LEGAL PROFESSION
CASES BATCH # 4
A.C. No. 10451, February 04, 2015
SPOUSES WILLIE AND AMELIA
UMAGUING, Complainants, v. ATTY. WALLEN R. DE
VERA, Respondents.
This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint1 for
the alleged betrayal of trust, incompetence, and gross
misconduct of respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (Atty.
De Vera) in his handling of the election protest case
involving the candidacy of MariecrisUmaguing
(Umaguing), daughter of Sps. Willie and Amelia
Umaguing (complainants), for the
SangguniangKabataan (SK) Elections, instituted before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36
(MeTC), docketed as ELEC. CASE No. 07-
1279.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Facts
As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the
position of SK Chairman in the SK Elections for the year
2007 but lost to her rival Jose Gabriel Bungag by one (1)
vote.3 Because of this, complainants lodged an election
protest and enlisted the services of Atty. De Vera. On
November 7, 2007, complainants were asked by Atty. De
Vera to pay his acceptance fee of P30,000.00, plus
various court appearance fees and miscellaneous
expenses in the amount of P30,000.00.4 According to the
complainants, Atty. De Vera had more than enough time
to prepare and file the case but the former moved at a
glacial pace and only took action when the November 8,
2008 deadline was looming.5 Atty. De Vera then rushed
the preparation of the necessary documents and
attachments for the election protest. Two (2) of these
attachments are the Affidavits6 of material witnesses
Mark Anthony Lachica (Lachica) and Angela Almera
(Almera), which was personally prepared by Atty. De
Vera. At the time that the aforesaid affidavits were
needed to be signed by Lachica and Almera, they were
unfortunately unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. De Vera
allegedly instructed AbethLalong-Isip (Lalong-Isip) and
Hendricson Fielding (Fielding) to look for the nearest kin
or relatives of Lachica and Almera and ask them to sign
over the names.7 The signing over of Lachica’s and
Almera’s names were done by Christina Papin (Papin)
and Elsa Almera-Almacen, respectively. Atty. De Vera
then had all the documents notarized before one Atty.
DonatoManguiat (Atty.
Manguiat).8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Later, however, Lachica discovered the falsification and
immediately disowned the signature affixed in the
affidavit and submitted his own Affidavit,9 declaring that
he did not authorize Papin to sign the document on his
behalf. Lachica’s affidavit was presented to the MeTC and
drew the ire of Presiding Judge Edgardo Belosillo (Judge
Belosillo), who ruled that the affidavits filed by Atty. De
Vera were falsified. Judge Belosillo pointed out that while
Atty. De Vera filed a pleading to rectify this error (i.e.,
an Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus
Motion,10 seeking, among others, the withdrawal of
Lachica’s and Almera’s affidavits), it was observed that
such was a mere flimsy excuse since Atty. De Vera had
ample amount of time to have the affidavits personally
signed by the affiants but still hastily filed the election
protest with full knowledge that the affidavits at hand
were falsified.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the
complainants pointed out that Atty. De Vera did not
appear before the MeTC, although promptly notified, for
a certain December 11, 2007 hearing; and did not offer
any explanation as to why he was not able to
attend.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The complainants then confronted Atty. De Vera and
asked for an explanation regarding his non-appearance
in the court. Atty. De Vera explained that he was hesitant
in handling the particular case because of the alleged
favoritism of Judge Belosillo. According to Atty. De Vera,
Judge Belosillo received P60,000.00 from the defense
counsel, Atty. Carmelo Culvera, in order to acquire a
favorable decision for his client. Atty. De Vera averred
that he would only appear for the case if the
complainants would give him P80,000.00, which he
would in turn, give to Judge Belosillo to secure a
favorable decision for
Umaguing.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence
in the integrity and competency of Atty. De Vera, as well
as his breach of fiduciary relations, the complainants
asked the former to withdraw as their counsel and to
reimburse them the P60,000.00 in excessive fees he
collected from them, considering that he only appeared
twice for the case.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In view of the foregoing, complainants sought Atty. De
Vera’s disbarment.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In his Counter-Affidavit,16 Atty. De Vera vehemently
denied all the accusations lodged against him by
complainants. He averred that he merely prepared the
essential documents for election protest based on the
statements of his clients.17 Atty. De Vera then explained
that the signing of Lachica’s falsified Affidavit was done
without his knowledge and likewise stated that it was
Christina Papin who should be indicted and charged with
the corresponding criminal offense. He added that he
actually sought to rectify his mistakes by filing the
aforementioned Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus
Motion in order to withdraw the affidavits of Lachica and
Almera. As he supposedly felt that he could no longer
serve complainants with his loyalty and devotion in view
of the aforementioned signing incident, Atty. De Vera
then withdrew from the case.18 To add, he pointed out
that along with his Formal Notice of Withdrawal of
Counsel, complainants executed a document entitled
“Release Waiver & Discharge,”19 which, to him,
discharges him and his law firm from all causes of action
that complainants may have against him, including the
instant administrative case.
After the conduct of the mandatory conference/hearing
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline, the matter was submitted
for report and recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In a Report and Recommendation20 dated December 5,
2009, the IBP Commissioner found the administrative
action to be impressed with merit, and thus
recommended that Atty. De Vera be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two (2)
months.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
While no sufficient evidence was found to support the
allegation that Atty. De Vera participated in the
falsification of Lachica’s affidavit, the IBP Commissioner
ruled oppositely with respect to the falsification of
Almera’s affidavit, to which issue Atty. De Vera
deliberately omitted to comment on. The Investigating
Commissioner pointed out that the testimony of Elsa
Almera-Almacen, Almera’s sister – attesting that Lalong-
Isip approached her and asked if she could sign the
affidavit, and her vivid recollection that Atty. De Vera
was present during its signing, and that Lalong-Isip
declared to Atty. De Vera that she was not Almera – was
found to be credible as it was too straightforward and
hard to ignore.22 It was also observed that the backdrop
in which the allegations were made, i.e., that the signing
of the affidavits was done on November 7, 2007, or one
day before the deadline for the filing of the election
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CASES BATCH # 4
protest, showed that Atty. De Vera was really pressed
for time and, hence, his resort to the odious act of
advising his client’s campaigners Lalong-Isip and
Fielding to look for kin and relatives of the affiants for
and in their behalf in his earnest desire to beat the
deadline set for the filing of the election protest.23 To
this, the IBP Investigating Commissioner remarked that
the lawyer’s first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice, and therefore, his conduct
ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of
the law and ethics of the
profession.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a Resolution25 dated December 14, 2012, the Board
of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt the findings of
the IBP Commissioner. Hence, for knowingly submitting
a falsified document in court, a two (2) month
suspension was imposed against Atty. De Vera.
On reconsideration,26 however, the IBP Board of
Governors issued a Resolution27 dated February 11,
2014, affirming with modification their December 14,
2012 Resolution, decreasing the period of suspension
from two (2) months to one (1) month.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not Atty. De Vera
should be held administratively liable.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP,
as the same were duly substantiated by the records.
However, the Court finds it apt to increase the period of
suspension to six (6) months.
Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client
and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be
honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These
expectations, though high and demanding, are the
professional and ethical burdens of every member of the
Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression
in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this country
has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the
Law Profession, thus:28
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I
will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit,
nor give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no man
for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my
clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God.29 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey
the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any
falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the
doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according
to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every
lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and
maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy
of emulation by others. It is by no means a coincidence,
therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and
trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code
of Professional Responsibility.30 In this light, Rule 10.01,
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that “[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.”
After an assiduous examination of the records, the Court
finds itself in complete agreement with the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, who was affirmed by the
IBP Board of Governors, in holding that Atty. De Vera
sanctioned the submission of a falsified
affidavit, i.e.,Almera’s affidavit, before the court in his
desire to beat the November 8, 2008 deadline for filing
the election protest of Umaguing. To this, the Court is
wont to sustain the IBP Investigating Commissioner’s
appreciation of Elsa Almera-Almacen’s credibility as a
witness given that nothing appears on record to seriously
belie the same, and in recognition too of the fact that the
IBP and its officers are in the best position to assess the
witness’s credibility during disciplinary proceedings, as
they – similar to trial courts – are given the opportunity
to first-hand observe their demeanor and comportment.
The assertion that Atty. De Vera authorized the
falsification of Almera’s affidavit is rendered more
believable by the absence of Atty. De Vera’s comment
on the same. In fact, in his Motion for Reconsideration of
the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution dated December
14, 2012, no specific denial was proffered by Atty. De
Vera on this score. Instead, he only asserted that he was
not the one who notarized the subject affidavits but
another notary public, who he does not even know or
has seen in his entire life,31 and that he had no
knowledge of the falsification of the impugned
documents, much less of the participation in using the
same.32 Unfortunately for Atty. De Vera, the Court views
the same to be a mere general denial which cannot
overcome Elsa Almera-Almacen’s positive testimony that
he indeed participated in the procurement of her
signature and the signing of the affidavit, all in support
of the claim of falsification.
The final lining to it all – for which the IBP Board of
Governors rendered its recommendation – is that
Almera’s affidavit was submitted to the MeTC in the
election protest case. The belated retraction of the
questioned affidavits, through the Answer to
Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion, does not, for this
Court, merit significant consideration as its submission
appears to be a mere afterthought, prompted only by the
discovery of the falsification. Truth be told, it is highly
improbable for Atty. De Vera to have remained in the
dark about the authenticity of the documents he himself
submitted to the court when his professional duty
requires him to represent his client with zeal and within
the bounds of the law.33Likewise, he is prohibited from
handling any legal matter without adequate
preparation34 or allow his client to dictate the procedure
in handling the case.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On a related point, the Court deems it apt to clarify that
the document captioned “Release Waiver & Discharge”
which Atty. De Vera, in his Counter-Affidavit, claimed to
have discharged him from all causes of action that
complainants may have against him, such as the present
case, would not deny the Court its power to sanction him
administratively. It was held in Ylaya v.
Gacott36 that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of
the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit
and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule
is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A
proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil
action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no
redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
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CASES BATCH # 4
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official administration of persons unfit to
practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the
court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of
the court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no
sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administration of justice.37
All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the
Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified
document before a court.
As for the penalty, the Court, in the case of Samonte v.
Atty. Abellana38 (Samonte), suspended the lawyer
therein from the practice of law for six (6) months for
filing a spurious document in court. In view of the
antecedents in this case, the Court finds it appropriate
to impose the same here.
Likewise, the Court grants the prayer for
reimbursement39 for the return of the amount of
P60,000.00,40 comprised of Atty. De Vera’s acceptance
fee and other legal expenses intrinsically related to his
professional engagement,41 for he had actually admitted
his receipt thereof in his Answer before the
IBP.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As a final word, the Court echoes its unwavering
exhortation in Samonte:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to
ensure that whoever is granted the privilege to practice
law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s
Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to
remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to
falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to
cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients and
the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness
to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law and
highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law
Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern
disciplinary sanctions.43
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera
(respondent) is found GUILTY of violating the Lawyer’s
Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
is SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of
law, effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a stern
warning that any repetition of the same or similar acts
will be punished more severely.
