Cequeña v.
Bolante
G.R. No. 137944, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 216
Panganiban, J.
FACTS: The petitioners Fernanda Mendoza Cequeña and
Eduarda Apiado sought for the ownership and possession of the
land occupied by the respondent Honorata Bolante. Prior to
1954, the land in Binangonan, Rizal was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, the father of
respondent. Sinforoso died in 1930. On the basis of an affidavit,
the tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza of the
contested lot was cancelled and subsequently declared in the
name of Margarito Mendoza, the father of the petitioners.
Margarito and Sinforoso are brothers. During the cadastral
survey, respondent Honorata is the present occupant of the land
together with Miguel Mendoza, another brother of the
petitioners. The trial court rendered the petitioners as the lawful
owner and possessors of the land. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision because the genuineness and
the due execution of the affidavit. It was said to be insufficient
to overcome the denial of respondent and her mother.
Moreover, the probative value of petitioners’ tax receipts and
declarations paled in comparison with respondent’s proof of
ownership of the disputed parcel. The actual, physical,
exclusive and continuous possession by respondent since 1985
gave her a better title under Article 538 of the Civil Code. The
petitioners contended otherwise that she came into possession
through force and violence, contrary to Article 536 of the Civil
Code.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the respondent has the actual, physical,
exclusive and continuous possession of the land.
2.) Whether or not tax declarations and receipts are conclusive
evidence of ownership or possession.
HELD: 1.) Yes. Possession by the petitioner before 1985 was
not exclusive, as the respondent also acquired it before 1985.
The records show that the petitioners’ father and brother, as well
as the respondent and her mother were simultaneously in
adverse possession of the land. Based on Article 538 of the Civil
Code, the respondent is the preferred possessor because,
benefitting from her father’s tax declaration of the subject lot
since 1926, she has been in possession thereof for a longer
period. On the other hand, petitioners’ father acquired joint
possession only in 1952.
2.) No. Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima
facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for which
taxes have been paid. In the absence of actual public and
adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes
does not prove ownership. The petitioners’ claim of ownership
of the whole parcel has no legal basis.
 Aznar v. Yapdiangco
13 SCRA 486
DOCTRINE: Ownership is not transferred by contract merely but by
tradition or delivery. Contracts only constitute titles or rights to the
transfer or acquisition of ownership, while delivery or tradition is the
mode of accomplishing the same.
Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith
is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or
has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person
in possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or which the owner has been
unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the
owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid
therefor.
FACTS:
● Teodoro Santos advertised the sale of his FORD
FAIRLANE 500 in a newspaper. L. De Dios went to the house of
Teodoro and talked to his son Ireneo Santos and said that his
uncle Vicente Marella is interested in buying the said car.
● The next day, Ireneo went to the house of Marella and
they agreed to the price of P14,700 on the understanding that it
will be paid after the car has been registered in the latter’s name.
○ 
A deed of sale was executed and the registration was
changed to the name of Marella. Ireneo went to Marella to
get the payment and deliver the car who informed him that
he is P2,000 short of the money and that they need to go
to his sister to get it. Ireneo, together with De Dios and an
unidentified man went to a house.
● Once inside, De Dios asked Ireneo to wait.. After
waiting in vain, he went down and discovered that the car was
gone.
● Marella was able to sell the car to plaintiff-appellant
Jose Aznar and while attending to registration; Philippine
Constabulary seized the car due to the report of the incident.
ISSUE:
Who has the better right on the property involved (car)??
HELD:
Teodoro Santos has the better right. Marella did not have any title to
the property under litigation because the same was never delivered to
him. He may have the contract but he never acquired valid title.
Although the keys to the car may have been given to the unidentified
companion, it may be done only because that companion took them
to the place where the sister of Marella was supposed to live. The car
was evidently stolen and that the buyer did not acquire any valid title
thereto.
Marella never had title to the car as the car wasn't ever delivered to
him. While there was a deed of sale in his favor, he was only able to
obtain possession of the car since he stole it from Santos. The
applicable law is Article 559. The rule is to the effect that if the owner
has lost a thing, or if he has been unlawfully deprived of it, he has a
right to recover it, not only from its finder, thief or robber, but also from
third persons who may have acquired it in good faith from such finder,
thief or robber. The said article establishes 2 exceptions to the general
rule of irrevindicabilty—to wit, the owner has lost the thing or has been
unlawfully deprived thereof. In these cases, the possessor cannot
retain the thing as against the owner who may recover it without paying
any indemnity, except when the possessor acquired it in a public sale.
