A Dying Empire Do Byzantine Accounts of PDF

Royal Holloway, University of London
A Dying Empire?
Do Byzantine accounts of the period 1204-1261 support or contradict

the claim that the Byzantine Empire was 'mortally wounded' by the loss
of its capital?
1802206
HS5205
September 2018
Author’s declaration
I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the
requirements of the University’s Regulations and Code of Practice for Taught
Programmes and that it has not been submitted for any other academic
award. Except where indicated by specific reference in the text, this work is my
own work. Work done in collaboration with, or with the assistance of others, is
indicated as such. I have identified all material in this dissertation which is not my
own work through appropriate referencing and acknowledgement. Where I have
quoted or otherwise incorporated material which is the work of others, I have
included the source in the references. Any views expressed in the dissertation,
other than referenced material, are those of the author.
SIGNED: James Arlett
(Digitally Signed)
DATE: 02 September 2018

Table of Contents
Page
Acknowledgments 1
Abbreviations 2
Introduction 5
The Economy of the Nicaean State 7
The True-self: Adoption of "Hellenic" Imperial Identity 18
A "New Jerusalem" and the Ideology of Exile 29
The Cornered Beast: A Changing Byzantine Ideology of Warfare 39
Conclusion 49
Bibliography 50
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Professor Jonathan Harris for
the useful comments, discussion and the valuable feedback provided both during this thesis
and during the second half of my one year at Royal Holloway. I would also like to thank
Professor Harris for introducing me to the "other side" of the Fourth Crusade.
I would also like to extend my thanks to Dr. Hannes Kleineke for helping with Latin
translations, and also Father Louis Beasley-Suffolk of St. Paul and St. Theresa's Catholic
Church, Wincanton, Somerset, for indulging my questions regarding martyrdom and
remission of sins.
Additionally, I would like to thank Dr. Sean McGlynn for encouraging me down this
path and also Megan Hurrell and Edward Dennis for humouring me and listening to my
musings whether they wanted to or not.
Finally, I would like to thank my wife Katie for allowing me this opportunity and
encouraging my every step.
Page 1
List of Abbreviations
Akropolites George Akropolites, The History, trans. by Ruth Macrides
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)
BCSCE Byzantium, Church, Society and Civilisation Seen Through
Contemporary Eyes, ed. by D.J. Geanakoplos (London:
University of Chicago Press, 1986)
Choniates Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, Annals of Niketas
Choniates, trans. by Harry J. Magoulias (Detroit: Wayne State
University Press, 1984)
Cremona Luidprand of Cremona, The Embassy to Constantinople and
Other Writings, eds. by F.A. Wright and John Julius Norwich
(London: Dent, 1993)
DOP Dumbarton Oaks Papers
Gregoras Nikephoros Gregoras, Rhomäische Geschichte, trans. by J.L.
Van Dieten, 4 vols (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1973-94),
vol. 1
Gregory VIII Pope Gregory VIII, 'Audita Tremendi', in Crusade and
Christendom: Annotated Documents, eds. and trans. by
Jessalynn Bird, Edward Peters and James M. Powell
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014)
Page 2
Komnene Anna Komnene, The Alexiad, trans. by E.R.A. Sewter and P.
Frankopan (London: Penguin, 2009)
Laskaris ‘Formation of a “National” Greek Army’, in Byzantium,
Church, Society and Civilisation Seen Through Contemporary
Eyes, ed. by D.J. Geanakoplos (London: University of Chicago
Press, 1986)
Malakes Euthymios Malakes, ‘Sermon to Manuel I, 1176’, trans. by
Ioannis Stouraitis in, ‘Jihad and Crusade: Byzantine Positions
Toward the Notions of “Holy War”‘, Byzantina Συμμεικτα, 21
(2011), 11-63
MHR Mediterranean Historical Review
Pachymeres George Pachymeres, 'Historia', in A Translation and Historical
Commentary of Book One and Book Two of the 'Historia' of
Geōrgios Pachymēres, trans. by Nathan John Cassidy (Un-
published PhD thesis: University of Western Australia, 2004)
Tudela Benjamin of Tudela, The Itinerary of Rabbi Benjamin of
Tudela, ed. and trans. by A. Asher (New York: Hakesheth,
1840)
Vatatzes ‘Constantinople, The Inalienable Capital’, in Byzantium,
Church, Society and Civilisation Seen Through Contemporary
Eyes, ed. by D.J. Geanakoplos (London: University of Chicago
Press, 1986)
Page 3
Villehardouin Geoffrey of Villehardouin, The Conquest of Constantinople, in
Chronicles of the Crusades, trans. by Caroline Smith (London:
Penguin, 2008)
Page 4
A Dying Empire?
Do Byzantine accounts of the period 1204-1261 support or

