1. Piper Aircraft v.

Reyno

Facts. In 1976 a small commercial aircraft crashed in the Scottish highlands. The pilot and five passengers, all Scottish
subjects and residents, were killed. The heirs and next of kin of all 6 victims were all also Scottish. The aircraft was
manufactured in Pennsylvania by petitioner Piper Aircraft Co. The aircraft was owned and operated by a Scottish air
taxi service. In July, 1977 a California probate court appointed Defendant Gaynell Reyno administratrix of the estates
of the five passengers Defendant was not related to any of the passengers; she was merely the legal secretary to the
attorney who filed this lawsuit. Several days after her appointment, Defendant commenced separate wrongful death
actions against Plaintiffs Piper and Hartzell in California superior court claiming negligence and strict liability.
Defendant admitted that suit was filed in the U.S., as opposed to Scotland, because of its more favorable laws
regarding liability and damages. Plaintiffs first removed to federal court in California, and then successfully sought
transfer to the Middle District of Pennsylvania, where Plaintiff does business. They then sought to dismiss the case
on grounds of forum non conveniens.

Issue. Whether a change in substantive law between venues is a sufficient reason for denying a motion to dismiss
on grounds of forum non conveniens. What is the standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss
via forum non conveniens

Held. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that plaintiffs may defeat a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum
non conveniens merely by showing that the substantive law that would be applied in the alternate forum is less
favorable to the plaintiffs than that of the present forum. The possibility of change in substantive law should not be
given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry. A plaintiff’s choice of forum is given
greater weight when the plaintiff has chosen the home forum. The forum non conveniens determination is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and may be overturned only when there has been a clear abuse
of discretion.

Discussion. Although the Supreme Court of the United States rejected the argument that the motion to dismiss
should be denied because the law in other forums would be less favorable to the plaintiff, it did however
acknowledge that if the alternative forum was so clearly inadequate that it would offer no remedy at all, then the
change in substantive law might be grounds for denying the motion. In ruling that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in granting the motion, the Supreme Court noted Scotland’s strong interest in the litigation, since all the
victims were Scottish residents, coupled with the fact that holding the trial in Pennsylvania would make it impossible
for Plaintiff to interplead third party defendants residing in Scotland. Thus the district court correctly held that public
policy favored holding the trial in Scotland. CHAPTER III.

2. Gulf oil v. Gilbert

FACTS: Respondent-plaintiff, Virginia resident, and public warehouse operator brought a tort action in New York
alleging that the petitioner-defendant, in violation of the ordinances of Virginia, so carelessly handled a delivery of
gasoline to his warehouse tanks and pumps as to cause an explosion and fire which consumed the warehouse
building, caused injury to his business, and burned the property of customers in his custody under warehousing
agreements. Petitioner-defendant oil company is a Pennsylvania corporation, qualified to do business in both
Virginia and New York, and it has designated officials of each state as agents to receive service of process. When
sued in New York, the defendant, invoking the doctrine offorum non conveniens, claimed that the appropriate place
for trial is Virginia, where the plaintiff lives and defendant does business, where all events in litigation took place,
where most of the witnesses reside, and where both state and federal courts are available to plaintiff and are able
to obtain jurisdiction of the defendant. The case, on its merits, involves no federal question and was brought in the
US District Court solely because of diversity in citizenship of the parties. The District Court considered that the law
of New York as to forum non conveniens applied and that it required the case to be left to Virginia courts. It therefore
dismissed the action. The Court of Appeals disagreed as to the applicability of New York law, took a restrictive view
of the application of the entire doctrine in federal courts and reversed. On certiorari, the court reversed.
ISSUE: Did the district court abuse its discretion in dismissing the suit pursuant to the doctrine of forum non
conveniens?

ANSWER: No. The court concluded that the district court had not exceeded its powers or the bounds of its discretion
in dismissing plaintiff's complaint and remitting it to the courts of his own community. The appeals court judgment
was too restrictive. The task of the trial court would be simplified by trial in Virginia. If trial was in a state court, it
could apply its own law to events occurring there. If in federal court by reason of diversity of citizenship, the court
would apply the law of its own state in which it is likely to be experienced. The course of adjudication in New York
federal court might be beset with conflict of laws problems all avoided if the case is litigated in Virginia where it
arose. If the combination and weight of factors requisite to given results are difficult to forecast or state, those to
be considered are not difficult to name. An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the
private interest of the litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof;
availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing,
witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems
that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforceability of
a judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial. But unless the
balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.

