5.

Doctrine of primary jurisdiction

A. OMICTIN VS. CA

B. REPUBLIC VS. LACAP

6. Doctrine of adherence of
jurisdiction/continuing jurisdiction
ABAD, ET AL. VS. RTC OF MANILA

II. Jurisdiction
A. Over the parties
2. How jurisdiction over the defendant is
acquired
A. OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION
VS. HERTZ PHIL, EXCLUSIVE. INC.
B. AFDAL & AFDAL VS. CARLOS
Facts:
Respondent Romeo Carlos filed a complaint
for unlawful detainer and damages against
petitioners Zenaida Guijabar, et al.
Respondent alleged that petitioners were
occupying, by mere tolerance. Respondent
claimed that petitioner Abubakar Afdal sold
the property to him but that he allowed
petitioners to stay in the property.
Respondent claimed that he demanded return
of the property because he needed its use but
that they refused to heed the demand.
According to the records, there were three
attempts to serve the summons and complaint
on petitioners which were returned with the
following annotations:
1.) Unsatisfied/given address cannot
be located.
2.) Duly served as evidenced by his
signature of one Gary Acob
(relative)
3.) Duly served but refused to sign”
without specifying to whom it
was served.
Petitioner failed to file an answer. The MTC
ruled in favor of respondent. Petitioner filed
a motion for relief in the MTC which they
withdrew. They filed the same motion in the
RTC.
The RTC dismissed the petition holding that
it didn’t have jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC had
jurisdiction over the petition for relief from
judgement. No jurisdiction.
Ruling:
In the present case, petitioners cannot file the
petition for relief with the MTC because it is
a prohibited pleading in an unlawful detainer
case. Petitioners cannot also file the petition
for relief with the RTC because the RTC has
no jurisdiction to entertain petitions for relief
from judgments of the MTC. Therefore, the
RTC did not err in dismissing the petition for
relief from judgment of the MTC.
The remedy is to file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the MTC over the person of
petitioners in view of the absence of
summons to petitioners. An action for
unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real
action and in personam. In an action in
personam, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is necessary for the court to validly
try and decide the case. Any judgment of the
court which has no jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is null and void.
Service of summons upon the defendant shall
be by personal service first and only when the
defendant cannot be promptly served in
person will substituted service be availed of.
In this case, the indorsements failed to state
that prompt and personal service on
petitioners was rendered impossible. These
requirements are indispensable because
substituted service is in derogation of the
usual method of service.
Likewise, nowhere in the return of summons
or in the records of the case was it shown that
Gary Acob, the person on whom substituted
service of summons was effected, was a
person of suitable age and discretion residing
in petitioners’ residence. the process server
failed to specify Gary Acob’s age, his
relationship to petitioners and to ascertain
whether he comprehends the significance of
the receipt of the summons and his duty to
deliver it to petitioners or at least notify them
of said receipt of summons.
In sum, petitioners were not validly served
with summons by substituted service. Hence,
the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the petitioners and, thus, the
MTC’s decision is void
B. Over the subject matter
1. How jurisdiction is conferred and
determined
A. FE V. RAPSING, ET AL VS. HON.
JUDGE MAXIMINO R. ABLES
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition
seeking to set aside the orders of the RTC of
Masbate.
Respondents are members of the Alpha
Company, 22nd infantry Battalion of the
Philippine Army in Masbate. Petitioners are
widows of Rapsing, Villanueva and
Aparejado, who were allegedly killed by the
respondents.
Respondents alleged that on May 3, 2004,
they received information about the presence
of NPA partisans in Masbate. Acting on the
information, they coordinated with the PNP
and proceeded to the place. There, they
encountered armed elements which resulted
to an intense fire fight. After which, seven
persons were named dead including the
husbands of the petitioners.
Petitioners claimed that there was no
encounter ensued. Hence, they requested the
NBI to conduct investigation. NBI, relying
on the statements of the witnesses who claim
that the military massacred helpless and
unarmed civilians recommended to the
prosecutor of Masbate to conduct a
preliminary investigation against the
respondents for the crime of multiple murder.
Then, before the warrant of arrest of
respondents was issued by the RTC Masbate,
Judge advocate general's office of the AFP
filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the case
against respondents be transferred to the
jurisdiction of the military tribunal, it was
granted.
Petitioners then sought reconsideration of the
order, but was denied by the RTC. Hence,
this present petition.
Issue:
Whether Judge Ables abused his discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction in
granting the transfer.
Held:
Petition is meritorious. RTC abused its
discretion in not taking cognizance of the
case, which actually falls within its
jurisdiction.
It is rule of the procedural law that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case is conferred by law and is determined by
the allegations of the complaint. what
determines the jurisdiction of the court is the
nature of the action pleaded as appearing in
the complaint.
In this case, murder is a crime within the
jurisdiction of the RTC. The military
tribunals cannot exercise jurisdiction over
this case because the offense charged is not
included in the enumeration of the "service-
connected offenses or crimes".
B. MENDOZA VS. GERMINO &
GERMINO (lawyerly meron)
C. REMEDIOS ANTONIO VS. THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MAKATI
CITY, ET AL.
FACTS:
Since March 21, 1978, petitioner Remedios
Antonino had been leasing a residential
property located at Makati City and owned by
private respondent Tan Tian Su (Su). Under
the governing lease contract, Antonino was
accorded with the right of Frst refusal in the
event Su would decide to sell the subject
property. On July 7, 2004, the parties
executed a document denominated as
Undertaking Agreement [4] where Su agreed
to sell to Antonino the subject property forP
39,500,000.00. However, in view of a
disagreement as to who between them would
shoulder the payment of the capital gains tax,
the sale did not proceed as intended. On July
9, 2004, Antonino Fled a complaint against
Su with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, for the reimbursement of the
cost of repairs on the subject property and
payment of damages. The complaint was
ra±ed to Branch 149 and docketed as Civil
Case No. 04-802. Later that same day,
Antonino Fled an amended complaint to
enforce the Undertaking Agreement and
compel Su to sell to her the subject property.
