Development Corp.
); for exhibiting manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to
SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as
Ombudsman, respondent.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
On June 13, 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223 constituting a
Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebration in 1998. The Committee was mandated
to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the
Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress. [1]
Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128, reconstituting the Committee
for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998. It renamed the Committee as the National
Centennial Commission. Appointed to chair the reconstituted Commission was Vice-President Salvador H.
Laurel. Presidents Diosdado M. Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were named Honorary Chairpersons. [2]
Characterized as an ad-hoc body, the existence of the Commission shall terminate upon the completion
of all activities related to the Centennial Celebrations. [3] Like its predecessor Committee, the Commission was
tasked to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial
of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.
Per Section 6 of the Executive Order, the Commission was also charged with the responsibility to
prepare, for approval of the President, a Comprehensive Plan for the Centennial Celebrations within six (6)
months from the effectivity of the Executive Order.
E.O. No. 128 also contained provisions for staff support and funding:
Sec. 3. The Commission shall be provided with technical and administrative staff support by a Secretariat to
be composed of, among others, detailed personnel from the Presidential Management Staff, the National
Commission for Culture and the Arts, and the National Historical Institute. Said Secretariat shall be headed
by a full time Executive Director who shall be designated by the President.
Sec. 4. The Commission shall be funded with an initial budget to be drawn from the Department of Tourism
and the presidents Contingent Fund, in an amount to be recommended by the Commission, and approved
by the President. Appropriations for succeeding years shall be incorporated in the budget of the Office of
the President.
Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo 98 Corporation (Expocorp) was
created.[4] Petitioner was among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators, who were also its first nine (9)
directors. Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer.
On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege speech in the Senate
denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project at the
Clark Special Economic Zone. Upon motion of Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Cosetengs privilege speech
was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (The Blue Ribbon
Committee) and several other Senate Committees for investigation.
On February 24, 1999, President Joseph Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 35, creating an ad
hoc and independent citizens committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
Philippine centennial projects, including its component activities. Former Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag was
appointed to chair the Committee.
On March 23, 1999, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the Secretary of the Senate its
Committee Final Report No. 30 dated February 26, 1999. Among the Committees recommendations was the
prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating
the rules on public bidding, relative to the award of centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction &
1
construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a valid contract that has caused material injury to
government and for participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of the funds infused by the
government for the implementation of the said contracts all in violation of the anti-graft law.[5]
Later, on November 5, 1999, the Saguisag Committee issued its own report. It recommended the
further investigation by the Ombudsman, and indictment, in proper cases of, among others, NCC Chair
Salvador H. Laurel for violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, Section 4(a) in relation to Section 11 of R.A.
No. 6713, and Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Reports of the Senate Blue Ribbon and the Saguisag Committee were apparently referred to the
Fact-finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman. On January 27, 2000, the Bureau issued
its Evaluation Report, recommending:
1. that a formal complaint be filed and preliminary investigation be conducted before the
Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), Office of the Ombudsman
against former NCC and EXPOCORP chair Salvador H. Laurel, former EXPOCORP
President Teodoro Q. Pea and AK President Edgardo H. Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e)
and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended in relation to PD 1594 and COA Rules and
Regulations;
2. That the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of this Office, act as the nominal complainant. [6]
In an Order dated April 10, 2000, Pelagio S. Apostol, OIC-Director of the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau, directed petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit and those of his witnesses.
On April 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion to Dismiss questioning
the jurisdiction of said office.
In an Order dated June 13, 2000, the Ombudsman denied petitioners motion to dismiss.
On July 3, 2000, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the June 13, 2000 Order but the motion was
denied in an Order dated October 5, 2000.
On October 25, 2000, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari.
On November 14, 2000, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau issued a resolution
finding probable cause to indict respondents SALVADOR H. LAUREL and TEODORO Q. PEA before the
Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to Republic Act No.
1594. The resolution also directed that an information for violation of the said law be filed against Laurel and
Pea. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the resolution with respect to Laurel but dismissed the
charge against Pea.
