HERCE VS.
MUN OF CABUYAO
GR No. 166645
FACTS:
Sometime in the years 1956 and 1957, Juanita Carpena and
company applied for the judicial registration of forty-four (44) parcels of
land all situated in Cabuyao, Laguna, docketed as LRC Case No. N-438,
LRC Record No. N-10514 with the then Court of First Instance of
Laguna.
After trial on the merits, the trial court granted the application and
directed the issuance of a decree of registration for the aforesaid forty-
four parcels.
However, out of these forty-four parcels, only forty-two were
issued decrees of registration. One of these two parcels for which no
decree of registration was issued was made the subject of cadastral
proceedings instituted by the Republic of the Philippines in 1976
docketed as Cadastral Case No. N-B-1-LRC, Cadastral No. N-651 with
the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch 1.
The property is designated as Lot 3484 in Cadastral Case No. N-
B-1 but previously, in the 1957 case filed by Juanita Carpena, the
property was identified as Lot 1, Plan II-2719-A.
Petitioner Vicente D. Herce filed an opposition to the
proceedings, informing the court that he had acquired ownership over
the subject property, having purchased the same from a certain Jose
Carpena in August of 1975. He alleged that Jose Carpena is one of the
heirs of Juanita Carpena who filed LRC Case No. N-438 in 1956-57.
After trial, the court rendered decision on May 30, 1980 awarding
the subject property in favor of petitioner Vicente Herce. However, in
spite of the favorable decision, a decree of registration could not be
immediately issued considering that the subject property was included in
the 1956-57 case filed by Juanita Carpena.
Thus in June 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to Modify Decision
explaining that since no decree was issued yet in LRC Case No. N-438,
the decision therein could still be modified by excluding the subject
property in order to facilitate the issuance of the decree to him.
After hearing, the trial court issued an order dated May 3, 1996
granting the motion and directing the Land Registration Authority
(hereinafter LRA) to finally issue a decree of registration in the name of
petitioner Vicente Herce. The respondent Municipality of Cabuyao filed a
motion for reconsideration of the trial courts order but this was denied by
the court on December 27, 1996.
Aggrieved by the above-described orders of the trial court, the
Municipality of Cabuyao filed, on May 15, 1996, a petition for the
reconstitution of its alleged title over the disputed property docketed as
LRC Case No. B-2118 before the RTC of Laguna, Branch 25, arguing
among others that it was issued a decree of registration over the said
property as early as 1911.
The petition was dismissed in an order dated February 5, 1996.
In the meantime, the LRA issued a decree of registration in favor of
petitioner on January 28, 1997 followed by the issuance of Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-2099 in his name.
On January 27, 1998, the Municipality of Cabuyao filed a petition
for the reopening of the decree of registration issued in favor of
petitioner. This led to the issuance of the questioned August 21, 1998
Order directing the reopening and review of the decree of registration.
The said order likewise set aside the order dated May 29, 1957 in LRC
Case No. N-438 as well as the order dated May 3, 1996. RTC reopened
the decree of registration.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the above-quoted Order but
this was similarly denied by the respondent court in an Order dated
August 15, 2003.[4]
Herce filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. CA
dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the RTCAugust 16,
2004.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
courts order to reopen the decree of registration.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The validity of Decree
No. 4244 issued on March 3, 1911 in favor of respondent Municipality of
Cabuyo, Laguna is AFFIRMED, whereas Decree No. N-216115 and
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-2099, issued in the name of petitioner
Herce, are declared NULL and VOID.
The Couts explained in the case of City of Manila v. Lack,[7] that
the purpose of the legislature in creating the Court of Land Registration
was to bring the land titles of the Philippine under one comprehensive
and harmonious system, the cardinal features of which are indefeasibility
of title and the intervention of the State as a prerequisite to the creation
and transfer of titles and interest, with the resultant increase in the use of
land as a business asset by reason of the greater certainty and security
of title. The Court of Land Registration does not create or vest a title. It
simply confirms a title already created and already vested, rendering it
forever indefeasible.
The Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, now P.D. No. 1529) as
well as the Cadastral Act protects only the holders of a title in good faith