In an Order dated December 8, 2004, the
RTC dismissed Antonino’s complaint on the
grounds of improper venue and non-payment
of the appropriate docket fees. According to
the RTC, Antonino’s complaint is one for
speciFc performance, damages and sum of
money, which are personal actions that
should have been Fled in the court of the
place where any of the parties resides.
Antonino and Su reside in Muntinlupa and
Manila, respectively, thus Makati City is not
the proper venue.
ISSUE: WON the lack of jurisdiction over
the case is a ground for annulment?
HELD: YES. Lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter a ground for annulment of
judgment. As this Court previously clarified
in Republic of the Philippines v. "G"
Holdings, Inc., "lack of jurisdiction" as a
ground for the annulment of judgments
pertains to lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the defending party or over the subject
matter of the claim. It does not contemplate
"grave abuse of discretion" considering that
"jurisdiction" is different from the exercise
thereof.
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of
jurisdiction. As distinguished from the
exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the
authority to decide a cause, and not the
decision rendered therein. Where there is
jurisdiction over the person and the subject
matter, the decision on all other questions
arising in the case is but an exercise of the
jurisdiction. And the errors, which the court
may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction,
are merely errors of judgment, which are the
proper subject of an appeal.
2. Objections to jurisdiction over the
subject matter
LASMIS VS. DONG-E
FACTS:
This case involves a conflict of ownership
and possession over an untitled parcel of
land.
Petitioners are the actual occupants of the
subject land and respondent is claiming
ownership thereof and is seeking to recover
its possession from petitioners.
According to respondent, her family’s
ownership and occupation of the land can be
traced as far back as 1922 to her late
grandfather, Ap-ap.
Upon Ap-ap’s death, the property was
inherited by his children, who obtained a
survey plan and declared the property for tax
purposes in the name of “Teirs of Ap-ap.”
The heirs of Ap-ap then executed a deed of
quitclaim in favor of respondent’s father.
That the heirs of Gilbert Semon tolerated the
acts of their first cousins, petitioner’s in-
laws, to stay on a Lot No. 1 together with
their respective families.
When Gilbert Semon died, his children
extrajudicially partitioned the property
among themselves and allotted Lot No.
1 in favor of Margarita.
When the petitioner began expanding their
occupation on the subject property and
selling portions thereof, Margarita filed a
complaint for recovery of ownership,
possession, reconveyance, and damages.
RTC: preponderates in favor of respondents
long-time possession of and claim of
ownership over the subject property.
The survey plan, tax declarations, and the
documentary evidence of the transfer of the
land from the heirs of ap-ap to respondent
father were given credence.
CA: Ruled that the respondent was able to
discharge her burden in proving
her title and interest to the subject property.
ISSUE:
(1) WON appellate court disregarded
material facts and circumstances in
affirming the trial courts decision
(2) WON petitioner have acquired the subject
property by prescription
(3) WON the ancestral land claim pending
before the National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) should
take precedence over the reivindicatory
action.
(4) WON the trial court has jurisdiction to
decide the case in light of the effectivity of
RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act (IPRA) of 1997 at the time that the
complaint was instituted.
HELD:
(1)Asda
(2)Asda
(3)No.
(4)Yes.
As a general rule, an objection over subject-
matter may be raised any time of the
proceedings. This is because jurisdiction
cannot be waived by the parties or vested by
the agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is
vested by law, which prevailed at the time of
the filing of the complaint.
However, an exception to this rule has been
carved by jurisprudence. In Tajim v.
Sibonghanoy, the court ruled that the
existence of laches will prevent a party from
raising the courts lack of jurisdiction. Laches
is defined as the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned or declined it.
In the case at bar, the application of the Tijam
doctrine is called for because of the presence
of laches cannot be ignored.
At the time the complaint was file in 1998,
the IPRA was already in effect but the
petitioners never raised the same as a ground
for dismissal; instead they filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the value of the
property did not meet the jurisdictional value
for the RTC. They obviously neglected to
take the IPRA into consideration.
It is only before the SC, 8 years after the
filing of the complaint, after the trial court
had already conducted a full-blown trial and Issue:
rendered a decision on the merits, after the
Whether or not the complaint filed was for an
appellate court had made a thorough review
unlawful detainer making the RTC want
of the records, and after petitioner have twice
jurisdiction over the case.
encountered adverse decision from the trial
and the appellate courts that petitioner now Held:
want to expunge all the efforts that have gone
into the litigation and resolution of their case A detainer suit exclusively involves the issue
and start of over again. of physical possession. The case filed by De
Leon was not an unlawful detainer since it
involved more than the issue of
possession. De Leon prayed that Inayan be
3. Effect of estoppel on objections to
ordered to vacate the premises, pay back
jurisdiction
rentals, unpaid irrigation fees, moral and
A. DE LEON VS. CA exemplary damages and litigation fees.
Facts: Where the issues of the case extend beyond
those commonly involved in unlawful
Balbuena, owner of a parcel of land, entered
detainer suits, such as for instance, the
into a lease agreement with Inayan in 1970,
respective rights of parties under various
who bound himself to deliver 252 cavans of
contractual arrangements and the validity
palay each year as rental. The ownership of
thereof, the case is converted from a mere
the land was then transferred to Balbuena's
detainer suit to one "incapable of pecuniary
daughter, De Leon.
estimation," thereby placing it under the
In 1983, Inayan stopped paying the agreed exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.
rental. In 1984, Balbuena filed a complaint
for "Termination of Civil Law Lease;
Recovery of Posession; Recovery of Unpaid B. TIJAM VS. SIBONGHANOY
Rentals and Damages" with the RTC against
FACTS:
Inayan.
The action at bar, which is a suit for
The RTC ruled in favor of De Leon. On
collection of a sum of money in the sum of
appeal to the CA, Inayan questioned the
exactly P 1,908.00, exclusive of interest filed
jurisdiction of the RTC. The CA, in Inayan's
by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog
motion for reconsideration, dismissed the
against Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy
civil case filed by De Leon for want of
and Lucia Baguio, was originally instituted in
jurisdiction. It ruled that De Leon's
the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July
complaint was based on accion interdictal, a
19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the
summary action for recovery of possession
complaint, the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A.
that should have been brought before the
296) took effect depriving the Court of First
MTC. It found that the 1-year period had not
Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in
yet elapsed from the time when the civil case
which the demand, exclusive of interest, is
for the recovery of possession was filed.
not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and
86[b], R.A. 296.)
