Civil Procedure Case Digests (Motion to Dismiss), Arbues, 2018-2019
CALIMLIM v HON. RAMIREZ G.R. No. L-34362 November 19, 1982
Facts:
The dismissal of Civil Case No. SCC-180 filed by the herein petitioners in the
respondent Court against the private respondent is sought to be annulled and set aside by
this Petition For Review On Certiorari. Petition granted.
Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the respondent Court to
compel Manuel Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 9138 in order that
the same may be cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the said corporation.
Not being the registered owner and the title not being in his possession, Manuel Magali
failed to comply with the order of the Court directing him to surrender the said title. This
prompted Independent Mercantile Corporation to file an ex-parte petition to declare
TCT No. 9138 as cancelled and to issue a new title in its name. The said petition was
granted by the respondent Court and the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued a new
title in the name of the corporation, TCT No. 68568. Petitioner, upon learning that her
husband's title over the parcel of land had been cancelled, filed a petition with the
respondent Court, sitting as a cadastral court, praying for the cancellation of TCT No.
68568 but the court dismissed the petition.
Petitioner thereafter filed in the LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of
TCT No. 68568 but the same was dismissed therein. Petitioners then resorted to the
filing of a complaint in for the cancellation of the conveyances and sales that had been
made with respect to the property, covered by TCT No. 9138, against Francisco Ramos
who claimed to have bought the property from Independent Mercantile Corporation.
Private respondent Francisco Ramos, however, failed to obtain a title over the property
in his name in view of the existence of an adverse claim annotated on the title thereof at
the instance of the herein petitioners. Francisco Ramos filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the same is barred by prior judgement or by statute of limitations. Resolving
the said Motion, the respondent Court dismissed the case on the ground of estoppel by
prior judgment
Issue:
Whether or not the case was validly dismissed due to estoppel.
Held: No.
It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the herein petitioner
in LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 as a bar by prior
judgment against the filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180. In order to avail of the defense
of res judicata, it must be shown, among others, that the judgment in the prior action
must have been rendered by a court with the proper jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was rendered. If there is lack of
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the judgment or order
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cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy. This essential element of the
defense of bar by prior judgment or res judicata does not exist in the case presently
considered.
The petition filed by the herein petitioners in LRC Record No. 39492 was an
apparent invocation of the authority of the respondent Court sitting as a land registration
court, Although the said petition did not so state, that reliance was apparently placed on
Section 112 of the Land Registration Act. It has been settled by consistent rulings of this
Court that a court of first instance, acting as a land registration court, is a court of
limited and special jurisdiction. As such, its proceedings are not adequate for the
litigation of issues pertaining to an ordinary civil action, such as, questions involving
ownership or title to real property.
It may hardly be questioned that the issues raised by the petitioners in their
petition to cancel TCT No. 68568 refer to the ownership or title over the property
covered thereby which, is a highly controversial matter which is beyond the judicial
competence of a cadastral court to pass upon or to adjudicate.
It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding
which was taken cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same
irrespective of the attendant circumstances. The equitable defense of estoppel requires
knowledge or consciousness of the facts upon which it is based. The same thing is true
with estoppel by conduct which may be asserted only when it is shown, among others,
that the representation must have been made with knowledge of the facts and that the
party to whom it was made is ignorant of the truth of the matter.
The point simply is that when a party commits error in filing his suit or
proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act may
not at once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been the result of an
honest mistake, or of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions. If any fault
is to be imputed to a party taking such course of action, part of the blame should be
placed on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into
believing that they pursued their remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules, it is the
duty of the court to dismiss an action "whenever it appears that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter." (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court.) Should the court
render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached or annulled
for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10) years from the finality
of the same. (Art. 1144, par. 3, Civil Code.).
 Civil Procedure Case Digests (Motion to Dismiss), Arbues, 2018-2019
G.R. No. 83588. September 29, 1997
Spouses ADORACION C. PANGILINAN v CA
Facts:
This petition for review seeks to set aside the January 14, 1988 decision and
May 31, 1988 resolution of the CA, which reversed the December 12, 1985 decision of
the RTC Pampanga. Petition denied.
A contract to sell was entered into by petitioner spouses, and the private
respondents Jose R. Canlas on May 18, 1968. The sum of P 1, 731 representing 10% of
the total price of the lot was paid by the petitioner to the private respondents and
thereafter monthly installments which amounted to about 85% of the total price were
effected as of January, 1974; the last payment thereof was made on May 14, 1975.
Paragraph 5 of the contract provides for automatic extrajudicial rescission of the contract
upon default in 3 installments. On 1983, sps. Pangilinan demanded the transfer of title
into their name with an offer to pay in full the remaining amount. The same was not
granted because the land has been mortgaged in the Rural Bank.