Furthermore, the common law principle that where one of two innocent
persons must suffer a fraud perpetrated by another, the law imposes
the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced confidence, has enable
the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied in this case, which is
covered by an express provision of law.
EDCA Publishing & Distributing Corp. v. Santos,
G.R. No. 80298, April 26, 1990, 134 SCRA 614
Cruz, J.
FACTS: Jose Cruz ordered by telephone 406 books from
EDCA Publishing and Distributing Corp. (EDCA), payable
on delivery. EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice
and delivered the books as ordered, for which Cruz issued
a check. Subsequently, Cruz sold 120 of the books to
Leonor Santos who paid him after verifying the seller's
ownership from the invoice he showed her. Meanwhile,
EDCA having become suspicious over a second order
placed by Cruz even before clearing of his first check,
made inquiries with the De la Salle College where he had
claimed to be a dean and was informed that there was no
such person in its employ. Further, Cruz had no account
with the Philippine Amanah Bank, against which he had
drawn the check. EDCA went to the police, which arrested
Cruz whose real name was Tomas de la Peña. EDCA
sought the assistance of the police, and forced their way
into the store of the Santos and threatened her with
prosecution for buying stolen property. They seized the
120 books. Santos sued for recovery of the books after
demand for their return was rejected by EDCA.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not EDCA was unlawfully deprived of the
books because the check issued by the impostor in
payment therefor was dishonored.
2.) Whether or not EDCA had the right to cease the books
that were sold to Santos.
HELD: 1.) No. EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the
books. Article 559 of the Civil Code provides that the
possession of movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any
movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may
recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the
possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has
been unlawfully deprived has acquired it in good faith at a
public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor. A contract of sale is
perfected once agreement is reached between the parties
on the subject matter and the consideration. Ownership in
the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment
of the purchase only if there is a stipulation to that effect.
Otherwise, the rule is that such ownership shall pass from
the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or constructive
delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not
yet been paid. Non-payment only creates a right to
demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal
prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But absent
the stipulation above noted, delivery of the thing sold will
effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn
transfer it to another.

2.) No. Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz
acquired ownership over the books which he could then validly
transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet
paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA
and did not impair the title to the books acquired by the Santos
spouses. Therefore, EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the
books and Santos had rights over the books.
Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v CA G.R. No. 124699 July
31, 2003
FACTS:
The respondents in this case were the heirs of Magdaleno Valdez
Sr., who purchased an unregistered parcel of land located in Cebu
from Feliciana Santillan (seller). The land was possessed by
decedent who had also paid taxes thereon. The heirs subsequently
inherited the land. However, a sugar company, Bogo-Medellin
Milling Co. was able to obtain title to Lot No. 954, the narrow lot
where the railroad tracks (existent even prior to the sale to
decedent) lay. The lot was likewise declared for tax purposes
under the name of the company.
The heirs filed a complaint for Compensation and/or Recovery of
Possession of the lot claiming that Bomedco was granted by the
seller of the lot a railroad right of way for a period of 30 years
which had expired sometime in 1959 but that the heirs allowed
Bomedco to continue using the land because one of them was then
an employee of the company. Bomedco, on the other hand,
claimed that it was the owner and possessor of the registered lot
when it bought the lot from seller in 1929 and that the heirs were
already barred by prescription and laches because of Bomedco’s
open and continuous possession of the property for more than 50
years.
The trial court rejected the evidence presented by Bomedco (as it
was only a Xerox copy of an unsigned deed of Sale) but ruled that
Bomedco had already acquired ownership of the property through
acquisitive prescription because it possessed the property in good
faith for more than 10 years. This was reversed by the Court of
Appeals which ruled that Bomedco only acquired an easement of
right of way by unopposed and continuous use of the land, but not
ownership. .
ISSUE:

1) whether Bomedco had indeed acquired ownership of the land
through extraordinary acquisitive prescription?

2) Whether easement was continuous and thus Bomedco had
acquired title over the use of the land?
