TERAÑA vs HON DE SAGUN

DECISION
The petitioner allegedly also gave the materials from the demolished house to her
BRION, J.: sister, who built a house adjacent to the respondents property. [8] When the
respondent discovered what the petitioner did, he immediately confronted her and

The petitioner Floraida Terana (petitioner) asks us to reverse and set aside, advised her to vacate the premises.[9] She refused. On February 3, 1997, the

through this Petition for Review on Certiorari,[1] the September 7, 2001 Decision[2] of respondent sent a letter demanding the petitioner to vacate the leased

the Court of Appeals (CA), and its subsequent Resolution[3] denying the petitioners property.[10] Despite this letter of demand, which the petitioner received on February

motion for reconsideration. 10,[11] she still refused to vacate the said property.

THE FACTS The respondent thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer[12] against the petitioner

on April 16, 1997 on the ground of the petitioners violation of the terms of the

The respondent Antonio Simuangco (respondent) owned a house and lot Contract of Lease.[13] The respondent prayed for the petitioners ejectment of the

at 138 J.P. Laurel St., Nasugbu, Batangas, which he leased to the leased property, and for the award of P70,000.00, representing the cost of the

petitioner.[4] Sometime in 1996, the petitioner demolished the leased house and materials from the demolished house, attorneys fees, and costs.[14]

erected a new one in its place.[5] The respondent alleged that this was done without

his consent.[6] The Contract of Lease[7] defining the respective rights and obligations The presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Nasugbu,

of the parties contained the following provisions, which the petitioner allegedly Batangas, Hon. Herminia Lucas, inhibited from the case on the ground that she is

violated: related to the respondent.[15]

3. That the lessee obligated herself with the

Lessor by virtue of this Lease, to do the following, The petitioner denied allegations of the complaint in her Sagot.[16] She claimed that
to wit:
she demolished the old building and built a new one with the knowledge and consent
a) xxx
of the respondent; that the original house was old and was on the verge of
b) To keep the leased property in such collapsing;[17] that without the timely repairs made by the petitioner, the houses
repair and condition as it was in the
commencement of the Lease with the collapse would have caused the death of the petitioner and her family. The petitioner
exception of portions or parts which may
prayed for the court to: 1) dismiss the ejectment case against her; and 2) award in
be impaired due to reasonable wear and
tear; her favor: a) P100,000.00 as moral damages, b) P200,000.00 as reimbursement for

c) xxx the expenses incurred in building the new house, c) P50,000.00 as attorneys fees,

and d) P10,000.00 as costs incurred in relation to the suit.[18]

d) Not to make any alterations in the
Leased property without the knowledge
and consent of the Lessor; x x x
The trial court called for a preliminary conference under Section 7 of the Revised IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
Rules of Summary Procedure (RSP) and Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, rendered in favor of the plaintiff Antonio B. Simuangco and
against the defendant Aida Terana as follows:
and required the parties to file their position papers and affidavits of their witnesses
1. Ordering the defendant Aida Terana and all persons
after they failed to reach an amicable settlement. [19] Instead of filing their position claiming right under her to vacate and surrender
papers, both parties moved for an extension of time to file the necessary possession of the subject house to the plaintiff;

pleadings. The trial court denied both motions on the ground that the RSP and the 2. Ordering the said defendant to pay the amount of
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as Attorneys fees;
Rules of Court, particularly Rule 70, Section 13(5), prohibit the filing of a motion for and
extension of time.[20]
3. To pay the costs of suit.
The MTC framed the issues in the case as follows:
SO ORDERED.[25]
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the contract
of lease when the old house was demolished and a new
house was constructed by the defendant; and
Unaware that a decision had already been rendered, the petitioner filed a
2. Whether or not defendant is entitled to be reimbursed for letter entitled Kahilingan,[26] to which she attached her position paper and the
her expenses in the construction of the new house.[21]
affidavits of her witnesses.[27] The submission was essentially a motion for
THE MTCS DECISION[22]
reconsideration of the denial of motion for extension of time. On November 6, 1977,

the MTC denied the petitioners Kahilingan as follows:

The MTC rendered its decision on November 5, 1997[23] despite the parties failure to
Defendant Aida
timely file their respective position papers.[24] The decision stated that: according to Teranias KAHILINGAN dated November 5,
1997 is DENIED for being moot and academic on account of
the parties Contract of Lease, the consent of the respondent must be obtained before the decision on the merits rendered by this court
any alteration or repair could be done on the leased property; that the petitioner dated November 4, 1997 relative to the instant case.

failed to produce any evidence that the respondent had given her prior permission to SO ORDERED.[28]
demolish the leased house and construct a new one; that even in her answer, she

failed to give specific details about the consent given to her; that in demolishing the
Petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal on November 12, 1997. [29] The
old structure and constructing the new one, the petitioner violated the Contract of
records of the case were ordered elevated to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) where
Lease; that this violation of the terms of the lease was a ground for judicial ejectment
the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 439.
under Article 1673(3) of the Civil Code; and that since the demolition and
construction of the new house was without the consent of the respondent, there was THE RTCS DECISION[30]
no basis to order the respondent to reimburse the petitioner.

The MTC thus ruled:

 The RTC rendered judgment affirming the decision of the MTC on February
26, 1998. The RTC ruled that: 1) the ruling of the MTC was supported by the facts
on record; 2) although the respondent failed to submit his position paper and the
affidavits of his witnesses, the MTC correctly rendered its decision on the basis of the
pleadings submitted by the parties, as well as the evidence on record; 3) the
petitioner failed to show enough reason to reverse the MTCs decision. The court
further declared that its decision was immediately executory, without prejudice to
any appeal the parties may take.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or for New Trial
on March 3, 1998.[31] The petitioner argued that the appealed MTC decision was not
supported by any evidence, and that the respondent failed to substantiate the
allegations of his complaint and to discharge the burden of proving these allegations
after the petitioner denied them in her Sagot. In effect, the petitioner argued that
the allegations of the complaint should not have been the sole basis for the judgment
since she filed an answer and denied the allegations in the complaint; the RTC
should have also appreciated her position paper and the affidavit of her witnesses
that, although filed late, were nevertheless not expunged from the records.
In her motion for a new trial, the petitioner argued that her failure to
submit her position paper and the affidavits of her witnesses within the 10-day
period was due to excusable negligence. She explained that she incurred delay
because of the distance of some of her witnesses residence. The petitioner alleged
that she had a good and meritorious claim against the respondent, and that aside
from her position paper and the affidavits of her witnesses, she would adduce
receipts and other pieces of documentary evidence to establish the costs incurred in
the demolition of the old house and the construction of the new one.
On April 28, 1998, the RTC granted the motion for reconsideration, and
thus reversed its February 26, 1998 judgment, as well as the November 5,
1997 decision of the MTC. It noted that: 1) the MTC rendered its decision before the
petitioner was able to file her position paper and the affidavit of her witnesses; 2)
the rule on the timeliness of filing pleadings may be relaxed on equitable
considerations; and 3) the denial of the petitioners motion for reconsideration and/or
new trial will result to a miscarriage of justice. Thus, believing that it was equitable to
relax the rules on the timeliness of the filing of pleadings, the RTC remanded the
case to the MTC for further proceedings, after giving the respondent the opportunity
to submit his position paper and the affidavits of his witnesses. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, on considerations of equity and substantial
justice, and in the light of Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of
Court, the judgment of this Court dated February 26, 1998, as
well as the Decision dated November 4, 1997 of the Lower Court
in Civil Case No. 1305, are hereby both set aside. The lower court
to which the records were heretofore remanded is hereby ordered
to conduct further proceedings in this case, after giving the
plaintiff-appellee an opportunity to file his position paper and
affidavits of witnesses as required by Section 10, Rule 70, of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. [Underscoring supplied.]
SO ORDERED.
On May 9, 1998, the petitioner challenged the order of remand through
another motion for reconsideration.[32] The petitioner argued that since the original
action for unlawful detainer had already been elevated from the MTC to the RTC, the
RSP no longer governed the disposal of the case. Before the RTC, the applicable rule
is the Rules of Court, particularly Section 6 of Rule 37, which reads:
Sec. 6. Effect of granting of motion for new trial. If a new trial
is granted in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, the
original judgment or final order shall be vacated, and the
action shall stand for trial de novo; but the recorded evidence
taken upon the former trial, in so far as the same is material
and competent to establish the issues, shall be used at the
new trial without retaking the same.
 Thus, the RTC should have conducted a trial de novo instead of remanding appellate courts may instead review the evidence and records transmitted to it by the

the case to the MTC. The petitioner further argued that a remand to the court a trial court. Since the petitioner is asking the court to review the records of the MTC,

quo may only be ordered under Section 8, Rule 40[33] of the Rules of Court. inclusive of her position paper and the affidavits of her witnesses, it is also important

to give the respondent an opportunity to file his position paper and the affidavits of

The RTC denied the motion noting that the petitioner missed the whole his witnesses before the MTC renders a judgment. It is the MTC or the trial court that

point of the reversal of the decision. First, the reversal was made in the interest of has the jurisdiction to do that.

substantial justice and the RTC hewed more to the spirit that vivifieth than to the
THE CAS DECISION
letter that killeth,[34] and that a lawsuit is best resolved on its full merits, unfettered

by the stringent technicalities of procedure. The RTC further emphasized that a

remand is not prohibited under the Rules of Court and that Section 6 of Rule 135 The CA affirmed the RTC in a decision promulgated on September 7,
allows it: 2001.[35] The CA noted that the RTCs order of remand was not just based on equity

Sec. 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect When by law and substantial justice, but was also based on law, specifically Section 6 of Rule 135.
jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry Thus, the CA ruled that the RTC did not err in remanding the case to the MTC and
it into effect may be employed by such court or officer, and if ordering the conduct of further proceedings after giving the respondent an
the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such
jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these opportunity to present his position paper and the affidavits of his witnesses. This
rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be
adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or ruling did not satisfy petitioner, giving way to the present petition.
rules.

Second, Rule 40 governs appeals from the MTC to the RTC. Nowhere in Rule 40 is THE PETITION

there a provision similar to Section 6 of Rule 37.

Before this Court, the petitioner alleges: 1) that the respondent made a
Third, Section 6 of Rule 37 contemplates a motion for new trial and for
request for the petitioner to vacate the subject property because his nearest of kin
reconsideration filed before a trial court a quo. The RTC in this case was acting as an
needed it; 2) that she was only going to vacate the premises if she were reimbursed
appellate court; the petitioners motion for new trial and reconsideration was directed
the actual cost incurred in building the said house;[36] 3) that the case be decided on
against the appellate judgment of the RTC, not the original judgment of the trial
the basis of the entire record of the proceedings in the court of origin, including
court.
memoranda and briefs submitted by the parties, instead of being remanded to the

MTC.
Fourth, after Republic Act No. 6031 mandated municipal trial courts to record their
proceedings, a trial de novo at the appellate level may no longer be conducted. The
 In his Comment[37] and Memorandum,[38] the respondent joins the We find that a remand of the case to the lower courts is no longer

petitioners prayer for a ruling based on the records instead of remanding the case to necessary, given the pleadings and submissions filed, and the records of the

the MTC. He prays that, as the MTC ruled, the petitioner be ordered to vacate the proceedings below. A remand would delay the overdue resolution of this case

leased property, and that the petitioners claim for reimbursement be denied. The (originally filed with the MTC on April 16, 1997), and would run counter to the spirit

respondent argues that the MTC correctly ruled on the basis of the parties pleadings, and intent of the RSP.[40]

the stipulation of facts during the preliminary conference, and the records of the
Petitioners Position Paper
proceedings. and the Affidavits of Her
Witnesses Cannot Be
Admitted
ISSUES

The petitioner submits the following as the issue to be decided: Should the Court admit the petitioners position paper and the affidavits of
[W]hether under the Rules of Summary Procedure, the Regional
Trial Court, as well as the Court of Appeals, may order the case her witnesses attached to her Kahilingan?
remanded to the MTC after the plaintiff, herein respondent, failed
to submit evidence in support of his complaint because his Position
Paper, affidavit of witnesses and evidence, were not submitted on The intent and terms of the RSP both speak against the liberality that the
time and the extension of time to file the same was denied because
it is prohibited under the Rules on Summary Procedure.[39] petitioner sees. By its express terms, the purpose of the RSP is to achieve an

expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases they cover, among them,

which we break down into the following sub-issues: 1) whether a remand is proper; forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases.[41] To achieve this objective, the RSP

2) whether the Court should appreciate the petitioners position paper and the expressly prohibit certain motions and pleadings that could cause delay, among

affidavits of her witnesses; and 3) whether the complaint for unlawful detainer them, a motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other

should be dismissed. paper. If the extension for the filing of these submissions cannot be allowed, we

believe it illogical and incongruous to admit a pleading that is already filed

late. Effectively, we would then allow indirectly what we prohibit to be done

THE COURTS RULING directly. It is for this reason that in Don Tino Realty Development Corporation v.

Florentino,[42] albeit on the issue of late filing of an answer in a summary proceeding,

The petition is partly meritorious. we stated that [t]o admit a late answer is to put a premium on dilatory measures,

the very mischief that the rules seek to redress.