contradict the claim that the Byzantine Empire was ‘mortally
wounded’ by the loss of its capital?
Introduction
The twentieth-century historian Steven Runciman wrote in his influential work The
History of the Crusades that the Fourth Crusade’s capture of Constantinople in 1204 equated
to a “mortal wound” for the Byzantine Empire.1 The Collins English Dictionary defines a
mortal blow ‘...as ending in or causing death...’.2 The intimation from Runciman is that the
Fourth Crusade caused the demise of the Byzantine Empire. Runciman’s perspective is
echoed by Speros Vryonis, who stated that the 1204 capture of the Imperial capital was ‘...a
blow to the heart of the Empire...’.3 Whilst Constantinople was indeed the administrative
heart of the empire, Vryonis’ metaphorical comparison of the empire to that of a physical
body - its Anatolian provinces “amputated” by Turkish enemies - reveals Vryonis’ belief that
the Byzantine Empire was fatally wounded by the events of 1204. Similarly, John Julius
Norwich expresses these previous views on the impact of the Fourth Crusade unequivocally;
‘... the Byzantine empire never recovered its strength, or any considerable part of its lost
dominion...’.4 A more extreme view is offered by Patrick O’Connell who offers the
perspective that, upon Constantinople’s capture, the Byzantine Empire ceased to exist - a
1
Steven Runciman, A History of the Crusades: The Kingdom of Acre, 3 vols (London: Folio Society, 1992), vol 3,
p.109.
2
‘Mortal’, in The Collins English Dictionary, 9th edn (Glasgow: Harper Collins, 2007), p.1060.
3
Speros Vryonis, ‘The Decline of Byzantine Civilisation in Asia Minor, Eleventh-Fifteenth Century. Remarks on
the Dumbarton Oaks Symposium of 1974’, DOP, 29 (1975), 351-356 (p.353).
4
J. J. Norwich, Byzantium: The Decline and Fall (London: Knopf, 1995), pp.182-3.
Page 5
concept repeated by the political theorist Edward Luttwak.5 However, a contrasting
perspective to the mortal wounding caused by the Fourth Crusade exists. Michael Angold
argues that, whilst the fall of Constantinople in 1204 is often perceived as a turning point in
Byzantine history, the continuation of Byzantine traditions within the imperial rump states
ensured the setback was only temporary.6 Conversely, Warren Treadgold places even less
significance upon the events of 1204 arguing that the successor states of Epirus, Nicaea and
Trebizond accounted for more than half of the thirteenth-century Empire themselves
following Constantinople’s capture. Furthermore, in contrast to O’Connell, Norwich and
Luttwak, Treadgold concludes that the Byzantine Empire was recreated following the
recapture of Constantinople in 1261 and recovered much of its former power.7
It must be acknowledged that, with the notable exception of Treadgold, the discussion
regarding the impact that the Fourth Crusade’s capture of Constantinople had upon the fate of
the Byzantine Empire, is often assessed in association with the final capture of
Constantinople by the Ottomans in 1453. However, this study seeks to assess specific and
prominent examples contained in Byzantine accounts regarding the economic plight and the
social, political and religious ideological reactions that occurred - predominantly within the
Empire of Nicaea - during the period of imperial exile, 1204-1261. To this end, this paper
intends to assess the evidence concerning the period of exile, in order to illustrate that, far
from inflicting a “mortal wound” upon the Byzantine Empire, the events of 1204 in fact
galvanised the Byzantines to reclaim the lost territories, particularly their capital of
Constantinople.
5
Patrick O’Connell, ‘The Greeks and Reunion up to the Fall of Constantinople’, An Irish Quarterly Review, 49
(1960), 68-81 (p.68); Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire (London: Harvard
University Press, 2009), pp.3, 234.
6
Michael Angold, A Byzantine Government in Exile: Government and Society Under the Laskarids of Nicaea
1204-1261 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p.1.
7
Warren Treadgold, ‘The Persistence of Byzantium’, The Wilson Quarterly, 22 (1998), 66-91 (p.78).
Page 6
Economic Prosperity in Nicaea
Contemporaneous descriptions of Constantinople’s opulence from Western European
visitors are of awe. Accompanying the First Crusade, Fulcher of Chartres described the
beauty and prosperity of Constantinople.8 Similarly, Benjamin of Tudela wrote of the
grandeur of St. Sophia and the emperor’s palaces.9 A soldier of the Fourth Crusade, Robert of
Clari, remarked that the ‘...Greeks say that two-thirds of the wealth of the world is in
Constantinople and the other third scattered throughout the rest of the world...’ whilst other
commentators could not believe that such a city could have existed.10 Constantinople exuded
an aura of wealth to the known world and represented the most important physical illustration
of imperial affluence.
Constantinople’s extraordinary prosperity was predominantly due to its geographic
position, which made the city the centre of global trade.11 The imperial customs duty, the
Kommerkion, harvested ten-percent of all transactions, imports and exports. Consequently,
coins of all types were freely exchanged throughout the city.12 According to one visitor, the
income of Constantinople from rents and trade amounted to 20,000 florins daily.13 Upon such
information of the city’s financial power and contemporary testimony of the city’s
magnificence, it is reasonable to conclude that losing such a city would constitute an
economic catastrophe.
8
Fulcher of Chartres, ‘Historia Hierosolymitana’, in A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem, 1095-1127, ed. by
Harold S. Fink, trans. by Frances Rita Ryan (London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1972), pp.176-7.
9
Benjamin of Tudela, The Itinerary of Rabbi Benjamin of Tudela, ed. and trans. by A. Asher (New York:
Hakesheth, 1840) vol. 1, p.54.
10
Robert of Clari, The Conquest of Constantinople, trans. by Edgar H. McNeal (Chichester: Columbia University
Press, 2005), p.101; Geoffrey of Villehardouin, The Conquest of Constantinople, in Chronicles of the Crusades,
trans. by Caroline Smith (London: Penguin, 2008), p.34.
11
George Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, trans. by Joan Hussey (New Brunswick, Rutgers
University Press, 2009), p.74; Jonathan Harris, Constantinople: Capital of Byzantium, 2nd edn (London:
Bloomsbury, 2017), p.103.
12
Harris, Constantinople, p.98-103.
13
Tudela, p.53.
Page 7
However, Byzantine evidence contradicts such an obvious conclusion. In explaining
the economic stability of the successor state, the Empire of Nicaea, scholars have given much
of the credit to Emperor John III Vatatzes (1221-53).14 A.A. Vasiliev regards John III’s
contribution to Nicaean economic growth as especially noticeable.15 Eleni Lianta attributes
John III’s reign with the growth of economic power in Nicaea.16 Similarly, Jonathan Harris
calls John III the ‘...real architect of Nicaean success...’ which was, in part, due to his
economic acumen.17 Such praise is predominantly attributed to the testimony of the
Byzantine historian Nikephoros Gregoras (1295-1361) who places great significance upon
John III’s agricultural reforms. In his Roman History, Gregoras claims that John III chose
land suitable for arable cultivation personally and populated Nicaea plentifully with livestock
which consistently provided him with significant income, and ensured the Empire of Nicaea
was plentifully supplied.18 John III’s successful implementation of such autarkic policies is
symbolised by the possibly anecdotal “egg crown”; a gift of a coronet made with pearls and
precious stones, financed by the sale of eggs from his personal estate.19 Such testimony
supposes that the loss of Constantinople was not economically significant to the Empire of
Nicaea. However, Gregoras was likely writing in the early-to-mid thirteenth century and was
therefore not a contemporary of the reign of John III.20
14
Jonathan Harris, Byzantium and the Crusades, 2nd edn (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), pp.190-1; Angold,
Government, p.125.
15
A.A. Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire, 2nd edn, 2 vols (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1958),
vol. 2, p.546.
16
Eleni Lianta, ‘John II Comnenus (1118-43) or John III Vatatzes (1222-54)? (Distinguishing Between the
Hyperpyra of John II From Those OF John III), in The Numismatic Chronicle, 166 (2006), 269-299 (p.269)
17
Harris, Crusades, pp.190-1
18
Nikephoros Gregoras, Rhomäische Geschichte, trans. by J.L. Van Dieten, 4 vols (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann,
1973-94), vol. 1, pp.84-5.
19
Nikephoros Gregoras, Historia Romana, eds. by L. Schopen and I. Bekker (Bonn: Corpus Scriptorium Historiae
Byzantinae, 1829), pp.1, 14, 43; Ostrogorsky, p.443; ‘John III Doukas Vatatzes (1221-1254)’, Dumbarton Oaks
Research Library and Collection, https://www.doaks.org/resources/online-exhibits/gods-regents-on-earth-a-
thousand-years-of-byzantine-imperial-seals/rulers-of-byzantium/john-iii-doukas-1222-54 (accessed
20/07/2018).
20
Bojana Pavlović, “The Roman History” of Nikephoros Gregoras: Historical Analysis of his Work (Unpublished
PhD Thesis, University of Belgrade, 2014), p.1.
Page 8
In contrast, Georgios Akropolites (1217-1282) was present in Nicaea during the reign
of John III, yet Akropolites details nothing of John III’s agricultural reforms.21 Akropolites’
silence could be explained by there being nothing significant regarding the implementation of
agricultural development within the Empire of Nicaea to comment on. After all, the lands
around the western coastlands of Asia-Minor are incredibly fertile. The fertility of Nicaea is
mentioned as a factor by Harris and recognised by Michael Angold who comments that aside
from the quality of its soil and suitability for farming, the land possessed minimal natural
resources.22 What else then, if not sustenance, would the Nicaeans have produced before John
III’s accession as emperor? Historically, the provinces of the Byzantine Empire provided
foodstuffs to sustain Constantinople’s massive population. Egypt had provided sustenance to
Constantinople until the seventh century AD. Afterwards, Thrace and the lands around the
Aegean, which likely included that of western Asia-Minor, contributed to Constantinople’s
demand.23 As confirmed by Peter Thonemann, Nicaea’s agricultural infrastructure -
particularly that of the Maeander Valley - was functioning adequately before the Latin
invasion of Constantinople.24 What then should be made of John III’s prominence regarding
Nicaean economic growth within Gregoras’ History?
Such prominence - as argued by Angold - may be explained by Choniates’ concept of
the ideology of exile and the defence of Orthodoxy. 25 Choniates partly explained the loss of
Constantinople theologically; ‘...We know, O’ Lord, our sins and the iniquities of our
21
George Akropolites, The History, trans. by Ruth Macrides (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp.165-
271.
22
Harris, Crusades, pp.190-1; Angold, Government, p.102.
23
Harris, Constantinople, pp.95-6.
24
Peter Thonemann, The Meander Valley: A Historical Geography From Antiquity to Byzantium (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp.180-3.
25
Michael Angold, ‘Byzantium in Exile’, in The Cambridge Medieval History: Vol.5, c.1198-1300, ed. by D.
Abulafia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.543-68 (p.545).
Page 9
fathers...’.26 Exile was God’s punishment for Byzantine sins and in exile, they would atone
and recover divine favour.27 Gregoras not only lauded John III’s agricultural reforms and
autarkic policy he was also keen to celebrate John III’s social awareness.28 In conflation with
Choniates’ “ideology of exile”, achieving self-sufficiency in Nicaea was an act of penance:
He (John III) desired that each be able to supply his wants from his own
resources so that he would not lay an avaricious hand on the common,
socially inferior man. At the same time he desired that Roman society be
henceforth completely cleansed of injustice.29
Gregoras also records that excess foodstuffs were granted to the neighbouring Seljuks during
a great famine.30 Whilst this apparently financially benefitted the Nicaeans, such a move
could be interpreted as Christian charity toward one’s enemies or even virtuous mercy.31
However, we must also consider Michael Angold’s assertion that John III’s debasing of gold
coinage indicates gold was in scant supply.32 Consequently, supplying the Seljuks was a
practical remedy to such a shortage.
What is seemingly underrepresented by scholars assessing the economic prosperity of
Nicaea - and in particular John III - is the almost hagiographic depiction of John III described
by Gregoras.33 Two things need to be considered. First, Gregoras was writing sometime after
Constantinople had been reclaimed and, most significantly, John III had been canonised as
26
Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, Annals of Niketas Choniates, trans. by Harry J. Magoulias (Detroit:
Wayne State University Press, 1984), p.318.
27
Angold, ‘Exile’, p.545.
28
Gregoras, pp..84-5.
29
Gregoras, pp.84-5.
30
Gregoras, pp.84-5.
31
M. Ciolfi, ‘John III Vatatzes: History, Myth and Propaganda’, in Landscapes of Power, eds. by Maximilian Lau,
Caterina Franchi and Morgan Di Rodi (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2014), pp.273-288 (p.276).
32
Angold, Government, pp.117-18.
33
for re-examination of contemporary perspectives of John III see Lorenzo M. Ciolfi, ‘John III Vatatzes: History,
Myth and Propaganda’, in Landscapes of Power, eds. by Maximilian Lau, Caterina Franchi and Morgan Di Rodi
(Oxford: Peter Lang, 2014), pp.273-288.
Page
10
Emperor John Vatatzes The Merciful. Both Ruth Macrides and Lorenzo Ciolfi point out that
Akropolites alludes to John III’s sanctification when detailing the emperor’s passing, stating
that John III was called “blessed”, or ‘the Merciful’ even in his own lifetime.34 Furthermore,
Akropolites eulogised John III as a compassionate ruler who ‘...by his management of affairs
[…] showed himself the best among us all...’.35 John III’s contemporaneous reputation as a
kind and generous ruler would only have aided Gregoras’ perception that John’s actions were
instrumental in atoning for the sins of the Byzantine people.36
It must be recognised that Gregoras’ perspective of John III chronicles the deeds of a
man seen as the catalyst for Constantinople’s reclamation - a reclamation only possible
through divine favour - who was later canonised for those deeds. However, Akropolites also
details John’s carnal exploits.37 This balanced description of John III provides further
grounds for Akropolites’ failure to mention John III’s agricultural reforms - and for
Gregoras’ possible exaggeration of John’s contribution to those reforms: Akropolites was
chronicling the life and deeds of a man, Gregoras was writing those of a saint.
Gregoras’ hyperbolic depiction of John III should not however diminish the
historian’s message of agricultural prosperity in post-1204 Nicaea, or John III’s effective
administration of it. Thonemann records several examples of John III sanctioning the
establishment of fisheries.38 However, Akropolites’ silence on Nicaean economic prosperity
leaves much of the detailing to near-contemporaries. Subsequently, John III’s impact on the
34
Ruth Macrides, ‘Commentary’, in George Akropolites: The History, trans. and ed. by Ruth Macrides Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008), p.277; Ciolfi, p.276; Akropolites, p.271; Ostrogorsky, p.444; Nathan John
Cassidy, A Translation and Historical Commentary of Book One and Book Two of the ‘Historia’ of Geōrgios
Pachymēres (Un-published PhD thesis: University of Western Australia, 2004), p.164.
35
George Akropolites, ‘Funeral Speech for John III Vatatzes (1254), in Social and Political Thought in Byzantium
from Justinian to the Last Palaeologus, trans. by E. Barker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), p.160;
Akropolites, History, p.271.
36
George Pachymeres, ‘Historia’, in A Translation and Historical Commentary of Book One and Book Two of the
‘Historia’ of Geōrgios Pachymēres, trans. by Nathan John Cassidy (Un-published PhD thesis: University of
Western Australia, 2004), pp30-2; Cassidy, Commentary, pp.164-5.
37
Akropolites, History, p.271.
38
Thonemann, pp.136 n.12, 320-1.
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11
Nicaean economy is often inferred by confirmation of economic stability after his reign.
Angold’s explanation of Nicaean economic management and prosperity during the period of
exile is perhaps the most comprehensive. Franz Miklosich and Josef Muller’s compendium of
Greek manuscripts and monastic documents feature heavily, detailing transhumance
pastoralism, the increase in cultivation of vineyards and olive groves, and the building of new
mills.39 Theodore Scutariotes details that corn was stockpiled in the cities and countryside
whilst George Pachymeres praises John III’s management and cultivation of the land.40 Some
success should perhaps be attributed to Theodore I Laskaris since he encouraged refugees
from Latin-held territories to settle in Nicaea, representing an obvious increase in demand for
foodstuffs.41 However, Theodore I’s reign focussed upon remedying the immediate issues in
the province - quelling unrest in Nicaea, securing the frontier against the Seljuks,
repopulating the province and implementing a continuation of imperial administration.42
Conversely, John III’s successor, Theodore II Laskaris praised the fertility of the regions
