Torts 11.

8 Self Defense, False Imprisonment, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Pages: SD 661-673; FI 677-680; IIED695-702; 705-711 (w/ Littlefield)

Material in Notes on Consent:

Implied Consent (661) contexts like a crowded train

Reasonable Belief Doctrine O’Brien v. Cunard: Immigrant vaccinated, had adverse reaction
and said she never consented. Even if a jury were to believe that O’Brien’s actual intent was to
refuse the vaccination, the ship’s owner would be free from liability because its doctor actually
and reasonably inferred consent under the circumstances.
Restatement says that in cases where the inference is made based on things other than the
victims conduct, this doctrine wouldn’t apply

8. Scope of Consent Mohr v. Williams: P went into surgery for problem in one ear, during
surgery they determined it was the other ear that needed surgery. Despite the fact that procedure
apparently went well and occurred with the permission of Mohr’s family physician, who was in
the operating room at the time, Mohr sued the surgeon for battery and prevailed after the court
determined that the surgeon had exceeded the scope of Mohr’s consent by operating on a
different part of the body than the part that she had consented to have touched.
Consent forms are responding to this type of doctrine

Self Defense

Haeussler v. De Loretto

The determination of which of the two parties precipitated the fight, and whether defendant acted
in self defense, and whether in so doing he used more force than was reasonably necessary
under the circumstances, were questions for the trier of fact.
One who is involved in an altercation with another has the right to use such force as is necessary
to protect himself from bodily injury, and the question of the amount of force justifiable
under the circumstances of a particular case is also one for the trier of fact.

Katko v. Briney

Plaintiffs installed a spring shotgun (trap) in one of the rooms of an unused house on a piece of
property. Modified to aim at victims legs. Victim thought was abandoned and went in to take
fruit jars, was shot and sued.
Affirmative defense here doesn’t work.
Dissent: Worry about benefiting from ones own crime.
Is the amount of force warranted given that its property
Notes: Spring gun can’t differentiate who to shoot: Burglar vs. Children or a delivery man.
Torts 11.8 Self Defense, False Imprisonment, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

False Imprisonment
Closely tied to the value of liberty: being able to move where you want
Separate intentional tort
Fojtik v. Charter Med. Corp.

The elements of a false imprisonment cause of action are:

(1) willful detention by the defendant,
(2) without consent of the detainee, and
(3) without authority of law.

A detention may be accomplished by violence, by threats, or by any other means that restrain a
person from moving from one place to another. Randall’s Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891
S.W.2d 640, 645 (Tex. 1995) Example of consent being incorporated into the elements.
Where it is alleged that a detention is effected by a threat, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
threat was such as would inspire in the threatened person a just fear of injury to his person,
reputation, or property. Id.
Threats to call the police are not ordinarily sufficient in themselves to effect an unlawful
imprisonment. Morales v. Lee, 668 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1984, no writ)
(citing W. Prosser, Torts §11 (4th ed. 1971)).
In determining whether such threats are sufficient to overcome the plaintiff’s free will, factors
such as the relative size, age, experience, sex, and physical demeanor of the participants may be
considered. . . .

to what extent must plaintiffs insist on their freedom and have it denied to them before they can
recover for false imprisonment? Under some circumstances, a combination of the plaintiff’s
vulnerability and oppressive circumstances permit recovery, even when the plaintiff does not
actually resist their detention.

His subjective view of being restrained is not enough to satisfy false imprisonment.
Slew of cases in this opinion demonstrates that context matters

Notes:
As the precedents suggest it is possible to have a threat based false imprisonment, even
though it didn’t succeed in this case specifically.