Remand Not Necessary

The strict adherence to the reglementary period prescribed by the RSP is

due to the essence and purpose of these rules. The law looks with compassion upon
a party who has been illegally dispossessed of his property. Due to the urgency
presented by this situation, the RSP provides for an expeditious and inexpensive
means of reinstating the rightful possessor to the enjoyment of the subject
property.[43] This fulfills the need to resolve the ejectment case quickly. Thus, we
cannot reward the petitioners late filing of her position paper and the affidavits of her
witnesses by admitting them now.
The failure of one party to submit his position paper does not bar at all
the MTC from issuing a judgment on the ejectment complaint. Section 10 of the RSP
states:
Section 10. Rendition of judgment. Within thirty (30) days
after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the
expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render
judgment. [Underscoring supplied.]
However, should the court find it necessary to clarify
certain material facts, it may, during the said period, issue an
order specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the
parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters
within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be
rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last
affidavit or the expiration of the period for filing the same.
The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just to gain
time for the rendition of the judgment.
Thus, the situation obtaining in the present case has been duly provided for by the
Rules; it was correct to render a judgment, as the MTC did, after one party failed to
file their position paper and supporting affidavits.
That a position paper is not indispensable to the courts authority to render
judgment is further evident from what the RSP provides regarding a preliminary
conference: on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and admissions made
by the parties, judgment may be rendered without the need for further proceedings,
in which event the judgment shall be rendered within 30 days from the issuance of
the order.[44] Thus, the proceedings may stop at that point, without need for the
submission of position papers. In such a case, what would be extant in the record
and the bases for the judgment would be the complaint, answer, and the record of
the preliminary conference.
Unlawful detainer
The special civil action for unlawful detainer has the following essential requisites:
1) the fact of lease by virtue of a contract, express or implied;
2) the expiration or termination of the possessor's right to hold possession;
3) withholding by the lessee of possession of the land or building after the
expiration or termination of the right to possess;
4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of
the lease and vacate the premises; and
5) the filing of the action within one year from the date of the last demand
received by the defendant.[45]
Requisites 1, 4, and 5 have been duly established. The presence of the
Contract of Lease is undisputed; the letter of demand was sent on February 3, 1997,
and received by the petitioner on February 10, 1997; and the action was filed
on April 16, 1997, well within the one-year period from the letter of demand. For our
determination is whether the petitioners right to possess the subject property may be
terminated by virtue of her violation of the terms of the contract. If we answer in the
affirmative, her continued detention of the property is illegal.
 Section 1673(3) of the Civil Code answers this question by providing that Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court likewise provides that material

the lessor may terminate the lease contract for violation of any of the conditions or allegations in the complaint which are not specifically denied, other than the amount

terms agreed upon,[46] and may judicially eject the lessee.[47] One of the stipulated of unliquidated damages, are deemed admitted. A denial made without setting forth

terms of the parties Contract of Lease, as narrated above, is that no alterations may the substance of the matters relied upon in support of the denial, even when to do so

be made on the leased property without the knowledge and consent of the is practicable, does not amount to a specific denial.[49]

lessor. The issue in this case is beyond the fact of alteration since it is not disputed

that the petitioner demolished the house under lease and built a new one. The The petitioners denial in her answer consists of the following:

crucial issue is whether the demolition was with or without the knowledge and 1. Maliban sa personal na katangian at tirahan ng
consent of the respondent. nasasakdal, ay walang katotuhanan ang mga
isinasakdal ng nagsasakdal;

2. Na hindi lumabag sa kasunduan ng upahan ang

The petitioner contends that the Court should not give credence to the respondents nasasakdal;
claim that he neither had knowledge of nor gave his consent to her acts. She argued
3. Na, ang pagpapagawa ng bahay na inuupahan ng
that the respondent had the burden of proving this allegation with positive evidence nasasakdal ay sa kaalaman at kapahintulutan ng
nagsasakdal at higit na gumanda at tumibay ang
after she frontally denied it in her answer. Since the respondent failed to discharge bahay ng nagsasakdal sa pamamagitan ng
this burden, she argues that she no longer needed to prove her defense that the pagpapagawa ng nasasakdal; xxx[50]

demolition and construction were done with the respondents knowledge and
We do not find this denial to be specific as the petitioner failed to set forth the
consent.[48]
substance of the matters in which she relied upon to support her denial. The

petitioner merely alleged that consent was given; how and why, she did not say. If
The petitioners contention is misplaced.
indeed consent were given, it would have been easy to fill in the details. She could

have stated in her pleadings that she verbally informed the respondent of the need
First, the material allegations in a complaint must be specifically denied by the
for the repairs, or wrote him a letter. She could have stated his response, and how it
defendant in his answer. Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Court, provides:
was conveyed, whether verbally or in writing. She could have stated when the

A defendant must specify each material allegation of consent was solicited and procured. These, she failed to do. Ergo, the petitioner is
fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever
deemed to have admitted the material allegations in the complaint.
practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon
which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant
desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so
much of it as is true and material and shall deny the Second, both parties failed to present evidence other than the allegations in their
remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or
pleadings. Thus, the court may weigh the parties allegations against each other. The
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
a material averment made in the complaint, he shall so state, petitioner presented a general denial, while the respondent set forth an affirmative
and this shall have the effect of a denial.
assertion. This Court has time and again said that a general denial cannot be given
more weight than an affirmative assertion.[51]
Damages recoverable in an
unlawful detainer action
are limited to rentals or
reasonable compensation
for the use of the property
This Court has no jurisdiction to award the reimbursement prayed for by
both parties. Both parties seek damages other than rentals or reasonable
compensation for the use of the property, which are the only forms of damages that
may be recovered in an unlawful detainer case.[52] Rule 70, Section 17 of the Rules of
Court authorizes the trial court to order the award of an amount representing arrears
of rent or reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises if it
finds that the allegations of the complaint are true.[53]
The rationale for limiting the kind of damages recoverable in an unlawful
detainer case was explained in Araos v. Court of Appeals,[54] wherein the Court held
that:
The rule is settled that in forcible entry or unlawful
detainer cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the
fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the leased property. The reason for this is that in
such cases, the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of
rightful possession; hence, the damages which could be
recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as
a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and
occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may
have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of
material possession.
An action for reimbursement or for recovery of damages may not be
properly joined with the action for ejectment. The former is an ordinary civil action
requiring a full-blown trial, while an action for unlawful detainer is a special civil
action which requires a summary procedure. The joinder of the two actions is
specifically enjoined by Section 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. A party may in one
pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes
of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to
the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall
comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special
civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between
the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions,
the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided
one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said
court and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action
are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount
claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. [Underscoring supplied.]
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-48534 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
petitioner FLORAIDA TERANA and all persons claiming right under her are ordered to
vacate and surrender possession of the subject property to the respondent ANTONIO
SIMUANGCO. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
AMELIA ROBERTS vs MARTIN PAPIO
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 69034 which reversed and set aside the
Decision[2]of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 150, Makati City, in Civil Case No.
01-431. The RTC ruling had affirmed with modification the Decision[3] of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 64, Makati City in Civil Case No. 66847. The
petition likewise assails the Resolution of the CA denying the motion for
reconsideration of its decision.
The Antecedents
The spouses Martin and Lucina Papio were the owners of a 274-square-
meter residential lot located in Makati (now Makati City) and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-44980.[4] In order to secure a P59,000.00 loan from
the Amparo Investments Corporation, they executed a real estate mortgage on the
property. Upon Papios failure to pay the loan, the corporation filed a petition for the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage.
Since the couple needed money to redeem the property and to prevent the
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, they executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over
the property on April 13, 1982 in favor of Martin Papios cousin, Amelia Roberts. Of
the P85,000.00 purchase price, P59,000.00 was paid to the Amparo Investments
Corporation, while the P26,000.00 difference was retained by the spouses.[5] As soon
as the spouses had settled their obligation, the corporation returned the owners
duplicate of TCT No. S-44980, which was then delivered to Amelia Roberts.
Thereafter, the parties (Amelia Roberts as lessor and Martin Papio as lessee)
executed a two-year contract of lease dated April 15, 1982, effective May 1, 1982.
The contract was subject to renewal or extension for a like period at the option of the
lessor, the lessee waiving thereby the benefits of an implied new lease. The lessee
was obliged to pay monthly rentals of P800.00 to be deposited in the lessors account
at the Bank of America, Makati City branch.[6]
On July 6, 1982, TCT No. S-44980 was cancelled, and TCT No. 114478 was
issued in the name of Amelia Roberts as owner.[7]
Martin Papio paid the rentals from May 1, 1982 to May 1, 1984, and
thereafter, for another year.[8] He then failed to pay rentals, but he and his family
nevertheless remained in possession of the property for a period of almost thirteen
(13) years.
In a letter dated June 3, 1998, Amelia Roberts, through counsel, reminded
Papio that he failed to pay the monthly rental of P2,500.00 from January 1,
1986 to December 31, 1997, and P10,000.00 from January 1, 1998 to May 31, 1998;
thus, his total liability was P410,000.00. She demanded that Papio vacate the
property within 15 days from receipt of the letter in case he failed to settle the
amount.[9] Because he refused to pay, Papio received another letter from Roberts
on April 22, 1999, demanding, for the last time, that he and his family vacate the
property.[10] Again, Papio refused to leave the premises.
On June 28, 1999, Amelia Roberts, through her attorney-in-fact, Matilde
Aguilar, filed a Complaint[11] for unlawful detainer and damages against Martin Papio
before the MeTC, Branch 64, Makati City. She alleged the following in her complaint:
Sometime in 1982 she purchased from defendant a 274-sq-m residential
house and lot situated at No. 1046 Teresa St., Brgy. Valenzuela, Makati City.[12] Upon
Papios pleas to continue staying in the property, they executed a two-year lease
contract[13] which commenced on May 1, 1982. The monthly rental was P800.00.
Thereafter, TCT No. 114478[14] was issued in her favor and she paid all the realty
taxes due on the property. When the term of the lease expired, she still allowed
Papio and his family to continue leasing the property. However, he took advantage of
her absence and stopped payment beginning January 1986, and refused to pay
despite repeated demands. In June 1998, she sent a demand letter[15] through
counsel requiring Papio to pay rentals from January 1986 up to May 1998 and to
vacate the leased property. The accumulated arrears in rental are as follows:
(a) P360,000.00 from January 1, 1986 to December 31, 1997 at P2,500.00 per
month; and (b) P50,000.00, from January 1, 1998 to May 31, 1998 at P10,000.00 per
month.[16] She came to the Philippines but all efforts at an amicable settlement
proved futile. Thus, in April 1999, she sent the final demand letter to defendant
directing him and his family to pay and immediately vacate the leased premises.[17]
Roberts appended to her complaint copies of the April 13, 1982 Deed of
Absolute Sale, the April 15, 1982 Contract of Lease, and TCT No. 114478.
In his Answer with counterclaim, Papio alleged the following:
He executed the April 13, 1982 deed of absolute sale and the contract of
lease. Roberts, his cousin who is a resident of California, United States of America
(USA), arrived in the Philippines and offered to redeem the property. Believing that
she had made the offer for the purpose of retaining his ownership over the property,
he accepted. She then remitted P59,000.00 to the mortgagor for his account, after
which the mortgagee cancelled the real estate mortgage. However, he was alarmed
when the plaintiff had a deed of absolute sale over the property prepared
(for P83,000.00 as consideration) and asked him to sign the same. She also
demanded that the defendant turn over the owners duplicate of TCT No. S-
44980. The defendant was in a quandary. He then believed that if he signed the deed
of absolute sale, Roberts would acquire ownership over the property. He asked her to
allow him to redeem or reacquire the property at any time for a reasonable
amount.[18] When Roberts agreed, Papio signed the deed of absolute sale.
Pursuant to the right to redeem/repurchase given him by Roberts, Papio
purchased the property for P250,000.00. In July 1985, since Roberts was by then
already in the USA, he remitted to her authorized representative, Perlita Ventura, the
amount of P150,000.00 as partial payment for the property.[19] On June 16, 1986,
she again remitted P100,000.00, through Ventura. Both payments were evidenced by
receipts signed by Ventura.[20] Roberts then declared that she would execute a deed
of absolute sale and surrender the title to the property. However, Ventura had
apparently misappropriated P39,000.00 out of the P250,000.00 that she had
received; Roberts then demanded that she pay the amount misappropriated before
executing the deed of absolute sale. Thus, the sole reason why Roberts refused to
abide by her promise was the failure of her authorized representative to remit the full
amount of P250,000.00. Despite Papios demands, Roberts refused to execute a deed
of absolute sale. Accordingly, defendant posited that plaintiff had no cause of action
to demand payment of rental and eject him from the property.
Papio appended to his Answer the following: (1) the letter dated July 18,
1986 of Perlita Ventura to the plaintiff wherein the former admitted having used the
money of the plaintiff to defray the plane fares of Perlitas parents to the USA, and
pleaded that she be allowed to repay the amount within one year; (b) the letter of
Eugene Roberts (plaintiffs husband) to Perlita Ventura dated July 25, 1986 where he
accused Ventura of stealing the money of plaintiff Amelia (thus preventing the latter
from paying her loan on her house and effect the cancellation of the mortgage), and
demanded that she deposit the balance;[21] and (c) plaintiffs letter to defendant Papio
dated July 25, 1986 requesting the latter to convince Ventura to remit the balance
of P39,000.00 so that the plaintiff could transfer the title of the property to the
defendant.[22]
Papio asserted that the letters of Roberts and her husband are in themselves
admissions or declarations against interest, hence, admissible to prove that he had
reacquired the property although the title was still in her possession.
 the property had been paid through Ventura, Papio did not adduce any proof to show
that Ventura had been authorized to sell the property or to accept any payment
In her Affidavit and Position Paper,[23] Roberts averred that she had paid the real
thereon. Any payment to Ventura could have no binding effect on her since she was
estate taxes on the property after she had purchased it; Papios initial right to occupy
not privy to the transaction; if at all, such agreement would be binding only on Papio
the property was terminated when the original lease period expired; and his
and Ventura.
continued possession was only by mere tolerance. She further alleged that the Deed
of Sale states on its face that the conveyance of the property was absolute and
unconditional. She also claimed that any right to repurchase the property must
She further alleged that defendants own inaction belies his claim of
appear in a public document pursuant to Article 1358, Paragraph 1, of the Civil Code
ownership over the property: first, he failed to cause any notice or annotation to be
of the Phililppines.[24] Since no such document exists, defendants supposed real
made on the Register of Deeds copy of TCT No. 114478 in order to protect his
interest over the property could not be enforced without violating the Statute of
supposed adverse claim; second, he did not institute any action against Roberts to
Frauds.[25] She stressed that her Torrens title to the property was an absolute and
compel the execution of the necessary deed of transfer of title in his favor; and third,
indefeasible evidence of her ownership of the property which is binding and
the defense of ownership over the property was raised only after Roberts demanded
conclusive upon the whole world.
him to vacate the property.