RATIO/HELD:
1. No. Bomedco only had a right of easement over the land as
shown by tax receipts wherein it declared, for several years, the
property to be a “central railroad right of way” or “sugar railroad
right of way” when it could have declared it to be “industrial
land” as it did for the years 1975 and 1985. Instead of indicating
ownership of the lot, these receipts showed that all petitioner had
was possession by virtue of the right of way granted to it. X x x A
person cannot have an easement on his own land, since all of the
uses of an easement are fully comprehended in his general right of
ownership.
An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the
corporeal immovable property of another, by virtue of which
the owner has to refrain from doing, or must allow someone to
do something on his property, for the benefit of another thing
or person. It exists only when the servient and dominant
estates belong to two different owners. It gives the holder of
the easement an incorporeal interest on the land but grants no
title thereto. Therefore, an acknowledgment of the easement is
an admission that the property belongs to another.
Having held the property by virtue of an easement, Bomedco
cannot now assert that its occupancy since 1929 was in the
concept of an owner. Neither can it declare that the 30- year
period of extraordinary prescription started from that year.
Moreover, the mere expiration of the period of easement in 1959
did not convert petitioner’s possession into an adverse one. Mere
material possession of land is not adverse possession as against
the owner and is insufficient to vest title, unless such possession is
accompanied by the intent to possess as an owner.
2. An easement is continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant
without the intervention of any act of man, like the easement
of draineage and it is discontinuous if it is used at intervals
and depends on the act of man, like the easement of right of
way.
x x x an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is
discontinuous because the right is exercised only if and when a
train operated by a person passes over another’s property.
A party is deemed to acquire title over the use of the land if:
a)
it had subsequently entered into a contractual right of way with
the heirs for the continued use of the land under the principles of
voluntary easements, or
b) it had filed a case against the heirs
for conferment on it of a legal easement of right of way (see orig
case for the requirements)
The point is, bomedco did not exercise any of the abovementioned
options in order for it to acquire title over the railroad right of
way.
Jabonete vs Monteverde, Legaspi, DBP, & Arcilla
GR# L- 17482
March 31, 1966
Facts
On March 11, 1954, the Court of First Instance of Davao, found that
Antonio Legaspi acquired the lot in question with the knowledge that
a "gravamen" or easement of right of way existed thereon,
promulgated a decision the dispositive portion of which reads (dili
ma basa kay spanish)
In view of the March 11 order, the plaintiffs (Jabonete) immediately
proceeded to the premises in question and opened in the fence of
the defendant (Antonio Legaspi) a sufficient opening for the passage
of men and vehicles. Even then, however, the defendant filed with
the court below on that very same day, May 21, 1954, a motion for
the reconsideration of the order granting discretionary execution.
Thereafter, and upon the lower court's suggestion, the parties
entered into an amicable AGREEMENT which was later embodied in
an order or "auto" dated May 24, 1954. (dili gihapon mabasa ang
AGREEMENT)
Both parties complied with terms of the AGREEMENT until the
plaintiffs, unable to continue with their repair shop, transferred to
another place in December 1959 whereupon the defendant
reconstructed his fence and its footing, closing thereby the opening
previously made by the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs' lot was foreclosed by the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) which, later still, conveyed it under a conditional
sale to Mrs. Luz Arcilla.
On her acquisition of the said lot, Mrs. Arcilla demanded of the
defendant the re-opening of the fence in question as it was her plan
to construct her house in the said lot. When the defendant refused,
the Development Bank filed with the lower court a petition to hold
the said defendant in contempt. Mrs. Luz Arcilla later intervened in
the case filed by DBP and was so allowed by the lower court.
The Development Bank of the Philippines and Mrs. Luz Arcilla
contended that the refusal of the defendant to cause or allow the
making of an opening in his fence was a defiance of the said court's
decision of March 11, 1954 and was, therefore, contemptuous. After
due hearing, the lower court sustained the petitioners and found the
defendant guilty of contempt with orders "to pay a fine of One
Hundred Pesos (P100.00) and to open the vereda or alley leading to
the lot owned by the Development Bank of the Philippines and
conveyed to Mrs. Luz S. Arcilla.
Issue
Whether DBP and Mrs. Arcilla has the right to the easement granted
to Jabonete
Held
No.
Under the aforesaid order of May 24, 1954, the easement awarded
or secured by the lower court to the plaintiffs was strictly a personal
one. The right of way granted was expressly limited to the latter and
their "family, friends, drivers, servants and jeeps." In the very
language of the agreement the following appears:
El demandado Antonio Legaspi, permitira el uso y paso en la calle
privada construida por el en su terreno a lo largo del terreno de los
demandantes, a estos, su familia, sus amigos, chofers, servidumbre y
de sus jeeps.