The case has already been pending now for
almost 15 years, and throughout the entire
proceeding the appellant never raised the
question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the
Court of Appeals' adverse decision.
Considering that the Supreme Court has the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases
in which jurisdiction of any inferior court is
in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the
case to the Supreme Court along with the
records of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant's motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance during the
pendency of the appeal will prosper.
RULING:
A party may be estopped or barred from
raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel
in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and
of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands"
is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims and, unlike
the statute of limitations, is not a mere
question of time but is principally a question
of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a
right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke
the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction
(Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79).
In the case just cited, by way of explaining
the rule, it was further said that the question
whether the court had jurisdiction either of
the subject-matter of the action or of the
parties was not important in such cases
because the party is barred from such conduct
not because the judgment or order of the court
is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but
for the reason that such a practice can not be
tolerated — obviously for reasons of public
policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after
voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the
merits, it is too late for the loser to question
the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease
vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L.
Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs.
McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And
in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the
Court said that it is not right for a party who
has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a
court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that
same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in
the three cases mentioned in the resolution of
the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra)
— to the effect that we frown upon the
"undesirable practice" of a party submitting
his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it
for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as
well as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R.
L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano,
et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc.,
G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc.
vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al.,
G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs.
Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time
the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31,
1948, it could have raised the question of the
lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the
present action by reason of the sum of money
involved which, according to the law then in
force, was within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do
so. Instead, at several stages of the
proceedings in the court a quo as well as in
the Court of Appeals, it invoked the
jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for a
final adjudication on the merits. It was only
after an adverse decision was rendered by the
Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to
raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to
sanction such conduct on its part, We would
in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it
was commenced on July 19, 1948 and
compel the judgment creditors to go up their
Calvary once more. The inequity and
unfairness of this is not only patent but
revolting.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after
going over the entire record, We have
become persuaded that We can do nothing
better than to quote in toto, with approval, the
decision rendered by the Court of Appeals x
x x granting plaintiffs' motion for execution
against the surety x x x
UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders
appealed from are hereby affirmed, with
costs against the appellant Manila Surety and
Fidelity Company, Inc.
C. ATTY. CUDIAMAT, ET AL. VS.
BATANGAS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK
Atty. Restituto Cudamiat and his brother
Perfecto were the registered co-owners of a
320 square meter parcel of land in Balayan,
Batangas. Perfecto, without Restituto’s
knowledge and consent, obtained a loan from
Batangas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (the
bank) for which the subject parcel of land was
mortgaged. Eventually the property was
foreclosed and Cudiamat et al. filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balayan a
complaint for quieting of title with damages
against the bank, assailing the mortgage as
being null and void as they did not authorize
the encumbrance of the property. The bank,
in its answer, alleges, among others, that the
Balayan RTC had no jurisdiction over the
case as the bank had been placed under
receivership and under liquidation by the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation
(PDIC), thus, jurisdiction to adjudicate
disputed claims against it is lodged with the
liquidation court-RTC Nasugbu. The
Balayan RTC rendered judgment in favour of
Cudiamat et al. The bank appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA) contending that the
Balayan RTC had no jurisdiction over
Cudiamat et al.’s complaint for quieting of
title.
ISSUE: May the bank be allowed to raise the
question of lack of jurisdiction after actively
participating in the proceedings in the
Balayan RTC
HELD: Estoppel bars the bank from raising
the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the Balayan
RTC. In Lozon v. NLRC, the Court came up
with a clear rule on when jurisdiction by
estoppel applies and when it does not: “The
operation of estoppel on the question of
jurisdiction seemingly depends on whether
the lower court actually had jurisdiction or
not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was
tried and decided upon the theory that it had
jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on
appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for
the same “must exist as a matter of law, and
may not be conferred by the consent of the
parties or by estoppel.” However, if the lower
court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard
and decided upon a given theory, such, for
instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction,
the party who induced it to adopt such theory
will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an
inconsistent position—that the lower court
had jurisdiction…” (underscoring supplied)
The ruling was echoed in Metromedia Times
Corporation v. Pastorin. In the present case,
the Balayan RTC, sitting as a court of general
jurisdiction, had jurisdiction over the
complaint for quieting of title filed by
petitioners on August 9, 1999. The Nasugbu
RTC, as a liquidation court, assumed
jurisdiction over the claims against the bank
only on May 25, 2000, when PDIC’s petition
for assistance in the liquidation was raffled
thereat and given due course. While it is well-
settled that lack of jurisdiction on the subject
matter can be raised at any time and is not lost
by estoppel by laches, the present case is an
exception. To compel petitioners to re- file
and relitigate their claims before the Nasugbu
RTC when the parties had already been given
the opportunity to present their respective
evidence in a full- blown trial before the
Balayan RTC which had, in fact, decided
petitioners’ complaint (about two years
before the appellate court rendered the
assailed decision) would be an exercise in
futility and would unjustly burden petitioners
4. Error of jurisdiction as distinguished
from error of judgement
FIRST CORPORATION VS. FORMER
SIXTH DIVISION OF CA
C. Over the issues
DE JOYA VS. MARQUEZ
 Manuel Dy filed a criminal case
against Hao and Tan for syndicated
estafa.
 Dy complained that he was enticed to
invest in a large sum of money in
State Resource Development
Management Corporation wherein he
issued several checks amounting to
almost P114M and in turn the
corporation issued several checks to
Dy which were dishonored due to
insufficient funds.
 A resolution was issued by Prosecutor
Nicdao finding probable cause to
indict petitioner and his other co-
accused for syndicated estafa and a
copy of the articles of incorporation
of the aforementioned corporation
named petitioner as incorporator and
director to which they had knowledge
of its activities and transactions.
