).
Modus ponens with (2) yields p ⊃ q. Now discharge (1) followed by (2) to get (q ⊃ q). ⊃ .∼p ⊃ (p ⊃ q).
Universal generalization then yields the negative “paradox”: (q ⊃ q). ⊃p,q .∼p ⊃ (p ⊃ q).
Implication in Principia 273

Lewis’s argument may be captured as a derivation from non-logical premises. As-


sume p.∼p. By 1, we get p, so by 2, we get p ∨ q. From the assumption and 1, we
also get ∼p. So, by 3 and 4, we get q. Discharging p.∼p, we get p.∼p ⊃ q . 5 then

.e ion
yields the negative “paradox.” Russell of course “admits” 5. It’s not clear why he
shouldn’t “admit” the remaining principles.

an iss
8.6 Implication in Principia

du
Russell’s views underwent a number of much-studied changes between Principles

m
and Principia:
• The theory of descriptions replaces the theory of denoting concepts.

per
• The theory of types, whatever exactly it is, is officially adopted.
• The notion of propositions as complex entities that are the objects of judgment
and belief is rejected in favor of the multiple-relation theory of judgment.

ut
There is, however, another change, which has not received much attention:

ey

h@ itho
Implication is defined in Principia.
In fact, implication is defined by precisely the equivalence thesis:
sl
The meaning to be given to implication in what follows may at first sight appear somewhat
artificial; but although there are other legitimate meanings, the one here adopted is very much
sh ite w
we
more convenient for our purposes than any of its rivals. The essential property that we require
of implication is this: ‘What is implied by a true proposition is true’. It is in virtue of this
property that implication yields proofs. But this property by no means determines whether
anything, and if so what, is implied by a false proposition. What it does determine is that,
if p implies q, then it cannot be the case that p is true and q is false, i.e. it must be the case
that, either p is false or q is true. The most convenient interpretation of implication is to say,
c

conversely, that if either p is false or q is true, then ‘p implies q’ is to be true. Hence ‘p implies
ie

q’ is to be defined to mean: ‘Either p is false or q is true.’ (1910, 19; emphases mine)


or not

Why this change of mind over the definability of implication? Does Russell at this
point think that there is no vicious circle in taking the ground of implication to be
truth and falsity?
No. In Principia, Russell has a different view of what counts as a definition. In
o
d.

order to see this, consider how he characterizes Cantor’s definition of the continuum:
:d

what [Cantor] is defining is the object which has the properties commonly associated with
the word ‘continuum,’ though what precisely constitutes these properties had not before been
known. In such cases, a definition is a ‘making definite’: it gives definiteness to an idea which
aft

had previously been more or less vague. (1910, 12)


nf

The same holds of Russell’s definition of implication. It is a “making definite” of an


Dr

idea that had previously been vague. Russell has a fairly standard view of vagueness.
The idea of a relation is vague if although there are terms that we take definitely to
sa

stand in that relation and terms that we take definitely not to stand in it, there are also
a range of “borderline” cases, terms which for us neither definitely stand nor defi-
nitely fail to stand in that relation. To make such an idea definite is to lay down what
is nowadays called a sharpening or a precisification of a vague term, in this case, the
relational expression ‘implies’. A sharpening keeps the definite cases fixed, and puts
274 Logic and Implication

each of the borderline cases either in or out of the extension of the sharpened rela-
tion. But there are, in general, many different ways of placing the borderline cases
in or out of the extension of the sharpened relation, many different sharpenings of a

.e ion
single vague expression. So long as the original definite cases remain in or out of the
extension of the sharpened relation in accordance with whether they are definitely
in or definitely out of the extension of the vague expression, the sharpening is le-
gitimate. This is why according to Russell there are “other legitimate meanings of

an iss
implication.” The definite cases for the vague idea of implication are given by what

du
Russell calls “[t]he essential property that we require of implication,” namely, true
propositions do not imply false ones. That is, we take it that any true proposition def-

m
initely does not stand in the relation of implication to any false one. This property is
essential to implication because it is “in virtue of this property that implication yields

per
proofs.” Here one has to bear in mind Russell’s conception of proof, which consists
of establishing truths by inferring them from true premises14 by modus ponens: if p
implies q and p is true, then, provided that true propositions do not imply false ones,
q is true. It is by reflecting on our deductive practices that one gets to this “essential

ut
property,” for it makes no sense to take any false proposition to be correctly inferred
from a true one.

ey
If this property is the only constraint on a relation for it to “yield proofs,” then
h@ itho
any non-empty relation R between propositions having the following feature:
sl
whenever any propositions p and q satisfy the condition:
(*) p is true and q is false
sh ite w
we
p does not stand in R to q
yields proofs. It should be clear that there are many (extensionally) distinct relations
that have this feature, differing on which of the propositions p and q that fail condition
(*) count as standing in that relation. Russell in effect picks out from among these
c

relations the one which holds of the most propositions: so long as propositions p and
ie

q fail to satisfy (*), p materially implies q. This is why Russell takes his definition
or not

to give “the most general meaning compatible with the preservation of” the essential
characteristic of implication.
But why is this definition more “convenient” for Russell’s purposes than others?
Russell never says, so here we are in the realm of conjecture. Perhaps the definition
o

is “convenient” because it does not require distinguishing among ordered pairs of


d.

propositions that fail (*). Another possibility concerns the formulation of the propo-
:d

sitional calculus. The Principles account is messy. Russell takes (formal) implication
to be the only indefinable notion, and defines
aft

p and q as [for all r,] if p implies that q implies r, then r is true


p or q as ‘p implies q’ implies q
nf

not p as “p implies r” whatever r may be. (16-18)


Dr

Moreover, Russell has to take as an axiom a principle called “reduction”:


sa

“ ‘p implies q’ implies p” implies p (1903, 17)

14
Thus, arguments by reductio are strictly speaking not proofs; but Russell thinks that all such argu-
ments can be converted into genuine proofs.
Implication in Principia 275

Russell finds that he cannot prove excluded middle or double negation elimination
without reduction; unfortunately it “has less self-evidence than” the other axioms.
In comparison, Principia is considerably tidier. Negation and disjunction are both

.e ion
primitive notions, so conjunction can be defined in an easily explainable way. Of the
five primitive propositions of the propositional calculus, perhaps only the fifth, which
Russell explains as “in an implication, an alternative may be added to both premiss
and conclusion without impairing the truth of the implication” (1910, 97), requires

an iss
some thought to be accepted as a principle of inference. So perhaps the convenience

du
lies in simpler definitions and more self-evident axioms; all paid for with just one bit
of artificiality.

m
What we have just now seen is that the conception of definition in Principia is
an ancestor of Carnap’s notion of explication: the precise delineation of some aspect

per
of a pre-theoretical notion for theoretical purposes, where the result of incorporating
the sharpened notion into a theory is judged by pragmatic considerations (see Carnap,
1950, 3). So Russell’s change of mind from Principles to Principia is not over the
definability of implication; it is over what a definition of implication consists in. In

ut
Principles, a definition of implication in terms of truth and falsity is an analysis of
the ground of implication. There is no reason to think that Russell ever gave up the

ey
Principles position that such an analysis is circular. Nor is there reason to think that
h@ itho
Russell gave up the view that we come to know properties of implication through
reflection on our deductive practices. What Russell came to accept is that all that a
sl
definition of implication has to accomplish, for carrying out proofs as required by his
logicist project, is be an explication that respects one central intuitive characteristic
sh ite w

of implication.
we
In fact, this pragmatic view of implication can already be discerned in Princi-
ples. In §37 Russell summarizes the argument against the definability of implication
and then goes on to claim that the relation of implication holds “without any refer-
ence to the truth or falsehood of the propositions involved.” And yet, at the end of
the very next paragraph, he writes,
c
ie

[T]here must be a relation holding between nothing except propositions, and holding between
or not

any two propositions of which either the first is false or the second true. Of the various equiv-
alent relations satisfying these conditions, one is to be called implication. (1903, 34)
At first blush, these two paragraphs are not mutually consistent. Russell seems first
to claim that there exists a relation of implication which we can’t identify via truth
o

and falsity, but then to claim that we can pick one from a range of relations identified
d.

through truth-values and just decide to “call it” implication. But in fact, there is a way
:d

of rendering these texts consistent. While the ground of the relation of implication
does not consist in the obtaining of conditions involving the truth-values of propo-
sitions, nevertheless, the holding of implication between two propositions requires
aft

their truth-values to satisfy certain conditions. But these conditions do not single out
a unique relation between propositions. Rather, there are “various equivalent rela-
nf

tions satisfying these conditions”; by “equivalent” Russell means “equivalent as far


Dr

as satisfying these conditions is concerned.” But, if our interest in implication is only


in this relation’s satisfying these conditions, then nothing prevents us from settling
sa

on one of these relations and “calling it implication.”