3. Lueck v. Sundstrand

FACTS: Plaintiffs appeal the district court's dismissal of their suit on the basis of forum non conveniens. Plaintiffs,
citizens of New Zealand, are victims of an airplane crash in New Zealand, on a New Zealand carrier. Plaintiffs allege
that the radio altimeter of the Ground Proximity Warning System (“GPWS”) malfunctioned during flight and was a
causal factor of the accident. Defendants, the Canadian manufacturer of the aircraft and the American
manufacturers of the GPWS and the radio altimeter, argued that New Zealand was an adequate alternative forum
and that the public and private factors weighed in favor of dismissal. The district court agreed with Defendants.

ISSUE: WON The US Courts have jurisdiction over the case

Held: Arizona has jurisdiction. In dismissing an action on forum non conveniens grounds the court must examine:

1.) Whether an adequate alternative forum exists; and

2.) Whether the balance of private & public interest factors favors the dismissal.

The district court was not required to ask whether plaintiffs could bring this lawsuit in NewZealand, but rather,
whether New Zealand offers a remedy for their losses. The District Court didnot abuse its discretion in finding that
an adequate remedy is available in New Zealand. Theforeign forum must provide the plaintiff with some remedy for
his wrong in order for the alternative forum to be adequate. Ordinarily, a plaintiff’s choice of forum will not be
disturbed unless the ―private interest‖ and ―public interest‖ factors strongly favor trial in a foreign country. If the
balance of convenience suggests that trial in the chosen forum would be unnecessarily burdensome for
the defendant or the court, dismissal is proper. Both private and public factorsweigh against having the suit in
Arizona.

PRIVATE INTEREST FACTORS

(1) residence of the parties and witnesses
(2) forum’s convenience to the litigants
(3) access to physical evidence and other sources of proof
(4) unwilling witnesses can be compelled to testify
(5) cost of bringing witnesses to trial
(6) enforceability of the judgment
(7) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive
PUBLIC INTEREST FACTORS

(1) local interest of lawsuit

(2) court’s familiarity with the governing law
(3) burden on local courts & juries
(4) congestion in the court
(5) costs of resolving a dispute unrelated to this forum

4. Monegro v. Rosa

Facts: Monegro and others (Dominican Republic) are aspiring professional baseball players and were recruited by
Luis Rosa (California), the Giant’s (California) former Latin American scout. At Rosa’s instigation, each signed a 7-
yearr Minor League Contract. Rosa expressly conditioned their continued employment to US teams upon their
submitting to his sexual advances. They allege that the Giants’ management knew or had reason to know of Rosa’s
misconduct. So Monegro filed suit in California. Suit was also filed in the Dominican Republic. Noting the pendency
of this “parallel” proceeding, Rosa filed motion to dismiss on the alternative grounds of forum non conveniens. The
case was dismissed. Hence, this appeal.

Held: California court has jurisdiction. This case is unlike Piper in a number of respects.
a. Unlike Piper, plaintiff’s chosen forum is more than merely the American defendants’ home forum. It is also
a forum with substantial relation to the action.
b. Unlike Piper, there are no possible co-defendants or third-party defendants who could not be made to
appear in the American forum.
c. Unlike Piper, there is no showing that access to proof, even aside from Rosa’s testimony, would be easier
in the Dominican Republic.

5. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins

Brief Fact Summary. Defendant Harry Tompkins, was injured by a freight car of Plaintiff Erie Railroad while in
Hughestown, Pennsylvania. Defendant brought suit in federal district court in New York, asking the judge to apply
“general law” regarding negligence, rather than Pennsylvania law, which required a greater degree of negligence.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Except in matters governed by the United States Constitution or Act of Congress, the law
that is to be applied in any case is the law of the state.

Facts. In July of 1934 Defendant visited his mother-in-law’s house in Pennsylvania. He walked part of the distance
along the railroad tracks of the Plaintiff. A train passed, and an open door on a refrigerator car struck him and
knocked him partially under the train. His right arm was severed. Defendant then brought suit against the railroad
in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York. Under Pennsylvania law the railroad would have
been liable only for “wanton” negligence. However, rather than apply Pennsylvania law, the District Judge, at
Defendant’s urging, applied the “general law” that the railroad was liable even if it was guilty only of “ordinary
negligence. The jury returned a verdict for Defendant. Plaintiff appealed, but the Second Circuit upheld Defendant’s
verdict. The railroad then sought certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States.