The servitude established was clearly for the benefit alone of the
plaintiffs and the persons above enumerated and it is clear that the
lower court, as well as the parties addressed by the said order, did
not intend the same to pass on to the plaintiffs' successors-in-
interest. In other words, the right acquired by the original plaintiffs
was a personal servitude under Article 614 of the Civil Code, and not
a predial servitude that inures to the benefit of whoever owns the
dominant estate.
Another evidence that the servitude in question was personal to the
plaintiffs is the fact that the same was granted to the latter without
any compensation to the respondent-appellant.
Encarnacion v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 77628, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 74
Fernan, C.J.
FACTS: Petitioner owns the dominant estate bounded on north by
the servient estate owned by respondents and an estate owned by
Magsino, all of which are located in Talisay, Batangas. The servient
estate is bound on the north by the national highway. To provide
access to the highway, a one meter road path was paved through in
which half of its width was taken from the estate of Magsino and the
other half from the estate of the respondent. Petitioner started a
nursery plant type of business in which pushcarts were used to haul
the plants from his estate to and from his nursery and the highway,
using the one meter road path. As his business grew, he bought a
jeepney to enable him to transport more plants and soil catering to
the now bigger demand. The problem however was that the jeepney
cannot pass through the road path since its width would not be
accommodated by a one meter width. Petitioner made a request
upon the respondent to sell to him 1 ½ meters of their property so
that the pathway may be widened to enable his jeepney to pass
through. The respondents refused. Petitioner went to court praying
that he would be granted the additional land to the right of way
already constituted but the trial court rendered a decision adverse
to the petitioner because there was no such necessity as it was
shown that there was the presence of dried river bed only 80 meters
away from the property of the petitioner which he may use as an
alternative route. The CA affirmed said decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to be granted his prayer
to buy the additional land to increase the existing one meter road
path.

HELD: Yes. Even with the presence of the dried river bed, upon
thorough investigation, it was found to be an inadequate right of
way because a concrete bridge traverses it thereby the jeep would
have to jump over said bridge which has a height of 5 meters in
order to reach the highway. It was also found that during the rainy
season, the same was impassable as it became flooded. This right
of way could not provide adequate access to the highway thereby
when an estate has no access to a public road, it may demand for a
right of way. Furthermore, under Article 651 of the Civil Code, it is
the needs of the dominant property which ultimately determine the
width of the right of way. In this case, since the business of the
petitioner grew larger and pushcarts became tedious to transport
his nursery plants, it became necessary for him to do so with a
jeepney. And in order to efficiently make such transportation of his
plants, the right of way had to be widened to accommodate the
width of the jeepney of the petitioner. The petitioner thus shall be
granted the additional land to the existing right of way.
Republic v. Guzman
326 SCRA 90
DOCTRINE: There are three (3) essential elements of a
donation: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b) the
increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do
an act of liberality or animus donandi. When applied to a
donation of an immovable property, the law further requires that
the donation be made in a public document and that there
should be an acceptance thereof made in the same deed of
donation or in a separate public document. In cases where the
acceptance is made in a separate instrument, it is mandated
that the donor should be notified thereof in an authentic form, to
be noted in both instruments.
FACTS:
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son
of the spouses Simerican citizen. In 1968 Simeon died leaving
to his sole heirs Helen and David an estate consisting of several
parcels of land located in Bulacan.
On 29 December 1970 Helen and David executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman
dividing and adjudicating to themselves all the property
belonging to the estate of Simeon. The taxes due thereon were
paid and the parcels of land were accordingly registered in their
names in undivided equal shares.
On 10 December 1981 Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed
assigning, transferring and conveying to her son David her
undivided one-half (1/2) interest on all the parcels of land
subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate of Simeon Guzman. On 18 October 1989 David executed
a Special Power of Attorney where he acknowledged thaeon
Guzman, a naturalized American citizen, and Helen Meyers
Guzman, an Amt he became the owner of the parcels of land
subject of the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen on 9 August
1989 and empowering Atty. Lolita G. Abela to sell or otherwise
dispose of the lots. On 1 February 1990 Atty. Lolita G. Abela,
upon instruction of Helen, paid donor’s taxes to facilitate the
registry of the parcels of land in the name of David.