In a Resolution dated September 24, 2001, the Court issued a temporary restraining order,
commanding respondents to desist from filing any information before the Sandiganbayan or any court
against petitioner for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
On November 14, 2001, the Court, upon motion of petitioner, heard the parties in oral argument.
Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer
because:
A.
EXPOCORP, THE CORPORATION CHAIRED BY PETITIONER LAUREL WHICH UNDERTOOK
THE FREEDOM RING PROJECT IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH VIOLATIONS OF THE ANTI-
GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES WERE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED, WAS A PRIVATE
CORPORATION, NOT A GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION.
B.
 THE NATIONAL CENTENNIAL COMMISSION (NCC) WAS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICE.
C.
PETITIONER, BOTH AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NCC AND OF EXPOCORP WAS NOT A PUBLIC
OFFICER AS DEFINED UNDER THE ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.[7]
In addition, petitioner in his reply[8] invokes this Courts decision in Uy vs. Sandiganbayan,[9] where it
was held that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman was limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, i.e.,
over public officers of Grade 27 and higher. As petitioners position was purportedly not classified as Grade
27 or higher, the Sandiganbayan and, consequently, the Ombudsman, would have no jurisdiction over him.
This last contention is easily dismissed. In the Courts decision in Uy, we held that it is the prosecutor,
not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the
regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.
In its Resolution of February 22, 2000, the Court expounded:
The clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize the authority of the State and regular provincial
and city prosecutors under the Department of Justice to have control over prosecution of cases falling
within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The investigation and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman
relate to cases rightfully falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of R.A.
6770 (An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman,
and for other purposes) which vests upon the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan And this is further buttressed by Section 11 (4a) of R.A. 6770 which emphasizes that the
Office of the Special Prosecutor shall have the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Thus, repeated references to the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction clearly serve to limit the Ombudsmans and Special Prosecutors authority to
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. [Emphasis in the original.]
The foregoing ruling in Uy, however, was short-lived. Upon motion for clarification by the
Ombudsman in the same case, the Court set aside the foregoing pronouncement in its Resolution dated March
20, 2001. The Court explained the rationale for this reversal:
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It
pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause any illegal act
or omission of any public official is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or
employee.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1)
giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4)
granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the
investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman to take over, at
any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases. The grant of
this authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers
and employees by other courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and
prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the
2
powers granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their
tenure of office.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited
authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is
merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control
and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is
limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not
intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The
Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government
and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence
warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate
any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor
to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him
work under his supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special Prosecutor to
prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11 (4c) of RA 6770.
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the most important
functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman
with such power to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in
public office. A review of the development of our Ombudsman law reveals this intent. [Emphasis in the
original.]
Having disposed of this contention, we proceed to the principal grounds upon which petitioner
relies. We first address the argument that petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, was not a public officer.
The Constitution[10] describes the Ombudsman and his Deputies as protectors of the people, who shall
act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the
government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Among the awesome powers, functions, and duties vested by the
Constitution[11] upon the Office of the Ombudsman is to [i]nvestigate any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.
The foregoing constitutional provisions are substantially reproduced in R.A. No. 6770, otherwise
known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Sections 13 and 15(1) of said law respectively provide:
SEC. 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people shall act promptly on
complaints file in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in
order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases;
x x x.
The coverage of the law appears to be limited only by Section 16, in relation to Section 13, supra:
SEC 16. Applicability. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and
non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof,
during his tenure of office.
In sum, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance
by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.[12]
Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however, defines who public officers are. A
definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence [13] is that provided by Mechem, a recognized authority on
the subject:
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public. The individual so invested is a public officer. [14]
The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign
functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties,
and the designation of the position as an office. [15]
Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not present in the position of NCC Chair,
namely: (1) the delegation of sovereign functions; (2) salary, since he purportedly did not receive any
compensation; and (3) continuance, the tenure of the NCC being temporary.
Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government
as [t]he most important characteristic in determining whether a position is a public office or not.
The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that the
creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign
functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; that some portion of the
sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be
exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public
officer.[16]
Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign functions of government? Certainly, the
law did not delegate upon the NCC functions that can be described as legislative or judicial. May the
functions of the NCC then be described as executive?
