Unity of Antipoetic Polemic in Plato's Republic

PAVLOS SILVESTROS
M.A. in Philosophy (Aristotle University of Thessaloniki)
Thessaloniki, Greece (2018) [Draft]

Abstract
The purpose of this study is to propose an inclusive interpretation of the attack on poetry
formulated in Plato’s Republic. Thus, it will be discussed two different interpretative
strategies and a combination of them, with the primary aim being to defend the claim that
the attack on poetry in Book X is consistent with the previous one in Books II & III.
Furthermore, the main reasons for the condemnation of poetry will be examined. Lastly,
it will be investigated under what conditions could ever allowed to the banned poetry to
enter the ideal city of Platonic Socrates.

A. The Case in Favor of Unity

In the first part of the last Book of Republic (595a-608b), Platonic Socrates1 once again
attacks on ancient Greek poetry. This second and last examination of the same issue in
the current text: is not only compatible with the previous one in Books II and III (363a-
398b) –a kind of reminder (‘ἐνθυμηθεὶς περὶ ποιήσεως λέγω’, 595a3)–, but also
complements and consolidates it.2 Since, in the light of the ontological, epistemological
and soul-related developments of mediating Books IV-IX, its philosophical deepening,
sharpening and –foremost– grounding is now possible (Levin 2000: 152).

1
I will not delve into the notorious ‘Socratic Problem’; thus, I am not holding any presumption about the actual views of
Plato or historical Socrates. So, I am using here the term ‘Platonic Socrates’ in order to refer solely to the views that the
character of Socrates expresses mainly in this dialogue. Also, from now on, I will be referring to ‘Platonic Socrates’ just
as ‘Socrates’.
2
I totally disagree with Annas (1981: 335) for her characterization and evaluation of Book 10: ‘But the result is that
Book 10 itself appears gratuitous and clumsy, and it is full of oddities. We can see why Plato thought it relevant to the
rest of the Republic; but the level of philosophical argument and literary skill is much below the rest of the book.’
Because in my view her judgment is hasty, aphoristic and insufficiently justified, hence she is quite unfair towards Plato.
In contrast, I agree with Tate (1928; 1932), Belfiore (1984), Asmis (1992) and Levin (2000), which, although each one
give emphasis to different points, they are in favor of a robust unity of the 10th Book with the rest Books, and especially
they support the continuity between the ‘two’ antipoetic attacks of Socrates.
 2

However, first the reasonable doubts regarding the total consistency of antipoetic
statements must be rebutted. These doubts have been raised due to the following phrase
of Socrates: ‘exclude so much of poetry as is imitative [mimetic]’3 (‘μηδαμῇ
παραδέχεσθαι αὐτῆς ὅση μιμητική’, 595a5)4. Since, prima facie, the complete refusal to
accept any imitative poetry (ὅση μιμητική) in the ideal city-state, as expressed in Book X,
seems not only to contradict what has been previously argued for the educational role of
censored poetry, but also to be in (internal) conflict with the rest of the last Book, where
some kind of poetry is allowed: consisting only of hymns to the gods and praises of
good/virtuous men (607a) (Tate 1928: 16).

Of the various proposed solutions to address and overcome these alleged

contradictions, it is worthwhile to present at least the following two, which, according to
my judgment, are among the best. First, because both have been of key importance for
understanding the puzzling sections in question; and second, they can be combined, thus
contributing to the maximal consistent interpretation of the text (Williams 2006: 166).

A.1. Tate’s Solution

An old –but gold– conciliatory approach, to the problem of alleged inconsistency outlined
above, is put forth by J. Tate (1928; 1932) and it is based on the subtle distinction which
he draws between: ‘bad imitation’ hence forbidden and ‘good imitation’ hence
permissible (Zografidis 2007: 191-193). In more detail, the first kind of imitation consists
in the indiscriminate/uncritical reproduction-copying of just the appearances of things
which are perceivable purely or primarily by the senses: being an imitation of
phenomenon and not of truth (‘φαντάσματος… οὖσα μίμησις’, 598b). Both the dramatic
poet and the painter use this kind of imitation, for they ignore the true nature or inner
meaning of the subject matter of their arts. Thus, they represent (imitate) something
without knowing or fully understanding it: the dramatic poet when performs multiple
roles and embodies inappropriate characters, and the painter when depicts only a partial
perspective of visually perceived things. Instead, the second kind of imitation is the
imitation of the realm of Forms/Ideas (the divine paradigm/blueprint, 500e), which is
performed solely by an expert (e.g. the philosopher-ruler), that is, the only one who can