Moreover, respondent is ORDERED to return to
complainants Spouses Willie and Amelia Umaguing the
amount of P60,000.00 which he admittedly received
from the latter as fees intrinsically linked to his
professional engagement within ninety (90) days from
the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the
foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of further
administrative penalties.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal
record as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A. C. No. 5355 December 13, 2011
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR,
Petitioner,
- versus -
ATTY. DANIEL B. LIANGCO,
Respondent.
The Case
This is an administrative Complaint for Disbarment filed
by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against
respondent Atty. Daniel B. Liangco.
In a per curiam En Banc Resolution in Gozun v. Hon.
Liangco,[1] dated 30 August 2000, this Court ordered the
dismissal from service of respondent as judge of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga
and as acting judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga. His dismissal
was with forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and
accumulated leave credits; and with prejudice to his
reinstatement or reemployment in any branch,
instrumentality or agency of the government, including
government-owned or -controlled corporations. The
Court further directed the OCA to initiate disbarment
proceedings against him for misconduct as a member of
the bar. Hence, this present case for resolution by the
Court.
The Facts
We quote the facts as stated in A. M. No. MTJ-97-
1136,[2] as follows:
Complainant Hermogenes T. Gozun (hereinafter referred
to as Gozun) was in open and adverse possession of
subject land for a period of more than thirty years. His
familys house was erected on the land. The house was
made of old vintage lumber, cement, hollow blocks, G.
I. sheet roofing and other strong materials. Gozun
inherited the house and lot from his parents.
The municipality of San Luis, Pampanga claimed to own
the same lot.
On January 12, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of San
Luis, Pampanga issued Resolution No. 26-96, stating:
RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED that the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga do hereby
consider (sic) the lot under Tax Dec. No. 114 owned by
the Municipal Government of San Luis, Pampanga,
specifically the lot where Mr. Hermogenes Gozun and
family were squatting (sic) as the new site of the Rural
Health Center will rise (sic).
On May 17, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan issued
Resolution No. 34-96 to amend the correct Resolution
No. 26-96.
On May 24, 1996, Romulo M. Batu, Vice Mayor, on behalf
of the Sangguniang Bayan, filed with the MTC, San Luis,
Pampanga, a petition for declaratory relief. We quote the
petition:
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
THE HONORABLE
JUDGE DANIEL LIANGCO
In behalf of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis,
Pampanga, We would like to petition your good office to
render legal opinion on the following matters, to wit:
1. The validity of the attached Resolution.
2. The powers of the Municipal Mayor to enforce said
Resolution.
3. To issue an order to the PNP to assist the Municipal
Mayor in implementing said Resolution.
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 LEGAL PROFESSION
CASES BATCH # 4
These request are (sic) in connection with our plan to
construct a new site for the Rural Health Center of San
Luis, Pampanga. However, the designated place thereof
is presently being squatted (sic) by a certain Mr.
Hermogenes Gozun and inspite of the official notice of
Atty. Benlfre S. Galang, our Provincial Legal Officer, and
personal request of our Municipal Mayor Jovito C. Bondoc
to Mr. Gozun to vacate his (sic) premises, he continues
to defy such notices and request to the detriment of the
proposed project.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this petition
will merit your favorable consideration and appropriate
action for the sake of public interest.
On the very same day, May 24, 1996, respondent judge
issued a resolution, reasoning: First, the municipality of
San Luis, Pampanga through its Sangguniang Bayan
may enact resolutions and ordinances to regulate the use
of property within its jurisdiction. Second, Resolution No.
34-96 is not contrary to law, morals and public
policy. Third, the municipal mayor through an executive
order may order the Philippine National Police or any
government law enforcement agency to enforce or
implement the resolution, using reasonable force if
necessary and justified. Fourth, squatting in government
property is considered a nuisance per se. Respondent
judge ruled:
With the issuance by the Municipal Mayor of an executive
order, the municipality of San Luis may order the
Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed in San Luis,
Pampanga to effect the eviction of Hermogenes Gozun
and all other persons who may be claiming any right
under him from Lot No. 114 covered by tax Declaration
No. 6030 (underscoring ours).
Again, on the same day, March 24, 1996, the municipal
mayor, Jovito C. Bondoc, pursuant to the aforequoted
resolution, issued Executive Order No. 1, series of 1996,
ordering the PNP to implement Resolution No. 34-96.
Note that complainant Gozun was not served with
summons or given notice of the petition for declaratory
relief.
On June 2, 1996, complainant Gozun learned about the
resolution.
On June 3, 1996, complainant Gozuns wife together with
other public school teachers went to the office of the
respondent judge. When asked about the resolution,
respondent judge answered, Ing Apung Guinu yu y
Mayor Bondoc at kaya ko makisabi (Your God is Mayor
Bondoc and you should talk to him).
On August 8, 1996, agents of the municipal government
demolished complainant Gozuns house, using
respondent judges resolution and the mayors executive
order as basis.
On December 18, 1996, complainant Gozun filed this
administrative complaint with the Office of the Court
Administrator. He averred that respondent judges
issuance of the resolution amounts to gross misconduct,
gross inefficiency and incompetence. Complainant Gozun
further accused the municipal mayor of having bribed
respondent judge. Mayor Bondoc told complainant
Gozun that the respondent judge is in his pocketbecause
he (Mayor Bondoc) has given him (respondent judge) a
lot of things (dacal naku a regalo kaya).
On January 20, 1997, the Office of the Court
Administrator submitted the petition to this Court for its
consideration, recommending that the complaint be
given due course.
On March 21, 1997, the Court resolved to require
respondent judge to comment thereon, within ten (10)
days from notice.
On May 15, 1997, respondent judge submitted his
comment, denying the charges and urging that the case
be dismissed.
On June 23, 1997, we referred the case back to the
Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report
and recommendation.
On April 13, 2000, after investigation, Court
Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo submitted a
memorandum, recommending the dismissal from office
of respondent judge.[3]
A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136
Dismissal of Respondent from the Bench
The OCA Resolution was forwarded to this Court for
evaluation and action and docketed as A.M. No. MTJ-97-
1136. On 30 August, 2000, the Court En Banc
promulgated a per curiam Resolution adopting the
report and recommendation of the Court Administrator.
It ruled that respondent had blatantly ignored the basic
rules of fair play, in addition to acting without jurisdiction
in entertaining a Petition for Declaratory Relief despite
his being a judge of a first-level court.[4] The Court also
pointed out that his ruling on the said Petition resulted
in the demolition of the house of complainant Gozun,
thus rendering his family homeless.[5] It described
respondents acts as biased and maleficent and ruled that
those acts merited the punishment of dismissal from the
service,[6] viz:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby orders the
DISMISSAL of respondent Judge Daniel B. Liangco,
Municipal Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San
Fernando, Pampanga, and Acting Judge Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC), Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga, from
the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and
accumulated leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to
reinstatement or reemployment in any branch,
instrumentality or agency of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
The Court directs the Court Administrator to initiate
disbarment proceedings against respondent Judge for
misconduct as a member of the bar within thirty (30)
days from finality of his decision.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.[7]
A.C. No. 5355
Disbarment
On 10 November 2000, the OCA filed a Complaint for
Disbarment against respondent.[8] In its Complaint dated
06 November 2000, docketed as Administrative Case No.
(A.C.) 5355, the OCA charged him with gross misconduct
for acting with manifest bias and partiality towards a
party, as well as for inexcusable ignorance of well-
established rules of procedure that challenged his
competence to remain a member of the legal profession.
Thus, it prayed that he be disbarred, and that his name
be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.[9]
On 28 November 2000, the Court En Banc promulgated
a Resolution requiring respondent to file his Comment on
the Complaint for Disbarment against him.[10] On 01
June 2001, he filed his Comment on/Answer to
Complaint for Disbarment,[11] appealing for
understanding and asking that the Court allow him to
continue practicing as a lawyer. He reasoned that when
he acted on the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by
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CASES BATCH # 4
the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San Luis,
Pampanga, he was merely rendering a legal opinion
honestly and in good faith;[12] and that his actions were
not attended by malice, bad faith or any other ulterior
motive.[13] He further pleads for compassion from this
Court and for permission to remain a member of the bar,
because the practice of law is his only means of livelihood
to support his family.[14]
On 07 August 2001, the Court En Banc noted the
submission of respondent and referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from
receipt of the records of the case.[15]
IBPs Report and Recommendation
The IBP held a series of hearings on the disbarment case
with respondents participation. On 03 October 2003, the
investigating commissioner issued her Report and
Recommendation[16] finding justification for the
disbarment of respondent and recommending that his
name be struck off the Roll of Attorneys. The
investigating commissioner found that, based on the
facts of the case, there was clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence to warrant the disbarment of
respondent.[17] She observed that he had exhibited
lapses, as well as ignorance of well-established rules and
procedures. She also observed that the present
Complaint was not the first of its kind to be filed against
him. She further noted that before his dismissal from the
judiciary, respondent was suspended for six (6) months
when he assigned to his court, without a raffle, fifty-four
(54) cases for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1602
a violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated 23
September 1974. Also, pending with the Supreme Court
were three (3) administrative cases filed against him for
dishonesty, gross ignorance of the law, and direct
bribery. In the bribery case, he was caught by the
National Bureau of Investigation in an entrapment
operation.[18]
On 30 January 2009, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[19] of the Report and Recommendation
of the IBP. He alleged that the evidence presented in the
proceedings for his dismissal as judge was the same as
that which was used in the disbarment case against him.
Thus, because he did not have the chance to cross-
examine the witnesses, he claimed to have been
deprived of due process.[20] In addition, respondent
emphasized the submission by Gozun of an Affidavit of
Desistance from the Complaint the latter had originally
filed against him and contended that the case should
have been dismissed.[21] Lastly, respondent averred that
he had endeavored to improve himself as a devout
Catholic by joining religious organizations. He also
impressed upon the IBP his effort to improve on his
knowledge of the law by attending Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education (MCLE).[22]
On 12 May 2009, respondent filed a Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration[23] wherein he implored the
IBP to take a second look at his case. He emphasized the
submission by Gozun of an Affidavit of Desistance and
the fact that the former had already suffered the
supreme penalty of dismissal as MTC
judge.[24] Respondent also reiterated the grounds
already stated in his first Motion for Reconsideration.
On 09 October 2008, the IBP board of governors passed
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-525,[25] which adopted the
Report and Recommendation of the investigating
commissioner, who found that respondent had acted
with manifest bias and partiality in favor of a party-
litigant and shown inexcusable ignorance of the Rules of
Procedure. The Resolution likewise adopted the
recommendation to disbar respondent.
On 30 June 2011, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
transmitted the case records of A. C. No. 5355 to this
Court, which noted it on 16 August 2011.[26]
The Courts Ruling
The Court affirms in toto the findings and
recommendations of the IBP.
The evidence on record overwhelmingly supports the
finding that respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and
inexcusable ignorance of well-established rules of
procedures.