We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance.[17] The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the
policies as set forth by law.
The Constitution provides in Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and
Sports) thereof:
Sec. 15. Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of the State. The State shall conserve, promote, and
popularize the nations historical and cultural heritage and resources, as well as artistic creations.
In its preamble, A.O. No. 223 states the purposes for the creation of the Committee for the National
Centennial Celebrations in 1998:
Whereas, the birth of the Republic of the Philippines is to be celebrated in 1998, and the centennial presents
an important vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino identity;
3
Whereas, the centennial can effectively showcase Filipino heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino values;
Whereas, the success of the Centennial Celebrations may be insured only through long-range planning and
continuous developmental programming;
Whereas, the active participation of the private sector in all areas of special expertise and capability,
particularly in communication and information dissemination, is necessary for long-range planning and
continuous developmental programming;
Whereas, there is a need to create a body which shall initiate and undertake the primary task of harnessing
the multisectoral components from the business, cultural, and business sectors to serve as effective
instruments from the launching and overseeing of this long-term project;
x x x.
E.O. No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998, cited the
need to strengthen the said Committee to ensure a more coordinated and synchronized celebrations of the
Philippine Centennial and wider participation from the government and non-government or private
organizations. It also referred to the need to rationalize the relevance of historical links with other countries.
The NCC was precisely created to execute the foregoing policies and objectives, to carry them into
effect. Thus, the Commission was vested with the following functions:
(a) To undertake the overall study, conceptualization, formulation and implementation of
programs and projects on the utilization of culture, arts, literature and media as vehicles
for history, economic endeavors, and reinvigorating the spirit of national unity and sense
of accomplishment in every Filipino in the context of the Centennial Celebrations. In this
regard, it shall include a Philippine National Exposition 98 within Metro Manila, the
original eight provinces, and Clark Air Base as its major venues;
(b) To act as principal coordinator for all the activities related to awareness and celebration of
the Centennial;
(c) To serve as the clearing house for the preparation and dissemination of all information about
the plans and events for the Centennial Celebrations;
(d) To constitute working groups which shall undertake the implementation of the programs
and projects;
(e) To prioritize the refurbishment of historical sites and structures nationwide. In this regard,
the Commission shall formulate schemes (e.g. lease-maintained-and-transfer, build-
operate-transfer, and similar arrangements) to ensure the preservation and maintenance
of the historical sites and structures;
(f) To call upon any government agency or instrumentality and corporation, and to invite
private individuals and organizations to assist it in the performance of its tasks; and,
(g) Submit regular reports to the President on the plans, programs, projects, activities as well
as the status of the preparations for the Celebration. [18]
It bears noting the President, upon whom the executive power is vested, [19] created the NCC
by executive order. Book III (Office of the President), Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Section 2 describes the
nature of executive orders:
SEC. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character
in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive
orders. [Underscoring ours.]
 Furthermore, the NCC was not without a role in the countrys economic development, especially in
Central Luzon. Petitioner himself admitted as much in the oral arguments before this Court:
MR. JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO:
And in addition to that expounded by Former President Ramos, dont you agree that the task
of the centennial commission was also to focus on the long term over all socio economic
development of the zone and Central Luzon by attracting investors in the area because
of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo.
FORMER VICE PRESIDENT SALVADOR H. LAUREL:
I am glad Your Honor touched on that because that is something I wanted to touch on by lack
of material time I could not but that is a very important point. When I was made
Chairman I wanted the Expo to be in Batangas because I am a Batangeo but President
Ramos said Mr. Vice President the Central Luzon is suffering, suffering because of the
eruption of Mt. Pinatubo let us try to catalize [sic] economic recovery in that area by
putting this Expo in Clark Field and so it was done I agreed and Your Honor if I may
also mention we wanted to generate employment aside from attracting business
investments and employment. And the Estrada administration decided to junk this
project there 48, 40 thousand people who lost job, they were employed in Expo. And our
target was to provide 75 thousand jobs. It would have really calibrated, accelerated the
development of Central Luzon. Now, I think they are going back to that because they
had the airport and there are plan to revive the Expo site into key park which was the
original plan.