Thus, sps Pangilinan filed a complaint for specific performance in the RTC of
Pampanga which was granted on December 12, 1985. Private respondents appealed the
abovementioned decision of the CA which on January 14, 1988, promulgated its
judgment which reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court due to laches.
Issue:
WON petitioner sps are guilty of laches.
Held: Yes.
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it.
It must be noted that upon a careful examination of the records of this case, it
appears that the contention of the petitioners that their failure to pay the balance of 15%
of the total contract price of the lot was due to the inability of the private respondent to
improve the subdivision and install facilities which was raised only for the first time on
appeal. They did not raised this issue before the lower courts. It is settled that an issue
which was neither averred in the complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Issues of fact and arguments not
adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be and ordinarily will not
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be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Assuming arguendo that it was raised before the trial court, the same would be without
merit because the failure of the private respondents to install facilities would not deter
them from asking for the rescission of the agreement if petitioners failed to comply with
their obligation to pay the monthly installments when they become due, otherwise, the
right of rescission would be rendered inutile. In the same vein, petitioners by virtue of
their contract with private respondents should have complied in good faith with its terms
and conditions being the law between them. From the moment the contract is perfected,
the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated
but also to all consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with
good faith, usage and law. The Contract to Buy and to Sell, specifically paragraph 5
thereof, not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy,
is valid and binding between the parties thereto.
The peculiar fact that militates against the cause of the appellees is that the
appellees spouses Pangilinan did not directly and personally prosecute the present
proceedings. As shown from the records, Mr. Mallari had equipped himself with the
special power of attorney in his favor by the appellees executed only on May 15, 1983
or about 8 years from the date of last payment, made on May 14, 1975 for the January,
1974 installment, during which time, the actual buyers, the Pangilinans had not by
themselves personally shown interest in compelling the appellants to accept the
remaining balance of the purchase price of the said subdivision lot, to execute in their
favor the Deed of Absolute Sale and deliver to them the Transfer Certificate of Title
over the said property. The aforesaid circumstances constitute laches. There was failure
or neglect on the part of the Pangilinan spouses for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence or could have been done
earlier, such failure or negligence warrants presumption that they had abandoned or
declined to assert such right.
Explicitly, spouses Pangilinan instead of being vigilant and diligent in
asserting their rights over the subject property had failed to assert their rights when the
law requires them to act. Laches or stale demands is based upon grounds of public
policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and
unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or
asserted.
The legal adage finds application in the case at bar. Tempus enim modus
tollendi obligationes et actiones, quia tempus currit contra desides et sui juris
contemptores For time is a means of dissipating obligations and actions, because time
runs against the slothful and careless of their own rights.
 Civil Procedure Case Digests (Motion to Dismiss), Arbues, 2018-2019
MA. CONCEPCION L. REGALADO v ANTONIO S. GO
G.R. No. 167988 February 6, 2007
Facts:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, of the Resolution dated 30 August 2004 of the Court of Appeals, finding
petitioner Atty. Regalado guilty of indirect contempt. Likewise assailed in this petition
is the Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration. Petition granted.
The present controversy stemmed from the complaint of illegal dismissal filed
before the Labor Arbiter by herein respondent Antonio S. Go against Eurotech Hair
Systems Inc. (EHSI) and its president Lutz Kunack and General manager Jose E. Barin.
TheLabor Arbiter ruled that respondent Go ,as illegally dismissed from employment.
The NLRC rendered a decision reversing the Labor Arbiter’s decision and declaring that
respondent Go’s separation from employment was legal for it was attended by a just
cause and was validly effected by EHSI Kunack and Barin. Aggrieved, respondent Go
elevated the adverse decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
promulgated a decision setting aside the ruling of the NLRC and reinstating the decision
of the Labor Arbiter adjudging EHSI Kunack and Barin guilty of illegal dismissal.
EHSI Kunack and Barin were able to receive a copy of the decision through
registered mail on 17 July 2003 while respondent Go received his copy on 21 July 2003.
In 16 July 2003, after the promulgation of the CA decision but prior to the
receipt of the parties of their respective copies, the parties decided to settle the case and
signed a Release waiver and Quitclaim with the approval of the Labor Arbiter. In view
of the amicable settlement, the Labor Arbiter, on the same day issued an order
dismissing the illegal dismissal case with prejudice. After the receipt of a copy of the
CA decision, respondent Go, through counsel, filed a manifestation with omnibus
motion seeking to nullify the Release waiver and Quitclaim on the ground of fraud,
mistake or undue influence. Acting on the motions, the appellate court issued a
Resolution annulling the order of the Labor Arbiter dated 16 July 2003 for lack of
jurisdiction.