and cannot be used as a shield for frauds [8] or that one should enrich
himself at the expense of another. One cannot conceal under the cloak
of its provisions to perpetrate fraud and obtain a better title than what he
really and lawfully owns. Thus, if he secures a certificate of title by
mistake or obtain more land than what he really owns, the certificate of
title should be cancelled or corrected.
In other words, indefeasibility and imprescriptibility are the
cornerstones of land registration proceedings. Barring any mistake or
use of fraud in the procurement of the title, owners may rest secure on
their ownership and possession once their title is registered under the
protective mantle of the Torrens system. Thus, once a decree of
registration is made under the Torrens system, and the reglementary
period has passed within which the decree may be questioned, the title is
perfected and cannot be collaterally questioned later on.[9]
Applying these legal precepts to the case at bar, it is clear that
Decree No. 4244 issued in favor of the respondent municipality in 1911
has become indefeasible; as such, petitioner is now barred from claiming
the subject land. Although the municipalitys claim of ownership is based
on the entry in the Ordinary Decree Book, LRC (CLR) Rec. No. 6763,
showing that Decree No. 4244 was issued on March 3, 1911 and that Lot
1 Plan II-2719 was one of the six parcels of land previously applied for
registration by the Municipality of Cabuyao in LRC (GLRO) Record No.
6763, being a public document, the Ordinary Decree Book is prima facie
proof of the entries appearing therein
Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is enshrined in the 1935,
1973, and 1987 Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State. Petitioner, as a private claimant, bears the burden of overcoming
the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the
public domain. He failed to discharge this burden. There is paucity of
proof that the subject property was segregated from the bulk of the public
domain and declared by competent authority to be alienable and
disposable. The necessity of such proof becomes more significant in the
light of clear indications that the property under litigation was intended for
public use. The Cabuyao Cadastral Map of the Bureau of Lands
approved on December 8, 1975 shows that Lot 1 Plan II-2719 was
intended as a school site for Banay-banay, Cabuyao, Laguna. The
municipal council of Cabuyao, in a resolution dated February 17, 1995,
resolved to inform all concerned that the land in question is intended as a
school site.[14]
But then again, what militates against the grant of the instant
petition is petitioners lack of legal standing to raise a legal question.
Legal standing denotes a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the act that is being challenged. The term interest means material
interest as distinguished from a mere incidental interest.[15]
Petitioners claim of ownership of the litigated property is based
on the Deed of Sale with Mortgage[16] dated August 25, 1975 executed
between him and Jose B. Carpena, one of the heirs of Juanita Carpena.
Yet extant evidence indicate that petitioner divested himself of any
interest over the disputed property and with it, his legal standing to
institute the instant petition, when he agreed in September 1978 to apply
the payments already made for the sale of the subject property as
payment for the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 5367. This was
confirmed by Carpena in his May 15, 1996 affidavit whereby the affiant
declared that no consideration has ever been given to him (Jose
Carpena) for the purchase of said Lot 3484 since petitioner withdrew the
amount of P54,495.00 and applied the same to another lot covered by
Tax Declaration No. 5367.[17] The evidentiary weight of the September
1978 agreement cannot be overturned by the uncorroborated assertion
by the petitioner that the sale of the subject property did in fact push
through in accordance with the August 25, 1975 agreement.

The declarations of Carpena are consistent with the August 25,

1975 Deed of Sale with Mortgage whereby it was stipulated that the
buyer (herein petitioner) may exercise the option to ask for
reimbursement in the event an adverse claim is instituted by a third
party. It is simply preposterous for petitioner to now impugn the Carpena
affidavit since he himself tacitly recognized, in his own affidavit ofAugust
26, 1975, the statements found therein.

A land already decreed and registered in an ordinary registration

proceedings cannot again be the subject of adjudication. Decree No.
4244 has long become final and incontrovertible. Accordingly, the lower
courts should have upheld the dominical rights of the respondent
municipality, being the prior registrant, over Lot No. 3484 by affirming the
validity of Decree No. 4244 and nullifying Decree No. N-216115 as well
as Original Certificate of Title No. 0-2099 issued in the name of petitioner
Herce.