Mechanical Damage Assessment & Excavation Guidelines

Final Report
MGP – Mechanical
Damage
Assessment and
Excavation
Guidelines
Proprietary to
ColtKBR Engineering
Prepared by
David Playdon, MSc, PEng
Reviewed by
Mark Stephens, MSc, PEng
Qishi Chen, PhD, PEng
September 2005
L133008
C-FER Technologies
PROJECT TEAM
MGP – Mechanical Damage Assessment

C-FER Project: L133008
and Excavation Guidelines
Name Responsibility
David Playdon, PEng Project management/Data Analysis/Final Report
REVISION HISTORY
MGP – Mechanical Damage Assessment

C-FER Project: L133008
and Excavation Guidelines
Revision Date Description Prepared Reviewed Approved
Draft Section 2 Issued

1 May 12, 2005 DKP QC --
for Internal Review
Draft Section 2 Issued
2 May 20, 2005 DKP MJS --
for Client Review
Draft Report Issued
3 May 30, 2005 DKP MJS/QC
for Client Review
Final Report Issued
4 June 21, 2005 DKP MAN/QC MAN
for MGP Use
Final Report with additional
5 July 26, 2005 minor revisions based on DKP MAN/QC MAN
comments from Client
Final Report with additional
September 16,
6 minor revisions based on DKP MAN/QC MAN
2005
comments from Client
Final Report – MGP – Mechanical Damage Assessment and Excavation Guidelines i

C-FER File No. L133008
C-FER Technologies
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Project Team and Revision History i

Notice iv
List of Figures and Tables v
Executive Summary vi
Acknowledgements ix
1. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................1
1.1 Scope and Objective 1

1.2 System Overview 1
2. MECHANICAL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT ..........................................................................2
2.1 Baseline Assessment 2

2.1.1 Methodology 2
2.1.2 Failure Probability Model 2
2.1.3 Failure Model Inputs 3
2.1.4 Failure Probability Estimates 7
2.1.5 Historical Failure Rates 8
2.1.6 Comparison with Historical Failure Rates 10
2.2 Sensitivity Analysis 11
2.2.1 Overview 11
2.2.2 High Steel Grade and High Operating Pressure 12
2.2.3 Excavator Weight 13
2.3 Mechanical Damage Mitigation 15
2.3.1 Overview 15
2.3.2 Mitigation Measures 15
2.3.2.1 Right-of-way Signage 15
2.3.2.2 Permanent Alignment Markers 16
2.3.2.3 Locating and Marking Enhancements 17
2.3.2.4 Physical Protection 18
2.4 Summary 19
3. ALLOWABLE EXCAVATION LENGTH ............................................................................20
3.1 Upheaval Buckling 20

3.2 Analytical Models 20
3.2.1 Preliminary Frost Heave Analyses 20
3.2.2 Non-heave Overbend Analyses 21
3.3 Analysis Results 23
3.3.1 Preliminary Frost Heave Analysis Cases 23
3.3.2 Non-heave Overbend Analysis Cases 23
4. GUIDELINES FOR SAFE EXCAVATION..........................................................................27
Final Report – MGP – Mechanical Damage Assessment and Excavation Guidelines ii

C-FER Technologies
Table of Contents
4.1 General 27
4.2 Relevant Regulations and Guidelines 27
4.2.1 National Energy Board 27
4.2.2 Common Ground Alliance 28
4.3 Pipeline-Specific Recommendations 28
4.3.1 Project Preparation 29
4.3.2 On-site Preparation/Ground Breaking 32
4.3.3 On-going Excavation 32
4.3.4 Project Completion 33
5. REFERENCES...................................................................................................................34
APPENDICES
Appendix A Impact Frequency Fault Tree Model
Appendix B Mechanical Damage Assessment Software Overview
Appendix C Probability of Failure as a Function of Excavator Weight
Appendix D PIPLIN Analysis to Simulate Excavation after Frost Heave – By SSD, Inc.
Appendix E PIPLIN Analysis to Simulate Excavation at Overbend Locations – By SSD, Inc.
Appendix F Excerpt from CGA Excavation Best Practice
Final Report – MGP – Mechanical Damage Assessment and Excavation Guidelines iii
C-FER Technologies
NOTICE
1. This Report was prepared as an account of work conducted at C-FER Technologies (1999)
Inc. (“C-FER”) on behalf of ColtKBR, a joint venture between Colt Engineering Corporation
and Kellogg Brown and Root (Canada) Company (“ColtKBR”), representing Imperial Oil
Resources Ventures Limited (“Owner”). All reasonable efforts were made to ensure that the
work conforms to accepted scientific, engineering and environmental practices. Any and all
implied or statutory warranties of merchantability or fitness for any purpose are expressly
excluded. Reference herein to any specified commercial product, process or service by trade
name, trademark, manufacturer or otherwise does not constitute or imply an endorsement or
recommendation by C-FER
2. Pursuant to the terms of the Contract for Performance of Services No. 99-C-3079-1812 dated
August 5, 2004 made between ColtKBR and C-FER (“Agreement”), all analysis results and
conclusions provided in the Report are proprietary to ColtKBR and Owner.
3. In accordance with the Agreement, C-FER assigned copyright to this Report to ColtKBR and
Owner, and the Report remains the property of ColtKBR and Owner.
4. Any authorized copy of this Report distributed to a third party shall include an
acknowledgement that the Report was prepared by C-FER and shall give appropriate credit to
C-FER and the authors of the Report.
Final Report – MGP – Mechanical Damage Assessment and Excavation Guidelines iv

C-FER Technologies
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES
Figures
Figure 2.1 Example of Maximum Anticipated Operating Pressure Profile
Figure 2.2 EGIG External Interference Failure Rate by Wall Thickness Range
Figure 2.3 US-DOT Reportable Failure Rate by Diameter Range (Gas Transmission Lines,
Third-party Damage)
Figure 2.4 Effect of Steel Grade on Failure Potential (with Constant Design Factor)
Figure 2.5 Effect of Wall Thickness on Failure Potential (with Constant Design Factor)
Figure 2.6 Effect of Excavator Weight
Figure 3.1 Finite Element Model Schematic for Non-heave Analysis Cases
Tables
Table 1.1 MGP Pipeline Design and Operating Parameters – Base Case
Table 2.1 Parameters Required to Estimate Equipment Impact Frequency
Table 2.2 Probabilistic Input Data Used to Calculate Probability of Failure Given Impact
Table 2.3 Internal Pressure Probability Distributions
Table 2.4 Estimated Mechanical Damage Failure Probabilities for MGP Pipelines
Table 2.5 Comparison of MGP and US-DOT Failure Rates
Table 2.6 Probability of Failure Given Impact for MGP Pipelines
Table 3.1 Soil Condition Categories and Associated Operating Parameters
Table 3.2 Maximum Excavation Lengths for 0.9 m Burial Depth
Table 4.1 Threshold Excavator Weights
Table 4.3 Recommended Allowable Excavation Length (MGP Main Gas Pipeline)
Final Report – MGP – Mechanical Damage Assessment and Excavation Guidelines v

C-FER Technologies
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Overview
This report describes a study undertaken by C-FER Technologies, Edmonton, Alberta (C-FER)
for ColtKBR, Calgary, Alberta (ColtKBR) to develop guidelines for safe excavation of the
Mackenzie Gas Project (MGP) pipelines. Issues considered include the potential for puncture or
damage due to accidental impacts with excavation equipment, and upheaval buckling due to loss
of restraint for sections that are exposed during repair or site remediation. The specific tasks
undertaken were:
• an assessment of the mechanical damage resistance of MGP pipelines relative to that of

conventional pipelines,
• an assessment of the length of pipeline that can be uncovered without jeopardizing pipeline
stability, and
• the development of safe excavation guidelines that reflect industry practices and the findings
of the preceding tasks.
Mechanical Damage Resistance
Mechanical damage failure probabilities for the MGP pipeline segments were estimated using a
model-based approach. The probability estimates for each pipeline segment were then compared
to the US-DOT historical failure rates. The results indicate that the MGP pipeline failure
probability estimates, based on lower and upper bound excavation activity rate estimates for
Northern regions, are mostly between one and two orders of magnitude lower than the US-DOT
average values for pipelines of comparable diameters.
Sensitivity analysis shows that the effects on mechanical damage failure potential of the wall
thickness reduction associated with the use of higher strength materials are more than
compensated for by the wall thickness increase associated with the use of higher operating
pressures. In general, the designs proposed for the MGP pipeline segments require wall
thicknesses that are similar to, or greater than, wall thicknesses typically associated with more
conventional Class 1 pipelines of comparable diameter. This, combined with the lower
excavation activity rates in the North, results in estimated failure probabilities that are generally
lower for MGP pipelines than for typical pipelines.
In addition, the use of relatively light equipment was shown to result in even lower mechanical
damage failure probabilities when compared to probability estimates obtained using an excavator
population that is considered broadly applicable to rural areas in the United States and Canada.
The probability of failure given impact was also found to be relatively insensitive to excavator
weight below a threshold weight, which is specific to each pipeline.
Final Report – MGP – Mechanical Damage Assessment and Excavation Guidelines vi

C-FER Technologies
Executive Summary
Lastly, while mechanical damage failure probability estimates developed for the MGP system
have been shown to be significantly below the US-DOT historical failure rates, a number of
damage mitigation strategies could be considered at the time of construction to further reduce the
probability of failure in the proximity of population centres and road or utility crossings. These
include: closely spaced signage, buried alignment marker, buried electronic markers, and ground-
based DGPS reference stations.
Excavation Length
The MGP pipelines may have to be exposed at specific locations during their operational life to
carry out direct inspections, to repair defects or damage, or to relieve strains caused by ground
movement. In order to determine the maximum allowable excavation length, finite element
analysis was used to simulate the removal of soil cover and quantify the pipeline displacements
and strains associated with upheaval buckling. The displacement of interest is the uplift at the
apex of an overbend, assuming excavation is carried symmetrically in each direction from the
center of the overbend. The strains of interest are the axial tensile and compressive membrane
strains, which are indicative of the potential for local buckling in compression or tensile rupture,
respectively.
In general, the maximum pipeline displacement was found to be negligible for all winter analysis
cases and for most of the summer cases involving frozen soil. The largest pipe displacements
were associated with thawed soil conditions combined with a high water table, which
corresponds to the lowest soil uplift resistance and the presence of buoyancy forces. It was also
shown that the uplift displacement increases with an increase in any one of the following:
operating pressure, operating temperature, overbend angle, or excavation length.
In all analysis cases, the pipe strains generated during excavation were found to be small (relative
to those required to produce local buckling or tensile rupture). The maximum tensile and
compressive strains, which were associated with the case that produced the maximum pipe
displacements, were only 0.22% and -0.28%, respectively.
The analyses also showed that upward pipe movements are expected to occur gradually as the
pipe is uncovered, primarily because of the axial restraint provided by the buried pipe sections
adjacent to the excavated area. In the absence of concerns associated with the potential for
sudden pipe movement, the maximum upward pipe displacement at the apex of the overbend was
chosen as the limiting factor. Maximum allowable excavation lengths were therefore determined
by limiting the maximum displacement to a tolerable level. The adopted displacement limits
were chosen such that, following excavation, the minimum cover depth requirement
(i.e. 600 mm) would be met.
Excavation Guidelines
Applicable Canadian regulatory requirements and industry best practices concerning excavation
near pipelines were reviewed. Based on this information, together with the findings of this study,
Final Report – MGP – Mechanical Damage Assessment and Excavation Guidelines vii
C-FER Technologies
Executive Summary
a set of pipeline-specific recommendations were developed that are intended to enhance

excavation safety in connection with the operation and maintenance of MGP pipelines.
The recommendations address the following areas: excavation execution planning; on-site
preparation and ground breaking; ongoing excavation; and project completion. Key elements of
these recommendations include:
1. Project preparation – a review of excavator weight considerations, a determination of the

maximum allowable length for a contiguous excavation, and the development of an
excavation plan that specifies the conditions under which an excavation can proceed, as
guided by the findings of the excavator weight review and calculation of the maximum
allowable excavation length.
2. On-site preparation and groundbreaking – a pre-excavation work site review involving

company personnel and all site personnel, guidelines for the locating and marking of the
pipeline, and explicit recommendations for selective daylighting of the pipeline.
3. Ongoing excavation – pipeline company supervision during excavation work, pipeline

deformation monitoring when significant lengths of pipe are exposed, coating inspection
prior to backfilling, and restrictions on the nature of backfill material and the need for
bedding material to prevent future subsidence.
4. Project completion – as-built documentation of mitigation work performed including the

extent of pipe exposed and the magnitude of deformations observed, and post-excavation
analysis where observed pipe deformations exceed anticipated magnitudes.
Final Report – MGP – Mechanical Damage Assessment and Excavation Guidelines viii
C-FER Technologies
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
C-FER acknowledges the contribution of SSD Inc. in performing many of the finite element
analyses that contributed to the development of the guidelines for safe excavation lengths.
Final Report – MGP – Mechanical Damage Assessment and Excavation Guidelines ix

C-FER Technologies
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Scope and Objective
This report describes a study undertaken by C-FER Technologies, Edmonton, Alberta (C-FER)
for ColtKBR, Calgary, Alberta (ColtKBR) to develop guidelines for safe excavation of the
Mackenzie Gas Project (MGP) pipelines. The issues considered included the potential for
puncture or damage due to accidental impacts with excavation equipment, and upheaval buckling
due to loss of restraint for sections that are exposed during repair or site remediation. The
specific tasks undertaken were:
• an assessment of the mechanical damage resistance of MGP pipelines relative to that of

conventional pipelines,
• an assessment of the length of pipeline that can be uncovered without jeopardizing pipeline
stability, and
• the development of safe excavation guidelines that reflect industry practices and the findings
of the preceding tasks.
1.2 System Overview
The MGP pipeline system is being designed to transport natural gas and Natural Gas Liquids
(NGL) from the Mackenzie Delta area to the border between the Northwest Territories and
Alberta. The major pipeline components include a gathering system, an NGL system, and a main
gas export pipeline. The key physical and operational characteristics of these pipelines are
summarized in Table 1.1.
Pipeline System Diameter Wall Thickness Grade Max/Nom MOP

(in/mm) (mm) (MPa) (MPa)
Gathering System 30/762 12.1 483 12.2/7.0
26/660 10.5 483 12.2/8.0
18/457 9.8 414 12.2/8.0
16/406 9.2 414 12.9/10.8
NGL Line 10.75/273 6.3 359 10.0/5.0
10.75/273 7.8 359 10.0/5.0
10.75/273 9.5 359 10.0/5.0
Main Gas Pipeline 30/762 15.6 550 18.0/16.0
Table 1.1 MGP Pipeline Design and Operating Parameters – Base Case
Final Report – MGP – Mechanical Damage Assessment and Excavation Guidelines 1

C-FER Technologies
2. MECHANICAL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
2.1 Baseline Assessment
2.1.1 Methodology
The mechanical damage potential for each MGP pipeline segment was assessed by estimating the
probability of mechanical damage failure and comparing the result to historical failure rates for
comparable pipelines. Failure probabilities for the MGP pipelines were estimated using a
structural reliability model developed by C-FER. Historical failure rates for both
North American and European gas pipelines were obtained from publicly available failure rate
databases and summary reports.
2.1.2 Failure Probability Model
Mechanical damage is caused by accidental impact with excavation equipment such as

excavators, backhoes, ploughs, graders and augers. These impacts can be modelled as discrete
short-duration loading events that occur randomly in time. Assuming that individual impacts are
independent, the failure probability due to mechanical damage can be calculated as the product
of the frequency of impact events and the probability of failure given an impact.
Impact Frequency Model
The frequency of impact was calculated using a fault tree (C-FER) that models combinations of
basic events leading to an excavator hitting the pipeline. A hit is assumed to occur if a party
undertakes an excavation project on the pipeline alignment, the excavation depth exceeds the
pipeline cover depth, and all precautions taken to prevent potential damage during the excavation
fail. Prevention methods considered in the model include right-of-way patrols, one-call systems
supported by right-of-way signs, permanent alignment markers, and public-awareness programs.
The fault tree calculates the probability of an impact event from the probabilities of more basic
events representing the frequency of excavation activities and the reliability of the various
prevention methods. The probabilities of the basic events are characterized based on relevant
historical data and pipeline operator responses to an industry survey undertaken in 1997 (Chen
and Nessim 1999). These probabilities are defined as functions of the pipeline location and the
damage prevention methods used. For example, the excavation rate is a function of population
density, land use, and state of development, whereas the probability that the right-of-way patrol
fails to detect an unauthorized excavation activity is a function of the patrol frequency. The
influence of various prevention methods on the failure probability is accounted for by adjusting
the basic event probabilities in the fault tree to reflect the effectiveness of these methods. This is
then reflected in the hit rate and ultimately in the mechanical damage failure probability. The
fault tree model and basic event probabilities are given in Appendix A.