The ownership of David was assailed and on the basis thereof,
the Government filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos
Bulacan a Petition for Escheat praying that one-half (1/2) of
David's interest in each of the subject parcels of land be forfeited
in its favor. On 9 August 1994 David Rey Guzman responded
with a prayer that the petition be dismissed.
Thus as a rule, only a Filipino citizen can acquire private lands
in the Philippines. The only instances when a foreigner can
acquire private lands in the Philippines are by hereditary
succession and if he was formerly a natural-born Filipino citizen
who lost his Philippine citizenship. Petitioner therefore contends
that the acquisition of the parcels of land by David does not fall
under any of these exceptions. It asserts that David being an
American citizen could not validly acquire one-half (1/2) interest
in each of the subject parcels of land by way of the two (2) deeds
of quitclaim as they are in reality donations inter vivos.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the quitclaim executed by Helen tantamount to
a donation in favor of her son David? -- NO
HELD:
Not all the elements of a donation of an immovable property are
present in the instant case. The language of the deed of
quitclaim is clear that Helen merely contemplated a waiver of
her rights, title and interest over the lands in favor of David, and
not a donation. That a donation was far from Helen's mind is
further supported by her deposition which indicated that she
was aware that a donation of the parcels of land was not
possible since Philippine law does not allow such an
arrangement. There are three (3) essential elements of a
donation: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b) the
increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do
an act of liberality or animus donandi. When applied to a
donation of an immovable property, the law further requires that
the donation be made in a public document and that there
should be an acceptance thereof made in the same deed of
donation or in a separate public document. In cases where the
acceptance is made in a separate instrument, it is mandated
that the donor should be notified thereof in an authentic form, to
be noted in both instruments.
Art. 633 of the Civil Code from whence Art. 749 came Manresa
said: "If the acceptance does not appear in the same document,
it must be made in another. Solemn words are not necessary; it
is sufficient if it shows the intention to accept x x x x it is
necessary that formal notice thereof be given to the donor, and
the fact that due notice has been given must be noted in both
instruments. Then and only then is the donation perfected. "
Therefore, the provisions of the law not having been complied
with, there was no effective conveyance of the parcels of land
by way of donation inter vivos. There is no valid repudiation of
inheritance as Helen had already accepted her share of the
inheritance when she, together with David, executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman on 29
December 1970 dividing and adjudicating between the two (2)
of them all the property in Simeon’s estate. By virtue of such
extrajudicial settlement the parcels of land were registered in
her and her son’s name in undivided equal share and for eleven
(11) years they possessed the lands in the concept of owner.
 Balaqui v. Dongso, 53 Phil. 673 gift in question is a donation mortis causa, the donor meant
nothing else than that she reserved of herself the
Facts: A part of the deed of donation made by Plaintffs mother was possession and usufruct of said two parcels of land until her
stated as thus:
death, at which time the donee would be able to dispose of
This gift to Placida Dongso resident of Candon, Ilocos them freely.
Sur, Philippine Islands, in recompense for her services to me, does not
pass title to her during my lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the true
owner of the two aforementioned parcels, including my house and shed
thereon, and she shall be rightfully entitled to transmit them to her
children. I also bind myself to answer to said Placida and her heirs and
successors for this property, and that none shall question or disturb her
right.

The appellants dwelling on the words of the fourth paragraph of the deed
of gift just quoted, “ does not pass title during my lifetime; but when I
die, she shall be the true owner of the two aforementioned parcels,"
contend that the gift in question is a donation mortis causa, and, the
requisites and conditions indispensable for a will, according to article 620
of the Civil Code, being lacking is null and void. Held:
Taking the
deed above quoted as a whole, it is observed, in the first
place, that Hipolita Balaqui, wishing to reward Placida
Dongso for the latter's services since said Placida's
childhood, who lived with her and was treated by her as a
daughter, she donated to her two parcels of land with their
improvements; in the second place, it is noted that in the
same deed Hipolita Balaqui guaranteed to Placida Dongso
and her heirs and successors, the right to said property thus
conferred. From the moment Hipolita Balaqui guaranteed
the right granted by her to Placida Dongso to the two
parcels of land by virtue of the deed of gift, she surrendered
such right; otherwise there would be no need to guarantee
said right. Therefore, when Hipolita Balaqui used the words
upon which the appellants base their contention that the