 The Court finds that these documents
sufficiently establish the existence of
probable cause.
Probable cause - facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent person to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be
arrested
 Petitioner then filed for certiorari and
prohibition to nullify the warrant of
arrest issued by Judge Marquez for
estafa. Petitioner asserts that
respondent judge erred in finding
probable cause justifying the issuance
of the warrant against him and his co-
accused.
ISSUE: May De Joya seek relief from
Court/trial even though he continuously
refuses to surrender and submit to the Court’s
jurisdiction? NO
HELD:
 A person is not entitled to seek relief
from the Supreme Court nor from the
trial court where he continuously
refuses to surrender and submit to the
court’s jurisdiction.
 His continued refusal to submit to the
court’s jurisdiction should give this
Court more reason to uphold the
action of the respondent judge.
 The purpose of a warrant of arrest is
to place the accused under the
custody of the law to hold him for trial
of the charges against him.
 It should be remembered that he who
invokes the court’s jurisdiction must
first submit to its jurisdiction.
Note:
Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and
how the court acquires such jurisdiction:
a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner:
 This is acquired by the filing of the
complaint, petition or initiatory
pleading before the court by the
plaintiff or petitioner.
b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or
respondent:
 This is acquired by the voluntary
appearance or submission by the
defendant or respondent to the
court or by coercive process issued
by the court to him, generally by
the service of summons.
c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter:
 This is conferred by law and, unlike
jurisdiction over the parties, cannot
be conferred on the court by the
voluntary act or agreement of the
parties.
d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case:
 This is determined and conferred by
the pleadings filed in the case by the
parties, or by their agreement in a pre-
trial order or stipulation, or, at times
by their implied consent as by the
failure of a party to object to evidence
on an issue not covered by the
pleadings, as provided in Sec. 5, Rule
10.
e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or
thing which is the subject of the litigation)
 This is acquired by the actual or
constructive seizure by the court of
the thing in question, thus placing it
in custodia legis, as in attachment or
garnishment; or by provision of law
which recognizes in the court the
power to deal with the property or
subject matter within its territorial
jurisdiction, as in land registration
proceedings or suits involving civil
status or real property in the
 Philippines of a non-resident
defendant
D. Over the Res or property in litigation
FERDINAND MARCOS JR., VS.
REPUBLIC
FACTS:
in 1972, Ferdinand Marcos formed the
Arelma S.A. entity under the laws of Panama
and, opened an account under its name at the
brokerage firm of Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. in New York and
deposited $2 million. A class action by the
Marcos' human rights victims resulted in a
nearly $2 billion judgment for the "Pimentel
class," which claimed a right to enforce its
judgment by attaching the Arelma assets. The
ownership in Arelma was represented by two
bearer share certificates that are held in
escrow by the Philippine National Bank
(PNB), after being transferred there in 1990
by an order of the Swiss Federal Supreme
Court.
The Republic of thePhilippines claimed
ownership of the Arelma deposit of
approximately $35 million based on its
custody of the Arelma shares, but citing
claims to the funds by the Marcos' human
rights victims, Merrill Lynch filed an
interpleader motion to request the courts to
settle ownership of the funds. Litigation is
ongoing in the United States, as of early
March 2011.
On 25 April 2012, this Court rendered a
Decision affirming the 2 April 2009 Decision
of the Sandiganbayan and declaring all the
assets of Arelma, S.A., an entity created by
the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, forfeited in
favor of the Republic of the Philippines. The
anti-graft court found that the totality of
assets and properties acquired by the Marcos
spouses was manifestly and grossly
disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as
public officials, and that petitioners were
unable to overturn the prima facie
presumption of ill-gotten wealth, pursuant to
Section 2 of Republic Act No. (RA) 1379.
In June 2012, the New York Court of
Appeals upheld the New York State
Appellate Court decision a year earlier which
held that the case of Swezey (representing the
class of human rights victims) v. Merrill
Lynch, et al, cannot proceed without the
participation of the Republic of Philippines,
making reference to the Philippines' Supreme
Court ruling that the Arelma assets belonged
to the People of the Philippines and should be
returned to them.
ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan does not
possess territorial jurisdiction over the res or
the Arelma proceeds
RULING:
We find that the Sandiganbayan did not err in
granting the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, despite the fact that the Arelma
account and proceeds are held abroad. To rule
otherwise contravenes the intent of the
forfeiture law, and indirectly privileges
violators who are able to hide public assets
abroad: beyond the reach of the courts and
their recovery by the State. Forfeiture
proceedings, as we have already discussed
exhaustively in our Decision, are actions
considered to be in the nature of proceedings
in rem or quasi in rem, such that:
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a)
by the seizure of the property under legal
process, whereby it is brought into actual
custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the
institution of legal proceedings, in which the
power of the court is recognized and made
effective. In the latter condition, the property,
though at all times within the potential power
of the court, may not be in the actual custody
of said court.
(The Republic's) national interests would be
severely prejudiced by a turnover proceeding
because it has asserted a claim of ownership
regarding the Arelma assets that rests on
several bases: the Philippine forfeiture law
that predated the tenure of President Marcos;
evidence demonstrating that Marcos looted
public coffers to amass a personal fortune
worth billions of dollars; findings by the
Philippine Supreme Court and Swiss Federal
Supreme Court that Marcos stole related
assets from the Republic; and, perhaps most
critically, the recent determination by the
Philippine Supreme Court that Marcos
pilfered the money that was deposited in the
Arelma brokerage account. Consequently,
allowing the federal court judgment against
the estate of Marcos to be executed on
property that may rightfully belong to the
citizens of the Philippines could irreparably
undermine the Republic's claim to the
Arelma assets.
Finally, we take note of the Decision
rendered by the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court on 26 June 2012.