Roberts admitted that she demanded P39,000.00 from the defendant in her
letter dated July 25, 1986. However, she averred that the amount represented his
back rentals on the property.[26] She declared that she neither authorized Ventura to
sell the property nor to receive the purchase price therefor. She merely authorized
her to receive the rentals from defendant and to deposit them in her account. She did
Based solely on the parties pleadings, the MeTC rendered its January 18,
2001 Decision[30] in favor of Roberts. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding this case for
the plaintiff, the defendant is hereby ordered to:

not know that Ventura had received P250,000.00 from Papio in July 1985 and
on June 16, 1986, and had signed receipts therefor. It was only on February 11, 1998
that she became aware of the receipts when she received defendant Papios letter to 1. Vacate the leased premises known as 1046 Teresa St.,
Valenzuela, Makati City;
which were appended the said receipts. She and her husband offered to sell the
property to the defendant in 1984 for US$15,000.00 on a take it or leave it basis
when they arrived in the Philippines in May 1984.[27] However, defendant refused to
2. Pay plaintiff the reasonable rentals accrual for the
accept the offer. The spouses then offered to sell the property anew on December
period January 1, 1996 to December 13, 1997 at the rate
20, 1997, for P670,000.00 inclusive of back rentals.[28] However, defendant offered to equivalent to Php2,500.00 per month and thereafter, Php10,000.00
settle his account with the spouses.[29] Again, the offer came on January 11, 1998, from January 1998 until he actually vacates the premises;
but it was rejected. The defendant insisted that he had already purchased the
property in July 1985 for P250,000.00.
3. Pay the plaintiff attorneys fees as Php20,000.00; and
Roberts insisted that Papios claim of the right to repurchase the property, as
well as his claim of payment therefor, is belied by his own letter in which he offered
to settle plaintiffs claim for back rentals. Even assuming that the purchase price of
 4. Pay the costs

As to the receipts of payment signed by Ventura, the court gave credence to

SO ORDERED.[31]
The MeTC held that Roberts merely tolerated the stay of Papio in the
property after the expiration of the contract of lease on May 1, 1984; hence, she had
a cause of action against him since the only elements in an unlawful detainer action
are the fact of lease and the expiration of its term. The defendant as tenant cannot
controvert the title of the plaintiff or assert any right adverse thereto or set up any
inconsistent right to change the existing relation between them. The plaintiff need
not prove her ownership over the property inasmuch as evidence of ownership can
be admitted only for the purpose of determining the character and extent of
possession, and the amount of damages arising from the detention.
Robertss declaration in her Affidavit that she authorized Ventura only to collect
rentals from Papio, and not to receive the repurchase price. Papios letter of January
31, 1998, which called her attention to the fact that she had been sending people
without written authority to collect money since 1985, bolstered the courts finding
that the payment, if at all intended for the supposed repurchase, never redounded to
the benefit of the spouses Roberts.
Papio appealed the decision to the RTC, alleging the following:
I.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE
CASE FOR EJECTMENT OUTRIGHT ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF
CAUSE OF ACTION.

The court further ruled that Papio made no denials as to the existence and
authenticity of Roberts title to the property. It declared that the certificate of title is II.
indefeasible in favor of the person whose name appears therein and incontrovertible
upon the expiration of the one-year period from the date of issue, and that THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE

a Torrens title, which enjoys a strong DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

presumption of regularity and validity, is generally a conclusive evidence of ownership
WHICH ESTABLISHED THAT A REPURCHASE TRANSACTION
of the land referred to therein.
EXISTED BETWEEN THE PARTIES ONLY THAT PLAINTIFF-

APPELLEE WITHHELD THE EXECUTION OF THE ABSOLUTE DEED

As to Papios claim that the transfer of the property was one with right of
OF SALE AND THE TRANSFER OF TITLE OF THE SAME IN
repurchase, the MeTC held it to be bereft of merit since the Deed of Sale is termed as
absolute and unconditional. The court ruled that the right to repurchase is not a right DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS NAME.
granted to the seller by the buyer in a subsequent instrument but rather, a right
reserved in the same contract of sale. Once the deed of absolute sale is executed,
the seller can no longer reserve the right to repurchase; any right thereafter granted
in a separate document cannot be a right of repurchase but some other right.

III.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT
THE LETTERS OF PLAINTIFF-[APPELLEE] AND OF HER HUSBAND
On March 26, 2001, Roberts filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution.[33] The court granted the motion in an Order[34] dated June 19,
2001. Subsequently, a Writ of Execution[35] pending appeal was issued on September
28, 2001. On October 29, 2001, Sheriff Melvin M. Alidon enforced the writ and placed
Roberts in possession of the property.

ADDRESSED TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AND HIS WIFE ARE IN

Meanwhile, Papio filed a complaint with the RTC of Makati City, for specific
THEMSELVES ADMISSION AND/OR DECLARATION OF THE performance with damages against Roberts. Papio, as plaintiff, claimed that he
FACT THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT HAD DULY PAID PLAINTIFF- entered into a contract of sale with pacto de retro with Roberts, and prayed that the
latter be ordered to execute a Deed of Sale over `the property in his favor and
APPELLEE OF THE PURCHASE AMOUNT COVERING THE SUBJECT
transfer the title over the property to and in his name. The case was docketed as Civil
PROPERTY. Case No. 01-851.

IV.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE
CASE FOR EJECTMENT OUTRIGHT CONSIDERING THAT
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE WHO IS [AN] AMERICAN CITIZEN AND
RESIDENT THEREIN HAD NOT APPEARED IN COURT ONCE,
NEITHER WAS HER ALLEGED ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, MATILDE
AGUILAR NOR [DID] THE LATTER EVER [FURNISH] THE LOWER
COURT A SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY AUTHORIZING HER TO
APPEAR IN COURT IN BEHALF OF HER PRINCIPAL.[32]
On October 24, 2001, the RTC rendered judgment affirming the appealed
decision of the MeTC. The fallo of the decision reads:[36]
Being in accordance with law and the circumstances
attendant to the instant case, the court finds merit in plaintiff-
appellees claim. Wherefore, the challenged decision dated January
18, 2001 is hereby affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.[37]

Papio maintained that Roberts had no cause of action for eviction because
she had already ceded her right thereto when she allowed him to redeem and
reacquire the property upon payment of P250,000.00 to Ventura, her duly authorized
Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration.[38] In an
representative. He also contended that Robertss claim that the authority of Ventura is
Order[39] dated February 26, 2002, the court denied the motion of Papio but modified
limited only to the collection of the rentals and not of the purchase price was a mere
its decision declaring that the computation of the accrued rentals should commence
afterthought, since her appended Affidavit was executed sometime in October 1999
from January 1986, not January 1996. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
when the proceedings in the MeTC had already started.
 Wherefore, the challenged decision dated January 18,
2001 is hereby affirmed with modification that defendant pay
plaintiff the reasonable rentals accrued for the period January
1, 1986 to December [31, 1997] per month and thereafter
and P10,000.00 [per month] from January 1998 to October 28,
2001 when defendant-appellant actually vacated the subject leased
premises.
SO ORDERED.[40]
On February 28, 2002, Papio filed a petition for review [41] in the CA, alleging
that the RTC erred in not finding that he had reacquired the property from Roberts
for P250,000.00, but the latter refused to execute a deed of absolute sale and
transfer the title in his favor. He insisted that the MeTC and the RTC erred in giving
credence to petitioners claim that she did not authorize Ventura to receive his
payments for the purchase price of the property, citing Roberts letter dated July 25,
1986 and the letter of
Eugene Roberts to Ventura of even date. He also averred that the MeTC and the RTC
erred in not considering his documentary evidence in deciding the case.
On August 31, 2004, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition. The
appellate court set aside the decision of the RTC and ordered the RTC to dismiss the
complaint. The decretal portion of the Decision[42] reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered: (1)
rendering an initial determination that the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated April 13, 1982 is in fact an equitable mortgage under Article
1603 of the New Civil Code; and (2) resolving therefore that
petitioner Martin B. Papio is entitled to possession of the property
subject of this action; (3) But such determination of ownership and
equitable mortgage are not clothed with finality and will not
constitute a binding and conclusive adjudication on the merits with
respect to the issue of ownership and such judgment shall not bar
an action between the same parties respecting title to the land, nor
shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in the case
between the same parties upon a different cause of action not
involving possession. All other counterclaims for damages are
hereby dismissed. Cost against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.[43]
According to the appellate court, although the MeTC and RTC were correct in holding
that the MeTC had jurisdiction over the complaint for unlawful detainer, they erred in
ignoring Papios defense of equitable mortgage, and in not finding that the transaction
covered by the deed of absolute sale by and between the parties was one of
equitable mortgage under Article 1602 of the New Civil Code. The appellate court
ruled that Papio retained the ownership of the property and its peaceful possession;
hence, the MeTC should have dismissed the complaint without prejudice to the
outcome of Civil Case No. 01-851 relative to his claim of ownership over the property.
Roberts filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision on the following
grounds:
I. Petitioner did not allege in his Answer the defense of
equitable mortgage; hence, the lower courts [should] not have
discussed the same;
II. Even assuming that Petitioner alleged the defense of equitable
mortgage, the MeTC could not have ruled upon the said
defense,
 III. The M[e]TC and the RTC were not remiss in the exercise of
their jurisdiction.[44]
The CA denied the motion.
In this petition for review, Amelia Salvador-Roberts, as petitioner, avers
that:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRIEVEOUSLY (SIC) ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
M[e]TC AN(D) THE RTC WERE REMISS IN THE
EXERCISE OF THAT JURISDICTION ACQUIRED
BECAUSE IT DID NOT CONSIDER ALL PETITIONERS
DEFENSE OF EQUITABLE MORTGAGE.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRIEVEOUSLY (SIC) ERRED IN REQUIRING THE
M[e]TC AND RTC TO RULE ON A DEFENSE WHICH WAS
NEVER AVAILED OF BY RESPONDENT.[45]
Petitioner argues that respondent is barred from raising the issue of
equitable mortgage because his defense in the MeTC and RTC was that he had
repurchased the property from the petitioner; by such representation, he had
impliedly admitted the existence and validity of the deed of absolute sale whereby
ownership of the property was transferred to petitioner but reverted to him upon the
exercise of said right. The respondent even filed a complaint for specific performance
with damages, which is now pending in the RTC of Makati City, docketed as Civil Case
No. 01-851 entitled Martin B. Papio vs. Amelia Salvador-Roberts. In that case,
respondent claimed that his transaction with the petitioner was a sale with pacto de
retro. Petitioner posits that Article 1602 of the Civil Code applies only when the
defendant specifically alleges this defense. Consequently, the appellate court was
proscribed from finding that petitioner and respondent had entered into an equitable
mortgage under the deed of absolute sale.
Petitioner further avers that respondent was ably represented by counsel
and was aware of the difference between a pacto de retro sale and an equitable
mortgage; thus, he could not have been mistaken in declaring that he repurchased
the property from her.
As to whether a sale is in fact an equitable mortgage, petitioner claims that
the issue should be properly addressed and resolved by the RTC in an action to
enforce ownership, not in an ejectment case before the MeTC where the main issue
involved is possession de facto. According to her, the obvious import of the CA
Decision is that, in resolving an ejectment case, the lower court must pass upon the
issue of ownership (in this case, by applying the presumptions under Art. 1602)
which, in effect, would use the same yardstick as though it is the main action. The
procedure will not only promote multiplicity of suits but also place the new owner in
the absurd position of having to first seek the declaration of ownership before filing
an ejectment suit.
Respondent counters that the defense of equitable mortgage need not be
particularly stated to apprise petitioner of the nature and character of the repurchase
agreement. He contends that he had amply discussed in his pleadings before the trial
and appellate courts all the surrounding circumstances of the case, such as the
relative situation of the parties at the time; their attitude, acts, conduct, and
declarations; and the negotiations between them that led to the repurchase
agreement. Thus, he argues that the CA correctly ruled that the contract was one of
equitable mortgage. He insists that petitioner allowed him to redeem and reacquire
the property, and accepted his full payment of the property through Ventura, the
authorized representative, as shown by the signed receipts.
The threshold issues are the following: (1) whether the MeTC had
jurisdiction in an action for unlawful detainer to resolve the issue of who between
petitioner and respondent is the owner of the property and entitled to the de
facto possession thereof; (2) whether the transaction entered into between the
parties under the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Contract of Lease is an equitable
mortgage over the property; and (3) whether the petitioner is entitled to the material
or de facto possession of the property.
The Ruling of the Court
The sole issue for resolution in an action for unlawful detainer is material
or de facto possession of the property. Even if the defendant claims
juridical possession or ownership over the property based on a claim that his
transaction with the plaintiff relative to the property is merely an equitable mortgage,
or that he had repurchased the property from the plaintiff, the MeTC may still delve
into and take cognizance of the case and make an initial or provisional determination
of who between the plaintiff and the defendant is the owner and, in the process,
resolve the issue of who is entitled to the possession. The MeTC, in unlawful detainer
case, decides the question of ownership only if it is intertwined with and necessary to
resolve the issue of possession.[48] The resolution of the MeTC on the ownership of
the property is merely provisional or interlocutory. Any question involving the issue of
ownership should be raised and resolved in a separate action brought specifically to
settle the question with finality, in this case, Civil Case No. 01-851 which respondent
filed before the RTC.