C-FER Technologies
Mechanical Damage Assessment
Probability of Failure Given Impact Model
The probability of failure in a given impact event is calculated as the probability that the pipeline
resistance, r, will be less than the applied load, l, or that the margin of safety, m = r – l, will be
less that zero. Analytical models are used to express the load and resistance as functions of other
basic variables, such as diameter, wall thickness, yield strength, internal pressure, fracture
toughness, and excavator mass. As a result, the margin of safety can be expressed as m = g(x),
where g is the limit state function, and x is a vector of the basic variables. The probability of
failure is then calculated using the Monte Carlo simulation method, which uses the limit state
function and the basic variable probability distributions.
Failure due to equipment impact can occur either by puncture under the excavator tooth or failure
of a resulting gouged dent after removal of the excavator load. The mechanism that causes
failure in a given impact event is the one with the lower resistance. To account for this, two
functions corresponding to puncture and gouged dent failures were considered simultaneously in
the simulation process. In addition, failure occurs by either leak or rupture, which depends on
whether unstable axial growth occurs in the resulting breach. A third limit state was therefore
included to determine whether the failure is a leak or rupture. Details of the actual limit states
used in the analysis are described in Appendix B.
2.1.3 Failure Model Inputs
Impact frequency estimation using the fault tree model described in Section 2.1.2 requires an
estimate of the frequency of excavation events and a characterization of anticipated damage
prevention measures. The damage prevention measures assumed for all of the MGP pipelines
are shown in Table 2.1. These assumptions reflect typical industry practise for Class 1 pipelines
and/or specific measures that are planned for the MGP pipelines (as provided to C-FER by the
project proponent).

C-FER Technologies
Damage Prevention Measures Condition

Above Ground Alignment Markers None
Buried Alignment Markers None
Alignment Signage At selected strategic locations
Depth of Burial 0.9 metres
Dig Notification Requirement Notification required but not enforced
Dig Notification Response Locate and mark with site supervision
Mechanical Protection None
One-call System Type None
Public Awareness Level Average
Right-of-way Indication Intermittent or variable indication
Surveillance Interval and Method Monthly aerial surveillance
Table 2.1 Parameters Required to Estimate Equipment Impact Frequency
Due to a lack of data regarding excavation activity in Northern regions, the applicable activity
rate was estimated by scaling the typical activity rate for Class 1 pipelines by the ratio between
the population density in the region of interest and the population density in typical Class 1 areas.
This approach is based on the assumption that activity rates on pipeline right of ways are roughly
proportional to population density.
For typical Class 1 areas in the United States, Chen and Nessim (1999) estimate an activity rate
of 0.08 excavations per km-yr. The same study demonstrates that small machines, such as
backhoes and ploughs, do not contribute significantly to the equipment impact failure
probability. Based on this finding, Chen and Nessim recommend that only equipment impact
events associated with large machines, such as excavators, need to be considered in the failure
frequency analysis. Based on industry survey results, which indicate that approximately 20% of
all excavations are conducted using excavators, they further recommend that the overall
excavation activity rate should be multiplied by 0.25 to obtain a conservative excavation rate
estimate for large machines. This set of assumptions supports an activity rate estimate of 0.02
events per km-year for large equipment operating in typical Class 1 areas.
This activity rate is assumed to apply in areas with an average population density on the order of
10 persons per square kilometre (this being approximately the average population density for
Class 1 areas in the United States). Based on census and electoral district data, the population
density is approximately 0.34 persons per square kilometre in Northern Alberta and 0.03 in the
Northwest Territories (Statistics Canada 2005). If settlements are excluded, these densities fall
to about 0.1 and 0.01 persons per square kilometre, respectively. In this study it has been
conservatively assumed that the population density along the MGP pipelines will range between
1.0 and 0.1 people per square kilometre (these densities being one order of magnitude greater
than the density estimates obtained assuming a uniformly distributed population). Assuming
further, as previously stated, that activity rates are proportional to population density, the

C-FER Technologies
prorated activity rate for significant excavators in Northern regions is estimated to be in the range
of 0.002 to 0.0002 excavations per km-year (0.02 x 1.0/10 = 0.002, and 0.02 x 0.1/10 = 0.0002).
Probability distributions for the input parameters required to calculate the probability of failure
given an impact event are summarized in Table 2.2. In general, the tabulated probability
distributions have been developed by C-FER from data that is considered directly applicable to
excavation equipment and pipelines in North America. The excavator weight distribution (see
Table 2.2) used in this study was obtained from a survey of excavator sales and frequency of
excavator usage in rural, semi-urban, and urban areas in Western Europe. (The excavator weight
distribution for rural areas was used to estimate mechanical damage impact forces for the MGP
pipeline system.) This impact force characterization, while not based directly on data from North
America, is considered to be the most realistic characterization currently available, and was
therefore used in this analysis.
Parameter Units Mean Standard Distribution Source

Deviation Type
Excavator Tooth Length mm 90 28.9 Rectangular Chen and Nessim
(1999)
Excavator Weight tonne 15.2 10.8 Gamma Wolvert et al.
(2004)
Gouge Depth mm 1.2 1.1 Weibull Fuglem (2003)
Gouge Length mm 201 372 Lognormal Fuglem (2003)
Notch Toughness (pipe body) Joule 150 33.5 Normal C-FER
Wall Thickness mm Nominal 0.25 Normal Jiao et al. (1995)
Yield Strength MPa
- X80 (550) 605 21.2 Normal Jiao et al. (1995)
- X70 (483) 531 18.6
- X60 (414) 455 15.9
- X52 (359) 395 13.8
Table 2.2 Probabilistic Input Data Used to Calculate Probability of Failure Given Impact
It is assumed that equipment impact events are equally likely to occur anywhere along the length
of a pipeline. It is further assumed that the operating pressure at the location of impact is
conservatively given by the maximum anticipated operating pressure at that location. For the
purpose of estimating the maximum anticipated operating pressure at a given location, the
maximum operating pressure profile for each pipeline was idealized by a straight line
approximation to the actual operating pressure profile, as shown in Figure 2.1.

C-FER Technologies
Winter Summer Idealized Shut-in Mechanical Damage
12500
12000
Pressure Profile (kPa)
11500
11000
10500
10000
9500
9000
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Distance (km)
Figure 2.1 Example of Maximum Anticipated Operating Pressure Profile
In addition, the shut-in pressure (i.e. the pressure to which the pipeline equalizes during a shut-in
event) was calculated using Equation 2.1 (Mohitpour et al. 2000)
2   PP 
Ps = P1 + P2 −  1 2   [2.1]
 
3  P1 + P2 
where
Ps = shut-in pressure;
P1 = upstream pressure; and
P2 = downstream pressure.
As shown in Figure 2.1, the shut-in pressure will govern in the downstream portion of the
pipeline.
Given the above, the maximum anticipated operating pressure at any point on the line is equal to
the greater of the operating pressure profile and the assumed shut-in pressure. For mechanical
damage assessment, the resulting bi-linear maximum pressure profile was conservatively
represented by a linear profile defined by the maximum upstream pressure, P1, and the shut-in
pressure, Ps, at the downstream end of the pipeline (see Figure 2.1). Given that impact is
assumed to occur with equal likelihood at any point along the length of the line, the operating
pressure at the point of impact is defined by a uniform or rectangular probability distribution
having upper and lower bounds equal to P1 and Ps, respectively. The assumed pressure

C-FER Technologies
distribution parameters, developed as described above, are summarized in Table 2.3 for the
pipelines considered in this study.
System Name Diameter WT P1 P2 PS

(in/mm) (mm) (kPa) (kPa) (kPa)
Gathering System 30/762 12.1 9,600 7,300 8,502
26/660 10.5 12,200 9,700 10,998
18/457 9.8 11,300 9,600 10,473
16/406 9.2 12,600 12,200 12,401
NGL Line 10.75/273 6.3 9,200 1,000 6,199
10.75/273 7.8 9,200 1,000 6,199
10.75/273 9.5 9,200 1,000 6,199
Main Gas Line 30/762 15.6 18,000 14,000 16,083
Table 2.3 Internal Pressure Probability Distributions
2.1.4 Failure Probability Estimates
Mechanical damage failure probabilities were calculated for each pipeline in the MGP system
using the models described in Section 2.1.2 and the input parameters summarized in
Section 2.1.3. Failure probabilities were estimated assuming three different levels of excavation
activity that are considered representative of: a lower bound for remote Northern areas
(0.0002 per km-yr); an upper bound for remote Northern areas (0.002 per km-yr); and typical
Class 1 locations in the United States (0.02 per km-yr). While the MGP pipelines are not
expected to operate in areas with population densities directly comparable to those in typical
Class 1 locations, failure probability estimates consistent with this population density were
developed for comparison with historical data.
The mechanical damage failure probabilities obtained using the above approach are summarized
in Table 2.4. The failure probabilities are shown to be directly proportional to the assumed
activity rate and strongly dependent on wall thickness, with thicker walled pipe being associated
with lower failure probabilities. For cases involving representative activity rates (i.e. values
consistent with the upper and lower bound rate estimates for Northern regions), the failure
probability estimates range from a low of 1.6 x 10-8 per km-yr for the 30 inch mainline with a
wall thickness of 15.6 mm and an assumed activity rate of 0.0002 per km-yr, to a high of 7.0 x
10-6 per km-yr for the 10 inch NGL line with a wall thickness of 6.3 mm and an assumed activity
rate of 0.002 per km-yr. Conservatively assuming activity rates that are representative of typical
Class 1 locations, the highest failure probability is estimated to be 7.0 x 10-5 per km-yr for the
10 inch NGL line with a wall thickness of 6.3 mm.

C-FER Technologies
System Diameter WT Failure Probability (per km-yr)

(in/mm) (mm)
Northern Northern Typical
lower bound activity upper bound activity Class 1
-8 -7
Gathering 30/762 12.1 2.34 x 10 2.34 x 10 2.34 x 10-6
System
26/660 10.5 1.81 x 10-7 1.81 x 10-6 1.81 x 10-5
18/457 9.8 1.44 x 10-7 1.44 x 10-6 1.44 x 10-5
16/406 9.2 2.39 x 10-7 2.39 x 10-6 2.39 x 10-5
NGL Line 10.75/273 6.3 7.04 x 10-7 7.04 x 10-6 7.04 x 10-5
10.75/273 7.8 1.53 x 10-7 1.53 x 10-6 1.53 x 10-5
10.75/273 9.5 2.64 x 10-8 2.64 x 10-7 2.64 x 10-6
Main Gas Line 30/762 15.6 1.58 x 10-8 1.58 x 10-7 1.58 x 10-6
Table 2.4 Estimated Mechanical Damage Failure Probabilities for MGP Pipelines
2.1.5 Historical Failure Rates
The US-DOT database for gas transmission and gathering pipelines (Kiefner et al. 2001) was
used as the primary source of North American historical failure data. This database represents
approximately 6,000,000 km-years of gas transmission pipeline exposure during the time period
between 1985 and 1997. During this period 255 pipeline incidents were reported due to
third-party damage. This results in an overall average incident rate of 4.3 x 10-5 per km-year.
Since the data include only reportable incidents, which are defined as incidents that cause injury
or property damage exceeding $50,000, it can reasonably be assumed that the great majority of
reported incidents are large leaks and ruptures. This reporting criterion suggests that some leaks
may go unreported and therefore the actual failure rate including all product release events is
likely to be higher than reported. This view is supported by European failure statistics as
published by the EGIG (2001). These European statistics, which reflect all loss of containment
incidents and 2,410,000 km-years of pipeline exposure, indicate that the total failure rate due to
equipment impact is 1.6 × 10-4 per km-year – approximately 3.7 times higher than the
corresponding DOT value. This difference results from the combined effect of a higher average
population density in Europe and the fact that not all failures are included in the US-DOT
database.
In addition to the average failure rate, the EGIG failure database provides failure rate estimates
as a function of pipe wall thickness (see Figure 2.2). The external interference failure rate is
shown to be very dependent on wall thickness. The failure rate for pipe with wall thicknesses
between 10 and 15 mm is approximately 13 percent of the overall average rate and no external
interference failures were reported for pipe with wall thicknesses greater than 15 mm.

C-FER Technologies
Pinhole-crack Hole Rupture

6.0E-04
Failure Frequencey (per km-yr)
5.0E-04
4.0E-04
3.0E-04
2.0E-04
1.0E-04
0.0E+00
0 to 5 5 to 10 10 to 15 15 to 20
Wall Thickness Range (mm)
Figure 2.2 EGIG External Interference Failure Rate by Wall Thickness Range
Similarly, the US-DOT failure database provides failure rate estimates as a function of pipe
diameter (see Figure 2.3). The failure rate reported for diameters below 28 inches varies
between 3.7 x 10-5 and 6.3 x 10-5 per km-year, while the failure rate for pipe larger than 28 inches
in diameter is significantly lower at 8.0 x 10-6 per km-year. The US-DOT trend of lower failure
rates for larger diameter pipe generally agrees with the EGIG trend of lower failure rates for pipe
with thicker walls, since larger diameter pipelines typically have larger wall thicknesses.
The Alberta EUB database (EUB 1998) is considered the primary source of Canadian historical
failure rate data. This database reflects approximately 1,271,300 km-years of pipeline exposure
between 1989 an 1997. (It is noted that the National Energy Board of Canada also maintains a
pipeline incident database; however, the pipeline system exposure data required to develop
accurate failure rate estimates is not currently available.)
EUB database includes all pipeline failure incidents regardless of cause, magnitude, or
consequences. This database reports failure rates for pipelines subdivided by both failure cause
and product transported. The reported third-party failure rate for natural gas pipelines is
1.5 x 10-4 per km-yr – comparable to the EGIG failure rate and approximately 3.5 times higher
than the corresponding DOT value. This difference between EUB and DOT rate estimates is
likely due to the inclusion of the smaller diameter, thinner walled gathering lines in the data set,
and the fact that not all failures are included in the DOT database.

C-FER Technologies
-3
8.24 x 10
1.00E-04
Failure Frequency (per km-yr)
1.00E-05
1.00E-06
<4 4 - 10 10 - 20 20 - 28 >= 28 Not Stated
Diameter Range (inches)
Figure 2.3 US-DOT Reportable Failure Rate by Diameter Range

(Gas Transmission Lines, Third-party Damage)
While the failure rates reported by the EGIG and the EUB are comparable, and by virtue of the
reporting criteria, more representative of the overall rate of mechanical damage failures, the
US-DOT failure rates by diameter range have been adopted as the basis for comparison. This is
because they constitute a conservative lower bound estimate of the actual historical failure rates
for North American transmission pipelines.
2.1.6 Comparison with Historical Failure Rates
Table 2.5 shows a comparison between the failure probability estimates developed for MGP
pipelines, as summarized in Section 2.1.4, and the historical US-DOT third-party damage failure
rates for corresponding diameter ranges, as described in Section 2.1.5.
The tabulated results show that the MGP pipeline failure probability estimates, based on lower
and upper bound activity rate estimates for Northern regions, are mostly between one and two
orders of magnitude below the DOT average values for pipelines of comparable diameters. The
MGP pipeline with the highest estimated failure probability, the 10 inch NGL line with a wall
thickness of 6.3 mm, is shown to have a predicted failure rate of between 1.6% and 16% of the
DOT average failure rate for lines of comparable diameter.