Issue:
WON Atty. Regalado is guilty of indirect contempt.
Held: No.
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court;
such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect
or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation. It is
defined as disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and
dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts orders, but
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such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law
into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to
the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments,
orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice.
Contempt proceedings has a dual function: (1) vindication of public interest by
punishment of contemptuous conduct; and (2) coercion to compel the contemnor to do
what the law requires him to uphold the power of the Court, and also to secure the rights
of the parties to a suit awarded by the Court. Contempt maybe direct or indirect.
Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court as to
obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, and includes disrespect toward the
court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or answer as a
witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so.
On the other hand, Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court enumerates
particular acts which constitute indirect contempt. Indirect contempt proceedings may be
initiated only in two ways: (1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) through a verified
petition and upon compliance with the requirements for initiatory pleadings. Procedural
requirements as outlined must be complied with.
The manner upon which the case at bar was commenced is clearly in
contravention with the categorical mandate of the Rules. Respondent Go filed a
Manifestation with Omnibus Motion, which was unverified and without any supporting
particulars and documents. Such procedural flaw notwithstanding, the appellate court
granted the motion and directed petitioner Atty. Regalado to show cause why she should
not be cited for contempt. Upon petitioner Atty. Regalados compliance with the
appellate courts directive, the tribunal proceeded in adjudging her guilty of indirect
contempt.
It bears to stress that the power to punish for contempt is not limitless. It must
be used sparingly with caution, restraint, judiciousness, deliberation, and due regard to
the provisions of the law and the constitutional rights of the individual. The limitations
in the exercise of the power to punish for indirect contempt are delineated by the
procedural guidelines specified under Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Strict
compliance with such procedural guidelines is mandatory considering that proceedings
against person alleged to be guilty of contempt are commonly treated as criminal in
nature.
 Civil Procedure Case Digests (Motion to Dismiss), Arbues, 2018-2019
SPOUSES MARIANO P.MARASIGAN v CHEVRON
G.R. No. 184015 February 8, 2012
Facts:
Challenged in this petition is the January 31, 2008 Decision of the CA which
reversed and set aside the January 4, 2005 Decision of the RTC-Gumaca, declaring the
subject foreclosure sale and the consequent certificate of sale null and void and ordering
the Spouses Marasigan to pay respondent Chevron. Petition denied.
Spouses Marasigan were operators of a gasoline station while chevron is a
corporation engaged in the business distributing manufacturing and marketing of fuels
and other petroleum products. They entered into a dealership and distributorship
agreement wherein the former can purchase petroleum products from the latter on credit.
To complete said agreement, Sps. Marasigan executed deeds of REM over their
properties as collateral in favor of Chevron. On September 1993, petitioners exceeded
the credit line. They also failed to pay despite demand.
Chevron, through its counsel ACCRA LAW, initiated a foreclosure
proceeding. Chevron was able to foreclose the REM of the Sps but the proceeds were
not enough to cover the entire obligation. On November 7, 1995, Chevron filed a
complaint for sum of money against the Sps Marasigan in RTC Makati to recover the
deficiency. In ther answer, sps alleged that they were prejudiced because the foreclosure
was illegal and that the bid price was shockingly low.
On February 7, 1996 Sps Marasigan filed a complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Foreclosure before RTC Gumaca. Chevron filed a motion to dismiss for the
sps failed to disclose in their cnfs the pending case filed before the RTC Makati and
consequent violation of litis pendentia. On August 21, 1996, RTC issued an order
denying the motion to dismiss ruling that there was no fs because there was no decision
yet in RTC Makati On January 4,2005, RTC Gumaca rendered a decision in favor of the
sps Marasigan. Chevron applead to the CA. CA in its decision, reversed and set aside
the RTC decision, hence this petition.
Issue:
Was there Litis Pendentia? Yes.
Was there Forum Shopping? Yes.
Held:
Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1)
identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both
actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on
the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two
cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
4
The essence of forum shopping is the filing by a party against whom an
adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, seeking another and possibly
favorable opinion in another suit other than by appeal or special civil action for
certiorari. It is the act of filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively for the purpose of obtaining a
favorable judgment. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are
present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration.
All the requisites of litis pendentia are present. The first element, identity of
parties, or at least representing the same interest in both actions, exists. The Court agrees
with the ruling of the CA that Chevron and Spouses Marasigan are the same parties in
the RTC-Makati Case and the RTC-Gumaca Case. The absence of ACCRAIN and
ACCRALAW as party plaintiffs in the RTC-Makati case and their additional presence
as party defendants in the RTC-Gumaca case would not unfavorably affect the
respondents because the rule does not require absolute identity of parties. A substantial
identity of parties is enough to qualify under the first requisite.