Moreover, recall that the argument for the positive “paradox” given in “Neces-
sity and Possibility” is repeated in “Theory of Implication.” Both papers were written
within a year of one another, between Principles and Principia. “Theory of Implica-
tion” is something like a penultimate draft of Principia’s account of the propositional
276 Logic and Implication

calculus, but one important difference is that in the paper Russell takes implication
to be a primitive idea, not defined. However, the explanation given by Russell of the
primitive idea of implication here is almost word-for-word identical to the explana-

.e ion
tion of the definition of implication given in Principia:

The meaning to be given to implication in what follows may at first sight appear somewhat
artificial; but although there are other legitimate meanings, the one here adopted is, if I am not

an iss
mistaken, very much more convenient {for our purposes} than any of its rivals. The essential
property that we require of implication is this: ‘What is implied by a true proposition is true’.

du
It is in virtue of this property that implication yields proofs. But this property by no means

m
determines whether anything, and if so what, is implied by a false proposition, or by something
which is not a proposition at all. What it does determine is that, if p implies q, then it cannot
be the case that p is true and q is {false, i.e. it must be the case that, either p is false or q is}

per
not true. The most convenient interpretation of implication is to say, conversely, that unless
p is true and q is not true, ‘p implies q’ is to be true. Hence, “p implies q” will be a relation
which holds between any two entities p and q unless p is true and q is not true, i.e. whenever
either p is not true or q is true. {if either p is false or q is true, then “p implies q” is to be true.

ut
Hence “p implies q” is to be defined to mean: ‘Either p is false or q is true.’} (1906, 161-2;
material deleted from the paper struck out; material added in the book in curly braces)

ey
h@ itho
After giving this explanation of the meaning “given” to implication, Russell brings
in the argument for the positive “paradox” as additional support for this meaning of
sl
implication. Russell’s argument, as we saw, is that “paradoxes result from restrict-
ing the meaning of implication” (1906, 162), i.e., from not taking implication to hold
whenever it’s not the case that the antecedent is true and the consequent false, because
sh ite w
we
we would then have to reject the two obvious principles governing implication, ax-
ioms (5) and (8) of Principles. So, at this point, in 1906, Russell is wavering between
thinking that he is “giving” implication a convenient meaning and thinking that this
meaning is forced on us by principles of deduction we all accept. Russell’s change of
mind from Principles to Principia represents, in the end, not the repudiation of any
c

doctrine, but a change of relative emphasis among views.


ie
or not
o
d.
:d
aft
nf
Dr
sa
9

.e ion
The Continuing Banishment of
Modality

an iss
du
m
In this chapter, I treat Russell’s account of modal notions after the amodalism of
Principles. In §9.1 I examine Moore’s attempt to give an account of necessity to

per
replace Kant’s theory of necessity, which Moore had criticized in “The Nature of
Judgment.” This account is in terms of the notion of logical priority, and Russell
argues, on the basis of his conception of implication, that this account fails. In §9.2
we will see a further important development of Russell’s views of modality, in the

ut
unpublished lecture “Necessity and Possibility.” In this lecture, he formulates a new
argument against modal notions. The argument begins with a survey of some four

ey
or five intuitions about modality. Russell proceeds to make them more precise, in
h@ itho
terms of notions of logic. Each of the resulting accounts, however, has one or more
of three characteristics: (a) the property of propositions it picks out is not logically,
sl
but at best epistemologically, significant, or, (b) it doesn’t distinguish necessary from
true or contingent propositions, or, (c) it conflicts with some other intuition we have
sh ite w

about necessity or possibility. This result Russell takes to provide evidence that we
we
have no coherent single intuitive conception of necessity and possibility. So, even if
this evidence is not conclusive, it’s unclear whether anything would be lost to logic
and philosophy if we simply replaced modal concepts with one or the other of the
accounts of modal intuitions in logical terms. The importance of this new argument
is that it allows Russell to continue to maintain his anti-modal position despite a
c

major change in his philosophy—the rejection of Moore-Russell propositions—that


ie

appears to block Moore’s argument for the absoluteness of truth. I briefly outline
or not

this change and its consequence in §9.2.6. In the concluding §9.3 I demonstrate
Russell’s continuing commitment, after “Necessity and Possibility,” to the view that,
in the absence of coherent intuitions about necessity and possibility, these concepts
are best eliminated in favor of coherent logical reconstructions.
o
d.
:d

9.1 Moore on Necessity as Logical Priority


Shortly after “Nature of Judgment,” in “Necessity” (1900), Moore gave up the view
aft

that all true propositions are necessary. This is not because he rejected the arguments
of “Nature of Judgment,” but because he came to think that the property, or, as he puts
nf

it, “predicate” of necessity is not what he took it to be in “Nature of Judgment.” Most


Dr

of “Necessity” is devoted to an examination of proposals for identifying properties


of propositions by possessing which a proposition counts as necessary.
sa

The account that Moore finally adopts is a version of the proposal that a truth is
necessary if it is universal:

There is, I think, a sense in which, not indeed strict universality, but a certain generality may
be claimed for all [necessary truths]. ….
278 The Continuing Banishment of Modality

This generality of necessary truths is what I take Kant to have established in part of his
diverse proofs that they are a priori. But … my contention is that you can but show [a truth] to
be a priori, and that you then add no new or true fact about it, but only a new name, when you

.e ion
also dub it necessary. The theory, briefly stated, is this: That a priori means logically prior,
and that any truth which is logically prior to some other true proposition is so far necessary;
but, that as you get more and more true propositions to which a given truth is logically prior, so
you approach that region within which the given truth will be said to be absolutely necessary

an iss
or a priori. There will, then, be only a difference of degree between necessary truths and many
others, namely, a difference in the number of propositions to which they bear a certain logical

du
relation (1900, 299-300)

m
Necessity is identified with apriority, but not with the Kantian epistemological con-
ception of the a priori as what is knowable independent of experience. Rather, for

per
Moore apriority rests on a logical relation of priority. Thus, “no proposition is nec-
essary in itself,” but only in being “connected … with other propositions” through
logical priority. Neither the precise analysis of necessity nor the nature of logical
priority is very clear. The quoted passage suggests two ways of understanding of the

ut
analysis. First, “any truth which is logically prior to some other true proposition is so
far necessary” suggests that necessity isn’t a property of propositions at all, but rather

ey
a relation among propositions: if a proposition p is logically prior to a proposition
h@ itho
q, then p is necessary with respect to q. The other view, based on “as you get more
and more true propositions to which a given truth is logically prior, you approach
sl
that region within which the given truth is absolutely necessary,” is that necessity
is a property that comes in degrees, so that one proposition may be more necessary
sh ite w

than a second, less necessary than a third, and equally necessary as a fourth. Moore’s
we
words suggest that there is something like a precise measure of degrees of necessity,
determined by the number of truths to which a proposition is prior. But perhaps a
more plausible alternative would be that the basic relations of necessity are relations
of comparative necessity: p is more necessary than q just in case there is a true propo-
sition r to which p is prior and q is not, but no true proposition to which q is prior and
c

p is not; p and q are equally necessary if neither is more necessary than the other.
ie

Now, what is logical priority? Moore claims that it is the relation among propo-
or not

sitions we mention when we claim that “one proposition is presupposed, or implied,


or involved in another” (1900, 300). Moore’s account of this relation proceeds by
attempting
o

to point it out …. It needs, I think, only to be seen in any instance, in order to be recognised.
d.

Thus when we say: Here are two chairs, and there are two chairs, and therefore, in all, there
:d

are four chairs; it would commonly be admitted that we presuppose in our conclusion that 2
+ 2 = 4. …. Similarly, when a man says: This is white, and that is black, and therefore these
are different objects; we should say he implied that black and white are different. [I]f we go
farther and say: That things which have different properties are different; this is a principle
aft

which is involved in every particular judgment of difference that we make; and we should be
unable to give any reason for our judgment that the things are different, except that this and
nf

that property, which belong to them respectively, are different. (1900, 300-1)
Dr

Moore identifies explicitly in his examples the propositions that are logically prior,
sa

but it’s not clear what exactly are the propositions to which they are prior. In the
first example, it seems that ‘2+2=4’ is supposed to be implied by or presupposed
in the conclusion of the argument, but that is surely the proposition that there are
four chairs. In what sense does this proposition imply or presuppose the arithmetical
truth? It seems, rather, that this truth is presupposed by the whole argument, in the
Russell on our “Feelings” of Necessity 279

sense that it is required to justify the conclusion from the premises. This applies
also to the second example. Moore seems to be arguing that the general logically
prior principle that things with different properties are different is involved in all

.e ion
particular judgments of difference, because the only grounds sufficient for justifying
such particular judgments are differences in properties. So it’s the inference, rather
than the conclusion by itself, that presupposes the general principle.
One way to clarify what Moore has in mind is to look at an account of logical

an iss
priority that Russell discusses in “Fundamental Ideas and Axioms of Mathematic”:

du
If we have ‘Q implies P1 and P2 and … and Pn ’, ‘ΣP implies Q’, then we say Pr is prior to Q;

m
we have Q implies Pr but not Pr implies Q. (1899, 293)

per
What underlies Russell’s thinking here is the idea that presuppositions are necessary
conditions. The claim that Q presupposes Pr then amounts to the claim that Q requires
Pr , that is to say, Pr ’s truth is necessary for Q to be true. If, in contrast, Pr is not by
itself sufficient for Q, as Russell envisages in the text just quoted, but sufficient only
in the company of other propositions, then Pr by itself doesn’t imply Q, that is to

ut
say, Pr ’s truth doesn’t require Q’s truth. So Pr has to be true, as it were, before Q

ey
can be true, but not vice versa. Thus Pr is logically prior to Q. As we saw in the
h@ itho
last chapter, in this manuscript Russell had already argued that implication is not
analyzable in terms of truth and falsity, he spells out this intuitive picture in terms of
sl
implication rather than truth and falsity.
Coming back now to Moore: one can take him to have in mind that if an in-
ference presupposes some general principle, then the truth of the conclusion of that
sh ite w
we
inference depends both on the premises and on the general principle: if the general
principle is false, then the truth of the conclusion doesn’t follow from that of the
premise. The general principle then counts as prior in accordance with the intuition
that underlies Russell’s account of logical priority in “Fundamental Ideas”: the truth
of the conclusion depends logically on the truth of the general principle, so the gen-
c

eral principle has to be true before the conclusion can be true, which is the reason
ie

why the general principle is logically prior to the conclusion. If this is right, then
or not

on Moore’s account any premise in a deductive argument, including purely logical


premises, are logically prior to its conclusion.
Now we can see why Moore takes some truths to be more necessary than others.
On the assumption that the propositions of logic are premises in all deductive argu-
ments, they are prior to all conclusions of all such arguments. The propositions of
o
d.

geometry are premises in deductive arguments for spatial propositions and so prior
:d

to those propositions. Now, all deductive arguments for spatial propositions are de-
ductive arguments, but not vice versa. So the propositions of logic are presupposed
by more conclusions than the propositions of geometry, and so are more necessary.
aft

9.2 Russell on our “Feelings” of Necessity


nf
Dr

As we saw, around the time of Principles Russell took Moore’s “Nature of Judgment”
argument showing that all truths are necessary to demonstrate that modality is of no
sa

logical or philosophical importance. It is in terms of this conclusion that Russell ini-


tially tried to make sense of Moore’s logical priority account of necessity. In “L’idée
d’ordre,” Russell fastens on one interpretation of this account, that a proposition is
necessary if it is logically prior to many true propositions. Russell takes this, not
280 The Continuing Banishment of Modality

to be an analysis of the property of necessity, but rather to furnish a psychological


explanation of why we call certain propositions necessary:

