‘From the Carrington-Cutileiro Plan to war, February-March 1992; was

there an alternative for Bosnia?’

  1  
Table of Contents

Terms and Abbreviations

Acknowledgements
Introduction
Chapter one ~ Aspects and Recommendations on the Carrington-Cutileiro Plan
Chapter two ~ Developments that Undermined the Carrington-Cutileiro Plan and
Western policies towards Negotiations.
Conclusion
Appendix One
Bibliography

2    
Terms and Abbreviations

BiH - Bosnia and Herzegovina

EC – European Community
EU – European Union
FCO – British Foreign & Commonwealth Office
HDZ – Hrvatska demokratska zajednica/Croatian Democratic Union
ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
JNA – Yugoslav People’s Army
SDA - Stranka Demokratske Akcije/Party of Democratic Action
SDS - Srpska Demokratska Stranka/Serbian Democratic Party
SFRJ - Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SPBiH – Socialist Party Bosnia and Herzegovina
SRBiH – Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
U.S. – United States
UNSC – United Nations Security Council

  3  
Introduction

Bosnia’s history has been characterized by six hundred years of intermingled cultural
heritage. Different ethnic groups – Serbs, Muslims, Croats, Hungarians - lived
together in multi-cultural and multi-religious sceneries, with more than one-quarter of
marriages divided along ethnic lines in BiH’s twentieth century. Bosnia’s
constitutional status symbolised a republic forged on the union of the three equal
components – Serbs, Croats, Muslims - as part of the Yugoslav federal state instituted
by Tito after the Second World War.1

However, an ominous specter impinged on BiH in the early 1990s. Its geographic
map was framed between three ethnic nations. None of them constituted an absolute
majority on the territory. Based on the four BiH’s population censuses, between
1961–1991, the percentages of the three ethnicities varied consistently. 2 The
distribution of the ethnicities on the territory constituted a political maelstrom.
Boshniaks were located predominantly in the northwest and east parts of the republic,
so a large majority of Serb areas. Croats were present in the southwest and in central
Bosnia. A division along ethnic lines was not conceivable. For this reason, BiH was
addressed as a Yugoslavia in miniature.3

The UNSC Resolution 724, adopted on 15 December 1991, envisaged the deployment
of military and civilian personnel to alleviate Yugoslav population’s anguish caused
by the wars in Croatia and Slovenia. It stated ‘all States and parties to refrain from
any action which might contribute to increasing tension...or delaying a peaceful and
negotiated outcome to the conflict in Yugoslavia’.4 Thus, implicitly, the Security
Council issued a warning against Slovenia’s and Croatia’s recognitions. Albeit the
aforementioned advise, the EC proclaimed to recognise, under specific parameters,5
the independence of the Yugoslav republics that applied for it on 15 January 1992.
Apart from Croatia and Slovenia, also BiH demanded independence. The EC decision

                                                                                                               
1
Ali, Rabia & Lifschultz, Lawrence, ‘Why Bosnia?’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 3 (September,
1994), p. 367.
2
Ramet, Sabrina & Adamović, Ljubiša, Beyond Yugoslavia: politics, economics, and culture in a
shattered community (Boulder CO.: Westview Press, 1995), p. 156.
3
Ibid., p. 157, p. 160.
4
de Cuéllar, Javier Perez, Pilgrimage for Peace: A Secretary General’s Memoir (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 497.
5
See U.N. document A/46/805, 18 December, 1991.

4    
to recognise Croatia and Slovenia accelerated the ensuing civil war in BiH. The
Bosnian parliament’s motion to proclaim BiH’s sovereignty deprived the EC
Conference of its diplomatic strength. Croatia demoted its interest in finding a
peaceful agreement and President Milosevic invoked peace talks under the guidance
of the United Nations, addressing the EC as a ‘disqualified actor in the negotiations,
having no authority to abolish another country’.6

International diplomatic efforts’ role to find a peaceful solution involved the

respective nationalist party leaders, Muslim Alija Izetbegovic, Serb Radovan
Karadžic, Croat Mate Boban. EC’s mediator José Cutileiro was at the helm of the
diplomatic mission that started negotiations on Bosnia in February 1992.7 Political
confrontations provided the arteries to create a permanent dichotomy in BiH,
consequently erupting into armed conflicts. A ‘Balkan Switzerland’ was the model
envisaged by the three parties, speaking about ethnic ‘cantonisation’8 of BiH by the
time of the Lisbon Conference in March 1992. Notwithstanding the proposed efforts
to reach a peaceful conclusion, an agreement never saw the light. Nevertheless,
Boshniaks along with Bosnian Croats called for a referendum on independence, which
took place between 29 February and 1 March.9

Violent clashes among nationalist groups erupted during and in the aftermath of the
vote in Sarajevo and rapidly propagated in the surrounding areas. Bosnian Serbs
boycotted the referendum and erected barricades in the city of Sarajevo. A plethora of
votes claimed for territorial sovereignty, however, the coveted design to create a new
state-community did not materialise.10 The three nationalist leaders even accepted a
declaration on constitutional principles for a republic, in Lisbon on 18 March 1992.11
Notwithstanding the reached agreement, Muslims and Croats withdrew their

                                                                                                               
6
de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage for Peace.
7
For a more detailed insight into diplomatic efforts concerning the future prospects of Yugoslavia and
the problems of recognition of Croatia and Slovenia see Lord Owen Balkan Odyssey Digital Archive.
Transcript of four letters regarding the negotiations over the former Yugoslavia (2 - 14 December
1991) BODA/1/1/2.
8
Ramet, Sabrina, The Three Yugoslavias: State Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005 (Washington
D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006), p. 417.
9
Gow, James, The Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 83.
10
Salzburger Nachrichten, 28 March, 1992, p. 4.
11
Klemencic, Matjaz, The International Community and the FRY/Belligerents, 1989-1997, in Ingrao,
W. Charles & Emmert, Thomas, Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholar's Initiative,
Central European Studies (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2009), pp. 152-199.

  5  
signatures short after, paving the way for armed conflicts. Albeit cantons were not
described as rigidly divided in relation to ethnicity, those ‘were based on an ethnic
map of BiH with an absolute or relative ethnic majority in each of the communes’.12

The study of early 1992 diplomatic negotiations to prevent BiH’s war gave birth to a
literature of gargantuan proportion. Scholars provided different levels of analysis,
much of it peripheral and descriptive, some others offered a superficial understanding,
only few fathomed the diplomatic negotiations during the early months of 1992. Josip
Glaurdic’s book ‘The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of
Yugoslavia’13 represents one of the few groundbreaking studies of the aforementioned
subject presenting a balanced analysis between domestic and international policies of
Yugoslavia’s break-up.

The historiography of the Bosnian crisis, with a particular mention of the works by S.
Burg & P. Shoup, 14 S. Touval,15 G. Ahrens16 , relates to domestic historical and
political causes that contributed to the escalation of war and to mediation efforts of
international diplomacy to find a peaceful solution. The research was conducted
through an extensive use of primary sources. Substantial articles have been written by
British politicians, by British, Bosnian historians and journalists, respectively. Rt.
Hon. Lord Carrington elucidates the reasons of the failure in recognising
independence of the Balkans states, significantly due to fragile conditions through
which the EC Peace Conference was conducted. 17 Croat historian J. Glaurdic
examines the evidences used during the trial of Slobodan Milosevic at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.18 Bosnian journalist H.

                                                                                                               
12
Tindemans, Leo et al., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Report of the International
Commission on the Balkans (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996),
p. 48.
13
Glaurdic, Josip, The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia (New Haven
& London: Yale University Press, 2011).
14
Burg, Steven, Shoup, Paul, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International
Intevention (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999).
15
Touval, Saadia, Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars: The Critical Years, 1990-95 (New York: Palgrave,
2002).
16
Ahrens, Geert-Hinrich, Diplomacy on the Edge: Containment of Ethnic Conflict and the Minorities
Working Group of the Conferences on Yugoslavia (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
2007).
17
Carrington, Peter, Turmoil in the Balkans: Developments and Prospects, RUSI Journal, vol. 137, no.
5 (October, 1992).
18
Glaurdic, Josip, Inside the Serbian War Machine: The Milosevic Telephone Intercepts, 1991-1992,
East European Politics and Societies, vol. 23, no.1 (2009).