3
Alternatively: ‘do not to allow even a single case of imitative poetry’.
4
Here, according to Havelock (1982: 26, 3-35), the term ‘imitative’ (mimetic) refers to all poetic (artistic) imitation that
represents or depicts anything of the sensible world, and not only the narrative technique of tragic poetry (via imitation) –
for the classification of the various narrative techniques see: 392d.
 3

re-cognize both the Forms themselves (as proto-types) and their tokens in the sensible
world.

The first category of imitation is imitative in the literal sense (mimetic): by virtue
of producing a mere copy of the sensible objects; whereas the second category of
imitation is not literally imitative but only analogically (Tate 1928: 23). That is, while the
former is based on some ontic correlation: depiction or representation, the latter is
established in the ontological connection through the participation in a Form or
exemplification (presence) of a Form. Besides, Plato himself in Sophist (236a-c),
explicitly divides ‘imitation’ as an idol-making process (ειδωλοποιητική) in
imaginative/fantastic (φανταστική) –the result of which is simply the production of a
nonfunctional image that coincidentally mimics the original thing– and to
iconofying/pictorial (εἰκαστική) –the result of which is the creation of a functional icon
(symbol) that necessarily presents/exemplifies the original thing. While the imaginative
process is literally imitative and based on an external (noncognitive) relation, the
iconofying process is imitative only analogically and grounded in an internal (cognitive)
relation; therefore, the second one does not belong to the bad imitative (mimetic) art (‘ὅση
μιμητική’, 595a5) (Tate 1932).

So, (a) the Republic as a work of ‘philosophical literature’ –let alone being in the
form of a dialogue– is not part of the bad imitative poetry, because its author is a
philosopher, viz. an expert par excellence. (b) Neither the poetry allowed for stricto sensu
educational purposes is imitative, because it is performed under the auspices of the state
via the austere supervision of the philosophers-rulers, and is censored, that is, purified:
both as content and form (regarding: the representation of gods, heroes and righteous men,
the general themes, the narrative technique and its formal features). (c) In addition, the
word ‘imitative’ in the phrase ‘exclude so much of poetry as is imitative’ (595a5), is used
literally, that is in the negative sense, hence it refers only to the first category of imitation:
viz. in painting and dramatic –especially tragic– poetry. Therefore, not every kind of
poetry have been excluded from the ideal city-state, but only so much of it as is literally
imitative: namely, only the imaginative –in the terms used in Sophist (Tate 1928; 1932).

A.2. Levin’s Solution

The second plausible exegesis, to be entertained here, was proposed by Levin (2000: 127-
167). According to her, the polemic of Book X focuses on the non-educational function
 4

of poetry, which is distinct from its pedagogical role in the basic education of the
guardians (Levin 2000: 153). This means that permissible-censored poetry, which
apparently is imitative (as described in Books II and III), has only a limited pedagogical
role, and thus is exclusively addressed to minors (children). On the other hand, regarding:
the adults, the social role and –more generally– the non-educational function of poetry in
the public sphere, every kind of imitative poetry will be forbidden; while the only
permissible kind of poetry will be the non-imitative: hymns to the gods and eulogies of
good people (Levin 2000: 152-154). In other words, Socrates doesn’t contradict himself
when in Book X prohibits the entrance to the city to any imitative art (‘μηδαμῇ
παραδέχεσθαι αὐτῆς ὅση μιμητική’, 595a5), because in Book X the frame of reference is
different: namely, he examines the extra-educational status of poetry that is addressed
solely to adults.