around Smyrna, Sardis and the Kaystros Valley, emphasising the work of his father.43 It
seems reasonable to conclude that the agricultural prosperity of Nicaea clearly flourished and
became profitable between the reigns of the two Theodores; during the reign of John III.
Further evidence of Nicaea’s self-sufficiency is provided by George Pachymeres
(1241/2-1307), though attributed to the protection of the Nicaean frontiers.44 According to
Pachymeres, frontiersmen were granted tax exemptions in return for protection of frontier
territories.45 The fact that tax-exemption - likely only applied to land-tax - is mentioned as a
39
40
Pachymeres , p.31; Angold, pp.103;
41
42
Akropolites, pp.117-20; Angold, ‘Exile’, pp.544-5; Angold, Government, pp.97-8; Vasiliev, p.547; Ostrogorsky,
pp.427-31.
43
Angold, Government, p.102.
44
Pachymeres, p.4.
45
Pachymeres, pp.3-4.
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12
privilege indicates that tax-collection was operating in Nicaea.46 However, it is a near-
contemporary, likely writing after 1261, that provides this information. Fortunately, Angold
returns to Miklosich and Muller to show that frequent demands for pasturage tax (ennomion)
are recorded in monastic documents during exile.47 Furthermore, M.C. Bartusis also provides
evidence of tax transactions and exemptions regarding both land (synone/sitarkia) and hearth
(kapnikon/agape) taxes as early as 1214.48 Theodore I’s implementation of imperial
administration ensured that the tax-raising machine in Nicaea continued to operate after the
fall of Constantinople.49 Taxes were collected without any radical augmentation to the
imperial tax system, aside from the introduction of epiteleia - the attachment of fiscal value to
property.50 These frontiersmen acquired significant fortunes and populated the frontier areas
with large flocks of sheep and cattle, enhancing their personal wealth with ambushes on
Turkoman raiders.51
Furthermore, Pachymeres also mentions the granting of pronoia (meaning “care” or
“solicitude”) to frontiersmen, possibly providing further insight into the economic stability
within the new empire.52 Nathan John Cassidy defines pronoia as ‘...a temporary grant to a
private individual of revenues that would otherwise have gone to the imperial coffers [...] this
revenue provided a set income to the individual pronoiar...’.53 However, the function of
pronoiai has been contested. George Ostrogorsky argued - with some lasting influence - that
pronoiai during the period of exile bore no difference to the Western feudum. In this regard,
Ostrogorsky claimed that the granting of pronoiai was for military ends - essentially
46
Cassidy, p.92.
47
48
M.C. Bartusis, Land and Privilege in Byzantium: The Institution of Pronoia (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2012), pp.172-5, 176-80.
49
Angold, ‘Exile’, p.549; Ostrogorsky, p.427.
50
Angold, ‘Exile’, p.549;
51
Pachymeres, pp.3-4; Angold, Government, pp.101-02.
52
Bartusis, Pronoia, p.14-5.
53
Cassidy, p.93.
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13
signalling the feudalisation of Byzantium.54 Ostrogorsky’s military “pronoia system” is at
odds with the definition provided by Cassidy. Furthermore, Bartusis’ recent study on the
function of pronoia partially confirms Cassidy’s assertion that pronoia was a grant of land
that provided financial revenue to the pronoiar.55
Several examples provided by Bartusis regarding the period of exile indicate that tax
revenues from properties were owed to the pronoiar. However, monasteries were seemingly
tax-exempt because they were technically either land-owners or inhabited imperial lands.56
The founding of monasteries and their exemption from tax indicate that the role of these
institutions was to work the land.57 Furthermore, the pronoiar seemingly did not have to own
property in their pronoiai to collect its taxes. Owning land within their own pronoiai
effectively granted them a tax-exemption on that property.58 Angold argues that the growth in
grants of pronoia and estates were intended to reorganise land cultivation, whilst maintaining
land integrity by consolidating smaller peasant properties into larger estates increasing
profit.59 However, Bartusis shows that soldiers were also made pronoiar. In this regard,
military needs must have been part of the pronoia concept, certainly in regard to
frontiersman.60 We will return to the military aspect of pronoia later.
Economically, pronoia served multiple functions. By granting pronoia exemptions
and revenue to frontiersmen, internal land production could flourish unhindered.61 The
consolidation of land and creation of large agrarian estates made for easier administration,
54
Ostrogorsky, pp.371, 425; Vasiliev, p.546; Kenneth M. Setton, ‘On the Importance of Land Tenure and
Agrarian Taxation in the Byzantine Empire, From the Fourth Century to the Fourth Crusade’, The American
Journal of Philology, 74 (1953), 225-259 (p.256).
55
Bartusis, Pronoia, p.1.
56
Bartusis, Pronoia, pp.172-5; Ekaterini Mitsiou, ‘The Monastery of Sosandra: A Contribution to its History,
Dedication and Localisation’, Bulgaria Mediaevalis, 2 (2011), 665-684 (pp.670-2).
57
58
Bartusis, Pronoia, pp.172-80.
59
60
Bartusis, Pronoia, pp.172, 176; Angold, Government, p.125.
61
Pachymeres, p.4.
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14
greater production and an increase in those paying ennomion, sitarkia and agape taxes, whilst
the creation of monasteries was possibly intended to increase agricultural output.62 The loss
of revenue due to privileges granted to the frontiersman would therefore be compensated
through the protection they provided to the rest of the empire.
External trade in the Empire of Nicaea is attested to, but its effects on the Nicaean
economy are largely indiscernible. However, contemporary Theodore II Laskaris writes that
foreign luxuries were available to the Nicaean elite, whilst there is evidence of Italian
merchants being present in Adramyttion.63 Given the agricultural production of Nicaea, it is
reasonable to assume that the majority of exports would have been foodstuffs. The extended
dominance over the region exhibited by the Venetians following 1204 brought them freedom
from trade dues in Nicaea during the period between 1214 and 1219, which likely restricted
income from trade in the region.64 However John III’s aggressive stance toward the Venetians
would have required an alteration of trade policy. This change was the prohibition concerning
the purchase of foreign clothing.65 Such a decision could theoretically improve domestic
production and subsequently further boost the Nicaean economy; fitting with John III’s
autarkic policy and allowing him to pursue an aggressive policy toward the Latins.
A similar concept can be found in the economic mainstay of fourteenth-century
England: the value of wool. Edward III prohibited the import of cloth from Flanders and the
export of raw wool from England in 1337. This prohibition served two primary purposes.
62
Saint Benedict of Nursia, ‘Holy Rule of St. Benedict’, in The Holy Rule of St. Benedict, trans. by Rev. Boniface
Verheyen (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 1949), p.55; E. F. Arnold, Negotiating the
Landscape: Environment and Monastic Identity in the Medieval Ardennes (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2013), pp.79-80; Angold, Government, pp. 108, 113.
63
Angold, Government, p.114; W. Heyd, Histoire du Commerce du Levant Au Moyen-Age, 2 vols (Leipzig: Otto
Harrassowitz, 1885), vol. 1, pp.305-6.
64
David Jacoby, ‘The Economy of Latin Constantinople, 1204–1261’, in Urbs Capta: The Fourth Crusade and its
Consequences ed. by A.E. Laiou (Paris, Éditions Lethielleux, 2005), pp.195-214 (p.206); Vasiliev, p.547; Donald
M. Nicol, Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008), p. 163.
65
Gregoras, pp.84-5.
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15
First, an economic war on the Low Countries who depended upon English wool for their
cloth, designed to force the leaders of Flanders to side with Edward against France. Secondly,
to boost production and cost of English wool and cloth giving Edward exclusive rights to
income and materials for the coming war.66 As already stated, Pachymeres does comment
upon the large flocks of sheep in the Maeander Valley and upon the frontiers.67 John III’s
reasoning for prohibiting foreign clothing was likely similar to Edward III’s - to boost
internal production and revenue. The success of this law is impossible to definitively confirm.
However, Angold points out that John III could afford to sustain a standing army; something
even Byzantine emperors before 1204 had struggled to achieve facilitating his military
victories.68 Reclamation of former territory was certainly a priority for John III and it would
seem that restricting imports on clothing was designed to boost production and income within
his own demense to fund his military. We may suppose that, in connection with the economic
prosperity of the agrarian policies, the law may have been somewhat successful.
The evidence suggests that the Empire of Nicaea steeled themselves economically,
with some vigour and success following the loss of Constantinople. By comparison, the Latin
Empire of Constantinople faced economic strife, as evidenced by numerous papal calls for
financial aid and the selling of treasured relics to Western Europe.69 Constantinople’s
lucrativeness as a centre of trade declined significantly during the early13th century,
impeding Constantinople’s financial potential.70 Furthermore, the partioning of the conquered
Greek lands into what David Jacoby describes as ‘...a feudal superstructure...’ impeded the
66
see W. Mark Ormrod, Edward III, (London: Yale University Press, 2011) pp.187-9, 194-8 and Michael
Prestwich, Plantagenet England 1225-1360 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.304.
67
Pachymēres, pp.3-4.
68
Angold, ‘Exile’, p.549; Akropolites, pp.165-6, 169-71, 187-8, 194-5.
69
Pope Innocent IV, ‘...to Bishop of Tusculum, papal legate, 6 November 1246’, in The Seventh Crusade:
sources and Documents, trans. by Peter Jackson (Surrey: Ashgate, 2009), p.28; Norman P. Tanner, Decrees of
the Ecumenical Councils: Nicaea to Lateran V, 2 vols (London: Sheed and Ward, 1990), vol. 1, pp.295-6.
70
Charles W. Oman, The Byzantine Empire (Pennsylvania, WA, Westholme, 20080), p.310; Harris,
Constantinople, p.160. For opposing argument see David Jacoby, ‘After the Fourth Crusade: The Latin Empire
of Constantinople and the Frankish States’, in The Cambridge History of the Byzantine Empire c.500-1492, ed.
by J. Shepard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp.759-778 (pp.759-62).
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16
centralised tax collection enjoyed by previous Byzantine emperors.71 Angold remarks that
‘...the loss of Constantinople made for more efficient government...’.72
In light of the economic woes of the Latin Empire, one might conclude that the
imperial administration in Nicaea was healthier economically than the Angelos dynasty had
been during the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. After all, the imperial
administration’s inability to pay the crusaders 200,000 marks in 1204 was fundamental to the
crusaders’ decision to capture Constantinople.73 A smaller demense certainly facilitated John
III’s effective economic control and the implementation of autarkic economic policies. The
fertile region of Nicaea which he inherited allowed such policies to prove incredibly
effective.
71
Harris, Constantinople, p.160; David Jacoby, ‘From Byzantium to Latin Romania: Continuity and Change’,
MHR, 4 (1989), 1-44 (p.3).
72
73
Villehardouin, p.50
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17
The True-self: Adoption of “Hellenic” Imperial Identity
The loss of Constantinople robbed the Byzantines of their visible representation of
“wealthy” empire. However, the greatest potential wound inflicted by events of 1204 was
ideological. Creating a perception of affluence was but one aspect of a Byzantine identity that
ownership of the city of Constantinople provided; that of Roman. The reasons for the belief
in a correlation between Romaness and Constantinople is clearly iterated by the tenth-century
Bishop Liudprand of Cremona, and Anna Komnene writing in the twelfth century. Both
stress the importance of Constantine’s founding of his “new Rome”, Constantinople, and the
transfer of imperial authority to the city; Constantinople granted them rights to the “Roman”
identity.74
This imperial lineage was often employed by Byzantine panegyrics to extol the
assertion that the Roman Emperor claimed dominion over the entire world - oikoumene.75
Romaness therefore, was an identity that distinguished the Byzantines from the rest of the
world. The eleventh-century cleric, Michael Psellos, explained Roman dominance as a
combination of prestige, wealth and wisdom; key components to the Byzantine ethos of
cultural superiority.76 Identical concepts were also extolled during Liudprand of Cremona’s
visit to Constantinople.77 Constantinople represented the concept of Romaness and Byzantine
cultural superiority. A belief in the cultural gulf between the Byzantines and the Western
“barbarians” is given greater prominence by John Kinnamos;
for the title of empire disappeared from Rome a long time back, since the
74
Luidprand of Cremona, The Embassy to Constantinople and Other Writings, eds. by F.A. Wright and John
Julius Norwich (London: Dent, 1993), p.201; Anna Komnene, The Alexiad, trans. by E.R.A. Sewter and P.
Frankopan (London: Penguin, 2009), p.39; Harris, Constantinople, pp.23-4, 28.
75
Dimiter Angelov, Imperial Ideology and Political Thought in Byzantium, 1204 -1330 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006), p.83; Harris, Crusades, p.18; Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the
Roman Empire, ed. by Hand-Friedrich Mueller, 6 vols (London: Modern Library, 2005), vol. 3, pp.298-9.
76
Michael Psellos, Fourteen Byzantine Rulers (Chronographia), trans. by E.R.A. Sewter, 2nd edn (London:
Penguin, 1966), p.170.
77
Cremona, p.203.
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18
attributes of power passed […] to Odovakar and then to Theodoric, ruler of
the Goths.78
When considered in relation to the concepts of Romaness described by Michael Psellos and
Liudprand of Cremona, Kinammos reveals the true scale of the cultural gulf that the
Byzantines believed existed between them and the West: barbarians - such as Odovakar and
Theodoric - were not culturally sophisticated enough to be Emperor of the Romans.
Therefore, the loss of Constantinople to the Latins greatly threatened their claim to the
“Roman” identity and subsequently, the Byzantine belief of superiority. Angold supposed
that, since the “Roman” identity was so intertwined with the imperial pretensions of the
capital, a change in definition was necessary.79 The change to which Angold refers is the
adoption of the term “Hellene” as a means of identification, something that became more
common during the period of exile.80 Such a move seems unusual since “Hellene” and its
derivatives carried negative connotations of pagan Greece and, whilst the terms Graecia and
Graeci appeared more palatable, they were still considered somewhat derogatory until the
twelfth century.81 The motive for adopting a Hellenic identity at such a crucial juncture has
led to theories regarding the formation of national identities or the desire for a continuation of
intellectual supremacy. Of course these are semantic distinctions of the same issue: the need
to maintain cultural individuality and superiority - essential to the “Roman” ideology - over
the “barbarian” Latins.82
78
John Kinnamos, The Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus, trans. by C.M. Brand (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1976), p.165.
79
80
Angold, Government, p.29; Paul J. Alexander, ‘The Strength of Empire and Capital as Seen Through Byzantine
Eyes’, Speculum, 37 (1962), 339-357 (p.340); Harris, Crusades, pp182-3; Anthony Kaldellis, Hellenism in
Byzantium: The Transformations of Greek Identity and the Reception of the Classical Tradition (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.360; Angelov, Ideology, p.95.
81
Alexander, p.340; Harris, Crusades, pp182-3; Angelov, Ideology, p.96.
82
Michael Angold, ‘Byzantine ‘Nationalism’ and the Nicaean Empire’, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 1
(1975), 49-70 (p.65).
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19
The necessity in redefining the Roman identity is self-evident. If Constantinople was
vital to their “Roman” claim, by their own rhetoric, they were now no longer “Roman” and
the Latins could now rightfully claim the “Roman” name. George Akropolites even confessed
that Romaness was common to both Latin and Byzantine peoples.83 Was the decision to adopt
a Hellenic identity simply to avoid confusion regarding the contentious “Roman” identity?
Anthony Kaldellis argues the Hellenic identity was used to buttress the Nicaean “Roman”
claim against the Latin claim, differentiating between “Hellenic Romans” and “Latin
Romans”.84 Kaldellis’ theory is supported by Patriarch Germanos II’s correspondence with
Western churchmen to which he often identified the Orthodox population as “Greek”.85
However, such an assertion would need Byzantine recognition of the Latin claim to the
“Roman” label. In a letter to Pope Gregory IX, John III Vatatzes voiced his grievance
regarding Latin occupation of Constantinople in these terms;