.e ion
La nécessité semble être une notion plutôt psychologique que logique. Il y a certaines proposi-
tions (notamment celles qu’impliquent un grand nombre d’autres propositions que nous croyons
être vraies) dont il nous semble presque impossible de douter. Nous les appelons alors néces-
saires[footnote to Moore’s “Necessity.”] (1901, 275)

an iss
In Principles Russell again refers to Moore’s paper, here seeing it, more plausibly, as

du
an account in logical terms of necessity as a gradable property of propositions:

m
The only logical meaning of necessity seems to be derived from implication. A proposition is
more or less necessary according as the class of propositions for which it is a premiss is greater

per
or smaller.[footnote to Moore’s “Necessity.”] In this sense the propositions of logic have the
greatest necessity, and those of geometry have a high degree of necessity. (1903, §430, 454)

The context of this approving reference to Moore is an argument against one of


Lotze’s arguments “designed to prove the Kantian apriority of space,” which Rus-

ut
sell represents as follows:

ey
h@ itho
There are, it says, necessary propositions concerning space, which show that the nature of
space is not a ‘mere fact’. We are intended to infer that space is an à priori intuition, and a
psychological reason is given why we cannot imagine holes in space. (1903, §430, 454)
sl
It’s hard to believe that this is a accurate or fair reading of Lotze or Kant, given that
sh ite w

Russell equates “space is an a priori intuition” with “there cannot really be any space
we
at all except in our imaginations” (1903, §430, 454). However, for our purposes what
is important to note is how Russell attacks this argument. He cites the amodality of
truth—“there seems to be no true proposition of which there is any sense in saying that
it might have been false”—to argue that there are no such things as necessary propo-
sitions distinct from “mere facts”; hence there’s nothing that requires the apriority of
c

space to account for. It is at this point that he refers to Moore’s logical priority theory
ie

as a workable theory of necessity. But, Russell immediately insists, this logical con-
or not

ception of necessity does no philosophical work for Lotze: even if the propositions
of geometry are premises in more arguments than certain other classes of proposi-
tions, it doesn’t follow that they are true in any special way distinct from the way
those other propositions are true. They are “mere facts,” like any other truths; hence
o

necessity as logical priority does nothing to support Kantian doctrines of apriority.


d.

Russell never moves very far from this assessment of the logical and philosoph-
:d

ical significance of modality. However, he came to realize, after Principles, that


even if one accepts that there are no modes of truth, it doesn’t immediately follow
that necessity and possibility should be extruded from logic and philosophy. It is
aft

plausible that this realization comes from reflecting on the case of Moore who, after
demonstrating in “Nature of Judgment” that the truth and falsity of propositions are
nf

absolute, nevertheless move on, in “Necessity,” to advance the logical priority ac-
Dr

count of necessity. This at suggests that Moore assumes that necessity is a property
of propositions, and takes the failure of the conception of necessity as a mode of truth
sa

to show only that we have given the wrong characterization of that property. More-
over, Moore’s view of the property of goodness in Principia Ethica (1903) suggests
that even if we can’t, in principle, come up with a definition of necessity, it doesn’t
follow that there isn’t a genuine indefinable property of necessity that we have in
mind when we ascribe necessity to propositions. Such a view goes naturally with the
Russell on our “Feelings” of Necessity 281

position that Russell held in 1899: necessity is a property we simply perceive, as we


perceive the color of the sky. Thus, in the unpublished lecture “Necessity and Pos-
sibility” of 1905, Russell attempts to undermine the assumption that there is a single

.e ion
property of propositions we have in mind in talking about necessity.
Russell begins by saying that philosophers who advance “definitions of neces-
sity” “believed that they have an idea of necessity, and that the definitions they gave
were true, i.e. gave marks, other than necessity, which are common and peculiar to

an iss
what is necessary” (1905, 509; first emphasis mine). The truth of such an assump-

du
tion is required for “different definitions” to be “marks of philosophical disagree-
ment” (1905, 509). Russell illustrates this point by an allusion to Principia Ethica:

m
“For example, when one writer says that the good is a pleasure, and another that it is
virtue, they differ in opinion, because both attach the same meaning to the word good,

per
though they differ as to the things that are good” (1905, 509; emphasis in original).
Russell explicitly names Meinong as a philosopher who makes such an assumption
about necessity: “Meinong … regards necessity as a recognizable property of propo-
sitions, discoverable by inspection, and not standing in need of a definition” (1905,

ut
509).
Without saying whether he thinks the assumption correct with respect to ‘good’,

ey
Russell asserts that the “main question to be considered in regard to necessity” is the
h@ itho
truth of the assumption for necessity:
sl
Is there any such predicate as necessity, as distinct from the various predicates which various
definitions assert to be equivalent to it? If not, different definitions do not disagree philosoph-
sh ite w

ically, but only as regards the use of words. (1905, 509)


we
Russell follows this immediately by putting his cards on the table: “I do not myself
believe that there is such a predicate as necessity, apart from definitions which are
strictly verbal definitions; though I hardly see how my opinion is to be proved” (1905,
509).
c

If Russell doesn’t believe that his view can be proved, what is he doing in this
ie

essay? His explicit agenda is to “consider various definitions of necessity, with a


or not

view to discovering, if possible, what people really have in their minds when they
affirm necessity” (1905, 509). Specifically, he discusses four types of definition of
necessity. In each case except possibly one Russell begins by attempting to isolate
the “feeling” or “feelings” of necessity that motivate the definitions. He then con-
tinues by making the definitions more precise, sometimes in more than one way, in
o
d.

terms of notions of logic. These reconstructions of modal distinctions show that “it is
:d

possible to make valid distinctions among propositions, which will have some of the
characteristics of the traditional modal distinctions” (1905, 508; emphasis mine). Fi-
nally, he argues that each precise account has one or more of three characteristics: (a)
aft

the property of propositions it picks out is not logically, but at best epistemologically,
significant, (b) it doesn’t distinguish necessary from true or contingent propositions,
nf

or, (c) it conflicts with some “feeling” we have about necessity.


Dr

The upshot of Russell’s discussion is that there is a diversity of distinct and con-
flicting intuitions about modality; as he puts it, “the feeling of necessity is a complex
sa

and rather muddled feeling, compounded of [a number of different] elements” (1905,


520). That is, the discussion provides evidence that not only is there no one thing that
“people really have in their minds when they affirm necessity,” but some of what they
have in mind is not compatible with others of what they have in mind. Of course, this
evidence is not conclusive. For one thing, as recent discussions of modality show,
282 The Continuing Banishment of Modality

conflicts of modal intuitions may be resolved by re-describing some of the intuitions.


But, prima facie, this evidence tends to go against the Moorean and Meinongian as-
sumption that philosophers advancing different definitions of necessity “have a single

.e ion
idea of necessity,” or “attach the same meaning to the word necessary.” So, Russell
concludes that it’s unclear whether anything would be lost if we abandoned both this
assumption and the use of modal notions in logic and philosophy.1
I turn now to Russell’s discussion of the four types of modal intuitions.

an iss
du
9.2.1 The Feeling from Apriority

m
The first intuition is: “There is a certain feeling that what we know by perception
might quite well have been otherwise, while what is known à priori is necessary; and

per
it is through this feeling that the à priori and the empirical become connected with
the necessary and the contingent” (1905, 510).
One way to go with such a feeling is a position Russell tried out a year earlier,
in response to Hugh MacColl’s criticisms of Russell’s views on possibility in Foun-

ut
dations of Geometry (MacColl, 1904a,b). After stating the amodalist view he had
converted to—“I should say that, whether [actual space] is Euclidean or whether it is

ey
non-Euclidean, there is no sense in saying that it might have been different”—Russell
h@ itho
suggests that possibility be understood epistemically: “we do not as yet know which
alternative is the true one, and … in this sense only, either alternative is possible”
sl
(1904, 592). Presumably, an alternative is necessary if it is known to obtain. The
suggestion, then, is that there is only epistemic modality.
sh ite w

This is not the tack Russell takes in “Necessity and Possibility.” Rather, he at-
we
tempts to make the intuition precise in logical terms, to “find a logical pair of terms
roughly corresponding to ‘propositions known à priori’ and ‘propositions known em-
pirically’ ”; these turn out to be

‘propositions not predicating existence at particular times’ and ‘propositions predicating ex-
c

istence at particular times’. But among those regarded as predicating existence at particular
ie

times, we must include those which are concerned with actually occurring sequences, and
or not

those which (like the laws of motion) are concerned with all particular times, without being
deducible from the nature of time. (1905, 510)

This is a slight complication of Moore’s analysis in “Nature of Judgment,” motivated


it seems to ensure that what are ordinarily taken to be empirical generalizations and
o

“laws” do count as known empirically.


d.
:d

Russell then makes two criticisms of this first modal intuition. First, when the
intuition is made precise, it captures “obviously, no specially notable logical char-
acteristic” (1905, 510), but is of epistemological importance only. Russell doesn’t
explain why the distinction is “obviously” of no logical significance, but I take it
aft

that it is because, given the emendation of Moore’s account, empirical propositions


turn out to include both singular and general propositions. What is logically signifi-
nf

cant is the distinction between singular and general, but that doesn’t line up with the
Dr

precisified empirical/a priori distinction.


sa

1
For philosophers who are committed to the coherence and importance of modal notions it is perhaps
difficult to avoid the temptation to read “Necessity and Possibility” as a succession of proposed accounts
of modal properties, so that the failure of any proposal to square with our modal intuitions is a problem
for Russell. This is not so. On the contrary, such failures support Russell’s aim, which is, ultimately, to
show that we don’t have a single coherent set of modal intuitions, which makes it less likely that there are
any determinate modal properties for these intuitions to be about.
Russell on our “Feelings” of Necessity 283

The remainder of Russell’s discussion of this intuition consists of arguing that


“the feeling of necessity which we have in regard to other propositions, but not in
regard to those derived from perception, seems to me derived from two sources, one

.e ion
psychological, and the other a confusion” (1905, 510). It’s not clear what exactly is
the point of these arguments. I read the psychological argument as attempting to show
that once we see the psychological explanation of why we feel a priori propositions
to be necessary, we’ll come to feel that they aren’t necessary after all. The confusion

an iss
argument is slightly different: once the confusion is cleared up, on the basis of certain

du
linguistic intuitions, the very reason why we feel singular empirical proposition to be
contingent leads us to feel that they aren’t contingent after all.

m
Russell offers two psychological explanations for the necessity of a priori propo-
sitions. First,

per
when a proposition is not concerned with a particular time, the knowledge of it, if attainable
at all, is equally attainable at all times, so that there is not an enforced period of doubt while
we wait to see what will happen. (1905, 510)

ut
The final clause suggests the following view. If a proposition is connected with

ey
particular times, then only observation at those particular times can verify the propo-
h@ itho
sition. Before reaching those times, we’re in the “enforced period of doubt,” when
we have to wait to see what will happen. In that state we have the intuition that the
sl
truth-value of the proposition could turn out either way, i.e. it is contingent. We then
feel that propositions not connected with particular times, for which there won’t be
any such waiting to see how it turns out, are necessary. But empirical generalizations
sh ite w
we
of science are also not concerned with any particular time, and, as we saw, we also
have the feeling that they are not necessary.
Second,

where science has rendered prediction possible, as in astronomy, people feel that events are
necessary: the motions of the heavenly bodies are often taken as the very type of necessity.
c

(1905, 510)
ie
or not

Russell leaves tacit the conclusion that when we feel predicted events to be necessary,
we also feel the basis of the prediction, the general propositions of science, to be
necessary. Once we see this, we are likely to wonder, wouldn’t different events be
predicted if the source of the prediction, the general proposition, were different? So
o

we would feel doubts about the necessity of the general proposition after all.
d.