Gross Misconduct
In Sps. Donato v. Atty. Asuncion, Jr.[27] citing Yap v.
Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr.,[28] this Court explained
the concept of gross misconduct as any inexcusable,
shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a
person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e.,
conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the
right determination of the cause. The motive behind this
conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose.
In the case at bar, respondent acted upon the Petition
for Declaratory Relief filed by the Sangguniang Bayan of
San Luis, Pampanga, without the mandatory notice to
Gozun who would be affected by the action. The records
show that respondent, upon receipt of the Petition, had
it docketed in his court, designated Gozun as respondent
in the case title, and quickly disposed of the matter by
issuing a Resolution all on the same day that the Petition
was filed without notice and hearing. Respondent
admitted that, to his mind, he was merely rendering a
legal opinion at the local governments behest, which he
gladly and expeditiously obliged. Without denying this
fact in his Comment, he admitted that he had erred in
acting upon the Petition, but emphasized that his actions
were not attended by malice or bad faith.[29]
We find his statements hard to believe.
The undue haste with which respondent acted on the
Petition negates good faith on his part. Moreover, the
testimonial evidence on record indicates that he
maintained close relations with the municipal vice-mayor
of San Luis, Pampanga, a party-litigant who had an
obvious interest in the outcome of the case. The
testimony of Romulo A. Batu, former vice-mayor of San
Luis, Pampanga, showed that respondent denigrated his
impartiality as a judge is as follows:
COMM. SANSANO:
You dont remember therefore that at any time at all you
were with the mayor in going to see the respondent?
WITNESS: (Mr. Batu)
I do not know any instance that the mayor visited the
respondent, Your Honor. I do not know any instance that
I was with him.
COMM. SANSANO:
But other than the occasion of the filing of this request
there were times when you went to see the respondent
also in his office?
WITNESS:
There was no other visit, Your Honor.
COMM. SANSANO:
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 LEGAL PROFESSION
CASES BATCH # 4
So May 24, 1996 was the first time you went to see him
in his office?
WITNESS:
Before that, Your Honor, nagpupunta na kami doon kung
minsan may nagpapatulong na mga may kaso.
COMM. SANSANO:
Yon ang tanong ko kanina sa iyo kung bago May
24 pumupunta ka na sa opisina niyang datihan?
WITNESS:
Yes, Your Honor. [30]
The testimony of respondents own witness clearly
showed his wanton disregard of Canon 1, Sections 4 and
5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, which requires the observance of judicial
independence and its protection from undue influence,
whether from private or from public interests.[31]
In Edao v. Judge Asdala,[32] we explained the rationale
behind this imposition:
As the visible representation of the law and justice,
judges, such as the respondent, are expected to conduct
themselves in a manner that would enhance the respect
and confidence of the people in the judicial system. The
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
mandates that judges must not only maintain their
independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must
also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality,
which may erode the peoples faith in the
judiciary. Integrity and impartiality, as well as the
appearance thereof, are deemed essential not just in the
proper discharge of judicial office, but also to the
personal demeanor of judges. This standard applies not
only to the decision itself, but also to the process by
which the decision is made. Section 1, Canon 2,
specifically mandates judges to ensure that not only is
their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to
be so in the view of reasonable observers.Clearly, it is of
vital importance not only that independence, integrity
and impartiality have been observed by judges and
reflected in their decisions, but that these must also
appear to have been so observed in the eyes of the
people, so as to avoid any erosion of faith in the justice
system. Thus, judges must be circumspect in their
actions in order to avoid doubt and suspicion in the
dispensation of justice. To further emphasize its
importance, Section 2, Canon 2 states:
Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must
reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary.
Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen
to be done.
As early as June 6, 2003, OCA Circular No. 70-2003 has
directed judges as follows:
In view of the increasing number of reports reaching the
Office of the Court Administrator that judges have been
meeting with party litigants inside their chambers,
judges are hereby cautioned to avoid in-chambers
sessions without the other party and his counsel present,
and to observe prudence at all times in their conduct to
the end that they only act impartially and with propriety
but are also perceived to be impartial and proper.
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the
judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but
also to the process by which the decision is made. As
such, judges must ensure that their conduct, both in and
out of the court, maintains and enhances the confidence
of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the
impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary. In the same
vein, the Code of Judicial Conduct behooves all judges to
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all their activities, as such is essential to the performance
of all the activities of a judge in order to maintain the
trust and respect of the people in the judiciary.
Also relevant is Canon 3, particularly Section 2 of the
new code, which exhorts judges not only to be impartial
in deciding the cases before them, but also to project the
image of impartiality.[33] Unfortunately, as shown by the
facts of the case, these rules were not properly observed
by respondent as a judge of a first-level court.
Inexcusable Ignorance of the Law
We are appalled by respondents ignorance of the basic
rules of procedure. His wanton use of court processes in
this case without regard for the repercussions on the
rights and property of others clearly shows his unfitness
to remain a member of the bar.
A cursory look at the Resolution dated 24 May 1996
issued by respondent would prompt an ordinary person
to conclude that an action in the form of a Petition for
Declaratory Relief was indeed filed, because it bears the
name and the branch of the court of law that issued it.
It had a docket number and the names of the parties
involved. The Resolution even states the justiciable
question to be resolved and accordingly makes a judicial
determination thereof. In reality, though, there was no
notice sent to Gozun, the named respondent in the
Petition; nor was a hearing held to thresh out the issues
involved. As far as respondent was concerned, he simply
issued a legal opinion, but one with all the hallmarks of
a valid issuance by a court of law, despite the absence
of mandatory processes such as notice especially to
Gozun and hearing. Even this excuse is unacceptable.
Judges do not, and are not allowed, to issue legal
opinions. Their opinions are always in the context of
judicial decisions, or concurring and dissenting opinions
in the case of collegiate courts, and always in the context
of contested proceedings.
What is most unfortunate is that the Sanguniang Bayan,
relying on the Resolution respondent issued, caused the
demolition of the house of Gozun and his family, who
were thus ejected from the property they had been
occupying for decades. In effect, Gozun was deprived of
his property without due process. To us, this is precisely
the injustice that members of the bench and the bar are
sworn to guard against. Regrettably, respondent as
judge was even instrumental in its commission. When
his liability for his act was invoked, he casually justifies
them as honest mistakes not attended by malice or bad
faith. His justification is unacceptable to us.
As a member of the bar and former judge, respondent is
expected to be well-versed in the Rules of Procedure.
This expectation is imposed upon members of the legal
profession, because membership in the bar is in the
category of a mandate for public service of the highest
order. Lawyers are oath-bound servants of society
whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible
norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the
advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which
they have sworn to be fearless crusaders.[34]
As judge of a first-level court, respondent is expected to
know that he has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition
for declaratory relief. Moreover, he is presumed to know
that in his capacity as judge, he cannot render a legal
opinion in the absence of a justiciable question.
Displaying an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he
in effect erodes the publics confidence in the competence
of our courts. Moreover, he demonstrates his ignorance
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 LEGAL PROFESSION
CASES BATCH # 4
of the power and responsibility that attach to the
processes and issuances of a judge, and that he as a
member of the bar should know.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that a lawyer must uphold the Constitution
and promote respect for the legal processes.[35] Contrary
to this edict, respondent malevolently violated the basic
constitutional right of Gozun not to be deprived of a right
or property without due process of law.
Under Canon 10, Rule 10.03, respondent as lawyer is
mandated to observe the Rules of Procedure and not to
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.[36] In this
case, however, the opposite happened. Respondent
recklessly used the powers of the court to inflict injustice.
Should the misconduct of respondent as judge also
warrant his disbarment from the legal profession? We
answer in the affirmative.
In Collantes v. Renomeron,[37] we ruled therein that the
misconduct of the respondent therein as a public official
also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer:
As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:
"A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar
which is designed to impress upon him his
responsibilities. He thereby becomes an officer of the
court on whose shoulders rest the grave responsibility of
assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and
efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the
court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that
in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and
justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the law
profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place.
From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter,
are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high
sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the
strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility - all of
which, throughout the centuries, have been
compendiously described as 'moral character.'
xxx xxx xxx
"A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession." (Rule
7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.)
This Court has ordered that only those who are
"competent, honorable, and reliable" may practice the
profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for
every lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in
the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs.
Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).
Recently, in Samson v. Judge Caballero,[38] we ruled that
because membership in the bar is an integral
qualification for membership in the bench, the moral
fitness of a judge also reflects the latters moral fitness
as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys the basic rules of
judicial conduct also violates the lawyers oath.
We note that on 25 August 2011, respondent filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-525 dated 09 October 2008 promulgated by
the IBP board of governors, which adopted and approved
the findings of the investigating commissioner
recommending his disbarment. Respondent alleged
therein that he had served as assistant provincial
prosecutor in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pampanga for thirteen (13) years prior to his dismissal
as MTC judge of San Luis, Pampanga and as acting MCTC
judge of Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga. He also complains
that he was deprived of due process by the IBP board of
governors when it approved and adopted the findings of
the investigating commissioner recommending his
disbarment; and he prays for a second look at his case,
considering the withdrawal of the Complaint originally
filed by Gozun.
In the light of our ruling in this case, we can no longer
consider the undocketed Petition for Review on Certiorari
filed by respondent. In the first place, such kind of
petition is not available to assail the resolution of the IBP
in an administrative case. His remedies from an adverse
resolution is to seek a reconsideration of the same, and
when denied, to raise the same defenses against
administrative liability before this Court. He has availed
of both remedies in this case.
Disbarment proceedings are sui generis. As such, they
render the underlying motives of complainant
unimportant and of little relevance. The purpose of
disbarment proceedings is mainly to determine the
fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the
court and as participant in the dispensation of justice an
issue which the complainants personal motives have
little relevance. For this reason, upon information of an
alleged wrongdoing, the Court may initiate the
disbarment proceedings motu proprio.[39]
Recently in Garrido v. Atty. Garrido,[40] we reiterated the
unique characteristic of disbarment proceedings and
their purpose in this wise:
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure
such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial
questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the
filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do
not apply in the determination of a lawyers qualifications
and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled
in the past and we see no reason to depart from this
ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a
component of the administration of justice and is a
matter of public interest because it involves service to
the public. The admission qualifications are also
qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the
privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or
the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like
criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the
State may inquire into through this Court. In this sense,
the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party
whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his
or her own; effectively, his or her participation is that of
a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the
Court.
Thus, despite Gozuns desistance in A.M. No. MTJ-97-
1136, from whence this case originated, respondent is
not exonerated.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to DISBAR Atty.
Daniel B. Liangco for the following offenses:
1. GROSS MISCONDUCT in violation of Canon 1,
Sections 4 and 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary
2. INEXCUSABLE IGNORANCE OF THE LAW in
violation of Canons 1 and 10, Rule 10.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal
records of Atty. Daniel B. Liangco in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines.