6    
Hecimovic,19 British historian M. Mazower,20 have produced an analysis, at times too
descriptive, of the Bosnian crisis from early 1990s, relying mainly on journal articles
and on memoirs, but without access to archive sources. Through her extensive
archival studies and fieldwork research S. Ramet demonstrates that Yugoslavia’s
incapability to create stability was due to the absence of rule of law in political life
and of legitimated governments, respectively, rather than primeval historical
hatreds.21 J. Gow’s ‘Triumph of the Lack of Will’22 additionally corroborates the idea
that the vacuous of domestic and international political unity to counteract the use of
force determined the descent into Bosnia’s civil war.

The author of this paper believes that exists a significant rupture in the historiography
between early January 1992 and the eruption of war in April 1992. With this work he
aims to analyse this restricted period of time in great detail. Through a meticulous
multi-archival research, he sheds light on the intricate political relations between the
parties during negotiations. Private correspondences, briefings and conferences’
reports, official documents have been used to fathom initially the motivations that
prompted the EC to initiate peace talks and then the subsequent events that
undermined the Lisbon agreement. The author strongly believes that the accurate
reconstruction of the events, accompanied by a parallel analysis, fills the gaps left
incomplete by the historiography and, at the same time, provides new contents for the
interpretation of the eruption of war in BiH.

The investigation conducted in this paper is based prominently on primary sources

from the George H. W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum; the Churchill
Archives Centre, University of Cambridge; Lord Owen Balkan Odyssey Digital
Archive; Lord Owen Papers relating to the former Yugoslavia: Closed Archive;
National Defense University Library Special Collections. Lord Owen Papers deserve
special attention. Through these, the author reviews documents and private
correspondences that previously received superficial consideration or absolute
negligence. The authors’ interviews with prominent envoys and politicians, involved
de facto in the Bosnian crisis, proved to be extremely beneficial to the author’s
                                                                                                               
19
Hecimovic, Hesad, Back to the future, Bosnia Report, New Series No: 23/24/25, London, June –
October, 2001, Bosnia Report Archive (Bosnian Institute).
20
Mazower, Mark, The War in Bosnia: An Analysis, Action for Bosnia, London, 1992.
21
Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias.
22
Gow, The Triumph of the Lack of Will.

  7  
analysis.23 Invaluable support for this paper comes from diplomats’ memoirs, ex-
Yugoslavian newspapers, more significantly Vreme, Oslobodjenje, Borba, Vjesnik.

The paper is divided into two chapters. The first chapter provides a brief analysis of
the Carrington-Cutileiro plan to prevent the sliding into war in BiH. In doing so it
sheds light, through aspects and recommendation, on the architecture of the peace-
platform, which involved a power-sharing solution among BiH’s Muslims, Serbs and
Croats. However, the coveted armistice transposed into a fragile central government
with most administrative powers devolved to local levels. The territory did not show a
clear indigenous majority, leaving minorities in fragmented ethnic enclaves. None of
the nationalist groups would control adjacent districts, thus, the dilemma of partition
remained unsolved.

The second chapter explores the events and developments that undermined the EC
plan and further exposes Western powers’ impact on the Bosnian crisis, taking into
account the roles of the U.S., EC, Germany, Great Britain. This section explains how
remarkable the differences were between foreign policy makers’ approaches and how
these progressed, trying ineffectively to find a peaceful agreement. Significantly,
there was not a ‘lack of will’ to implement diplomacy with the use of force. Instead,
there were different modus operandi to face the crisis, militarily and diplomatically,24
Western diplomacies engaging to put all the pieces together.

                                                                                                               
23
The author is particularly thankful to Dr. J. Glaurdic, Professor B. Simms, Professor S. Ramet, Ret.
Colonel C. Doyle, Mag. P. Jureković, Dr. S. Rajak for all their help and support during the research
conducted for this paper.
24
Hodge, Carole & Grbin, Mladen, A Test for Europe: Confidence-Building in Former Yugoslavia
(Glasgow: Institute of Russian and European Studies, University of Glasgow, 1996), p. 47.

8    
Chapter one ~ Aspects and Recommendations on the Carrington-Cutileiro Plan

Political frictions between the three Bosnian ethnic groups raised during Autumn
1991. The EU nominated a special commission, headed by French diplomat Robert
Badinter, to analyse recognition claims by Slovenia, Croatia and BiH. Latter’s request
did not meet the necessary requirements, as the commission ruled on 11 January.

BiH’s sovereignty was subordinated to a popular referendum with a clear majority

voting for independence ‘under international supervision’.25 The EC prompted the
Yugoslav republics to apply for independence by 23 December. Muslims interpreted
the EC plan as a metaphoric shield against Serbs’ and Croats’ coveted geographic
partition maps.26 Notwithstanding Izetbegovic nurtured reserves, he signed.27 Before
the electoral vote, Ambassador Cutileiro held a second session of the EC Conference
on Bosnia in Lisbon between 21-23 February 1992. The three nationalist leaders
agreed to participate.28 Ambassador Cutileiro was encouraged by the atmosphere
during the reunion and by Izetbegovic’s progressive softening attitude.29

According to Croatian President Franjo Tudjman ‘A complete war and chaos would
arise if the world would allow the change of border’.30 He supported ‘intra-national
relations in BiH based on equality and sovereignty...Croats in BiH cannot accept any
unitarianistic solution from Sarajevo which was once offered by Belgrade for all
Yugoslavia’.31 Archbishop Vinko Puljic, head of Bosnia’s Catholic church, echoed
Tudjman claims, stating that ‘the only way we can cool tensions is by resorting to
democratic means and the referendum is one such means’.32 The referendum was

                                                                                                               
25
Opinion 4, International Legal Materials, vol. 31, no. 6 (11 January, 1992) pp. 1501-3. See also
Pirjevec, Jože, Jugoslovanske vojne 1991–2001 (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 2003), pp. 101-2.
26
Karadzic, Radovan, Assembly of Serbian People in BiH, to José Cutileiro, Lord David Owen: Papers
relating to the former Yugoslavia: Closed Archive. Sarajevo, 20 February, 1992.
27
Zimmermann, Warren, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers-America’s Last
Ambassador Tells-What Happened and Why (New York: Times Books, 1999), pp. 173-4, 177-8.
28
Vjesnik, 27 February, 1992.
29
‘EC next steps on Bosnia’, 19 February 1992, Electronic Messages: Bosnia February 1992, OA/ID
CF 01542, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library.
30
‘Tudjman discusses Bosnia’, 27 March 1992, Electronic Messages: Bosnia March 1992, OA/ID CF
01542, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library.
31
Ibid.
32
‘Bosnian leaders appeal for end to violence before referendum’, 19 February 1992, Electronic
Messages: Bosnia February 1992, OA/ID CF 01542, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library.