The feeling that particular empirical propositions are contingent, Russell claims,
:d

comes from the fact that sentences such as

‘it is raining’ expresses a proposition which is true sometimes but not always (except in the
aft

Lake district). Hence it comes to be felt that the proposition expressed is sometimes true and
sometimes false, and therefore may be true or may be false. (1905, 511)
nf

This Russell takes to be “sheer confusion,” because “the same form of words ex-
Dr

presses different propositions at different times, and each of these propositions is


true or false independently of the date at which it is considered” (1905, 510-511).
sa

This claim is of course closely connected to the basis of Moore’s argument for the
necessity of pure existential propositions. Moore’s argument rests on the theories of
truth and fact of the Moore-Russell metaphysics of propositions, a metaphysics likely
still held by Russell at this point. But I take it that Russell’s argument rests merely
284 The Continuing Banishment of Modality

on the intuition that e.g., ‘it’s raining at 9 pm on October 22, 1905’, which surely ex-
presses a particular empirical proposition, isn’t sometimes true and sometimes false,
and so by the original intuition the proposition expressed doesn’t count as contingent

.e ion
after all.
Whether these are good or bad explanations, that they are explanations at all
presupposes that the epistemological characteristics are distinct from the modal char-
acteristics.

an iss
du
9.2.2 The Feeling from Demonstrability

m
The second intuition is that

per
a proposition is necessary when it is demonstrable. ….
In practice, people do not say ‘so-and-so must be true’ unless they have inferred so-and-
so by a process sufficiently difficult to be consciously felt as inference.
…. It is the feeling of having inferred that we express by ‘it must be so’. (1905, 511)

ut
Russell considers three attempts to give an account of this intuition. First, Bradley’s

ey
theory of necessity, which according to Russell “amounts to this: ‘A proposition q is
h@ itho
said to be necessary if it is implied by a proposition p”’ (1905, 512). The problem
with this account is that “it makes every proposition necessary, true and false alike.
For there is no proposition whatever which will not follow from some premiss, e.g.
sl
the premiss ‘all propositions are true, and this is a proposition’ ” (1905, 512). The
situation from Russell’s perspective doesn’t improve much if we amend the account
sh ite w

to require the implying proposition to be true. The reason is this. As we have seen,
we
Russellian implication is material. The amendment rules out false propositions as
necessary, but, since every true proposition is materially implied by all propositions,
it is, a fortiori, implied by any true proposition; hence if any proposition is true all
true propositions are necessary.
Russell next considers Bosanquet’s version of Bradley’s theory which he takes
c

to be: “every true hypothetical or disjunctive proposition is necessary, and no other


ie

propositions are necessary” (1905, 513). The problem with this proposal is that it
or not

doesn’t square with other intuitions we have about what propositions are necessary:
‘If it rains, I shall bring my umbrella’; ‘if I am in town tomorrow, I shall go to the play’—
such hypotheticals may very well be true, and yet few people would call them necessary. ….
o

Exactly the same remark applies to disjunctive propositions. It is true that ‘either Caesar was
d.

killed on the Ides of March, or he died of a surfeit of pickles’, but this would not be commonly
:d

called a necessary proposition. (1905, 513)

The final attempt to capture this second intuition is Moore’s logical priority theory,
interpreted as Russell did in Principles, as the view that necessity is a gradable prop-
aft

erty the degree of whose possession by a proposition is fixed by the number of “other
propositions to which it is logically prior”. Russell’s objection exploits the unclarities
nf

in Moore’s account, by proposing to explicate the relation of logical priority in terms


Dr

of material implication: “p is logically prior to q if q implies p but p does not imply q”


(1905, 513) Since all true propositions are (materially) implied by every proposition,
sa

all true propositions imply one another and so none is logically prior to any other.2
No true proposition implies a false proposition, so all true propositions are logically
prior to every false proposition. Since false propositions imply every proposition, all
2
Russell makes this point also in (1904, 208).
Russell on our “Feelings” of Necessity 285

false propositions imply one another and so none is prior to any other. But for the
same reason all false propositions imply all true propositions, and so are not prior
to any true proposition. Thus, although true propositions have a greater degree of

.e ion
necessity than false ones, all true propositions are equally necessary, as are all false
propositions.

an iss
9.2.3 The Feeling from Analyticity
The third intuition is that a proposition is necessary if it “can be deduced from the laws

du
of logic” (1905, 513). This intuition Russell takes to be expressed by the pre-Kantian

m
identification of “the necessary with the analytic,” where an analytic proposition “is
one whose truth can be deduced from the law of contradiction” (1905, 514). This

per
identification already goes a step beyond the intuitive notion, in specifying the laws
of logic as the law of contradiction. But from Russell’s perspective, a precise account
of this intuition requires modifying and making precise the notion of analyticity. The
modification is to the laws of logic: they are not just the law of contradiction. What

ut
has to be made precise is the notion of deducibility.
Deducibility cannot simply be identified with implication. The reason is, again,

ey
that all true propositions are materially implied by any proposition, and so by the
h@ itho
law of contradiction. Thus if necessity is analyticity and analyticity consists of being
implied by the law of contradiction, then there’s no distinction between necessary
sl
truth and mere truth. Russell’s account of deducibility goes as follows:
sh ite w

There are certain general propositions, which we may enumerate as the laws of deduction:
we
such are ‘if not-p is false, then p is true’, ‘if p implies not-q, then q implies not-p’, ‘if p implies
q and q implies r, then p implies r’; in all we need about ten such principles. …. We may
then say that q is deducible from p if it can be shown by means of the above principles that p
implies q.
This definition may be restated as follows. The laws of deduction tell us that two proposi-
tions having certain relations of form (e.g. that one is the negation of the negation of the other)
c

are such that one of them implies the other. Thus q is deducible from p if p and q either have
ie

one of the relations contemplated by the laws of deduction, or are connected by any (finite)
or not

number of intermediaries each having one of these relations to its successor. (1905, 514)

Russell’s first try at a definition is: q is deducible from p just in case “it can be shown
by means of” what he calls the “laws of deduction” that p implies q. Obviously, to turn
o

this into an adequate definition Russell has to specify what these laws of deduction
d.

are, and spell out what it is to show that a proposition holds by means of them. We can
:d

be fairly certain of the identity of the laws of deduction. The three examples given
in this passage are, in order of appearance, ★2.9, ★2.92, and ★2.7 of “The Theory
of Implication” (1906, 167-8), and in ★2 of this paper Russell lists ten primitive
aft

propositions, dovetailing with the claim in the passage that “we need about ten” laws
of deduction. Russell makes clear later that the laws of deduction are some of “a small
nf

number of general logical premises” from which all the propositions of “formal logic
Dr

and pure mathematics” are deducible (1905, 516), but “it is more or less arbitrary
what we put among the ‘laws’ and what we put among their consequences” (1905,
sa

516n). So there isn’t a unique set of laws of deduction. Indeed, the examples in the
text are also axiom (6), and two principles claimed to be “proved with” the axioms, in
Principles (1903, §18, 16-7). It is clear, though, that since Russell takes these general
logical premises to be the laws of logic (1905, 516), the laws of deduction are among
the laws of logic.
286 The Continuing Banishment of Modality

Russell’s “restatement” of this definition provides a clearer account of what it


is to show that p implies q by means of the laws of deduction. Taking the axioms of
Principles as a model, each law of deduction is a formal implication. So, each of its

.e ion
instances is an implication. These particular implications have in common that the
logical structure of each hypothesis stands in one and the same relation to the logical
structures of the corresponding consequent. Thus q is deducible from p just in case
one of two cases holds:

an iss
• ‘p implies q’ expresses an instance of a law of deduction, that is, as Russell puts

du
it, “have one of the relations contemplated by the laws of deduction,” or

m
• there exists a finite sequence of propositions p1 , …, pn such that p is p1 , q is pn ,
and for each i such that 1≤ i < n, ‘pi implies pi+1 ’ expresses an instance of a

per
law of deduction, that is, as Russell puts it, p and q “are connected by a finite
number of intermediaries each having one of these relations to its successor.”
Analytic propositions are then defined to be just those “which are deducible from
the laws of logic” (1905, 516). If an implication is analytic, then its consequent is

ut
an analytic consequence of its hypothesis. Analytic consequence, Russell claims, is

ey
extensionally equivalent to deducibility: “q is an analytic consequence of p when
h@ itho
and only when q is deducible from p” (1905, 517). Russell doesn’t spell out the
reason for this, but we can understand it based on taking the laws of logic to be
sl
the axioms of the propositional calculus of Principles. All the axioms except for
axiom (4) are formal implications, and (4) is in essence modus ponens. If we take the
sh ite w

axioms except for (4) to be axiom schemata and (4) to be the only rule of inference,
we
then Russell’s propositional calculus is an axiomatic formulation of logic. Since all
the axiom schemata are conditional, Russell’s definition of deducibility is equivalent
to the usual definitions of a deduction of one formula from another in an axiomatic
system. Given axioms (6) and (8), in this system, the second case in the definition of
deducibility holds if and only if ‘p ⊃ q’ is derivable from the axioms alone.
c

The full account of the third intuition is thus that a proposition is necessary just
ie

in case it is analytic as just defined. As soon as this definition of necessary proposition


or not

is presented, Russell argues that it doesn’t square with all of our modal intuitions:

[T]he feeling of necessity does not answer to this definition; many propositions are felt to
be necessary which are not analytic. Such are: ‘If a thing is good, it is not bad’, ‘If a thing
is yellow, it is not red’, and so on. Bad does not mean the same as not-good, and therefore
o

mere logic will never prove that good and bad are any more incompatible than round and blue.
d.