The second element, identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts, likewise subsists here. It cannot be denied that
the complaint filed in the RTC-Makati was for a Sum of Money while that filed in the
RTC-Gumaca was for Declaration of Nullity and/or Annulment of Foreclosure with
Damages. Although both cases differ in form or nature, the same facts would be alleged
and the same evidence would be presented considering that the resolution of both cases
would be based on the validity and enforceability of the same credit lines, real estate
mortgages and foreclosure proceedings. Indeed, the true test in determining the identity
of causes of action lies not in the form or nature of the actions but rather in the evidence
that would be presented.
Finally, the presence of the third element, that the identity of the two cases
should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other, cannot be disputed either.
Spouses Marasigan do not deny the fact that the affirmative defense that they
raised in the RTC-Makati case was the illegality of the foreclosure sale of the Mulanay
property. They raised the same issue in the RTC-Gumaca case. As correctly ruled by the
CA, the judgment in the RTC-Makati with regard to the validity of the foreclosure sale
of the Mulanay property will constitute res judicata in the case, and vice versa. The
Court also agrees with its ruling that the RTC-Makati case should be the priority case
because it was filed earlier and, therefore, the appropriate vehicle for litigating all issues
in this case.
 Civil Procedure Case Digests (Motion to Dismiss), Arbues, 2018-2019
ERMELINDA C. MANALOTO v ISMAEL VELOSO III
G.R. No. 171365 October 6, 2010
Facts:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision dated January
31, 2006 of the CA affirmed with modification the Resolution dated September 2, 2003
of RTC Quezon City. Petition denied.
Petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against respondent for failure to pay
rentals on the leased property owned by petitioners. MeTC decided in favor of the
petitioners. While the respondent’s appeal of the MeTC’s decision is pending before the
RTC, respondent filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages with the RTC
(another branch) in the complaint for damages, respondent alleged that he supposedly
suffered embarrassment and humiliation when petitioners distributed copies of the above
mentioned MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case to the homeowners of
Horseshoe Village while respondent’s appeal was still pending.
Issue:
Whether respondent timely filed his appeal of the Resolution dated September
2, 2003 of the RTC Quezon City before the Court of Appeals. Yes.
Whether the case validly stated a cause of action. Yes
Held:
Jurisprudence has settled the fresh period rule, according to which, an ordinary
appeal from the RTC to the CA, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, shall
be taken within 15 days either from receipt of the original judgment of the trial court or
from receipt of the final order of the trial court dismissing or denying the motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration.
In the case before us, respondent received a copy of the Resolution dated
September 2, 2003 of the RTC-Branch 227 dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-02-48341 on September 26, 2003. Fourteen days thereafter, on October 10, 2003,
respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution. The RTC-Branch 227
denied respondents Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated December 30, 2003,
which the respondent received on February 20, 2004. On March 1, 2004, just after nine
days from receipt of the order denying his Motion for Reconsideration, respondent
already filed his Notice of Appeal. Clearly, under the fresh period rule, respondent was
able to file his appeal well-within the prescriptive period of 15 days, and the Court of
Appeals did not err in giving due course to said appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 82610.
When the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action,
such fact can be determined only from the facts alleged in the complaint and from no
other, and the court cannot consider other matters aliunde. The test, therefore, is
5
whether, assuming the allegations of fact in the complaint to be true, a valid judgment
could be rendered in accordance with the prayer stated therein.
A cause of action (for damages) exists if the following elements are present:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises
or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of
the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. We find
that all three elements exist in the case at bar. Respondent may not have specifically
identified each element, but it may be sufficiently determined from the allegations in his
complaint.
DOLORES ADORA MACASLANG v RENATO AND MELBA ZAMORA
G.R. No. 156375 May 30, 2011
Facts:
1. Mar 10, 1999: Zamora’s FILED: Unlawful detainer with MTCC, alleging among
others:
a. Macaslang sold to them a residential lot in Sabang, Davao City. 400sqm. Including a
residential house, where Macaslang was then living.
b. After the sale, Macaslang requested to be allowed to live in the house. Zamora
granted the request on the reliance of Macaslang’s promise to vacate as soon as she
would be able to find a new residence
c. After 1 year, Zamora’s demanded upon the defendant to vacate but she failed and
refused. The demand letter (Sept 1998) reads: “This is to give notice that since the
mortgage to your property has long been expired and that since the property is already in
my name, I will be taking over the occupancy of said property two(2) months from the
date of this letter.”
d. Zamora’s sought the help of the Lupon, but no settlement was reached as shown by
certification to file.