In Swezey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., the foreign court agreed with
the dismissal of the turnover proceeding
against the Arelma assets initiated by alleged
victims of human rights abuses during the
Marcos regime. It reasoned that the Republic
was a necessary party, but could not be
subject to joinder in light of its assertion of
sovereign immunity:
The Republic's declaration of sovereign
immunity in this case is entitled to
recognition because it has a significant
interest in allowing its courts to adjudicate
the dispute over property that may have been
stolen from its public treasury and transferred
to New York through no fault of the
Republic. The high courts of the United
States, the Philippines and Switzerland have
clearly explained in decisions related to this
case that wresting control over these matters
from the Philippine judicial system would
disrupt international comity and reciprocal
diplomatic self-interests.
E. Jurisdiction of Courts
SUPAPO VS. SPS. DE JESUS
FACTS:
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for
accion publiciana against Roberto and Susan
de Jesus with the MeTC of Caloocan City.
The complaint sought to compel the
respondents to vacate a piece of land located
in Novaliches, Quezon City, and registered
under petitioners’ name. The land has an
assessed value of Php39,980.00. Petitioners
did not reside on the lot but made sure to visit
at least twice a year.
During one of their visits, they saw two
houses built on the lot without their
knowledge and permission. They learned that
respondents occupied both houses. They
demanded the surrender of the lot by bringing
the dispute before the appropriate Lupong
Tagapamayapa. The Lupon issued a
certificate to file action for failure of the
parties to settle amicably.
The Spouses Supapo filed a criminal case
against the respondents for violating PD No.
772 (Anti-Squatting Law). The trial court
convicted the respondents. On appeal, the CA
dismissed the case because Congress enacted
R.A. No. 8368 repealing the Anti-Squatting
Law. Notwithstanding the dismissal, the
Spouses Supapo moved for the execution of
the respondents’ civil liability, praying that
the latter vacate the subject lot. The RTC
granted the motion and issued the writ of
execution. Respondents moved to quash it
but the RTC denied their motion. They filed
with the CA a petition for certiorari. The CA
granted it and ruled that with the repeal of the
Anti-Squatting Law, the criminal and civil
liabilities of respondents were extinguished,
but it also said that recourse may be had in
court by filing the proper action for recovery
of possession. Thus, the Spouses Supapo
filed the complaint for accion publiciana.
After filing their Answer, the respondents
moved to set their affirmative defenses for
preliminary hearing and argued that there is
another action pending between the same
parties, the complaint is barred by statute of
limitations, and the petitioners’ cause of
action is barred by prior judgment.
The MeTC denied the motion to set the
affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing.
The RTC granted the petition for certiorari of
respondents because the action has
prescribed and accion publiciana falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. It
likewise denied the motion for
reconsideration of petitioners. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the RTC decision; hence, this
petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the MeTC properly
acquired jurisdiction.
2. Whether or not the cause of action has
prescribed.
3. Whether or not the complaint for accion
publiciana is barred by res judicata.
HELD:
1. YES. Under BP 129, the jurisdiction of the
RTC over actions involving title to or
possession of real property is plenary.
However, R.A. No. 7691 granted the MeTC,
MTC, and MCTC the exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear actions where the
assessed value of the property does not
exceed Php20,000 ot Php50,000 if the
property is located in Metro Manila.
Jurisdiction over actions involving title to or
possession of real property is now
determined by its assessed value. It is its fair
market value multiplied by the assessment
level.
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo
alleged that the assessed value of the subject
lot located in Metro Manila is Php39,980.
Thus, the MeTC properly acquired
jurisdiction over the complaint for accion
publiciana.
2. NO. Lands covered by a title cannot be
acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. Even it be supposed that the
holders of the Torrens Title were aware of the
other persons’ occupation of the property,
regardless of the length of that possession,
the lawful owners have a right to demand the
return of their property at any time as long as
the possession was unauthorized or merely
tolerated.
3. NO. Res judicata is not present in the case
because:
a. First, there is no identity of parties. The
criminal complaint was prosecuted in the
name of the People of the Philippines. The
accion publiciana was filed in the name of the
Spouses Supapo.
b. There is no identity of subject matter. The
criminal case involves the prosecution of a
crime under the Anti-Squatting Law while
the accion publiciana is an action to recover
possession of the subject property.
c. There is no identity of causes of action. The
People of the Philippines filed the case to
protect governmental interests, while the
spouses filed the accion publiciana to protect
their proprietary interests.
PETITION GRANTED.
F. Jurisdiction over small claims
A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC VS. EMMA
MONDEJAR, ET AL.
FACTS
On 23 March 2011, petitioner filed a
complaint for collection of sum of money
under Rule of Procedure for Small Claims
Cases before the MTCC, seeking to collect
from respondent the amount of P23, 111.71
which represented her unpaid water bills for
the period of 1 June 2002 to 30 September
2005.
Petitioner claimed that it was duly
authorized to supply water to and collect
payment therefor from the homeowners of
Regent Pearl Subdivision, one of whom is the
respondent.
Respondent assailed that she
religiously paid the monthly charges of
P75.00. She claimed that the increased rate of
P113.00 for every 10 cubic meter of water
plus an additional P11.60 for every cubic
meter thereafter was not valid because the
petitioner unilaterally made the increase
without informing the residents therein which
was stipulated in their agreement.
MTCC
The MTCC ruled in favour of the respondent.
The petitioner can only charge the respondent
the agreed flat rate for the period 1 June 2002
to 7 August 2003 since the Certificate of
Public Convenience was only issued on the
latter date. Respondent should be considered
to have fully paid.
The MTCC disregarded the
petitioner’s reliance on HLURB’s decision
because it failed to prove that it complied
with the directive to inform the HLURB of
the result of its consultation with the
concerned homeowners as regards the rates
to be charged and the HLURB’s approval to
such charges.
Petitioner also failed to submit
evidence showing the exact date when it
actually began imposing the NWRB
approved rates and the formal agreement of
the parties containing the terms and
conditions thereof, without which it cannot
establish with certainty respondent’s
obligation.
RTC
On a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court for grave abuse of
discretion filed with the RTC, the petitioner
assailed that the MTCC disregarded
petitioner’s reliance on the source of its
authority to impose new water consumption
rates.