(1905, 517)
:d

That is to say, we have an intuition that what nowadays are sometimes called “mate-
rial incompatibilities” are necessary, but these are not deducible from what Russell
aft

takes to be the laws of logic.


nf

9.2.4 The Feeling from Generality


Dr

The final intuition, as Russell suggests in Part I of “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes


sa

and Assumptions” (1904), may be taken to be a general version of one aspect of


the first intuition, namely, where we feel that some sentences that do not mention
particular times are contingent because their truth-value varies over time. The gen-
eralization is: “when a proposition contains a term which we instinctively regard
as variable, we feel that the proposition is contingent if some values of the variable
Russell on our “Feelings” of Necessity 287

make the proposition true, others false” (1904, 209). Russell gives the same example
of this intuition in “Meinong’s Theory” and “Necessity and Possibility”:

.e ion
Suppose I take a cab, and its number has five figures; I shall feel that it might have had four
figures. In this case, all that is meant seems to be: ‘This is a London cab, and some London
cabs have numbers consisting of four figures.’ In such cases, the subject of the proposition is
felt as a variable: it is not felt as fully determinate, but as an indefinite member of some class.

an iss
(1905, 518)

du
There is a corresponding intuition of necessity. In a proposition like “if Socrates

m
is a man, he is mortal,” “Socrates is felt as a variable” (1903, §15, 14); moreover,
this proposition “remains true if we put anything else in place of Socrates, and may
therefore be called necessary” (1905, 517).

per
Russell proposes to make these intuitions precise by taking necessity and pos-
sibility to be fundamentally properties of propositional functions rather than propo-
sitions:

ut
The propositional function ‘x has the property ϕ’ is necessary if it holds of everything; it is
necessary throughout the class u if it holds of every member of u.

ey
The propositional function ‘x has the property ϕ’ is possible if it holds of something; it
h@ itho
is possible within the class u if it holds of some member of u. (1905, 518)

sl
The range of the quantifier phrases ‘everything’ and ‘something’ does not include
possibilia in the sense of merely possible existents or beings. Russell doesn’t mean
“all terms, including those that don’t exist (or have being) but might have,” nor does
sh ite w
we
he mean “some term, possibly one that doesn’t exist (or have being) but might have.”
Rather, the range of the quantifiers comprise simply all terms, all subsistents. Call
this the propositional function reconstruction of modality. We’ll see indirect confir-
mation of this in 9.3.3 below. In “On the Notion of Cause” Russell holds that the
propositional function “if x is a man then x is mortal” is necessary simply because
c

there are no immortal men among the values of the variable x. That is to say, he
ie

doesn’t countenance merely possible immortal men.


or not

The natural idea for defining necessity and possibility for propositions would
then be that a proposition is necessary or possible just in case it is a value or an
instance of, respectively, a necessary or a possible propositional function. This idea
won’t do, because a single proposition may be a value of a number of different propo-
sitional functions, not all of which is necessary. For example, the proposition ex-
o
d.

pressed by
:d

(6) Socrates is identical with Socrates


is an instance of
aft

(7) « x, is identical with, x »


nf

(8) « Socrates, is identical with, x »


Dr

(9) « x, is identical with, Socrates »


sa

(7) is necessary, but (8) and (9) are contingent. Thus, (6) would count as necessary
“when regarded as an instance of” (7), “but is only contingent when regarded as an
instance of” (8) or (9) (1905, 518).
The solution is to reject the notion of necessity simpliciter for propositions, in
favor of defining a proposition p as necessary with respect to one of its constituents c
288 The Continuing Banishment of Modality

just in case there is a necessary propositional function ϕ(x) such that p is the instance
of ϕ(x) for c as the value of the variable x.3 Thus (6) is “necessary with respect to
Socrates” (1905, 518), or better, with respect to both occurrences of Socrates. Note

.e ion
that as it stands this solution doesn’t apply to universal quantifications of proposi-
tional functions. The proposition “if Roscoe is cordate, then Roscoe is renate” is
necessary with respect to Roscoe because ‘if x is cordate then x is renate’ is true for
all values of x, but is ‘all cordates are renates’ necessary or contingent? With respect

an iss
to what constituents?

du
Russell points out that (6) is not necessary with respect to identity, for the propo-
sitional function “Socrates has relation R to Socrates” fails to hold for certain values

m
of R, e.g., older than, or different from. This is related to what Russell regards as
an advantage of this theory: “Analytic propositions have the property that they are

per
necessary with respect to all their constituents except such as are what I call logical
constants. Thus e.g. [(6)] is an analytic proposition, and identity (with respect to
which it is not necessary) is a logical constant” (1905, 519);4 evidently, Russell takes
(6) to be analytic because it is an instance of the law of identity, which either is a law

ut
of logic or is derivable from such laws.
The general claim is very problematic. The laws of logic and propositions deriv-

ey
able from them are by definition analytic, but why are they necessary with respect to
h@ itho
all constituents except for logical constants? The problem stems from the fact that if
Russell’s propositional axioms are formal implications, then the only constants they
sl
contain are logical. So, if any such axiom is an instance of a propositional function,
the constituent of that axiom which is the value of the variable of that propositional
sh ite w

function has to be a logical constant. If that axiom contains only one logical con-
we
stant, then the result of replacing it with a variable is just a list of variables and not
a function. If it contains more than one constant, then the propositional function of
which it is an instance is not necessary, since replacing a logical constant with a non-
logical property or relation generally leads to a false proposition. Even if there were a
necessary propositional function of which the axiom is an instance, the axiom would
c

be necessary with respect to a logical constituent. Clearly, this line of argument also
ie

shows that the laws of logic are not necessary with respect to any of their constituents.
or not

Russell’s objection to this account of the fourth modal intuition is slightly differ-
ent from the ones against the other three. He argues, not that it simply fails to square
with other modal intuitions we have, but that our intuitions fail to render a verdict
on the correctness of this account. On the one hand, we have an intuition against the
o

propositional functions reconstruction:


d.
:d

For example, we feel certain of the truth of all propositions of the type: ‘x either is not a moment
of time, or is a moment of time subsequent to the death of Cromwell, or is a moment of time
preceding the Restoration’; yet we should hesitate to call propositions of this type necessary.
aft

For we realize at once that the truth of all propositions of this type is a deduction from ‘the
death of Cromwell preceded the Restoration’, which must be a contingent proposition if any
nf

proposition is to be contingent.
Dr

On the other hand, Russell suggests that we may also have the opposite intuition:
sa

3
This shows that, pace Griffin, Russell does not “define ‘necessity’ for propositions” as being “an
instance of a type of propositions all of which are true” (1980, 122); this is a definition Russell abandons
in favor of defining necessity with respect to a propositional constituent.
4
Given this claim, Russell could have defined a proposition as necessary just in case it is necessary
with respect to all its non-logical constituents. But it’s notable that he doesn’t.
Russell on our “Feelings” of Necessity 289

Yet perhaps this feeling could be turned into its opposite. For if anybody said ‘Such and such an
event happened before the death of Cromwell but after the Restoration’, we should reply ‘that
is impossible, because Cromwell died before the Restoration’. Thus the feeling of necessity

.e ion
on such points seems to be uncertain and vacillating. (1905, 519)

There is, of course, a standard way of explaining away this second intuition, in terms
of the distinction between the necessity of a conditional with the necessity of its con-

an iss
sequent. The second intuition reflects the necessity of the implication from the fact
that Cromwell died before the Restoration to the conclusion that no event happens

du
both before the death of Cromwell and after the Restoration. So the intuition is not

m
that such an event is absolutely impossible, but only impossible relative to the con-
tingent fact that Cromwell died before the Restoration. Now, this is a theoretical

per
re-description of the original second intuition, so it’s not clear how much weight it
carries against the conclusion that Russell is ultimately driving at: we don’t have a
single coherent set of modal intuitions. It might be said that the theoretical distinction
is itself founded on modal intuitions, so that overall our modal intuitions is against the
propositional function reconstruction. But then these modal intuitions conflict with

ut
the intuition of necessity underlying this reconstruction of necessity as generality.

ey
h@ itho
9.2.5 The Significance of the Feelings
sl
The upshot of this examination of accounts of necessity based on modal intuitions is
that
sh ite w
we
the feeling of necessity is a complex and rather muddled feeling, compounded of such elements
as the following:
(1) The feeling that a proposition can be known without an appeal to perception;
(2) The feeling that a proposition can be proved;
(3) The feeling that a proposition can be deduced from the laws of logic;
c

(4) The feeling that a proposition holds not only of its actual subject, but of all subjects
ie

more or less resembling its actual subject, or, as an extreme case, of all subjects abso-
or not

lutely.
Any one of these four may be used to found a theory of necessity. (1905, 520)

This makes it plausible that Moore and Meinong are mistaken in assuming that there
is a single property or relation that we have in mind in ascribing necessity. If Moore
o
d.

and Meinong are right, then, even if one holds that fundamentally there are only non-
:d

modal logical properties and relations of propositions, one could affirm the existence
of modality provided that the single notion of necessity underlying our intuitions
can be analyzed in logical terms. One could, that is, hold a reductionist account of
aft

necessity. However, if our intuitions do not pick out any single notion of necessity,
nothing stands in the way of adopting a wholesale eliminativist position on modality.
nf

Thus Russell’s final conclusion is that “there is no one fundamental logical notion
Dr

of necessity, nor consequently of possibility,” and therefore “the subject of modality


ought to be banished from logic, since propositions are simply true or false, and
sa

there is no such comparative and superlative of truth as is implied by the notions of


contingency and necessity” (1905, 520).5
5
Thus, on Russell’s view, the fact that the definition based on the fourth intuition fails to qualify
logical laws as necessary (with respect to any propositional constituents), whereas the definition based on
the third intuition does admit logical laws as necessity is not a point in favor of the third intuition.
290 The Continuing Banishment of Modality