2.Despite the due service of summons, Macaslang did not file an answer. Hence MTCC
declared her in default.
 Civil Procedure Case Digests (Motion to Dismiss), Arbues, 2018-2019
3 .MTC: In favor of Zamora’s, ordered Macaslang to vacate, pay atty’s fees, and rental
until they shall have vacatedthe properties in question.
4 .Macaslang appealed to the RTC alleging: a. Extrinsic Fraud b.Meritorious defense:
there was no actual sake considering that the deed of absolute sale relied upon is a patent
nullity as her signature therein was procured through fraud and trickery.
5. RTC: Ruled in favor of Macaslang and DISMISSED Zamora’s complaint, for failure
to state a COA. The same maybe refilled in the same court by alleging COA, if any.
Zamora’s M for Execution of MTCC decision rendered moot by this judgment.
6.CA: REVERSED RTC decision for having no basis in fact and law. MTCC decision
reinstated
Issues:
w/n RTC in its appellate jurisdiction is limited to assigned errors
w/n in an action for unlawful detainer, where there was no prior demand to vacate and
comply with the conditions of the lease, a valid Cause of action (COA) exists.
w/n there was a violation of the Rules on Summary procedure.
Held:
1.RTC in its appellate jurisdiction may rule upon an issue not raised on appeal.
a.CA said that RTC cannot rule on issue not assigned as an error. This may have been
correct if the appeal to the CA was a first appeal from RTC to CA (R41). There is an
express limitation of the review to only specified in the assignment of errors.
b. But HERE this is a, MTC to RTC appeal governed by a specific rule for unlawful
detainer cases. R70 §18provides that MTC judgment may be appealed to the RTC which
shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record.
c. This difference in procedure is traceable from BP129 §22, then in the 1991 Rules on
summary procedure§21, then 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure R40 §7. (Please see code)
d.Even if the rules did not differentiate in the procedure, the review on the entire case is
still allowed as an exception (c) and (d).
General Rule: Appellate court may only review errors assigned and properly argued:
Exceptions:
(a) When the question affects jurisdiction
(b) Matters that evidently plain or clerical errors
(c) Matters whose consideration is necessary for a just and complete resolution]
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(d) Matters of record having bearing on the issue that parties failed to raise
(e) Matters closely related to an error assigned
(f) Matters upon which the determination of a question is dependent.
2.CA Correctly delved into w/n there was a COA.
a.RTC: there is no COA because there was no demand to vacate.
b.CA: No, the complaint readily reveals that there was a demand to vacate.
c. A complaint for Unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges the withholding of
possession or the refusal is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of
the law. Demand was not only made but also alleged in the complaint.
d. A complaint has sufficient COA for unlawful det. If it states the FF
:i. Initial possession by defendant was by contract or tolerance.
ii. Eventually possession became illegal upon notice re:termination
iii. Defendant still remained in possession and deprived plaintiff of its
enjoyment
iv .Complaint was instituted within one year from last demand to vacate.
e. TEST for sufficiency of complaint: is w/n the court can render a valid judgment based
on facts alleged in complaint.
f. SC: Complaint sufficiently stated a COA. Complaint complied with 1-4. BUT Fail to
state and Lack of COA are different. RTC said there is failure to state COA when in fact
its basis was that there was no demand to vacate. Again RTC erred in this regard.
3.Ejectment was not proper due to defense of ownership.
a. Zamora’s COA is based on right to posses resulting from ownership.
b. BUT exhibits show that the real transaction is one of equitable mortgage not sale.
NCC1602 instances where a contract may be presumed to be an equitable mortgage.
i. Land was sold for P100K, when the demand letter was for a sum of P1.6M.
Price inadequate. Then the vendor remained in possession of the property.
Deed of sale was executed as a result or by reason of a loan.
c. Nonetheless, findings favorable to Macaslang’s ownership are not finally definitive
because R70 §16provides: that when the defendant raises ownership, and the Q of
possession cannot be resolved, ownership shall only be resolved to determine possession
[not title].
 Civil Procedure Case Digests (Motion to Dismiss), Arbues, 2018-2019
4.MTC committed procedural lapses.
a.MTC granted M to Declare Macaslang in default for failure to file an answer
.i. This motion is expressly prohibited under R70 §13 (8)
ii. What MTC should have done was provided for in R70 § 7: to simply render
judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and
limited to what is prayed for therein.
iii. Failure to file an answer under R70, results only to a judgment by default
not a declaration of default.
b. MTC’s reception of oral testimony is also a procedural lapse.i.R70 envisions the
submission only of affidavits of the witnesses under §10ii.§11 (2) that should the MTC
need to clarify material facts, it may require parties to submit affidavits or other
evidence. (note: in both sections no mention of testimony, only affidavits.)