  9  
scheduled between 29 February–1 March 1992. 33 Bosnian Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Haris Silajdjic, envisaged the referendum being controlled by observers, also
in its preparatory phase.34 The EC considered deploying a monitoring group from the
CSCE office of Democratic Institutions in Warsaw. Moreover, further steps included
a substantial delegation from the European Parliament and a troika observer team,
comprising between three to six members, at the political director level. In
Carrington’s view the monitoring mission would have mollified the frictions between
parties and Izetbegovic’s administration, respectively.35

As for the referendum, the Serbs aim was to boycott the vote.36 However, 63.4% of
the eligible population to vote participated, 37 99.7% of whom declared their
preference for independence.38 In response to this result, Nikola Koljevic, a Serbian
member of Bosnia’s Presidency, refused to acknowledge BiH’s independence, calling
it unconstitutional and accused the EC to interfere in Yugoslavia’s domestic relations.
He referred to the EC as a ‘...a political organisation not competent to deal with these
matters. It does not have a unified foreign policy. It is German dominated...’.39

Nevertheless, he recognized the EC peace talks the last credible tentative to find an
agreed solution. ‘The EC Conference...seems to me to be the last chance to stop a
civil and religious war breaking out. The Europeans meddled and now they must stay
with it. A civil war in BiH would make the war in Croatia look like Disneyland’.40
Koljevic stated that the EC recognition in January of Slovenia and Croatia created

                                                                                                               
33
Ljubic, Mariofil, Assembly of the SRBiH, Lord David Owen: Papers relating to the former
Yugoslavia: Closed Archive. Sarajevo, 25 January, 1992.
34
Silajdjic, Haris, SRBiH, Ministry of International Cooperation, Lord David Owen: Papers relating to
the former Yugoslavia: Closed Archive. Sarajevo, 29 January, 1992.
35
‘EC next steps on Bosnia’, 19 February 1992, Electronic Messages: Bosnia February 1992, OA/ID
CF 01542, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library. See also the letter (ii) from Lord Carrington to
Minister Pinheiro concerning Yugoslavia, Lord David Owen: Papers relating to the former Yugoslavia:
Closed Archive. COREU, 20.02.92.
36
See the letter (ii) from Lord Carrington to Minister Pinheiro concerning Yugoslavia, Lord David
Owen: Papers relating to the former Yugoslavia: Closed Archive. COREU, 8.02.92.
37
Silajdjic, Haris, BiH Foreign Minister, to Mr. Badinter, President of the Arbitration Commission.
Lord David Owen: Papers relating to the former Yugoslavia: Closed Archive.
38
Kronologija rata: Agresija na Hrvatsku i Bosnu i Hercegovinu (Zagreb: Hrvatski Informativni
Centar, 1998), p. 144.
39
‘Serbian leaders in Bosnia rejects independence vote’, 4 March 1992, Electronic Messages: Bosnia
March 1992, OA/ID CF 01542, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library. See also Momcilo Krajisnik,
President of the Assembly of Serbian People in BiH, Lord David Owen: Papers relating to the former
Yugoslavia: Closed Archive. Sarajevo, 20 January, 1992.
40
Ibid.

10    
tensions in BiH. These were accentuated by the referendum on independence and by
external pressures such as Turkey’s recognition of BiH’s sovereignty.41

In the wake of this, violence erupted on 1 March and rapidly propagated. In Sarajevo
barricades were built, the airport was closed and the trains were not in function.
During a correspondence with Mr. J. Greenstock, assistant Under Secretary in the
FCO, Koljevic explained how the scenario in BiH was on the verge of dramatic
collapse and emphasized positively the diplomatic role of Ambassador Cutileiro,
urging him to reach a peaceful truce. Moreover, Koljevic stressed the point that he did
not aim to secede and the current borders of BiH were not planned to be revised.42 By
the end of 1991 over 300,000 civilians had arms.43

Notwithstanding an ominous situation entangled BiH, Izetbegovic expressed positive

feelings. In a telephone call to Ambassador Zimmermann on 2 March 1992,44 he was
confident the war theatre would have calmed down. Mr. David Evans, the Helsinki
Committee Representative, was located in Sarajevo to monitor the referendum. He
reported that armed clashes were progressively escalating. Sarajevo’s centre was
blocked and the Holiday Inn was occupied by Muslim forces in military uniforms.

Moreover, Mr. Evans stated that the event that unleashed violence through Sarajevo’s
streets has been a shooting that occurred on 1 March 1992.45 There was a wedding
party waving a Serbian flag at the helm of the procession. Two men attacked the flag
carriers and the father of the groom was killed. President Izetbegovic defined this
attack as a ‘shot against BiH’46 and the Major of Sarajevo, Mohamed Krazjejakovic,
stated that the barricades would have not put down until the responsible for the event
were caught.47 In the wake of this episode, armed Serb militia reoccupied Sarajevo

                                                                                                               
41
Ibid.
42
‘Bosnia-Hercegovina: Bosnian Serb views’, Lord David Owen: Papers relating to the former
Yugoslavia: Closed Archive. COREU, 04.03.92.
43
Calic, Marie-Janine, Krieg und Frieden in Bosnien-Hercegovina (Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp,
1996), p. 89.
44
For a detailed description of these events see ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina situation report no. 1’, 2 March
1992, Electronic Messages: Bosnia March 1992, OA/ID CF 01542, George H. W. Bush Presidential
Library.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.

  11  
claiming that ‘this is our territory that I’m defending. We are in the majority here and
this will become our canton’.48

In February 1992, Portuguese EC mediator José Cutileiro promoted peace

negotiations in Sarajevo, involving the three nationalist leaders. The plan presented by
mid March aimed at segmenting BiH into ethnic districts, creating a geographic
tapestry similar to Swiss cantons. Albeit these were not described as rigidly divided in
relation to ethnicity, practically they ‘were based on an ethnic map of BiH with an
absolute or relative ethnic majority in each of the communes’.49 Based on this plan
Serbs and Muslims would have occupied 44% of BiH’s territory and Croats the
remaining 12%.50 Each part felt betrayed by this agreement.51 The Muslims were not
in favour of dividing BiH. Croats represented more than 17% of BiH population and
the space percentage offered was inferior by 5%.52 Serbs aimed to enlarge Serbia by
annexing two-third of BiH’s territory.53

More significantly, they claimed sixty-five counties in Bosnia based on the 1991
census and on pre-World War II figures, with the aim to exploit the Yugoslav Army
in these territories in order to strengthen their presence. A provisional map, based on
the 1991 Etnicka Karta of BiH and showing groups’ percentages in each commune,
was presented to the parties.54 Eastern Bosnia was the most vulnerable area where
Muslim and Serb ethnicities were intermixed and each of the nationalist parties had its
own claims. The district of Drventa in the Posavina was a common object of
contention.55 Serbs aimed at constructing corridors to link Bosnian-Serb territories to
Serbia proper.56

                                                                                                               
48
‘Bosnia-Herzegovina: street barricades paralyze Bosnian capital’, 2 March 1992, Electronic
Messages: Bosnia March 1992, OA/ID CF 01542, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library.
49
Tindemans, Leo et al., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Report of the International
Commission on the Balkans (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996),
p. 48.
50
Monnesland, Svein, For Jugoslavia, og etter (Oslo: Sypress Forlag, 1999), pp. 289-90.
51
Borba, 10 March 1992, p. 8.
52
Borba, 27 March 1992, p. 3.
53
Jajcinovic, Milan, ‘Svi izgubili – a zadovolnji?’ (Zagreb: Vecernji list, 24 March 1992), p. 2.
54
Oslobodjenje, 19 March 1992, p. 3.
55
Borba, 19 March 1992, p. 2.
56
Vjesnik, 13 March 1992, p. 7.

12    
This design was elaborated on the basis of a map showing a 1981 census of areas
comprising villages. Muslims’ main issue was directed at the number of constituent
units present on the territory. They retained the Etnicka Karta misleading due to the
fact that scarcely populated areas could have not been compared to more densely
ones. Croats and Serbs were already discussing potential partition of territories where
they were the only contenders, whereas, areas comprising also Muslims faced
convoluted solutions. Serbs and Croats addressed the Etnicka Karta as fallacious,
with new borders to be redrawn.57 They were determined to resist any pressure from
Sarajevo to regain control.