9.2.6 Amodalism after the Rejection of Moore-Russell Propositions


In this section I briefly outline the reasons for Russell’s decision, reached sometime

.e ion
after 1906, to rejected Moore-Russell propositions, and the problem this decision cre-
ates for Russell’s position on modality. Dodging this problem is one of the important
uses of Russell’s 1905 argument for an eliminativist view of modality.
From 1906 onwards, Russell became increasingly uneasy about the notion of

an iss
proposition, especially of the idea of false propositions. In “On the Nature of Truth
and Falsehood” (1910) he puts the problem in this way:

du
m
If we allow that all judgments have objectives, we shall have to allow that there are objectives
which are false. Thus there will be in the world entities, not dependent upon the existence of
judgments, which can be described as objective falsehoods. This is in itself almost incredible:

per
we feel that there could be no falsehood if there were no minds to make mistakes. But it has the
further drawback that it leaves the difference between truth and falsehood quite inexplicable.
We feel that when we judge truly some entity ‘corresponding’ in some way to our judgment is
to be found outside our judgment, while when we judge falsely there is no such ‘corresponding’
entity. (1910, 152)

ut
ey
(The term ‘objective’ here comes from Meinong and applies exactly to Moore-Russell
h@ itho
propositions.) Why is it almost incredible that there are false propositions? One hy-
pothesis is this. A false proposition like
sl
«Desdemona, loves, Cassio»
consists of the relating relation loves uniting Desdemona to Cassio into a single entity
sh ite w

that has the unanalyzable property of falsehood. But if the relation of loves unites
we
Desdemona to Cassio, doesn’t this mean that Desdemona does love Cassio? If loving
does relate Desdemona to Cassio in this way is it not a fact that Desdemona loves
Cassio? It seems then that any attempt to specify what a false proposition turns into
the specification of something like a fact. But for Russell a fact, as we saw, is a
true proposition. That’s why Russell says that the doctrine of objective falsehoods,
c

“leaves the difference between truth and falsehood quite inexplicable” (1910, 152).
ie

In response to this difficulty, Russell decides that there are no propositions to


or not

serve as the objects of judgment or belief. The account of judgment that he then
formulates is known as the multiple-relation theory of judgment, a theory that I will
discuss in detail in Volume II. Here, however, we need only note that if there are no
propositions, then Russell no longer has the option of taking facts to be true propo-
o

sitions. But Moore’s argument for the absoluteness of the truth and falsity of propo-
d.

sitions depend on taking facts to be true propositions. So, once Russell abandoned
:d

propositions, this Moorean argument no longer works. But then one would not be in
a position to show that there is no distinction between truth and necessary or possible
truth on the ground that necessity and possibility require the relativization of truth.
aft

However, Russell’s 1905 argument doesn’t depend on the absoluteness of the


truth of propositions, and so is not affected by this problem. This argument thus
nf

supports the continuing banishment of modality after the rejection of Moore-Russell


Dr

propositions.
sa

9.3 After “Necessity and Possibility”


In this final section, I survey all of Russell’s discussions of modality known to me af-
ter “Necessity and Possibility,” up through Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy
After “Necessity and Possibility” 291

(1919).

9.3.1 “Some Explanations in Reply to Mr. Bradley” (1910)

.e ion
We have already seen in 7.3 above that in this paper Russell rejects “necessity and
possibility as fundamental notions,” and holds “that fundamentally truths are merely
true in fact” (1910, 374). In addition, Russell explicitly claims that a logical relation

an iss
like deducibility is not modal:

du
I do not mean to deny that one fact is often deducible from another; but such deducibility is in

m
turn a fact, i.e. it has no modal property of necessity not possessed by the facts which it relates.
(1910, 374)

per
On the assumption that Russell’s conception of deducibility has not changed from
“Necessity and Possibility,” this evidently means that implication, which is the basis
of deducibility, is not modal either. Moreover, this makes it clear that “deducible”
means “there exists a deduction,” not “a deduction is possible.”

ut
ey
9.3.2 The Problems of Philosophy (1912)
h@ itho
This is the only text composed after “Necessity and Possibility” known to me in
sl
which Russell seems to use modal notions without qualification, and also makes no
criticism of traditional modal distinctions.
sh ite w

[W]e feel some quality of necessity about the proposition ‘two and two are four’, which is ab-
we
sent from even the best attested empirical generalizations. Such generalizations always remain
mere facts: we feel that there might be a world in which they were false, though in the actual
world they happen to be true. In any possible world, on the contrary, we feel that two and two
would be four: this is not a mere fact, but a necessity to which everything actual and possible
must conform. (1912, 121; emphases mine)
c
ie

A closer look, however, puts in doubt whether Russell is here unequivocally endors-
or not

ing the notion of possible worlds or a fundamental contrast between the possible and
the actual.
To begin with, note that Russell doesn’t simply assert any of the following:
• the proposition ‘2+2=4’ has a quality of necessity
o
d.

• even the best attested empirical generalizations might be false in some possible
:d

world
• that two and two would be four in any possible world
aft

Rather, he prefaces each of these claims with “we feel.” But our “feelings” of neces-
sity, as we saw in “Necessity and Possibility,” do not support the view that there is
nf

any determinate property of necessity we have in mind.


Dr

Second, at the context in which this passage occurs is an argument against the
empiricist claim that mathematical and logical knowledge is based on experience,
sa

in particular that “by the repeated experience of seeing two things and two other
things, and finding that altogether they made four things, we were led by induction
to the conclusion that two things and two other things would always make four things
altogether” (1912, 120). One point Russell makes against this view is that “We do
not, in fact, feel our certainty that two and two are four increased by fresh instances,
292 The Continuing Banishment of Modality

because, as soon as we have seen the truth of this proposition, our certainty becomes
so great as to be incapable of growing greater” (1912, 120). He then tells us about
the contrast in our feelings about the modal status of ‘2+2=4’ and of the best-attested

.e ion
empirical generalizations. So Russell is not claiming that these propositions have
different modal properties, but pointing to differences in our psychological reactions
to them which suggest that there may be an epistemological difference between them.
Finally, this suggestion is consistent with how Russell proceeds after this talk

an iss
about our modal feelings. He invites the reader to “imagine two different worlds, in

du
one of which there are men who are not mortal, while in the other two and two make
five” (1912, 122), suggests that we would have little trouble with the former but a lot

m
with the latter, and then says,

per
The fact is that, in simple mathematical judgements such as ‘two and two are four’, and also
in many judgements of logic, we can know the general proposition without inferring it from
instances, although some instance is usually necessary to make clear to us what the general
proposition means. (1912, 123; emphasis mine)

ut
Russell is here giving the actual philosophical—epistemological—thesis that the psy-
chological facts and the thought experiment he presents point to.

ey
On the present reading, Russell takes an epistemological distinction among generalizat
h@ itho
knowable independently of instances as against knowable on the basis of its instances—
to be a criterion for distinguishing logical and mathematical propositions from em-
sl
pirical propositions. Moreover, it is this distinction that underlies his talk of possible
worlds: to be true in all possible worlds is nothing more than to be a generalization
sh ite w

knowable independent of its instances; to be true in the actual world but possibly
we
false in other worlds is nothing more than to be a generalization knowable only on
the basis of its instances. We will see below how we can interpret other instances of
Russell’s talk of possible worlds as resting on similar epistemological distinctions.
I take this reading of the passage, as evincing no serious departure from a rejec-
tion of modality, to cohere better with the litany of complaints about modality that
c

we have seen, and will continue to see, in the rest of this section.
ie
or not

9.3.3 “On the Notion of Cause” (1912-13)


Russell quotes from the article on necessity in Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy,
“That is necessary which not only is true, but would be true under all circumstances,”
o

and his response reprises two familiar doctrines. First, truth is amodal:
d.
:d

A proposition is simply true or false, and that ends the matter: there can be no question of
‘circumstances’. ‘Charles I’s head was cut off’ is just as true in summer as in winter, on
Sundays as on Mondays. (1912-13, 3)
aft

Second, modality is reconstructible in terms of propositional functions:


nf

Thus when it is worth saying that something ‘would be true under all circumstances’, the some-
Dr

thing in question must be a propositional function, i.e. an expression containing a variable, and
becoming a proposition when a value is assigned to the variable; the varying ‘circumstances’
alluded to are then the different values of which the variable is capable. Thus if ‘necessary’
sa

means ‘what is true under all circumstances,’ then ‘if x is a man, x is mortal’ is necessary,
because it is true for any possible value of x. (1912-13, 3)

As I noted above, the last sentence shows that Russell takes “possible value” to mean
the same as “actual value” or just “value,” for the truth of the propositional function
After “Necessity and Possibility” 293

in question requires that no immortal men are among the “possible values” of the
variable.