The Bar Confidant is hereby directed to strike out the
name of Daniel B. Liangco from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
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 LEGAL PROFESSION
CASES BATCH # 4
A.C. No. 1900 June 13, 2012
RODRIGO A. MOLINA,
Complainant,
- versus -
ATTY. CEFERINO R. MAGAT,
Respondent.
efore the Court is the undated Resolution[1] of the Board
of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) finding Atty. Ceferino R.
Magat (Atty. Magat) liable for unethical conduct and
recommending that he be reprimanded.
The Facts:
The case stemmed from a complaint for
disbarment[2] filed by Rodrigo A.
Molina (complainant) against Atty. Magat before the
Court on May 5, 1978. The complaint alleged, among
others, that complainant filed cases of Assault Upon an
Agent of a Person in Authority and Breach of the Peace
and Resisting Arrest against one Pascual de Leon (de
Leon) before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila;
that the counsel of record for accused de Leon in both
cases was Atty. Magat; that a case for slight physical
injuries was filed against him (Molina) by de Leon as a
counter-charge and Atty. Magat was also the private
prosecutor; that Atty. Magat subsequently filed a motion
to quash the information on Assault upon an Agent of a
Person in Authority on the sole ground of double
jeopardy claiming that a similar case for slight physical
injuries was filed in court by a certain Pat.
Molina (Molina); that based on the record, no case of
slight physical injuries was filed by Molina against de
Leon; that Atty. Magat was very much aware of such fact
as he was the counsel and private prosecutor on record
of de Leon from the very start of the case way back on
May 24, 1974; that Atty. Magats act of filing the Motion
to Quash was a malicious act done in bad faith to mislead
the court, thus, a betrayal of the confidence of the court
of which he is an officer; and that Atty. Magat likewise
committed willful disobedience of the court order when
he appeared as counsel for de Leon on two (2) occasions
despite the fact that he was suspended from the practice
of law.
In his Answer,[3] Atty. Magat averred that in so far as the
filing of the motion to quash was concerned, he was
really under the impression that a criminal case in lieu of
the two (2) charges was indeed filed and that the said
motion was opposed by the other party and was denied
by the court. He admitted his appearances in court while
under suspension. He explained that his appearance in
the December 21, 1977 hearing was to inform the court
that the accused was sick and to prevent the issuance of
a warrant of arrest against the accused. In the January
9, 1978 hearing, he appeared because the accused had
no money and pleaded that his testimony be finished.
Atty. Magat begged for the indulgence of the court and
conveyed his repentance and apology and promised that
the same would not happen again.
The complaint was endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[4] Thereafter, the OSG transmitted the
records of the case to the IBP for proper disposition.
In his Report and Recommendation[5] dated March 20,
2009, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found merit
in the complaint and recommended that Atty. Magat be
reprimanded and fined P50,000.00. It stated that:
This Commission finds it hard to believe that respondent
would have mistakenly been under the impression that
a case for physical injuries was filed against his client
when there was no such case filed. Respondent was
either negligently reckless or he had mischievous
intentions to deceive the trial court. In any case, he
committed a transgression for which he should be
punished.
However, the graver sin of respondent is, and this he
admits, that he appeared as counsel before a trial court
on at least two (2) occasions notwithstanding the fact
that he had been suspended by the Supreme Court from
the practice of law. Despite professing his contrition in
his Answer, this Commission is not convinced.
Otherwise, respondent should have had, at the onset of
the proceedings, admitted to his misdeeds and put his
fate squarely with the disciplinary body. Yet, he
proceeded to fight the charges against him.
Moreover, if respondent was indeed moved by altruistic
intentions when he made those appearances before the
trial court despite having been suspended, he could have
so informed the Presiding Judge of his plight and
explained why the party he was representing could not
attend. Yet, what he proceeded to do was to enter his
appearance as counsel. Indeed, it is beyond doubt he
trifled with the suspension order handed by the Supreme
Court.
If there is one thing going for respondent, it is that the
passage of time with which this case remains pending
makes it difficult to impose a penalty of suspension on
him. Under normal circumstances, this Commission
would not have thought twice of suspending respondent.
However, the acts committed by respondent occurred
over TWENTY (20) YEARS ago. It would not be fair to
now impose a suspension on respondent, more so
considering that he is, in all likelihood, in the twilight of
his career.
On the other hand, there is still a need to discipline
respondent if only to set an example to other lawyers
that suspension orders of the Supreme Court cannot
simply be ignored. Thus, it is the recommendation of the
undersigned that respondent be meted a fine of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) and that he be heavily
reprimanded for his actions, the passage of time
notwithstanding.[6]
On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed its
Resolution[7] adopting the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner. It, however, deleted the imposition of
fine.
The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP but not
with respect to the penalty.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who
show that they possess and continue to possess the legal
qualifications for it. Indeed, lawyers are expected to
maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency
and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. They must perform their four-fold duty to
society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients,
in accordance with the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[8]
Atty. Magats act clearly falls short of the standards set
by the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly
Rule 10.01, which provides:
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
In this case, the Court agrees with the observation of the
IBP that there was a deliberate intent on the part of Atty.
Magat to mislead the court when he filed the motion to
dismiss the criminal charges on the basis of double
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 LEGAL PROFESSION
CASES BATCH # 4
jeopardy. Atty. Magat should not make any false and
untruthful statements in his pleadings. If it were true
that there was a similar case for slight physical injuries
that was really filed in court, all he had to do was to
secure a certification from that court that, indeed, a case
was filed.
Furthermore, Atty. Magat expressly admitted appearing
in court on two occasions despite having been suspended
from the practice of law by the Court. Under Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from office as an attorney for
a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court and/or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an
attorney without authority to do so. It provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. [Underlining
supplied]
As stated, if Atty. Magat was truly moved by altruistic
intentions when he appeared before the trial court
despite having been suspended, he could have informed
the Presiding Judge of his plight and explained why the
party he was representing could not attend. On the
contrary, Atty. Magat kept his silence and proceeded to
represent his client as counsel.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ceferino R. Magat is
hereby ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for six (6) months with a WARNING that the
commission of the same or similar offense in the future
would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED
"RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE
FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE
ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For disposition of the Court are the various submissions
of the 37 respondent law professors1 in response to the
Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause
Resolution), directing them to show cause why they
should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for
violation of specific provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility enumerated therein.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause
Resolution clearly dockets this as an administrative
matter, not a special civil action for indirect contempt
under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the
dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P.
A. Sereno (Justice Sereno) to the said October 19, 2010
Show Cause Resolution. Neither is this a disciplinary
proceeding grounded on an allegedly irregularly
concluded finding of indirect contempt as intimated by
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (Justice
Morales) in her dissenting opinions to both the October
19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution and the present
decision.
With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary
proceeding firmly in mind, the Court finds that with the
exception of one respondent whose compliance was
adequate and another who manifested he was not a
member of the Philippine Bar, the submitted
explanations, being mere denials and/or tangential to
the issues at hand, are decidedly unsatisfactory. The
proffered defenses even more urgently behoove this
Court to call the attention of respondent law professors,
who are members of the Bar, to the relationship of their
duties as such under the Code of Professional
Responsibility to their civil rights as citizens and
academics in our free and democratic republic.
The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility
involved in this case are as follows:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes.
RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence
in the legal system.
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good
faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision
or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert
as a fact that which has not been proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of
procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends
of justice.
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.
RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a
Judge to the proper authorities only.
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his
cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to
influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the
court.
Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our
view that when lawyers speak their minds, they must
ever be mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical
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 LEGAL PROFESSION
CASES BATCH # 4
standards of their profession, and in particular, avoid foul
and abusive language to condemn the Supreme Court,
or any court for that matter, for a decision it has
rendered, especially during the pendency of a motion for
such decision’s reconsideration. The accusation of
plagiarism against a member of this Court is not the real
issue here but rather this plagiarism issue has been used
to deflect everyone’s attention from the actual concern
of this Court to determine by respondents’ explanations
whether or not respondent members of the Bar have
crossed the line of decency and acceptable professional
conduct and speech and violated the Rules of Court
through improper intervention or interference as third
parties to a pending case. Preliminarily, it should be
stressed that it was respondents themselves who called
upon the Supreme Court to act on their
Statement,2 which they formally submitted, through
Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean Leonen), for the
Court’s proper disposition. Considering the defenses of
freedom of speech and academic freedom invoked by the
respondents, it is worth discussing here that the legal
reasoning used in the past by this Court to rule that
freedom of expression is not a defense in administrative
cases against lawyers for using intemperate speech in
open court or in court submissions can similarly be
applied to respondents’ invocation of academic freedom.
Indeed, it is precisely because respondents are not
merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould the
minds of young aspiring attorneys that respondents’ own
non-observance of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, even if purportedly motivated by the
purest of intentions, cannot be ignored nor glossed over
by this Court.
To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of
respondents’ actuations, it is apropos to revisit the
factual antecedents of this case.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Antecedent Facts and Proceedings
On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice
Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo) in Vinuya, et al.
v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was
promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the counsel3 for
Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Vinuya decision, raising solely the
following grounds:
I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories
reject this Honorable Courts’ (sic) assertion that the
Executive’s foreign policy prerogatives are virtually
unlimited; precisely, under the relevant jurisprudence
and constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are
proscribed by international human rights and
humanitarian standards, including those provided for in
the relevant international conventions of which the
Philippines is a party.4
II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic
protection with the broader, if fundamental,
responsibility of states to protect the human rights of its
citizens – especially where the rights asserted are
subject of erga omnes obligations and pertain to jus
cogens norms.5
On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys.
H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and Romel Regalado
Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230, where they posited
for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the
grounds for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision.
Among other arguments, Attys. Roque and Bagares
asserted that:
I.
IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS
HONORABLE COURT’S JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO
PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST THREE SOURCES – AN ARTICLE
PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND AN
ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN
RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW – AND
MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THESE SOURCES SUPPORT THE
JUDGMENT’S ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSING THE
INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN TRUTH, THE PLAGIARIZED
SOURCES EVEN MAKE A STRONG CASE FOR THE
PETITION’S CLAIMS.7
They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the
evidence bears out the fact not only of extensive
plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of
the plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit the
arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying the
Petition."8
According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works
allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya decision were namely:
(1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s article "A
Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens;"9 (2) Christian J. Tams’
book Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International
Law;10 and (3) Mark Ellis’ article "Breaking the Silence:
On Rape as an International Crime."11
On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration on July 19, 2010, journalists Aries C.
Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted an article, entitled "SC
justice plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort women," on
the Newsbreak website.12 The same article appeared on
the GMA News TV website also on July 19, 2010.13
On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque’s column, entitled
"Plagiarized and Twisted," appeared in the Manila
Standard Today.14 In the said column, Atty. Roque
claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle, one of the authors
purportedly not properly acknowledged in the Vinuya
decision, confirmed that his work, co-authored with Prof.