C-FER Technologies
System Diameter WT US-DOT MGP Failure Probability (per km-yr)

(in/mm) (mm) Failure [percentage of DOT category average]
Rate Northern Northern Typical
(per km-yr)
(lower bound (upper bound Class 1
activity) activity)
Gathering 30/762 12.1 8.00 x 10-6 2.34 x 10-8 2.34 x 10-7 2.34 x 10-6
System [0.3] [2.9] [29.2]
-5 -7 -6
26/660 10.5 3.74 x 10 1.81 x 10 1.81 x 10 1.81 x 10-5
[0.5] [4.8] [48.3]
18/457 9.8 4.32 x 10-5 1.44 x 10-7 1.44 x 10-6 1.44 x 10-5
[0.3] [3.3] [33.2]
-5 -7 -6
16/406 9.2 4.32 x 10 2.39 x 10 2.39 x 10 2.39 x 10-5
[0.6] [5.5] [55.3]
-5 -7 -6
NGL Line 10.75/273 6.3 4.32 x 10 7.04 x 10 7.04 x 10 7.04 x 10-5
[1.6] [16.3] [163.0]
-5 -7 -6
10.75/273 7.8 4.32 x 10 1.53 x 10 1.53 x 10 1.53 x 10-5
[0.4] [3.5] [35.5]
-5 -8 -7
10.75/273 9.5 4.32 x 10 2.64 x 10 2.64 x 10 2.64 x 10-6
[< 0.1] [0.6] [6.1]
-6 -8 -7
Main Gas Line 30/762 15.6 8.00 x 10 1.58 x 10 1.58 x 10 1.58 x 10-6
[0.2] [2.0] [19.7]
Table 2.5 Comparison of MGP and US-DOT Failure Rates
Even with the higher activity rates representative of typical Class 1 areas in the United States, all
pipelines except for one (i.e. the 10 inch diameter by 6.3 mm wall NGL line) have projected
failure rates that are below the DOT category averages. Given the extremely conservative nature
of the activity rate that is associated with these failure probability estimates, the results confirm
that the probability of failure for the MGP pipelines is significantly lower than the historical
failure rates for pipelines within a similar diameter range.
2.2 Sensitivity Analysis
2.2.1 Overview
Selected pipelines within the proposed MGP system use higher steel grades (e.g. X80 for the
main gas export line) and high operating pressures (as high as 18 MPa). In addition, ColtKBR
has indicated that there may be practical limits on the maximum size of excavation equipment
that will be used in the vicinity of the pipeline. To explore the significance of these factors, a
sensitivity analysis was performed to examine their effect on the estimated equipment impact
failure probability.

C-FER Technologies
2.2.2 High Steel Grade and High Operating Pressure
The effect of material grade on the mechanical damage failure potential was investigated by
calculating the probability of failure given impact for the main gas export line, assuming a range
of steel grades and a constant design factor. In this analysis design factor consistency was
achieved by increasing the pipe wall thickness to compensate for the reduction in pipe body yield
strength. The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 2.4. The plot shows that trading
material strength for wall thickness has a significant effect on the failure probability. This is
because pipe resistance to failure by mechanical damage is more sensitive to wall thickness than
it is to material strength. All other parameters being equal, increasing wall thickness to offset a
material strength reduction, results in improved mechanical damage resistance.
1.0E-02
Probability of Failure Given Impact
1.0E-03 Increasing Wall Thickness
X80
Main Gas Pipeline
X70
X65
1.0E-04
X60
X52
1.0E-05
300 350 400 450 500 550 600
SMYS (MPa)
Figure 2.4 Effect of Steel Grade on Failure Potential (with Constant Design Factor)
The effect of operating pressure on the mechanical failure potential was investigated by
calculating the probability of failure given impact for an MGP pipeline segment over a range of
operating pressures, again assuming a constant design factor. This was achieved by changing the
pipe wall thickness in direct proportion to the change in operating pressure. The results of this
analysis are shown in Figure 2.5 for the NGL pipeline segment having a 7.8 mm wall thickness.
The plot shows that by simultaneously increasing the operating pressure and wall thickness to
maintain a constant design factor, there is a net decrease in the probability of failure given
impact.

C-FER Technologies
Leak Rupture Total
1.0E-01
1.0E-02
Increasing Wall Thickness
1.0E-03
1.0E-04
1.0E-05
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Internal Pressure (MPa)
Figure 2.5 Effect of Wall Thickness on Failure Potential (with Constant Design Factor)
The effect on mechanical damage resistance of the wall thickness reduction resulting from the
use of higher strength materials is more than compensated for by the increase in wall thickness
associated with the use of higher operating pressures. In general, the designs proposed for MGP
pipelines require wall thicknesses that are similar to or greater than wall thicknesses typically
associated with more conventional Class 1 pipelines of comparable diameter and therefore the
estimated failure probabilities are generally lower for MGP pipelines than for typical pipelines.
2.2.3 Excavator Weight
The effect on mechanical damage potential of a possible cap on excavator weight was assessed
by calculating the probability of failure given impact over a range of excavator weights. This
assessment generated a chart for each MGP pipeline. An example of the results obtained for the
main gas pipeline is shown in Figure 2.6. Similar results for each of the MGP pipeline segments
are included in Appendix C.
In general, the results indicate that the probability of failure given impact is relatively constant up
to a threshold excavator weight, which depends on the pipeline. Above this threshold the
probability of failure given impact tends to increase more rapidly with increasing excavator
weight. Figure 2.6 shows that the excavator weight thresholds are approximately 29 and
58 tonnes for leak and rupture failures, respectively. The results also show that the propensity

C-FER Technologies
for leak type failure increases more rapidly than the propensity for rupture failures when the
weight thresholds are exceeded.
Leak Rupture Total
1.0E-02
1.0E-03
1.0E-04
1.0E-05
0.00 25.00 50.00 75.00
Excavator Weight (tonnes)
Figure 2.6 Effect of Excavator Weight
For comparison, the probabilities of failure given an impact were calculated for a 12 tonne
backhoe and for the base case excavator weight distribution for rural locations (see Section
2.1.2). (The base case equipment weight assumptions are considered directly applicable to
readily accessible areas in temperate climate zones.) The analysis results of this analysis are
summarized in Table 2.6.
If excavation is restricted to the use of the assumed 12 tonne backhoe, it is estimated that the
probability of failure given impact, and by extension the expected probability of failure for the
MGP line segments, will be reduced by between 3 and 28 %. The magnitude of the reduction
was found to depend on both the pipe diameter and wall thickness.

C-FER Technologies
System Diameter WT Probability of Failure Given Impact

(in/mm) (mm)
Rural Area Distribution
Gamma(µ = 15.2, σ = 10.8) 12.0 tonnes
-4
Gathering System 30/762 12.1 8.47 x 10 7.72 x 10-4
26/660 10.5 6.34 x 10-3 5.99 x 10-3
18/457 9.8 5.14 x 10-3 4.66 x 10-3
16/406 9.2 8.56 x 10-3 7.57 x 10-3
NGL Line 10.75/273 6.3 2.47 x 10-2 1.78 x 10-2
10.75/273 7.8 5.41 x 10-3 4.02 x 10-3
10.75/273 9.5 9.29 x 10-4 7.86 x 10-4
Main Gas Line 30/762 15.6 7.29 x 10-4 7.10 x 10-4
Table 2.6 Probability of Failure Given Impact for MGP Pipelines
2.3 Mechanical Damage Mitigation
2.3.1 Overview
In general, mechanical damage failure probabilities can be reduced through the use of proactive
damage prevention methods, over and above those that are typically associated with conventional
design, operating and maintenance practices. While the failure probability estimates obtained for
the MGP pipeline segments (assuming conventional damage mitigation practises and activity
rates representative of remote Northern areas) have been shown to be significantly below the
historical failure rates for comparable pipelines, the scope of work for this project included
consideration of the potential benefits to be gained from the incorporation of selected damage
mitigation measures. The measures considered involve actions (i.e. the installation of physical
devices) that would best be carried out at the time of construction.
2.3.2 Mitigation Measures
2.3.2.1 Right-of-way Signage
The use of explicit signage that conveys the type of pipeline, the owner/operator of the pipeline,
and the appropriate contact information, is a requirement. Minimum requirements typically
involve the placement of signage at strategic locations, such as facility crossing points and points
where the pipeline direction changes. In areas where encroachment concerns are heightened
(i.e. in areas that may undergo development) the signage density is increased to ensure visibility
from all points along the right-of-way.

C-FER Technologies
If closely spaced right-of-way signs were to be installed on the MGP system, they would
promote public awareness of the pipeline and aid right-of-way maintenance crews in quickly
locating the pipeline alignment. It is noted that above-ground markers are frequently vandalized,
particularly in remote areas. Therefore, an ongoing program to replace and maintain the above-
ground markers is worth considering.
Using the fault tree model and basic event probabilities described in Appendix A, the probability
of basic event B3 was changed to reflect an increase in the level of signage from the base case
assumption (i.e. at selected strategic location) to the point where signage is closely spaced and
visible from all locations. It was determined from the fault tree model that this would lower the
expected failure probability by 22%.
2.3.2.2 Permanent Alignment Markers
Surface Markers
Permanent on-ground alignment markers are typically used in areas of high excavation activity,
such as populated areas or near other underground facilities. They enhance the recognition
potential afforded by the general appearance of the right-of-way and the use of explicit signage.
Examples of permanent surface marking schemes currently in use include:
• distinctive landscaping elements such as rows of trees or shrubs;
• paved (or otherwise engineered) pathways;
• pre-cast concrete barriers; and
• fencing.
In addition to heightening recognition potential, some forms of permanent surface markers, such
as concrete barriers and fencing, constitute a physical barrier to excavation by restricting
equipment access. The effectiveness of surface markers is further enhanced if they incorporate
signage or other descriptive elements that serve the same purpose as explicit pipeline signage.
The probability of basic event B11 (see Appendix A) was changed to reflect the introduction of
continuous above-ground markers. Using the fault tree model it was estimated that this would
lower the expected failure probability by 78%.
Buried Markers
Buried alignment markers typically consist of continuous strips of highly flexible, brightly
coloured polyethylene tape placed in the backfill material parallel to and on top of the pipeline.
The buried tape compliments the pipeline locating and marking process because incorrect
location and erroneous marking can be offset during excavation by the marking function
achieved by exposure of the buried tape. However, the primary function of buried tape markers
is to serve as a last line of defence in the event of un-notified and/or unauthorized excavation. In

C-FER Technologies
that event, the warning tape will potentially be snagged by the bucket or blade of the excavation
equipment and pulled from the ground, thereby exposing the tape to view. Because the tape is
labelled with either a generic warning message or an operator-specific message and set of
instructions, it would convey to the equipment operator the presence of an unmarked pipeline in
the immediate vicinity. This should effectively trigger a work stoppage followed by dig
notification.
Typical installation involves the use of a single tape strip buried at a depth of between 1 and
1½ ft (0.3 and 0.45 m) directly above the pipeline. A variation on this installation procedure
involves the use of two parallel lines of tape spread apart to increase the likelihood of an
excavator snag prior to pipeline contact, particularly if digging approaches the pipeline from one
side.
High tensile netting, while affording some direct protection, is perceived to be more effective at
slowing the progress of unintended excavation and warning the equipment operator of the
presence of a buried facility. Therefore, the netting serves as a form of buried marker, similar to
two parallel lines of buried tape.
buried marker tape. Using the fault tree it was estimated that this would lower the expected
failure probability by 55%.
2.3.2.3 Locating and Marking Enhancements
Conventional methods for locating buried pipelines include ground penetrating radar, radio rate
detectors, and magnetic or electromagnetic devices. A survey of pipeline companies shows that
ground penetrating radar is by far the most frequently used locating technique. However, in
comparison to remote locating devices, vacuum excavation is the most reliable way to
simultaneously determine pipeline depth and horizontal location. Vacuum excavation systems
include both liquid and air systems that are capable of excavating frozen and/or cohesive soils.
Electronic markers buried above pipelines can also provide a reliable and effective locating
method. These markers have an antenna tuned to respond to a specific radio frequency signal
generated by specially designed locators. The radio reflection from the antenna generates a wide
signal field with a peak directly above the marker. The operator of the locating equipment
associates the location of the marker, presumably placed along the centreline the pipe, with the
location where the audible return signal reaches a maximum volume. Note that electronic
markers are only practical if installed at the time of construction.
Standard or un-augmented GPS systems do not have the accuracy required to provide anything
more than general, ±10 metre, pipeline location. More advanced systems, such as WAAS and
DGPS, do provide sub-metre accuracy and are capable of providing detailed pipeline location
information when used in combination with the results of a GEOPIG survey. However, both
WAAS and DGPS require ground-based stations to provide correction messages.

C-FER Technologies
WAAS consists of approximately 25 ground reference stations positioned across the

United States that monitor GPS satellite data. WAAS uses two master stations, located on either
coast of the United States, to collect data from the reference stations and create a GPS correction
message. The corrected differential message is then broadcast through one of two geostationary
satellites with a fixed position over the equator. The location of the ground reference stations in
the lower 48 states and the equatorial orbits of the associated satellites is a problem for Northern
pipelines because the correction signals cannot be received in northern latitudes. Therefore,
WAAS augmented GPS is not practical for locating the MGP pipelines.
DGPS technology depends on correction signals transmitted directly from ground-based

reference stations. Outside the lower 48 states, reference stations are currently only located
along coastlines and have a maximum range of 400 kilometres. It may be possible to set up
temporary DGPS reference stations for the MGP system. However, the installation of temporary
DGPS reference stations may make DGPS augmented GPS cost prohibitive.
Using a fault tree model similar to the one described in Appendix A, it is estimated that
increasing the locating and marking accuracy beyond that obtainable with conventional practises,
using for example buried electronic markers, has the potential to lower the expected failure
probability by approximately 6%. It is noted that the potential for improvement is likely to be
greater if it is assumed that the locating accuracy of conventional methods is compromised in
Northern regions where the ground surrounding the pipe is frozen for extended periods.
2.3.2.4 Physical Protection
In areas where excavation activity is expected, protective devices can be used to provide a
physical barrier between excavating equipment and the pipeline. These measures serve to both
indicate the presence of a buried pipeline and prevent or delay the onset of damage if excavation
activity continues in the immediate vicinity.
Concrete slabs or steel plate protection can practically eliminate the potential for pipe damage
provided that they are sized, positioned and/or reinforced to resist and redistribute the loads
generated by digging equipment, even under repeated loading events. Slabs and plates, whether
made from concrete or steel, are reportedly more effective if they are painted with a colour
scheme that conveys a warning. The increased effectiveness is attributed to the fact that plain
concrete or steel may be interpreted by digging contractors as an abandoned facility and
excavation activities may continue until the protective cover is destroyed or removed. The use of
an appropriate colour scheme (e.g. coloured stripes) significantly reduces the potential for
misunderstanding and reduces the potential for further excavation at that location.
continuous buried physical protection in the form of painted concrete slabs or steel plates. Using
the fault tree it was estimated that this would lower the expected failure probability by 95%.

C-FER Technologies
2.4 Summary
The mechanical damage failure probabilities for MGP pipelines were estimated using the
structural reliability model described in Sections 2.1.2 with the input parameters summarized in
Section 2.1.3. The failure probability estimates so obtained for each MGP pipeline segment were
then compared to the US-DOT historical failure rates. The results indicate that the MGP pipeline
failure probability estimates (based on lower and upper bound activity rate estimates for
Northern regions) are mostly between one and two orders of magnitude below the DOT average
values for pipelines of comparable diameters. If more conservative activity rate assumptions are
made (i.e. if activity rates representative of typical Class 1 areas in the United States are
assumed), the calculated failure rates for all but one pipeline segment are below the DOT
category averages. Given the extremely conservative nature of the activity rate used in
calculating these Class 1 equivalent failure probability estimates, the results confirm that the
probability of failure for MGP pipelines is significantly lower than the historical failure rates for
pipelines within a similar diameter range.
Sensitivity analysis shows that the effects on mechanical damage failure potential of the wall
thickness reduction associated with using higher strength materials is more than compensated for
by the wall thickness increase associated with higher operating pressures. In general, the designs
proposed for MGP pipelines require wall thicknesses that are similar to, or greater than, wall
thicknesses typically associated with more conventional Class 1 pipelines of comparable
diameter. This, combined with the lower excavation activity rates in the North, results in
estimated failure probabilities that are generally lower for the MGP pipelines than for typical
pipelines.
In addition, the use of lighter (12 tonne) excavation equipment was found to result in lower
probabilities of failure due to mechanical damage when compared to the results obtained from
the base case analysis, which assumes an excavator population applicable to more easily
accessible rural areas in the United States and Canada. The probability of failure given impact
was found to be relatively insensitive to excavator weight below a pipeline-specific weight
threshold. Therefore, the probability of failure for a pipeline is not significantly decreased by
reducing the excavator weight below the threshold weight.
While mechanical damage failure probability estimates for the MGP system have been shown to
be significantly below the US-DOT historical failure rates, a number of damage mitigation
strategies could be considered near population centres, or at road and utility crossings. These
include:
• closely spaced signage to provide a clear indication of the alignment at any point along the
pipeline,
• buried alignment marker (i.e. polyethylene tape, high tensile netting) to provide an indication
during the excavation process that a pipeline is in the area,
• buried electronic markers to aid accurate location of the buried pipeline, and
• ground-based DGPS reference stations to provide sub-metre, GPS-based pipeline location
information.