.e ion
9.3.4 The Theory of Knowledge (1913)
In this (mostly) unpublished manuscript there are three sets of comments on possi-
bility.

an iss
The first is in a discussion of William James’s neutral monism. One of James’s
characterizations of “the knower and the known” is “the known is a possible expe-

du
rience either of [one] subject or another, to which” a series of experiences “would

m
lead, if sufficiently prolonged” (1912, 53). Russell’s objection is:

per
It may be laid down generally that possibility always marks insufficient analysis: when analysis
is completed, only the actual can be relevant, for the simple reason that there is only the actual,
and that the merely possible is nothing. (1913, 27)

Second, in the course of presenting a version of a multiple-relation theory of

ut
judgment, Russell mentions a characteristic of asymmetrical relations, “with a given

ey
relation and given terms two complexes are ‘logically possible’ ” (1913, 111), and
h@ itho
comments, “the notion of what is ‘logically possible’ is not an ultimate one, and
must be reduced to something that is actual before our analysis can be complete”
sl
(1913, 111). Note that this characteristic is closely connected to the reason Russell
gives in Principles for taking propositions to be a different kind of whole, composed
differently of their parts, than the wholes that classes are (see 7.4 above.) The prob-
sh ite w
we
lems that asymmetrical relations pose for this account of judgment will be discussed
in Volume II.
Finally, Russell objects to correspondence theories of truth according to which
“true and false propositions correspond respectively with real and unreal objects” on
the ground that “there cannot possibly be such things as unreal objects, and … any
c

theory which assumes or implies that there are must be false” (1913, 151-2). He then
ie

goes on to condemn “‘possibles’ which are not actual” on the same grounds:
or not

[W]hat has been said about unreality applies unchanged when it is called by some title of
politeness, such as ‘being for me’ or ‘being for thought’, which represent merely the vacillating
regret in pronouncing the sentence of non-existence on life-long friends. And the same applies
to any philosophy which believes, in any ultimate way, in a realm of ‘possibles’ which are not
o

actual. The view that the possible is something, but not quite so much something as the actual,
d.

and that error consists in mistaking the possible for the actual, is only rendered possible by
:d

the wrong analysis of sentences which results from confusing descriptions with proper names.
(1913, 152)
aft

The final sentence, claiming that “mistaking the possible for the actual” results from
“confusing descriptions with proper names,” suggests that the illusion that there is
nf

such a thing as possibility is much like the illusion that ‘the present king of France’
Dr

names a non-existent individual. So, phrases apparently referring to possible situa-


tions or possible entities are, like definite descriptions, incomplete symbols: state-
sa

ments in which they occur are to be analyzed into statements from which they no
longer occur. An important case of such analyses is the analysis of statements appar-
ently referring to classes into statements in which class terms do not occur. Russell
characterizes such analyses as showing that there are no classes or that classes are
“logical fictions” or “logical constructions.” Would Russell adopt the same line about
294 The Continuing Banishment of Modality

possibilia, that they are logical fictions or constructions? It seems to me that although
nothing prevents Russell from attempt such analyses, he would see no philosophical
point in it because in his view while discourse about classes plays a significant and

.e ion
uncontroversial role in mathematics and the sciences, discourse about possibilia do
not.

an iss
9.3.5 Our Knowledge of the External World (1914)
In this book, one finds a comment on possible entities and a use of the notion of

du
possible worlds.

m
The first concerns the sense-data on the basis of which to construct an “inter-
pretation” of “physics or common sense”; Russell’s position is unsurprising: “I think

per
it may be laid down quite generally that, in so far as physics or common sense is
verifiable, it must be capable of interpretation in terms of actual sense-data alone”
(1914, 81). “Possible sense-data” “provided” by “real” things may be postulated to
explain how it is that “sense-data that occur at one time are often causally connected

ut
with those that occur at quite other times”; however, even if there are such possible
sense-data, they play no role in verification, which “consists always in the occurrence

ey
of an expected sense-datum,” i.e., in actually occurring sense-data (1914, 81).
h@ itho
In Lecture VII, in the course of describing the respect in which mathematics is
like philosophy, Russell use the Leibnizian notion of possible worlds:
sl
Between philosophy and pure mathematics there is a certain affinity, in the fact that both are
sh ite w

general and a priori. Neither of them asserts propositions which, like those of history and
we
geography, depend upon the actual concrete facts being just what they are. We may illustrate
this characteristic by means of Leibniz’s conception of many possible worlds, of which only
one is actual. In all the many possible worlds, philosophy and mathematics will be the same;
the differences will only be in respect of those particular facts which are chronicled by the
descriptive sciences. (1914, 186)
c

Possible worlds are brought in “to illustrate” an epistemological distinction between


ie

propositions of mathematics and philosophy on the one hand and propositions such
or not

as those of history and geography on the other. Given that in Lecture III Russell
explicitly rejects the possible in favor of the actual, it’s plausible that possible worlds
are no more than an illustration. Just as in Problems of Philosophy, the doctrine to
which Russell is committed is the epistemological distinction, and that distinction
o

forms the entire content of the illustrative language of possible worlds.


d.
:d

9.3.6 “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” (1918-9)


In lecture V, “General Propositions and Existence,” Russell once again gives the
aft

propositional function reconstruction of modality:


nf

One may call a propositional function


Dr

necessary, when it is always true;


possible, when it is sometimes true;
sa

impossible, when it is never true.


Much false philosophy has arisen out of confusing propositional functions and propositions.
There is a great deal in ordinary traditional philosophy which consists simply in attributing
to propositions the predicates which only apply to propositional functions, and, still worse,
After “Necessity and Possibility” 295

sometimes in attributing to individuals predicates which merely apply to propositional func-


tions. The case of necessary, possible, impossible, is a case in point. In all traditional philoso-
phy there comes a heading of ‘modality,’ which discusses necessary, possible, and impossible

.e ion
as properties of propositions, whereas in fact they are properties of propositional functions.
Propositions are only true or false. (1919, 193)

In this lecture Russell goes on to characterize the notion of existence in exactly the

an iss
same way, as the same property of propositional functions as possibility:
Existence. When you take any propositional function and assert of it that it is possible, that it

du
is sometimes true, that gives you the fundamental meaning of ‘existence’. You may express

m
it by saying that there is at least one value of x for which the propositional function is true.
Take ‘x is a man’, there is at least one value of x for which this is true. That is what one means

per
by saying that ‘There are men’, or that ‘Men exist’. Existence is essentially a property of a
propositional function. (1919, 195)

The view seems to be that there is no distinction between existence and possibility.
If so it differs from the Principles position that although there is no fundamental

ut
distinction between truth and possible truth, so no such thing as a term that doesn’t

ey
in fact exist but might possibly have existed, one can construe the notion of possible
h@ itho
term as just a term that doesn’t exist but (like all terms) subsists.
The view also seems to conflict with an intuition which some have that it is one
thing to claim existence and something altogether different to claim possibility; for
sl
example, to claim that lions exist is not to claim that lions are possible. Of course,
by itself such a conflict would not bother Russell; given amodalism, if there is no
sh ite w

account of some modal intuition in logical or epistemological terms, so much the


we
worse for that intuition. But, in fact, Russell’s theory of possibility and existence in
these lectures is more nuanced, and capable of accounting for this “feeling.”
We can see this from lecture VII, which Russell begins with “a few remarks
in explanation and amplification of what I have said about existence in [the] two
previous lectures” (1919, 345). In particular,
c
ie

I did not mean to say that when one says that a thing exists, one means the same as when one
or not

says that it is possible. What I meant was, that the fundamental logical idea, the primitive idea,
out of which both those are derived is the same. That is not quite the same thing as to say that
the statement that a thing exists is the same as the statement that it is possible, which I do not
hold. (1919, 345)
o

Russell goes on to say,


d.
:d

I used the word ‘possible’ in perhaps a somewhat strange sense, because I wanted some word
for a fundamental logical idea for which no word exists in ordinary language, and therefore if
one is to try to express in ordinary language the idea in question, one has to take some word
and make it convey the sense that I was giving to the word ‘possible’, which is by no means
aft

the only sense that it has but is a sense that was convenient for my purpose. We say of a
propositional function that it is possible, where there are cases in which it is true. (1919, 345)
nf
Dr

Thus, Russell’s claim is that the ordinary notions of existence and possibility are both
derived from the fundamental logical notion of existential quantification. Russell
sa

construes existential quantification as the property which a propositional function


has when “there are cases in which it is true.”
Now Russell claims that “no word exists in ordinary language” for this funda-
mental logical idea, so he appropriated the word ‘possible’ to express it. He is aware
that “ordinarily” ‘possible’ doesn’t express this idea:
296 The Continuing Banishment of Modality

We say of a propositional function that it is possible, where there are cases in which it is true.
That is not exactly the same thing as what one ordinarily means, for instance, when one says
that it is possible that it may rain tomorrow. (1919, 345-6)

.e ion
However, Russell claims,

the ordinary uses of ‘possible’ are derived from this notion by a process. E.g., normally when

an iss
you say of a proposition that it is possible, you mean something like this: first of all it is implied
that you do not know whether it is true or false, and I think it is implied; secondly, that it is one

du
of a class of propositions, some of which are known to be true. When I say, e.g., ‘It is possible

m
that it may rain tomorrow’—‘It will rain tomorrow’ is one of the class of propositions ‘It rains
at time t’, where t is different times. We mean partly that we do not know whether it will rain
or whether it will not, but also that we do know that that is the sort of proposition that is quite

per
apt to be true, that it is a value of a propositional function of which we know some value to
be true. Many of the ordinary uses of ‘possible’ come under this head, I think you will find.
That is to say, that if you say of a proposition that it is possible, what you have is this: ‘There
is in this proposition some constituent, which, if you turn it into a variable, will give you a
propositional function that is sometimes true.’ You ought not therefore to say of a proposition

ut
simply that it is possible, but rather that it is possible in respect of such-and-such a constituent.

ey
That would be a more full expression. (1919, 346)
h@ itho
In this passage, Russell outlines an epistemic analysis of discourse ascribing possi-
sl
bility similar to but more complex than that which he made in his 1904 response to
MacColl. We might formulate it as follows. The statement
sh ite w

It is possible that p
we
means
(1) It is not known whether p is true or false, and,
(2) There exists a propositional function p(x) that results from p by replacing a
c

constituent of p by the variable x such that either


ie
or not

• for some a, it is known that p(a) is true

or
• it is known that (∃x)p(x) is true.
o
d.

It should be noted, to begin with, that this is an analysis of “many of the ordinary
:d

uses of the word ‘possible’,” in particular those uses which by which one appears to
ascribe the property of being possible to propositions. The result of the analysis
conforms to Russell’s position that there is no such modal property of propositions,
aft

which “are only true or false.”


Another point to emphasize about this analysis is that it is epistemic. Some of
nf

Russell’s formulations in this passage are misleading in this regard. For example,
Dr

when he writes that “if you say of a proposition that it is possible, what you have
is this: ‘There is in this proposition some constituent, which, if you turn it into a
sa

variable, will give you a propositional function that is sometimes true,” he seems to
be committed to the view that ‘it is possible that p’ means the same as ‘(∃x)p(x)’,
where ‘x’ replaces some constituent of p. This has counter-intuitive consequences:
existentially generalizing from ‘four’ in ‘four is a prime number’ yields the truth
‘there are prime numbers’, which implies by Russell’s supposed commitment that
After “Necessity and Possibility” 297

‘it is possible that four is a prime number’ is true. But obviously, this statement is
false according to the full-fledged epistemic analysis because it is known that ‘four
is prime’ is false, and so the first conjunction of the analysis is false.