‘...our rights of government and of authority over Constantinople which go
back a thousand years to Constantine the Great. The ancestors of our
majesty [...] came from the “Greek” race and for many centuries held sway
over Constantinople...’.86
John III shows no such recognition. In fact he uses a double claim to Constantinople and the
“Roman” identity through Constantine and Greek lineage. The message here is that the Latins
have no legitimate claim to Constantinople or the “Roman” identity since they are neither
beneficiaries of Constantine nor culturally “Hellenic”. Furthermore, the Hellenic identity is
used in situations where clarity of “Roman” identification is not necessary, such as Theodore
83
George Akropolites, ‘Against the Latins’, in Georgii Acropolitae Opera, ed.by A. Heisenberg, 2 vols (Stuttgart:
1978) vol. 2, p.64, trans. by Berend Titulaer, in O, Lost City of New Rome: The Byzantine Outlook on
Constantinople From Exile (Nijmegen: Un-published Master Thesis, 2017), p.1.
84
Kaldellis, p.361.
85
Angelov, Ideology, p.95-6.
86
John Vatatzes, ‘Constantinople, The Inalienable Capital’, in Byzantium, Church, Society and Civilisation Seen
Through Contemporary Eyes, ed. by D.J. Geanakoplos (London: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p.35.
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20
II Laskaris’ address to his troops identifying them all as “Greek”.87 Therefore, it is too
simplistic to accept that the “Hellenic” addition was simply to facilitate definition between
Western and Eastern “Romans”.
The implementation of “Hellene” into the Byzantine self-identity has led to some
scholars to interpret it an early sign toward Greek nationalism. Vasiliev championed this
concept,88 whilst Ian Moles theorises that the crusader capture of 1204 withered Roman
traditions within the Byzantine Empire, and that political disintegration was a prerequisite to
“Hellenic” national awareness.89 Such theories would be disagreeable to scholars of
Byzantine nationhood. Johannes Koder argues that the average Byzantine would have
identified as Roman.90 Similarly, Kaldellis concludes that political culture had abolished
ethno-cultural diversity within the Byzantine Empire from the seventh century AD, with
Roman political culture assimilating the masses, thus identifying them as Roman.91 Both
perspectives imply that the entire empire understood themselves to be “Roman”. The issue
with such theories - as correctly identified by Ioannis Stouraitis - is that they ignore the origin
of the reported “Roman” identity; namely contemporary source material written by the
politico-intellectual upper stratum.92 Simply, material written by the intellectual or political
classes would not be representative of the lower-stratum’s self-identification.
Furthermore, belief of an existing, unified national identity does not take into account
that the exiles of Constantinople in the wake of its capture were not met with sympathy from
87
Theodore II Laskaris, ‘Formation of a “National” Greek Army’, in BCSCE, ed. by D.J. Geanakoplos (London:
University of Chicago Press, 1986), p.106.
88
Vasiliev, p.548, 582.
89
I.N. Moles, ‘Nationalism and Byzantine Greece’, Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 10 (1969), 95-107
(pp.99-100); Stephen G. Xydis, ‘Medieval Origins of Modern Greek Nationalism’ Balkan Studies, 11 (1970), 1-20
(p.1).
90
Johannes Koder, ‘Byzanz, Die Griechen und die Romaiosyne - eine “Ethnogenese” der “Römer”?, in Typen
der Ethnogenese unter Besonderer Berucksichtigung der Bayern Teil 1, ed. by H. Wolfram (Vienna:
Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1990), 103-111 (p.111).
91
Kaldellis, pp.42-119.
92
Ioannis Stouraitis, ‘Roman Identity in Byzantium: A Critical Approach’, Byzantinische Zeitschrift, 107 (2014),
175-220 (p.179).
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21
those in the imperial provinces.93 Such hostility can be linked to Byzantine policy.
Historically, the Byzantine Empire had been a centralised administration and the importance
and safety of the capital superseded all other concerns.94 Whilst Richard Knight argues that
decentralisation was taking place in the late twelfth century - a concept emphasised by
Choniates’ criticism of Manuel Komnenos - Constantinople’s importance to imperial
ideology, Manuel Komnenos’ mismanagement of taxation, and the legacy, a slow decay of
centralisation, likely meant the provincials felt somewhat neglected.95 Distinction between
the lower-classes and the “Roman” educated and political class and the feeling of provincial
iniquity is emphasised by Choniates;
The rustics and baseborn greatly taunted those of us from Byzantion. They
foolishly called the misery of our poverty and nakedness the equality of
civic rights [...] and they treat the Romans with arrogance and contempt.96
It appears apparent that any concept of “Roman” nationhood was not shared by either the
educated-political classes or the “rustics and baseborn”. Such clear class divide contradicts
any concept that the addition of “Hellene” to the “Roman” identity was intended to create any
‘...context of patriotism...’.97 It would appear that “Hellene”, like “Roman”, was the province
of the upper-class and intended to augment the Roman/Byzantine identity in order to
maintain its exclusivity.
Some scholars have also suggested that the “Hellenic” appropriation is evidence of
proto-nationalism. This perspective is argued by Stephen Xydis who believes that
“Hellenism” was designed to stimulate ethnic awareness to mobilise them against the
93
Akroplites, pp.117-8; Choniates, p.326.
94
Tudela, pp.53-4; Harris, Crusades, pp.16-18, 28.
95
Choniates, pp.115-19; Richard Knight, The Political Economy of Byzantium: Transaction Costs and the
Decentralisation of the Byzantine Empire in the Twelfth Century (London: MSc Dissertation, London Scholl of
Economics, 2013), p.1; Ostrogorsky, pp.393-4; Harris, Crusades, p.28.
96
Choniates, p.326.
97
Angold, ‘Nationalism’, p.65.
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22
Latins.98 Additionally, Apostolos Vakalopoulos argues that Hellenic identity was naturally
stimulated by ‘...cultural differences in the presence of alien conquerors...’ and was intended
to replace their “Roman” identity.99 However, Dimitri Angelov correctly argues that the
adoption of “Hellene” and its derivatives showed little evidence of replacing the existing
“Roman” ideology.100 As early as 1208, the oath of the Byzantine clergy to Theodore I
Laskaris promised that they would pledge themselves to the emperor of the Romans, with
“Roman” still being used in the reign of John III. 101 Angelov argues that “Hellenism” was
characterised by a few literati and therefore unlikely to have been representative of official
Nicaean political ideology. Additionally, Angelov states Theodore II Laskaris was one of the
primary exponents of the Hellenic identity.102 It can be argued that the longer the exiled
Byzantines were without Constantinople, the more important the Hellenic distinction became
to the “Roman” identity. That “Hellene” was utilised by prominent ruling individuals of
Nicaea for political means indicates that it was somewhat more accepted within the changing
political ideology of Nicaea than supposed by Angelov.103 Hellenic identification facilitated
the Nicaean claim to be the legitimate “Romans”.
Seemingly less considered is how the geographic use of “Hellene” complements its
use as a form of personal identity. Theodore II Laskaris’ references to the geography of
Nicaea as Hellas or Hellenkion complemented the contemporary poet Nikephoros
Blemmydes’ description of the north-west of Asia Minor, then still under Latin rule, as not
98
Xydis, pp.18-20; for explanation of proto-nationalism see Maurice Duverger, The Study of Politics (Surrey:
Nelson, 1972), pp.144-5; Walter Scheidel, Ian Morris, The Dynamics of Ancient Empires: State Power From
Assyria to Byzantium (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 5-6, 132.
99
Apostolos V. Vakalopoulos, Origins of the Greek Nation, 1204-1461 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University
Press, 1970), p.37.
100
Angelov, Ideology, p.97.
101
'Oath of the Byzantine Clergy to Emperor Theodore I Laskaris (1208)', in Nicolas Oikonomides, ed., 'Cinq
Actes Inedits du Patriarche Michel Autoreianos', Revue des Etudes Byzantines, 25 (1967), 113-45
102
103
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23
under the sceptre of the Hellene.104 The significance of the adoption of “Hellene” to
geographical identity possibly relates to concepts of rightful ownership of territory. For
example, consider the Norman Invasion of England. The lands and subjects of England were
de jure right of the crown despite William’s differing cultural heritage.105 Further illustration
can be found in the British occupation of Egypt in the nineteenth century; Egypt became a de
facto part of the British Empire yet the Ottoman Empire retained a de jure claim on the
territory.106 A more contemporary example is to highlight the concept of de jure or rightful
territory regarding the Byzantine attempts to reclaim Cyprus through papal intervention
following the Third Crusade.107 The capture of Constantinople by the Latins, and the
subsequent crowning of a Latin emperor produced a similar situation; the territories of
Byzantium - and its subjects - were now the de jure property of a French ruling class. Nicaea,
Epiros and Trebizond were only ruled by Byzantines de facto, but were de jure territories of
Romania - be that under a Byzantine or Latin - emperor.
Adoption of “Hellene” further legitimised claim to righteous ownership of the
Hellenic territories. By conflating the “Hellenic” and “Roman” identities for geographical
and cultural purposes, the Nicaean administration concurrently solved both the issues of
ownership of “Roman” identity and ownership of the Roman demense. According to Roman
law, the emperor had de jure authority over Europe and beyond, implicating that the Roman
104
Angold, ‘Nationalism’, pp.64-5.
105
John Gillingham, ‘Problems of Integration Within the Lands Ruled by the Norman and Angevin Kings of
England’, in Fragen der Politischen Integration im Mittelalterlichen Europa, ed. by Werner Maleczek
(Ostfildern: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 2005), pp.85-134 (pp.85-92); Marc Morris, The Norman Conquest (London:
Hutchinson, 2012), pp.319-20.
106
Mak, Lanver, The British in Egypt: Community, Crime and Crisis 1882-1922 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), pp.
10-11.
107
Abu Shama, ‘Le Livre des Deux Jardins: Histoire des Deux Regnes, Celui de Nour ed-Din et Cekui de Salah ed-
Din’, in Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Historiens Orientaux, 5 vols (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1872-
1906), vol. 4, pp.508-10; ‘Letter to Alexios III Angelos (March-April 1201)’, from The Deeds of Pope Innocent III,
ed. and trans., by J.M. Powell (Washington DC: Catholic University America, 2007), pp.94-5.
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24
identity came with de jure claim over imperial lands - in this case - Hellenic Greece.108 In
combination with the “Hellenic” geographic identity, the Nicaeans claimed that Hellenic
identity was a necessary component of the Roman identity. Effectively, adoption of the
cultural and geographic Hellenic identity served to reverse the de jure/de facto situation. The
Latins were not “Roman” despite their occupation of Constantinople since they had no claim
to Hellenic descent. They therefore had no claim to the historic “Hellenic” territories of the
“Roman”, Byzantine Empire - likely the intended message sent from John III to Pope
Gregory IX.109 From this perspective, the Latins were only de facto emperors; Nicaea was
held by the de jure, “Roman” administration. Such a concept was pivotal to the creation of
the Roman/Byzantine government in exile and continued ownership of the Oikoumene.
This move perhaps also served further geographical claims and cultural distinction
between Nicaea and Epiros. George Akropolites recorded how the Epirots ‘...drew back to
their own boundaries, namely the Pyrrenaia Mountains which separate Old and New Epiros
from our Hellenic land...’.110 Angold and Ruth Macrides both suppose that Akropolites was
drawing distinction between the Epirots and “Hellenic” Nicaeans.111 “Hellene” becomes
exclusive to the Nicaean “Roman” identity. Therefore, in relation to concepts of de jure
territory, similar to the motives of such an identification regarding Roman/Hellenic land
detailed above, Nicaea were claiming rightful ownership of all Hellenic Greece, including
that of their rival imperial claimants, Epiros. Like the Latins, the Epirots were pretenders and
de facto rulers of a territory that was de jure to the imperial authority of Nicaea.
We must then see the use of “Hellene” not as a means to distinguish between rival
108
Ryan Greenwood, ‘War and Sovereignty in Medieval Roman Law’ Law and History Review, 32 (2014), 31-63
(p.40).
109
see note 86
110
Akropolites, p.356.
111
Angold, ‘Nationalism’, p.64, Ruth Macrides, ‘Commentary, 80’, in George Akropolites ‘The History’, ed. and
trans. by Ruth Macrides (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.357.
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25
claims to the “Roman” identity or as a movement toward nationalism, but through a key
aspect of Byzantine political theory - restoration.112 Speaking of his own reign and his
establishment of Christianity as official imperial religion, Constantine celebrated it as a time
of renovation for the whole earth.113 Similarly, the reign of Emperor Basil I - chronicled by
Constantine Porphyrogenitus - is, according to Paul J. Alexander, replete with the ‘...language
of rejuvenation.114 Even Gregoras’ depiction of John III’s agricultural exploits allude to the
emperor himself revitalising the fertile Nicaean land single-handed.115 To the Nicaean
administration, the addition of the “Hellene” identifier redefined what constituted a true
“Roman,” essentially eliminating any possible Western affiliation to the “Roman” label.
Conflation of Hellenic identifiers regarding geographical concepts ensured that rightful
claims on the lands of the historic Hellenic Greeks of antiquity were joined with the “Roman”
identity. By being “Hellene”, the Nicaean administration not only redefined Romaness, they
renewed imperial authority in exile.
Maintaining the “Roman” identity also relied upon exhibiting tangible ideological
tenets. Constantinople’s legacy and visible wealth were tangible concepts of the lost imperial
identity, and wisdom was another fundamental component of the “Roman” identity. Whilst it
would seem that basic education and learning were widespread throughout the Byzantine
Empire, Constantinople had represented the intellectual capital of the empire.116 Vasiliev
highlights contemporary identification of Nicaea as ‘...an ancient Athens in her abundance of
scholars...’ which emphasises Theodores I Laskaris’ commitment to scholarship by inviting
112
Alexander, p.349.
113
Constantine the Great, ‘Letter to the Church of Nicomedia AD 325’, in Urkunden zur Geschichte des
Arianischen Streites, ed. by H.G. Opitz (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1934), p.59. Translation: Sed ego super istis
donis propter renovationem maxime orbis terrarem gaudebam - But I have been exceedingly glad of these gifts
particularly on account of the renovation of the whole world.
114
Alexander, p.350.
115
see note 18.
116
Athanasios Markopoulos, ‘In Search For “Higher Education” in Byzantium’, Zbornik Radova Vizantološkog
Instituta, 50 (2013), 29-44 (p.33); Harris, Constantinople, p.117; Michael J. Kyriakis, ‘The University: Origin and
Early Phases in Constantinople’, Byzantion, 4 (1971), 161-182 (pp. 164, 167)
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26
scholars to join him in his fledgling empire.117 This “Athenian” comparison is further
accentuated by John III who founded libraries and a palace school.118 To this end, Angold
argues that adoption of a Hellenic identity served to ‘...recover the intellectual heritage of
Byzantium...’.119 Theodore II Laskaris presided over a disputation between scholars of
Nicaea and a Hohenstaufen embassy. Unsurprisingly perhaps, Theodore II found the German
embassy wanting. The Nicaean victory apparently reflected greatly on the “Hellenes”.120
However there appears to be some discrepancy in the educational evaluation of
Nicaea, especially regarding “Hellenic” intellectualism. Angelov argues that eminent rhetors
Nikephoros Chrysoberges and Niketas Choniates failed to introduce Komnenian rhetorical
practices into Nicaean government. Furthermore, Theodore II Laskaris informs us that his
father, John III was unfavourable to “refined words”.121 Byzantine rhetoric was rooted in the
Hellenic Greece of antiquity and was spoken in Attic Greek - a language used for ‘...high
culture and administration...’.122 The use of rhetoric was perhaps the most authentic link to
Hellenism at their disposal.
The evidence does suggest that the emperors of Nicaea were keen to continue a
culture of education. Angold’s argument that the Latin capture of Constantinople revealed to
the exiled Byzantines the ‘...great strides made by western learning during the twelfth
century...’ has some credibility.123 During the latter stages of the twelfth century the Papacy
was active in encouraging study in the west and at Constantinople.124 However, such a
dismissal of rhetoric - a real example of Hellenic descent - surely indicates that promotion of
117
Vasiliev, p.548.
118
Vasiliev, pp.548-9; Angold, p.561.
119
Angold, ‘Exile’ p.561.
120
121
Angelov, Ideology, p.39-40.
122
Angelov, Ideology, p.18; Gregory Nagy, Greek Literature (Surrey: Routledge, 2001), p.179.
123
124
Lynn Thorndike, ed., University Records and Life in the Middle Ages (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), pp.19-
25; Vasiliev, p.548.
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27
Hellenic intellectualism did not necessarily define the Byzantines from the Latins.125 Whilst it
would appear that a perception of Hellenic intellectualism became more important during the
reign of Theodore II Laskaris, the addition of “Hellene” to the “Roman” identity had been
established some time before.126 It would appear that intellectual superiority was achieved
simply by the redefining of the “Roman” identity. Hellenism was applied to the whole
context of cultural superiority, not just the intellectual.
According to Dimitri Angelov scholars have cautioned that Hellenism made no
significant impact on Nicaean ideology.127 Additionally, since the adoption of the Hellenic
identity apparently began pre-1204, it is also reasonable to conclude that the capture of
Constantinople gave the decision to attach a “Hellenic” identity into the “Roman” persona a
‘...coherent expression...’.128 However, as argued above, there is rationale behind its
implementation. By using “Hellene” as a stipulation of the “Roman” identity, the Emperors
of Nicaea created a situation whereby you had to be subject of the Emperor of Nicaea to be
considered “Roman”. Such a concept apparently aided the submission of Melenkion in
1246.129 In light of the importance of the “Roman” identity to the Byzantine elite, the
importance of Constantinople regarding Romaness and the rival claimants to the “Roman”
name, the addition of Hellenic affiliation to the “Roman” identity must have been to renew
and rejuvenate their own selves and confirm their claims to imperial majesty. None of these
concepts present a mortally wounded administration, but one unwilling to surrender their
identity or their ‘...lawful rights to the government and authority over Constantinople...’.130
125
126
127
128
129
Akropolites, pp.230-1.
130
Vatatzes, p.35.
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28
A “New Jerusalem” and the Ideology of Exile
As discussed previously, the “Roman” identity was important to the political and geo-
cultural concept of Romaness. However, whilst separated in this study to facilitate analysis of
differing reactions of the Nicaean State to the loss of Constantinople, these concepts were
inseparable from the religious ideologies of the Empire.131 To emphasise this point, Norman
Baynes stated ‘...The subjects of the Roman Empire were convinced their polity was
approved by God [...] And if you believe that, what profits it to discuss other polities...’.132
Constantinople had never been seized by a foreign invader. The city’s greatness and
its inhabitants were thought to be protected by supernatural defenders.133 Like the political
status of the city, its holy status linked to Constantine whose adoption of Christianity created
the first Christian imperial capital. Constantine, and therefore all emperors, were appointed
‘... in imitation of the Higher Power...’ and was ‘... the helm of the earth and guides all its
affairs.134 The Roman Emperors were God’s vicars on Earth.135 Constantine’s adoption of
Christianity and the moving of the imperial capital represent the ultimate example of
Byzantine political rejuvenation and renewal. Arguably, Constantinople was more important
to the Byzantines than Jerusalem. Therefore, Constantinople was not just an administrative or
economic capital, it was also the Byzantine holy city.136 Not just a “New Rome”, but a “New
131
Tia M. Kolbaba, ‘Fighting for Christianity Holy War in the Byzantine Empire’, Byzantion, 68 (1998), 194-221
(p.219).
132
Norman H. Baynes, ‘The Thought-World of East Rome’, in Byzantine Studies and Other Essays (London: The
Athlone Press, 1955), pp.24-47 (p.32).
133
Alexander, p.339.
134
Eusebius of Caesarea, ‘Tridecennial Oration’, in BCSCE, ed. by D.J. Geanakoplos (London: University of
Chicago Press, 1986), p.17-18.
135
Patriarch Anthony IV, ‘Letter to the Grand Duke of Moscow’, in BCSCE, ed. by D.J. Geanakoplos (London:
University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp.143-4; Justinian, ‘Novel 6’, in E. Barker, Social and Political Thought in
Byzantium from Justinian I to the Last Palaeologus (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.75-6.
136
Harris, Constantinople, p.3.
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Jerusalem”.137
The loss of Constantinople triggered a dramatic alteration toward established religious
ideology within the Empire of Nicaea. In 1209 the Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople,
Michael IV Autoreianos (d.1212), addressed the armies of the newly crowned emperor
Theodore I Laskaris before battle with the Latins. In this address, the Patriarch accepted the
concept of remission of sins;
Having received from him the great gift of his grace, we pardon all the sins
of those among you who die fighting for the defence of their homeland and
for the well-being of the people of God.138
Michael Autoreianos’ statement proves pivotal in arguing the theory that the Byzantines were
not mortally wounded by the Fourth Crusade’s capture of Constantinople, but galvanised into
action because of it. This statement is significant for several reasons. In the first instance,
acceptance of remission of sins was unprecedented within established Byzantine
ecclesiastical ideology.139 Furthermore, it was representative of increased religious hostility
toward the Latins and finally, that the loss of Constantinople was the catalyst for such
changes.
The thirteenth canon of St. Basil (330-379) heavily influenced Byzantine policy
toward martyrdom and was used in counter to reject the request of Emperor Nikephoros II
137
John Mauropous, ‘Speech on St. George’s Day (1047)’, in A.P. Kazhdan and Ann Wharton Epstein, Change in
Byzantine Culture in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries (London: University of California Press, 1990), p.255;
Michael Angold, ‘Greeks and Latins After 1204: The Perspective of Exile’, MHR, 4 (1989), 63-86 (p.69).
138
‘Patriarch Michael IV Autoreianos to the Soldiers in Theodore I Laskaris’ Army (c.1209)’, in Nicolas
Oikonomides, ‘Cinq Actes Inedits du Patriarche Michel Autoreianos, Revue des Etudes Byzantines, 25 (1967),
113-45 (pp.115-17).
139
Ioannis Stouraitis, ‘Jihad and Crusade: Byzantine Positions Toward the Notions of “Holy War”‘, Byzantina
Συμμεικτα, 21 (2011), 11-63 (p.58).
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30
Phokas (963-969) to grant martyrdom to his soldiers who died in battle.140 It was argued that
that those who kill - even ‘... on behalf of chastity and true religion...’ - should abstain from
communion for three years.141 The basic tenets of “holy war” are thereby rejected. This
example is often cited as evidence that the Byzantines historically did not conceive Western
concepts of holy war, with one historian stating that scholars of Byzantine military history
reject theories of the evolution of holy war in Byzantium.142 If we agree with this conclusion,
what were the origins of Michael Autoreianos’ acceptance of martyrdom? Some scholars
have suggested that martyrdom was an incentive offered to Western troops within the
Nicaean army.143 Furthermore, Ioannis Stouraitis reduces the Patriarch’s “extraordinary”
message of remission of sins to a mere footnote stating that the message implies Western
influence.144 Both statements explain Michael Autoreianos’ decision as influenced by
Western invention, furthering the theory that holy war was an inconceivable notion until the
advent of the Crusades.145 Such conclusion would obviously diminish the significance of the
patriarch’s address.
However, the “Western influence” theory is unconvincing. Ascertaining a definition
of “holy war” is not the intention of this study, yet the thirteenth canon directly addresses the
concept of fighting on behalf of true faith. Its invocation in rejecting Nikephoros II Phokas’
140
John Skylitzes, Synopsis of Byzantine History, 811-1057, trans. by John Wortley (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), p.263.
141
St. Basil the Great, ‘Thirteenth Canon’, in The Treatise de Spiritu Sancto: The Nine Holilies of the
Hexaemeron and the Letters of Saint Basil the Great, ed. and trans. by Rev. Blomfield Jackson (New York:
Christian Literature Company, 1894), p.539; Basil the Great, ‘Amphilochio de Canonbus, Letter 188, canon 13’,
in Saint Basile Lettres, ed. Y. Courtonne, 2 vols (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1961), p.130, trans. by Tia M.
Kolbaba, in ‘Fighting for Christianity Holy War in the Byzantine Empire’, Byzantion, 68 (1998), 194-221 (p.205).
142
Kolbaba, p.205; Savvas Kyriakidis, ‘Crusaders and Mercenaries: the West-European Soldiers of the Laskarids
of Nicaea (1204-1258)’, MHR, 29 (2014), 139-153 (p.144).
143
Kyriakidis, ‘Crusaders’, p.143; Angelov, Ideology, pp.100-1.
144
Stouraitis, ‘Jihad’, p.58, n.118.
145
Kyriakidis, ‘Crusaders’,p.144; Stouraitis, ‘Jihad’, p.61.
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31
request addresses another key element of holy war; martyrdom.146 Furthermore, Patriarch
Athanasius of Alexandria, (298-373) argued that killing was lawful and permissible in war.147
Both examples predate the fall of the Western Roman Empire and the full Christianisation of
Western Europe, yet both address essential components of the holy war concept.148 Further
understanding of holy war in Byzantium is evident in the multiple uses of martyrdom by
various emperors addressing their troops in such terms from the seventh to the twelfth
century.149 Whilst it is likely correct that these exhortations of martyrdom were rhetorical
appeals to God, they should not be dismissed as anomalous.150 Additional evidence of
Byzantine understanding of holy war is found in a tenth-century version of the Triodion - the
liturgical book for the Easter cycle - housed in the Orthodox monastery of St. Catherine’s,
and contains clear reference to the remission of sins for soldiers.151
It must also be recognised that the Western concept of remission of sins differed to
that of Byzantium. “Western influence” can perhaps be identified in the language used. For
example, Pope Urban II and Fulcher of Chartres used the term “remission of sins” in
reference to the First Crusade (1095-1099).152 However, any suggestion of Western influence
146
for discussion of the concepts and definitions of Holy War and Crusade see Tia M. Kolbaba, ‘Fighting for
Christianity Holy War in the Byzantine Empire’, Byzantion, 68 (1998), 194-221; Jonathan Riley-Smith, What
Were the Crusades (London: Macmillan, 1977).
147
Anathanasius of Alexandria, ‘Letter to Amun circa 354’, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, trans. by
Archibald Robinson, eds. by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, 14 vols, (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing,
1892), vol. 4, available at https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Nicene_and_Post-Nicene_Fathers:_Series_II
(accessed 21/08/2019).
148
for decline of Western Rome see A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire, 284-602: A Social, Economic, and
Administrative Survey (Baltimore, MA, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp.1025-68; Peter J.
Heather, Empires and Barbarians: The Fall of Rome and the Birth of Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012); for Christianisation of Western Europe see Jean-Pierre Isbouts, ‘Jesus and the Origins of Christianity’,
National Geographic (2016), pp.36-9.
149
see Theophanes, Chronicle, trans. by C. Mango and R. Scott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.441-
3; Kolbaba, p.205; Stouraitis, ‘Jihad’, p.44, n.84.
150
Kolbaba, p.206; N. Oikonomides, ‘The Concept of “Holy War” and Two Tenth-Century Ivories’, in Peace and
War in Byzantium. Essays in Honour of G.T. Dennis, eds. by T.S. Millar and J. Nesbitt (Washington DC: The
Catholic University of America Press, 1995), pp.62-86 (pp.66-7).
151
P. Stephenson, ‘About the Emperor Nikephoros and How He Leaves His Bones in Bulgaria”: A Context for
the Controversial Chronicle of 811’, DOP, 60 (2006), 87-109 (pp.107-8).
152
Urban II, ‘Letter of Instruction, December, 1095’, in The First Crusade: The Accounts of Eyewitnesses and
Participants, trans. by August C. Krey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1921), p.42-3; Fulcher of Chartres,
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32
rests solely upon terminology, not actuality. In the first instance - Fulcher of Chartres’
account notwithstanding - remission of sins did not depend on death in Western descriptions
but was also granted for completion of the pilgrimage as evident in the letter of Urban II, the
account of Robert the Monk and significantly, the Papal Bulls Quantum Praedecessores and
Audita Tremendi.153 Conversely, death is a prerequisite of Michael Autoreianos’ offer of
forgiveness indicating that the Patriarch is endorsing martyrdom. Christian martyrdom is
rewarded with remission of all post-baptismal sin since life is being surrendered freely up to
God in an act of perfect contrition.154 To fight and die for the love of God was believed to
result in such a state.155 Michael Autoreianos’ “pardoning of sins” is granted through
martyrdom - a concept clearly used for centuries in Byzantium. In fact, one could see it as the
realisation of the will of Emperor Nikephoros II Phokas. Therefore, Michael IV Autoreianos’
acceptance of such cannot be simply dismissed as a product of Western influence; neither can
the concept of “holy war”.
In light of the above argument, Michael Autoreianos’ acceptance of martyrdom could
be indicative of an evolution of Byzantine holy war. Stouraitis rejects this theory citing a
sermon delivered in 1176 before Manuel I’s campaign to Myriokephalon;
‘Fulcherii Carnotensis Gesta Peregrinantium Francorum cum Armis Hierusalem Pergantium’, in Gesta Dei Per
Francos Orientalium Expeditionum Hierosolimitani Historia, ed. by Jacques Bongars (Hanover: 1611), p.383,
available at
https://archive.org/stream/GestaDeiPerFrancosSiveOrientaliumE/Gesta_Dei_per_Francos_sive_orientalium_e
#page/n1 (accessed 15/08/2018). Translation: Cuntis autem illuc euntibus si aut transfretando, sive contra
paganos dimicando, vitam finierint peccaminum remissio praesens aderit - The present remission of sins shall
come to all going there, whether they end their life in going or crossing the sea or in fighting against the
pagans.
153
Robert the Monk, ‘Urban II’s Clermont Address of 1095’, in Translations and Reprints from the Original
Sources of European History, trans. by Dana C. Munro, 2 vols (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1895),
vol. 1, pp.5-8; Pope Eugenius III ‘Quantum Praedecessores’, in Jonathan Philips, The Second Crusade: Extending
the Frontiers of Christendom (London: Yale University Press, 2007), pp.280-2, trans. by L. and J.S.C. Riley-Smith,
in The Crusades: Idea and Reality, 1095-1274 (London: Hodder Arnold, 1981), pp.57-9; Pope Gregory VIII,
‘Audita Tremendi’, in Crusade and Christendom: Annotated Documents, eds. and trans. by Jessalynn Bird,
Edward Peters and James M. Powell (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), pp.8-9.
154
The Catholic Church, Catechism of the Catholic Church: Article 4 The Sacrament of Penance and
Reconciliation, 2nd edn. (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2012), no.1453. Thanks to Father Louis
Beasley-Suffolk of St. Luke and St. Theresa’s Catholic Church, Wincanton, Somerset.
155
Niketas Choniates, pp.40-1; Kyriakidis, ‘Crusaders’ p.144.
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we labour to defend piety and go to war on behalf of God. We do not
conquer Barbarian cities nor pursue what it is not ours. We do no injustice
to others but fight for what is our own. For it is abominable that the
inheritance of God is stolen and reduced by the impious.156
Stouraitis claims that the main idea that legitimised Manuel’s campaign was restoration of
“Roman” territory, identifiable in Byzantine ideology, as defence.157 Significantly, Stouraitis
argument ignores the start and finish of that legitimisation which shows an obvious religious
justification for an “offensive” campaign. Savvas Kyriakidis also argues that the Byzantines
did not utilise religion as a tool to war against infidels and heretics, also citing the Byzantine
“just war” concept in relation to former “Roman” territories.158 It appears correct that
reclamation of “Roman” territory was a legitimate cause for war however, religious concepts
also formed part of that justification.
These above assertions - without directly mentioning them - seem to be drawing
distinction between Byzantine “just war” and Western “crusading” concepts. However, the
similarity in contemporary perceptions of “crusading” were similar to Byzantine “just war”
theory. Jerusalem was Christ’s land and the Western Christians marched to retake Jerusalem
in defence of the Holy Sepulchre. Similarly, Western Christians believed they had “rightful
claim” to “the inheritance of God”.159 Furthermore, Michael Autoreianos’ address is also
couched in terms of defence in reclamation of lost territory, despite the fact that 1209
signalled a Nicaean offensive against the Latins. Equally, the crusades were viewed
contemporaneously as “defensive” reclamation of Christian inheritance. Athinia Kolia-

156
Euthymios Malakes, ‘Sermon to Manuel I, 1176’, trans. by Ioannis Stouraitis in, ‘Jihad and Crusade:
Byzantine Positions Toward the Notions of “Holy War”‘, Byzantina Συμμεικτα, 21 (2011), 11-63 (pp.42-3).
157
Stouraitis, ‘Jihad’, p.43.
158
Kyriakidis, ‘Cursaders’, p.144.
159
Guibert of Nogent, ‘Urban II’s Crusade Address at Clermont, 1095’, in The First Crusade: The Accounts of
Eyewitnesses and Participants, trans. by August C. Krey Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1921), pp.42-3;
Fulcher of Chartres, ‘‘Urban II’s Crusade Address at Clermont, 1095’, in A Sourcebook for Medieval History,
trans. by Oliver J. Thatcher and Edgar Holmes McNeal (New York: Scribers, 1905), pp.513-17; Gregory VIII, p.6.
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34
Dermitazi partially defines a holy war as for the protection of the Church, revenge for an
insult against God and the recovery of lost Christian territory.160 Both former “Roman” land
and Western European concepts of Jerusalem fall into this category. The considerations of
both are not so different.161
We are therefore confronted with a fundamental difference that separates Western
“crusade” and Byzantine “just war”; rewards for those who fight for God. The acceptance of
martyrdom into this ideology must surely symbolise an evolution of Byzantine holy war
against the Latins? Again, Stouraitis disagrees arguing that Michael Autoreianos’ address was
directed toward those fighting the Latins who, whilst hated enemies, were still Christians.162
If the Latins were perceived as Christians as Stouraitis argues, the “just war” concept of
reclamation of “Roman” territory had no legitimacy since - as Stouraitis’ example of
Euthymios Malakes sermon above makes clear - the inheritance of God had not been stolen
by the impious, but was still possessed by Christians.163
It is however debatable that the Latins were viewed as fellow Christians by the
Byzantines following events of 1204.164 In the immediate aftermath of the sack of
Constantinople, Niketas Choniates described the Latins as forebears of the Antichrist and
frauds against Christ.165 Furthermore, Constantine Stilbes’ anti-Latin polemic Griefs Against
the Latins (c.1214) reasoned that the Latin Church had fallen into heresy.166 This line of
thought was continued into John III’s reign by patriarch Germanus II who stated that the
160
Athina Kolia-Dermitzaki, ‘“Holy War” in Byzantium Twenty Years Later: A Question of Term, Definition and
Interpretation’, in Byzantine War Ideology Between Roman Imperial Concept and Christian Religion, eds. by
Johannes Koder and Ioannis Stouraitis (Wein: Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschafen, 2006), pp.121-133
(p.122).
161
Kolbaba, pp.198-9, n.19
162
Stouraitis, p.58, n.118.
163
see note 155
164
Kolbaba, p.218.
165
Choniates, pp.315-6.
166
Angold, ‘Exile’, pp.545-6; Angold, ‘Greeks’, pp.68-9; Alicia Simpson, Niketas Choniates: A Historiographical
Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp.109-10.
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35
Latin heresy was not confined to one or even three errors.167 Michael Autoreianos recognition
of martyrdom - which as we can infer from the example of Nikephoros II Phocas - seemed to
need the consent of both emperor and patriarch.168 In this regard, the action is an obvious
alteration of previous imperial and ecclesiastical ideological thought. Therefore, it needs to be
considered that the Latins were labelled heretics by the Orthodox Community and Nicaean
administration before 1209. Such action - combined with the loss of “Roman” territory,
particularly Constantinople - would facilitate the evolution of Byzantine holy war,
culminating in the concord of imperial and ecclesiastical authorities regarding the subject of
martyrdom for soldiers. Therefore, the alteration in established Byzantine ideology to
recognise martyrdom was intended to galvanise the military and legitimise the reclamation of
“Roman” territory, under the concept that ‘... it is abominable that the inheritance of God is
stolen and reduced by the impious...’.169
Conversely, the acceptance of martyrdom, and the hereticisation of the Latins may be
separate components of a continuous ideological augmentation. Michael Angold calls this the
“Ideology of Exile” whereby the protection of Christian Orthodoxy and the reclamation of
Constantinople became priority to the Nicaean Empire.170 Angold’s concept is evident in the
chain of events. Michael IV Autoreianos’ appointment to the patriarchate of Constantinople
in 1208 was in reaction to Latin refusal to sanction divided ecclesiastical authority in
Constantinople.171 Without an elected Orthodox patriarch the patriarchate of Constantinople
167
Angold, ‘Greeks’, pp.69; Germanus II, trans. J. Gill, ‘An Unpublished Letter of Germanus, Patriarch of
Constantinople (1222-1240) , Byzantion, 44 (1974), 138-51 (p.143).
168
Norman H. Baynes, ‘The Byzantine State’, Byzantine Studies and Other Essays (London: Atholone Press,
1955), pp.47-66 (p.64).
169
Malakes, pp.42-3; Efstratia Synkellou, ‘Reflections on Byzantine War Ideology in Late Byzantium’, Byzantine
War Ideology Between Roman Imperial Concept and Christian Religion, eds. by Johannes Koder and Ioannis
Stouraitis (Wein: Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschafen, 2006), pp.99-109 (pp.101-2).
170
171
Jean Richard, ‘The Establishment of the Latin Church in the Empire of Constantinople (1204-1227)’, MHR, 4
(1989), 45-62 (p.48); Filip Van Tricht, The Latin Renovatio of Byzantium, trans. by Peter Longbottom (Leiden:
Brill, 2011), pp.313-5.
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36
would pass by default to the Latin Church.172 The crowning of Theodore I Laskaris as
Emperor followed Michael Autoreianos’ appointment establishing the Byzantine Empire in
exile, thus continuing imperial integrity.173 In turn, Theodore I went to war with the Latins in
1209. These events clearly demonstrate an early ambition to protect imperial authority and
reclaim lost territory. However, defeat of the Nicaean forces in 1211 and further loss of
territory likely made military reclamation of “Roman” lands unrealistic at this juncture.
Additionally, the death of Patriarch Autoreianos followed in 1212.174 Both events combined,
conceivably signalled the end of Byzantine “holy war”; the first thrust of Nicaea’s “Ideology
of Exile”.
Events following the Nicaean defeat in 1211 could indicate a change of policy. Filip
van Tricht argues that during the period between 1204-1228, some Orthodox clergy and
followers were prepared to accept the Latin hierarchy.175 Acceptance of Latin hierarchy was a
danger to the Orthodox Church which may explain the swift offensive of Theodore I Laskaris
in 1209. In 1214, Patriarch Autoreianos’ successor, Theodore Irenicus, circulated an
encyclical to the Orthodox population of Constantinople encouraging them to not submit to
papal supremacy under threat of excommunication.176 Such a message was obviously meant
to prevent acceptance of papal authority and comes at a point when the papal legate, Pelagius,
was aggressively attempting to force papal authority upon the Orthodox community. 177 These
events lend a different perspective to the anti-Latin polemics exhibited by both Constantine
Stilbes and later, Patriarch Germanus II. Significantly, Constantine Stilbes’ polemic - thought
172
173
‘Mihail D’Authorian’, Ecumenical Patriarch, available at http://www.ec-
patr.org/list/index.php?lang=gr&id=126 (accessed 25/08/2018).
174
Michael Angold, ‘Theodore I Laskaris’, in The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, ed. by Alexander P. Kazhdan,
3 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), vol. 3, pp.2039-40.
175
Van Tricht, Renovatio, p.317.
176
Louis Ellies Du Pin, A New Ecclesiastical History, (London: Timothy Childe, 1599), vol. 11, p.84; Angold,
‘Greeks’, p.69.
177
Van Tricht, Renovatio, p.314; Angold, ‘Greek’, p.69.
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37
to have been written in 1214 - criticised the Latin Church for endorsing martyrdom.178 Of
course, this criticism was against the imperial ideology set out in 1209.
This alteration in tactic represented Orthodox protectionism as opposed to the
aggressive early ideology of Theodore I Laskaris. We may debate that the polemics against
the heretical Latins, the gradual decline of the Latin forces and Nicaean economic prosperity,
again led to a further alteration - or reversion - of policy, toward renewed territorial
reclamation; a feature of John III. Conclusively, two things are noticeable. First, regardless of
an active policy of territorial reclamation, or the more passive protectionism afforded
Christian Orthodoxy, both examples were designed to galvanise the Orthodox population
against the Latin invaders. Second, whilst survival of Orthodoxy and the reclamation of
Constantinople were priority aims, the ideological method of these aims were changeable
dependant on circumstance and pragmatism. Stouraitis celebrates the continuity of pre-1204
Byzantine religious ideology however, the loss of Constantinople and the period of exile
represented a cataclysmic shock that necessitated ideological alterations in order to
survive.179 One could call this period the most significant example of imperial renewal since
Constantine. However, the change to Byzantine religious ideology in accepting martyrdom
during this period are perhaps best summed up by Odo of Deuil; ‘...anything that is done for
the holy empire cannot be considered perjury...’.180
178
Kryriakidis, p.144; Angold, ‘Exile’, p.546.
179
Stouraitis, ‘Jihad’, pp.16, 49, 51-2;
180
Odo of Deuil, De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem, trans. by V.G. Berry (New York, W.W. Norton
Company Press, 1948), p.57.
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38
The Cornered Beast: A Changing Byzantine Ideology of Warfare
The increase in religious hostility within the Nicaean administration toward the
Latins - and the augmentations to their religious ideology - was matched by an apparent
alteration in their attitudes toward warfare. To begin with, some scholars have suggested that
the Byzantines were effeminate and suffered from cowardice.181 Other writers cite the
thirteenth canon to suggest that fighting Greek men were considered “unchristian”.182 Given
the many battles fought by the Byzantines over the centuries - that are too numerous to
mention here - such perspectives are disingenuous to the facts. Therefore, it must be stressed
that this chapter deals only with the apparent change in attitude and ideology towards warfare
in association with the situation of exile following the loss of Constantinople in 1204.
Byzantine ideology toward warfare was significantly different to their Western
European counterparts. Contemporary Western reproach of Byzantine cowardice or duplicity
was combated by Eastern writers criticising the Western love of war.183 The difference in
cultural perspectives regarding warfare could not be more polarised. In the West, war was
glorified. In contrast, the Byzantine ideology seemingly categorised war as a last resort. 184
According to Efstratia Synkellou, the pursuit of peace was a priority factor in Byzantine
political ideology.185 Emperor Leo VI’s Taktika stresses the importance of peace consistently
stating that battle was a matter of luck, not courage. However, Leo VI also reveals the other
side of Byzantine attitudes to war; that money was the route to victory if employed as a bribe
181
for summary see Dimiter Angelov, ‘Byzantinism: The Imaginary and Real Heritage of Byzantium in
Southeastern Europe’, in New Approaches to Balkan Studies, eds. by Dimitris Keridis, Ellen Elias-Bursac and
Nicholas Yatromanolakis (Virginia:Potomac Books, 2003), pp.3-22 (pp.6-10); also see Vitalien Laurent, ‘L’idee
de Guerre Sainte et la Tradition Byzantine’, Revue Historique du Sud-est Europeen, 23 (1946), 71-98 (pp. 72, 86,
92); Steven Runciman, The Emperor Romanus Lecapenus and his Reign: A Study of Tenth-Century Byzantium
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.9
182
Karen Armstrong, Holy War. the Crusades and their Impact on Today’s World (New York: Bantam Doubleday
Bell, 2001), p.25;
183
Amatus of Montecassino, The History of the Normans, trans. by P.N. Dunbar (Woodbridge: Boydell Press,
2004), p.49; Komnene, pp.40, 283.
184
Harris, Crusades, p.30.
185
Synkellou, pp.99-101.
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or incentive.186 Bribery was utilised in the 1150s against the Armenians by Manuel I.
Furthermore, Robert Guiscard’s son was granted the imperial title of Kouropalates as part of
the treaty of 1074 which came with an annual pension.187 Of course the most topical example
is that of Alexios IV promise of 200,000 marks to the Crusaders to aid his reclamation of the
imperial throne.188 Additionally, Anna Komnene stated that force of arms was only one way
to beat an enemy; treaties, and in some cases fraud, were to be utilised.189 Historian Julian
Chrysostomides’ statement - that the Byzantine church, supported war as a last resort - is
seemingly equally pertinent regarding imperial ideology.190 Peace was to be the priority, and
deception, diplomacy and bribery were tools to be used ahead of armed battle in its pursuit.
Losing Constantinople prompted a change in Byzantine attitude regarding military
engagement.191 This change was likely in reaction to two key issues. First, that the Nicaean
state did not have access to the sort of financial muscle that supported existing imperial
thought and practice during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Second, reclamation of
territory, particularly of their prized asset of Constantinople, was unlikely to be realised
through financial transaction. John III Vatatzes’ reign saw the military policy reap huge
gains. During his reign, John III reclaimed Latin-held lands in Asia Minor, regained control
over the Aegean islands and subjugated the rival imperial claimants in Epiros.192
Significantly, his seizure of Thrace and Thessalonica effectively surrounded Constantinople,
and even made two - ultimately unsuccessful - attempts to siege the imperial capital in 1235
186
Leo VI, Taktika, ed. and trans. by George Dennis (Washington DC: Harvard University Press, 2010), pp.555-
89; Synkellou, pp.99-100.
187
Paul Magdalino, The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.67;
Harris, Crusades, p.33.
188
Villehardouin, p.26.
189
Komnene, p.367.
190
Julian Chrysostomides, ‘Byzantine Concepts of War and Peace’, in War, Peace and World Orders in
European History, eds. by Anja V. Hartmann and Beatrice Heuser (London: Routledge, 2001), pp.91-101 (p.93).
191
Angelov, Ideology, pp.195-6.
192
Akropolites, pp.165-6, 171-2, 187, 215-6, 241-2; Warren Treadgold, A History of the Byzantine State and
Society (Stanford: University of Stanford Press, 1997), pp.719-728; Ostrogorsky, pp.435, 438-9.
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40
and 1236.193 Whilst it should be acknowledged that John III’s military successes were
somewhat facilitated by extraneous events outside of his own control - for example, the
Epirot defeat at Klokotnista and the civil strife in the Latin Empire during and after the reign
of Robert of Courtenay - his renewal of an aggressive strategy paid dividends for the Nicaean
state and was instrumental in Constantinople’s recapture in 1261.194 As already discussed, the
economic stability of Nicaea played a huge role in facilitating John III aggressive policy. As
will be discussed later, John III management of land-holding was also a factor in his military
successes.
However, an active military policy against the Latins was identifiable during the reign
of John III’s predecessor, Theodore I Laskaris. As previously mentioned, Theodore I Laskaris
attacked the Latins in 1209. The defeat of the Nicaean forces at Rhyndacus in 1211, and the
subsequent ceding of territory to the Latins under the Treaty of Nymphaeum in 1214
illustrates a reversal in ideological priority.195 Theodore I Laskaris’ actions following the
1214 treaty - tax-exemption for the Venetian traders and an alliance with the Latins,
formalised by Theodore’s I marriage to the Latin Emperor’s sister - indicate that pursuing an
aggressive policy was not prudent during these years.196 In this instance, a diplomatic treaty
became a tool with which to regroup following defeat and to maintain peaceful relations until
the aggressive policy against the Latins could be resumed; which occurred in 1220.197 The
193
Akropolites, pp.195-7; Alexandru Madearu, The Asanids: The Political and Military History of the Second
Bulgarian Empire, 1185-1280 (Liege: Brill, 2017), p.216-9; Ostrogorsky, p.438; Banev Guentcho, ‘John III
Vatates’, Encyclopaedia of the Hellenic World, Asia Minor, trans. by Koutras Nikolaos, available at
http://asiaminor.ehw.gr/forms/fLemmaBodyExtended.aspx?lemmaID=9275 (accessed 29/08/2018).
194
for Battle of Klokonista see George Akropolites, The History, trans. by Ruth Macrides (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008), pp.178-9; for Robert of Courtenay see Philip Van Tricht, ‘Robert of Courtenay (1221-
1227): An Idiot on the Throne of Constantinople’, Speculum, 88 (2013), 996-1034.
195
Akropolites, pp.148-9; Ostrogorky, p.430.
196
Akropolites, pp.145, 148; Alice Gardiner, The Lascarids of Nicaea: The Story of an Empire in Exile
(Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1964), p.94; Michael Angold, ‘The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204-1261:
Marriage Strategies’, in Identities and Allegiances in the Eastern Mediterranean After 1204, eds. by Judith
Herrin and Guillaume Saint-Guillain (London: Ashgate, 2011), p.52.
197
Angold, ‘Marriage’, p.52; Ostrogorsky, p.430; Philip Van Tricht, ‘Robert of Courtenay (1221-1227): An Idiot
on the Throne of Constantinople’, Speculum, 88 (2013), 996-1034 (p.1016, n.79); Van Tricht, Renovatio, p.365.
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41
long peace with the Latins between 1214 and 1220 indicate that, unlike John III, Theodore I
was hindered by supply and manpower.
The state of Nicaea following Constantinople’s capture in 1204 was, according to
Angold, devastated and depopulated.198 Lack of resource was therefore not just financial but
also applied to manpower. This lack of manpower is evident in George Akropolites’ account
of the Battle of Antioch on the Meander against the Seljuks in June 1211.199 Akropolites
reveals that Theodore’s army consisted of no more than 2000 men, 800 of which were Latin
mercenaries, against a significantly larger force.200 Whilst victorious, Theodore I Laskaris
lost almost all of his Latin mercenaries during the battle. According to Akropolites, the Latin
Emperor Henry, upon hearing the outcome of the battle quipped ‘...Theodore was not
victorious, he was vanquished...’.201 The defeat at Rhyndacus to the Latins a mere three
months later, followed by the prolonged peace and the numerous diplomatic treaties during
that time, indicate that providing and sustaining manpower for an aggressive policy against
the Latins was a serious issue for Nicaea at this time. This conclusion leads us to consider
three factors regarding continuation of such a policy; the impact of mercenaries upon
Byzantium, a return to the debate regarding pronoia, and the practice of using mercenaries
within the Nicaean ranks.
The use of mercenaries has become synonymous with the Byzantine Empire.202 These
hired soldiers have also, according to some historians, become synonymous with the decline
of the Byzantine state. Some have tracked the origin of this decline back to the eleventh
198
199
Dimitri Korobeinikov, Byzantium and the Turks in the Thirteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2014), p.149.
200
Akropolites, p.129-30; Adam Ali, ‘Antioch on the Meander, Battle of (1211)’, in Conflict and Conquest in the
Islamic World: A Historical Encyclopedia, ed. by Alexander Mikaberidze, 2 vols (Oxford: ABC-Clio, 2011),
pp.118-19 (p.119).
201
Akropolites, p.148.
202
see Jonathan Shepard, ‘The Use of the Franks in Eleventh Century Byzantium’, in Anglo-Norman Studies XV:
Proceedings of the XV Battle Conference and of the XI Colloquio Medievale of the Officina Di Studi Medievali,
ed. by Marjorie Chibnall (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1993), pp.275-305; Ostrogorsky, p.482;
Page
42
century, arguing that the decision to enlist expensive foreign mercenaries in place of the
peasant armies contributed to the collapse of the empire.203 George Ostrogorsky similarly
lays culpability at the feet of mercenary soldiers but places the decline closer to the period of
exile. Following the recapture of Constantinople in 1261, Ostrogorsky argues that Michael
VIII’s numerous military undertakings were facilitated almost entirely by mercenaries,
creating enormous economic strain, bringing financial ruin to the empire. The financial
implosion and reliance upon mercenaries is blamed by Ostrogorsky on the inefficiency of
pronoia as a system for providing military service.204 This assertion leads us again to
consider how pronoia could have been used as a means of military recruitment.
As debated earlier, evidence of pronoia provided by Bartusis confirms that the
institution brought financial benefits to the pronoiar. Furthermore, Bartusis argues that
pronoia was implemented with the intention of growing the Nicaean army.205 In this regard,
Ostrogorsky and Vasiliev agree with Bartusis’ assertion, but disagree as to how such an
outcome was achieved. The two latter historians believed that pronoia mimicked Western
concepts of land in return for military service. Effectively, paroikoi were comparable to the
Western serf.206 Ostrogorsky cites the Latin Chronicle of the Morea as evidence that Western
and Eastern concepts of land holding were identical, illustrated by the resistance to the Latins
exhibited by the pronoiars; at least until retention of their previous positions of land-holding
were confirmed. Therefore, like Western nobility, resistance is effected by the pronoiars - the
Byzantine nobility - the position of the people remained virtually the same and ‘...much could
203
see P. Charanis, ‘The Byzantine Empire in the Eleventh Century’, in A History of the Crusades, eds. by K.M.
Setton and M.W. Baldwin, 3 vols (Milwaukee, WI: Madison, 1969), vol. 1 p.204; R. Jenkins, Byzantium: The
Imperial Centuries A.D. 610-1071 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1966), p.365; J.J. Norwich, Byzantium:
V.2: The Apogee (London: Viking, 1991), p.339.
204
Ostrogorsky, p.425.
205
206
Ostrogorsky, p.425; Vasiliev, pp.546. For definition of pronoia regarding Western serfdom see Andreas
Mehl, and Franz Tinnefeld, ‘Paroikoi’, in Brill’s New Pauly, ed. by Christine F. Salazar,
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/brill-s-new-pauly/paroikoi-e908550 (accessed 30/08/2018);
Arcaduis Kahan, ‘Notes of Serfdom in Western and Eastern Europe’, The Journal of Economic History, 33
(1973), 86-99 (p.90).
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43
be taken unchanged...’. 207 However, it does not necessarily mean that pronoia was identical
to the Western feudum and that paroikoi rendered military service to their pronoiar. In fact,
Bartusis claims that there is no documentary evidence that such an obligation existed in
Nicaea.208
However, pronoia as a military facilitator should not be discounted. Bartusis’ study
shows that some pronoiar were soldiers. In protecting the paroikoi of a monastery from
paying tax, the pronoia act of 1184 states that they should not be hindered by soldiers, tax
collectors or officials. Further example of soldiers holding pronoia is found in a document
issued by Michaeal VIII in 1258 regarding St. John, Patmos. Bartusis argues that the frequent
and specific mention of soldiers who ‘...dwell pronoiastically...’, must indicate that soldiers
made up a large percentage of pronoiar during the thirteenth century.209 Evidence shows that
taxes were the usual obligation of the paroikoi. For example, in 1262 the village of
Malachiou was granted as pronoia to George Komnenos Angelos. The ensuing dispute over
hereditary lands held by the paroikoi, revealed that the paroikoi had paid ‘...state and military
taxes...’ on their properties.210 Military taxes are also referenced in the case of Michael
Petritzes - who seemingly held his pronoiai from the 1240s.211 It is possible that paroikoi and
pronoiar provided funds for mercenaries. Is it then reasonable to deduce that pronoia was
intended to swell the Nicaean forces, but not in any conventional Western sense?
Bartusis presents another theory. Following the fall of Constantinople, disputed
properties in Asia Minor were confiscated by the Nicaean administration. According to
Angold, the early Nicaean emperors granted out many estates as pronoia.212 As argued in the
207
Ostrogorsky, p.425.
208
209
Bartusis, Pronoia, pp.174-5, 185, 192
210
Bartusis, Pronoia, pp.187-8.
211
Bartusis, Pronoia, p. xxxix.
212
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44
first chapter, this aided agricultural and economic recovery, but Bartusis argues that pronoia
was also used to grow the Nicaean army by granting mercenary soldiers land with which to
make them permanent residents. George Akropolites reports that an army of Scyths or
Cumans were placated by John III, moved to Nicaea and added to the Roman ranks.213
Bartusis argues that these Cumans were granted pronoia. Similarly, John III also issued the
first Latins with pronoia or kavallarioi in the region of Smyrna. Such a move allowed John
III to maintain a core of professional soldiers without exhausting his financial reserves.214
Interestingly, Ostrogorsky identifies that John III granted pronoia to more socially modest
people, without coming to Bartusis’ conclusion.215 In order to blame financial ruin of the
Byzantine Empire on the use of mercenaries because of a failing pronoia system, that system
must in some way be used to recruit soldiers. However, it would appear that pronoia was
used to keep soldiers resident, not recruit them through obligatory service. In this regard,
Michael VIII’s use of mercenary soldiers cannot be blamed on a failing pronoia system.
However, a question still remains regarding the theory that using mercenaries was a
signal of a failing administration. Angold supposes that Theodore II Laskaris identified
mercenaries as the cause of potential financial ruin stating that Theodore II objected to the
vast sums spent on paying them.216 In what could be conceived as pre-Machiavellianism,
Theodore II himself wrote a letter c.1255 in which he conveyed a desire to reform the
Nicaean force and create a “Greek” army, arguing that Persians, Latins or Bulgars cannot be
depended on to defend the empire.217 Accordingly, George Pachymeres confirms that
213
Akropolites, p.215; Savvas Kyriakidis, Warfare in Late Byzantium (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp.103-4; Angold,
Government, p.105.
214
Mark C. Bartusis, The Late Byzantine Army (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), pp. 26-8;
Kyriakidis, ‘Crusaders’, p.148.
215
Ostrogorsky, pp.442-3.
216
217
Niccolo Machiavelli created a Florentine army in 1493 because he distrusted mercenaries. see Miles J
Ungar, Machiavelli: A Biography (London: Simon and Schuster, 2011), pp.79, 86, 106-7. also for comparisons of
Theodore II Laskaris and Nicollo Machivelli as political thinkers see Dimiter Angelov, Imperial Ideology and
Political Thought in Byzantium, 1204-1330 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp.234-52. Laskaris, p.106.
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45
Theodore II restricted privileges and reduced payments toward his Latin mercenaries. 218
Angold supposes that these actions were intentional military reforms intended to curb
spending on mercenaries and ‘...recruit wholly from his own subjects...’.219 Such a move
could indicate that Theodore II was attempting to alienate his Latin troops however, Savvas
Kyriakidis argues that this may have been because the Latins had become too politically
influential.220 A further point of contention is that the mercenaries had played a crucial role in
John III’s successful military policy, contributing to the lands now presided over by Theodore
II; a fact acknowledged by Theodore before and after his accession as emperor.221 Why after
recognising their importance to imperial reclamation, would Theodore II decide to dispense
with mercenary service?
To accept Angold’s conclusion is to only take the letter at face value. Theodore II’s
statement does not indicate impending financial ruin. In fact the letter in question appears to
be a justification for increasing military funding. Dimitar Angelov argues that this letter was
part of a dispute between Theodore II and Nikephoros Blemmydes over increased taxes, with
the latter claiming that the emperor should use the saved wealth of the empire, not public tax.
Theodore’s response was to argue that financing the military should be from taxes since the
use of saved wealth in this pursuit would quickly be depleted.222 Affordability is relative to
revenue. To maintain the army, funds needed to be found. Theodore II was displaying a
sound grasp of economics. If at all, the situation regarding Theodore II’s letter indicates that
mercenaries were only a symptom of financial ruin, not the cause. Mercenary use as
supplementation to an existing force was not only common in medieval warfare but useful in
218
Pachymeres, p.24; Angold, p.185.
219
220
Kyriakidis, ‘Crusaders’, p.147.
221
Angelov, Ideology p.295; Kyriakidis, ‘Crusaders’, p.147.
222
Angelov, Ideology, pp.295-6; Kyriakidis, ‘Crusaders’, p.147.
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46
tipping the military balance.223 William the Conqueror’s invasion of England was facilitated
by mercenaries from France and Brittany. Richard the Lionheart’s mercenary captain,
Mercadier, was ever present on the king’s campaigns.224 Conversely, total reliance on
mercenaries - as evidenced by the reign of King John of England (1204-1217) - is indicative
of a wider political and administrative failing.225
In contrast, we may view Theodore II’s letter as a wish to follow his father’s example
regarding mercenary recruitment and may not necessarily indicate a national sentiment as is
commonly believed, but a geographic distinction.226 Theodore I’s and John III’s recruitment
and retention of foreign soldiers was militaristically beneficial and economically viable. In
fact, evidence shows that Cuman mercenaries were employed by Theodore II in 1256 as a
garrison at Thessalonoki.227 Using Bartusis’ theory of the use of pronoia in Nicaea, those
Cuman and Latin soldiers, now pronoiars, could be considered imperial subjects, or “Greek”
subjects. Being imperial land holders, it could be argued that they would defend imperial
lands as valiantly as any indigenous Greek. In this regard - and in light of his predecessor’s
territorial gains in Asia Minor and Eastern Europe - Theodore II’s letter may be evidence of
his intention to extend pronoia and settle foreign mercenaries as “Roman”, Byzantine or
“Greek” subjects, instilling a vested interest in defending Byzantine land, thus,
geographically creating a “Greek” military force.
The Nicaean use of mercenary soldiers was not indicative of imperial decline. In fact,
223
to list all examples of mercenary use in medieval warfare would be an arduous task. for examples see John
France, Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 1000-1300 (Abingdon: Routledge, 1999), pp.60-75, 131-5;
R.C. Smail, Crusading Warfare, 1097-1193, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 23, 32,
93-7, 102-4; Christopher Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, 1192-1291 (Cambridge University Press, 1996),
pp.78-9, 83-6, 170-2.
224
Orderic Vitalis, Ecclesiastical History, trans. by Marjorie Chibnall, 6 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1980), p.220; John Gillingham, Richard I (London: Yale University Press, 1999), pp.78, 288, 322-3.
225
see King John’s exclusive use of mercenaries W.L. Warren, King John, 2nd edn (London: Yale University
Press, 1997), pp.90-1.
226
Angelov, Ideology, p.295; Angold, Government, p.185;
227
Bartusis, Army, p.36.
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47
one could argue that without mercenaries, the imperial reclamation of 1261 would have not
been possible. Their importance to the Nicaean policy of aggression is evident, first in the
bravery of the 800 Latins who in 1209 earned the praise of George Akropolites, then in the
manner that John III accepted and convinced previously hostile Cumans to join his forces. 228
Furthermore the method in which pronoia was implemented in order to maintain a military
force was an enterprising move. That pronoia was not employed in Asia-Minor until the
period of exile shows that its implementation was deliberate and not an augmentation of an
existing system already in place. Conclusively, the granting of pronoia to mercenary soldiers
accounts for the flurry of pronoia grants associated with the reign of John III, and explains
how the emperor was capable of maintaining a ready force. The adoption of pronoia for the
retention of mercenary soldiers is representative of a galvanisation in pursuit of military
reclamation of Byzantine territory. The use of mercenaries was essential for that policy.
228
Akropolites, p.130.
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48
Conclusion
The declaration that the Fourth Crusade “mortally wounded” the Byzantine Empire is
often reiterated as a statement of fact without contextual detail to support the conclusion. As
shown in this study, many scholars suggest that the decline had already begun as early as the
eleventh century, with David Jacoby and Jonathan Harris suggesting that the Fourth Crusade
merely accelerated the collapse of the Byzantine Empire.229 What the evidence contained
here does suggest is that the loss of Constantinople actually stimulated the remnants of the
Byzantine Empire. A “mortal wound” would have been represented by a continued decline.
However, the evidence of the period 1204-1261 reveals an increase in economic growth to
facilitate an actively aggressive policy, intended to reclaim lost Byzantine lands.
Furthermore, the alterations to the imperial and religious ideology of the Byzantine
administration demonstrate an intention to preserve imperial continuity and to legitimise and
motivate its people towards the recovery of Constantinople; which was achieved. The
Byzantine Empire may have been wounded by events of 1204, but not mortally. The actions
of the successor states - particularly those of the Empire of Nicaea - indicate that the years of
exile represent a period of growth and strengthening, not a period of terminal decline.
Ironically, one may argue that the ‘mortal wound’ was struck with the reclamation of
Constantinople in 1261.
Word-count: 14,971
229
David Jacoby, 'The Encounter of Two Societies: Western Conquerors and Byzantines in the Peloponnesus
After the Fourth Crusade', The American History Review, 78 (1973), 873-906 (p.874); Harris, Crusades, pp.209-
10.
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49
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Royal Holloway, University of London

Do Byzantine accounts of the period 1204-1261 support or contradict

requirements of the University’s Regulations and Code of Practice for Taught

own work through appropriate referencing and acknowledgement. Where I have

quoted or otherwise incorporated material which is the work of others, I have

other than referenced material, are those of the author.

SIGNED: James Arlett

DATE: 02 September 2018

The Economy of the Nicaean State 7

The True-self: Adoption of "Hellenic" Imperial Identity 18

A "New Jerusalem" and the Ideology of Exile 29

The Cornered Beast: A Changing Byzantine Ideology of Warfare 39

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Professor Jonathan Harris for

Church, Wincanton, Somerset, for indulging my questions regarding martyrdom and

musings whether they wanted to or not.

encouraging my every step.

Akropolites George Akropolites, The History, trans. by Ruth Macrides

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)

BCSCE Byzantium, Church, Society and Civilisation Seen Through

Contemporary Eyes, ed. by D.J. Geanakoplos (London:

University of Chicago Press, 1986)

Choniates Niketas Choniates, O City of Byzantium, Annals of Niketas

Choniates, trans. by Harry J. Magoulias (Detroit: Wayne State

University Press, 1984)

Cremona Luidprand of Cremona, The Embassy to Constantinople and

Other Writings, eds. by F.A. Wright and John Julius Norwich

(London: Dent, 1993)

DOP Dumbarton Oaks Papers

Gregoras Nikephoros Gregoras, Rhomäische Geschichte, trans. by J.L.

Van Dieten, 4 vols (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1973-94),

Gregory VIII Pope Gregory VIII, 'Audita Tremendi', in Crusade and

Christendom: Annotated Documents, eds. and trans. by

Jessalynn Bird, Edward Peters and James M. Powell

(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014)

Frankopan (London: Penguin, 2009)

Laskaris ‘Formation of a “National” Greek Army’, in Byzantium,

Church, Society and Civilisation Seen Through Contemporary

Eyes, ed. by D.J. Geanakoplos (London: University of Chicago

Malakes Euthymios Malakes, ‘Sermon to Manuel I, 1176’, trans. by

Ioannis Stouraitis in, ‘Jihad and Crusade: Byzantine Positions

Toward the Notions of “Holy War”‘, Byzantina Συμμεικτα, 21

MHR Mediterranean Historical Review

Pachymeres George Pachymeres, 'Historia', in A Translation and Historical

Commentary of Book One and Book Two of the 'Historia' of

Geōrgios Pachymēres, trans. by Nathan John Cassidy (Un-

published PhD thesis: University of Western Australia, 2004)

Tudela Benjamin of Tudela, The Itinerary of Rabbi Benjamin of

Tudela, ed. and trans. by A. Asher (New York: Hakesheth,

Vatatzes ‘Constantinople, The Inalienable Capital’, in Byzantium,

Church, Society and Civilisation Seen Through Contemporary

Eyes, ed. by D.J. Geanakoplos (London: University of Chicago

Chronicles of the Crusades, trans. by Caroline Smith (London:

Do Byzantine accounts of the period 1204-1261 support or

following Constantinople’s capture. Furthermore, in contrast to O’Connell, Norwich and

recapture of Constantinople in 1261 and recovered much of its former power.7

Contemporaneous descriptions of Constantinople’s opulence from Western European

beauty and prosperity of Constantinople.8 Similarly, Benjamin of Tudela wrote of the

Constantinople’s extraordinary prosperity was predominantly due to its geographic

Kommerkion, harvested ten-percent of all transactions, imports and exports. Consequently,

magnificence, it is reasonable to conclude that losing such a city would constitute an

contribution to Nicaean economic growth as especially noticeable.15 Eleni Lianta attributes

economic acumen.17 Such praise is predominantly attributed to the testimony of the

therefore not a contemporary of the reign of John III.20