The ruling of the CA, that the contract between petitioner and respondent
On the first issue, the CA ruling (which upheld the jurisdiction of the MeTC
was an equitable mortgage, is incorrect. The fact of the matter is that the respondent
to resolve the issue of who between petitioner or respondent is the lawful owner of
intransigently alleged in his answer, and even in his affidavit and position paper, that
the property, and is thus entitled to the material or de facto possession thereof) is
petitioner had granted him the right to redeem or repurchase the property at any
correct. Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that when the defendant
time and for a reasonable amount; and that, he had, in fact, repurchased the
raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession
property in July 1985 for P250,000.00 which he remitted to petitioner through an
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership
authorized representative who signed receipts therefor; he had reacquired ownership
shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. The judgment rendered
and juridical possession of the property after his repurchase thereof in 1985; and
in an action for unlawful detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession
consequently, petitioner was obliged to execute a deed of absolute sale over the
only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or
property in his favor.
building. Such judgment would not bar an action between the same parties
respecting title to the land or building.[46]

Notably, respondent alleged that, as stated in his letter to petitioner, he was

given the right to reacquire the property in 1982 within two years upon the payment
The summary nature of the action is not changed by the claim of ownership
of P53,000.00, plus petitioners airfare for her trip to the Philippines from the USA and
of the property of the defendant.[47] The MeTC is not divested of its jurisdiction over
back; petitioner promised to sign the deed
the unlawful detainer action simply because the defendant asserts ownership over
of absolute sale. He even filed a complaint against the petitioner in the RTC,
the property.
docketed as Civil Case No. 01-851, for specific performance with damages to compel
petitioner to execute the said deed of absolute sale over the property presumably on
the strength of Articles 1357 and 1358 of the New Civil Code. Certainly then, his
claim that petitioner had given him the right to repurchase the property is antithetical
to an equitable mortgage.
An equitable mortgage is one that, although lacking in some formality, form
or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals the
intention of the parties to change a real property as security for a debt and contain
nothing impossible or contrary to law.[49] A contract between the parties is an
equitable mortgage if the following requisites are present: (a) the parties entered into
a contract denominated as a contract of sale; and (b) the intention was to secure an
existing debt by way of mortgage.[50] The decisive factor is the intention of the
parties.
In an equitable mortgage, the mortgagor retains ownership over the
property but subject to foreclosure and sale at public auction upon failure of the
mortgagor to pay his obligation.[51] In contrast, in a pacto de retro sale, ownership of
the property sold is immediately transferred to the vendee a retro subject only to the
right of the vendor a retro to repurchase the property upon compliance with legal
requirements for the repurchase. The failure of the vendor a retro to exercise the
right to repurchase within the agreed time vests upon the vendee a retro, by
operation of law, absolute title over the property.[52]
One repurchases only what one has previously sold. The right to repurchase
presupposes a valid contract of sale between the same parties. [53] By insisting that he
had repurchased the property, respondent thereby
admitted that the deed of absolute sale executed by him and petitioner on April 13,
1982 was, in fact and in law, a deed of absolute sale and not an equitable mortgage;
hence, he had acquired ownership over the property based on said deed. Respondent
is, thus, estopped from asserting that the contract under the deed of absolute sale is
an equitable mortgage unless there is allegation and evidence of palpable mistake on
the part of respondent;[54] or a fraud on the part of petitioner. Respondent made no
such allegation in his pleadings and affidavit. On the contrary, he maintained that
petitioner had sold the property to him in July 1985 and acknowledged receipt of the
purchase price thereof except the amount of P39,000.00 retained by Perlita Ventura.
Respondent is thus bound by his admission of petitioners ownership of the property
and is barred from claiming otherwise.[55]
Respondents admission that petitioner acquired ownership over the property
under the April 13, 1982 deed of absolute sale is buttressed by his admission in the
Contract of Lease dated April 15, 1982 that petitioner was the owner of the property,
and that he had paid the rentals for the duration of the contract of lease and even
until 1985 upon its extension. Respondent was obliged to prove his defense that
petitioner had given him the right to repurchase, and that petitioner obliged herself to
resell the property for P250,000.00 when they executed the April 13, 1982 deed of
absolute sale.
We have carefully reviewed the case and find that respondent failed to
adduce competent and credible evidence to prove his claim.
As gleaned from the April 13, 1982 deed, the right of respondent to
repurchase the property is not incorporated therein. The contract is one of absolute
sale and not one with right to repurchase. The law states that if the terms of a
contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties,
the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.[56] When the language of the
contract is explicit, leaving no doubt as to the intention of the drafters, the courts
may not read into it any other intention that would contradict its plain import.[57] The
clear terms of the contract should never be the subject matter of
interpretation. Neither abstract justice nor the rule of liberal interpretation justifies
the creation of a contract for the parties which they did not make themselves, or the
imposition upon one party to a contract or obligation to assume simply or merely to
avoid seeming hardships.[58] Their true meaning must be enforced, as it is to be
presumed that the contracting parties know their scope and effects.[59] As the Court
held in Villarica, et al. v. Court of Appeals:[60]

The right of repurchase is not a right granted the vendor
by the vendee in a subsequent instrument, but is a right reserved
by the vendor in the same instrument of sale as one of the
stipulations of the contract. Once the instrument of absolute sale is
executed, the vendor can no longer reserve the right to
repurchase, and any right thereafter granted the vendor by the
vendee in a separate instrument cannot be a right of repurchase
but some other right like the option to buy in the instant case.[61]
In Ramos v. Icasiano,[62] we also held that an agreement to repurchase
becomes a promise to sell when made after the sale because when the sale is made
without such agreement the purchaser acquires the thing sold absolutely; and, if he
afterwards grants the vendor the right to repurchase, it is a new contract entered
into by the purchaser as absolute owner. An option to buy or a promise to sell is
different and distinct from the right of repurchase that must be reserved by means of
stipulations to that effect in the contract of sale.[63]
There is no evidence on record that, on or before July 1985, petitioner
agreed to sell her property to the respondent for P250,000.00. Neither is there any
documentary evidence showing that Ventura was authorized to offer for sale or sell
the property for and in behalf of petitioner for P250,000.00, or to receive the said
amount from respondent as purchase price of the property. The rule is that when a
sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent, the authority of the
latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void[64] and cannot produce any
legal effect as to transfer the property from its lawful owner.[65] Being inexistent and
void from the very beginning, said contract cannot be ratified. [66] Any contract
entered into by Ventura for and in behalf of petitioner relative to the sale of the
property is void and cannot be ratified by the latter. A void contract produces no
effect either against or in favor of anyone.[67]
Respondent also failed to prove that the negotiations between him and
petitioner has culminated in his offer to buy the property for P250,000.00, and that
they later on agreed to the sale of the property for the same amount. He likewise
failed to prove that he purchased and reacquired the property in July 1985. The
evidence on record shows that petitioner had offered to sell the property for
US$15,000 on a take it or leave it basis in May 1984 upon the expiration of the
Contract of Lease[68] an offer that was rejected by respondentwhich is why on
December 30, 1997, petitioner and her husband offered again to sell the property to
respondent for P670,000.00 inclusive of back rentals and the purchase price of the
property under the April 13, 1982 Deed of absolute Sale. [69] The offer was again
rejected by respondent. The final offer appears to have been made on January 11,
1998[70] but again, like the previous negotiations, no contract was perfected between
the parties.
A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds
himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some
service.[71] Under Article 1318 of the New Civil Code, there is no contract unless the
following requisites concur:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.
Contracts are perfected by mere consent manifested by the meeting of the
offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the
contract.[72]Once perfected, they bind the contracting parties and the obligations
arising therefrom have the form of law between the parties which must be complied
with in good faith. The parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been
expressly stipulated but also to the consequences which, according to their nature,
may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.[73]
 There was no contract of sale entered into by the parties based on the
Receipts dated July 1985 and June 16, 1986, signed by Perlita Ventura and the letter
of petitioner to respondent dated July 25, 1986.
By the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to
transfer the ownership of and deliver a determinate thing and the other, to pay
therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.[74] The absence of any of the
essential elements will negate the existence of a perfected contract of sale. As the
Court ruled in Boston Bank of the Philippines v. Manalo:[75]
A definite agreement as to the price is an essential
element of a binding agreement to sell personal or real property
because it seriously affects the rights and obligations of the
parties.Price is an essential element in the formation of a binding
and enforceable contract of sale. The fixing of the price can never
be left to the decision of one of the contracting parties. But a price
fixed by one of the contracting parties, if accepted by the other,
gives rise to a perfected sale.[76]
A contract of sale is consensual in nature and is perfected upon mere
meeting of the minds. When there is merely an offer by one party without acceptance
of the other, there is no contract.[77] When the contract of sale is not perfected, it
cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a binding juridical relation
between the parties. [78]
Respondents reliance on petitioners letter to him dated July 25, 1986 is
misplaced. The letter reads in full:
7-25-86
Dear Martin & Ising,
Enclosed for your information is the letter written by my
husband to Perlita. I hope that you will be able to convince your
cousin that its to her best interest to deposit the balance of your
payment to me of P39,000.00 in my bank acct. per our agreement
and send me my bank book right away so that we can transfer the
title of the property.
Regards,
Amie [79]
We have carefully considered the letter of Perlita Ventura, dated July 18, 1986, and
the letter of Eugene Roberts, dated July 25, 1986, where Ventura admitted having
used the money of petitioner amounting to P39,000.00 without the latters knowledge
for the plane fare of Venturas parents. Ventura promised to refund the amount
of P39,000.00, inclusive of interests, within one year.[80] Eugene Roberts
berated Ventura and called her a thief for stealing his and petitioners money and that
of respondents wife, Ising, who allegedly told petitioner that she, Ising, loaned the
money to her parents for their plane fare to the USA. Neither Ventura nor Eugene
Roberts declared in their letters that Ventura had used the P250,000.00 which
respondent gave to her.
Petitioner in her letter to respondent did not admit, either expressly or impliedly,
having received P211,000.00 from Ventura. Moreover, in her letter to petitioner, only
a week earlier, or on July 18, 1986, Ventura admitted having spent the P39,000.00
and pleaded that she be allowed to refund the amount within one (1) year, including
interests.

Naririto ang total ng pera mo sa bankbook mo, P55,000.00 pati na
yong deposit na sarili mo at bale ang nagalaw ko diyan
ay P39,000.00. Huwag kang mag-alala ibabalik ko rin sa iyo sa loob
ng isang taon pati interest.
Ate Per[81]
It is incredible that Ventura was able to remit to petitioner P211,000.00 before July
25, 1986 when only a week earlier, she was pleading to petitioner for a period of one
year within which to refund the P39,000.00 to petitioner.
It would have bolstered his cause if respondent had submitted an affidavit
of Ventura stating that she had remitted P211,000.00 out of the P250,000.00 she
received from respondent in July 1985 and June 20, 1986.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69034 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, affirmed with
modification by the Regional Trial Court, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
BENGUET CORP vs CORDILLERA CARABALLO MISSION INC
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the Resolution[1] dated
August 22, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72150 and
the Decision[2] dated June 14, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,
Benguet, Branch VIII, in Civil Case No. 2K-CV-1698, and thus reinstate
the Decision[3] dated December 21, 2001 of the Municipal Trial Court of Itogon,
Benguet in Civil Case No. 314.
Petitioner Benguet Corporation owns Pilo mineral claim covering several hectares of
land in Virac, Itogon, Benguet. It planted pine trees in compliance with the directive
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and built roads,
buildings and security gates in the covered area. Sometime in September 1997,
petitioner discovered that representatives of respondent Cordillera Caraballo Mission,
Inc. (CCMI) bulldozed and leveled the grounds within its Pilo mineral claim in
preparation for the construction of a school. Despite petitioners demands to cease,
respondents continued with the construction activities.
Petitioner filed a complaint[4] for forcible entry against respondents in the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Itogon, Benguet. The MTC ruled in favor of petitioners prior
possession of the land since August 10, 1964, vis--vis CCMIs possession which began
only in 1994. The court ordered respondents to vacate the premises, restore
complete possession to the petitioner, and pay the cost. [5]
 On appeal, the RTC reversed the judgment of the MTC and dismissed the resolution were in its Makati Office while its counsel was based in Baguio City. It

complaint for failure to state a cause of action. It found that the complaint did not maintains that the attached complaint and decisions of the MTC and RTC were

state the means of dispossession and did not constitute an action for forcible entry.[6] sufficient since the petition before the Court of Appeals was limited to pure questions

of law. It posits that the complaint itself is the best evidence to determine whether
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed
the allegations therein sufficiently state a cause of action.
the petition for failure to attach (a) the board resolution authorizing the affiant to file

the complaint, and (b) the certified copies of other pleadings and documents
This Court has consistently held that the requirement regarding verification

pertinent and relevant thereto.[7]

of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional.[9] Such requirement is a condition affecting

the form of the pleading; non-compliance with this requirement does not necessarily
Petitioner now comes before us alleging that
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error
render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an
a) in denying due course the petition (sic);
b) in not considering the issues raised in the petition which assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the
are actually based on facts not controverted but even
stipulated by the parties; product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in
c) in not disposing the issues which are not even factual
but legal issues based on duly established facts at the trial good faith.[10] Further, the purpose of the aforesaid certification is to prohibit and
court.[8]
penalize the evils of forum-shopping.[11] Considering that later on Mr. Bolaos

authority to sign the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping was

Simply stated, we are asked to resolve the following issues: (1) Is
ratified[12] by the board, there is no circumvention of these objectives.
petitioners failure to attach the board resolution and the copies of other pleadings an
On the necessity of other pleadings and documents, Section 2 of Rule 42 of
excusable mistake? (2) Does the complaint state a cause of action? and (3) If it does,
the Rules of Court requires attachments if these would support the allegations of the
who should have possession?
petition. We note that the facts alleged in the petition filed before the Court of