Evan Fox-Decent, had been plagiarized. Atty. Roque
quoted Prof. Criddle’s response to the post by Julian Ku
regarding the news report15 on the alleged plagiarism in
the international law blog, Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle
responded to Ku’s blog entry in this wise:
The newspaper’s16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a
motion for reconsideration filed yesterday with the
Philippine Supreme Court yesterday. The motion is
available here:
http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-
motion-alleging-plagiarism-in-the-supreme-court/
The motion suggests that the Court’s decision contains
thirty-four sentences and citations that are identical to
sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL article (co-
authored with Evan Fox-Decent). Professor Fox-Decent
and I were unaware of the petitioners’ [plagiarism]
allegations until after the motion was filed today.
Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the
court’s jus cogens discussion is that it implies that the
prohibitions against crimes against humanity, sexual
slavery, and torture are not jus cogens norms. Our
article emphatically asserts the opposite. The Supreme
Court’s decision is available
here: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/ap
ril2010/162230.htm17
On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote
to his colleagues on the Court in reply to the charge of
plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration.18
In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly
plagiarized author in the Vinuya decision, Dr. Mark Ellis,
wrote the Court, to wit:
Your Honours:
I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come
to my attention in the last few days.
Much as I regret to raise this matter before your
esteemed Court, I am compelled, as a question of the
integrity of my work as an academic and as an advocate
of human rights and humanitarian law, to take exception
to the possible unauthorized use of my law review article
on rape as an international crime in your esteemed
Court’s Judgment in the case of Vinuya et al. v. Executive
Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230, Judgment of 28 April
2010).
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My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue
of possible plagiarism by the Philippine chapter of the
Southeast Asia Media Legal Defence Initiative
(SEAMLDI),19 an affiliate of the London-based Media
Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI), where I sit as trustee.
In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the
extensive discussion in footnote 65, pp. 27-28, of the
said Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also
concerned that your esteemed Court may have misread
the arguments I made in the article and employed them
for cross purposes. This would be ironic since the article
was written precisely to argue for the appropriate legal
remedy for victims of war crimes, genocide, and crimes
against humanity.
I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case
Western Reserve Journal of International Law in 2006
has been made available to your esteemed Court. I trust
that your esteemed Court will take the time to carefully
study the arguments I made in the article.
I would appreciate receiving a response from your
esteemed Court as to the issues raised by this letter.
With respect,
(Sgd.)
Dr. Mark Ellis20
In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27,
2010, the Court formed the Committee on Ethics and
Ethical Standards (the Ethics Committee) pursuant to
Section 13, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court. In an En Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010,
the Court referred the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del
Castillo to the Ethics Committee. The matter was
subsequently docketed as A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys.
Roque and Bagares to comment on the letter of Justice
Del Castillo.21
On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010,
entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty
of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the
Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the
Supreme Court" (the Statement), was posted in
Newsbreak’s website22 and on Atty. Roque’s blog.23 A
report regarding the statement also appeared on various
on-line news sites, such as the GMA News TV24 and the
Sun Star25 sites, on the same date. The statement was
likewise posted at the University of the Philippines
College of Law’s bulletin board allegedly on August 10,
201026 and at said college’s website.27
On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of
the Statement of the University of the Philippines College
of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the Court, through
Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice Corona).
The cover letter dated August 10, 2010 of Dean Leonen
read:
The Honorable
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines
Through: Hon. Renato C. Corona
Chief Justice
Subject: Statement of faculty
from the UP College of Law
on the Plagiarism in the case of
Vinuya v Executive Secretary
Your Honors:
We attach for your information and proper disposition a
statement signed by thirty[-]eight (38)28members of the
faculty of the UP College of Law. We hope that its points
could be considered by the Supreme Court en banc.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.)
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Dean and Professor of Law
(Emphases supplied.)
The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted
letter did not contain the actual signatures of the alleged
signatories but only stated the names of 37 UP Law
professors with the notation (SGD.) appearing beside
each name. For convenient reference, the text of the UP
Law faculty Statement is reproduced here:
RESTORING INTEGRITY
A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been
committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered
abuse during a time of war. After they courageously
came out with their very personal stories of abuse and
suffering as "comfort women", waited for almost two
decades for any meaningful relief from their own
government as well as from the government of Japan,
got their hopes up for a semblance of judicial recourse in
the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
162230 (28 April 2010), they only had these hopes
crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty
and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land.
It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University
of the Philippines College of Law views the charge that
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court committed
plagiarism and misrepresentation in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary. The plagiarism and misrepresentation are not
only affronts to the individual scholars whose work have
been appropriated without correct attribution, but also a
serious threat to the integrity and credibility of the
Philippine Judicial System.
In common parlance, ‘plagiarism’ is the appropriation
and misrepresentation of another person’s work as one’s
own. In the field of writing, it is cheating at best, and
stealing at worst. It constitutes a taking of someone
else’s ideas and expressions, including all the effort and
creativity that went into committing such ideas and
expressions into writing, and then making it appear that
such ideas and expressions were originally created by
the taker. It is dishonesty, pure and simple. A judicial
system that allows plagiarism in any form is one that
allows dishonesty. Since all judicial decisions form part
of the law of the land, to allow plagiarism in the Supreme
Court is to allow the production of laws by dishonest
means. Evidently, this is a complete perversion and
falsification of the ends of justice.
A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original
source material shows that the ponente merely copied
select portions of other legal writers’ works and
interspersed them into the decision as if they were his
own, original work. Under the circumstances, however,
because the Decision has been promulgated by the
Court, the Decision now becomes the Court’s and no
longer just the ponente’s. Thus the Court also bears the
responsibility for the Decision. In the absence of any
mention of the original writers’ names and the
publications from which they came, the thing speaks for
itself.
So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from
the ponente of this case and the spokesman of the Court.
It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the
footnotes from the original articles is a reference to the
‘primary’ sources relied upon. This cursory explanation
is not acceptable, because the original authors’ writings
and the effort they put into finding and summarizing
those primary sources are precisely the subject of
plagiarism. The inclusion of the footnotes together with
portions of their writings in fact aggravates, instead of
mitigates, the plagiarism since it provides additional
evidence of a deliberate intention to appropriate the
original authors’ work of organizing and analyzing those
primary sources.
It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot
be expected to be familiar with all legal and scholarly
journals. This is also not acceptable, because personal
unfamiliarity with sources all the more demands correct
and careful attribution and citation of the material relied
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 LEGAL PROFESSION
CASES BATCH # 4
upon. It is a matter of diligence and competence that requires competence and integrity completely above
expected of all Magistrates of the Highest Court of the any and all reproach, in accordance with the exacting
Land. demands of judicial and professional ethics.
But a far more serious matter is the objection of the With these considerations, and bearing in mind the
original writers, Professors Evan Criddle and Evan Fox- solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers
Descent, that the High Court actually misrepresents the in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty
conclusions of their work entitled "A Fiduciary Theory of of the University of the Philippine College of Law that:
Jus Cogens," the main source of the plagiarized text. In (1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v.
this article they argue that the classification of the crimes Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in
of rape, torture, and sexual slavery as crimes against breach of the high standards of moral conduct and
humanity have attained the status of jus cogens, making judicial and professional competence expected of the
it obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on behalf Supreme Court;
of its aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses (2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity
parts of the same article to arrive at the contrary and credibility of the entire Supreme Court and
conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual dishonesty undermines the foundations of the Philippine judicial
of copying works without attribution by transforming it system by allowing implicitly the decision of cases and
into an act of intellectual fraud by copying works in order the establishment of legal precedents through dubious
to mislead and deceive. means;
The case is a potential landmark decision in International (3) The same breach and consequent disposition of
Law, because it deals with State liability and the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial function
responsibility for personal injury and damage suffered in of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice
a time of war, and the role of the injured parties’ home to all those who have been left without legal or equitable
States in the pursuit of remedies against such injury or recourse, such as the petitioners therein;
damage. National courts rarely have such opportunities (4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching
to make an international impact. That the petitioners nature of the dishonesty and to save the honor and
were Filipino "comfort women" who suffered from horrific dignity of the Supreme Court as an institution, it is
abuse during the Second World War made it incumbent necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive
on the Court of last resort to afford them every Secretary to resign his position, without prejudice to any
solicitude. But instead of acting with urgency on this other sanctions that the Court may consider appropriate;
case, the Court delayed its resolution for almost seven (5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to
years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners review the manner by which it conducts research,
seeking justice from the Court. When it dismissed prepares drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions in order
the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and to prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to provide
plagiarized materials, the Court decided this case based clear and concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to
on polluted sources. By so doing, the Supreme Court ensure only the highest quality of legal research and
added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its writing in pleadings, practice, and adjudication.
"power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of
take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous Law, Quezon City, 27 July 2010.
disposition, coupled with false sympathy and (SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for Dean and Professor of Law
even the most basic values of decency and respect. The
reputation of the Philippine Supreme Court and the (SGD.) FROILAN M. (SGD.) PACIFICO
standing of the Philippine legal profession before other BACUNGAN A. AGABIN
Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake. Dean (1978-1983) Dean (1989-1995)
The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute
honesty in its decisions and cannot accept excuses for
(SGD.) SALVADOR
failure to attain the highest standards of conduct (SGD.) MERLIN M.
T. CARLOTA
imposed upon all members of the Bench and Bar because MAGALLONA
Dean (2005-2008)
these undermine the very foundation of its authority and Dean (1995-1999)
and Professor of Law
power in a democratic society. Given the Court’s recent
history and the controversy that surrounded it, it cannot REGULAR FACULTY
allow the charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to
pass without sanction as this would only further erode (SGD.) CARMELO (SGD.) JAY L.
faith and confidence in the judicial system. And in light V. SISON BATONGBACAL
of the significance of this decision to the quest for justice Professor Assistant Professor
not only of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in
the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse
and exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly (SGD.) PATRICIA
deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of R.P. SALVADOR (SGD.) EVELYN
pilfered and misinterpreted texts. DAWAY (LEO) D. BATTAD
The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its Associate Dean and Assistant Professor
moral authority without ensuring that its own conduct, Associate Professor
whether collectively or through its Members, is beyond
reproach. This necessarily includes ensuring that not (SGD.) DANTE B. (SGD.) GWEN G.
only the content, but also the processes of preparing and GATMAYTAN DE VERA
writing its own decisions, are credible and beyond Associate Professor Assistant Professor
question. The Vinuya Decision must be conscientiously
reviewed and not casually cast aside, if not for the
purpose of sanction, then at least for the purpose of (SGD.) THEODORE (SGD.) SOLOMON
reflection and guidance. It is an absolutely essential step O. TE F. LUMBA
toward the establishment of a higher standard of Assistant Professor Assistant Professor
professional care and practical scholarship in the Bench
and Bar, which are critical to improving the system of
administration of justice in the Philippines. It is also a (SGD.) FLORIN T. (SGD.) ROMMEL J.
very crucial step in ensuring the position of the Supreme HILBAY CASIS
Court as the Final Arbiter of all controversies: a position Assistant Professor Assistant Professor

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LECTURERS On both aspects, I would appreciate a prompt response
(SGD.) JOSE GERARDO from your Honourable Court.
(SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA I remain
A. ALAMPAY
Sincerely yours
(SGD.) ARTHUR P. (SGD.) DINA D.
(Sgd.)
AUTEA LUCENARIO
Christian J. Tams31
(SGD.) ROSA MARIA J. In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty.
(SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH
BAUTISTA Bagares’ exhibits during the August 26, 2010 hearing in
(SGD.) MARK R. (SGD.) ANTONIO M. the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, the Ethics
BOCOBO SANTOS Committee noted that Exhibit "J" (a copy of the Restoring
(SGD.) VICENTE V. Integrity Statement) was not signed but merely reflected
(SGD.) DAN P. CALICA the names of certain faculty members with the letters
MENDOZA
(SGD.) beside the names. Thus, the Ethics Committee
(SGD.) TRISTAN A. (SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL directed Atty. Roque to present the signed copy of the
CATINDIG S. QUIMBO said Statement within three days from the August 26
(SGD.) SANDRA MARIE (SGD.) GMELEEN FAYE hearing.32
O. CORONEL B. TOMBOC It was upon compliance with this directive that the Ethics
(SGD.) ROSARIO O. (SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX Committee was given a copy of the signed UP Law
GALLO L. TY Faculty Statement that showed on the signature pages
the names of the full roster of the UP Law Faculty, 81
(SGD.) CONCEPCION L. (SGD.) EVALYN G.
faculty members in all. Indubitable from the actual
JARDELEZA URSUA
signed copy of the Statement was that only 37 of the 81
(SGD.) ANTONIO G.M. (SGD.) RAUL T. faculty members appeared to have signed the same.
LA VIÑA VASQUEZ However, the 37 actual signatories to the Statement did
(SGD.) SUSAN D. not include former Supreme Court Associate Justice
(SGD.) CARINA C. Vicente V. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) as represented in
VILLANUEVA29
LAFORTEZA the previous copies of the Statement submitted by Dean
(Underscoring supplied.)
Meanwhile, in a letter dated August 18, 2010, Prof. Leonen and Atty. Roque. It also appeared that Atty.
Christian J. Tams made known his sentiments on the Miguel R. Armovit (Atty. Armovit) signed the Statement
alleged plagiarism issue to the Court.30 We quote Prof. although his name was not included among the
Tams’ letter here: signatories in the previous copies submitted to the Court.
Glasgow, 18 August 2010 Thus, the total number of ostensible signatories to the
Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. Statement remained at 37.
162230) The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court
Hon. Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice en banc since the same Statement, having been formally
Your Excellency, submitted by Dean Leonen on August 11, 2010, was
My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of already under consideration by the Court.33
international law at the University of Glasgow. I am In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en
writing to you in relation to the use of one of my banc made the following observations regarding the UP
publications in the above-mentioned judgment of your Law Faculty Statement:
Honourable Court. Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the
The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on educators’ opinion on the allegations of plagiarism
p. 30 of your Court’s Judgment, in the section addressing against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation
the concept of obligations erga omnes. As the table not only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular,
annexed to this letter shows, the relevant sentences they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s
were taken almost word by word from the introductory explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the
chapter of my book Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion
International Law (Cambridge University Press 2005). I to those of the authors of the articles supposedly
note that there is a generic reference to my work in plagiarized.
footnote 69 of the Judgment, but as this is in relation to Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain
a citation from another author (Bruno Simma) rather remarks which raise concern for the Court. The opening
than with respect to the substantive passages sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional
reproduced in the Judgment, I do not think it can be attack that lay ahead. It reads:
considered an appropriate form of referencing. An extraordinary act of injustice has again been
I am particularly concerned that my work should have committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered
been used to support the Judgment’s cautious approach abuse during a time of war.
to the erga omnes concept. In fact, a most cursory The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the
reading shows that my book’s central thesis is precisely decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as
the opposite: namely that the erga omnes concept has a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation
been widely accepted and has a firm place in by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.
contemporary international law. Hence the introductory The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated
chapter notes that "[t]he present study attempts to by imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of
demystify aspects of the ‘very mysterious’ concept and the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted
thereby to facilitate its implementation" (p. 5). In the sources," the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of
same vein, the concluding section notes that "the petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed
preceding chapters show that the concept is now a part alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for
of the reality of international law, established in the even the most basic values of decency and respect.34 x
jurisprudence of courts and the practice of States" (p. x x. (Underscoring ours.)
309). In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that:
With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary
loss to see how my work should have been cited to is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society,
support – as it seemingly has – the opposite approach. there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism
More generally, I am concerned at the way in which your only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the
Honourable Court’s Judgment has drawn on scholarly judiciary cross the line to become harmful and
work without properly acknowledging it. irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating
attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the

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independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on
being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its
business in an orderly manner, free from outside
interference obstructive of its functions and tending to
embarrass the administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose
for the faculty’s less than objective comments except to
discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case
and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and
competence in addressing the motion for its
reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women’s
claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty
would fan the flames and invite resentment against a
resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This
runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and
officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity
and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity
according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and
not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice.35 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases and
underscoring supplied.)
Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen,
Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M.
Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison,
Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan,
Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal,
Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F.
Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay,
Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J.
Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A.
Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo,
Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C.
Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel
S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B.
Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul T.
Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario to
show cause, within ten (10) days from receipt of the
copy of the Resolution, why they should not be
disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons
1,36 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.37
Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause within
the same period why he should not be disciplinarily dealt
with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and
10.03 for submitting through his letter dated August 10,
2010, during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230 and of
the investigation before the Ethics Committee, for the
consideration of the Court en banc, a dummy which is
not a true and faithful reproduction of the UP Law Faculty
Statement.38
In the same Resolution, the present controversy was
docketed as a regular administrative matter.
Summaries of the Pleadings Filed by Respondents in
Response to the October 19, 2010 Show Cause
Resolution
On November 19, 2010, within the extension for filing
granted by the Court, respondents filed the following
pleadings:
(1) Compliance dated November 18, 2010 by counsels
for 35 of the 37 respondents, excluding Prof. Owen Lynch
and Prof. Raul T. Vasquez, in relation to the charge of
violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and
11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
(2) Compliance and Reservation dated November 18,
2010 by Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista in relation to
the same charge in par. (1);
(3) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for
Prof. Raul T. Vasquez in relation to the same charge in
par. (1);
(4) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsels
for Dean Leonen, in relation to the charge of violation of
Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03; and
(5) Manifestation dated November 19, 2010 by counsel
for Prof. Owen Lynch.
Common Compliance of 35 Respondents (Excluding Prof.
Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul Vasquez)
Thirty-five (35) of the respondent UP Law professors
filed on November 19, 2010 a common compliance which
was signed by their respective counsels (the Common
Compliance). In the "Preface" of said Common
Compliance, respondents stressed that "[they] issued
the Restoring Integrity Statement in the discharge of the
‘solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers
in the profession of law,’ and as members of the Bar to
speak out on a matter of public concern and one that is
of vital interest to them."39 They likewise alleged that
"they acted with the purest of intentions" and pointed
out that "none of them was involved either as party or
counsel"40 in the Vinuya case. Further, respondents
"note with concern" that the Show Cause Resolution’s
findings and conclusions were "a prejudgment – that
respondents indeed are in contempt, have breached
their obligations as law professors and officers of the
Court, and have violated ‘Canons [1], 11 and 13 and
Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility."41
By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the
following points:
(a) Respondents’ alleged noble intentions
In response to the charges of failure to observe due
respect to legal processes42 and the courts43 and of
tending to influence, or giving the appearance of
influencing the Court44 in the issuance of their
Statement, respondents assert that their intention was
not to malign the Court but rather to defend its integrity
and credibility and to ensure continued confidence in the
legal system. Their noble motive was purportedly
evidenced by the portion of their Statement "focusing on
constructive action."45 Respondents’ call in the
Statement for the Court "to provide clear and concise
guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest
quality of legal research and writing in adjudication," was
reputedly "in keeping with strictures enjoining lawyers to
‘participate in the development of the legal system by
initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the
improvement of the administration of justice’" (under
Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility) and
to "promote respect for the law and legal processes"
(under Canon 1, id.).46 Furthermore, as academics, they
allegedly have a "special interest and duty to vigilantly
guard against plagiarism and misrepresentation because
these unwelcome occurrences have a profound impact in
the academe, especially in our law schools."47
Respondents further "[called] on this Court not to
misconstrue the Restoring Integrity Statement as an
‘institutional attack’ x x x on the basis of its first and
ninth paragraphs."48 They further clarified that at the
time the Statement was allegedly drafted and agreed
upon, it appeared to them the Court "was not going to
take any action on the grave and startling allegations of
plagiarism and misrepresentation."49 According to
respondents, the bases for their belief were (i) the news
article published on July 21, 2010 in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer wherein Court Administrator Jose Midas P.
Marquez was reported to have said that Chief Justice
Corona would not order an inquiry into the matter;50 and
(ii) the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo which
they claimed "did nothing but to downplay the gravity of
the plagiarism and misrepresentation
charges."51 Respondents claimed that it was their
perception of the Court’s indifference to the dangers
posed by the plagiarism allegations against Justice Del
Castillo that impelled them to urgently take a public
stand on the issue.
(b) The "correctness" of respondents’ position that
Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism and should be
held accountable in accordance with the standards of
academic writing
A significant portion of the Common Compliance is
devoted to a discussion of the merits of respondents’
charge of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo. Relying
on University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court
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of Appeals52 and foreign materials and jurisprudence,
respondents essentially argue that their position
regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del
Castillo is the correct view and that they are therefore
justified in issuing their Restoring Integrity Statement.
Attachments to the Common Compliance included,
among others: (i) the letter dated October 28, 2010 of
Peter B. Payoyo, LL.M, Ph.D.,53 sent to Chief Justice
Corona through Justice Sereno, alleging that the Vinuya
decision likewise lifted without proper attribution the text
from a legal article by Mariana Salazar Albornoz that
appeared in the Anuario Mexicano De Derecho
Internacional and from an International Court of Justice
decision; and (ii) a 2008 Human Rights Law Review
Article entitled "Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and
International Human Rights Law" by Michael O’Flaherty
and John Fisher, in support of their charge that Justice
Del Castillo also lifted passages from said article without
proper attribution, but this time, in his ponencia in Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections.54
(c) Respondents’ belief that they are being "singled out"
by the Court when others have likewise spoken on the
"plagiarism issue"
In the Common Compliance, respondents likewise
asserted that "the plagiarism and misrepresentation
allegations are legitimate public issues."55 They
identified various published reports and opinions, in
agreement with and in opposition to the stance of
respondents, on the issue of plagiarism, specifically:
(i) Newsbreak report on July 19, 2010 by Aries Rufo and
Purple Romero;56
(ii) Column of Ramon Tulfo which appeared in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer on July 24, 2010;57
(iii) Editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on
July 25, 2010;58
(iv) Letter dated July 22, 2010 of Justice Del Castillo
published in the Philippine Star on July 30, 2010;59
(v) Column of Former Intellectual Property Office
Director General Adrian Cristobal, Jr. published in the
Business Mirror on August 5, 2010;60
(vi) Column of Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 8,
2010;61
(vii) News report regarding Senator Francis Pangilinan’s
call for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo published in
the Daily Tribune and the Manila Standard Today on July
31, 2010;62
(viii) News reports regarding the statement of Dean
Cesar Villanueva of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law on the calls for the resignation of Justice
Del Castillo published in The Manila Bulletin, the
Philippine Star and the Business Mirror on August 11,
2010;63
(ix) News report on expressions of support for Justice
Del Castillo from a former dean of the Pamantasan ng
Lungsod ng Maynila, the Philippine Constitutional
Association, the Judges Association of Bulacan and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Bulacan Chapter
published in the Philippine Star on August 16,
2010;64 and
(x) Letter of the Dean of the Liceo de Cagayan University
College of Law published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer
on August 10, 2010.65
In view of the foregoing, respondents alleged that this
Court has singled them out for sanctions and the charge
in the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010
that they may have violated specific canons of the Code
of Professional Responsibility is unfair and without basis.