C-FER Technologies
3. ALLOWABLE EXCAVATION LENGTH
3.1 Upheaval Buckling
Upheaval buckling is a global beam-column buckling phenomenon that occurs in a pipe loaded
in axial compression, if there is insufficient vertical restraint. It is primarily caused by axial
compression due to internal pressure (compression of the gas column) and restrained thermal
expansion. Pipe out-of-straightness, due to pipe laying and cold bending operations, or at
overbends caused by frost heave, have the potential to make the problem more severe.
The purpose of the work described in this section, was to determine if MGP pipelines are
susceptible to upheaval buckling due to loss of soil restraint if a length of pipe is uncovered in
order to conduct inspection and maintenance activities (including excavation to mitigate the
effects of frost heave). The focus of the work was to determine the length of pipe that can be
uncovered, for various operational scenarios and soil conditions, without upheaval buckling
causing large upward pipe displacements.
In order to determine the allowable excavation length, finite element analysis was used to
simulate the sequential removal of soil cover and calculate the upward pipeline displacements
associated with upheaval buckling. The predicted displacements were then compared with a set
of assumed permissible values to establish allowable excavation lengths for various conditions.
3.2 Analytical Models
The upheaval buckling analyses of the 30-inch main gas line were carried out by SSD Inc. using
the PIPLIN finite element software. These analyses were carried out for various cases selected
by C-FER in consultation with ColtKBR to determine the effect of pipe excavation for various
pipe configurations, loading conditions, cover depths, soil conditions and cold bend shapes. Two
basic sets of analyses were conducted: the first were preliminary analyses for a pipe that was
vertically displaced due to a multi-year frost heave event; the second were non-heave analyses
for a pipe with the overbend caused by the pipeline being roped-in during construction or cold
bending operations.
3.2.1 Preliminary Frost Heave Analyses
The preliminary analyses were performed to investigate pipeline configurations that were
initially straight, and subsequently deformed in service due to multi-year frost heave. The results
of the preliminary analyses (see Appendix D), indicated there was no evidence of a tendency for
upheaval buckling to occur in the heaved and excavated region, since the heave action produces
high tensile forces in the pipe. The analyses also showed that removing soil cover results in a
significant reduction in the maximum stresses and strains generated by frost heave. For this
reason, the remaining work was focused on the non-heave buckling scenarios.

C-FER Technologies
Allowable Excavation Length
3.2.2 Non-heave Overbend Analyses
The basic FEA model used by SSD for the non-heave analysis scenarios is shown in Figure 3.1.
It consisted of a segment of pipe, connected to longitudinal, uplift and bearing soil springs, which
represented soil restraints in the respective directions.
The loading sequence included application of an initial hydrostatic test pressure, followed by
application of the operating pressure and a construction-to-operating temperature differential,
and finally the incremental removal of uplift and longitudinal soil-springs to simulate excavation.
The maximum excavation length considered was 152 m (500 ft), which is based on an inspection
length of 30 m (100 ft) plus a length of five pipe joints (60 m; 200 ft) at each end. The finite
element model and analysis procedure are described in more detail in Appendix E.
In consultation with the client, a matrix of 32 non-heave analysis cases was selected based on
combinations of the following parameters:
• four overbend angles (0.5, 1.2, 3.0, and 6.0 degrees) with a cold bend curvature of one degree
per diameter length;
• two soil cover depths (0.9 and 1.2 m); and
• four soil conditions (“Winter/Frozen”, “Summer/Frozen”, “Basic Thawed”, and
“UB (Upper Bound) Thawed”).
The four overbend angles cover the expected range of values for the main gas pipeline. The
prescribed overbend angles and curvature correspond to a bend length varying from 1.2 to 15 m.
The 0.5 degree overbend case is intended to represent an initially straight pipe that has been
roped-in during construction. The two soil cover depths represent the specified project minimum
cover of 0.9 m, and the larger depth of 1.2 m, which has been proposed as the minimum for
overbend angles of three degrees or more.
The four soil conditions cover the expected range of soil uplift resistances in winter and summer
conditions. (The “Winter/Frozen” and “Summer/Frozen” conditions refer to the excavation of
frozen soil during winter and summer seasons, respectively.) The difference between the two
thawed soil conditions relates to the ground water table: the water level is assumed to be below
the pipeline for the “Basic Thawed” condition and at the ground surface for the “UB Thawed”
condition. A set of soil springs was prescribed for each soil condition, as described in
Appendix E.
The soil temperature, operating pressure, and construction-to-operating temperature differential

associated with each soil condition are given in Table 3.1. Nominal operating pressures were
used in all analyses and possible pressure reductions during maintenance were not considered.
This is a conservative approach to the estimation of allowable excavation lengths because
upheaval bucking is primarily driven by the pressure-induced compressive force in the gas
column.

C-FER Technologies
Soil Cover
Overbend
Angle
Pipeline
a) Pipeline Configuration (Before Excavation)
Uplift Soil Springs

Longitudinal Soil Springs
Bearing Soil Springs
b) Finite Element Model (Before Excavation)
Excavation Length
After Excavation
Before Excavation
c) Pipeline Configuration (After Excavation)
d) Finite Element Model (After Excavation)
Figure 3.1 Finite Element Model Schematic for Non-heave Analysis Cases

C-FER Technologies
Soil Soil Operating Temperature

Condition Temperature Pressure Differential
(Deg C) (MPa/psi) (Deg C)
Winter/Frozen -11.5 9.0/1300 15
Summer/Frozen -2 12.4/1800 34
Basic Thawed >0 12.4/1800 34
UB Thawed >0 12.4/1800 34
3.3 Analysis Results
3.3.1 Preliminary Frost Heave Analysis Cases
Results of the preliminary analyses are given in Appendix D. They are not discussed further
here, since there was no indication of a tendency for upheaval buckling in the heaved and
excavated region, for the excavation lengths considered. It follows that the findings for the
non-heave overbend cases discussed in Section 3.3.2 can conservatively be assumed to apply to
the cases involving frost heave.
3.3.2 Non-heave Overbend Analysis Cases
Detailed results of the 32 analyses conducted are given in Appendix E. Table 1 in Appendix E
summarizes the configuration parameters and shows the progression of calculated displacements
at the apex of the overbend before excavation, after excavation and after application of the
maximum operating pressure and temperature conditions. Appendix E also provides plots of
calculated pipe forces (axial force and bending moment) and deformations (curvature and
strains). Complete results for all analysis cases are included in the enclosed CD. A number of
apparent trends in the results are summarized below.
The maximum upward displacement at the apex of the overbend was found to be negligible for
all “Winter/Frozen” cases and most of the “Summer/Frozen” cases. The largest calculated
displacement is associated with the “UB Thawed” condition, which corresponds to the lowest
soil uplift resistance and the presence of buoyancy forces. The calculated apex displacement,
due to operating pressure and temperature differential prior to excavation, was negligible for all
cases, except for the cases involving three- and six-degree overbends in the “UB Thawed” soil,
for which the respective displacements were 0.09 m and 0.62 m.
In general, the results showed that an increase in calculated displacement occurred with an
increase in any one of the following: pressure, temperature, overbend angle, and excavation
length.

C-FER Technologies
In all cases, the pipe strains occurring during excavation were small (relative to those required to
produce local buckling or tensile rupture). Overall, the maximum tensile and compressive strains
at the centre of the overbend were 0.22% and -0.28%, respectively. These strain levels were
obtained for the “UB Thawed” case, with a 1.2 degree overbend and 0.9 m soil cover. The
maximum tensile and compressive strains associated with the frozen soil cases were significantly
lower.
The analyses showed that upward pipe movements occurred gradually as the pipe was uncovered
for all cases considered, primarily because of the axial restraint provided by the buried pipe
sections adjacent to the excavated area. In the absence of concerns associated with the potential
for sudden pipe movement1, the maximum upward pipe displacement at the apex of the overbend
was chosen as the limiting factor. Maximum allowable excavation lengths were therefore
determined by limiting the maximum displacement to some tolerable level.
As shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, a set of maximum tolerable displacements ranging between 0.3
and 1.2 m were considered. The values of 0.3 and 0.6 m were selected for the 0.9 and 1.2 m
initial cover depth cases, respectively, to ensure that the minimum cover depth of 0.6 m required
by CSA Z662 (CSA 2003) can be maintained after reburying the pipeline. The allowable
excavation lengths associated with these limits are highlighted in the tables. Larger limiting
displacements were also considered based on the assumption that additional uplift may be
tolerated if mitigation measures (e.g. building a berm above the ground level) are adopted. The
excavation lengths reported the in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 are nominal values, which do not include a
safety factor. If a margin of safety is required, maximum excavation lengths associated with
smaller tolerable vertical displacements can be developed based on the results presented in
Appendix E.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show that the calculated allowable excavation length is greater than 152 m
(the maximum length considered) for all “Winter/Frozen” cases and for cases with a 0.5 degree
overbend in all other soil conditions. Furthermore, the allowable excavation length is greater
than 48 m for all cases, except for those involving the “UB Thawed” soil conditions. It is
expected that this length, approximately the length of four pipe joints, should be sufficient for
most required inspection and repair work.
For the cases involving a 6.0 degree overbend and the “UB Thawed” conditions, the limiting
uplift displacement is exceeded prior to excavation (due to the effects of operating pressure and
temperature differential alone). It is therefore recommended that overbends be limited to a
1
The finding that pipe movement will in all cases be gradual, in direct response to the amount of soil removed, is
contingent upon the assumed properties of the vertical uplift soil springs. The spring properties used in this analysis
were provided to SSD by ColtKBR and/or their sub-consultants. Relatively sudden vertical pipe translation is
conceivable under certain conditions (e.g. situations where the frozen soil exhibits extreme post-peak softening
behaviour), however, assessment of the potential for and/or extent of this condition is beyond the scope of this
project.

C-FER Technologies
smaller angle in such soil conditions, unless alternative design measures are used, such as
additional soil cover or ground anchors.
Analysis Case Maximum Excavation Lengths for Given

Tolerable Vertical Displacements (m)
Soil Overbend 0.3 m 0.6 m 0.9 m 1.2 m
Condition Angle vertical vertical vertical vertical
(degrees) displ. displ. displ. displ.
0.5 See Note 1 See Note 1 See Note 1 See Note 1
Winter/Frozen

Summer/Frozen
1.2 120 See Note 1 See Note 1 See Note 1

Basic Thawed
1.2 63 80 108 See Note 1

UB Thawed
1.2 38 40 42 44
Note 1 – Pipe displacement was less than the specified displacement when excavation length reached 152 m (500 ft).

C-FER Technologies
Analysis Case Maximum Excavation Lengths

for Given Tolerable Vertical
Displacements (m)
Soil Overbend 0.6 m 0.9 m 1.2 m
Condition Angle vertical vertical vertical
(degrees) displ. displ. displ.
0.5 See Note 1 See Note 1 See Note 1

Winter/Frozen

Summer/Frozen
3.0 92 See Note 1 See Note 1
6.0 111 See Note 1 See Note 1
1.2 87 129 See Note 1

Basic Thawed
3.0 55 76 123
6.0 48 77 See Note 1
1.2 47 52 57
UB Thawed
3.0 18 26 35
6.0 See Note 2 5 10
Note 1 – Pipe displacement was less than the specified displacement when excavation length reached 152 m (500 ft).
Note 2 – Pipe displacement was greater than the specified displacement prior to the excavation.

C-FER Technologies
4. GUIDELINES FOR SAFE EXCAVATION
4.1 General
In this section, applicable Canadian regulatory requirements and industry best practices
concerning excavation near pipelines are reviewed and summarized. Based on this information,
together with the work presented in previous sections, pipeline-specific recommendations are
developed regarding maximum excavator weight, allowable excavation length and excavation
procedures. These recommendations are intended to enhance excavation safety in connection
with the operation and maintenance of MGP pipelines.
4.2 Relevant Regulations and Guidelines
4.2.1 National Energy Board
The National Energy Board has established regulations (NEB 2004a, NEB 2004b) regarding
excavation near pipelines under its jurisdiction. The NEB document Excavation and
Construction Near Pipelines (NEB 2002) provides requirements for third-party excavation
contractors. These requirements are summarized below:
Notify Pipeline Company - The pipeline company must be given notice three working days
before the start of any work (except in the case of emergencies) and 24 hours before backfilling
over the pipe. Any contact with the pipe or its coating must be reported to the pipeline company
immediately.
Observe Temporary Restricted Area - A temporary restricted area may be established by a

pipeline company field representative. During the three-day period that the restricted area is in
existence, no mechanical excavation in the restricted area is permitted without the prior consent
and supervision of an authorized company field representative. Before starting work, it must be
confirmed with the representative that all the company’s pipes in the construction area have been
staked and that the meaning of the various stakes is understood.
Follow Rules for Excavation within Three Metres of the Pipe - Excavation using power-
operated equipment is not permitted within three metres (10 feet) of the pipe unless:
(i) the pipe has been exposed by hand or,
(a) where the excavation runs parallel to the pipe, the pipe has been exposed at sufficient
intervals to confirm its location, or
(b) the pipeline company has informed the excavation contractor that it has confirmed
the location of the pipe by probing.

C-FER Technologies
Guidelines for Safe Excavation
(ii) where the excavation crosses a pipe, the pipeline company has informed the excavator
that it has confirmed the location of the pipe by probing and the pipe is at least six tenths
of a metre (2 feet) deeper than the proposed excavation.
(iii) where ground conditions render exposure of the pipe by hand impractical, the pipeline
company has agreed that the excavation may be performed safely to within one metre
(3 feet) of the pipe under the direct supervision of the pipeline company.
Comply with Pipeline Company’s Conditions - The pipeline company may make its permission
to excavate conditional on meeting certain requirements related to excavation procedures when
working near the right-of-way. If the conditions are accepted, they must be complied with, as
must the instructions of any authorized pipeline company field representative.
4.2.2 Common Ground Alliance
The so-called Common Ground Study was sponsored by the US-DOT, starting in 1999. This
study was carried out to identify and validate existing best practices in connection with
preventing damage to underground facilities. The Best Practices are divided into eight categories
with each category being described in a separate chapter of the study. The eight chapters
include:
1. Planning & Design Best Practices

2. One Call Center Best Practices
3. Location & Marking Best Practices
4. Excavation Best Practices
5. Mapping Best Practices
6. Compliance Best Practices
7. Public Education Best Practices
8. Reporting & Evaluation Best Practices
In 2004, the Common Ground Alliance (CGA) published Best Practices Version 2.0
(CGA 2004). This version of the document contains the practice statements and supporting
descriptions contained in the original Common Ground Study, as well as new practices passed by
the Best Practices Committee since the completion of the original study. An excerpt from the
latest CGA Best Practices document that covers excavation practices is included in Appendix F.
4.3 Pipeline-Specific Recommendations
The following recommendations were developed to address the special requirements associated
with the operation and maintenance of MGP pipelines. Some of the recommendations follow
directly from the analysis results presented in Sections 2 and 3. They are to be interpreted as

C-FER Technologies
supplementary to the NEB regulatory requirements and CGA Best Practice guidelines
summarized in Section 4.2.
4.3.1 Project Preparation
Excavator weight considerations – The possibility of imposing a maximum weight on

excavators that can be used for maintenance work during pipeline operation was investigated.
This investigation was based on a set of charts showing the probability of failure give an impact
with excavation equipment as a function of excavator weight. The approach used in developing
these charts is described in Section 2.2.3. Although this analysis did not demonstrate the need
for any specific upper bound on excavator weight, it was found that for the probability of failure
for each pipeline is not significantly decreased by reducing the excavator weight below the
threshold weight values given in Table 4.1. This indicates that, if maximum excavator weights
are to be defined, these weights need not be any lower than the threshold values given in the
table.
System Diameter WT Threshold Weight

(in/mm) (mm) (tonne)
Gathering System 30/762 12.1 32
26/660 10.5 34
18/457 9.8 32
16/406 9.2 32
NGL Line 10.75/273 6.3 20
10.75/273 7.8 20
10.75/273 9.5 24
Main Gas Line 30/762 15.6 56
Table 4.1 Threshold Excavator Weights
Excavation length considerations – The maximum allowable length of a single continuous

excavation should be determined based on the expected operating conditions and local soil
conditions at the time of excavation. The procedure described below for determining the
maximum allowable length is based on the analysis described in Section 3. It applies specifically
to the 30-inch main gas pipeline.
The information that factors into excavation length determination includes geotechnical data (soil
temperature, ground water level and cover depth), operating conditions (pressure and
construction-to-operating temperature differential), and overbend angle. It is assumed that the
overbend angle at a particular location can be established from the most recent geometry pig
survey data or, if such a survey has not yet been performed, it can be estimated based on
construction data.