Furthermore, ensuing ethnic conflicts showed tragic war scenarios in regions with no
ethnic majorities, such as Mostar and Bosanski Brod, where all the three nationalist
groups nurtured expansionist objective, being the borders subject to changes.58 BiH’s
state proved not to be unitary and bureaucracy was too divided along ethnic lines. By
September 1991, many firms based on the territory were not paying taxes to the
central government but instead to their nationalist parties.59

Peace negotiations were focused on the strategic demands of the three ethnic groups.
Izetbegovic aimed at a unitary state with equal rights for the citizens, the constitution
being the legal foundation. Karadzic’s objective was a confederation of independent
states, whereas, Croats were initially in favour of a unitary state, with defined regional
rights and a second chamber of parliament where each group had the same number of
members. Decisions on cardinal issues required a consensus. In the end, based on a
paper presented to the parties involved, the Croats came closer to Serbs’ stance and
Izetbegovic was willing to accept the offer of a state composed by three constituents
units. 60 Notwithstanding the constructive attitude towards negotiations, fear and
suspicions reigned among them, especially between Serbs and Muslims. The former
expected to be outnumbered by Muslims, while the latter envisaged the confederation
proposed by Serbs as a first step before secession, with Croats coming progressively
                                                                                                               
57
Darwin, H. G., Bosnia: Territorial Division into Constituent Units, Lord David Owen: Papers
relating to the former Yugoslavia: Closed Archive. 29 February, 1992.
58
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Electronic Reading Room,
National Intelligence Daily, 19 March, 1992.
59
Calic, Krieg und Frieden in Bosnien-Hercegovina, p. 88.
60
See the letter (ii) from Lord Carrington to Minister Pinheiro, Lord David Owen: Papers relating to
the former Yugoslavia: Closed Archive. COREU, 15.02.92.

  13  
close this extremist position. In this regard, one Serb claimed that Croats aspirations
were to reach a confederate Bosnia and then eventually secede.61

On the 21st-22nd of February 1992, Lisbon hosted a second round of talks. Serbs and
Croats demonstrated a firm position in supporting a confederation between
independent states. Muslims’ position was demoted within the talks, having
abandoned a unitary state outcome. Nevertheless they were still adamant to refuse any
form of federation. Izetbegovic appeared to be willing to appease Croats and Serbs
positions but feared an ensuing secessionist manoeuvre by the latter. In this regard,
Lord Carrington also suspected Belgrade abetting the SDS. In a meeting in the
Serbian capital on 26 January between Lord Carrington, President Milosevic and Mr.
Jovanovic, the Serbian Foreign Minister, Milosevic was asked to act as a peacemaker
with the Bosnian Serbs. He praised the Cutileiro peace talks and approved an
independent BiH within its current borders, where each of the three parties had the
same rights.62

A fourth round of peace talks took place in Brussels between 7th and 9th March
1992. 63 The three nationalist leaders attended the meetings. However, during
negotiations the Serbian delegation retrieved its position, impeding the opportunity to
seal a diplomatic solution over a common ‘Statement of Principles’.64

Despite the aforementioned frictions, on 18 March in Sarajevo, Cutileiro reached an

agreement with the nationalist groups involved.65 The peace accord referred to a
‘Statement of Principles for New Constitutional Arrangements for Bosnia and
Hercegovina’.66 Serbs and Muslims pointed at the agreement as a victory for both

                                                                                                               
61
Ibid.
62
See the letter (ii) from Lord Carrington to Minister Pinheiro, Lord David Owen: Papers relating to
the former Yugoslavia: Closed Archive. COREU, 23.02.92.
63
Lord Owen Balkan Odyssey Digital Archive. Statement of Lord Carrington (9 March 1992)
BODA/1/1/3.
64
‘Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ambassador Cutileiro’s talks in Brussels’, Lord David Owen: Papers relating
to the former Yugoslavia: Closed Archive. COREU, 10.03.92. See also Lord Owen Balkan Odyssey
Digital Archive. Statement of Principles for New Constitutional Agreements for Bosnia-Herzegovina
(18 March 1992) BODA/1/1/4.
65
Wynaendts, Henry, L'engrenage: chroniques yougoslaves juillet 1991-aoat 1992 (Paris: Denoèl,
1993), pp. 176-177. See Vreme, 23 March 1992, pp. 7-8.
66
The Balkan Odyssey Digital Archive, Statement of Principles for New Constitutional Agreements for
Bosnia-Herzegovina, BODA/1/1/4, 18 March 1992. See Borba, 27 March, 1992.

14    
parties .67 It stated that BiH ‘would be a state, composed of three constituent units,
based on national principles and taking into account economic, geographic and other
criteria’.68 The central government exerted authority in determined fields, whereas, it
had marginal influence within the institutions of the ethnic units.69 BiH would have
had ‘its currency, its system of defense, its foreign policy and a single legal-judicial
system’.70

In Lord Carrington’s opinion, the plan’s aim was not to divide Bosnia into three
separate regions, but it was elaborated for the establishment of cantons, each
represented by its ethnic group.71 The aforementioned statement did not figure in the
final version of the plan. Various aspects were left without a definite settlement on
purpose, with the hope that the undefined parts could have paved the way for a
peaceful solution. Nevertheless, the proposed plan created further tensions related to
territorial boundaries.72 Ethnic frictions arose where communities shared the same
portion of land, with the incumbent peril of ethnic cleansing.

The agreed Statement of Principles meant that undertaken decisions were to be

acknowledged by a common consensus of the three parties. In relation to this issue,
Serbs interpreted the independence decision adopted by the Bosnian parliament as a
violation of the aforementioned communal accord. On the contrary, Serbs and Croats
acquisitions about division of powers between central government and territorial
communities and the right of the latter to build political relations with neighbouring
countries73, constituted delicate issues to be accepted by the Muslims.74 Few days
after the signed accord in Lisbon, Croats and Muslims reneged their positions.75 The

                                                                                                               
67
Ibid.
68
Ibid. See Oslobodjenje, 19 March 1992, p. 3.
69
Touval, Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars, p. 108.
70
Oslobodjenje, 19 March, 1992.
71
Carrington, Peter, Turmoil in the Balkans: Developments and Prospects, RUSI Journal, vol. 137, no.
5 (October, 1992).
72
Politika, 19 March, 1992, p. 5.
73
Ramcharan, Bertrand, The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: Official Papers (The
Hague: Kluwer law international, 1997), pp. 24-27.
74
Touval, Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars, p. 109. For a more detailed description see Szasz, C. Paul,
The Quest for a Bosnian Constitution: Legal Aspects of Constitutionals Proposals Relating to Bosnia,
Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 19, no. 2 (1995).
75
Borba, 26 March, 1992, p. 2.

  15  
Bosnian Croats were the first delegation to retrieve their signature demurring at the
geographic delimitations of the cantons.76

However, the principal motive behind the mutated political scenario were the
Muslims. Croatia’s objective was to secede Bosnia from Yugoslavia, thus, a
partnership with the Muslims was fundamental. On the other side, Izetbegovic
accepted the pact reluctantly.77 His hesitation was explained firstly by the fact that not
all the EC government supported the Cutileiro peace talks. Germany considered it a
disaster. 78 Secondly, notwithstanding U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger
reassured the Bosnian President that the U.S. would have supported EC sponsored
diplomatic efforts, Izetbegovic was not convinced. 79 His doubts were based on
different reasons.

First, Ambassador Zimmermann criticized Izetbegovic with regard to the fact that he
subscribed an accord on which he nurtured reserves. 80 Secondly, Muslims were
conscious of a U.S. opposition to an ethnic cantonisation and about pressures on EC
ministers to recognize BiH’s independence. The U.S. were doubtful with regard to an
implementation of the Balkan cantonisation solution. Moreover, they exerted their
political leverage in relation to BiH independence regardless a potential positive
outcome of a Statement of Principle agreement. Muslims’ thoughts were vigorously
entrenched in the belief that if they sealed a more advantageous pact, this would
conceptualize in a U.S. political support for them.81

By the end of March the war scenario in BiH was precipitating. In a letter to Lord
Carrington, BiH’s Socialist Party pledged the EC ministers not to recognize Bosnia
and so avoiding a terrible civil war.82 The SPBiH urged the EC to ultimate first BiH’s
political and constitutional negotiations. It appealed also to EC ministers’ sense of
responsibility, envisaging how perilous could be a premature and one-party

                                                                                                               
76
Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pp. 111-12.
77
Oslobodjenje, 25 March, 1992.
78
Touval, Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars, p. 111. Author’s interview, 17 May, 1994.
79
Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, pp. 188-90.
80
Medjunarodni Problemi, no. 1-2, 1992, p. 195.
81
Gompert, David, How to Defeat Serbia, Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 4 (1994), p. 37.
82
Subic, Rabija, ‘An Appeal to the European Community Ministerial Council’, SPBiH, Lord David
Owen: Papers relating to the former Yugoslavia: Closed Archive. Sarajevo, 25.03.92.