(d) Freedom of expression
In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common Compliance,
respondents briefly discussed their position that in
issuing their Statement, "they should be seen as not only
to be performing their duties as members of the Bar,
officers of the court, and teachers of law, but also as
citizens of a democracy who are constitutionally
protected in the exercise of free speech."66 In support of
this contention, they cited United States v. Bustos,67In
re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, 68 and In the Matter of
Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of
Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections.69
(e) Academic freedom
In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common Compliance,
respondents asserted that their Statement was also
issued in the exercise of their academic freedom as
teachers in an institution of higher learning. They relied
on Section 5 of the University of the Philippines Charter
of 2008 which provided that "[t]he national university
has the right and responsibility to exercise academic
freedom." They likewise adverted to Garcia v. The
Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology70 which they claimed recognized the extent
and breadth of such freedom as to encourage a free and
healthy discussion and communication of a faculty
member’s field of study without fear of reprisal. It is
respondents’ view that had they remained silent on the
plagiarism issue in the Vinuya decision they would have
"compromised [their] integrity and credibility as
teachers; [their silence] would have created a culture
and generation of students, professionals, even lawyers,
who would lack the competence and discipline for
research and pleading; or, worse, [that] their silence
would have communicated to the public that plagiarism
and misrepresentation are inconsequential matters and
that intellectual integrity has no bearing or relevance to
one’s conduct."71
In closing, respondents’ Common Compliance exhorted
this Court to consider the following portion of the
dissenting opinion of Justice George A. Malcolm in
Salcedo v. Hernandez,72 to wit:
Respect for the courts can better be obtained by
following a calm and impartial course from the bench
than by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary
by chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious
exposition of his side of a case. The Philippines needs
lawyers of independent thought and courageous bearing,
jealous of the interests of their clients and unafraid of
any court, high or low, and the courts will do well
tolerantly to overlook occasional intemperate language
soon to be regretted by the lawyer which affects in no
way the outcome of a case.73
On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe
they are entitled, the Common Compliance stated, thus:
WHEREFORE:
A. Respondents, as citizens of a democracy, professors
of law, members of the Bar and officers of the Court,
respectfully pray that:
1. the foregoing be noted; and
2. the Court reconsider and reverse its adverse findings
in the Show Cause Resolution, including its conclusions
that respondents have: [a] breached their "obligation as
law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, … and not
to promote distrust in the administration of justice;" and
[b] committed "violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and
Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility."
B. In the event the Honorable Court declines to grant the
foregoing prayer, respondents respectfully pray, in the
alternative, and in assertion of their due process rights,
that before final judgment be rendered:
1. the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing;
2. respondents be given a fair and full opportunity to
refute and/or address the findings and conclusions of
fact in the Show Cause Resolution (including especially
the finding and conclusion of a lack of malicious intent),
and in that connection, that appropriate procedures and
schedules for hearing be adopted and defined that will
allow them the full and fair opportunity to require the
production of and to present testimonial, documentary,
and object evidence bearing on the plagiarism and
misrepresentation issues in Vinuya v. Executive
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Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010) and In the
Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against
Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-
17-SC); and
3. respondents be given fair and full access to the
transcripts, records, drafts, reports and submissions in
or relating to, and accorded the opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses who were or could have been
called in In The Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc.
Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC).74
Compliance and Reservation of Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-
Bautista
Although already included in the Common Compliance,
Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista (Prof. Juan-Bautista)
filed a separate Compliance and Reservation (the
Bautista Compliance), wherein she adopted the
allegations in the Common Compliance with some
additional averments.
Prof. Juan-Bautista reiterated that her due process rights
allegedly entitled her to challenge the findings and
conclusions in the Show Cause Resolution. Furthermore,
"[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered
indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, such may be punished only after charge
and hearing."75
Prof. Juan-Bautista stressed that respondents signed the
Statement "in good faith and with the best intentions to
protect the Supreme Court by asking one member to
resign."76 For her part, Prof. Juan-Bautista intimated
that her deep disappointment and sadness for the plight
of the Malaya Lolas were what motivated her to sign the
Statement.
On the point of academic freedom, Prof. Juan-Bautista
cited jurisprudence77 which in her view highlighted that
academic freedom is constitutionally guaranteed to
institutions of higher learning such that schools have the
freedom to determine for themselves who may teach,
what may be taught, how lessons shall be taught and
who may be admitted to study and that courts have no
authority to interfere in the schools’ exercise of
discretion in these matters in the absence of grave abuse
of discretion. She claims the Court has encroached on
the academic freedom of the University of the Philippines
and other universities on their right to determine how
lessons shall be taught.
Lastly, Prof. Juan-Bautista asserted that the Statement
was an exercise of respondents’ constitutional right to
freedom of expression that can only be curtailed when
there is grave and imminent danger to public safety,
public morale, public health or other legitimate public
interest.78
Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez
On November 19, 2010, Prof. Raul T. Vasquez (Prof.
Vasquez) filed a separate Compliance by registered mail
(the Vasquez Compliance). In said Compliance, Prof.
Vasquez narrated the circumstances surrounding his
signing of the Statement. He alleged that the Vinuya
decision was a topic of conversation among the UP Law
faculty early in the first semester (of academic year
2010-11) because it reportedly contained citations not
properly attributed to the sources; that he was shown a
copy of the Statement by a clerk of the Office of the Dean
on his way to his class; and that, agreeing in principle
with the main theme advanced by the Statement, he
signed the same in utmost good faith.79
In response to the directive from this Court to explain
why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar
under the Show Cause Resolution, Prof. Vasquez also
took the position that a lawyer has the right, like all
citizens in a democratic society, to comment on acts of
public officers. He invited the attention of the Court to
the following authorities: (a) In re: Vicente Sotto;80 (b)
In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen;81 and (c) a discussion
appearing in American Jurisprudence (AmJur) 2d.82 He
claims that he "never had any intention to unduly
influence, nor entertained any illusion that he could or
should influence, [the Court] in its disposition of the
Vinuya case"83 and that "attacking the integrity of [the
Court] was the farthest thing on respondent’s mind when
he signed the Statement."84Unlike his colleagues, who
wish to impress upon this Court the purported
homogeneity of the views on what constitutes
plagiarism, Prof. Vasquez stated in his Compliance that:
13. Before this Honorable Court rendered its Decision
dated 12 October 2010, some espoused the view that
willful and deliberate intent to commit plagiarism is an
essential element of the same. Others, like respondent,
were of the opinion that plagiarism is committed
regardless of the intent of the perpetrator, the way it has
always been viewed in the academe. This uncertainty
made the issue a fair topic for academic discussion in the
College. Now, this Honorable Court has ruled that
plagiarism presupposes deliberate intent to steal
another’s work and to pass it off as one’s
own.85 (Emphases supplied.)
Also in contrast to his colleagues, Prof. Vasquez was
willing to concede that he "might have been remiss in
correctly assessing the effects of such language [in the
Statement] and could have been more careful."86 He
ends his discussion with a respectful submission that
with his explanation, he has faithfully complied with the
Show Cause Resolution and that the Court will rule that
he had not in any manner violated his oath as a lawyer
and officer of the Court.
Separate Compliance of Dean Leonen regarding the
charge of violation of Canon 10 in relation to his
submission of a "dummy" of the UP Law Faculty
Statement to this Court
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen claimed that there were
three drafts/versions of the UP Law Faculty Statement,
which he described as follows:
"Restoring Integrity I" which bears the entire roster
of the faculty of the UP College of Law in its signing
pages, and the actual signatures of the thirty-seven (37)
faculty members subject of the Show Cause Resolution.
A copy was filed with the Honorable Court by Roque and
Butuyan on 31 August 2010 in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
"Restoring Integrity II" which does not bear any
actual physical signature, but which reflects as
signatories the names of thirty-seven (37) members of
the faculty with the notation "(SGD.)". A copy of
Restoring Integrity II was publicly and physically posted
in the UP College of Law on 10 August 2010. Another
copy of Restoring Integrity II was also officially received
by the Honorable Court from the Dean of the UP College
of Law on 11 August 2010, almost three weeks before
the filing of Restoring Integrity I.
"Restoring Integrity III" which is a reprinting of
Restoring Integrity II, and which presently serves as the
official file copy of the Dean’s Office in the UP College of
Law that may be signed by other faculty members who
still wish to. It bears the actual signatures of the thirty-
seven original signatories to Restoring Integrity I above
their printed names and the notation "(SGD.") and, in
addition, the actual signatures of eight (8) other
members of the faculty above their handwritten or
typewritten names.87
For purposes of this discussion, only Restoring Integrity
I and Restoring Integrity II are relevant since what Dean
Leonen has been directed to explain are the
discrepancies in the signature pages of these two
documents. Restoring Integrity III was never submitted
to this Court.
On how Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II
were prepared and came about, Dean Leonen alleged,
thus:
2.2 On 27 July 2010, sensing the emergence of a
relatively broad agreement in the faculty on a draft
statement, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to print the
draft and circulate it among the faculty members so that
those who wished to may sign. For this purpose, the staff
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encoded the law faculty roster to serve as the printed
draft’s signing pages. Thus did the first printed draft of
the Restoring Integrity Statement, Restoring Integrity I,
come into being.
2.3. As of 27 July 2010, the date of the Restoring
Integrity Statement, Dean Leonen was unaware that a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Honorable Court’s
Decision in Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No.
162230, 28 April 2010) had already been filed, or that
the Honorable Court was in the process of convening its
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards in A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC.
2.4. Dean Leonen’s staff then circulated Restoring
Integrity I among the members of the faculty. Some
faculty members visited the Dean’s Office to sign the
document or had it brought to their classrooms in the
College of Law, or to their offices or residences. Still
other faculty members who, for one reason or another,
were unable to sign Restoring Integrity I at that time,
nevertheless conveyed to Dean Leonen their assurances
that they would sign as soon as they could manage.