On the first issue, petitioner claims to have substantially complied with the rules, and Appeals were the same facts found in the decisions of the MTC and RTC. Accordingly,

pleads for the liberal construction, as a matter of substantive justice. It averred that we find no compelling need to attach other portions of the records. Besides, the

affiant Marcelo A. Bolao was authorized by the board but copies of the board

appellate court can always refer to the records transmitted[13] by the clerk of the trial
court if it wanted to verify the allegations.
The Rules of Civil Procedure should be applied with reason and
liberality[14] to promote its objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are used to help
secure and not override substantial justice. Thus, the dismissal of an appeal on a
purely technical ground is frowned upon especially if it will result in unfairness.[15] No
such result happened here.
Anent the second issue, which goes to the merits of the instant controversy,
petitioner asserts that it specifically alleged the acts constituting forcible entry and it
points to paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the complaint as well as to the annexed
photographs. For its part, the respondent defends the ruling of the RTC that
petitioner failed to state sufficiently a cause of action in the complaint before the
MTC.
The pertinent portion of the complaint reads:
...
3. The plaintiff is the owner as well as lawful and peaceful
possessor of a parcel of land covered by PILO Mineral Claim
shown in the approved plan hereto attached as Annex
A hereof.
4. Sometime in the later part of September 1997, plaintiffs
caretaker noticed an ongoing bulldozing and ground leveling
activities within Pilo Mineral Claim. His investigation
revealed that the illegal activity was being undertaken by
individual defendants who were supervising the heavy
equipment owned by one Pio Wasit. When confronted, said
defendant represented themselves to be representatives of
defendant Cordillera Caraballo Mission, Inc. To this effect,
hereto attached.
5. The defendants were warned of their unlawful entry in the
above-described property of the plaintiff but defendants
refused to stop to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff
herein. In fact, in the process of forcible entry in the property,
the defendants destroyed young and full grown pine trees alike
which your plaintiff had been protecting and spending
considerable amount therefor.
6. The unlawful activities by the defendants and their refusal to
stop despite demand prompted plaintiff to send them demand
letter dated October 1, 1997, copy of which is hereto attached
as Annex G, but in spite of the receipt of said letter, the
defendants ignored it and continued in their activities
dispossessing plaintiff of its peaceful possession over the
property. In fact, the defendants even proceeded in laying the
foundation of the construction of a building as shown in the
photographs hereto attached as Annex H.[16]
In actions for forcible entry, it may be stressed, two allegations are
mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction. First, the plaintiff must
allege his prior physical possession of the property. Second, he must also allege that
he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, namely, force, intimidation, threat, strategy, and
stealth.[17] If the alleged dispossession did not occur by any of these means, the
proper recourse is to file not an action for forcible entry but a plenary action to
recover possession with the Regional Trial Court.[18]
Nothing in the complaint before the MTC would show how the entry was
effected nor how dispossession took place. The complaint merely stated that
petitioners caretaker noticed an ongoing bulldozing and leveling activities. The

allegations that these activities were illegal and that respondents entry was unlawful
are not statements of bare facts but conclusions of law. The complaint should have
specified what made the activities illegal and the entry unlawful.[19] Without these
ultimate facts, the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. In view of the
foregoing, the RTC properly reversed the MTCs decision and then dismissed the
complaint of petitioner for failure to state a cause of action. The appellate court
would not and did not commit a reversible error in sustaining in effect the RTCs
decision of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolution dated
August 22, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72150 and the Decision
dated June 14, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch VIII,
in Civil Case No. 2K-CV-1698 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Spouses Valdez vs Spouses Fabella,
(Civil Procedure – Jurisdiction, Real Action, Unlawful Detainer)
Facts: Petitioner spouses filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondent
spouses before the MTC.
The complaint alleges that sometime in November 1992, by virtue of a sales contract,
petitioner spouses acquired a residential lot and respondent spouses , without any
color of title whatsoever occupied the said lot by building their house in the same
thereby depriving the former rightful possession thereof.
A formal demand to vacate the premises was sent on July 12, 1994 but it was
ignored.
Respondent spouses contend that the complaint failed to state that petitioner had
prior physical possession of the property in dispute and in the alternative, claimed
ownership over the land on the ground that they possess the same for more than
thirty years.
The MTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners and ordered respondents to
vacate the property.
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC.
On a petition for review, the Court of Appeals reverse and set aside the decision of
the RTC on the ground that petitioners failed to make a case for unlawful detainer
because they failed to show that they had given the private respondents the right to
occupy the premises or that they had tolerated private respondents’ possession of the
same, which is a requirement in unlawful detainer cases. It added that the allegations
in the complaint lack jurisdictional elements of forcible entry which requires an
allegation of prior material possession. Hence, MTC has no jurisdiction over the case.
Issue: WON the allegations of the complaint made out a case for unlawful detainer
and MTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Held: No.
The three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property are:
First, Accion interdictal comprises forcible entry and unlawful detainer. In forcible
entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force,
intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied.In forcible entry, the possession of
the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has
prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is
originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess.
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper
MTC. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on
the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of
unlawful detainer.The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.
Second, Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession
which should be brought in the proper RTC when dispossession has lasted for more
than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title.
Third, Accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in the
proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.
Doctrine: Jurisdictional facts establishing a case for ejectment must appear
on the face of the complaint
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed
acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which
is later sought to be recovered.Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the
start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.
It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause of
action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the
action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry
is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.
To vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary
that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party
clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these
proceedings are summary in nature.
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as
where it does not state how entry was affected or how and when dispossession
started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria
in the proper regional trial court.
Reason:
In the case at bar, the allegations in petitioner spouses complaint did not contain any
averment of fact that would substantiate their claim that they permitted or tolerated
the occupation of the property by respondents. The complaint contains only bare
allegations that “respondents without any color of title whatsoever occupies the land
in question by building their house in the said land thereby depriving petitioners the
possession thereof.” Nothing has been said on how respondents’ entry was effected
or how and when dispossession started.
The failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful
detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a
valid cause for unlawful detainer, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case.
RUBEN MANALANG, CARLOS MANALANG, CONCEPCION GONZALES AND
LUIS MANALANG, Petitioners, vs. BIENVENIDO AND MERCEDES BACANI,
Respondents.
Facts: Petitioners were co-owners for lot in question and caused a relocation and
verification survey which showed that respondents had encroached on a portion of
said lot. When the respondents refused to vacate the encroached portion and to
surrender peaceful possession thereof despite demands, the petitioners commenced
this action for unlawful detainer.
MTC dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. RTC reversed the decision of the
MTC and remanded case on appeal. MTC ultimately dismissed case. Another appeal
to RTC was made. RTC ordered the petitioners to conduct a relocation survey to
determine their allegation of encroachment, and also heard the testimony of the
surveyor. The RTC then reversed the MTC’s decision.
Issue (1) Can RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction conduct a relocation
and verification survey of lot in question? (2) Was an action for unlawful detainer
proper?
Ruling: The RTC, in an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment case, shall not
conduct a rehearing or trial de novo. In this connection, Section 18, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Courtclearly provides:
Sec. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving
title or ownership.
xxxx
The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial
Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the
proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be
submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court. (7a)
Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of the relocation
and verification survey “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” and by hearing the
testimony of the surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to its holding of a trial de
novo. The violation was accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the
appeal based on the survey and the surveyor’s testimony instead of the record of the
proceedings had in the court of origin.
(2) CA correctly held that a boundary dispute must be resolved in the context of
accion reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The boundary dispute is not about
possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the property claimed by the
defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A boundary dispute cannot be
settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under which
are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the
defendant unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon the expiration or
termination of his right to hold such possession under any contract, express or
implied. The defendant’s possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful
only because of the expiration or termination of his right of possession. In forcible
entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the
issue centers on which between the plaintiff and the defendant had the prior
possession de facto.
The MTC dismissed the action because it did not have jurisdiction over the case. The
dismissal was correct. It is fundamental that the allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought by the complaint determine the nature of the action and
the court that has jurisdiction over the action. To be clear, unlawful detainer is an
action filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or
implied.
However, the allegations of the petitioners’ complaint did not show that they had
permitted or tolerated the occupation of the portion of their property by the
respondents; or how the respondents’ entry had been effected, or how and when the
dispossession by the respondents had started. All that the petitioners alleged was the
respondents’ “illegal use and occupation” of the property. As such, the action was not
unlawful detainer.
Santos v. Ayon G.R. No. 137013, 458 SCRA 83
Topic: Unlawful detainer: possession by tolerance
Facts: Santos was the registered owner of three lots while the spouses Ayon were the
registered owners of an adjacent parcel of land. The previous occupant of this
property built a building which straddled both the lots of Santos and the Ayons. The
Ayons had been using the building as a warehouse. When Santos bought the three
lots, he informed the Ayons that the building occupies a portion of his land. However,
he allowed them to continue using the building. However, later he demanded that the
Ayons demolish and remove the part of the building encroaching his property. They
refused, continuing to occupy the contested portion. Santos filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer against the Ayons. The MTCC found in favor of Santos. On appeal,
the RTC upheld the finding of the MTCC that the Ayons' occupation of the contested
portion was by mere tolerance. Hence, when Santos needed the same, he had the
right to eject them through court action. The CA reversed and held that the proper
remedy should have been an accion publiciana before the RTC, not an action for
unlawful detainer.
Issue: Whether or not prior physical possession of the property by tolerance
precludes an action for unlawful detainer
Held/Ratio: No, prior physical possession of the property by tolerance does not
preclude an action for unlawful detainer. The SC reinstated the RTC decision. A
complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of the
possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the
terminology of the law. Here, there is an allegation in the complaint that respondents'
occupancy on the portion of his property is by virtue of his tolerance. Possession by
tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by
tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner. Thus, a person who
occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against him.
SUMMARY: ATO sought the nullification of the CA Resolutions which granted the TRO
of Miaque and caused the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
enjoining the implementation of the writ of execution issued by the RTC. DOCTRINE:
Judgment of the RTC in ejectment cases are immediately executory without prejudice
to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. Judgment of the RTC is also not
stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the RTC or, in the
appellate court’s discretion, suspended or modified. Despite these, CA may still issue
a writ of preliminary injunction that will restrain or enjoin the judgment, while being
aware that such grant rests on the sound discretion of the court and that it should be
made with great caution. FACTS: 1. ATO filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
against Miaque in MTCC Iloilo. It sought to have Miaque permanently vacate and
return the possession of 3 properties to ATO; and to ahve Miaque pay ATO not less
than P1, 296, 103 representing unpaid rental space and concessionaire privilege fees.
MTC found Maique to be unlawfully detaining in the premises and ordered them to
vacate. 2. Miaque appealed the Decision to RTC Iloilo, which affirmed the MTCC
decision. Miaque’s MR was likewise denied. 3. Miaque filed a petition for review in the
CA, which affirmed the RTC decision. Miaque’s MR was also denied (January 5,
2006). 4. Miaque filed a petition for review in the SC. SC denied the petition and the
MR filed by Miaque. EXECUTION: 5. CA (in relation to #3) issued a TRO effective for
60 days and required Miaque to post a bond in the amount of P100K. After the lapse
of the TRO, ATO filed an urgent motion for the execution of the RTC decision, which
was opposed by Miaque. RTC granted the motion. Miaque filed an MR but was
denied. RTC then issued a Writ of Execution (Aug.16, 2004). 6. However, CA issued a
Resolution (Aug.18, 2004) ordering the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and
enjoining the ATO from enforcing the MTCC and RTC Decisions while case was
pending in CA (See #3). 7. After the dismissal in #3, the ATO filed an Urgent Motion
for Execution of the RTC Decision wherein they pointed out that the supersedeas
bond filed by Miaque had lapsed and was not renewed and that the rental and
concessionaire privilege fees have not paid at all in violation of Section 8, Rule 70.
Miaque opposed ATO’s urgent motion for execution, while ATO filed a supplemental
urgent motion for execution stating that Miaque’s appeal in the CA had been
dismissed. 8. RTC granted ATO’s urgent motion for execution and issued a Writ of
Execution (June 2, 2005). A notice to vacate was given to Miaque. On June 3, 2005,
Miaque filed a MR of the Order. At the same time, Miaque filed a motion praying that
the CA order the RTC judge and the sheriffs to desist from implementing the writ of
execution. 9. CA issued Resolution (June 14, 2005) ordering the sheriffs to desist
from executing the MTCC nd RTC decisions pending #3. 10. However, on June 15,
2005, before the concerned sheriffs received a copy of the Resolution dated June 14,
2005, the sheriffs implemented the writ of execution and devlivered the premises to
ATO. 11. Miaque subsequently regained possession of the premises based on CA
Resolution (#9). 12. After the denial of the MR in #3, ATO filed a motion for the
revival of the writs of execution with the RTC (#5 and #8). RTC granted the motion
and revived the writs (March 20, 2006). 13. Miaque filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA assailing the RTC Order (#12). He prayed that the implementation of the writs
of execution be enjoined. CA issued Resolution dated March 29, 2006 issuing a TRO
effective for 60 days and Resolution dated May 30, 2006 issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining implementation of the writs. These are the Resolutions being
challenged in this case.
QUISUMBING, J.:
the RTC, and the Court of Appeals all ruled that Miaque does not have any
right to continue in possession of the said premises. It is therefore puzzling
how the Court of Appeals justified its issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction with the sweeping statement that Miaque "appears to have a
clear legal right to hold on to the premises leased by him from ATO at least
until such time when he shall have been duly ejected therefrom by a writ of
execution of judgment caused to be issued by the MTCC in Iloilo City, which
is the court of origin of the decision promulgated by this Court in CAG.R. SP
No. 79439."
BENEDICTO vs CA
DECISION

ISSUE/S: 1. W/N RTC was validly exercising its jursidiction when it issued the writs of
execution- YES
This special civil action for certiorari and prohibition seeks to annul
2. W/N CA committed GAD in issuing the assailed Resolutions- YES.
the Resolution,[1] dated March 21, 2003, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

HELD: The petition is GRANTED. The Resolution dated May 30, 2006 of the CA is 73919 for grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ANNULLED for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion.