.e ion
Russell now applies this analysis to distinguish between claims of existence and
claims of possibility:

When I say, for instance, that ‘Lions exist’, I do not mean the same as if I said that lions were

an iss
possible; because when you say ‘Lions exist’, that means that the propositional function ‘x
is a lion’ is a possible one in the sense that there are lions, while when you say ‘Lions are

du
possible’ that is a different sort of statement altogether, not meaning that a casual individual

m
animal may be a lion, but rather that a sort of animal may be the sort that we call ‘lions’. If
you say ‘Unicorns are possible’, e.g., you would mean that you do not know any reason why
there should not be unicorns, which is quite a different proposition from ‘Unicorns exist.’ As

per
to what you would mean by saying that unicorns are possible, it would always come down to
the same thing as ‘It is possible that it may rain tomorrow.’ You would mean, the proposition
‘There are unicorns’ is one of a certain set of propositions some of which are known to be true,
and that the description of the unicorn does not contain in it anything that shows there could

ut
not be such beasts. (1919, 346-7)

ey
Again Russell’s formulations are rather loose; in particular, the statements, “a sort
h@ itho
of animal may be the sort that we call ‘lions’,” and “the description of the unicorn
does not show that there could not be such beasts” suggest that possibility has not
sl
been eliminated in the analysis. But it is relatively straightforward to tighten up the
account. ‘Lions exist’, as Russell says, means the same as ‘(∃x)(x is a lion)’. ‘Lions
sh ite w

are possible’, in contrast, means ‘it’s possible that lions exist’. According to the
we
analysis, this in turn means
(1) It is not known whether ‘lions exist’ is true or false
(2) There exists a propositional function p(x) that results from p by replacing a
constituent of p by the variable x such that either
c
ie

• for some a, it is known that p(a) is true


or not

or
• it is known that (∃x)p(x) is true.
The second conjunct is what Russell means by saying “a sort of animal may be the
o
d.

sort that we call ‘lions’.” Remember that in the initial formulation of the analysis
:d

Russell writes “ ‘It will rain tomorrow’ is one of the class of propositions ‘It rains
at time t’, where t is different times,” and it “is the sort of proposition that is quite
apt to be true, that it is a value of a propositional function of which we know some
aft

value to be true.” So, to belong to a sort of proposition that is “apt to be true” is


to be a value of a propositional function such that we know some value to be true.
nf

I take it then that “the sort of animal that we call ‘lions’ ” is meant to indicate the
Dr

propositional function p(x) resulting from results from ‘lions exist’. Thus the main
task in applying the general analysis to the present case is to figure out what is p(x).
sa

Here is one proposal. The predicate ‘… is a lion’ is not primitive but is analyzed as
σ is a space-time region and … occupies σ and … is an animal and Λ( … )
where ‘σ’ names or describes a specific region of space-time and ‘Λ(…)’ abbreviates
a conjunction of predicates that we take to apply to animals that we call ‘lions’. The
298 The Continuing Banishment of Modality

constituent that is replaced by a variable here is the name or description ‘σ’. That is,
on a fuller analysis ‘lions exist’ is

.e ion
(∃x)(σ is a space-time region & x occupies σ & Λ(x))
The propositional function of the second conjunct of the analysis is obtained by re-
placing the name ‘σ’ with a variable, say ‘y’. So the second conjunct states that either

an iss
• For some σ′ , it is known that (∃x)(σ′ is a space-time region & x occupies σ′ &
Λ(x)),

du
m
or
• It is known that (∃y)(∃x)(y is a space-time region & x occupies y & Λ(x)).

per
Notice that, on this analysis, that some sort or the other of animal exist doesn’t guar-
antee that for any hypothetical sort of animal Ξ, ‘Ξs are possible’ is true. There are
two ways in which such an existence claim could fail. First, it is known that no space-
time region is occupied by animals satisfying the defining predicates of Ξs. Second,

ut
it is known whether ‘Ξs exist’ is true or false. The second way is what Russell has

ey
in mind when he claims that ‘unicorns are possible’ requires that “the description of
h@ itho
the unicorn does not show that there could not be such beasts.” This phrase means
that there is no deduction of a contradiction from ‘(∃x)Υ(x)’, where ‘Υ(x)’ is the de-
sl
scription of the unicorn. If this condition fails then we know that ‘∼(∃x)Υ(x)’ is true,
and so the first conjunct in the analysis also fails.
sh ite w
we
9.3.7 Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (1919)
The final text in this survey is another which appears to contain both an explicit
criticism of modality and a number of uses of the notion of possible worlds.
The criticism again repeats claims we have encountered throughout in this chap-
c

ter:
ie
or not

Another set of notions as to which philosophy has allowed itself to fall into hopeless confusions
through not sufficiently separating propositions and propositional functions are the notions of
‘modality’: necessary, possible, and impossible. …. The traditional view was that, among true
propositions, some were necessary, while others were merely contingent …. In fact, however,
there was never any clear account of what was added to truth by the conception of necessity.
o

(1919, 165)
d.
:d

Russell continues with the propositional function reconstruction of modal distinc-


tions:
aft

In the case of propositional functions, the three-fold division is obvious. If ‘ϕx’ is an undeter-
mined value of a certain propositional function, it will be necessary if the function is always
nf

true, possible if it is sometimes true, and impossible if it is never true. (1919, 165)
Dr

However, Russell also uses the language of possible worlds in two contexts: discus-
sions of the “axioms” of infinity and reducibility in Principia. In both cases, Russell
sa

argues that the putative “axiom” is not “logically necessary.” About the axiom of
infinity Russell says:

From the fact that the infinite is not self-contradictory, but is also not demonstrable logically,
we must conclude that nothing can be known a priori as to whether the number of things in
After “Necessity and Possibility” 299

the world is finite or infinite. The conclusion is, therefore, to adopt a Leibnizian phraseology,
that some of the possible worlds are finite, some infinite, and we have no means of knowing
to which of these two kinds our actual world belongs. The axiom of infinity will be true in

.e ion
some possible worlds and false in others; whether it is true or false in this world, we cannot
tell. (1919, 141; emphases mine)
But for the diversity of types, it would be possible to prove logically that there are classes
of n terms, where n is any finite integer; or even that there are classes of ℵ0 terms. But, owing to

an iss
types, such proofs … are fallacious. We are left to empirical observation to determine whether
there are as many as n individuals in the world. Among ‘possible’ worlds, in the Leibnizian

du
sense, there will be worlds having one, two, three, … individuals. There does not even seem

m
any logical necessity why there should be even one individual—why, in fact, there should be
any world at all. (1919, 203)

per
The fundamental claim here is that the axiom of infinity is neither self-contradictory
nor provable logically. From this claim, Russell moves to the epistemological status
of the axiom of infinity: it not known a priori whether it is true or false. This status is
then “rephrased” as the claim that some possible worlds are finite and others infinite.

ut
Again, as in External World and in Problems, what the “phraseology” of possible
worlds comes to is the epistemic status of the axiom of infinity, which in turn rests

ey
on its logical status as neither self-contradictory nor logically demonstrable.
h@ itho
Furthermore, the notions involved in this logical status are not modal ones. Log-
ically demonstrable means the existence of a logical proof; self-contradictory means
sl
the existence of a logical proof of the negation. Moreover, “logically necessary”
means no more than “logically demonstrable.” Now, what is a “logical proof”? It
sh ite w

is proof from logical propositions only, and, in this book, Russell doesn’t have an
we
account of the nature of logical propositions beyond this:

logical propositions … are a wholly different class of propositions from those that we come
to know empirically. They all have the characteristic which … we agreed to call ‘tautology.’
This, combined with the fact that they can be expressed wholly in terms of variables and logical
c

constants (a logical constant being something which remains constant in a proposition even
ie

when all its constituents are changed)—will give the definition of logic or pure mathematics.
or not

For the moment, I do not know how to define ‘tautology.’ (1919, 204-5)

About the axiom of reducibility Russell says,

The axiom is a generalised form of Leibniz’s identity of indiscernibles. … In the actual world
o

there seems no way of doubting its empirical truth as regards particulars, owing to spatio-
d.

temporal differentiation: no two particulars have exactly the same spatial and temporal rela-
:d

tions to all other particulars. But this is, as it were, an accident, a fact about the world in which
we happen to find ourselves. Pure logic, and pure mathematics (which is the same thing),
aims at being true, in Leibnizian phraseology, in all possible worlds, not only in this higgledy-
aft

piggledy job-lot of a world in which chance has imprisoned us. There is a certain lordliness
which the logician should preserve: he must not condescend to derive arguments from the
things he sees about him.
nf

Viewed from this strictly logical point of view, I do not see any reason to believe that the
Dr

axiom of reducibility is logically necessary, which is what would be meant by saying that it is
true in all possible worlds. The admission of this axiom into a system of logic is therefore a
sa

defect, even if the axiom is empirically true. (1919, 192-3)

Again, the cash value of the “Leibnizian phraseology,” “what would be meant by”
talking about possible worlds, is logical status. That reducibility is true in the actual
world, but there is no reason to believe that it is true in all possible worlds means
300 The Continuing Banishment of Modality

no more than that it is not logically necessary, which, in turn, as we saw, means that
there is no proof of it from logical propositions.
Russell maintains an unwavering anti-modal stance throughout this period: the

.e ion
traditional conception of modality is a confusion or illusion, since there are no modes
of truth, and the best sense that can be made of modal distinctions is as properties of
propositional functions.6 Whether he is right to do so is, of course, another question,

an iss
to be investigated in the next Volume, in which we will discuss C. I. Lewis’s and
Wittgenstein’s criticisms of Russell’s amodal conceptions of logic and of proposition.

du
m
per
ut
ey
h@ itho
sl
sh ite w
we
c
ie
or not
o
d.
:d
aft
nf
Dr

6
It is thus quite surprising that such a careful and thoughtful scholar of Russell like Nicholas Griffin
sa

would hold that Russell had several concepts of necessity that “played an important role in his logic”
(1980, 121). It should also be clear why it is a misreading to take, as Jan Dejnožka (1999) does, Russell’s
definitions of modality as intended for the formulation of formal modal logics to analyze Russell’s and
others’ casual talk of possible worlds. Russell’s explicit statements against the foundational status of
modality show that his aim is not to uncover logical principles governing imprecise and intuitive modal
concepts, but to show that we have no single coherent conception of modality.
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