The boundries of the Confined Space: D incapable of leaving Taiwan because of employers
misconduct, not considered false imprisonment

Shopkeeper’s privilege: The shopkeeper’s privilege provides that a person who reasonably
believes another person has stolen, or is attempting to steal property, is privileged to detain that
person in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable time to investigate ownership of the property.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §124.001; Wal-Mart v. Resendez, 962 S.W.2d 539, 540 (Tex.
1998).
There are three components to the shopkeeper’s privilege: (1) a reasonable belief a person has
stolen or is attempting to steal; (2) detention for a reasonable time; and (3) detention in a
reasonable manner.
Torts 11.8 Self Defense, False Imprisonment, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Consent problem as an affirmative defense pg. 680

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Ch. 10)

Facts of these cases are all but requirements of cases that succeed on this theory
Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57. There, a man appeared at plaintiff’s home and, as a
practical joke, falsely informed her that her husband had been “smashed up” in an accident, had
suffered two broken legs, and had sent for the plaintiff to rescue him, all of which caused the
plaintiff severe and lasting distress.
Nickerson v. Hodges, As an elaborate joke, people convinced mentally ill woman that therewas a
pot of gold her family was entitled to, was given a map by fourtuneteller and went and tried to
deposit the gold for safe keeping, next day when she saw bbag was retied she was convinced she
had bbeen robbed which inflicted long lasting emotional distress.

May be good as a way of handling dignitary interests

Question of how bad conduct needs to be

Dickens v. Puryear
SOL changes based on which tort actually happened , long SOL could reflect discovery
difficulties or could reflect a particularly severe harm

How IIED fills a gap in Assault: Tackles fear of effects that can happen farther into the future-
which wouldn’t qualify as supporting an assault ( immanency required)

Covers extreme and outrageous conduct

This tort, under the authorities already cited, consists of: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2)
which is intended to cause and does cause (3) severe emotional distress to another. The tort may
also exist where defendant’s actions indicate a reckless indifference to the likelihood that they
will cause severe emotional distress. Recovery may be had for the emotional distress so caused
and for any other bodily harm which proximately results from the distress itself

Causes of Action (701) Court doesn’t allow P to define the Tort at issue, courts define tort based
on the substance of what’s being alleged. There’s a lot of factual evidence related to assaults and
batteries.

The evidentiary showing on the summary judgment motion does, however, indicate that
defendant Earl Puryear threatened plaintiff with death in the future unless plaintiff went home,
pulled his telephone off the wall, packed his clothes, and left the state. The Court of Appeals
characterized this threat as being “an immediate threat of harmful and offensive contact. It was a
present threat of harm to plaintiff. . . . ” 45 N.C. App. at 700, 263 S.E.2d at 859. The Court of
Appeals thus concluded that this threat was also an assault barred by the one-year statute of
limitations.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals’ characterization of this threat. The threat was not one of
imminent, or immediate, harm. It was a threat for the future apparently intended to and which
Torts 11.8 Self Defense, False Imprisonment, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

allegedly did inflict serious mental distress; therefore it is actionable, if at all, as an intentional
infliction of mental distress.

SOL bars recovery for the specific assaults

Hard to parse out from the IIED in this fact pattern, this may often be the case

Another Example of IIED Doctrine: 3rd Restatement An actor who by extreme and
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional harm to another is subject
to liability for that emotional harm and, if the emotional harm causes bodily harm, also for the
bodily harm.

Littlefield v. McGuffey

After trying to rent an apartment from D, denied P at last minute because she was in a mixed race
marriage. Called and harassed her, came to her home, called and terrorized her and her family
etc.
D’s argument on Appeal: P shouldn’t cite evidence about medically documented physical
manifestations of this emotional harm. Court rejects this, no physical manifestations are
necessary under the Tort.

Even if no physical manifestations can still recover high punitive damages.

Part of the harm is future long-term damages.

Size of damages: (think back to Kenton, inflammatory evidence necessary to eval. Damages)
Here, court isn’t troubled by allowing this damage in because necessary in gauging the severity
of damage and the cooresponding awards.

Attorney Fees: The size of a damage award, however, is not the gauge of a plaintiff’s victory.
Rather, value is gauged more broadly . . . Ms. Littlefield prevailed on her federal law claims,
receiving both compensatory and punitive damages. The latter certainly will punish McGuffey
and, one hopes, deter him from further violations. The award is also likely to deter others.
Therefore, we find the attorney’s fees awarded are not unreasonable, and the award stands

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