C-FER Technologies
Using the criteria outlined in Table 4.2, the soil conditions can be classified into one of four
categories: “Winter/Frozen”, “Summer/Frozen”, “Basic Thawed”, or “UB (Upper Bound)
Thawed”. When selecting the category, it is both appropriate and conservative to select a
category with a soil temperature, operating pressure and construction-to-operating temperature
differential that are all equal to or greater than the actual values for the segment under
consideration. For cases with an operating pressure and/or temperature differential greater than
the values shown in Table 4.2, a site-specific analysis is required to determine the allowable
excavation length.
Soil Soil Operating Temperature

Condition Temperature Pressure Increase from
(Deg C) (MPa/psi) Construction
(Deg C)
Winter/Frozen -11.5 9.0/1300 15
Summer/Frozen -2 12.4/1800 34
Basic Thawed >0 12.4/1800 34
UB Thawed >0 12.4/1800 34
Given a soil category and overbend angle, the maximum allowable excavation length at a given
location can be determined using Table 4.3. The tabulated allowable length estimates are based
on an assumed cover depth of 0.9 m, for locations where the overbend angle is less than three
degrees, and a cover depth of 1.2 m, where the angle is greater than or equal to three degrees.
For intermediate overbend angles, the lower excavation length limit should be used.
The excavation length limits given in Table 4.3 were derived based on a serviceability limit,
namely that the soil cover after excavation must be at least 600 mm (to maintain code minimum
cover depth requirements). If berming is permitted, the tolerable pipe uplift increases by the
height of the berm and the allowable excavation length increases accordingly. Excavation length
limits assuming a 300 mm berm height are also provided in the table for illustration purposes.
The vertical pipe movements are expected, in most cases, to occur gradually as the pipe is
uncovered. However, it is conceivable that relatively sudden vertical pipe movement could
occur under certain conditions (e.g. situations where the frozen soil exhibits extreme post-peak
softening behaviour). If such conditions are believed to apply, the excavation plan should
consider the potential for sudden movement and its associated consequences.
The excavation length limits in Table 4.3 are nominal values that do not include a safety factor.
If a margin of safety is required, allowable excavation lengths should be developed for a smaller
tolerable vertical displacement. These new allowable excavation lengths can be determined from
the analysis results presented in Appendix E.

C-FER Technologies
The maximum excavation length considered in this study was 152 m (500 ft). If a longer
continuous excavation length is required, a site-specific analysis is required to determine whether
the proposed length will satisfy the adopted serviceability limit.
Allowable Excavation
Overbend Length (m)
Soil
Angle
Condition No 0.3 m
(degrees)
Berm Berm
Winter/Frozen ≤6 > 152 > 152
0.5 > 152 > 152
1.2 120 > 152
Summer/Frozen
3 92 > 152
6 111 > 152
0.5 > 152 > 152
1.2 63 80
Basic Thawed
3 55 76
6 48 77
0.5 > 152 > 152
1.2 38 40
UB Thawed
3 18 26
6 See Note 1 5
Note 1 – Pipe displacement is greater than the specified displacement prior to the excavation.
Table 4.3 Recommended Allowable Excavation Length (MGP Main Gas Pipeline)
Excavation plan – The excavation plan should explicitly define the conditions under which an
excavation is allowed to proceed. These conditions should include, but not be limited to:
• the selected maximum allowable excavator weight;
• the recommended maximum allowable length of a continuous excavation, as guided by the
length limits summarized in Table 4.3; and
• the pipeline operating pressure and temperature and the soil temperature. These parameters
should be monitored during excavation to ensure that the recommended maximum
excavation length limit is applicable. If any of these values is found to be outside the range
assumed in determining the maximum excavation length, the excavation should be stopped
and steps taken (e.g. lower pressure, temporarily backfill) to ensure that pipeline
deformations do not exceed serviceability limits.
To the extent possible, the conditions set out in the pipeline company’s excavation plan should
be imposed on any third-party excavation contractor that is engaged in excavation work on or
near the right-of-way.

C-FER Technologies
4.3.2 On-site Preparation/Ground Breaking
Work site review – Prior to the start of work, the pipeline company site supervisor should review
the excavation plan with all site personnel.
Locating and marking – The pipeline should be located and marked using best practices. In
addition, the planned extent of excavation along the length of the pipeline should be clearly
marked. The planned excavation extent should not be exceeded without a formal review of the
excavation plan.
Selective daylighting – Selected portions of the pipeline should be exposed using hand digging
or soft excavation techniques. The appropriate number of daylighting sites depends on the
configuration of the pipeline and the shape and extent of the proposed excavation. The pipeline
should be daylighted at planned crossing points and/or at enough locations to clearly convey the
horizontal position of the pipeline and its depth. Daylighting should ensure that excavation
equipment operators have line of sight communication with the exposed pipeline while they are
digging.
4.3.3 On-going Excavation
Excavation supervision – The pipeline company should provide a site supervisor to assist the
equipment operator when excavating on the pipeline right-of-way. Where ground conditions
render exposure of the pipe by hand impractical, the site supervisor should provide continuous
assistance to the equipment operator to ensure safe excavation to within one metre of the
pipeline.
Pipeline deformation supervision – Where the planned excavation involves the exposure of a
significant length of pipe, the pipeline company should provide a supervisor to monitor pipeline
deformations during excavation. In addition, the supervisor should arrange for the monitoring of
relevant pipeline operating conditions and soil temperatures throughout the work. The
supervisor should stop excavation when any of the monitored values exceed the predetermined
limits outlined in the excavation plan.
Coating inspection – Where the excavation exposes the pipeline, the pipeline company must
visually inspect the pipeline coating prior to backfilling. Coating damage must be repaired prior
to backfilling.
Bedding and backfill method – Large pieces of frozen soil must not be allowed to impact the
pipeline/coating during backfilling operations. Where the pipeline has lifted off of the bedding
material, backfill should be placed under the pipeline to prevent future subsidence of the soil
cover.

C-FER Technologies
4.3.4 Project Completion
As-built documentation – In addition to documenting the actual location of any facility on the
right-of-way, the location of any mitigation actions performed on the pipeline should be
documented. This includes recording the lineal extent of any excavation and all observed
pipeline deformations that occur during the excavation process.
Post-excavation evaluation – Where an excavation results in exposure of the pipeline, an

evaluation of any observed pipeline deformations and associated strain should be undertaken if
the observed deformations exceed anticipated magnitudes.

C-FER Technologies
5. REFERENCES
CGA 2004. Common Ground Alliance – Best Practices, Version 2.0, Internet:
http://www.commongroundalliance.com/Content/NavigationMenu/Publications_and_
Resources/Brochures_Materials/BP20.pdf, December.
Chen, Q. and Nessim, M.A. 1999. Reliability-Based Prevention of Mechanical Damage to

Pipelines. Submitted to the Pipeline Research Committee International, American
Gas Association, Project PR-244-9729, C-FER Report 97034, August.
CSA 2003. Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems, CSA Standard Z662-03, Canadian Standards
Association, Mississauga.
EGIG 2001. 5th EGIG-report 1970-2001: Gas Pipeline Incidents, European Gas Pipeline
Incident Data Group (EGIG), N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie, Groningen, Netherlands.
EUB 1998. Pipeline Performance in Alberta 1980-1997. Report 98-G. EUB Information
Services, Calgary, Alberta, December.
Fuglem, M., 2003. Software for Estimating the Lifetime Cost of High Strength, High Design
Factor Pipelines. Prepared for Gas Research Institute, GRI Contract No. 8505, April.
Jiao G., Mørk K. J., Sotberg T., Igland R. 1995. SUPERB 2M – STATISTICAL DATA:
Basic Uncertainty Measures for Reliability Analysis of Offshore Pipelines. Report
No. STF70 F95212. Submarine Pipelines – Superb Project No. 700411, June.
Kiefner, J. F., Mesloh, R. E., and Kiefner, B. A. 2001. Analysis of DOT Reportable
Incidents for Gas Transmission and Gathering System Pipelines, 1985 Through 1997.
Prepared for PRCI, PRCI Report PR-218-9801.
Mohitpour, H., Golshan, H., and Murray, A., 2000. Pipeline Design and Construction – A
Practical Approach, ASME Press, New York.
NEB 2002. Excavation and Construction Near Pipelines, Publications Office, National
Energy Board, Calgary.
NEB 2004a. National Energy Board Pipeline Crossing Regulations, Part I, SOR/88-528,
Internet: http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/n-7/sor-88-528/text.html
NEB 2004b. National Energy Board Pipeline Crossing Regulations, Part II, SOR/88-529,
Internet: http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/n-7/sor-88-529/text.html

C-FER Technologies
References
Statistics Canada, 2005. Health Indicators, Community and Health System Characteristics,
Geographic Attributes, Population Density, Catalogue No. 82-221-XIE, Internet:
http://www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/82-221-XIE/82-221-XIE2004002.htm
Wolvert, G., Mures Z., Rousseau D. and Andrieux, C. 2004. Probabilistic Assessment of
Pipeilne Resistance to Third Party Damage: Use of Surveys to Generate Necessary
Input Data. Proceedings of the International Pipeline Conference, IPC04-0656.
October 2004.

C-FER Technologies
APPENDIX A IMPACT FREQUENCY FAULT TREE MODEL

C-FER Technologies
A.1 Fault Tree Model Overview
The fault tree used in the analysis to calculate the impact frequency for mechanical; damage
is shown in Figure A.1. The different shapes used in the figure follow standard fault tree
notation. Branching points are called gates and are characterized by different shapes
representing the AND and OR relationships defined earlier (see legend in Figure A.1). An
event that is defined as the result of other event combinations is called an output event and is
placed in a rectangle. At the bottom of each branch of the tree the basic events are placed in
circles.
Pipeline hit by third-

party mechanical
equipment E1
Failure of Failure of
Activity on preventive protective
pipeline measures E2 measures
alignment
E3
B1
Alignment not Accidental Excavation

Failure of
correctly located activity on depth
mechanical
E4 located exceeds
protection
alignment cover depth
B13 B14 B15
Buried Temporary measures Permenant

markers fail fail to correctly above-ground
to convey locate alignment E5 markers fail to
location convey
location
B12 B11 OR gate AND gate
Operator Pipeline operator

fails to not notified of
ensure correct pending activity
location of E6 Basic Output
alignment Event Event
B10
ROW patrols One-call system

Parties fail to notify
fail to detect fails to notify
operator directly
activity E9 pipeline operator E8
E7
Patrol One-call
No patrol Parties fail to use Parties
personnel system fails Explicit
during one-call system
to notify signage not ignore explicit
period of fail to detect
relevant seen signage
activity activity
B8 B9 operator B5 E10 B6 B7
Parties
Parties fail to use
fail to call
one-call system before
when on ROW E11 moving onto
ROW
B2
ROW
indicators Parties
not ignore ROW
recognized indicators
B3 B4
Figure A.1 Fault Tree for Mechanical Interference
A.1
C-FER Technologies
Appendix A
The basic event probabilities used in association with the fault tree model are given in
Tables A.1 to A.12.
One-Call Dig Notification Requirement

System
Type Not required (voluntary) Required but not enforced Required and enforced
None 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Multiple
0.80 0.70 0.60 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.40 0.30 0.20
systems
Unified
0.80 0.70 0.60 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.40 0.30 0.20
system
Unified
system to
0.80 0.70 0.60 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.40 0.30 0.20
minimum
standards
Below Average Above Below Average Above Below Average Above
Public Awareness Level
Table A.1 Event Probability Matrix for Basic Event B2

(Failure to Call Before Moving onto Right-of-way)
Right-of-way Public Awareness Level

Indication Below average Average Above average
None
1.0 1.0 1.0
Intermittent and/or
0.75 0.65 0.55
very limited indication
Continuous but limited
0.45 0.35 0.25
indication
Continuous and highly
0.0 0.0 0.0
indicative

(Right-of-way Indicators Not Recognized)
A.2
C-FER Technologies
Appendix A
Public Awareness Level

On-Call System Type
Below Average Average Above Average
None 1.0 1.0 1.0
Multiple systems 0.60 0.30 0.15
Unified system 0.60 0.30 0.15
Unified system
to minimum standards 0.60 0.30 0.15

(Parties Ignore Right-of-way Indicators)
One-Call System Type Event Probability

None 1.0
Multiple systems 0.02
Unified system 0.01
Unified system to minimum standards 0.005
Table A.4 Event Probability Array for Basic Event B5

(Failure of One-Call-System to Notify Relevant Operator)
Alignment markers – Explicit Signage Event Probability

None 1.0
At selected strategic locations 0.2
Closely spaced and highly visible 0.0

(Explicit Signage Not Seen)
Dig Notification Requirement Event Probability

Not required (voluntary) 0.5
Required but not enforced 0.3
Required and enforced 0.1

(Parties Ignore Explicit Signage)
The probability that there will not be a right-of-way patrol during the on-site mobilization
and activity time period (basic event B8 in Figure A.1) is assumed to be solely dependent
upon the patrol frequency. A probability estimation model, developed by C-FER, was used
to estimate the probability that a right-of-way patrol will not take place during an excavation
A.3
C-FER Technologies
Appendix A
activity event. Example event probabilities for various surveillance intervals are given in
Table A.7.
Surveillance Interval Event Probability

Twice daily 0.16
Daily 0.30
Three times per week 0.52
Two times per week 0.67
Weekly 0.83
Bi-weekly 0.92
Monthly 0.96
Quarterly 0.99
Semi-annually 0.99
Annually or longer 1.0

(No Patrol During Period of Activity)
Surveillance Method Event Probability

Aerial patrol 0.01
Ground-based patrol 0.05

(Patrol Personnel Fail to Detect Activity)
Dig Notification Response Event Probability

Provide location information only 0.25
Locate and mark with no site supervision 0.05
Locate and mark with site supervision 0.02
Excavation by operator 0.01

(Operator Fails to Ensure Correct Location of Alignment)
Alignment Markers – Above Ground Event Probability

No 1.0
Yes 0.0
TableA.10 Event Probability Array for Basic Event B11

(Permanent Markers Fail to Convey Alignment Location)
A.4
C-FER Technologies
Appendix A
Alignment Markers - Buried Event Probability

No 1.0
Yes 0.3

(Buried Markers Fail to Convey Alignment Location)
Dig Notification Response Event Probability

Provide location information only 0.2
Locate and mark with no site supervision 0.1
Locate and mark with site supervision 0.05
Excavation by operator 0.01

(Accidental Activity on Located Alignment)
A probability estimation model developed for basic event B14 is based on a model originally
proposed by Kiefner (1994) for characterizing the effect of burial depth on pipe susceptibility
to external interference damage. Example event probabilities are given in Table A.13.
Event Probability
Depth of Burial (m) 1
Developed Areas Undeveloped Areas2
0.5 1.00 1.00
0.6 1.00 0.69
0.8 0.79 0.44
1.0 0.50 0.25
1.2 0.35 0.17
1.5 0.22 0.11
1.8 0.16 0.08
2.1 0.11 0.06
Note:
p = (0.71 d )
2
1. Representative event probabilities based on
p = (0.5 d )
2
2. Representative event probabilities based on