1. The Court of Appeals was mistaken in issuing the Resolution with the view The antecedent facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the issuance of the writ of execution. It
disregarded both (1) the immediately executory nature of the judgment of
the RTC in ejectment cases, and (2) the rule that such judgment of the RTC Petitioner George V. Benedicto is the owner of a parcel of land with an area
is not stayed by an appeal taken there from. It ignores the nature of the
RTC’s function to issue a writ of execution of its judgment in an ejectment
of 736 square meters located in Carlos Hilado Highway, Bacolod City. He entered into
case as ministerial and not discretionary.

a contract of lease with private respondent Romeo G. Chua on October 15, 2000.
2. A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be
granted only in the face of actual and existing substantial rights. The duty of Under the contract, the lease was to start on November 15, 2000. The contract also
the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is
to determine whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction
stipulated that the rent would be P7,000 monthly.
are present in the case before it. In the absence of the same, and where
facts are shown to be wanting in bringing the matter within the conditions
for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck down for having been
rendered in grave abuse of discretion. The CA, in granting the writ of Chua immediately started constructing a hollow-block fence, conformably
preliminary injunction, did not state the source or basis of Miaque’s clear
legal right to retain the premises. In this case, the decisions of the MTCC, of with paragraph 6 of their contract, to wit:
the RTC, and of the Court of Appeals unanimously recognized the right of 6. the Lessee may introduce any improvements and
the ATO to possession of the property and the corresponding obligation of additions on the land, and at the termination of the lease, he may
Miaque to immediately vacate the subject premises. This means that MTCC, remove the same, except the fence surrounding and enclosing the
 property, the cost of which shall be equally divided into twenty-four
(24) months and the amount thereof be deducted from the rent Chua appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 43. In its
until the same shall have been completely set-off.[2]
Decision,[4] dated August 30, 2002, the RTC modified the MTCC judgment. It

dismissed the case for consignation, for lack of tender of payment and prior notice;
On November 13, 2000, Chua paid Benedicto P28,000 representing deposit
ordered Chua to immediately vacate or peacefully surrender possession to Benedicto;
for one month and advance rent for three months. Thereafter, Chua failed to pay the
ordered the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court in the City of Bacolod to turn
rent prompting Benedicto to send a demand letter after a fruitless amicable
over to Benedicto P46,500 and P18,000 upon presentation of the original receipts;
settlement at the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa.
ordered Benedicto to pay Chua P6,136.39 representing the remaining value of the

Chua did not pay. Hence, Benedicto filed a case against Chua for unlawful improvement constructed by the former, which is the perimeter hollow block fence,

detainer and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 26881, with the Municipal Trial and deliver to Chua P4,672.64 deposited by the latter with the aforementioned

Court in Bacolod City, Branch 3. In turn, Chua filed with the same court a petition for judicial authorities in the excess of the rental of the property as computed by the

consignation docketed as Civil Case No. 26911. Court; and ordered Chua to pay Benedicto the P10,000, attorneys fees and P5,000

for cost and other expenses. The RTC also denied all other claims and counterclaims
The MTCC dismissed the consignation case for lack of jurisdiction as the said
of the parties.[5]
case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC. The MTCC found merit in the complaint

for unlawful detainer and damages. It ordered Romeo G. Chua and all persons acting On November 19, 2002, Chua filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for

for and under him or on his behalf, (1) to immediately vacate or surrender possession review with prayer for temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.

of the leased premises to therein plaintiff; (2) to pay plaintiff P19,500, covering the
Meanwhile, on November 22, 2002, in Civil Case No. 02-11643, the RTC of
period from March 15, 2001 to August 14, 2001, and thereafter, the additional or
Bacolod City, Branch 43 issued a Writ of Execution.[6]
further amount of P4,500 only per month until said premises was vacated and until

the P2,500 monthly credit in favor of the defendant was exhausted reckoned from However, in view of the aforesaid petition for review, the Court of Appeals

February 15, 2001 to January 14, 2003 whichever comes first; and (3) to pay the issued a temporary restraining order on December 23, 2002, enjoining the RTC of

plaintiff the sum of P10,000 as attorneys fee and P5,000 for costs and other Bacolod City, Branch 43, from enforcing its Decision in Civil Case No. 02-11643.

expenses.[3]

Upon receipt of the said TRO, Presiding Judge Philadelfa B. Pagapong-
Agraviador replied in a letter dated January 2, 2003 as follows:
Pertinent to your telegram dated December 23, 2002
received by the undersigned on the same date, please be informed
that returns were made by Mr. Leoncio Yongque, Jr., Deputy
Sheriff of this branch, on the partial execution of the Courts
Decision dated August 30, 2002 in the aforementioned case.
Attached for your ready reference are the following annexes:
A Sheriffs return dated December 5, 2002;
B Sheriffs return dated December 16, 2002;
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, let the writ of
preliminary injunction be issued in this case upon the posting of
a P100,000.00 injunction bond restraining the respondents from
prohibiting the petitioner from entering the subject premises and/or
from conducting business thereon just like before the controversy
between the parties had arisen. For this purpose, respondent is
hereby ordered to remove anything that was placed to block the
display room of the petitioner and to remove the padlock and to
open the gate so that petitioner may resume his usual business in
the premises, all pending resolution of the instant petition for
review.
...
SO ORDERED.[10]

C Sheriffs return dated December 23, 2002.

Also attached is the undersigneds Memorandum to the Clearly, the sole issue in this case is: Did the Court of Appeals commit grave
branch sheriff enjoining him from fully implementing the Writ of
Execution dated November 22, 2002.
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
[Concomitant] to your resolution granting defendants
questioned writ of preliminary injunction, despite the immediately
application for a Temporary Restraining Order, there being no
complete execution of the assailed decision, undersigned
undertakes that no further execution shall be implemented until executory character of RTC judgments in ejectment cases?
further order from your court.[7]

Herein petitioner Benedicto contends that the Court of Appeals committed

On April 4, 2003, Benedicto filed with the Court of Appeals an Urgent grave abuse of discretion in issuing a preliminary injunction even if it was not prayed

Manifestation and Motion to Dissolve/Quash Temporary Restraining Order[8] on the for. Granting arguendo that said provisional remedy was prayed for, Benedicto insists

ground that the TRO had already become moot and academic. preliminary injunction does not lie as judgments of the RTC against the defendant in

ejectment suits are immediately executory even pending appeal. Benedicto also
In his Comment[9] to the said Manifestation and Motion, Chua replied that
argues that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, in effect, disposed of
the writ of execution issued by the RTC had not been fully implemented because his
the main case without trial. Benedicto further points out that the act sought to be
properties and the improvements were still within the subject premises.
enjoined by the preliminary injunction was already fait accompli.

The Court of Appeals ruled on the said Manifestation and Motion, in its
For his part, Chua counters that the present petition cannot be resorted to
assailed Resolution of March 21, 2003, as follows:
without a prior motion for reconsideration to allow public respondent Court of
Appeals to correct the error imputed to it. He also maintains that there was only This section presupposes that the defendant in a forcible entry or unlawful

partial delivery of possession to Benedicto; hence, the acts sought to be enjoined had detainer case is unsatisfied with the judgment of the Regional Trial Court and decides

not yet become fait accompli. Finally, Chua stresses that despite the executory to appeal to a superior court. It authorizes the RTC to immediately issue a writ of

character of the RTC judgment against the defendant in ejectment cases, injunctive execution without prejudice to the appeal taking its due course.[12] It is our opinion

relief may still be granted. that on appeal the appellate court may stay the said writ should circumstances so

require.
We find petitioners arguments without sufficient basis.

In the case of Amagan v. Marayag,[13] we reiterated our pronouncement

First, a preliminary injunction may be granted even if not prayed for as long
in Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendao[14] that the proceedings in an ejectment case may be
as the requisites therefor are present. More so if it is prayed for. Second, contrary to
suspended in whatever stage it may be found. We further drew a fine line between
petitioners contention, the questioned writ of preliminary injunction did not dispose of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer, thus:
the main case without trial. The writ merely suspended the execution of the RTC Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as
distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the
judgment pending appeal. It bears stressing that the main case, subject of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a
proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less
productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession,
petition for review, is still yet to be resolved by the Court of Appeals. Lastly, it is
with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court
in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership
evident from Judge Pagapong-Agraviadors letter[11] that the impugned judgment is or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary
injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the
not yet fully executed. Thus, the acts sought to be enjoined by the assailed writ of unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the
more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. It is
preliminary injunction are not yet fait accompli. only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public
policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at
rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the
Rule 70, Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Court on Forcible Entry and other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the
premises involved thereby to discourage any attempt to recover
Unlawful Detainer states: possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to
Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or the courts.[15]
Supreme Court. The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against
the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to
a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.
Patently, even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases are immediately

executory, preliminary injunction may still be granted. There need only be clear
 jurisdiction. He contended that the complaint did not state the assessed value of the
showing that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the property, which determines the jurisdiction of the court.

writ is to be directed violate said right.[16] Hilario maintained that the RTC had jurisdiction since their action was an accion
reinvindicatoria, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, regardless of the
assessed value of the subject property, exclusive jurisdiction fell within the said court.
In this case, we note that the petition for review filed with the Court of Also, in their opposition to Salvador's motion to dismiss, they mentioned the increase
in the assessed value of the land in the amount of P3.5 million. Moreover, they
Appeals raises substantial issues meriting serious consideration. Chuas putative right maintained that their action was also one for damages exceeding P20,000.00, over
which the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction.
to continued possession of the premises stands to be violated if the adverse
Issue:
judgment of the RTC were to be fully executed. Hence, the complete execution of the
Whether or not the action filed by Hilario was an accion reinvindicatoria.
RTC judgment could be held in abeyance, through a writ of preliminary injunction,
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Hilario.
until final resolution of the main controversy.
Held:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
assailed Resolution, dated March 21, 2003, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
73919 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
The action filed by Hilario did not involve a claim of ownership over the property.
They prayed that Salvador vacate the property and restore possession to
them. Hence, it was an accion publiciana, or one for the recovery of possession of
the real property. It was not an aaccion reinvindicatoria or a suit for the recovery of
possession over the real property as owner.
The nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction is
determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for
by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether
the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.

The complaint did not contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the
property. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the
property, it could not thus be determined whether the RTC or the MTC had original
and exclusive jurisdiction over the action.

The law also explicitly excluded from the determination of the jurisdictional amount
the demand for interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses, and costs.

HILARIO vs SALVADOR Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein,
including the decision of the RTC, were null and void.
Facts:
VICTORINO QUINAGORAN vs COURT OF APPEALS and
Hilario filed a complaint with the RTC against Salvador alleging that they were the co- THE HEIRS OF JUAN DE LACRUZ
owners of the parcel of land where Salvador constructed his house without their G.R. NO. 155179 August 24, 2007
knowledge and refused to vacate despite their demands. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Salvodor filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of