16    
recognition, adding that ‘The ones who survive the Bosnia and Herzegovina Sodom
and Gomorrah will be able to govern the graveyards only’.83

Furthermore, Ejup Ganic, a member of Bosnia’s collective Presidency, sustained that

‘...the situation in the Republic is seriously deteriorating...’. 84 Ganic accused
Karadzic’s party of organising terrorist activities against Bosnian authorities, ‘Such
acts represent a declaration of war on the legal institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
All this is leading to civil war which could spread beyond this Republic’.85 On Friday
20 March, the self-proclaimed Serbian parliament in Bosnia adopted a new
constitution related to Serb occupied territories, which was interpreted as a legal basis
for the regions to separate from Bosnia and form a new Yugoslavia.86

Momcilo Krajisnik, leader of the Serbs parliament in Bosnia, announced that a new
‘Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is created’.87 Moreover, he supported the
invalidity of the referendum and of BiH’s independence request, respectively.
President Krajisnik stated that both did not respect the legal procedure of BiH
Constitution. ‘International law does not recognize any definition of the notion of
minority’.88 Based on this statement it was contradictory to conclude that Serbian
population in BiH represented a minority, colliding with art. 1 SFRJ Constitution and
art. 2 SRBiH Constitution.89 The end of March saw the sixth EC Conference on BiH.
Ambassador Cutileiro, as a last resort to captivate Muslims’ approval on the eve of
BiH’s recognition, proposed an army composed of 18,000 units for the Bosnian
government and a single President.90

BiH was proclaimed independent on 7 April 1992. Lord Carrington and EC mediator
Cutileiro tried in vain to persuade Izetbegovic to resume peace talks. Muslims relied

                                                                                                               
83
Ibid.
84
‘Bosnia asks U.N. to intervene as fighting worsens’, 27 March 1992, Electronic Messages: Bosnia
March 1992, OA/ID CF 01542, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library.
85
Ibid.
86
‘Serbs proclaim own constitution in volatile Bosnia’, 27 March 1992, Electronic Messages: Bosnia
March 1992, OA/ID CF 01542, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library. See also Belgrade Radio, 26
March, 1992.
87
Ibid.
88
Krajisnik, Momcilo, President of the Assembly of Serbian People in BiH, Lord David Owen: Papers
relating to the former Yugoslavia: Closed Archive. Sarajevo, 20 March, 1992.
89
Ibid.
90
Touval, Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars, p. 117. See also Borba, 1 April, 1992, p. 7.

  17  
on the international community to interrupt Croats and Serbs attacks. Western powers
condemned Serb military actions and withdrew their diplomatic envoys from
Yugoslavia, while the Security Council imposed sanctions on Serbs.91 Cutileiro and
Lord Carrington strived to mitigate Muslims position. However, their diplomatic
mission encountered a definitive negative response from Izetbegovic in June 1992,
who affirmed its unwillingness to resume peace talks unless ‘the basis for discussion
was changed’.92

The aforementioned point emphasises Western diplomacy’s failure to coalesce peace

talks into a unitary approach. The EC objective was based on diplomatic mediation
focused to bring parties to a final agreement, using BiH territorial sovereignty to
allure ethnic groups. On the contrary, the U.S. did not take part into peace
negotiations. They strongly believed that recognition would have acted as a deterrent
against Serbs.93 For this reason, U.S. diplomacy prompted EC ministers to declare
BiH’s independence rapidly, devoting minor importance to peace talks.

                                                                                                               
91
Resolution 757, 30 May, 1992.
92
U.N. Document S/24100, 15 June, 1992. See also S/23836, 24 April, 1992.
93
Danas, 27 January, 1992.

18    
Chapter two ~ Developments that Undermined the Carrington-Cutileiro Plan
and Western policies towards Negotiations

The events in BiH precipitated rapidly towards a treacherous war-scenario after the
armed conflicts in Croatia reached a stalemate by the end of 1991. In this regard, BiH
was left with scarce political solutions in order to find a peaceful agreement.94 First,
the EC decision to recognize Croatia and Slovenia in December 1991, prompted the
Bosnian government to follow the same path of the two break-away republics.

Secondly, BiH’s position was hardened by the fact that Bosnian Serbs were aided
militarily by Serbia, thus, the request for a referendum and a consequent
independence were the coveted prospects for the Bosnian government.95 Bosnian SDS
documents, showing war occupation plans in BiH, were used in the trials conducted at
the ICTY against their army officers.96 Furthermore, in support of the aforementioned
statement, official papers found in JNA’s headquarters in Sarajevo in May 1992 stated
that the Yugoslav National Army already furnished arms to Bosnian Serbs in the
spring of 1991.97

Bosnian Serbs plans concerning an ethnic cantonisation of BiH have been proposed
since 1990. Radovan Karadzic was ‘ecstatic over developments in Lisbon’,98 whereas,
Alija Izetbegovic was ‘astonished by the EC proposal for the creation of ethnically
based regions’.99 The Bosnian Serb leader with regard to the Lisbon agreement stated
that it was ‘a great leap forward because it accepted reality’.100 He further added that
‘...now in Europe they don’t take law into consideration. They take facts and
analogies...Izetbegovic won’t be able to assert control over 70 percent of the
territory’. 101 On the contrary, the opposition parties, more significantly the

                                                                                                               
94
Mazower, Mark, The War in Bosnia: An Analysis, Action for Bosnia, London, 1992, p. 7.
95
Ibid.
96
Gow, James, The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes (London: Hurst,
2003), pp. 121-29.
97
Divjak, Jovan, The first Phase, 1992-1993: Struggle for Survival and Genesis of the Army of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, in Magaš, Branka & Žanić, Ivo, The war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1991-1995
(London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), p. 154.
98
Gow, The Triumph of the Lack of Will, p. 81. See also Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, pp.
189-90.
99
Ibid.
100
Begic, Kasim, Bosna i Hercegovina od Vanceove misije do daytonskog sporazuma, 1991-1995
(Sarajevo: Bosanska knjiga, 1997), p. 87.
101
Biserko, Sonja, Kovanje antijugoslovenske zavere (Belgrade: Helsinski odbor za ljudska prava u
Srbiji, 2006), p. 263.

  19  
Communists, rejected the partition plan claiming that it was against BiH’s tradition
during Tito’s Yugoslavia.102

After the results of the referendum were publicized on 3 March, BiH government
referred to the EC in order to keep its promise with regard to recognition. However,
the EC response towards the issue was absent. On 5 March, notwithstanding German
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher expressed his willingness for a plural
recognition of BiH comprising all European foreign ministers, his proposal has not
been supported by his colleagues.103 Being loyal to Portuguese EC Presidency and
given the tacit rules of European Political Cooperation,104 after the recognition of
Croatia and Slovenia German politicians had no concrete policy towards Bosnia.
Germany was in favour of BiH’s recognition by the EC together with the U.S. and
advised to take a formal decision on 6 April.105 By the end of March, also Chancellor
Helmut Kohl, in a meeting with President Bush at Camp David, confirmed that a
solution over BiH was close.106 However, it was the U.S. and not Germany that led to
BiH recognition.107 Genscher did not reject this approach, but he neither put pressure
on recognition.108

With regard to the aforementioned issue, dissenting opinions were present within
British foreign policy. British politician Rt. Hon. J. Enoch Powell in December 1992
stated that ‘Britain has broken that rule [not to recognize the government of a country
until it is in unchallenged control of that country’s territory] in its dealings with the
former state of Yugoslavia, with consequences that are productive of acute
embarrassment to Britain and create hardship for others’.109 He continued affirming
that ‘When Yugoslavia dissolved into civil war we rushed in along with other
countries of the European Community and recognized fragments of the old
                                                                                                               
102
Glaurdic, The Hour of Europe, p. 291.
103
Biserko, Kovanje antijugoslovenske zavere, p. 275.
104
Libal, Michael, Limits of Persuasion: Germany and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1991-1992 (London:
Praeger, 1997), p. 92.
105
‘Recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina’, Lord David Owen: Papers relating to the former Yugoslavia:
Closed Archive. COREU. Bonn, 27 March, 1992.
106
‘Meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany’, 21 March 1992, Electronic Messages: Bosnia
March 1992, OA/ID CF 01542, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library.
107
Meier, Viktor, Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise, Trans. Sabrina P. Ramet (London: Routlege,
1999), pp. 241-42.
108
Meier, Viktor, Conversation with Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Bonn, 19 December, 1994.
109
The Speeches of John Enoch Powell, POLL 4/1/24, January-December 1992, Tuesday, 8th
December, 1992, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, University of Cambridge.

20    
Yugoslavia...We had not need to do that...Our motive was merely to be in the
forefront of those who pretend that the European Community ought to have a single
foreign policy...to be a fully-fledged state’.110

On the contrary, the U.S. showed a firm approach towards BiH, prompting for
recognition. In a letter to EC minister Pinheiro, U.S. Secretary of State Baker restated
its support to EC’s efforts to resolve the crisis. He underlined the highly unstable
situation in BiH after the referendum and shed light over the economic crisis that was
affecting the country. For these reasons, the U.S. vehemently supported the process of
recognition.111 Secretary Baker continued asserting that ‘a solution for Serbia and
Montenegro needed to be reached, suggesting recognition for these as a common
Yugoslav state and pledging for mutual territorial respect and integrity of all the new
states’.112 Moreover, he insisted ‘We are prepared to give all our support to Lord
Carrington and use whatever influence we have with the parties to assist him’.113 On
10 March, in a meeting between the EC foreign ministers and the U.S. Secretary of
State, the parties agreed to coordinate further political decisions on the recognition of
the Balkan republics, Croatia, Slovenia, BiH, Macedonia.114 Between the end of
February and the aforementioned meeting, the new U.S. approach to the Balkan crisis
interpreted Bosnia’s recognition as the only political solution to confer stability to the
region.115

The ensuing day after the EC ministers’ reunion, Secretary Baker met in Brussels
with Bosnian Foreign Minister Silajdjic. The latter encouraged U.S. Secretary’s view
that recognition would have promoted stability and, at the same time, stressed BiH’s
disastrous economic situation116 and asked the U.S. to intercede with Saudi Arabia so

                                                                                                               
110
Ibid.
111
‘Yugoslavia. Letter from Secretary Baker’, Lord David Owen: Papers relating to the former
Yugoslavia: Closed Archive. COREU. 5 March, 1992.
112
Ibid.
113
Ibid. See also ‘Yugoslavia. Letter from Secretary Baker’, Lord David Owen: Papers relating to the
former Yugoslavia: Closed Archive. COREU. 21 March, 1992.
114
Trifunovska, Snezana, Yugoslavia through Documents: From Its Creation to Its Dissolution
(Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), p. 520.
115
Baker, James A., III, with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and
Peace, 1989-92 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), pp. 639-42.
116
‘EC emergency food aid for Bosnia-Herzegovina’, 5 March 1992, Electronic Messages: Bosnia
March 1992, OA/ID CF 01542, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library.

  21  
that they could have provided assistance. 117 The Yugoslav economic dissolution
generated a social emergency in BiH. ‘Credit sales of wheat and oil, as well as
financial credits were needed’.118 Silajdjic also appreciated the U.S. firm posture
against Croatia and Serbia. In fact, Secretary Baker warned the two republics to stop
meddling in Bosnia’s internal affairs.119

What captured the attention during the diplomatic negotiations in March was the
different approach of Ambassador Cutileiro and Lord Carrington. Both, Serbs and
Croats were willing to sign the peace agreement, whereas, Bosnian President
Izetbegovic was reluctant to conclude negotiations, interpreting the Lisbon agreement
as the ultimate step before BiH’s ethnic partition. In this regard, Ambassador
Cutileiro conceived the Bosnian signature as a necessary requirement before
recognition.120 In the light of this, Lord Carrington admonished Izetbegovic about the
grievous consequences Muslims would have faced if he had not signed the agreement.
‘I thought that it was very much in President Izetbegovic’s interest to settle on the
basis of the Cutileiro plan because it was clear to me that the overwhelming military
superiority at that time at any rate was with the Serbs...I mean President Milosevic
may have denied it, but they were obviously being helped in a big way by Serbia’.121

Lord Carrington and Cutileiro acknowledged the Serb military capacity and exploited
this issue to exert pressure on Izetbegovic and impel him to acquiesce in the partition
of BiH. The Bosnian President in the end capitulated to the mounting pressures of the
SDS and HDZ and signed the agreement. Although the three nationalist parties sealed
a peaceful solution, they all expressed their will implicitly of not respecting the pact
few days after the meeting with Cutileiro on 18 March. 122 One week later the
agreement was signed, Izetbegovic uttered the EC incited him to comply with the
peace plan and, consequently, he refused to recognize any partition based on ethnic

                                                                                                               
117
‘Secretary Baker’s meeting with Bosnian Foreign Minister Silajdjic’, 11 March 1992, Electronic
Messages: Bosnia March 1992, OA/ID CF 01542, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library.
118
Ibid.
119
Ibid.
120
Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, interview with Josip Glaurdic, 27 April, 2006.
121
Lord Carrington, BL-DY interview transcript, 4 January 1995, 3/11, p. 17.
122
In relation to Cutileiro’s view’s see, Hecimovic, Hesad, Back to the future, Bosnia Report, New
Series No: 23/24/25, London, June – October, 2001, Bosnia Report Archive (Bosnian Institute). In
relation to Lord Carrington’s view see the interview with Josip Glaurdic, 18 May, 2005.

22    
characters.123 Croats and Serbs also reneged their positions, criticizing the indigenous
partition of BiH, 124 and considered the Cutileiro map only as a first step for a
confederalisation of Bosnia and for the reunion of Bosnian Serb territories to Serbia
proper,125 respectively. Substantially, Izetbegovic amended his position because of
resolute pressures from his party126 and because of a U.S. political ascendancy.127 The
19 March National Intelligence Daily report expressed that the Cutileiro plan ‘may
prevent clashes in the near term, but ethnic groups left outside their respective units
almost certainly will resort to violence eventually...ethnic fighting is likely in the
regions where no ethnic group is in the majority, such as Mostar and Bosanski
Brod...’.128

The violence that erupted in Sarajevo from early March rapidly propagated in the
surroundings areas. Furthermore, the JNA prepared to undertake war actions and
positioned strategically its army around Sarajevo, Bosanski Brod and Mostar.129 After
the nationalist leaders reneged their positions and peace talks derailed, violent
conflicts exploded in the Posavina region.130 This area was of extreme strategic
importance to Serbs due to the fact that linked their occupied territories in Croatia and
in Bosnia to Serbia proper. Rapidly Bosnian Muslims and cities such as Bijeljina,
Zvornik, Foca, Visegrad, Prijedor and Banja Luka, capitulated under the force of the
JNA and of Serb special units.131

                                                                                                               
123
CIA, Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995 (Washington,
DC: CIA, Office of Russian and European Analysis, 2002), 1: 135.
124
‘Zamijeniti delegaciju HDZ’, Oslobodenje, 27 March, 1992, p. 2.
125
Caplan, Richard, Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), p. 130.
126
Begic, Bosna i Hercegovina, pp. 92-3.
127
Ambassador Zimmermann influenced Izetbegovic to reconsider its position. In relation to this issue
see Lord Carrington, interview with Josip Glaurdic, 18 May 2005. Lord Carrington stated that
Ambassador Cutileiro saw a telegram from the U.S. State Department for Bosnian President
Izetbegovic. This document underpinned the fact that the signed agreement recognised annexed
territorial parts by the use of force.
128
CIA, ‘National Intelligence Daily’, 19 March 1992, FOIA F-1992-01432, p. 7.
129
Glaurdic, The Hour of Europe, p. 296.
130
‘Smrt, razaranja, pljacke’, Olsobodenje, 28 March, 1992, p. 1.
131
Cigar, Norman, Serb War Effort and Termination of the War, in Magas and Zanic, The War in
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1991-1995, pp. 216-17. Local Serb forces were supported by the
special units belonging to the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) under commandant Željko
Ražnatović. See also Glaurdic, Josip, Inside the Serbian War Machine: The Milosevic Telephone
Intercepts, 1991-1992, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 23, no.1 (2009), pp. 96-7.

  23  
From a military standpoint, Bosnian Serbs counted more than 100,000 armed units,
whereas, Croats and Muslims were capable of deploying a reduced number of soldiers
with an estimate of 15,000 and of 3,500 troops, respectively.132 In relation to Serb
forces’ status, on 3 December 1992, British politician Sir John Nott, in a letter to
former Secretary of State for Defence Malcolm Rifkind, elucidated briefly the
situation in Bosnia. Sir Nott surmised that the population of Serbia was not willing to
engage in a war and that they would repudiate Milosevic if the West took an assertive
stance against him.

More significantly, Serbia had to cope with the issue of desertion, in fact ‘there are
thought to be 200,000 deserters in Belgrade alone. Few of the young people want to
fight. The army is able to man only one in three of its tanks. Morale is at the lowest
ebb with the Serbian Generals consistently unable to achieve their military
objectives’.133 For this reason, Milosevic was compelled to mobilise paramilitaries
units. Sir John Nott reinforced his belief underlining the urgent need of ‘a proper
measure of military deterrence against Serbia’134 to defeat local forces in Bosnia. To
this end, he called for a strong political leadership in order to solve the Balkan
turmoil, especially within the British Conservative Party.

President Izetbegovic, in the beginning of April, made a proclaim exhorting all the
people of Bosnia to defend themselves against Serbs and Croats attacks.135 However,
as already happened previously to Croatian and Slovenian TO’s, Bosnian forces were
deprived of firearms by the JNA and its command positions were occupied by Serbs,
loyal to the Yugoslav army. 136 On 5 April, the day after Izetbegovic prompted
Bosnian Muslims to resist military attacks, Sarajevo was besieged by enemy fire
offensives and Serb forces took possession of the airport and of the police station.137
In response to these events, Sarajevo’s citizens organized a rally, venting their peace
                                                                                                               
132
Paula A. DeSutter, ‘Strategy and Campaign Plan to Defeat Serbian Aggression’, January 1994,
Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188, National Defense University Library Special Collections. See
also Gow, James, One Year of War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, RFE/RL Research Report. Vol. 2, No.
23, (June 4, 1993), p. 9.
133
The Papers of Sir John Nott. Reference NOTT 1/2/3. Letter from Sir John Nott to Malcolm Rifkind,
Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence. London, 3.12.1992. Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill
College, University of Cambridge.
134
Ibid.
135
Sarac, A., Mobilisati TO, miliciju i civilnu zastitu, Oslobodenje, 5 April, 1992, p. 1.
136
Divjak, The first Phase, 1992-1993, p. 158.
137
Ibid., p. 157.

24    
message in front of the Parliamentary building. The march ended in a bloodshed.
Snipers belonging to the SDS, stationing at the Holiday Inn Hotel, killed six people
creating havoc among the population.138 On 6 April the EC ministers responded
recognizing BiH and the ensuing day the U.S. echoed the EC declaration on Bosnia,
following the same path for Croatia and Slovenia.139 Moreover, the U.S decided to
maintain their sanctions on Serbia, pursuing the opposite political direction of the EC
in this regard, and, on the contrary, freed Slovenia, Croatia and BiH from grievous
burdens.140 Bosnia’s recognition was considered to be of minor importance by the
Serbs, Milosevic paralleling it ‘to the Roman emperor Caligula declaring his horse to
be a senator’.141

The SDS’ political and military stratagems in Bosnia were known within the U.S.
Department of State. U.S. deputy secretary of state Lawrence Eagleburger was aware
of Bosnian Serbs’ plans in BiH and about the use of force and violence displayed ‘at
forcibly partitioning Bosnia-Herzegovina and effecting large forced transfers of
population...The clear intent of Serbian use of force is to displace non-Serbs from
mixed areas to consolidate Bosnian Serb claims to some 60 percent of Bosnian
territory...in a manner which would create a Serbian Bosnia’.142 In order to counteract
Bosnian Serbs aims, the U.S. Department of State sent Ralph Johnson, deputy
assistant secretary, to engage in diplomatic talks with both, Milosevic and the SDS
party. The U.S. envoy warned Milosevic of a potential global economic and political
isolation against Serbia.

However, the aforementioned menace was surmised only at a figurative level, in fact
deputy assistant secretary Johnson excluded any military intervention at an
international stage.143 This point underlined that western powers and the U.S. did not

                                                                                                               
138
Gjelten , Tom, Sarajevo Daily: A City and Its Newspapers under Siege (New York: Harper Collins,
1995), p. 19-24.
139
Trifunovska, Yugoslavia through Documents, p. 521.
140
Ibid. p. 522. See also The Papers of Sir John Nott. Reference NOTT 1/2/3. America is right about
Bosnia. The Times, 1.12.94. Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, University of Cambridge.
141
Radovan Karadzic, BL-DY interview transcripts, p. 3.
142
Power, Samantha, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic
Books, 2002), p. 264.
143
Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, pp. 196-200.

  25  
profuse sufficient ‘clarity of purpose’144 or openness in order to modify the situation
in Yugoslavia. In the words of former Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd ‘George Bush
had famously said he didn’t do the vision thing...[Bush and James Baker] weren’t
visionaries, and nor were we’.145 Lord Carrington claimed ‘Peace will not come to
Bosnia until there is a de facto partition’.146 The British foreign minister Douglas
Hogg referred to the Bosnian government stating that ‘There is no cavalry over the
hill. There is no international force coming to stop this’.147

In May 1992 Lord Carrington went back to Sarajevo to renew peace talks with
President Izetbegovic, however, their mission culminated in perfunctory
conversations. During their dialogue, that encapsulates the diplomatic approach to
war in the Balkans, Lord Carrington asked the Bosnian President ‘’What would you
do? I told him we would fight back...Carrington paused, looked into my eyes and said
‘How do you think you will fight back?’...I told him we didn’t have any choice. If we
capitulate, we will either be captured or killed...Carrington replied...’They have
several thousand tanks...stocks of ammunition and weapons; are you aware of it?’’.148

                                                                                                               
144
Hutchings, Robert, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Account of U.S.
Policy in Europe, 1989-1992 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 320.
145
Sarotte, Mary Elise, 1989: The Struggle to Creat Post-Cold War Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press), p. 4.
146
Simms, Brendan, Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (Allen Lane: The Penguin
Press, 2001), p. 20, p. 30.
147
Ibid.
148
Alija Izetbegovic, BL-DY interview transcript, July 1994-July 1995, 3/32, pp. 3-4.

26    
Conclusion

In 1992 the European geographic map was substantially modified. Yugoslavia was
dismembered and new republics were proclaimed independent. The EC recognition of
Slovenia and Croatia in January 1992 and BiH’s independence in April, sealed the
faith of Yugoslavia and marked ‘a new era in the history of the South Slavs’.149 BiH’s
path to sovereignty was signed by different events and diplomatic approaches
compared to the two mentioned breakaway republics. With regard to the latter, the
conflicts were addressed as phoney and dirty wars. Both countries satisfied the
preconditions proposed by the Badinter Commission, of assuring adequate protection
to national minorities and of controlling securely their own frontiers, in order to be
proclaimed independent.150

Furthermore, Germany assumed a role of primary importance with foreign minister

Hans-Dietrich Genscher at the helm of diplomatic dialogues, under the vestige of
principal actor. On the contrary, BiH recognition process ushered in a more intricate
scenario. Its territory was composed by intermingled ethnic communities with
fissiparous tendencies, more significantly by Bosnian Serbs, Croats, Muslims. None
of them constituted a clear majority. Compared to Slovenia and Croatia, BiH did not
satisfy the Badinter Commission’s preconditions, however, its independence was
subject to a referendum scheduled between 29 February–1 March, and its voting
results had to demonstrate an undisputed propensity for sovereignty.

Notwithstanding the outcome unveiled a marked preference for independence with

Croats and Muslims voting en masse, the Serbs boycotted the referendum. Barricades
were erected in Sarajevo and violent clashes erupted in the city between the three
nationalist groups. Conflicts rapidly propagated in the surroundings areas. In order to
counteract the sliding into war in BiH, the EC sponsored peace talks in February 1992
and named a Portuguese Ambassador José Cutileiro as mediator, with the concerted
collaboration of British politician Lord Carrington, in order to find a peaceful solution
between the parties involved in the conflict. Several diplomatic meetings were

                                                                                                               
149
Glaurdic, The Hour of Europe, p. 300.
150
With regard to Slovenia’s phoney war, June-July 1991 and Croatia’s dirty war, July-December
1991, see Silber, Laura & Little, Alan, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: TV Books, 1995),
pp. 154-67, pp. 169-88. In relation to the two Badinter preconditions, Ibid., p. 200.

  27  
conducted in Brussels between February and March 1992. The EC was the principal
mediator, with Germany relegated to a minor role. Initial U.S. lack of concern was
arrestingly callous, refraining to follow the EC path in recognizing Slovenia and
Croatia in January 1992.

However, ensuing conversation between Bosnian President Izetbegovic and U.S.

Ambassador Zimmermann signed a return of the U.S. to diplomatic talks. This was in
part the result of intense lobbying conducted in Washington D.C. by Bosnian
representatives, whom were trying to convince the American diplomatic corps to
intervene in favour of Bosnia.151 Although the parties signed an agreement in Lisbon
on 18 March, under the guidance of EC mediator Cutileiro, few days after Muslims
and Bosnian Croats reneged their positions. Peace talks derailed and tension rapidly
escalated in BiH. On 7 April BiH was recognized by the U.S. and the EC. Diverging
opinions were proffered in this regard whether this solution accelerated the war in
Bosnia.

Ljiljana Smajlovic, a journalist for Oslobodenje during early 1990s, affirmed that BiH
was collapsing from inside.152 A year before war in Bosnia, none of the parties
already was willing to send tax money or army soldiers to the other factions.153
Moreover, Milosevic was convinced that the German policy of recognizing Slovenia
and Croatia, would require BiH’s recognition by the EC and the U.S., and as a natural
consequence it would accelerate its sliding into war. Ambassador Zimmermann
echoed this critic.154 The U.S. envoy warned Milosevic that he considered Serbia
responsible for the conflicts caused by indigenous Serbs in Bosnia and added that the
U.S. decided to recognise BiH very soon. On the other hand, the Serb leader
envisaged this solution. However, Milosevic underlined the necessity first to reach an
agreement under the Cutileiro talks and then proceed with Bosnia’s recognition.155
The failure of EC peace negotiations made President Izetbegovic reluctant to retard
                                                                                                               
151
The note refers to Bosnian foreign minister Haris Silajdjic and to U.N. Ambassador Mohamed
Sacirbegovic. See Gow, The Triumph of the Lack of Will, p. 88.
152
Smajlovic, Ljiljana, From the Heart of the Heart of the Former Yugoslavia, Wilson Quarterly
(Summer, 1995), p. 111.
153
Ibid.
154
Zimmermann, Warren, The Last Ambassador: Memoirs of the Collapse of Yugoslavia, Foreign
Affairs 74, no. 2 (March/April, 1995), p. 16.
155
‘Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH): early recognition’ Lord David Owen: Papers relating to the former
Yugoslavia: Closed Archive. March, 1992.

28    
Bosnia’s recognition and vanished BiH’s prospects for longevity. Croatia’s and
Slovenia’s independence did not constitute the catalyst factor for the eruption of war
in BiH. The issue that was at the centre of debates was the incapacity to ultimate first
political and constitutional negotiations and then proceed to recognition.156

In this regard, both EC and U.S. envoys were repeatedly warned by Serbian officers
that an early recognition of Bosnia would have meant a sliding into a treacherous war-
scenario.157 In a letter of Ambassador Hall to Lord Carrington the aforementioned
thought is reinforced, underpinning the concept that ‘...recognition should be given as
soon as, but not until, the Bosnian parties have reached agreement on the basic future
structures...early recognition could precipitate their collapse without the EC having
either the power to prevent it’.158 In relation to Bosnian Serbs, he warned that they
‘have their own very deep-seated anti-Muslim agenda stemming from the role of
Muslims in the World War II death camps in Bosnia and the forced exodus of the
Serbs. These feelings still run very deep...’.159

The U.S. firm convincement was that only an early recognition of BiH could have
deterred Serbs’ aggression against Bosnia. Among policymakers, a parallel with the
German policy towards Slovenia and Croatia was surmised. However, to compare the
aforementioned approaches was considered a mistake. The wars of the two break-
away republics were strictly related to territorial contentions, whereas, the Bosnian
scene was more tortuous, being the survival of the state and its population in peril. EC
mediator Cutileiro was of the belief that a peaceful solution was still possible in
March 1992, but this process was stymied by external forces. He criticized the
Bosnian leader writing that ‘President Izetbegovic and his aides were encouraged to
scupper that deal and to fight for a unitary Bosnian state by well-meaning outsiders
who thought they knew better’,160 with clear reference to the U.S administration.

                                                                                                               
156
Subic, Rabija, ‘An Appeal to the Euroepan Community Ministerial Council’, SPBiH, Lord David
Owen: Papers relating to the former Yugoslavia: Closed Archive. Sarajevo, 25.03.92.
157
Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, p. 185, p. 188. Zimmermann received warnings from
Svetozar Stojanovic, Karadzic and from Generals Kadijevic and Adzic. However, the U.S. envoy
firmly believed that recognition would avoid a war scenario.
158
‘Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH): early recognition’ Lord David Owen: Papers relating to the former
Yugoslavia: Closed Archive. March, 1992.
159
Ibid.
160
José Cutileiro, ‘Letter to the Editor’, The Economist, 9 December, 1995, p. 6

  29  
To conclude, Bosnia was brought to an inevitable collapse by internal forces. Ret.
Colonel Doyle affirms that ‘’there was no alternative for Bosnia to war. The EU was
not sufficiently united in its policy on Bosnia given the manner in which some EU
countries gave unilateral recognition to some republics. There was no appetite for
military intervention. US foreign Secretary Baker had earlier called for the Yugoslav
Federation to be maintained, thus unwittingly giving Milosevic the go ahead to use
‘whatever means necessary’ to sustain the federation’’.161

On 20 January, Koljevic, in an interview with the newspaper Vreme, stated ‘...The

Muslims want a sovereign Bosnia, the Serbs do not want it, and the Croats have said
that they want it. The Muslims want a unified Bosnia, a Bosnia that will not split
apart...Can Bosnia be both sovereign and unified, integral, at the same time?
Hardly’,162 and President Izetbegovic, during a congress of the SDA in November
1991, concluded that only a practical solution was feasible, ‘the historical formula of
Bosnia as multi-denominational, multi-national, and multi-cultural community’.163

                                                                                                               
161
Ret. Colonel Doyle, Colm, Head of the European Community Monitor Mission for the Republic of
Bosnia based in Sarajevo, 24.11.1991 to 24.3.1992, e-mail exchange with the author, 3 July, 2012.
162
Vreme, January 20, 1992, pp. 24-25, as translated in FBIS, EEU, January 30, 1992, p. 68.
163
Sarajevo Radio, November 29, 1991, as translated in FBIS, EEU, December 3, 1991, p. 42.

30    
Appendix One

$este /\' •> M .-•, 11 I

./ V,
O J V Q O / N A /^

CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCE^

DECLASSIFY ON OADR MONTENEGRO

YUGOSLAVIA KOSOVO /
International boundary
— •—• Republic boundary
Autonomous area boundary
© National capital
O Republic or autonomous
area capital

Serbian Controlled Territory y*1"'"

Duties* TIKANE V

  31  
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32    
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  33  
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  37