(Excavation Depth Exceeds Cover Depth).
A.5
C-FER Technologies
Appendix A
Mechanical Protection Event Probability

None 1.0
Plain concrete slab 0.2
Painted concrete slab or steel plate 0.05

(Failure of Mechanical Protection).
A.2 References

Pipelines. Submitted to the Pipeline Research Committee International, American Gas
Association, Project PR-244-9729, C-FER Report 97034, August.
Kiefner, J. F. 1994. Ranking Pipelines for Maintenance Purposes. Presented at the IGT
Symposium on Gas Company Productivity and Cost Containment, Chicago, July 25-26.
A.6
C-FER Technologies
APPENDIX B MECHANICAL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT SOFTWARE OVERVIEW

C-FER Technologies
B.1 Overview
Failure due to equipment impact can occur by puncture under the excavator tooth or failure
of a resulting gouged dent after removal of the excavator load. The mechanism that will
cause failure in a given impact is the one with the lower resistance. In addition, failure
occurs in one of three distinct modes, namely small leaks, large leaks and ruptures.
Consideration of the two applicable failure mechanisms and three possible failure modes
requires use of a number of limit states as illustrated in Figure 1. For illustration purposes
the figure is based on two random variables representing load and resistance, but in reality,
there will be a number of random variables representing impact load, internal pressure, wall
thickness, yield strength, fracture toughness, gouge geometry and model error.
Leak
Load
g3 = 0
Gouged Dent Safe
Rupture Failure
Large leak
g2 = 0
Rupture
No Gouged
Dent Failure
Puncture g1 = 0 No puncture
Resistance
Figure B.1 Limit States for Different Failure Modes Associated with Equipment Impact
The following three limit states are assumed:
• Puncture (g1 = 0). This failure mechanism occurs if the load imposed by the excavator
tooth exceeds the combined shear and membrane resistance of the pipe wall.
• Gouged Dent (g2 = 0). This failure mechanism occurs if the load is not sufficient to cause
puncture, but is large enough to cause a gouged dent that fails under pressure after
removal of the load.
• Rupture (g3 = 0). A puncture or gouged dent failure will result initially in a leak. If the
length of the resulting breach is large enough, unstable axial growth could occur leading
to a rupture.
Figure 1 illustrates combinations of load and resistance leading to a safe pipeline (no failure)
and to failure by a leak or rupture. The safe area is the area on the safe side of both g1 and g2.
B.1
C-FER Technologies
Appendix B
The failure domain is the area on the failure side of either or both of g1 and g2. The failure
domain is split into two areas representing conditions that lead to propagation (i.e. rupture)
and arrest (leak). The limit state functions are described in detail in Sections 1.3 through 1.5.
B.2 Notation
The following notation for common parameters is used in this appendix:

t = wall thickness
D = pipe diameter
σy = yield strength
σu = tensile strength
P = internal pressure
Unless otherwise stated, the units used are MPa for pressure and stress, mm for dimensions
and kN for force.
B.3 Puncture
The limit state function described here is appropriate for a load generated by an indentor
having a shape corresponding to that of an excavator bucket tooth. The model was
developed by C-FER (Driver and Playdon, 1997, Driver and Zimmerman, 1998) following a
review of existing models (Spiekhout et al. 1987, Spiekhout 1995 and Corbin and Vogt
1997), theoretical considerations, and available test data. The C-FER model has a term of the
form a + b D/t where a and b are empirical coefficients. The coefficients a and b were
determined based on regression analysis of a set of test data produced by the EPRG
(Muntiga 1992, Hopkins et al. 1992 and Chatain 1993) and Battelle (Maxey 1986). This
model was calibrated for values of t between 4 and 12.5 mm, D between 168 and 914 mm,
and steel grades up to X70.
The limit state function g1 for puncture is as follows:

g1 = ra – q [B.1]
where:
ra is the estimated resistance including model error, given by
ra = [1.17 – 0.0029 (D t)] (lt + wt) t σu + e [B.2a]
σu is the tensile strength;
lt is the cross-sectional length of the indentor;
wt is the cross-sectional width of the indentor;
q is the normal impact force (kN), given by
B.2
C-FER Technologies
Appendix B
q = 16.5w0.6919 RD RN [B.2b]
w is the excavator mass (tonne);
RD is the dynamic impact factor and equals 2/3;
RN is the normal load factor, which is the ratio between the component force
normal to the pipe wall and the total force, characterized by a random quantity
uniformly distributed between 0 and 1;
e is a model error term, characterized by a normal distribution with a mean of

0.833 kN and a standard deviation of 26.7 kN.
B.4 Dent-Gouge Failure
The limit state function for dent-gouge failure is a version of the EPRG semi-empirical
model. The dent depth is calculated from the impact force using a model published by
Linkens et al. (1998). A model error term has been developed for this relationship by C-FER
based on confidence intervals specified in Corder and Chatain (1995). The resulting gouged
dent is checked for failure under hoop stress using a model developed for EPRG (Hopkins et
al. 1992) and later modified by Francis et al. (1997). The method is based on an evaluation
of the fracture ratio, Kr, and the load ratio, Sr, according to the British Standards PD6493
procedure for defect assessment. A term for model uncertainty was developed by C-FER
(Fuglem et al. 2001). The form of the error term used reflects the observation that the error
diminishes as the critical stress approaches the failure stress for perfect pipe (i.e. for very
small gouges, the pipe does not fail unless the hoop stress is near the flow stress, in which
case the model error is relatively small and may be more closely related to errors in
modelling failure of perfect pipe than in modelling dent-gouge type failures).
The limit state function g2 for dent-gouge type failures is as follows, given an impact with a
force q normal to the pipe wall (as defined by Equation B.2b]) and a gouge of length lg and
depth dg.
g2 = σc (1+e1)- σp [B.3]
where:
σc is the calculated critical hoop stress resistance, determined as a solution of
[B.9]
σp is the normal stress acting on the plane of the gouge, given by
σ p = σ h (cos 2 θ + 0.3 sin 2 θ ) [B.4]
σh is the hoop stress = PD/2t,
θ is the angle between the gouge and the pipe longitudinal axis
e1 is an error term for the dent-gouge model, defined as
e1 = (1-σc / (1.15⋅σy))⋅e2 [B.5]
B.3
C-FER Technologies
Appendix B
e2 is an error defined by a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and standard

deviation of 0.5
The critical hoop stress resistance is calculated from
2   π 2 2 2 
 b2  K IC 
σc = Arc cos exp−    [B.6]
π b2   8  b1  π d g 

where
KIC is the critical stress intensity, defined as
0.5 0.95
 E ⋅ cv 0   c v 2 / 3 
KIC =   ⋅   , [B.7]
 aC   cv 0 
b1 and b2 are given by
b1 = ( S m Ym + 5.1Yb d do / t ) [B.8]
 dg 
S m 1 − 
 m t 
b2 = [B.9]
 dg 
1.15 σ y 1 − 
 t 
m is the Folias factor defined as
0.5
 0.52 ⋅ l g 2 
m = 1 +  , [B.10]
 D ⋅ t 

dd0 is the dent depth at zero pressure, approximated by
2.381
 q 
d d 0 = 1.43  [B.11]
 0.49 (lt ⋅ σ y ⋅ t ) ⋅ (t + 0.7 ⋅ P ⋅ D / σ u ) 
0.25
Sm, Ym, and Yb are given by

S m = (1 − 1.8 d do / D) [B.12]
2 3 4
 dg  d  d  d 
Ym = 1.12 − 0.23  + 10.6 g  − 21.7 g  + 30.4 g  [B.13]
 t   t   t   t 
2 3 4
 dg  d  d  d 
Yb = 1.12 − 1.39  + 7.32 g  − 13.1 g  + 14.0 g  [B.14]
 t   t   t   t 
and the basic input parameters are defined as follows
E is Young’s modulus
cv2/3 is the Charpy energy of 2/3 size specimens (2/3 of full size specimen energy)
cv0 is an empirical coefficient equal to 110.3 Joule
B.4
C-FER Technologies
Appendix B
aC is the cross-sectional area of 2/3 Charpy V-Notch specimens, equal to 53.55

mm2,
lt is the cross-sectional length of the excavator tooth
B.5 Differentiating Leaks and Ruptures

Given puncture or failure of a dent-gouge, the mode of failure is determined based on
whether or not unstable axial growth of the resulting through-wall defect will occur. The
defect is assumed to fail as a through-wall crack-like (i.e. sharp) defect. The initial defect
length is assumed to equal the indentor length in the case of puncture and the gouge length in
the case of gouged dent failure. If the length of the resulting through-wall crack exceeds the
critical defect length for unstable growth, as determined using the criterion developed by
Kiefner et al. (1973), the failure is classified as a rupture. Otherwise the failure is classified
as a leak.
The limit state function g for rupture is:
g3 = Scr - σh [B.15]
where
2(σ y + 68.95) −1   125π E C v 

S cr = cos exp−   [B.16a]
π MT  c(σ y + 68.95) Ac 
2

1/ 2
 c2 c4  c2
M T = 1 + 1.255 − 0.0135 2 2  for ≤ 25 [B.17b]
 Rt Rt  Rt
c2 c2
M T = 0.064 + 3.3 for > 25 [B.18c]
Rt Rt
R = pipe radius = D/2 (mm);
c is ½ the defect length (mm) where 2c equals the indentor cross-sectional

length for the case of puncture and equals the gouge length in the case of dent-
gouge failure;
Cv = full-size Charpy V-notch plateau energy (J);
Ac = full-size Charpy shear area (mm2); and
E = elastic modulus (MPa).
B.5
C-FER Technologies
Appendix B
B.6 References
Chatain, P. 1993. An Experimental Evaluation of Punctures and Resulting Dents in

Transmission Pipelines. Proc., 8th Symposium on Line Pipe Research, American Gas
Association, Sep. 26-29, Houston, Texas, pp. 11-1 to 11-12.

Pipelines. Submitted to the Pipeline Research Committee International, American
Gas Association, Project PR-244-9729, C-FER Report 97034, August.
Corbin, P. and Vogt, G. 1997. Future Trends in Pipelines. Proc., Banff/97 Pipeline
Workshop: Managing Pipeline Integrity - Planning for the Future, Banff, Alberta.
Corder, I. and Chatain, P., 1995, EPRG Recommendations for the Assessment of the
Resistance of Pipelines to External Damage, EPRG/PRC 10th Biennial Joint
Technical Meeting On Line Pipe Research.
Driver, R. and Playdon, D., 1997, Limit States Design of Pipelines for Accidental Outside
Force, Report to National Energy Board of Canada.
Driver, R.G. and Zimmerman, T.J.E. 1998. A Limit States Approach to the Design of
Pipelines for Mechanical Damage. Proceedings of the Seventeenth International
Offshore & Arctic Engineering Conference, OMAE98-1017, Lisbon, Portugal, July.
Francis A., Espiner R., Edwards A., Cosham A., and Lamb M., 1997, Uprating an In-Service
Pipeline Using Reliability-Based Limit State Methods, Risk-Based and Limit State
Design and Operation of Pipelines, Aberdeen, UK, 21st-22nd, May, 1997.
Fuglem, M., Chen, Q., and Stephens, M. 2001. Pipeline Design for Mechanical Damage.
Submitted to the Pipeline Research Committee International, Project PR-244-9910,
C-FER Report 99024.
Hopkins, P., Corder, I. and Corbin, P. 1992. The Resistance of Gas Transmission Pipelines
to Mechanical Damage. Proc., CANMET International Conference on Pipeline
Reliability, vol. 2, June 2-5, Calgary, AB, pp. VIII-3-1 to VIII-3-18.
Kiefner, J. F., Maxey, W. A., Eiber, R. J. and Duffy, A. R. 1973. Failure Stress Levels of
Flaws in Pressurized Cylinders. Progress in Flaw Growth and Fracture Toughness
Testing, ASTM STP 536, American Society for Testing and Materials, pp. 461 - 481.
Linkens D., Shetty N., and Bilo M., 1998, A Probabilistic Approach to Fracture Assessment
of Onshore Gas-Transmission Pipelines, Pipes & Pipeline International
Maxey, W.A. 1986. Outside Force Defect Behavior. Proc., 7th Symposium on Line Pipe
Research, American Gas Association, Oct, Houston, Texas.
B.6
C-FER Technologies
Appendix B
Muntinga, T.G. 1992. Wall Thickness in Relation to Puncture - Summary of GU Results

Report to EPRG, N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie, Oct. 2.
Spiekhout, J. 1995. A New Design Philosophy for Gas Transmission Pipelines - Designing
for Gouge-Resistance and Puncture-Resistance. Proc., 2nd International Conference
on Pipeline Technology, vol. I, Sept. 11-14, Ostend, pp. 315-328.
Spiekhout, J., Gresnigt, A. M. and Kusters, G. M. A. 1987. The Behaviour of a Steel

Cylinder Under the Influence of a Local Load in the Elastic and Elasto-Plastic Area.
Proc., International Symposium on Shell and Spatial Structures: Computational
Aspects (July, 1986), Leuven, Belgium. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Germany, pp. 329-
336.
B.7
C-FER Technologies
APPENDIX C PROBABILITY OF FAILURE AS A FUNCTION OF EXCAVATOR WEIGHT

C-FER Technologies
Appendix C
Leak Rupture Total
Probability of Failure Given Impact 1.0E-01
1.0E-02
1.0E-03
1.0E-04
1.0E-05
0.00 25.00 50.00 75.00
Figure C.1 Mechanical Damage Resistance - Gathering System 30 inch
Leak Rupture Total
1.0E-01
1.0E-02
1.0E-03
1.0E-04
1.0E-05
0.00 25.00 50.00 75.00
Figure C.2 Mechanical Damage Resistance – Gathering System 26 inch

C-FER Technologies
Appendix C
Leak Rupture Total
1.0E-01
1.0E-02
1.0E-03
1.0E-04
1.0E-05
0.00 25.00 50.00 75.00
Leak Rupture Total
1.0E-01
1.0E-02
1.0E-03
1.0E-04
1.0E-05
0.00 25.00 50.00 75.00

C-FER Technologies
Appendix C
Leak Rupture Total
1.0E-01
1.0E-02
1.0E-03
1.0E-04
1.0E-05
0.00 25.00 50.00 75.00
Figure C.5 Mechanical Damage Resistance – NGL Line 10.75 inch, WT 6.3 mm
Leak Rupture Total
1.0E-01
1.0E-02
1.0E-03
1.0E-04
1.0E-05
0.00 25.00 50.00 75.00
C-FER Technologies
Appendix C
Leak Rupture Total
1.0E-01
1.0E-02
1.0E-03
1.0E-04
1.0E-05
0.00 25.00 50.00 75.00
Leak Rupture Total
1.0E-02
1.0E-03
1.0E-04
1.0E-05
0.00 25.00 50.00 75.00
Figure C.8 Mechanical Damage Resistance – Main Gas Pipeline 30 inch

C-FER Technologies
APPENDIX D PIPLIN ANALYSIS TO SIMULATE EXCAVATION AFTER FROST

HEAVE – BY SSD, INC.
SSD, Inc.
PIPLIN Analysis to Simulate Excavation after Frost Heave
By: SSD, Inc.
January 23, 2005