The RTC issued a decision dismissing
the petition, finding that the petition was only
filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature
of small claims cases as provided in
Section23 of the Rules of Procedure on Small
Claims Cases. To this end, the RTC ruled that
it cannot supplant the decision of the MTCC
with another decision directing respondent to
pay petitioners a bigger sum than that which
has been awarded.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration
but was denied.
Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC erred in
dismissing petitioner’s recourse under Rule
65 of the RRC assailing the propriety of the
MTCC’s decision in the subject small claims
case.
RULING
Yes. The RTC erred in its decision.
The petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the RRC before the RTC was proper.
It is an essential requisite for the
availability of the extraordinary remedies
under the Rules in the absence of an appeal
or any “plain, speedy and adequate remedy”
in the ordinary course of law.
In the case at bar, the first level courts
are vested exclusive jurisdiction over small
claims cases, certiorari petitions assailing its
dispositions should be filed to their
corresponding RTCs.
The SC held that the RTC was wrong
in dismissing the said petition on the ground
that it was an improper remedy and, as such,
the RTC case must be reinstated and
remanded thereto for its proper disposition.
Petition is granted. The RTC’s
decision and resolution are reversed and set
aside. RTC case is reinstated and the court a
quo is ordered to resolve the same with
dispatch.
G. Rule on summary procedure
FLORELLO R. JOSE VS. ROBERTO
ALFUERTO
H. Baranggay conciliation
1. GEGARE VS. CA
Facts: There was a lot with an area of
approximately 270 sq. m. in General Santos
City. Its title was named after Paulino Elma.
A reversion case was filed by the State
against Elma in the CFI of South Cotabato,
wherein a decision was rendered declaring
Elma’s title null and void and thus, was
ordered cancelled. The lot was reverted to the
mass of public domain subject to disposition
and giving preferential right to its actual
occupant, Napoleon Gegare. (The writ of
execution went to series of processes
including applying before the Board of
Liquidators. They are, however, not essential
to our topic.)
The chief of LASEDECO, through
the Board of Liquidators’ directive,
investigated the lot and recommended the
division of the same equally to both parties.
The Board issued the resolution ordering the
said division. The Office of the President
affirmed the board’s resolution.
Private respondent, Armie Elma, paid
for the value of the ½ of the lot. An original
certificate was then issued to him. Petitioner
was also advised by the Board to do the same.
 Petitioner then filed an action for filing his or
“Annulment and Cancellation of Partition of complaint in instrumentality.
Lot 5989, Ts-217, situated at Dadiangas, court.
General Santos City and Annulment of
Resolutions No. 272 and and 185 and/or to
Declare them Null and Void” against private Issue: Whether or not Katarungang
respondent and the Board. The suit was Pambarangay Law is applicable in this case.
docketed Civil Case No. 3270 in the RTC of
General Santos City. Held: Yes, Katarungang Pambarangay Law
is applicable in the case at bar.
Sequence of events after
filing: Ratio: True it is that the Board is a
government instrumentality but the petitioner
Priv. Resp: Motion to dismiss and private respondent who are also
(GRANTED) contending parties in the case are residents of
Pet: Motion for the same barangay so Section 6 of
reconsideration (GRANED) Presidential Decree No. 1508 should apply to
them as it provides---
PR: Asked for a preliminary hearing
of the grounds for the Section 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to
filing of complaint. No complaint, petition,
motion to dismiss in his affirmative action or proceeding involving any matter
defenses. (DENIED) within the authority of the Lupon as provided
in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted
PR: Petition for certiorari and prohibition in
in court or any other government office for
the CA (GRANTED)
adjudication unless there has been a
Pet: Urgent Motion for reconsideration confrontation of the parties before
(DENIED) the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no
conciliation or settlement has been reached as
Pet: Appeal before the SC
certified by the Lupon Secretary or
(DISMISSED)
the Pangkat Secretary attested by the Lupon
or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the
settlement has been repudiated.
Respondent Petitioner’s
Elma’s Response The purpose of this confrontation is to enable
Defense the parties to settle their differences
amicably. If the other only contending party
Petitioner Such law is not is the government or its instrumentality or
failed to applicable since subdivision the case falls within the
comply with one of the parties exception but when it is only one of the
the provisions is the contending parties, a confrontation should
of PD No. 1508 government or still be undertaken among the other parties.
(Katarungang any subdivision
Pambarangay
Law) before
2. SANCHEZ VS. TUPAZ
3. VDA. DE BORROMEO VS. POGOY
FACTS:
Petitioner herein seeks to stop respondent
Judge Julian B. Pogoy of the Municipal Trial
Court of Cebu City from taking cognizance
of an ejectment suit for failure of the plaintiff
to refer the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for
conciliation.
The intestate estate of the late Vito Borromeo
is the owner of a building bearing the
deceased’s name which was leased and
occupied by petitioner Petra Vda. de
Borromeo at a monthly rental of P500.00
payable in advance within the first five days
of the month.
On August 28, 1982, Atty. Ricardo Reyes,
administrator of the estate, served upon
petitioner a demand letter for her to pay
theoverdue rentals corresponding to the
period from March to September 1982, and
thereafter to vacate the premises. Petitioner
failed to do so and Atty. Reyes instituted an
ejectment case against the former.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case pointing
out that the parties are residents of the same
city and must refer the dispute to the
barangay court, as required by PD No. 1508,
otherwise known
as Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
The motion was dismissed thus this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not going through Lupon
was necessary?
RULING: NO
The defense of Atty Reyes regarding
the statute of limitations is unacceptable
because the case was filed on September 16,
1982, less than a month before the letter of
demand was served. Forcible entry and
detainer prescribes in one year counted from
demand to vacate the premises and the law
only required 60 days upon which the parties
should try to reconcile in Lupon; Respondent
had more than 9 months left even if
reconciliation failed.
Under Section 4(a) of PD No. 1508, referral
of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is
required only where the parties thereto are
"individuals." An "individual" means "a
single human being as contrasted with a
social group or institution." 5 Obviously, the
law applies only to cases involving natural
persons, and not where any of the parties is a
juridical person such as a corporation,
partnership, corporation sole, testate or
intestate, estate, etc.
In Civil Case No. R-23915, plaintiff
Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal party who
is suing in behalf of the Intestate Estate of
Vito Borromeo. While it is true that Section
3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the
administrator of an estate to sue or be sued
without joining the party for whose benefit
the action is presented or defended, it is
indisputable that the real party in interest in
Civil Case No. R-23915 is the intestate estate
under administration. Since the said estate is
a juridical person 6 plaintiff administrator
may file the complaint directly in court,
without the same being coursed to the
Barangay Lupon for arbitration.
4. PEREGRINA VS. PANIS
Facts:
Spouses Sanchez filed a Civil Action for
Damages against Petitioners Peregrina for
alleged disrespect for the dignity, privacy and
peace of mind of the Spouses under Art.26 of
the Civil Code, and for alleged defamation
under Art.33 of the same code.
The parties are neighbors in a barangay in
Olongapo City. However, no conciliation
proceedings were filed before the Lupon.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the
Complaint.
Before filing an Opposition, Spouses applied
for a Writ of Preliminary Attachment.
Thereafter, Spouses presented their
Opposition claiming that under Sec.6(3), PD
1508, the parties may go directly to the
Courts if the Action is coupled with a
provisional remedy such as a Preliminary
Attachment.
In resolving the Motion to Dismiss,
respondent Judge initially dismissed the
Complaint for Spouse’s failure to comply
with the precondition for amicable settlement
under PD 1508. However, on Motion for
Reconsideration, respondent Judge denied
the Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that under Rule 57, Sec.1 of the Rules
of Court, the application for attachment can
be made at the commencement of the action
or any time thereafter.
Issue:
Whether respondent court’s assumption of
jurisdiction, without prior conciliation
proceedings between the parties in the Lupon
Tagapamayapa, is valid.
Held:
Sec.3 of PD 1508 specifically provides that
“disputes between or among persons actually
residing in the same barangay shall be
brought for amicable settlement before the
Lupon of said barangay”.
Sec.6 of the same law also mandates that “no
complaint, petition, action or proceeding
involving any matter within the authority of
the Lupon…shall be filed or instituted in
court or any government office for
adjudication unless there has been
confrontation of the parties before the Lupon
Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation
or settlement has been reached as certified by
the Lupon Secretary or Pangkat Secretary,
attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman,
or unless the settlement has been
repudiated…”
PD 1508 makes the conciliation process at
the Barangay level a condition precedent for
the filing of a complaint in court. Non-
compliance with that condition precedent
could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s
cause of action and make his complaint
vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack
of cause of action or prematurity. The
condition is analogous to exhaustion of
administrative remedies, or the lack of
earnest efforts to compromise suits between
family members, lacking which, the case can
be dismissed.
The parties therein fall squarely within the
ambit of PD 1508. They are actual residents
in the same barangay and their dispute does
not fall under any of the excepted cases.
Respondent Judge erred in reconsidering his
previous Order of Dismissal on the ground
that the provisional remedy of attachment
was seasonably filed. Not only was the
application for that remedy merely an
afterthought to circumvent the law, but also,
a writ of attachment is not available in a suit
for damages where the amount, including
moral damages, is contingent or unliquidated.
Prior referral to the Lupon for conciliation
proceedings, therefore, was indubitably
called for.
5. LIBRADA M. AQUINO VS. ERNEST
AURE
FACTS
Aure Lending filed a Complaint for
ejectment against Aquino. In their
Complaint, Aure and Aure Lending alleged
that they acquired the subject property from a
Deed of Sale.
Aquino countered that the Complaint lacks
cause of action for Aure and Aure Lending do
not have any legal right over the subject
property.
MeTC rendered in favor of Aquino and
dismissed the Complaint for ejectment of
Aure and Aure Lending for non-compliance
with the barangay conciliation process,
among other grounds. Te MeTC observed
that Aure and Aquino are residents of the
same barangay but there is no showing that
any attempt has been made to settle the case
amicably at the barangay level.
RTC affirmed
CA reversed the MeTC and RTC Decisions
and remanding the case to the MeTC for
further proceedings and final determination
of the substantive rights of the parties.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH THE BARANGAY
CONCILIATION PROCEEDINGS IS A
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT THAT
WARRANTS THE DISMISSAL OF THE
COMPLAINT.
HELD: NO
There is no dispute herein that the present
case was never referred to the Barangay
Lupon for conciliation before Aure and Aure
Lending instituted Civil Case No. 17450. In
fact, no allegation of such barangay
conciliation proceedings was made in Aure
and Aure Lending’s Complaint before the
MeTC.
It is true that the precise technical effect of
failure to comply with the requirement of
Section 412 of the Local Government Code
on barangay conciliation (previously
contained in Section 5 of Presidential Decree
No. 1508) is much the same effect produced
by non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies -- the complaint becomes afflicted
with the vice of pre-maturity; and the
controversy there alleged is not ripe for
judicial determination. The complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to
dismiss.[22] Nevertheless, the conciliation
process is not a jurisdictional requirement,
so that non-compliance therewith cannot
affect the jurisdiction which the court has
otherwise acquired over the subject matter
or over the person of the defendant.[23]
As enunciated in the landmark case of
Royales v. Intermediate Appellate Court[24]:
Ordinarily, non-compliance with the
condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508
could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's
cause of action and make his complaint
vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of
cause of action or prematurity; but the same
would not prevent a court of competent
jurisdiction from exercising its power of
adjudication over the case before it, where
the defendants, as in this case, failed to
object to such exercise of jurisdiction in
their answer and even during the entire
proceedings a quo.
While petitioners could have prevented the
trial court from exercising jurisdiction over
the case by seasonably taking exception
thereto, they instead invoked the very same
jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking
affirmative relief from it. What is more, they
participated in the trial of the case by cross-
examining respondent Planas. Upon this
premise, petitioners cannot now be
allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent
posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the
court to which they had submitted
themselves voluntarily. x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)
Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined
by the allegations pleaded in the complaint.
As long as these allegations demonstrate a
cause of action either for forcible entry or for
unlawful detainer, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the subject matter. This
principle holds, even if the facts proved
during the trial do not support the cause of
action thus alleged, in which instance the
court -- after acquiring jurisdiction -- may
resolve to dismiss the action for insufficiency
of evidence.
x x x. The law, as revised, now provides
instead that when the question of
possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue
of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession. On its
face, the new Rule on Summary Procedure
was extended to include within the
jurisdiction of the inferior courts ejectment
cases which likewise involve the issue of
ownership. This does not mean, however,
that blanket authority to adjudicate the issue
of ownership in ejectment suits has been thus
conferred on the inferior courts.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated 17 October 2001 and
its Resolution dated 8 May 2002 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 63733 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
6. CRISANTA ALCARAZ MIGUEL VS.
JERRY D. MONTANEZ
I. Totality rule
FLORES VS. MALLARE-PHILIPS
Summary:
 Flores has 2 causes of actions: 1st
against Binongcal for refusing to
pay amount representing cost of
truck tires purchased on credit from
Flores from Aug-Oct 1981 and 2nd
against Calion for refusing to pay
amount representing cost of truck
tires from 1981-1982. RTC
dismisses case for lack of
jurisdiction. The SC ruled that
Flores is partially correct, but still
in favor of respondent judge. The
application of the totality rule
under Section 33(l) of BP 129 and
Sec 11 of the Interim Rules is
subject to the requirements for the
permissive joinder of parties under
Section 6 of Rule 3: the total of
claims shall furnish the
jurisdictional test and that they
arose out of the same transaction or
 series of transactions and there is a
common question of law or fact.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC:
RTC Baguio City and Benguet Province
dismissed petition -> Petition for review SC
Rule 45
FACTS:
 Flores appealed by certiorari from the
order of Judge Mallare-Phillipps of
the RTC of Baguio City and Benguet
Province which dismissed his
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Flores did not attach to his petition a
copy of his complaint in the
erroneous belief that the entire
original record of the case shall be
transmitted to this Court pursuant to
Sec 39 of BP129. This provision
applies only to ordinary appeals from
the RTC to the CA.
 However, the order appealed from
states that the 1st cause of action
alleged in the complaint was against
Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay
the amount of P11,643.00
representing cost of truck tires which
he purchased on credit from Flores on
various occasions from Aug to Oct
1981; and the 2nd cause of action was
against respondent Fernando Calion
for allegedly refusing to pay the
amount of P10,212.00 representing
cost of truck tires which he purchased
on credit from petitioner on several
occasions from Mar 1981-Jan 1982.
 Counsel for Binongcal filed a Motion
to Dismiss. At the MTD hearing,
counsel for respondent Calion joined
in moving for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Counsel for petitioner
opposed the Motion to Dismiss. RTC
dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT:
 Lower court has jurisdiction over the
case following the "novel" totality
rule introduced in Sec 33(l) of BP129
and Sec 11 of the Interim Rules.
 Flores compares the provisions with
the pertinent portion of the former
rule under Sec 88 Judiciary Act of
1948: ... Where there are several
claims or causes of action between
the same parties embodied in the
same complaint, the amount of the
demand shall be the totality of the
demand in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of
action arose out of the same or
different transactions; but where the
claims or causes of action joined in a
single complaint are separately
owned by or due to different parties,
each separate claim shall furnish the
jurisdictional test. ...
 With the deletion of the proviso in the
former rule, the totality rule was
reduced to clarity and brevity and the
jurisdictional test is the totality of the
claims in all, not in each, of the causes
of action, irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same
or different transactions.
  Sec 11 Interim Rules: In actions
where the jurisdiction of the court is
dependent on the amount involved,
the test of jurisdiction shall be the
aggregate sum of all the money
demands, exclusive only of interest
and costs, irrespective of whether or
not the separate claims are owned by
or due to different parties. If any
demand is for damages in a civil
action, the amount thereof must be
specifically alleged.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT:
 12/15/83, counsel for respondent
Binongcal filed a MTD on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction since the
amount of the demand against said
respondent was only P11,643.00, and
under Section 19(8) of BP129 RTC
shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction if the amount of the
demand is more than twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00). It was further
averred in said motion that although
another person, Fernando Calion, was
allegedly indebted to petitioner in the
amount of P10,212.00, his obligation
was separate and distinct from that
of the other respondent.
ISSUES: WON the RTC correctly dismissed
Flores’ petition for lack of jurisdiction - YES
HELD:
 Flores’ argument is partly correct.
There is no difference between the
former and present rules in cases
where a plaintiff sues a defendant on
two or more separate causes of action.
In such cases, the amount of the
demand shall be the totality of the
claims in all the causes of action
irrespective of whether the causes of
action arose out of the same or
different transactions. If the total
demand exceeds twenty thousand
pesos, then the regional trial court has
jurisdiction. Needless to state, if the
causes of action are separate and
independent, their joinder in one
complaint is permissive and not
mandatory, and any cause of action
where the amount of the demand is
twenty thousand pesos or less may be
the subject of a separate complaint
filed with a metropolitan or municipal
trial court.
 However, there is a difference
between the former and present
rules in cases where two or more
plaintiffs having separate causes of
action against a defendant join in a
single complaint.
 Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the
Peace Under the former rule, "where
the claims or causes of action joined
in a single complaint are separately
owned by or due to different parties,
each separate claim shall furnish the
jurisdictional test". As worded, the
former rule applied only to cases of
permissive joinder of parties plaintiff.
However, it was also applicable to
cases of permissive joinder of parties
defendant.
 The application of the totality rule
under Sec 33(l) of BP 129 and Sec 11
Interim Rules is subject to the
requirements for the permissive
joinder of parties under Section 6 of
Rule 3: the total of claims shall
furnish the jurisdictional test and that
they arose out of the same transaction
 or series of transactions and there is a
common question of law or fact.
 After a careful scrutiny of the
complaint, it appears that there is a
misjoinder of parties for the reason
that the claims against respondents
Binongcal and Calion are separate
and distinct and neither of which falls
within its jurisdiction
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from
is affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.