CASE: Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45assailing the Decisionof the Court Appeals (CA) and the resolution denying
the MR filed.
Antecedent Facts:1. Complaint for Recovery of Portion of Registered Land with
Compensation and Damages
against Victorino Quinagoran (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Branch XI of Tuao, Cagayan;
2. They alleged that they are the co-owners of a a parcel of land containing
13,100 sq m located at Centro, Piat, Cagayan;
3. in the mid-70s, petitioner started occupying a house on the north-west
portion of the property, covering 400 sq m, by tolerance of respondents;
4. 1993, they asked petitioner to remove the house as they planned to
construct a commercial building on the property; that petitioner refused,
claiming ownership over the lot; and that they suffered damages for their
failure to use the same.;
5. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the case under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691;
6. He argued that since the 346 sq mlot which he owns adjacent to the
contested property has an assessed value of P1,730.00, the assessed value
of the lot under controversy would not be more than the said amount;
7. RTC denied the motion to dismiss stating that the action was in the
nature of accionpubliciana;
8. Upon appeal the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto;
ISSUE: WON the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession
regardless of the value of the property involved?
WON the complaint must allege the assessed value of the property
involved.
HELD/RULING: The answer is no. The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its
denial of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, as affirmed by the CA -- that all
cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the regional
trial courts regardless of the value of the property -- no longer holds
true. As things now stand, a distinction must be made between those
properties the assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro
Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.
The Court has also declared that all cases involving title to or possession of
real property with an assessed value of less thanP20,000.00 if outside Metro
Manila, falls under the original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court.
SECOND ISSUE: Nowhere in said complaint was the assessed value of
the subject property ever mentioned. There is therefore no showing on the
face of the complaint that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the action
of the respondents. Indeed, absent any allegation in the complaint of the
assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or
the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's
action. The courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market
value of the land.
Jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the answer of the defendant
or even upon agreement, waiver or acquiescence of the parties. Indeed, the
jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action and the subject matter
thereof cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or
upon a motion to dismiss for, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would
depend almost entirely on the defendant.
SUAREZ vs EMBOY
Facts:
A parcel of land was partitioned into 5 among the heirs of the Carlos and
Asuncion. Lot No. 1907-A-2 was occupied by Felix and Marilou Emboy, who were
claiming that they inherited it from their mother Claudia Emboy, who inherited it from
her parents Carlos and Asuncion.
Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins to vacate Lot No. 1907-A-2 and transfer
to Lot No. 1907-A-5. They refused to comply and insisted that Claudia's inheritance
pertained to Lot No. 1907-A-2.
In 2004, Felix and Marilou received a demand letter from Carmencita requiring them
to vacate the lot and informed them that she had already purchased the lot from the
former's relatives. Felix and Marilou did not heed the demand so Carmencita filed
before the MTCC a complaint against unlawful detainer against them.
Felix and Marilou argued that the complaint for unlawful detainer was fundamentally
inadequate. There was practically no specific allegation as to when and how
possession by tolerance of them began.
Issue:
Whether or not the complaint for unlawful detainer was inadequate.
Held:
In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following requisites must be alleged:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of
the termination of the latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived
the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
In ejectment cases, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show a
statement of facts to determine the class of case and remedies available to the
parties. When the complaint fails to state the facts constituting a forcible entry or
unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how the
dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion
reinvidicatoria.
In this case, the first requisite was absent. Carmencita failed to clearly allege and
prove how Emboy entered the lot and constructed a house upon it. She was also
silent about the details on who specifically permitted Emboy to occupy the lot, and
how and when such tolerance came about.
Hence, the complaint should not have been for unlawful detainer and the CA did not
commit an error in dismissing Carmencita's complaint.
TOKIO MARINE MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY
INCORPORATED, ALMA PEÑALOSA, KIMIO HOSAKA,
SUMITOMI NISHIDA, TERESITA H. QUIAMBAO and
ANTONIO B. LAPID, petitioners, vs. JORGE
VALDEZ, respondent.
JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL v. ATTY. BENJAMIN S. FORMOSO AND SPS.
BENITO SEE AND MARLY SEE, GR NO. 150949, 2007-06-21
Facts:
Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc. (Sharcons) bought from Evanswinda Morales a
piece of land... covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-278479 issued in
her name.
TCT No. T-278479 in Evanswinda's name was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No.
T-511462 was issued in the name of Sharcons. When the latter's workers tried to
fence and take possession of the lot, they were prevented by the caretaker of
spouses Joseph and Enriqueta Mapua. The caretaker claimed that spouses Mapua are
the owners of the land. Sharcons verified the status of the title and found that TCT
No. T-107163 was indeed registered in the names of spouses Mapua
Sharcons filed with the Regional Trial Court... a complaint for quieting of title
Impleaded as defendants were spouses Mapua, Evanswinda Morales, and the
Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City. Spouses Mapua alleged, among others, that
all the documents relied upon by Sharcons are spurious and falsified.
In the course of the proceedings Judge Dolores L. Español... issued an Order stating
that Benito See and Marly See, president and treasurer, respectively, of Sharcons,
and its counsel, Atty. Benjamin Formoso, respondents, have used a spurious...
certificate of title and tax declaration when it (Sharcons) filed with the RTC its
complaint for quieting of title. Petitioner declared respondents guilty of direct
contempt of court and ordered their confinement
Petitioner stated that in determining the merits of Sharcons' complaint for quieting of
title, she "stumbled" upon Civil Case No. 623-92 for cancellation of title and damages
filed with the RTC... presided by then Judge Lucenito N. Tagle.
Petitioner then took judicial notice of the judge's Decision declaring that Sharcons'
TCT and other supporting documents are falsified and that respondents are
responsible therefor.
Respondents then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus... the Court of Appeals granted the petition.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Judge Español erred in taking cognizance of the
Decision rendered by then Judge Tagle... since it was not offered in evidence in Civil
Case No. 2035-00 for quieting of title. Moreover, as the direct contempt of court is...
criminal in nature, petitioner should have conducted a hearing.
Issues:
whether petitioner erred in ruling that respondents are guilty of direct contempt of
court for using falsified documents when Sharcons filed its complaint for quieting of
title.
Ruling:
We agree with petitioner that the use of falsified and forged documents is a
contumacious act. However, it constitutes indirect contempt not direct contempt.
In Santos v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI,[12] we ruled that the
imputed use of a falsified document, more so where the falsity of the document is not
apparent on its face, merely constitutes indirect contempt, and as... such is subject to
such defenses as the accused may raise in the proper proceedings. Thus, following
Section 3, Rule 71, a contemner may be punished only after a charge in writing has
been filed, and an opportunity has been given to the accused to be heard by himself
and... counsel.[13] Moreover, settled is the rule that a contempt proceeding is not a
civil action, but a separate proceeding of a criminal nature in which the court
exercises limited jurisdiction.[14] Thus, the modes of procedure and the... rules of
evidence in contempt proceedings are assimilated as far as practicable to those
adapted to criminal prosecutions.[15] Perforce, petitioner judge erred in declaring
summarily that respondents are guilty of direct contempt and ordering their...
incarceration. She should have conducted a hearing with notice to respondents.
In Gener v. De Leon,[16] we held that courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the contents of records of other cases even when such cases have been
tried or pending in the same court.
Verily, the Court of Appeals did not... err in ruling that respondents are not guilty of
direct contempt of court.
 DIGITAL vs CANTOS
Facts: Digital Telecommunications, Philippines, Inc. was granted a legislative
franchise to install, operate and maintain telecommunications systems throughout the
Philippines on February 17, 1994. Upon seeking the renewal of its Mayor’s Permit,
they were informed that their business operation would be restrained should it fail to
pay the assessed real property taxes on or before October 5, 1998. The company
failed to pay hence they were given a Cease and Desist Order enjoining them from
further operating its business. As case was filed for the annulment of the order, the
RTC ruled in favor of the company stating that the order is without basis, and further
that the company is only liable to pay real property taxes on properties not used in
connection with the operation of its franchise. In June 2002, Jessie Cantos, Provincial
Treasurer of Batangas, issued seven Warrants of Levy certifying that several real
properties of the company are delinquent in the payment of real property tax.
Therefore, the properties would be sold at a public auction.
Issue: Whether or not there is double jeopardy.
Held: The company contends that the rule on double jeopardy will not bar it from
pursuing its appeal because this is not a criminal case and respondent is not tried as
an accused. The Court does not agree. Contempt is not a criminal offense. However,
a charge for contempt of court partakes of the nature of a criminal action. Rules that
govern criminal prosecutions strictly apply to a prosecution for contempt. In fact,
Section 11 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides that the appeal in indirect
contempt proceedings may be taken as in criminal cases. The Court has held that an
alleged contemnor should be accorded the same rights as that of an accused. Thus,
the dismissal of the indirect contempt charge against respondent amounts to an
acquittal, which effectively bars a second prosecution. Be that as it may, respondent
is not guilty of indirect contempt. "Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to
the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not
only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s order, but such conduct which
tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute
or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. It is a defiance of
the authority, justice, or dignity of the court which tends to bring the authority and
administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice party-
litigants or their witnesses during litigation."
GOVERNOR GARCIA vs LEO MANRIQUE
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a Petition for Indirect Contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court filed
against respondent Leo Ruben C. Manrique (Manrique) for allegedly publishing
statements which tend to directly impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of
justice.
Factual Antecedents
The instant case stemmed. from an article in Luzon Tribune, a newspaper of general
circulation wherein respondent Manrique is the publisher/editor, which allegedly
contained disparaging statements against the Supreme Court.
The petitioners, namely: Governor Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. (Gov. Garcia), Aurelio C.
Angeles, Jr. (Angeles), Emerlinda S. Talento (Talento) and Rodolfo H. De Mesa (De
Mesa) alleged that the subject article undermines the people’s faith in the Supreme
Court due to blunt allusion that they employed bribery in order to obtain relief from
the Court, particularly in obtaining a temporary restraining order (TRO) in G.R. No.
185132. The pertinent portions of the article which was entitled, "TRO ng Korte
Suprema binayaran ng ₱ 20-M?" and published in the January 14 to 20, 2009 issue of
the Luzon Tribune, are reproduced as follows:1
Prior to the publication of the foregoing article, two (2) interrelated petitions were
filed before this Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 185132 and 181311, entitled Governor
Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, et al. and Province of Bataan v. Hon.
Remigio M. Escalada, respectively.
In G.R. No. 185132, the Provincial Government of Bataan ordered for the conduct of
a tax delinquency sale of all the properties of Sunrise Paper Products Industries, Inc.
(Sunrise) situated in Orani, Bataan. When no public bidder participated in the
delinquency sale, the provincial government acquired all the properties of Sunrise
which consisted of machineries and equipment, including the parcel of land where the
factory stood. Subsequently, Sunrise filed a petition for injunction which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 8164, to annul the auction sale and prevent the provincial
government from consolidating its title over the properties. Two (2) other creditors of
Sunrise intervened in the proceedings. The provincial government entered into a
compromise agreement with Sunrise and the intervening creditors and thereafter filed
a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 8164. However, the trial court refused to dismiss
the case and proceeded to hear the same on the merits. Subsequently, it rendered a
Decision dated June 15, 2007, which was thereafter challenged in another petition
docketed as G.R. No. 181311.
Meanwhile, former workers of Sunrise, namely: Josechito B. Gonzaga (Gonzaga),
Ruel A. Magsino (Magsino) and Alfredo B. Santos (Santos), filed criminal and
administrative charges against petitioners Gov. Garcia, Angeles, Talento and De
Mesa, among others, before the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as OMB-L-A-08-
0039-A. Subsequently, Deputy Ombudsman Orlando S. Casimiro (Ombudsman
Casimiro) issued an Order dated October 28, 2008, preventively suspending the
petitioners.
Unyielding, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA), assailing the Order dated October 28, 2008 of Ombudsman Casimiro, with an
urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction. The CA,
however, deferred the resolution of the prayer for the issuance of TRO and instead
issued Resolution dated November 14, 2008, requiring Gonzaga, Magsino and Santos
to file a comment. Dissatisfied with the action of the CA, the petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with urgent prayer for the issuance
of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction with this Court, which was docketed as
G.R. No. 185132. On November 19, 2008, this Court issued a TRO enjoining the
public respondents in OMB-L-A-08-0039-A from implementing the Order dated
October 28, 2008 of Ombudsman Casimiro, specifically the order for the petitioners’
preventive suspension, until further orders of the Court. The issuance of this TRO is
the incident mentioned in Manrique’s article.
In his Comment,2 Manrique alleged that there was nothing malicious or defamatory in
his article since he only stated the facts or circumstances which attended the
issuance of the TRO. He likewise denied that he made any degrading remarks against
the Supreme Court and claimed that the article simply posed academic questions. If
the article ever had a critical undertone, it was directed against the actions of the
petitioners, who are public officers, and never against the Supreme Court. At any
rate, he asseverated that whatever was stated in his article is protected by the
constitutional guaranties of free speech and press1âwphi1.
The subject article falls under the
second type of contemptuous
publication.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether the contents of Manrique’s article would
constitute indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which
reads:
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts as it is indispensable to
their right of self-preservation, to the execution of their powers, and to the
maintenance of their authority; and consequently to the due administration of
justice.3 It must however be exercised on the preservative not vindictive principle,
and on the corrective not retaliatory idea of punishment. The courts must exercise
the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that
power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions
that they exercise.4
The power to punish for contempt does not, however, render the courts impenetrable
to public scrutiny nor does it place them beyond the scope of legitimate criticism.
Every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public
officers and such right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at
judicial authority.5 It is the cardinal condition of all such criticisms however that it
shall be bona fide, and shall not spill the walls of decency and propriety. A wide
chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand; and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a
gross violation of the duty to respect courts6 and therefore warrants the wielding of
the power to punish for contempt.
In his erudite dissenting opinion in People v. Alarcon,7 which was impliedly adopted in
subsequent cases dealing with contempt,8 Justice Manuel V. Moran noted the two
kinds of publication which are punishable with contempt, to wit:
Contempt, by reason of publications relating to court and to court proceedings, are of
two kinds. A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the
courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal
contempt which is summarily punishable by courts. This is the rule announced in the
cases relied upon by the majority. A publication which tends to degrade the courts
and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any
way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable
by courts. In the language of the majority, what is sought, in the first kind of
contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-
important duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case.
In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate
the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to
destroy public confidence in them. In the first, there is no contempt where there is no
action pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by the
newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending
case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. x x x Courts
would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.9 (Italics ours)
Succinctly, there are two kinds of publications relating to court and to court
proceedings which can warrant the exercise of the power to punish for contempt: (1)
that which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding; and (2) that which tends to
degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to
bring them in any way into disrepute.
We find the subject article illustrative of the second kind of contemptuous publication
for insinuating that this Court’s issuance of TRO in G.R. No. 185132 was founded on
an illegal cause. The glaring innuendos of illegality in the article is denigrating to the
dignity of this Court and the ideals of fairness and justice that it represents. It is
demonstrative of disrespect not only for this Court, but also for the judicial system as
a whole, tends to promote distrust and undermines public confidence in the judiciary
by creating the impression that the Court cannot be trusted to resolve cases
impartially.10
This Court has always exercised utmost restraint and tolerance against criticisms on
its decisions and issuances, bearing in mind that official actions are subject to public
opinion as a means of ensuring accountability. Manrique’s article, however, has
transgressed the ambit of fair criticism and depicted a legitimate action of this Court
as a reciprocated accommodation of the petitioners’ interest. Contrary to Manrique’s
claim of objectivity, his article contained nothing but baseless suspicion and aspersion
on the integrity of this Court, calculated to incite doubt on the mind of its readers on
the legality of the issuance. It did not simply dwell on the propriety of the issuance
on the basis of some sound legal criteria nor did it simply blame this Court of an
irregularity in the discharge of duties but of committing the crime of bribery. The
article insinuated that processes from this Court may be obtained for reasons other
than that their issuance is necessary to the administration of justice. Judging from
the title alone, "TRO ng Korte Suprema binayaran ng ₱ 20M?" the article does not
aim for an academic discussion of the propriety of the issuance of the TRO but seeks
to sow mistrust in the dispositions of this Court. To suggest that the processes of this
Court can be obtained through underhand means or that their issuance is subject to
negotiation and that members of this Court are easily swayed by money is a serious
affront to the integrity of the highest court of the land. Such imputation smacks of
utter disrespect to this Court and such temerity is deserving of contempt.
Manrique claims that he was only being critical of the actions of the petitioners as
public officers and that no disrespect was meant to the Court. While he claims good
faith, the contents of his article bespeak otherwise. A person’s intent, however good
it maybe, cannot prevail over the plain import of his speech or writing. It is gathered
from what is apparent, not on supposed or veiled objectives.
The truth is we consider public scrutiny of our decisions and official acts as a healthy
component of democracy. However, such must not transcend the wall of tolerable
criticism and its end must always be to uphold the dignity and integrity of the justice
system and not to destroy public confidence in them. In People v. Godoy, 11 we
stressed:
Generally, criticism of a court’s rulings or decisions is not improper, and may not be
restricted after a case has been finally disposed of and has ceased to be pending. So
long as critics confine their criticisms to facts and base them on the decisions of the
court, they commit no contempt no matter how severe the criticism may be; but
when they pass beyond that line and charge that judicial conduct was influenced by
improper, corrupt, or selfish motives, or that such conduct was affected by political
prejudice or interest, the tendency is to create distrust and destroy the confidence of
the people in their courts.12
There is thus a need to distinguish between adverse criticism of the court’s decision
after the case has ended and scandalizing the court itself. The latter is not criticism; it
is personal and scurrilous abuse of a judge as such, in which case it shall be dealt
with as a case for contempt.13
A reading of the subject article shows that Manrique was not simply passing
judgment on an official act of the Court. He was actually intimating that the
petitioners were able to obtain a TRO through illicit means, with the complicity of this
Court. As he hurls accusation of corruption against petitioners, he also unfairly
smeared the reputation of this Court by stirring the idea that one or some members
of this Court yield to said illegal act. By no means can such an imputation be justified
by mere curiosity or suspicion. That he was only mulling on the thought that such an
illegal act transpired does not make his insinuation any less contemptuous.
Manrique’s article no longer partakes of an adverse criticism of an official act but an
indecent attempt to malign the petitioners which ultimately brought equal harm to
the reputation of this Court.
It bears stressing that the Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the
Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief
for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if
the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this
Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to
take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the
result.14 Thus, the inflexible demand to adhere to the highest tenets of judicial
conduct is imposed upon all members of the judiciary. They are required to keep their
private as well as official conduct at all times free from all appearances of impropriety
and be beyond reproach.15
Malicious publications cannot seek
the protection of the constitutional
guaranties of free speech and press.
Manrique tries to invoke the protection of the constitutional guaranties of free speech
and press, albeit unpersuasively, to extricate himself from liability. However, said
constitutional protection is not a shield against scurrilous publications, which are
heaved against the courts with no apparent reason but to trigger doubt on their
integrity based on some imagined possibilities. Contrary to nourishing democracy and
strengthening judicial independence, which are the expected products of the
guaranties of free speech and press, the irresponsible exercise of these rights wounds
democracy and leads to division.
In Alarcon, we emphasized:
It is true that the Constitution guarantees the freedom of speech and of the press.
But license or abuse of that freedom should not be confused with freedom in its true
sense. Well-ordered liberty demands no less unrelaxing vigilance against abuse of the
sacred guaranties of the Constitution than the fullest protection of their legitimate
exercise. As important as is the maintenance of a judiciary unhampered in its
administration of justice and secure in its continuous enjoyment of public confidence.
x x x.16
Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must occasionally be balanced with the
requirements of equally important public interests, such as the maintenance of the
integrity of the courts and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. 17 For
the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only
within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within
the context, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are
accepted by the general community.18
Certainly, the making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not
an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks
on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of
said right cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or
public respect therefore and confidence therein.19
Therefore; Manrique's article, lacking in social value and aimed solely at besmirching
the reputation of the Court, is undeserving of the protection of the guaranties of free
speech and press.
The critical role of the Supreme Court as the court of last resort renders it imperative
that it maintains the ideals of neutrality, integrity and independence:) the
characteristics in which the people's trust and confidence are built, alive and
unscathed. Thus, justices and judges alike are constantly reminded to live up to the
stringent standards of the profession or else suffer the consequences. In return, the
people are expected to respect and abide by the rulings of this Court and must not be
instrumental to its disrepute.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, respondent Leo Ruben C.
Manrique is hereby adjudged GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT and is ordered to
pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱ 20,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
ATTY. TABUJARA vs JUDGE ASDALA
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Atty. Ernesto A. Tabujara III (complainant), by Complaint-Affidavit[1] dated June 8,
2006 which was sworn to on June 9, 2006 and received by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) on June 13, 2006, charged Judge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala
(respondent), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87,
with gross ignorance of the law and procedure, gross misconduct constituting violation
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, graft and corruption, knowingly rendering an unjust
order, and culpable violation of the Constitution.
Complainant was a party to the following cases which were originally raffled to
different branches but which were ordered consolidated and assigned to Branch 86
presided by Judge Teodoro Bay (Judge Bay), they having involved the same parties
(complainant and his wife), related issues and reliefs prayed for: (1) Civil Case No. Q-
06-57760,[2] for Violation of Republic Act No. 9262 or the Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act, filed by complainants wife against him praying for, among others,
the issuance of Temporary Protection Order (TPO), (2) Civil Case No. 06-57857,[3] filed
by complainant against his wife for declaration of nullity of marriage, and (3) Civil
Case No. Q-06-57984,[4] petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by complainants wife
against him involving their son Carlos Iigo R. Tabujara (habeas corpus case).
The habeas corpus case was raffled to Branch 102 which issued on May 23, 2006 a
Writ[5] directing Deputy Sheriff Victor Amarillas to take and have the body of . CARLOS
IIGO R. TABUJARA before this Court on 25 May 2006, at 10:00 A.M. and [to] summon
the respondent-[herein complainant] to appear then and there to show cause why he
should not be dealt with in accordance with law.[6] (Capitalization and underscoring in
the original)
During the hearing on May 25, 2006 of the habeas corpus case before Branch 102, on
complainants information that there were two pending cases before Branch 86
presided by Judge Bay, Branch 102 directed the consolidation of said habeas corpus
case with the other cases pending before Branch 86.
After hearing was conducted on the habeas corpus case, Branch
86 Presiding Judge Bay issued on May 31, 2006 an Order[7] reading:
After considering the records of the three (3) cases
consolidated before this Court, this Court resolves as follows:
1. the child Carlos Iigo R. Tabujara shall continue
to be under the custody of the respondent Ernesto
Tabujara III until the Court shall have resolved
 the issue of custody of said child. This is
necessary to protect the child from emotional and Alleging that respondents May 31, 2006 Order was issued with undue haste and
psychological violence due to the without notice to complainant, and that respondent violated the rule against
misunderstanding now existing between his
parents. interference with courts of co-equal and concurrent jurisdiction, complainant filed on
2. the Motion to Admit Amended Petition with
Prayer for Temporary Protection Order is June 1, 2006 a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order
GRANTED. The Temporary Protection Order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals.[12]
dated April 19, 2006 is hereby extended until the
prayer for Permanent Protection is resolved.
3. The respondent Ernesto Tabujara III is hereby
ordered to bring the child Carlos Iigo Tabujara to On June 1, 2006, complainant having failed to appear at the rescheduled date (by
this Court during the hearing of these cases
on July 14, 2006 at 8:30 in the morning. respondent) for him to produce the minor child, declared him

x x x x[8] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) . . . in contempt of Court for defying the order directing the
production of the minor, in which case, a bench warrant is
hereby ordered against respondent, who is likewise ordered
imprisoned until such time that he is willing to appear and
On the same date (May 31, 2006) of the issuance by Judge Bay of the above-quoted comply with the order of this Court directing the production of
the minor. Until further notice.[13] (Underscoring supplied)
Order, complainants wife filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Order Respondent to
On June 2, 2006, the appellate court issued a Resolution[14] in complainants petition
Comply with the Writ of Habeas Corpus with Urgent Motion For Partial Reconsideration
for Certiorari granting a Temporary Restraining Order and ordering complainants wife
(Of the Order dated May 31, 2006).[9] The motion contained no notice of
to submit a Comment on the petition. On even date, in view of the contempt order
hearing and no copy was furnished herein complainant, albeit a copy was sent to his
and bench warrant issued by respondent on June 1, 2006, complainant filed before
counsel via registered mail. Also on May 31, 2006, respondent Presiding Judge of
the appellate court an urgent ex-parte motion to set aside respondents June 1, 2006
Branch 87, the pairing Judge of Branch 86 presided by Judge Bay who had filed a
Order and bench warrant.[15] The appellate court granted the motion by June 7,
Leave of Absence effective the following day or on June 1, 2006, acted on the motion
2006 Resolution.[16]
of complainants wife and amended Judge Bays May 31, 2006 order by advancing the

production of the parties child from July 14, 2006 to June 1, 2006.[10] The decretal
Hence, arose the present complaint, complainant contending that when respondent
portion of respondents May 31, 2006 Order reads:
issued her May 31, 2006 Order, Judge Bay was not yet on official leave as it was yet

to start the following day, June 1, 2006; that as a judge of a co-equal and concurrent
WHEREFORE, Ernesto A. Tabujara III or any person or persons
acting for and in his behalf and under his direction is jurisdiction, respondent could not amend, revise, modify or disturb the orders of the
hereby directed to produce the person of minor Carlos I[]igo R.
other courts;[17] and that respondent violated Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of
Tabujara before the Session Hall, Branch 87, located at 114,
Hall of Justice, Quezon City on June 1, 2006 at 9:00 oclock in Court[18] on litigated motions which Rule calls for the setting of such motions for
the morning. Failing which, the more coercive process of a
Bench Warrant will be issued against said respondent, without hearing and the service of copy thereof upon the opposing party at least three days
prejudice to a declaration of contempt which may be due under
before the scheduled hearing.
the obtaining circumstances.[11] (Underscoring supplied)

Complainant adds that respondents May 31, 2006 Order was issued after the opposing
counsel personally met and conferred with respondent in her chambers without the
presence of his (complainants) counsel; and that after issuing the Order, respondent
personally summoned via telephone complainants counsel to her chambers where she
reason for his non-appearance and non-compliance with a
standing order. Under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
complainants alleged disobedience is an indirect contempt the
punishment for which requires that a respondent should be first
asked to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt.

personally furnished him a copy of the Order in the presence of opposing counsel.[19] There is one more act equally serious in nature. As correctly
claimed by the complainant, respondent indeed took
Then Court Administrator Christopher Lock, by Ist Indorsement dated July 3, cognizance of the consolidated cases without proper
authority. Respondent cannot reason out that she acted in her
2006,[20] directed respondent to comment on the Complaint-Affidavit within ten days capacity as pairing judge. It is clear from the records that her
from notice. authority as pairing judge of Branch 86 started only on 01 June
2006 when Judge Bays leave of absence
commenced. Judge Bay was still sitting as the regular judge of
the OCA came up with the following evaluation of the Complaint:
Branch 86 as evidenced by the issuance of his order on 31 May
As correctly claimed by the complainant, respondent Judge had
2006. Respondents explanation that Judge Bay was no longer in
indeed acted on the three (3) consolidated cases: (1) without
the premises in the afternoon of 31 May 2006, so that she
the legal authority as pairing judge of Branch 86 considering
could act on the subject ex-parte motion is clearly
that the regular presiding judge thereat was still sitting as such
unacceptable. x x x
when she issued the order of 31 May 2006; (2) in violation of
the basic rule on procedural due process when she
resolved ex-parte the motion of the complainants wife; and . .
. in citing complainant in contempt of court and issuing the
Under Section 8 and 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as
bench warrant without requiring the complainant to file his
amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10, the penalty of gross ignorance
comment on said ex-parte motion and explain the reason for his
of the procedure and gross misconduct is dismissal from the
failure to appear and bring the minor child during the hearing
service with forfeiture of all salaries, benefits and leave credits
on 01 June 2006.
to which she may be entitled and with disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
xxxx
government-owned or controlled corporation
x x x x [24] (Italics in the original, emphasis and underscoring
It must be noted that the motion of complainants wife was an
supplied)
ordinary motion which required the application of ordinary
rules and was not itself the application of writ under Rule 102.

xxxx As reflected above, respondent having been earlier dismissed from the service, the

Clear it is from the foregoing that respondents basis in OCA recommended that respondent should be fined in the sum of P40,000.00 pesos,
disregarding the rule under Section 4 of Rule 15 is not
the maximum penalty of fine under Section 11(3) under Rule 140, as amended.
valid. While respondent may be justified in immediately setting
the hearing of the said urgent ex-parte motion, she should
not have resolved it without first requiring the By Resolution of June 30, 2008,[25] this Court re-docketed the complaint as a regular
complainant to file his comment. Although the appearance
of the complainant during the hearing may be waived, he has administrative matter.
the right to be heard insofar as the said motion is concerned
through the filing of his comment thereon.
The Court finds the evaluation of the case by the OCA well-taken.
Respondent Judges blunder was compounded when she As found by the Court of Appeals, respondent gravely abused her discretion when
immediately cited complainant in contempt of court and issued
the bench warrant without requiring the latter to explain the she acted on the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Order Respondent to Comply with the
Writ of Habeas Corpus with Urgent Motion For Partial Reconsideration (Of the Order
Because, again as reflected above, respondent was, in Edao v. Asdala, dismissed
dated May 31, 2006).[26] That Judge Bay may have left the court premises in the
from the service with forfeiture of all salaries, benefits and leave credits to which she
afternoon of May 31, 2006 did not justify her acting on even date on motion of
may be entitled, [32] she should, as recommended by the OCA, be fined in the amount
complainants wife, as her authority as pairing judge commenced only the following
of Forty Thousand Pesos, the highest amount of fine imposable for gross ignorance of
day, June 1, 2006, when Judge Bays leave of absence started; Nor did respondents
the law or procedure, a serious charge under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.[33]
opinion on the urgency of the case justify her sacrificing law and settled

jurisprudence for the sake of expediency.[27]

Respondent also abused her contempt powers. If at all, complainant was guilty of

indirect contempt and not direct contempt.[28] Indirect or constructive contempt is

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent GUILTY of gross ignorance of law and
committed outside of the sitting of the court and may include misbehavior of an
procedure. She having been earlier dismissed from the service, she is FINED the
officer of the court in the performance of his official duties or in his official
amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000) Pesos to be deducted from the Eighty Thousand
transactions, disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order,
(P80,000) Pesos which this Court withheld pursuant to its January 15,
judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or a judge, any
2008 Resolution in Edao v. Asdala.
abuse or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court not
SO ORDERED.
constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to

impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.[29]

For not affording complainant the opportunity to explain why he

should not be cited in contempt, she blatantly disregarded Rule 71 of the

Rules of Court.[30] In Lim v. Domagas[31] where the therein judge declared the therein
complainant guilty of contempt and ordered his arrest for failure to bring three

minors before the court without the benefit of a hearing, the Court faulted the therein

judge not only for grave abuse of discretion but also for gross ignorance of the law.