As part of the ongoing MGP frost heave design studies, a preliminary study has been performed using
PIPLIN to investigate the effects of pipe excavation after a multi-year period of frost heave. For this
study, five different heave span lengths were considered. The current MGP base case frost heave model
configuration was used as a starting point for this study. The pipe has a 30-inch diameter and a wall
thickness of 0.614 inches. The mesh across the excavated region consists of 1-foot long elements. The
model considers temperature and pressure dependent secondary creep in the bearing springs, temperature,
rate and displacement dependent uplift springs, and temperature dependent longitudinal springs. The
loading consists of the application and removal of a 3389 psi hydrotest pressure, followed by application
of gravity load with a temperature differential of 61.2oF and an operating pressure of 1800 psi. For this
study, the pipe steel is based on the “MGP_Recommended” X80 stress-strain relationship. The pipeline
is buried under a uniform 1 meter cover depth. The average annual pipe temperature is –6oC and the
maximum (summer) and minimum (winter) pipe temperatures are –1.1oC and -11.5 oC, respectively.
After the application of operating loads, the frost heave analyses are carried out using the “Revised
Formula Method” which is based on the segregation potential equation. The frost heave parameters are
based on tabulated results from THERM2 simulations provided by Nixon Geotech, Ltd. The evaluation is
carried out for the “medium-heave” soil which is based on THERM2 Case 35. This soil generates 4.3 feet
of free heave in a 25 year time period.
Based on direction provided by C-FER, they are interested in the response of the pipeline during the
excavation process. Response quantities of interest include how the pipe deflected shape, axial force,
axial strains and curvatures change during excavation. For initial analysis cases, C-FER suggested that
the pipe be excavated in the winter and summer season prior to it reaching a maximum compression strain
of 1.5%. Figure 1 presents a 25 year time history of the maximum pipe tension and compression strains
for this soil with heave spans of 20, 25, 35, 60 and 100 feet. As shown, the 20 foot heave span length
configuration reached a compression strain limit of 1.5% at about 4.33 years while the corresponding time
for the 25 foot heave span length configuration is about 11.34 years. The longer heave span length
configurations (35, 60 and 100 foot) do not reach this strain level within the 25 years analysis duration.
As a starting point for this investigation, excavation analyses have been carried out for a 20 foot heave
span length configuration which reaches a maximum compression strain of 1.5% at about 4.33 years. The
winter excavation case was carried out at 3.40 years corresponding to the minimum pipe temperature in
the winter season prior to the pipe reaching a maximum compression strain of 1.5%. The summer
excavation case was carried out at 3.90 years corresponding to the maximum pipe temperature in the
summer season prior to the pipe reaching a maximum compression strain of 1.5%.
For each of these cases, the frost heave analysis is carried out as usual up to the selected time of
excavation. In order to simulate the excavation, the strengths of the longitudinal and uplift pipe soil
springs are reduced to zero sequentially over several 10 foot long segments of the pipeline starting at 30
feet upstream of the center of the heave span and progressing across the heave span to a location 30 feet
downstream of the center of the heave span. The individual 10-foot long segments of pipe are excavated
progressively using 10 analysis steps per segment. The total length of the excavation is 60 feet centered
on the 20 foot heave span length. The strength of the pipe soil springs outside of the excavated region
remains constant at the values corresponding to the pipe temperature at the time of excavation. The entire
state of the pipe model is monitored at each step of the excavation process.
1
SSD, Inc.
For the winter excavation analysis case, Figure 2 presents spatial profile plots of the following key
response quantities: pipe elevation, pipe axial displacement, pipe axial force and pipe bending moment.
Figure 3 presents spatial profile plots of the pipe top and bottom fiber strains and the pipe curvature. The
results in these plots are shown for the states corresponding to “before” and “after” the excavation.
Figure 4 presents spatial profile plots of the change in state due to winter excavation (i.e., after excavation
state minus before excavation state) for the following pipe response quantities: pipe axial force, pipe
bending moment, and the top and bottom fiber strain profiles. Figures 5, 6 and 7 present the
corresponding plots for the summer excavation analysis case.
Based on these assessments, the following observations can be made:
(1) The primary pipe state changes that occur due to excavation are a reduction in the maximum pipe
axial tension force and the maximum pipe bending moment at the mid-span location. For the
winter excavation, the maximum pipe axial force is reduced from 640.8 kips to 527.5 kips (a
reduction of 113.3 kips or about 18%) and the maximum bending moment is reduced from 37,375
kip-inches to 30,277 kip-inches (a reduction of 7,099 kip-inches or about 19%). For the summer
excavation, the maximum pipe axial force is reduced from 610.9 kips to 457.1 kips (a reduction of
153.8 kips or about 25%) and the maximum bending moment is reduced from 31,050 kip-inches to
22,310 kip-inches (a reduction of 8,730 kip-inches or about 28%).
(2) The changes in the maximum moment and the maximum axial force due to excavation are largest
for the summer excavation case. As shown in Figures 4 and 7, the state changes due to summer
excavation are distributed over a longer length of pipe than those due to winter excavation.
(3) The overall shape of the moment diagram changes slightly due to excavation. The magnitude of the
bending moment is actually increased slightly at some locations away from the mid-span.
(4) Excavation changes the overall shape of the axial force profile which becomes essentially “flat-
topped” across the excavation. For the winter excavation, Figure 4 shows that the axial force
actually increases outside of the excavation (at locations between about 25 and 180 feet from the
center of the heave span). The maximum increase in axial force is about 28 kips at 30 feet from the
center of the heave span. For the summer excavation, there is no increase in the axial force.
(5) Changes in the pipe strain and curvature (i.e., deformation measures) are less pronounced than
changes in the pipe axial force and bending moment (i.e., force measures). This is because yielding
of the pipe steel has resulted in residual deformations. For the summer excavation, the largest
strain change is about 0.07% near mid-span. For the winter excavation, the largest strain change is
about 0.06% about 20 feet from mid-span. These strain changes correspond to stress changes of
about 23 ksi.
(6) There was no evidence of any tendency for the pipe to experience upheaval buckling in the
excavated region. This is because prior to and after excavation, the pipe is subject to both very
high tension forces and significant bearing of the pipe into the soil below the pipe across the heave
span.
(7) In general, it appears that the act of excavating the pipe moves it into a safer load state (i.e.,
significant reductions in the maximum axial force and moment).
Closure
Correspondence with C-FER indicates that they are interested in evaluating other excavation scenarios
e.g., symmetric excavation from the center of the heave span progressing outward, symmetric excavation
progressing inward from the ends of the excavation, etc. The simulations can certainly be performed but
we believe that it is unlikely that the results will change substantially. It may be worthwhile pursuing
analysis of other cases that have a higher likelihood of producing upheaval buckling of the pipe within the
excavation.
2
Figure 1 (a) Pre-Excavation Run 2035: Max. Tension Strain vs. Time (DT=61.2F P=1800 psi)
2.5
Span = 20 ft
Span = 25 ft
Span = 35 ft
2.0 Span = 60 ft
Span = 100 ft
Tension Strain Capacity
1.5
Axial Strain (%)
1.0
0.5
0.0
0 5 10 15 20 25
Time (years)
Figure 1 (b) Pre-Excavation Run 2035: Max. Compression Strain vs. Time (DT=61.2F P=1800 psi)
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
Axial Strain (%)
-1.5
Span = 20 ft
-2.0 Span = 25 ft
Span = 35 ft
Span = 60 ft
Span = 100 ft
Compression Strain Capacity
-2.5
0 5 10 15 20 25
Time (years)
Figure 2 (a) Winter Excavation - Heave Span = 20 ft
Before Excavation After Excavation
1.6
Pipe Elevation (feet)
1.2
0.8
0.4
0.0
-0.4
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100
Distance from Center of Heave Span (feet)
Figure 2 (b) Winter Excavation - Heave Span = 20 ft

0.3
Axial Displacement (inches)
0.2
0.1
0.0
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100
Figure 2 (c) Winter Excavation - Heave Span = 20 ft

800
Axial Force (kips)
600
400
200
-200
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100
Figure 2 (d) Winter Excavation - Heave Span = 20 ft

60000
Moment (kip-inch)
40000
20000
-20000
-40000
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100
1.2
Top Fiber Axial Strain (%)
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
-0.2
-0.4
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100

0.4
Bot Fiber Axial Strain (%)
0.0
-0.4
-0.8
-1.2
-1.6
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100

0.012
0.009
Curvature (1/ft)
0.006
0.003
0.000
-0.003
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100
Change in State due to Excavation
40
20
Axial Force (kips)
0
-20
-40
-60
-80
-100
-120
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100

12000
Moment (kip-inch)
8000
4000
0
-4000
-8000
-12000
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100

0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.00
-0.02
-0.04
-0.06
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100
Figure 4 (d) Winter Excavation - Heave Span = 20 ft

0.06
0.04
0.02
0.00
-0.02
-0.04
-0.06
-0.08
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100
Figure 5 (a) Summer Excavation - Heave Span = 20 ft
2.0
1.6
1.2
0.8
0.4
0.0
-0.4
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100
Figure 5 (b) Summer Excavation - Heave Span = 20 ft

0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100
Figure 5 (c) Summer Excavation - Heave Span = 20 ft

800
Axial Force (kips)
600
400
200
-200
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100
Figure 5 (d) Summer Excavation - Heave Span = 20 ft

45000
Moment (kip-inch)
30000
15000
-15000
-30000
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
-0.2
-0.4
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100

0.4
0.0
-0.4
-0.8
-1.2
-1.6
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100

0.012
0.009
Curvature (1/ft)
0.006
0.003
0.000
-0.003
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100
0
Axial Force (kips)
-40
-80
-120
-160
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100

9000
6000
Moment (kip-inch)
3000
0
-3000
-6000
-9000
-12000
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100

0.06
0.04
0.02
0.00
-0.02
-0.04
-0.06
-0.08
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100

0.06
0.04
0.02
0.00
-0.02
-0.04
-0.06
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100
SSD, Inc.
Follow Up PIPLIN Analyses to Simulate Excavation after Frost Heave
By: SSD, Inc.
January 23, 2005

As part of the ongoing MGP frost heave design studies, a preliminary study was performed using PIPLIN
to investigate the effects of pipe excavation after a multi-year period of frost heave. The results of the
preliminary study indicated that there was no evidence of a tendency for the pipe to experience upheaval
buckling in the heaved and excavated region. This is because prior to and after excavation, the pipe is
subject to both very high tension forces and significant bearing of the pipe into the soil below the pipe
across the heave span. In general, the preliminary study indicated that excavating the pipe moved it into a
safer load state (i.e., significant reductions in the maximum axial force and moment). Based on the
preliminary results, it was decided to pursue additional follow up excavation analyses for cases that might
have a higher likelihood of producing upheaval buckling of the pipe within the excavation. This
document presents a follow up study.
The main difference between the preliminary study and the follow up study is that a slightly warmer mean
annual pipe temperature is considered in the frost heave analysis; -5oC as compared to -6oC. As was done
for the preliminary study, the follow up study considers initial frost heave analyses of five different heave
span lengths. The pipe has a 30-inch diameter and a wall thickness of 0.614 inches and the mesh across
the excavated region consists of 1-foot long elements. The model considers temperature and pressure
dependent secondary creep in the bearing springs, temperature, rate and displacement dependent uplift
springs, and temperature dependent longitudinal springs. The loading consists of the application and
removal of a 3,263 psi hydrotest pressure, followed by application of gravity load with a temperature
differential of 61.2oF and an operating pressure of 2,100 psi. The pipe steel is based on the
“MGP_Recommended” X80 stress-strain relationship. The pipeline is buried under a uniform 1 meter
cover depth. As previously noted, the average annual pipe temperature is –5oC and the maximum
(summer) and minimum (winter) pipe temperatures are +0.04oC and –10.1oC, respectively. Note that
because the pipe temperature rises above the freezing point every summer, the strengths of the uplift and
longitudinal pipe-soil springs, which are controlled by the pipe temperature, drop to thawed spring
strength values. This results in a substantial relaxation of the pipe and a reduction in the pipe deformation
demand. After the application of operating loads, the frost heave analyses are carried out using the
“Revised Formula Method” which is based on the segregation potential equation. The frost heave
parameters are based on tabulated results from THERM2 simulations provided by Nixon Geotech, Ltd.
The evaluation is carried out for the “high-heave” soil, which is based on THERM2 Case 7. For a mean
annual pipe temperature of –5oC, this soil generates 5.17 feet of free heave in a 25 year time period.
C-FER is interested in the response of the pipeline during the excavation process. Response quantities of
interest include how the pipe deflected shape, axial force, axial strains and curvatures change during
excavation. Figure 1 presents a 25 year time history of the maximum pipe tension and compression
strains for this soil with heave spans of 20, 25, 35, 60 and 100 feet. For this study, C-FER suggested that
the longest span length to reach a maximum compressive strain of 0.75% within 25 years be selected for
excavation analysis and that the pipe be excavated in the summer season prior to it reaching this level of
strain. As shown, the 35 foot heave span configuration was the longest of the span lengths considered to
reach the compression strain level of 0.75%, at about 3.36 years. Therefore, excavation analysis has been
carried out for the 35 foot heave span length configuration. The summer excavation was carried out at
2.875 years corresponding to the maximum pipe temperature in the summer season prior to the pipe
reaching the target strain level.
1
SSD, Inc.
The frost heave analysis is carried out as usual up to the selected time of excavation. In order to simulate
the excavation, the strengths of the longitudinal and uplift pipe soil springs are reduced to zero
sequentially over several 8 to 10-foot long segments of the pipeline starting at 37.5 feet upstream of the
center of the heave span and progressing across the heave span to a location 37.5 feet downstream of the
center of the heave span. The individual 8 to 10-foot long segments of pipe are excavated progressively
using 10 analysis steps per segment. The total length of the excavation is 75 feet centered on the 35 foot
heave span length. The strengths of the pipe soil springs outside of the excavated region remain constant
at the values corresponding to the summer pipe temperature. The entire state of the pipe model is
monitored at each step of the excavation process.
Figure 2 presents spatial profile plots of the following key response quantities: pipe elevation, pipe axial
displacement, pipe axial force and pipe bending moment for the before and after excavation states. Figure
3 presents spatial profile plots of the pipe top and bottom fiber strains and the pipe curvature for the
before and after excavation states. Figure 4 presents spatial profile plots of the change in state due to
summer excavation (i.e., after excavation state minus before excavation state) for the following pipe
response quantities: pipe axial force, pipe bending moment, and the top and bottom fiber strain profiles.
In order to provide additional information regarding the stability of the excavated pipe, an additional load
sequence consisting of a progressive increase in the pipe temperature differential was imposed after the
pipe was excavated. The pipe temperature differential was increased by a total of 88.6oF. Figures 5(a)
and 5(b) present sequence plots showing how the maximum compressive strain and the vertical
displacement at the center (apex) of the heave span increase as the pipe temperature differential is
increased from 61.2oF to 149.8oF. Figure 6 presents spatial profile plots of the pipe elevation, pipe axial
displacement, pipe axial force and pipe bending moment for after excavation and “increased temperature
differential” states. Figure 7 presents the corresponding spatial profile plots of the pipe top and bottom
fiber strains and the pipe curvature.
Based on this follow up analysis, the following observations can be made:
(1) The primary pipe state changes that occur due to excavation are reductions in the maximum pipe
axial tension force and the maximum pipe bending moment at the mid-span location. The
maximum pipe axial force is reduced from 369.8 kips to 319.1 kips (a reduction of about 50.6 kips
or about 13.7%) and the maximum bending moment is reduced from 28,247 kip-inches to 22,622
kip-inches (a reduction of 5,624 kip-inches or about 20%).
(2) Excavation results in a slight change to the overall shape of the axial force profile which becomes
slightly flatter across the excavation.
(3) Changes in the pipe strain and curvature (i.e., deformation measures) are even less pronounced than
changes in the pipe axial force and bending moment (i.e., force measures). This is because yielding
of the pipe steel has resulted in residual deformations. The largest strain change is about 0.04%
near mid-span. This strain change corresponds to a stress change of about 14 ksi.
(4) Even for the analysis based on the thawed pipe-soil spring strengths, there was no evidence of any
tendency for the pipe to experience upheaval buckling in the excavated region due to excavation
alone. The pipe is subject to both high tension forces and significant bearing of the pipe into the
soil below the pipe across the heave span.
(5) In general, it appears that the act of excavating the pipe moves it into a safer load state (i.e.,
reductions in the maximum axial force and moment).
(6) The additional analysis sequence that increased the pipe temperature differential by an additional
88.6oF provides an indication that the pipe remains stable even for total temperature differentials
very much larger than the upper bound values expected for the pipeline. The maximum
compressive strain at a total temperature differential of 149.8oF is about 0.93% and the mid-span
(apex) displacement remains essentially constant.
2
Figure 1 (a) Pre-Excavation Run 3007: Max. Tension Strain vs. Time (DT=61.2F P=2100 psi)
2.5
Span = 20 ft
Span = 25 ft
Span = 35 ft
2.0 Span = 60 ft
Span = 100 ft
Tension Strain Capacity
1.5
Axial Strain (%)
1.0
0.5
0.0
0 5 10 15 20 25
Time (years)
Figure 1 (b) Pre-Excavation Run 3007: Max. Compression Strain vs. Time (DT=61.2F P=2100 psi)
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
Axial Strain (%)
-1.5
Span = 20 ft
-2.0 Span = 25 ft
Span = 35 ft
Span = 60 ft
Span = 100 ft
Compression Strain Capacity
-2.5
0 5 10 15 20 25
Time (years)
2.0
1.6
1.2
0.8
0.4
0.0
-0.4
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100