WHEREFORE GRANTED. Complaint for unlawful detainer dismissed.
SEVERINO S. CAPIRAL v SIMEONA CAPIRAL ROBLES
G.R. No. 173628 November 16, 2011
Facts:
Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court are the Decision dated May 29, 2006 and Resolution dated July 20, 2006
of the CA. The CA Decision dismissed petitioner's petition for certiorari and affirmed
the August 15, 2003 and January 12, 2004 Orders of RTC Malabon, while the CA
Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Petition denied.
The instant petition arose from a Complaint for Partition with Damages filed
with the RTC of Malabon City by herein respondents against herein petitioner. On
September 5, 2002, herein petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds that
respondents' Complaint lacked cause of action or that the same is barred by prescription
and laches.
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On February 21, 2003, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for hearing.
On August 12, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion to Resolve praying that an Order be
issued by the RTC resolving petitioner's Motion to Dismiss.
On August 15, 2003, the RTC issued its first assailed Order denying
petitioner's Motion to Resolve. Subsequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for
certiorari with the CA, arguing that the RTC is guilty of grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the abovementioned Orders. On May 29, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed
Decision dismissing the special civil action for certiorari and affirming the disputed
Orders of the RTC.
Issue:
WON THE TRIAL-TYPE HEARING REQUIRED BY THE TRIAL COURT
FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS IS IN ACCORD WITH
SECTION 2, RULE 16 OF [THE] RULES OF COURT.
Held: Yes.
Section 2, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court sanctions trial-type proceedings in the
sense that the parties are allowed to present evidence and argue their respective positions
before the court.
The issues raised in a motion to dismiss have to be determined in accordance
with the evidence and facts presented, not on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations and
that the courts could not afford to dismiss a litigant's complaint on the basis of half-
baked conclusions with no evidence to show for it. In emphasizing the need for a formal
hearing, this Court held that the demand for a clear factual finding to justify the grant or
denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be dispensed with. To this end, Section 2, Rule 16
of the Rules of Court allows not only a hearing on the motion to dismiss, but also for the
parties to submit their evidence on the questions of fact involved, which may be litigated
extensively at the hearing or hearings on the motion. During the said hearings, the
parties are allowed to submit their respective evidence, and even rebut the opposing
parties' evidence. The hearings should provide the parties the forum for full presentation
of their sides. Moreover, from the trial court's perspective, the extent of such hearings
would depend on its satisfaction that the ground in filing the motion to dismiss has been
established or disestablished.
In the present case, petitioner's ground in filing his Motion to Dismiss is that
he has been openly, continuously and exclusively possessing the subject property in the
concept of an owner for more than ten years and that he has explicitly repudiated his co-
ownership of the subject property with his co-heirs. Evidence is quite obviously needed
in this situation, for it is not to be expected that said ground, or any facts from which its
existence may be inferred, will be found in the averments of the complaint. When such a
ground is asserted in a motion to dismiss, the general rule governing evidence on
motions applies. The rule is embodied in Section 7, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
 Civil Procedure Case Digests (Motion to Dismiss), Arbues, 2018-2019
which provides that [w]hen a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court
may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but
the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or
depositions.
However, in the present case, there was no affidavit or any other documentary
evidence attached to petitioner's Motion to Dismiss as proof of the averments contained
therein. Thus, the RTC is justified in directing the conduct of further hearings to
ascertain petitioner's factual allegations in its motion.
Indeed, unlike a motion to dismiss based on the failure of the complaint to
state a cause of action, which may be resolved solely on the basis of the allegations of
the complaint, the Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner raised an affirmative defense
that he has long been in possession of the disputed property as an owner and that he has
repudiated his co-ownership of the subject property with private respondents and the
other co-heirs. The motion thus posed a question of fact that should be resolved after
due hearing.
Neither may the trial court's act of setting the case for hearing in order to
receive evidence be considered as a move to defer the resolution of petitioner's Motion
to Dismiss. As discussed above, Section 2, Rule 16 is explicit in allowing the conduct of
hearings and the reception of evidence on the questions of fact involved in the motion to
dismiss.
Contrary to petitioner's asseveration, what is prohibited by the second
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 16 of the same Rules is the deferment until trial of the
resolution of the motion to dismiss itself. Under the circumstances obtaining in the
instant case, the assailed Orders of the RTC may not be construed as tantamount to
deferring action on the motion to dismiss until trial is conducted.