Issue. Whether a Federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction, should apply the substantive law of the state the
activities leading to the suit arose in, or the law of the Federal court in the forum state

Held. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that except in matters governed by
the United States Constitution or Act of Congress, the law that is to be applied in any case is the law of the state.
There is no Federal common law.
The dissenting opinions of Justices Butler and McReynolds are omitted by the casebook. Concurrence. Justice Reed
concurred. Justice Reed agreed with the majority to the extent that he thought where Congress has not spoken,
then a Federal court should apply the law of the state in which the activities arose. However, he disagreed that there
could be no such thing as “federal common law,” finding instead that Congress has the power to declare what rules
of substantive law the federal courts shall use.

The primary rationale for the Supreme Court’s decision here was the prevention of forum shopping, whereby, under
the old policy of allowing a federal court to ignore the state’s substantive law and instead apply “general law” made
it so that the substantive law that was applied in each case varied according to enforcement was sought in the state
or federal court. Moreover, in asserting that there is no such thing as federal common law, the court is probably
referring to judicial common law. Common law, Congress implicitly retained the right to pass rules governing the
federal courts, e.g. the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, etc.

6. Manila Hotel et. al v. NLRC

FACTS: In May 1988, Marcelo Santos was an overseas worker in Oman. In June 1988, he was recruited by Palace
Hotel in Beijing, China. Due to higher pay and benefits, Santos agreed to the hotel’s job offer and so he started
working there in November 1988. The employment contract between him and Palace Hotel was however without
the intervention of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). In August 1989, Palace Hotel
notified Santos that he will be laid off due to business reverses. In September 1989, he was officially terminated.
In February 1990, Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) and Manila
Hotel International, Ltd. (MHIL). The Palace Hotel was impleaded but no summons were served upon it. MHC is a
government owned and controlled corporation. It owns 50% of MHIL, a foreign corporation (Hong Kong). MHIL
manages the affair of the Palace Hotel. The labor arbiter who handled the case ruled in favor of Santos. The National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the labor arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: No. The NLRC is a very inconvenient forum for the following reasons:
a. The only link that the Philippines has in this case is the fact that Santos is a Filipino;
b. However, the Palace Hotel and MHIL are foreign corporations – MHC cannot be held liable because it merely
owns 50% of MHIL, it has no direct business in the affairs of the Palace Hotel. The veil of corporate fiction
can’t be pierced because it was not shown that MHC is directly managing the affairs of MHIL. Hence, they
are separate entities.
c. Santos’ contract with the Palace Hotel was not entered into in the Philippines;
d. Santos’ contract was entered into without the intervention of the POEA (had POEA intervened, NLRC still
does not have jurisdiction because it will be the POEA which will hear the case);
e. MHIL and the Palace Hotel are not doing business in the Philippines; their agents/officers are not residents
of the Philippines;

Due to the foregoing, the NLRC cannot possibly determine all the relevant facts pertaining to the case. It is not
competent to determine the facts because the acts complained of happened outside our jurisdiction. It cannot
determine which law is applicable. And in case a judgment is rendered, it cannot be enforced against the Palace
Hotel (in the first place, it was not served any summons).

The Supreme Court emphasized that under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may
assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided:
(1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;
(2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and
(3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.

None of the above conditions are apparent in the case at bar.

 7. K.K. Shell Sekiyu Osaka Hatsubaisho v. CA

Facts: Kumagai Kaiun Kaisha, Ltd., a corporation formed and existing under the laws of Japan, filed a complaint for
the collection of a sum of money with preliminary attachment against Atlantic Venus Co., S.A., a corporation
registered in Panama, the vessel MV Estella and Crestamonte Shipping Corporation, a Philippine corporation.
Atlantic is the owner of the MV Estella. The complaint alleged that Crestamonte, as bareboat charterer and operator
of the MV Estella, appointed N.S. Shipping Corporation as its general agent in Japan. The appointment was
formalized in an Agency Agreement. NSS in turn appointed Kumagai as its local agent in Osaka, Japan. Kumagai
supplied the MV Estella with supplies and services but despite repeated demands Crestamonte failed to pay the
amounts due. Petitioner Fu Hing Oil Co., Ltd., a corporation organized in Hong Kong and not doing business in the
Philippines, filed a motion for leave to intervene with an attached complaint-in-intervention, alleging that Fu Hing
supplied marine diesel oil/fuel to the MV Estella and incurred barge expenses for the total sum of US$152,412.5, but
such has remained unpaid. The issuance of a writ of attachment was also prayed for.

Petitioner K.K. Shell Sekiyu Osaka Hatsubaisho, a corporation organized in Japan and not doing business in the
Philippines, likewise filed a motion to intervene with an attached complaint-in-intervention, alleging that upon
request of NSS, Crestamonte's general agent in Japan, K.K. Shell provided and supplied marine diesel oil/fuel to the
W Estella at the ports of Tokyo and Mutsure in Japan and that despite previous demands Crestamonte has failed to
pay the amounts of US$16,996.96 and Y1,000,000.00, and that K.K. Shell's claim constitutes a maritime lien on the
MV Estella. The complaint-in-intervention sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.

Trial court allowed the intervention and preliminary attachments were issued upon the posting of bonds. Thereafter,
respondents posted a counterbond which discharged the earlier issued writ of attachment. Respondents moved to
dismiss the complaints-in- intervention filed by Fu Hing and K.K. Shell.

Thereafter, CA annulled the orders of the trial court and directed it to cease and desist from proceeding with the
case. According to the Court of Appeals, Fu Hing and K.K. Shell were not suppliers but sub-agents of NSS, hence they
were bound by the Agency Agreement between Crestamonte and NSS, particularly, the choice of forum clause,
which provides that any matter of dispute shalle be resolved in the district courts of Japan.

Issue: WON the CA made an error of disallowing the motion for intervention filed by herein Petitioners

Ruling: Yes. Court finds reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals in so far as it disallowed petitioners'
intervention in the case before the trial court and ordered the latter to cease and desist from proceeding with the
case. A reading of the Agency Agreement fails to support the conclusion that K.K. Shell is a sub-agent of NSS and is,
therefore, bound by the agreement. No express reference to the contracting of sub-agents or the applicability of the
terms of the agreement, particularly the choice-of-forum clause, to sub-agents is made in the text of the agreement.
What the contract clearly states are NSS' principal duties, i.e., that it shall provide for the necessary services required
for the husbanding of Crestamonte's vessels in Japanese ports and shall be responsible for fixing southbound cargoes
with revenues sufficient to cover ordinary expenses

Moreover, the complaint-in-intervention filed by K.K. Shell merely alleges that it provided and supplied the MV
Estella with marine diesel oil/fuel, upon request of NSS who was acting for and as duly appointed agent of
Crestamonte. There is thus no basis for the Court of Appeal's finding that "the sub-agents admitted in their pleadings
that they were appointed as local agent/sub-agent or representatives by NSS by virtue of said Agency Agreement"
The allegation of herein Petitioners do not conclusively establish a sub-agency between NSS and K.K. Shell. It is
therefore surprising how the Court of Appeals could have come to the conclusion, just on the basis of the Agency
Agreement and the pleadings filed in the trial court, that "Crestamonte is the principal, NSS is the agent and ... Fu
Hing and K.K Shell are the sub-agents."
In the same vein, as the choice-of-forum clause in the agreement has not been conclusively shown to be binding
upon K.K. Shell, additional evidence would also still have to be presented to establish this defense, K.K. Shell cannot
therefore, as of yet, be barred from instituting an action in the Philippines.
Private respondents argued that the doctrine of forum non conveniens would be a valid ground to cause the
dismissal of K.K. Shell's complaint-in-intervention. K.K. Shell counters this argument by invoking its right as maritime
lienholder - Any person furnishing repairs, supplies, to wage, use of dry dock or marine railway, or other necessaries,
to any vessel, whether foreign or domestic, upon the order of the owner of such vessel, or of a person authorized
by the owner, shall have a maritime lien on the vessel, which may be enforced by suit in rem, and it shall be necessary
to allege or prove that credit was given to the vessel.

Private respondents on the other hand argue that even if P.D. No. 1521 is applicable, K.K. Shell cannot rely on the
maritime lien because the fuel was provided not exclusively for the benefit of the MV Estella, but for the benefit of
Crestamonte in general. Under the law it must be established that the credit was extended to the vessel itself. Now,
this is a defense that calls precisely for a factual determination by the trial court of who benefitted from the delivery
of the fuel. Hence, again, the necessity for the reception of evidence before the trial court.

In other words, considering the dearth of evidence due to the fact that the private respondents have yet to file their
answer in the proceedings below and trial on the merits is still to be conducted, whether or not petitioners are
indeed maritime lienholders and as such may enforce the lien against the MV Estella are matters that still have to
be established.

Neither are we ready to rule on the private respondents' invocation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, as the
exact nature of the relationship of the parties is still to be established. We leave this matter to the sound discretion
of the trial court judge who is in the best position, after some vital facts are established, to determine whether
special circumstances require that his court desist from assuming jurisdiction over the suit.

8. Communication Materials and Design et. al v. CA

FACTS: Petitioners COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC., (CMDI) and ASPAC MULTI-TRADE INC., (ASPAC)
are both domestic corporations.. Private Respondents ITEC, INC. and/or ITEC, INTERNATIONAL, INC. (ITEC) are
corporations duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Alabama, USA. There is no dispute that ITEC
is a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines. ITEC entered into a contract with ASPAC
referred to as “Representative Agreement”.

Pursuant to the contract, ITEC engaged ASPAC as its “exclusive representative” in the Philippines for the sale of ITEC’s
products, in consideration of which, ASPAC was paid a stipulated commission. Through a “License Agreement”
entered into by the same parties later on, ASPAC was able to incorporate and use the name “ITEC” in its own name.
Thus , ASPAC Multi-Trade, Inc. became legally and publicly known as ASPAC-ITEC (Philippines). One year into the
second term of the parties’ Representative Agreement, ITEC decided to terminate the same, because petitioner
ASPAC allegedly violated its contractual commitment as stipulated in their agreements. ITEC charges the petitioners
and another Philippine Corporation, DIGITAL BASE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (DIGITAL), the President of which is
likewise petitioner Aguirre, of using knowledge and information of ITEC’s products specifications to develop their
own line of equipment and product support, which are similar, if not identical to ITEC’s own, and offering them to
ITEC’s former customer. The complaint was filed with the RTC-Makati by ITEC, INC.

Defendants filed a MTD the complaint on the following grounds: (1) That plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue as it is
a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without the required BOI authority and SEC license, and (2)
that plaintiff is simply engaged in forum shopping which justifies the application against it of the principle of “forum
non conveniens”. The MTD was denied. Petitioners elevated the case to the respondent CA on a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised ROC. It was dismissed as well. MR denied, hence this Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE:
1. Did the Philippine court acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner corp, despite allegations of lack of
capacity to sue because of non-registration?
2. Can the Philippine court give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the principle of forum non convenience?

HELD: petition dismissed.

1. YES; We are persuaded to conclude that ITEC had been “engaged in” or “doing business” in the Philippines for
some time now. This is the inevitable result after a scrutiny of the different contracts and agreements entered into
by ITEC with its various business contacts in the country. Its arrangements, with these entities indicate convincingly
that ITEC is actively engaging in business in the country. A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may
sue in Philippine Courts although not authorized to do business here against a Philippine citizen or entity who had
contracted with and benefited by said corporation. To put it in another way, a party is estopped to challenge the
personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. And the doctrine
of estoppel to deny corporate existence applies to a foreign as well as to domestic corporations. One who has dealt
with a corporation of foreign origin as a corporate entity is estopped to deny its corporate existence and capacity.
In Antam Consolidated Inc. vs. CA et al. we expressed our chagrin over this commonly used scheme of defaulting
local companies which are being sued by unlicensed foreign companies not engaged in business in the Philippines
to invoke the lack of capacity to sue of such foreign companies. Obviously, the same ploy is resorted to by ASPAC to
prevent the injunctive action filed by ITEC to enjoin petitioner from using knowledge possibly acquired in violation
of fiduciary arrangements between the parties.

2. YES; Petitioner’s insistence on the dismissal of this action due to the application, or non application, of the private
international law rule of forum non conveniens defies well-settled rules of fair play. According to petitioner, the
Philippine Court has no venue to apply its discretion whether to give cognizance or not to the present action, because
it has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff in the case, the latter allegedly having no personality
to sue before Philippine Courts. This argument is misplaced because the court has already acquired jurisdiction over
the plaintiff in the suit, by virtue of his filing the original complaint. And as we have already observed, petitioner is
not at liberty to question plaintiff’s standing to sue, having already acceded to the same by virtue of its entry into
the Representative Agreement referred to earlier. Thus, having acquired jurisdiction, it is now for the Philippine
Court, based on the facts of the case, whether to give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the principle of forum
non convenience. Hence, the Philippine Court may refuse to assume jurisdiction in spite of its having acquired
jurisdiction. Conversely, the court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the
following requisites are met: 1) That the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; 2)
That the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, 3) That the
Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision. The aforesaid requirements having been met,
and in view of the court’s disposition to give due course to the questioned action, the matter of the present forum
not being the “most convenient” as a ground for the suit’s dismissal, deserves scant consideration.