0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100

400
Axial Force (kips)
350
300
250
200
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100

45000
Moment (kip-inch)
30000
15000
-15000
-30000
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
-0.2
-0.4
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100

0.2
0.0
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
-0.8
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100

0.006
Curvature (1/ft)
0.003
0.000
-0.003
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100
0
-10
Axial Force (kips)
-20
-30
-40
-50
-60
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100

6000
4000
Moment (kip-inch)
2000
0
-2000
-4000
-6000
-8000
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100

0.030
0.020
0.010
0.000
-0.010
-0.020
-0.030
-0.040
-0.050
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100

0.040
0.030
0.020
0.010
0.000
-0.010
-0.020
-0.030
-0.040
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100
Figure 5 (a) Summer Excavation - Compression Strain at Center of Heave Span
-0.60
-0.65
-0.70
Compression Strain (%)
-0.75
-0.80
-0.85
-0.90
-0.95
60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160
Temperature Differential (degrees F)
Figure 5 (b) Summer Excavation - Apex Displacement at Center of Heave Span

22.30
22.25
Apex Displacement (inches)
22.20
22.15
22.10
22.05
22.00
60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160
Temperature Differential (degrees F)
After Excavation Increased Temperature Differential
2.0
1.6
1.2
0.8
0.4
0.0
-0.4
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100

0.8
0.4
0.0
-0.4
-0.8
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100

800
Axial Force (kips)
400
-400
-800
-1200
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100

30000
Moment (kip-inch)
15000
-15000
-30000
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100
0.4
0.2
0.0
-0.2
-0.4
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100

0.4
0.0
-0.4
-0.8
-1.2
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100

0.006
Curvature (1/ft)
0.003
0.000
-0.003
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100
C-FER Technologies
APPENDIX E PIPLIN ANALYSIS TO SIMULATE EXCAVATION AT OVERBEND

LOCATIONS – BY SSD, INC.
SSD, Inc.
PIPLIN Analyses to Simulate Excavation of a Matrix of Overbend Configurations
By: SSD, Inc.
March 4, 2005
As part of the ongoing MGP frost heave design effort, preliminary studies have been performed using
PIPLIN to investigate the effects of pipe excavation after a multi-year period of frost heave. The results
of the preliminary studies indicated that there was no evidence of a tendency for the pipe to experience
upheaval buckling in the heaved and excavated region. This is because prior to and after excavation, the
pipe is subject to both very high tension forces and significant bearing of the pipe into the soil below the
pipe across the heave span. In general, the preliminary studies indicated that excavating the pipe moved it
into a safer load state (i.e., significant reductions in the maximum axial force and moment).
Based on the preliminary results, it was decided to pursue additional excavation analyses for non-heave
scenarios involving overbend configurations under frozen soil and thawed soil conditions. Unlike the
previous “after-heave” excavation analyses which showed that excavation moved the pipe into a safer
load state (i.e., significant reductions in the maximum axial force and bending moment), these non-heave
excavation analyses indicated that excavation of the overbend configurations resulted in increased axial
force and bending moment demands. Based on the initial series of non-heave excavation analyses, C-FER
requested additional excavation analyses of a matrix of non-heave overbend configurations. The matrix
of cases is defined by the following parameters:
• Four overbend geometries with overbend angles of 0.5o, 1.2o, 3.0o, and 6.0o each with a bend
radius of 57D (142.5 feet).
• Two soil cover depths: 0.9 m and 1.2 m.
• Four pipe-soil spring temperature conditions: “Winter/Frozen” with a soil temperature of –
11.5oC, “Summer/Frozen” with a soil temperature of –2oC, “Basic Thawed” conditions, and “UB
Thawed” conditions.
For the Winter/Frozen pipe-soil spring temperature conditions, the operating pressure and temperature
differential are 1300 psi and 15oC (27oF), respectively. For all other pipe-soil spring temperature
conditions, the operating pressure and temperature differential are 1800 psi and 34oC (61.2oF),
respectively. The maximum pressure and temperature differential for each case are 2600 psi and 81.2oF,
respectively.
For the Winter/Frozen and Summer/Frozen pipe-soil spring temperature conditions, the pipe-soil spring
properties were computed using Excel spreadsheets provided by ExxonMobil (Heave Springs.xls and
Uplift Macro3.xls) using the specified soil temperatures and cover depths. For the Basic Thawed soil
conditions, a cohesionless “till” soil with a friction angle of 33o and a bulk density of 119 pcf was used
with the specified cover depths (assuming the water table is below pipe) to compute the pipe-soil spring
properties using another Excel spreadsheet provided by ExxonMobil (Springs5.xls). For the “UB
Thawed” soil conditions, a “till and organics” soil mix with a friction angle of 33o and a submerged
density of 41.6 pcf was used with the specified cover depths (assuming the water table at the ground
surface) to compute the pipe-soil spring properties (using Springs5.xls). The “UB Springs” provide a
very low level of soil resistance to maximize the pipe’s tendency to experience upheaval buckling (hence
the “UB” terminology). Note that the “UB Springs” modeling approach (developed by Wes Dyck &
Derick Nixon) combines the buoyant weight of the soil above the pipe and the buoyant force acting on the
pipe together with the soil shear resistance in the uplift spring resistance and the combined (net) resistance
is assumed to reduce to zero when the top of pipe reaches the ground surface. This is clearly an
approximation of the combined effect of the uplift soil resistance and the buoyant force acting on the pipe.
1
SSD, Inc.
As with the previous excavation analysis cases, the pipe has a 30-inch diameter and a wall thickness of
0.614 inches and the mesh across the excavated region consists of 1-foot long elements and the pipe steel
is based on the “MGP_Recommended” X80 stress-strain relationship. For these analyses, the model
geometry includes the specified overbend with a bend radius of 57D (142.5 feet). Note that for
simplicity, the effects of cold bending prestrain have not been included in this analysis. One-half of the
overbend configuration is modeled assuming a plane of symmetry at the center of the bend. The loading
consists of the application of gravity loads and the application and removal of a 3,263 psi hydrotest
pressure, followed by application of the operating pressure and temperature differential. Once the pipe is
subjected to the selected operating loads, the pipe is progressively excavated starting from the center of
the bend and working symmetrically outward until a maximum total excavation length of 500 feet is
reached. In order to simulate the excavation, the strengths of the longitudinal and uplift pipe soil springs
are reduced to zero and the weight of soil (if it is included as a gravity load) is removed sequentially over
nine segments of the pipeline (six 20-foot long segments, two 40-foot long segments, and one 50-foot
long segment) starting at the center of the overbend and progressing symmetrically outwards to locations
250 feet upstream and downstream of the center of the overbend. Note that for the “UB Springs” case,
the reduction of the uplift spring strength also reduces the buoyant force on the pipe since this force has
been included in the uplift spring. The individual segments of pipe are excavated progressively using 10
analysis steps per segment. The strengths of the pipe-soil springs outside of the excavated region remain
constant. Once the excavation is complete, the pipe internal pressure and temperature differential are
simultaneously increased to values corresponding to the maximum operating conditions (P=2600 psi and
∆T=45oC=81oF). C-FER requested that the analyses be carried out until either (a) the maximum pipe
strain exceeds 2%, (b) the upward deflection of the pipe exceeds the original soil cover depth, or (c)
the loading/excavation procedure is completed.
For each of the 32 cases in the matrix, an Excel file has been generated containing several sheets of data
and the plots requested by C-FER. The Excel files are included as a Zipped file under Appendix A.
Based on a review of the analysis results, the key response quantity is the displacement at the apex of the
overbend (i.e., in general, the pipe strain demands were relatively low). For each of the 32 cases in the
matrix, Table 1 summarizes the configuration parameters, the Excel file name and the progression of apex
displacement for the pipe states corresponding to before excavation, after excavation and maximum
operating conditions after excavation.
The individual figures in the Excel file for each case are described as follows. Figure 1 of each Excel file
presents load sequence plots of the vertical displacement of the apex of the bend and the maximum pipe
strains and curvatures as a function of the applied temperature differential. Note that different line colors
in Figure 1 are used to identify the portions of the load sequence corresponding to the addition of initial
operating conditions, the progressive excavation, and the increase to maximum operating conditions.
Figure 2 of each Excel file presents spatial profile plots of the following key response quantities: pipe
vertical displacement, pipe horizontal displacement, pipe axial force, pipe bending moment, pipe top and
bottom fiber strains and pipe curvature for states corresponding to before excavation, after excavation and
maximum operating conditions after excavation. Figure 3 of each Excel file provides a more refined look
at the state changes due to progressive excavation – the apex displacement and the maximum tension and
compression strains are shown as a function of excavation length.
The primary intent of this analysis effort was to provide detailed results packages to C-FER for more in-
depth synthesis. However, based on our observation of the these analysis results, the following
observations can be offered:
(1) Application of operating pressure and temperature differential tends to result in upward movement
of the apex of the overbend with the amount of movement increasing with increasing overbend
angle. The upward movement is negligible for the frozen soil cases. The amount of upward
2
SSD, Inc.
movement is most significant for the “UB Thawed” soil conditions, where the 6o overbend moves
up about 49 inches for the 0.9 m cover depth and about 24 inches for the 1.2 m cover depth.
(2) Excavation of the pipe results in progressively increasing vertical displacements of the apex of the
overbend. The amount of upward movement increases with decreasing soil strengths. For the
Winter/Frozen soil condition, the maximum upward movement after excavation occurs for the 6o
overbend. For the Summer/Frozen and the Basic Thawed soil conditions, the maximum upward
movement after excavation occurs for the 3o overbend. For the “UB Thawed” soil condition, the
maximum upward movement after excavation occurs for the 1.2o overbend. Also for the “UB
Thawed” soil condition for all overbend angles greater than 1.2o, the upward movements after
excavation were greater than 90 inches (far exceeding the depth of cover). Hence for these cases,
the analysis sequence for maximum operating conditions was not undertaken.
(3) Increasing to maximum operating conditions after excavation of the pipe also results in
progressively increasing vertical displacements of the apex of the bend with larger upward
movements occurring for weaker soil conditions.
(4) For all configurations, the maximum curvatures, strains, and bending moments occur in the middle
of the overbend.
(5) For all configurations, upward movement of the apex of the bend due to operating conditions,
excavation, and increasing to maximum operating conditions is associated with increased “closing”
bending moments acting on the bend.
3
SSD, Inc.
Table 1 Configuration Parameters and Apex Displacements for Entire Analysis Matrix
Apex Displacement (inches)
Excel Cover Overbend
After After Max
File Soil Depth Angle
Operating Excavation Operating
Name Condition (m) (deg)
WF_09m_0_5deg Winter/Frozen 0.9 0.5 0.00 0.01 0.25
SF_09m_0_5deg Summer/Frozen 0.9 0.5 -0.01 0.06 0.26
SF_09m_1_2deg Summer/Frozen 0.9 1.2 0.00 20.99 65.34
SF_12m_0_5deg Summer/Frozen 1.2 0.5 -0.01 0.06 0.26
ST_09m_0_5deg Summer/Thawed 0.9 0.5 -0.05 0.06 0.26
ST_09m_3_0deg Summer/Thawed 0.9 3.0 0.14 56.51 113.90
S_UBT_09m_0_5deg Summer/UB_Thawed 0.9 0.5 0.05 0.05 0.26
S_UBT_09m_1_2deg Summer/UB_Thawed 0.9 1.2 0.66 119.30 NA
S_UBT_12m_0_5deg Summer/UB_Thawed 1.2 0.5 0.04 0.05 0.26
NA: Results not available because analysis was terminated since upward pipe movement already far
exceeded the cover depth.
4
C-FER Technologies
APPENDIX F EXCERPT FROM CGA EXCAVATION BEST PRACTICE

Mechanical Damage Assessment &amp; Excavation Guidelines

Încărcat de

Informații document

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Mechanical Damage Assessment &amp; Excavation Guidelines

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Final Report

MGP – Mechanical Damage Assessment

David Playdon, PEng Project management/Data Analysis/Final Report

MGP – Mechanical Damage Assessment

Revision Date Description Prepared Reviewed Approved

Draft Section 2 Issued

Final Report – MGP – Mechanical Damage Assessment and Excavation Guidelines i

Project Team and Revision History i

1.1 Scope and Objective 1

2. MECHANICAL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT ..........................................................................2

2.1 Baseline Assessment 2

3. ALLOWABLE EXCAVATION LENGTH ............................................................................20

3.1 Upheaval Buckling 20

4. GUIDELINES FOR SAFE EXCAVATION..........................................................................27

Final Report – MGP – Mechanical Damage Assessment and Excavation Guidelines ii

Appendix A Impact Frequency Fault Tree Model

Appendix B Mechanical Damage Assessment Software Overview

Appendix C Probability of Failure as a Function of Excavator Weight

Appendix E PIPLIN Analysis to Simulate Excavation at Overbend Locations – By SSD, Inc.

Appendix F Excerpt from CGA Excavation Best Practice

Final Report – MGP – Mechanical Damage Assessment and Excavation Guidelines iv

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure 2.6 Effect of Excavator Weight

Table 2.1 Parameters Required to Estimate Equipment Impact Frequency

Table 2.3 Internal Pressure Probability Distributions

Table 2.5 Comparison of MGP and US-DOT Failure Rates

Table 2.6 Probability of Failure Given Impact for MGP Pipelines

Table 3.1 Soil Condition Categories and Associated Operating Parameters

Table 3.2 Maximum Excavation Lengths for 0.9 m Burial Depth

Table 3.3 Maximum Excavation Lengths for 1.2 m Burial Depth

Table 4.1 Threshold Excavator Weights

Table 4.2 Soil Condition Categories and Associated Operating Parameters

Final Report – MGP – Mechanical Damage Assessment and Excavation Guidelines v

• an assessment of the mechanical damage resistance of MGP pipelines relative to that of

Final Report – MGP – Mechanical Damage Assessment and Excavation Guidelines vi

a set of pipeline-specific recommendations were developed that are intended to enhance

1. Project preparation – a review of excavator weight considerations, a determination of the

2. On-site preparation and groundbreaking – a pre-excavation work site review involving

3. Ongoing excavation – pipeline company supervision during excavation work, pipeline

4. Project completion – as-built documentation of mitigation work performed including the

Final Report – MGP – Mechanical Damage Assessment and Excavation Guidelines ix

1.1 Scope and Objective

• an assessment of the mechanical damage resistance of MGP pipelines relative to that of

1.2 System Overview

Pipeline System Diameter Wall Thickness Grade Max/Nom MOP

Gathering System 30/762 12.1 483 12.2/7.0

26/660 10.5 483 12.2/8.0

18/457 9.8 414 12.2/8.0

16/406 9.2 414 12.9/10.8

NGL Line 10.75/273 6.3 359 10.0/5.0

10.75/273 7.8 359 10.0/5.0

10.75/273 9.5 359 10.0/5.0

Main Gas Pipeline 30/762 15.6 550 18.0/16.0

Final Report – MGP – Mechanical Damage Assessment and Excavation Guidelines 1

2. MECHANICAL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

2.1 Baseline Assessment

2.1.2 Failure Probability Model

Mechanical damage is caused by accidental impact with excavation equipment such as

Impact Frequency Model

Final Report – MGP – Mechanical Damage Assessment and Excavation Guidelines 2

Mechanical Damage Assessment

Probability of Failure Given Impact Model

2.1.3 Failure Model Inputs

Final Report – MGP – Mechanical Damage Assessment and Excavation Guidelines 3

Mechanical Damage Assessment & Excavation Guidelines

Mechanical Damage Assessment & Excavation Guidelines