SPOUSES ERNESTO and VICENTA TOPACIO v BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS
and MORTGAGE BANK G.R. No. 157644 November 17, 2010
Facts:
1. Petitioners Sps Topacio filed a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision
and resolution denying their MR and affirming in toto the RTC decision, which issued
an alias writ of possession in favor of respondent Banco Filipino.
2. Sps Topacio obtained a P400,000 loan from the bank and gave an REM as security.
They failed to pay prompting the bank to extra-judicially foreclose. To satisfy the
obligation, the provincial sheriff sold in auction the mortgaged the property, where bank
emerged as highest bidder. A Cert of Sale was issued to the bank and was registered
with ROD.
3. Bank filed a Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession, which RTC granted
conditioned on the posting of P100,000 bond, which bank posted.
4. Writ of possession was not implemented because of Sps Topacio’s Writ to set aside
auction sale and writ of possession. RTC thereafter issued TRO and writ of prelim
injunction sheriff from implementing writ of possession.
5. Bank filed an Answer to dissolve the writ of prelim injunction, to which Sps Topacio
filed a reply for its maintenance.
6. More than 2 years after and several postponements, the Judge dismissed bank’s petition
for “failure to prosecute”. However, no copy of this decision was served on respondent
bank, whose operations were shut down by Monetary Bank.
7. Nearly 6 years later, bank filed a motion to clarify the order of dismissal and moved for
issuance of an alias writ of possession, which was denied.
8. Bank filed an MR. New judge reconsidered and issued alias writ. Petitioners file MR,
claiming that dismissal order has long been final and executory and alias writ should be
made in a separate motion. Both RTC and CA denied.
Issue:
WON there was res judicata
Held: No.
Under the rule of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies,
in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit. The term
literally means a matter adjudged, judicially acted upon, or settled by judgment. The
principle bars a subsequent suit involving the same parties, subject matter, and cause of
action. The rationale for the rule is that public policy requires that controversies must be
settled with finality at a given point in time.
The doctrine of res judicata embraces two (2) concepts: the first is "bar by
prior judgment" under paragraph (b) of Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court, and
the second is "conclusiveness of judgment" under paragraph (c) thereof. Res judicata
8
 Civil Procedure Case Digests (Motion to Dismiss), Arbues, 2018-2019
applies in the concept of "bar by prior judgment" if the following requisites concur: (1)
the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the
merits; (3) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and the second
action, identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action.
Petitioners claim for the application of the 1st type but SC said “nah fam. 1st
element is lacking.”
The December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order never attained finality as it was not
properly served. Rule 13 of the Rules of Court define the proper modes of service of
judgment.
As a rule, judgments are sufficiently served when they are delivered
personally, or through registered mail to the counsel of record, or by leaving them in his
office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. After service, a judgment or
order which is not appealed nor made subject of a motion for reconsideration within the
prescribed 15-day period attains finality.
As for issues raised for the 1st time on appeal, a party who deliberately adopts
a certain theory upon which the case is tried and decided by the lower court will not be
permitted to change the theory on appeal.
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1696. June 20, 2002
MELISSA DOMONDON v JUDGE PERCIVAL MANDAP LOPEZ
Facts:
This case against respondent judge arose from a case filed by complainants
who were all students of AMA College. Said students were members of the editorial
board of the school’s official publication who were expelled from the school for alleged
libelous and scandalous writings in a spoof paper they published.
Complainants filed a case for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against AMA Computer College and Mauricia
Herrera, Dean of Student Affairs. Complainants pressed their request for the immediate
resolution of their application for preliminary mandatory injunction before the end of the
enrollment period so that they can enroll in the first trimester of SY 1997-1998. They
9
alleged that respondent judge failed to resolve their application for mandatory injunction
on time to the prejudice of the complainants. Respondent countered however that there
was no provision in law providing for a timeframe in resolving such application. On
June 14, 1997, on the basis of the pleadings of the parties, respondent judge dismissed
the case itself after finding that the expulsion of the complainants from the school was
for cause and was effected only after an investigation during which they were duly
heard.
Issue:
WON Judge Lopez is liable for delay.
Held:
Judge Lopez cannot invoke the absence of any provision prescribing a period
within which to resolve an application for a writ of injunction. He should have been
guided by the exigencies of the situation. He knew that complainants were seeking the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction precisely because they wanted to be readmitted
by the college and for them to be able to enroll in the first trimester of school year 1997-
1998. Respondent judge should have considered the defendants to have waived the filing
of their rejoinder and resolved the issue of injunction promptly. Respondent judges
procrastination only opens him to suspicion that he was favoring the defendants.