There can hardly be any dispute that the promotion of industrialization and full employment is a
fundamental state policy.[20]
Petitioner invokes the ruling of this Court in Torio vs. Fontanilla[21] that the holding by a municipality
of a town fiesta is a proprietary rather than a governmental function. Petitioner argues that the holding of a
nationwide celebration which marked the nations 100th birthday may be likened to a national fiesta which
involved only the exercise of the national governments proprietary function. [22] In Torio, we held:
[Section 2282 of the Chapter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code] simply gives authority
to the municipality to [celebrate] a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe
one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in
essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public performed
in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed, was not to secure profit
or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance,
the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the town, nonetheless it is [a] private undertaking as
distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public service.
As stated earlier, there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an
undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be
considered and will be decisive. The basic element, however beneficial to the public the undertaking may
be, is that it is government in essence, otherwise, the function becomes private or propriety in
character. Easily, no governmental or public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of a town fiesta.
Torio, however, did not intend to lay down an all-encompassing doctrine. Note that the Court
cautioned that there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an
undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be
considered and will be decisive. Thus, in footnote 15 of Torio, the Court, citing an American case, illustrated
how the surrounding circumstances plus the political, social, and cultural backgrounds could produce a
conclusion different from that in Torio:
We came across an interesting case which shows that surrounding circumstances plus the political, social,
and cultural backgrounds may have a decisive bearing on this question. The case of Pope v. City of New
4
Haven, et al. was an action to recover damages for personal injuries caused during a Fourth of July fireworks
display resulting in the death of a bystander alleged to have been caused by defendants negligence. The
defendants demurred to the complaint invoking the defense that the city was engaged in the performance
of a public governmental duty from which it received no pecuniary benefit and for negligence in the
performance of which no statutory liability is imposed. This demurrer was sustained by the Superior Court
of New Haven Country. Plaintiff sought to amend his complaint to allege that the celebration was for the
corporate advantage of the city. This was denied. In affirming the order, the Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut held inter alia:
Municipal corporations are exempt from liability for the negligent performance of purely public
governmental duties, unless made liable by statute.
A municipality corporation, which under permissive authority of its charter or of statute, conducted a
public Fourth of July celebration, including a display of fireworks, and sent up a bomb intended to explode
in the air, but which failed to explode until it reached the ground, and then killed a spectator, was engaged
in the performance of a governmental duty. (99 A.R. 51)
This decision was concurred in by three Judges while two dissented.
At any rate the rationale of the Majority Opinion is evident from [this] excerpt:
July 4th, when that date falls upon Sunday, July 5th, is made a public holiday, called Independence Day, by
our statutes. All or nearly all of the other states have similar statutes. While there is no United States statute
making a similar provision, the different departments of the government recognize, and have recognized
since the government was established, July 4th as a national holiday. Throughout the country it has been
recognized and celebrated as such. These celebrations, calculated to entertain and instruct the people
generally and to arouse and stimulate patriotic sentiments and love of country, frequently take the form of
literary exercises consisting of patriotic speeches and the reading of the Constitution, accompanied by a
musical program including patriotic air sometimes preceded by the firing of cannon and followed by
fireworks. That such celebrations are of advantage to the general public and their promotion a proper
subject of legislation can hardly be questioned. x x x
Surely, a town fiesta cannot compare to the National Centennial Celebrations. The Centennial
Celebrations was meant to commemorate the birth of our nation after centuries of struggle against our former
colonial master, to memorialize the liberation of our people from oppression by a foreign power. 1998 marked
100 years of independence and sovereignty as one united nation. The Celebrations was an occasion to reflect
upon our history and reinvigorate our patriotism. As A.O. 223 put it, it was a vehicle for fostering nationhood
and a strong sense of Filipino identity, an opportunity to showcase Filipino heritage and thereby strengthen
Filipino values. The significance of the Celebrations could not have been lost on petitioner, who remarked
during the hearing:
Oh, yes, certainly the State is interested in the unity of the people, we wanted to rekindle the love for
freedom, love for country, that is the over-all goal that has to make everybody feel proud that he is a
Filipino, proud of our history, proud of what our forefather did in their time. x x x.
Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner, as its
Chair, is a public officer.
That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of little consequence. A
salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not
conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed,
the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public
good.[23] Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed
to a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached. [24] But it
is a public office, nonetheless.
 Neither is the fact that the NCC was characterized by E.O. No. 128 as an ad-hoc body make said
commission less of a public office.
The term office, it is said, embraces the idea of tenure and duration, and certainly a position which is merely
temporary and local cannot ordinarily be considered an office. But, says Chief Justice Marshall, if a duty be
a continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the government and not by contract, which an
individual is appointed by government to perform, who enters on the duties pertaining to his station
without any contract defining them, if those duties continue though the person be changed, -- it seems very
difficult to distinguish such a charge or employment from an office of the person who performs the duties
from an officer.
At the same time, however, this element of continuance can not be considered as indispensable, for, if
the other elements are present it can make no difference, says Pearson, C.J., whether there be but one act
or a series of acts to be done, -- whether the office expires as soon as the one act is done, or is to be held
for years or during good behavior.[25]
Our conclusion that petitioner is a public officer finds support in In Re Corliss.[26] There the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island ruled that the office of Commissioner of the United States Centennial Commission is
an office of trust as to disqualify its holder as elector of the United States President and Vice-President. (Under
Article II of the United States Constitution, a person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States
is disqualified from being appointed an elector.)
x x x. We think a Commissioner of the United States Centennial Commission holds an office of trust under
the United States, and that he is therefore disqualified for the office of elector of President and Vice-
President of the United States.
The commission was created under a statute of the United States approved March 3, 1871. That statute
provides for the holding of an exhibition of American and foreign arts, products, and manufactures, under
the auspices of the government of the United States, and for the constitution of a commission, to consist of
more than one delegate from each State and from each Territory of the United States, whose functions shall
continue until close of the exhibition, and whose duty it shall be to prepare and superintend the execution
of the plan for holding the exhibition. Under the statute the commissioners are appointed by the President
of the United States, on the nomination of the governor of the States and Territories respectively. Various
duties were imposed upon the commission, and under the statute provision was to be made for it to have
exclusive control of the exhibit before the President should announce, by proclamation, the date and place
of opening and holding the exhibition. By an act of Congress approved June 1st, 1872, the duties and
functions of the commission were further increased and defined. That act created a corporation, called The
Centennial Board of Finance, to cooperate with the commission and to raise and disburse the funds. It was
to be organized under the direction of the commission. The seventh section of the act provides that the
grounds for exhibition shall be prepared and the buildings erected by the corporation, in accordance with
plans which shall have been adopted by the United States Centennial Commission; and the rules and
regulations of said corporation, governing rates for entrance and admission fees, or otherwise affecting the
rights, privileges, or interests of the exhibitors, or of the public, shall be fixed and established by the United
States Centennial Commission; and no grant conferring rights or privileges of any description connected
with said grounds or buildings, or relating to said exhibition or celebration, shall be made without the
consent of the United States Centennial Commission, and said commission shall have power to control,
change, or revoke all such grants, and shall appoint all judges and examiners and award all premiums. The
tenth section of the act provides that it shall be the duty of the United States Centennial Commission to
supervise the closing up of the affairs of said corporation, to audit its accounts, and submit in a report to the
President of the United States the financial results of the centennial exhibition.
It is apparent from this statement, which is but partial, that the duties and functions of the commission were
various, delicate, and important; that they could be successfully performed only by men of large experience
and knowledge of affairs; and that they were not merely subordinate and provisional, but in the highest
degree authoritative, discretionary, and final in their character. We think that persons performing such
duties and exercising such functions, in pursuance of statutory direction and authority, are not to be
5
regarded as mere employees, agents, or committee men, but that they are, properly speaking, officers, and
that the places which they hold are offices. It appears, moreover, that they were originally regarded as
officers by Congress; for the act under which they were appointed declares, section 7, that no compensation
for services shall be paid to the commissioners or other officers, provided for in this act, from the treasury of
the United States. The only other officers provided for were the alternates appointed to serve as
commissioners when the commissioners were unable to attend.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the NCC performs executive functions and is, therefore, a public
office, we need no longer delve at length on the issue of whether Expocorp is a private or a public
corporation. Even assuming that Expocorp is a private corporation, petitioners position as Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) of Expocorp arose from his Chairmanship of the NCC. Consequently, his acts or omissions as
CEO of Expocorp must be viewed in the light of his powers and functions as NCC Chair. [27]
Finally, it is contended that since petitioner supposedly did not receive any compensation for his
services as NCC or Expocorp Chair, he is not a public officer as defined in Republic Act No. 3019 (The Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and is, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
Respondent seeks to charge petitioner with violation of Section 3 (e) of said law, which reads:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
A public officer, under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2 of said law as follows:
SEC. 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, the term
xxx
(b) Public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from
the government as defined in the preceding paragraph. [Emphasis supplied.]
It is clear from Section 2 (b), above, that the definition of a public officer is expressly limited to the
application of R.A. No. 3019. Said definition does not apply for purposes of determining the Ombudsmans
jurisdiction, as defined by the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
Moreover, the question of whether petitioner is a public officer under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act involves the appreciation of evidence and interpretation of law, matters that are best resolved
at trial.
To illustrate, the use of the term includes in Section 2 (b) indicates that the definition is not
restrictive.[28] The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is just one of several laws that define public officers.
Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, provides that a public officer is:
x x x any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority,
takes part in the performance of public functions in the Government of Philippines, or performs in said
Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any
rank or class.
Section 2 (14) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987, [29] on the other hand, states:
Officer as distinguished from clerk or employee, refers to a person whose duties not being of a clerical or
manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of the
government. When used with reference to a person having authority to do a particular act or perform a
particular person in the exercise of governmental power, officer includes any government employee, agent
or body having authority to do the act or exercise that function.
It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees), one may be considered a public official whether or not one receives
compensation, thus:
Public Officials include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether
in the career or non-career service including military and police personnel, whether or not they receive
compensation, regardless of amount.
Which of these definitions should apply, if at all?
Laurel v. Desierto
GR No. 145368, April 12, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner Vice-President Salvador Laurel was appointed as the head of the National Centennial
Commission, a body constituted for the preparation of the National Centennial celebration in 1998. He was
subsequently appointed as the Chairman of ExpoCorp., and was one of the nine (9) incorporators. A
controversy erupted on the alleged anomalies with the bidding contracts to some entities and the petitioner
was implicated. By virtue of an investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, the petitioner
was indicted for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). The petitioner filed
a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman, which was denied. He
further filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied, hence this petition for certiorari.
The petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and contended that he is not a public officer since
ExpoCorp is a private corporation.
Issue: W/N the petitioner is a public officer
Yes, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case of the petitioner since he is a public officer. The NCC is
an office performing executive functions since one of its mandate is to implement national policies.
Moreover, the said office was established by virtue of an executive order. It is clear that the NCC performs
sovereign functions, hence it is a public office. Since petitioner is chair of the NCC, he is therefore a public
officer. The fact that the NCC was characterized by EO 128 as an 'ad-hoc body' make it less of a public
office. Finally, the fact that the petitioner did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of no
consequence since such is merely an incidence and forms no part of the office.

Assuming that the definition of public officer in R.A. No. 3019 is exclusive, the term compensation,
which is not defined by said law, has many meanings.

Under particular circumstances, compensation has been held to include allowance for personal expenses,
commissions, expenses, fees, an honorarium, mileage or traveling expenses, payments for services,
restitution or a balancing of accounts, salary, and wages. [30]

How then is compensation, as the term is used in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 3019, to be interpreted?

Did petitioner receive any compensation at all as NCC Chair? Granting that petitioner did not receive
any salary, the records do not reveal if he received any allowance, fee, honorarium, or some other form of
compensation. Notably, under the by-laws of Expocorp, the CEO is entitled to per diems and
compensation.[31] Would such fact bear any significance?

Obviously, this proceeding is not the proper forum to settle these issues lest we preempt the trial court
from resolving them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction issued in the Courts Resolution
dated September 24, 2001 is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.