A.3. A Combinative Solution

Finally, the aforementioned solutions can be combined. On the one hand, by

changing the frame of reference in the 10th Book of Republic: proceeding from minors
to adults and from the educational to the socio-political role of poetry in the public sphere;
and on the other hand, by using the term ‘imitation’ with two different meanings: literally
(bad imitation) and figuratively (good imitation). That is, even if the censored poetry of
Books II and III is literally imitative, it is limited to its educational role; and even if extra-
educational poetry (hymns to the gods and eulogies of humans) is imitative, this is only
figuratively. Therefore, it can be concluded that the antipoetic polemic in Plato’s Republic
constitutes a coherent unity, since Book X is not only consistent with itself but also with
the relevant conclusions of the rest of the Books.

B. The Reasons for the Condemnation of Poetry

After the condemnation –without fair trial– of the entirety of (literally) imitative5 poetry:
consisting in complete denial of entrance to the city; Socrates proceeds to the
philosophical justification of his verdict. This justification will be based on two central
axes: (a) on the analysis of the process and objects of imitation, and (b) on the influence
that poetry can exert on human souls. It is rather obvious that the background of both is
metaphysical and have been drawn upon the ‘turbulent’ discussion of the previous Books

5
From now on, I will use the term ‘imitative’ in the literal/negative sense.
 5

(IV–IX) (Zografidis 2007: 194). Strategically, that contributes to the refinement of the
arguments and makes it possible to firmly ground and restate the attack on ancient Greek
poetry.6

B.1. Ontological Reasons

Concerning the first axis, it will be based on the hypothetical analogy between (imitative)
poetry and painting, because is assumed that the art of painting can clarify some
inconspicuous but essential features of poetry (Pappas 2003). However, Socrates
consequently (603b) warns us of the precariousness to depend our entire reasoning on a
such unwarranted analogy; the role of which is mainly, if not only, assistive and it might
require more suppositions or further justification (Moss 2007: 416-17).7

On the other hand, even if the imitative relations in these two arts have nothing in
common, the basic claim about the falsehood of their products still can be sound.
Therefore, the only thing required to presuppose about the poetry in order to support this
analogy is: that the poets are ignorant regarding the truth of their subject matter just like
the painters (Papas 2003). So, by using as typical case the art of painting and having as
end goal the application of conclusions that will be drawn into the case of poetry, the
analysis of imitation unfolds as follows (595c7).

First of all, Socrates presupposes that a certain version of his Hypothesis of Forms
is generally accepted or at least familiar (ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας μεθόδου, 596a)8 among his
interlocutors:9 (a) ‘For we are, as you know, accustomed of positing [referring to] some

6
Also, in retrospect could be seen as giving additional reasons in support of the censorship of poetry formulated in
Books II and III (thus completing an all-around justification).
7
Broadly speaking, ‘arguments by analogy’ (analogical arguments) are a subclass of inductive arguments and their
conclusions are not entailed by logical necessity, but they are probabilistic; since the compared: things, cases or states of
affairs; are not identical, but differ in various respects/features or in some degree (Peonidis 2014: 29-40). Hence,
analogical arguments are considered as the weakest and least convincing kind of inductive arguments. Nevertheless,
Plato in Republic not only makes an extensive use of them (though cautiously, since he is aware of their weaknesses), but
also gives them a central role in his argumentation.
8
Possibly, Plato tactically attempts to present a distorted (false) image (like an imitative artist, so to speak) to the
uninitiated reader, namely that exists a consensus about this metaphysical supposition or at least that it is the dominant
view (the common ground) among philosophically trained (educated) people, in order to shift the burden of proof to
those who are willing to challenge it.
9
According to Pappas (2003), the Forms here are used as fundamental referents (ground) not only for evaluative,
relational and mathematical general terms –as in the previous Books–, but they are expanded to include both natural
kinds (for instance species: the Form of Human) and kinds of artifacts (their conceptual models or blueprints, e.g. the
Form of Bed). Especially the supposed existence of Forms of artificial beings is highly controversial, such Forms
reappear briefly only in Parmenides (Moss 2007: 417; Annas 2006; Pappas 2003).
 6

single Form in each case we can name any beings which are many with one and the same
term’ (596a). Based on this assumption, Socrates puts forth the so-called Third Bed
Argument.

Let’s suppose, that there are only three kinds of craftsmen for beds (596a-589c): (i)
the formidable and admirable god, (ii) the bedmaker and (iii) the painter. (b) First, the
god who either didn’t want or was forced by necessity, he didn’t create more than one
bed, but solely the single original bed (the unique Form of beds), that is the immaterial
universal/prototype Bed10. Subsequently, the bedmaker by visualizing the immaterial
universal/prototype Bed (the Form of bed)11 manufactures a particular 3-D material bed:
an imitation of the Form of bed. The particular 3-D material bed is the first image (idol)
and functions as a model for the painter, which somehow crafts a seemingly particular
bed (2-D material): a second image, which is an imitation of the first image or an idol of
the idol (596a-598c) (Zografidis 2007: 190). Thus, there are three distinct classes of beds
according to a three-degree ontological scale, in reference of which these craftsmen are
ranked, viz. depending on the ontological status (class) of their creations.

The ranking is rather obvious. The first place of craftsmanship is taken rightfully by
the god, because his creation is original, the being par excellence (the universal: the single
Form of the many particular beds), and for he is the only genuine creator/craftsman, since
he created a novel thing (ex nihilo?): something that previously didn’t exist at all. The
second place is occupied by the bedmaker for his work is a full physical image of the
Form of bed (a tangible object: one among the many particular beds). And the third-place
fits to the painter, because his composition is just an image of a physical idol: a partial

10
Here I agree with the insightful remark of Annas (1981: 229): ‘it is odd (and unique in Plato) for a Form to be made by
God; Forms are eternal and uncreated. It might be said that we should not make too heavy weather of the talk of Forms
being created by God: this is just introduced so as to produce a parallel with the craftsman and painter […].’
11
It is quite interesting to consider which artificial objects (artifacts) are chosen as examples by Socrates (596a-b): (1)
beds and (2) tables. Perhaps, this is a subtle and implicit reference via these items to the bodily pleasures of sex, eating
and sleeping; which are characteristically desires of the lowest (evaluatively) part of the human soul (one of the two
body-dependent parts): the so-called appetitive. For in fact the experience of these pleasurable activities habitually take
place in the material context of such objects, thus beds and tables are associated in some way with them. Also, on the one
hand, these pleasures are the result of the necessary desires of the embodied soul, hence in some degree they are
necessary, because the deprivation of these desires causes us pain, that is why they are called (humanly) necessary. On
the other hand, they are somewhat idols of the genuine pleasures, namely the intellectual pleasures, which can be
achieved only by the rational part of the soul (the intellect) –like the material beds are idols of the corresponding
immaterial prototype: the Form of bed (see: 571a, 581-590 and mainly Book IX). Furthermore, the two basic instincts are
associated with these pleasures: the instinct of self-preservation (the survival of the individual) and the instinct of
reproduction (the survival/perpetuation of the species).
 7

representation of a particular thing, since he cannot not grasp mentally the Form of bed:
the prototype. Given that the Form of bed is the first and true, namely original being, it
follows that the painter is in the third position regarding the truth and he is in the double
distance from it, since his product is not a similitude of the truth –like bedmaker’s– (first
ontological demise) but a similitude of phenomenon, that is a similitude of untruth (second
ontological demise).

(1) God  the unique immaterial Form of bed (universal)  (2) Bedmaker  many
3-D material beds (particulars): an idol of the Form of bed (an image of the truth)  (3)
Painter  a 2-D depiction of some aspect of the 3-D material beds (images of
particulars): an idol of the idol (an image of some image).

More specifically, the painter is likened to a man holding a mirror (596e): As the
man with the mirror does not need to have any relevant-expert knowledge, since he
produces facilely but also uncritically and mechanically mere reflections/shadows of the
particular things (manmade or natural) in accordance to which way he turns the mirror
(viewing angle). Likewise, the painter is an ignorant, since he behaves passively and
unreflectively presenting each object not from a universal but from a partial viewpoint.
This generates various problems, because his imitative craft in each case provides only
some external aspect (bare appearances) of tangible things (which are the physical idols
of the respective Forms) according to his biases, and furthermore only from a two-point
perspective on a two-dimensional surface (Moss 2007: 418-422). Comparatively to a
bedmaker, the painter makes two-dimensional/flat and fake beds, which lack the proper
functionality and deceive us like a mirror (or some water reflections) that mirrors and
misrepresents its objects (illusionism)12 (598a). Thus, while god is the par excellence
creator and the bedmaker is a true craftsman, the painter is not a genuine craftsman but
a mere deceiver (deceitful imitator), and hence his craft is imitative in the worst possible
sense.

So, imitative art (painting) is in the farthest possible place from the truth. And by
extension, imitative poetry (especially the tragic) is also in the farthest place from the
truth. In fact, these arts get positioned in third-place regarding the truth of their works,

12
Illusionism is a commonly used technique in painting, which aims to create the false impression of presence of the
third dimension (depth) on a two-dimensional level. In a sense, it makes possible the seemingly representation of 3-D
objects on a 2-D surface.
 8

which implies the significant ontological degradation of their works (deprivation/absence

of any essence).

Socrates (595b3-c3) takes tragic poetry as paradigmatic case of imitative poetry –in
the literal/negative sense– and Homer as quasi-representative of all tragic poets, for he
considers him their leader and original master of the kind (‘πρῶτος διδάσκαλος… καὶ
ἡγεμὼν’).13 Socrates’ action in retrospect could be seen as ironic, since his recognition-
appraisal of Homer as father of the genre of tragedy is simply a requisite for committing
yet another creative patricide. He only posits him as ‘father’ in order to ‘kill’ him
subsequently after (599-601):14 where all together the imitative poets headed by the great
Homer are denounced as deceitful imitators of the idols of virtue (excellence) and
incapable even to simulate the truth. Since, anyone who is equally capable of making both
an object's image and the object itself, he would never have engaged in the making of the
image, but he would had devoted himself exclusively to the construction of the object
itself (599a-b).

B.2. Epistemological Reasons

For the reinforcement of antipoetic accusations, an additional tripartite distinction is

drawn by Socrates (601c3-602c3): ‘There are some three arts concerned with everything
the user's art, the maker's, and the imitator's’ (601d1-d3). But each person in virtue of his
nature (innate capacity) can have mastery of only one art –due to the implicitly
presupposed Principle of Specialization (‘διαφέρων τὴν φύσιν, ἄλλος ἐπ᾽ ἄλλου ἔργου
πράξει’, 370b; ‘τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν’, 433b; ‘τὰ αὑτοῦ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ πράττῃ,
οὗτος δίκαιός’, 441e) (Annas 1981). Consequently, there are three different specialists in
respect of these arts: (c) the user, (b) the maker, and (c) the imitator.15

These specialists are ranked, not just stated in random manner, something that will
get clear in the following reasoning: (1) ‘Doesn't that mean that the excellence, beauty
and correctness of each implement, living thing and action has no other purpose than the

13
Socrates applies here a kind of representativeness heuristic (Annas 1981).
14
It is no coincidence that every recognition of intellectual paternity in Plato is also accompanied by a creative patricide
representing somewhat a ‘rite of passage’ to another/higher level of knowledge or a new paradigm, but rather a basic
narrative motif –see: Sophist (241d). Undoubtedly, such movements reinforce Plato's presentation as a radical reformer
against the whole status quo of his time (worldview).
15
Annas (1981: 191) is right on pointing that: ‘In the case of anything that can be made and used, the skill of making it
will be different from the skill of using it. (Plato assumes here that they will be found in different people, but this is not
necessary.)’
 9

usage for which each of them has been created or developed by nature? That's right.’
(601d4-d7) (2) Thus, the user of some usable creation gains knowledge regarding its
features via using it (by direct acquaintance). Therefore, the user is better informed in the
subject matter than any other, and by extension he is the one that can supervise and guide
the respective creator/maker via explaining to him: the merits and defects (everything
concerning the utility and foremost the purpose) exemplified during usage by the usable
creation in question (601d8-e2).

(3) Thus, the user as an advisor of the maker is the one who can judge whether the
creation is good/beneficial or bad/harmful, for he possesses the requisite knowledge
(601e3-e6). (4) So, in order for the maker to have knowledge or correct opinion/belief
regarding the merits, defects and generally the features of the particular thing he is about
to make; he is obliged by the unforced force of reason to listen, follow and depend upon
the instructions-correctives (total feedback) of a paradigmatic user of that thing. Because
he can acquire the requisite epistemic content only through discussion on the subject
matter with someone who is knowledgeable (by indirect acquaintance), namely a proper
user who possess the relevant knowledge (601e7-602a3).

Now, the imitator (602a3-b4): (5) doesn’t have knowledge of what he imitates,
namely, whether things are as they should according to their use, inasmuch he does not
use them, is unable to know from experience (by direct acquaintance); (6) nor does have
to follow and listen to the instructions of the user, that is, the one who knows about the
thing that the former imitates (since the product of this imitation is characterized by the
lack of proper functionality, namely it is useless). (7) Hence the imitator will not have
neither knowledge nor correct belief/opinion about the merits/benefits or defects/harms
of the things he portrays. (8) ‘Yet still he will none the less imitate, though in every case
he does not know in what way the thing is bad or good. But, as it seems, the thing he will
imitate will be the thing that appears beautiful [καλὸν] to the ignorant multitude’ (602b1-
b4). (9) Thus, ‘[…] as it seems, we are fairly agreed: that the imitator knows nothing
worth mentioning about the things he imitates, but that imitation is a kind of game and
not serious. Second, that all those who attempt tragic poetry, whether in iambic or epic
verse, are and above all imitators’ (602b6-b11). (10) Therefore, imitative art(s), and
 10

especially tragic poetry, are wholly devoted to that which is in the third-place from the
truth (‘περὶ τρίτον… ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας’) (602c1-c3).16

And by applying all the above on the analogy of the Divided Line that previously
discussed in Book VI (509e-511e), the following can be formulated. On the one hand,
regarding each useable creation: the user has the relevant knowledge, the maker possesses
at best a correct belief, while the imitator lacks any relevant knowledge or correct
opinion/belief, namely he has total ignorance, and by being a complete ignorant remains
in the epistemological level of mere speculation (Pappas 2003).17 On the other hand,
while the works of the maker are material idols (physical models) of the original
immaterial prototypes (Forms), the works of the imitator are mere shadows and
reflections of these idols, thus having the status of false image and being the causes of the
deceitful illusions that keep us entrapped in the notorious Platonic Cave (our shackles are
made by the power of captivation such false images exert upon us) (514a-520).

B.3. Soul-related (Ethico-Political) Reasons

Subsequently, Socrates proceeds to the second axis of his indictment against imitative
poetry: regarding the effects that imitation exerts on the souls of people. His starting point
is the investigation about which human parts and in what manner are affected when a
person is exposed to the products of imitation (602c). For this, he brings an example
(602e-603a) in which the senses and especially the visual perception, which is vulnerable
to imitative arts, get deceived; while the faculty of intellect avoids the error (optical
illusion) via calculation or rational estimation (namely good reasoning). Since vision and
intellect are in opposition as to whether a rod being submerged in water is curved or
straight; and given that any part of the soul cannot oppose with itself (602e), then the part
of the soul being deceived by false images must be different from the rational (or
accounting) part (viz. the intellect) (Pappas 2003) (436b).