It is undisputed that no trial was ever conducted by respondent judge before
issuing his resolution, dated June 14, 1997, dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-97-30549 for lack of merit. Respondent judge, however, justifies his action on the
ground that the defendants rejoinder sought the dismissal of the case for lack of merit
and the same was in the nature of a motion to dismiss the case for lack of cause of
action.
It is apparent that respondent judge failed to distinguish between a motion to
dismiss for failure of the complaint to state a cause of action and a motion to dismiss
based on lack of cause of action. The first is governed by Rule 16, 1(g), while the
second by Rule 33 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The distinction
between these two has been explained thus:
The first [situation where the complaint does not allege a sufficient cause of
action] is raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 before a responsive
pleading is filed and can be determined only from the allegations in the
initiatory pleading and not from evidentiary or other matters aliunde. The
second [situation where the evidence does not sustain the cause of action
alleged] is raised in a demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 after the plaintiff
has rested his case and can be resolved only on the basis of the evidence he
has presented in support of his claim. The first does not concern itself with the
truth and falsity of the allegations while the second arises precisely because
the judge has determined the truth and falsity of the allegations and has found
the evidence wanting.
 Civil Procedure Case Digests (Motion to Dismiss), Arbues, 2018-2019
Hence, a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action is filed by the
defendant after the plaintiff has presented his evidence on the ground that the latter has
shown no right to the relief sought. While a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 is based on
preliminary objections which can be ventilated before the beginning of the trial, a
motion to dismiss under Rule 33 is in the nature of a demurrer to evidence on the ground
of insufficiency of evidence and is presented only after the plaintiff has rested his case.
As the rejoinder filed by the defendants was not based on the failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action but on factual and legal matters allegedly excusing
them from liability, the same could not be considered a motion to dismiss under Rule 16,
1(g).
Actually, what respondent judge did was to render a decision. Respondent
judge could not do this since there were issues of facts which had to be resolved.
Respondent could dismiss Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 for lack of cause of action only
after a trial on the merits.
VIRGINIA MARAHAY v HON. MENELEO C. MELICOR
G.R. No. L-44980 February 6, 1990
Facts:
On June 20, 1974, petitioner filed with respondent court an action for recovery
of real property against Aliwanag B. Valleramos. Later, the complaint was amended to
implead and include other defendants, the other private respondents herein, as
indispensable parties.
After the issues were joined, the case was set for pre-trial on August 9,1974,
but this was deferred to a later date due to the absence of petitioner and her counsel but
was held only on October 9, 1975 due to various reasons of the petitioner. Trial on the
merits commenced on November 13, 1975 with the petitioner taking the witness stand
on direct examination On January 7, 1976, petitioner filed a motion for postponement
because his counsel was taking the examination for government prosecutors in Manila.
The court eventually issued an order resetting the trial to February 18, 1976 with notice
to petitioner and her counsel. On said date, petitioner appeared without counsel
10
prompting private respondents, through their counsel, to move for the dismissal of the
case for petitioner's alleged inability to prosecute her case and for apparent lack of
interest.
Motions to dismiss was denied by respondent judge.
Issue: WON the case should have been dismissed for failure to prosecute.
Held: No.
An order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final order. If it is
erroneous, ordinarily the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal, hence the same cannot
be assailed by certiorari. Nevertheless, in the broader interests of justice, this Court has
given due course to the present petition in consideration of the fact that this is not the
first time we have passed upon a petition for certiorari, although the proper remedy is
appeal, where the equities warrant such extraordinary recourse.
The absence of the plaintiff, and not the absence of the lawyer, which may
warrant the dismissal of the case on the ground of non-suit. In the case at bar, only the
counsel for plaintiff was absent, plaintiff herself being in attendance in court.
While the aforequoted provision also provides sanctions for failure to
prosecute for an unreasonable length of time, despite the presence of the interested
parties, it cannot be said that such neglect or failing obtains in the present case. There is
failure to prosecute when the plaintiff, being present, is not ready or is unwilling to
proceed with the scheduled trial. In the instant case, petitioner did not in the least
manifest unwillingness to proceed with the hearing. Upon the call for appearances,
petitioner responded that her counsel was in Manila and that he had not yet returned.
Unschooled as she is in the vagaries of procedural law, petitioner indeed could not have
responded otherwise nor done any better.
While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test
for the exercise of such power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is
chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude.
In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton
failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as
in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield their authority
to dismiss.
Further, when a party, without malice, fault, or inexcusable negligence, is not really
prepared for trial, the court would be abusing its discretion if a reasonable opportunity is
denied him for preparing therefor and for obtaining due process of law. Time and again,
we have emphasized that the rules should be liberally construed in order to promote
their object and assist the parties in obtaining not only speedy but, more importantly,
just and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding.