Journal of Fish Biology (2011) 78, 2093–2095

doi:10.1111/j.1095-8649.2011.03007.x, available online at wileyonlinelibrary.com

BOOK REVIEW

DO FISH FEEL PAIN? Edited by V. Braithwaite. 208 pp. Published by Oxford University Press, Oxford,
U.K., 2010. Price £14.99. ISBN: 978-0-19-955120-0.

Over the past decade, the question of whether fish can feel pain has come to the
forefront. Several experiments have been performed in an attempt to answer this
important question and researchers on both sides of the argument have published
their findings. Victoria Braithwaite came into the spotlight in 2003 as one of the
authors of the high-profile paper ‘Do fish have nociceptors? Evidence for the evolu-
tion of a vertebrate sensory system’ [Sneddon, L. U., Braithwaite, V. A. & Gentle,
M. J. (2003). Do fish have nociceptors? Evidence for the evolution of a vertebrate
sensory system. Proceedings of the Royal Society B 270, 1115–1121]. Her present
book outlines the overall physiological development of pain pathways as well as
the anatomy for pain perception in fish. In it, she also discusses the basic level at
which animals can feel pain and how this relates to sentience and consciousness.
Braithwaite contrasts fish welfare with current welfare practices of other animals
and concludes with future goals including the regulation of protocols surrounding
fish welfare that may provide both a higher quality product for the consumer and a
higher quality of life for the fish.
Braithwaite’s introductory chapter highlights the problems concerning the defini-
tion of pain and asks if the question related to pain is relevant when discussing fish.
To prove that fish are capable of feeling pain, Braithwaite suggests that there are
three definitive questions that must be answered,

1. Do fish have the necessary receptors and nerve fibres to detect painful events?

2. Will a potentially painful stimulus trigger activity in the nervous system?

3. How does the experience of these events affect the behaviour of fish and the
decisions that they make?

While these questions are pertinent to the fish pain debate, the question of emotion
and consciousness in fish is not addressed here. The International Association for
the Study of Pain (IASP) has defined pain as ‘a sensory and emotional experience
associated with actual or potential tissue damage’. Braithwaite addresses the question
of emotion and consciousness in fish in subsequent chapters, but she does so in the
form of an afterthought, perhaps because no definitive answer is given. Braithwaite
states that the view of the current book is unbiased, although her scientific papers
have clearly stated an answer. She explains that the processing of a painful stimulus
in fish is similar to that of mammals and addresses the fact that although the pain
processing area in the brain in mammals is not present in fish, it is important to
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Journal of Fish Biology © 2011 The Fisheries Society of the British Isles
2094 BOOK REVIEW

separate brain activity and brain capacity over different taxonomic groups. She then
poses the question of where fish belong in comparison with other animals in relation
to how conscious they are.
When assessing pain perception in any animal, there are certain criteria that must
be met. Does the animal have the physiological structures to support the transmission
and recognition of pain; do they react with certain behavioural and physiological
changes? Braithwaite outlines the research that has been conducted in her laboratory
and others. Indeed, A delta and C afferent nerve fibres as well as nociceptors have
been found in fish. Braithwaite provides a Darwinian perspective of the evolution
of pain [Gibson, K. R. (2002). Evolution of human intelligence: the roles of brain
size and mental construction. Brain, Behavior and Evolution 59, 10–20], arguing
that while the pain an animal experiences may be different from the pain a human
experiences, it is unlikely that there is a complete absence of pain processes in
animals. She explains the long evolutionary history of nociception and its presence
from sea anemones to humans, citing the benefits of this survival trait. Braithwaite
explains that organisms with a less developed brain, such as snails that possess opioid
receptors, also display signs of ‘feeling’ pain, processing pain, as well as responding
internally to painful stimuli. This is an interesting chapter that brings the reader up
to speed on the experimental process and the questions that pain researchers strive
to answer.
Consciousness has been described as the fully functional brain, i.e. intercommu-
nication between many parts of the brain interacting with one another [Baars, B. J.,
Ramsøy, T. Z. & Laureys, S. (2003). Brain, conscious experience and the observ-
ing self. Trends Neuroscience 26, 671–675; Gaillard, R., Dehaene, S., Adam, C.,
Clémenceau, S., Hasboun, D., Baulac, M., Cohen, L. & Naccache, L. (2009). Con-
verging intracranial markers of conscious access. PLoS Biology 7, e1000061. doi:
10.1371/journal.pbio.1000061]. An animal must be conscious to suffer from a painful
event; this is why general anaesthetics are used during surgery. Are fish conscious
and are they aware of internal and external stimuli that would make suffering pos-
sible? Braithwaite tries to tackle these questions in fish by discussing emotion and
memory. In humans, pain causes brain activity in areas associated with emotion,
i.e. the limbic system especially the amygdala. While Braithwaite states that fish,
with their simpler brains, may not feel pain the same way as humans, this does not
necessarily mean they are completely devoid of emotion, or without the capacity
for some sort of suffering. The absence of evidence does not necessarily imply the
evidence of absence.
Braithwaite argues that fish are capable of self-consciousness, the experience of
thinking about one’s actions and being able mentally to consider different possible
scenarios and modify behaviour accordingly, and cites cooperative hunting between
eels and groupers as an example. One example of complex behaviour cannot suf-
ficiently prove higher cognitive processing in fish and as such this is a weak point
in her argument. The definition of pain in animals ascribed to by her colleagues
removes the emotional factor and instead relies on behavioural and physiological
responses to an event that would be deemed painful in humans. This argument, if
taken by Braithwaite, would have made her statements more compelling.
This book provides a basic view of the issues and some of the experiments relating
to the fish pain issue, but its conclusions may be premature. If we look at publications
by Rose [Rose, J. D. (2002). The neurobehavioral nature of fishes and the question

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Journal of Fish Biology © 2011 The Fisheries Society of the British Isles, Journal of Fish Biology 2011, 78, 2093–2095
 BOOK REVIEW 2095

of awareness and pain. Reviews in Fisheries Science 10, 1–38; Rose, J. D. (2007).
Anthropomorphism and ‘mental welfare’ of fishes. Diseases of Aquatic Organisms
75, 139–154], we see the dichotomy between the two sides of this debate. While
research has expanded considerably in this area over the past decade, the current
understanding of fish cognition and sentience is not sufficient. This book does provide
the reader with a much-needed background on the issues for those with a passing
interest in fish welfare and pain perception and gives a good synopsis of Braithwaite’s
past research and papers. The fact that she was one of the founding ‘fish feel pain’
researchers makes it difficult to see her opinion as unbiased. While the European
Union has made use of these findings with protocols that reflect her research, the
U.S.A. seems at least a decade behind in following suit.

S. G. JONES AND A. DOUGLAS

Biomedical Science Department,
University of Prince Edward Island,
Charlottetown,
Canada

© 2011 The Author

Journal of Fish Biology © 2011 The Fisheries Society of the British Isles, Journal of Fish Biology 2011, 78, 2093–2095