So, it can be concluded that imitative poetry (in the bad sense) addresses to the
irrational part of the human soul and awakens it, thus causing inner conflict with the

16
The fact that it can be an unserious or insignificant game does not exclude it from being also a dangerous one. Perhaps
it is precisely this total lack of seriousness that makes imitative poetry dangerous because it hasn't any social (extra-
educational) function, so it is at least a useless occupation for adults, which only must deal with important occupations,
i.e. socially beneficial activities. Therefore, this unserious or unimportant activity can become a serious threat to the city.
17
This harsh critique of the epistemic status of poetry is a preparation for the following psychological criticism (Pappas
2003).
 11

rational part, and hence unsettling soul's established hierarchical order (mental balance)
(603b-605c): the spirited part of the soul by policing the appetitive part (keeping it under
rational control) ensures the domination of the intellect, that is mental balance (order) →
soul’s proper function → justice → moral health → ethical life → living well. Incited
disorder results in unresolvable internal conflict (351d-351e), thus fragmenting and
rendering the individual unable to act in a proper manner, that is, fulfilling his
predetermined social role. If this ‘mental illness’ spreads to the whole population it will
destroy the social cohesion, thus bringing political chaos, and putting into existential
danger the ideal city-state (603d). The disordered affections which are result of the
misleading charm that imitative art evokes (601b, 604a-605a, 607) are detrimental to the
moral health of the individual and to the well-being of the political community. Because
this charm poisons both the individual soul (the small republic) and the soul of the city
(the big republic) (595b), and by extend causes disagreement in the ranks of the guardians
(external conflict), namely a ‘class warfare’ (or even a civil war) between the military and
the intellectual-ruling elite (605c-607a).

Consequently: (1) Imitative poetry –art(s) in general– imitates the (manmade or

natural) physical imitations (idols) of the original beings (Forms) (595b-602c). (2) The
original beings (Forms) as objects of knowledge can be fully grasped only by the rational
part of the human soul. (3) Thus, the imitations (images) of idols without the originals
appeal solely to the non-rational part of the soul [2]. (4) Hence, imitative poetry addresses
only to the non-rational part of the soul [1, 2, 3]. (5) The non-rational part is the worst
part of the soul. (6) Hence, imitative poetry addresses solely to the worst part of the soul
(602c-606d) [4, 5]. (7) Whatever appeals solely the worst part of the soul should be
banned. (8) Therefore, all (literally) imitative poetry (except for educational-censored –
maybe imitative– poetry and the non-imitative poetry for adults: hymns to the gods and
praises of good/virtuous people) must be excluded from the ideal city-state (‘μηδαμῇ
παραδέχεσθαι αὐτῆς ὅση μιμητική’, 595a5, 606e-608b) (Pappas 2003).

C. Poetic Justice: Is an Apology Possible?

In the epilogue of the second and final antipoetic assault (607b-608c), and after the
complete exposition of all the reasons (grounding) for the universal condemnation of
imitative poetry, which consists in the exclusion from the ideal city-state. Socrates, on the
one hand, attempts to downplay the unprecedented extreme and authoritarian character of
 12

this condemnation. Thus, he is claiming that relies on the ancient Greek intellectual
history (tradition) for diagnosing that the quarrel between poetry and philosophy is long-
established since ancient times, hence predating him (‘παλαιὰ μέν τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφίᾳ
τε καὶ ποιητικῇ’, 607b-607c4). So, he simply came up with the right treatment to cure a
preexisting-chronic condition (a remedy for the inflammaging Greek mentality); hence,
only seemingly is a radical reformist, for in fact he utilizes and maximizes the old
antipoetic ways (e.g. the critiques by Xenophanes and Heraclitus against the divine
anthropomorphism which paradigmatically is expressed in Homeric poetry).

And on the other hand, Socrates anticipates that he may be accused of crudeness
and aesthetic insensibility, viz. inability to appreciate purely the aesthetic value of
imitative poetry (‘σκληρότητα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀγροικίαν’). Thus, he acknowledges –while at
the same time renouncing– his old love for this kind of poetry, for the sake of which is
prepared to grant entrance to imitative poets. If and only if, they or their
supporters/friends/defenders (φιλοποιηταὶ) succeed in giving sufficient reason for this. In
other words, it is required a philosophical apology from poetry, which due to its bad
imitative nature is not entitled to be within the city limits.

However, the seemingly magnanimity of Socrates is accompanied by draconian

preconditions. Since, the philosopher while addressing to those who are not poets
themselves but love poetry (φιλοποιηταὶ), and are going to undertake its defense, sets the
following terms: (1) The apology should be in prose not rhyme and (2) supported via
philosophical arguments which will establish that (3) imitative poetry is not only pleasant
and delightful (ἡδεῖα), but also beneficial and foremost useful (has a proper function or
role): (a) for the political community (big republic) and (b) for the human soul (small
republic). Only under these strict terms will an apology be made possible. But, remains
quite uncertain if it will eventually be convincing, that is to achieve the reintegration of
imitative poetry into the city.

In conclusion, the whole intellectual enterprise of (literally) imitative poetry is

treated as a priori guilty and furthermore must prove its innocence beyond any Socratic
doubt. In this respect, Socrates is the one who defines both the means and the desiderata
of the apology, thus he has the power to predetermine the outcome of the examined case
as well. In other words, he demands that the defense of poetry to be adjusted fully in the
terms and criteria (norms) of philosophical discourse (and especially to his own). So, the
 13

defenders of poetry will lose anyway (the game is rigged so to speak): if they succeed,
then they would have transformed poetry in to a handmaiden of philosophy (viz. a fully
heteronomous enterprise), and if they fail, then they would have justified Socrates harsh
judgment once and for all. And thus, the fate of poetry seems very grim, since it is
subjected to a philosophical ruling…

D. General Conclusions

(1) Imitation (mimesis) can be literally imitative (imaginative) or analogically

(iconofying); the first is bad and forbidden, while the second is good and permissible
(but maybe only in specific contexts).
(2) Socrates in Book X changes the frame of reference, namely he examines the extra-
educational regime of poetry's existence which is addressed to adults. So, in Book X
he does not generally prohibit ancient Greek poetry, but only the literally imitative
kind, and it applies solely to adults, that is to its extra-educational function. Because
the censored imitative poetry may have a minimal pedagogical role.
(3) The antipoetic polemic of Platonic Socrates in Republic constitutes a coherent unity
(continuity), since the 10th Book is not only consistent with itself but also with the
relevant conclusions of the previous Books, which establish (ground) the second and
final attack on the ancient Greek poetry.
(4) The products of imitative art(s) are images of the images (idols of idols), that is, they
possess the status of false image. They are at the double distance of the truth, for their
existence as mere shadows or reflections, is dependent upon the physical idols
(phenomena) of the original beings (Forms/Ideas) and not on the truth (double
ontological demise).
(5) Imitative artist has neither relevant knowledge nor correct belief/opinion, but plain
ignorance, which amounts in mere speculations; he is a total ignorant. And thus, he
is in third-place regarding truth: in the lowest possible epistemological level.
(6) Socrates perceives (595b3-c3) as a paradigmatic kind of imitative poetry (in the
literal/negative sense) the tragic poetry and as quasi-representative of all the tragic
poets: Homer, for he considers him the leader and the first master of the kind (their
father). And in this case, he is committing another ‘creative patricide’, this time the
‘victim’ is Homer.
 14

(7) Imitative poetry corrupts the human soul and by extension the city (thus jeopardizing
moral health); for it addresses to the worst part of the human soul. That is why it must
be excluded for the ideal city-state.
(8) For Socrates art should have ethico-political functionality (a proper role) and the loss
of it is sufficient reason for its exclusion. Therefore, he gives priority to the judgment
of the user of any creation than to its maker/craftsman. According to Socrates, poetry
is strictly delimited and subjected under the total control of (his) philosophy as a
handmaiden; since, it must be beneficial-useful to both the political community and
the individual, that is, to have moral and socio-political commitments. That means
that art can be accepted only as a fully heteronomous enterprise: dependent to
philosophy for assigning its purpose and existing exclusively as engaged in the service
of the guardians of the ideal city-state.
(9) Finally, in a way the whole history of aesthetic theories could be seen in the light of
the Socratic (iconoclastic) indictment. That is, as an attempt to establish an adequate
defense of art: a ‘philosophical apology’.

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