2.5. Sometime in the second week of August, judging
that Restoring Integrity I had been circulated long
enough, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to reproduce
the statement in a style and manner appropriate for
posting in the College of Law. Following his own
established practice in relation to significant public
issuances, he directed them to reformat the signing
pages so that only the names of those who signed the
first printed draft would appear, together with the
corresponding "(SGD.)" note following each name.
Restoring Integrity II thus came into being.88
According to Dean Leonen, the "practice of eliminating
blanks opposite or above the names of non-signatories
in the final draft of significant public issuances, is meant
not so much for aesthetic considerations as to secure the
integrity of such documents."89 He likewise claimed that
"[p]osting statements with blanks would be an open
invitation to vandals and pranksters."90
With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendoza’s name
as among the signatories in Restoring Integrity II when
in fact he did not sign Restoring Integrity I, Dean Leonen
attributed the mistake to a miscommunication involving
his administrative officer. In his Compliance, he narrated
that:
2.7. Upon being presented with a draft of Restoring
Integrity II with the reformatted signing pages, Dean
Leonen noticed the inclusion of the name of Justice
Mendoza among the "(SGD.)" signatories. As Justice
Mendoza was not among those who had physically
signed Restoring Integrity I when it was previously
circulated, Dean Leonen called the attention of his staff
to the inclusion of the Justice’s name among the
"(SGD.)" signatories in Restoring Integrity II.
2.8. Dean Leonen was told by his administrative officer
that she had spoken to Justice Mendoza over the phone
on Friday, 06 August 2010. According to her, Justice
Mendoza had authorized the dean to sign the Restoring
Integrity Statement for him as he agreed fundamentally
with its contents. Also according to her, Justice Mendoza
was unable at that time to sign the Restoring Integrity
Statement himself as he was leaving for the United
States the following week. It would later turn out that
this account was not entirely accurate.91(Underscoring
and italics supplied.)
Dean Leonen claimed that he "had no reason to doubt
his administrative officer, however, and so placed full
reliance on her account"92 as "[t]here were indeed other
faculty members who had also authorized the Dean to
indicate that they were signatories, even though they
were at that time unable to affix their signatures
physically to the document."93
However, after receiving the Show Cause Resolution,
Dean Leonen and his staff reviewed the circumstances
surrounding their effort to secure Justice Mendoza’s
signature. It would turn out that this was what actually
transpired:
2.22.1. On Friday, 06 August 2010, when the dean’s staff
talked to Justice Mendoza on the phone, he [Justice
Mendoza] indeed initially agreed to sign the Restoring
Integrity Statement as he fundamentally agreed with its
contents. However, Justice Mendoza did not exactly say
that he authorized the dean to sign the Restoring
Integrity Statement. Rather, he inquired if he could
authorize the dean to sign it for him as he was about to
leave for the United States. The dean’s staff informed
him that they would, at any rate, still try to bring the
Restoring Integrity Statement to him.
2.22.2. Due to some administrative difficulties, Justice
Mendoza was unable to sign the Restoring Integrity
Statement before he left for the U.S. the following week.
2.22.3. The staff was able to bring Restoring Integrity III
to Justice Mendoza when he went to the College to teach
on 24 September 2010, a day after his arrival from the
U.S. This time, Justice Mendoza declined to sign.94
According to the Dean:
2.23. It was only at this time that Dean Leonen realized
the true import of the call he received from Justice
Mendoza in late September. Indeed, Justice Mendoza
confirmed that by the time the hard copy of the
Restoring Integrity Statement was brought to him
shortly after his arrival from the U.S., he declined to sign
it because it had already become controversial. At that
time, he predicted that the Court would take some form
of action against the faculty. By then, and under those
circumstances, he wanted to show due deference to the
Honorable Court, being a former Associate Justice and
not wishing to unduly aggravate the situation by signing
the Statement.95 (Emphases supplied.)
With respect to the omission of Atty. Armovit’s name in
the signature page of Restoring Integrity II when he was
one of the signatories of Restoring Integrity I and the
erroneous description in Dean Leonen’s August 10, 2010
letter that the version of the Statement submitted to the
Court was signed by 38 members of the UP Law Faculty,
it was explained in the Compliance that:
Respondent Atty. Miguel Armovit physically signed
Restoring Integrity I when it was circulated to him.
However, his name was inadvertently left out by Dean
Leonen’s staff in the reformatting of the signing pages in
Restoring Integrity II. The dean assumed that his name
was still included in the reformatted signing pages, and
so mentioned in his cover note to Chief Justice Corona
that 38 members of the law faculty signed (the original
37 plus Justice Mendoza.)96
Dean Leonen argues that he should not be deemed to
have submitted a dummy of the Statement that was not
a true and faithful reproduction of the same. He
emphasized that the main body of the Statement was
unchanged in all its three versions and only the signature
pages were not the same. This purportedly is merely
"reflective of [the Statement’s] essential nature as a
‘live’ public manifesto meant to continuously draw
adherents to its message, its signatory portion is
necessarily evolving and dynamic x x x many other
printings of [the Statement] may be made in the future,
each one reflecting the same text but with more and
more signatories."97 Adverting to criminal law by
analogy, Dean Leonen claims that "this is not an instance
where it has been made to appear in a document that a
person has participated in an act when the latter did not
in fact so participate"98 for he "did not misrepresent
which members of the faculty of the UP College of Law
had agreed with the Restoring Integrity Statement
proper and/or had expressed their desire to be
signatories thereto."99
In this regard, Dean Leonen believes that he had not
committed any violation of Canon 10 or Rules 10.01 and
10.02 for he did not mislead nor misrepresent to the
Court the contents of the Statement or the identities of
the UP Law faculty members who agreed with, or
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expressed their desire to be signatories to, the
Statement. He also asserts that he did not commit any
violation of Rule 10.03 as he "coursed [the Statement]
through the appropriate channels by transmitting the
same to Honorable Chief Justice Corona for the latter’s
information and proper disposition with the hope that its
points would be duly considered by the Honorable Court
en banc."100 Citing Rudecon Management Corporation v.
Camacho,101 Dean Leonen posits that the required
quantum of proof has not been met in this case and that
no dubious character or motivation for the act
complained of existed to warrant an administrative
sanction for violation of the standard of honesty provided
for by the Code of Professional Responsibility.102
Dean Leonen ends his Compliance with an enumeration
of nearly identical reliefs as the Common Compliance,
including the prayers for a hearing and for access to the
records, evidence and witnesses allegedly relevant not
only in this case but also in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the
ethical investigation involving Justice Del Castillo.
Manifestation of Prof. Owen Lynch (Lynch Manifestation)
For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to
this Court that he is not a member of the Philippine bar;
but he is a member of the bar of the State of Minnesota.
He alleges that he first taught as a visiting professor at
the UP College of Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned in
the same capacity in 2010. He further alleges that "[h]e
subscribes to the principle, espoused by this Court and
the Supreme Court of the United States, that ‘…[d]ebate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide
open and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials."103 In signing the Statement, he
believes that "the right to speak means the right to
speak effectively."104 Citing the dissenting opinions in
Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio,
Jr.,105 Prof. Lynch argued that "[f]or speech to be
effective, it must be forceful enough to make the
intended recipients listen"106 and "[t]he quality of
education would deteriorate in an atmosphere of
repression, when the very teachers who are supposed to
provide an example of courage and self-assertiveness to
their pupils can speak only in timorous
whispers."107 Relying on the doctrine in In the Matter of
Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of
Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections,108Prof. Lynch believed that the Statement did
not pose any danger, clear or present, of any substantive
evil so as to remove it from the protective mantle of the
Bill of Rights (i.e., referring to the constitutional
guarantee on free speech).109 He also stated that he "has
read the Compliance of the other respondents to the
Show Cause Resolution" and that "he signed the
Restoring Integrity Statement for the same reasons they
did."110
ISSUES
Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of
the submissions of respondents, the material issues to
be resolved in this case are as follows:
1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents
their freedom of expression?
2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents’
academic freedom as law professors?
3.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily
explain why they should not be disciplined as Members
of the Bar under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02
and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen
satisfactorily explain why he should not be disciplined as
a Member of the Bar under Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02
and 10.03?
5.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause
Resolution set for hearing and in relation to such hearing,
are respondents entitled to require the production or
presentation of evidence bearing on the plagiarism and
misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No.
162230) and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo
(A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records
and transcripts of, and the witnesses and evidence
presented, or could have been presented, in the ethics
case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC)?
DISCUSSION
The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents
their freedom of expression.
It is respondents’ collective claim that the Court, with the
issuance of the Show Cause Resolution, has interfered
with respondents’ constitutionally mandated right to free
speech and expression. It appears that the underlying
assumption behind respondents’ assertion is the
misconception that this Court is denying them the right
to criticize the Court’s decisions and actions, and that
this Court seeks to "silence" respondent law professors’
dissenting view on what they characterize as a
"legitimate public issue."
This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause
Resolution will plainly show that it was neither the fact
that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court
nor that they had charged one of its members of
plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was the
manner of the criticism and the contumacious language
by which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels
in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor
of the petitioners in the said pending case for the "proper
disposition" and consideration of the Court that gave rise
to said Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution
painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court
considered excessive and uncalled for under the
circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication,
and later submission to this Court of the UP Law faculty’s
Restoring Integrity Statement.
To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that
respondents expressed a belief that Justice Del Castillo
was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression of
that belief as "not only as an established fact, but a
truth"111 when it was "[o]f public knowledge [that there
was] an ongoing investigation precisely to determine the
truth of such allegations."112 It was also pointed out in
the Show Cause Resolution that there was a pending
motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision.113 The
Show Cause Resolution made no objections to the
portions of the Restoring Integrity Statement that
respondents claimed to be "constructive" but only asked
respondents to explain those portions of the said
Statement that by no stretch of the imagination could be
considered as fair or constructive, to wit:
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain
remarks which raise concern for the Court. The opening
sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional
attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been
committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered
abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the
decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as
a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation
by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated
by imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of
the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted
sources," the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of
petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed
alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for
even the most basic values of decency and respect.114 x
x x. (Underscoring ours.)
To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized
respondents’ freedom of expression when it stated that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary
is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society,
there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism
only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the
judiciary cross the line to become harmful and
irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating
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attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the
independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on
being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its
business in an orderly manner, free from outside
interference obstructive of its functions and tending to
embarrass the administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose
for the faculty’s less than objective comments except to
discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case
and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and
competence in addressing the motion for its
reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women’s
claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty
would fan the flames and invite resentment against a
resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This
runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and
officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity
and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity
according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and
not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice.115 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases and
underscoring supplied.)
Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in
respondents’ submissions, this Court has held that the
right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be
balanced against the equally primordial concern that the
independence of the Judiciary be protected from due
influence or interference. In cases where the critics are
not only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence
has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to
discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the
courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or
extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment
and common decency.
As early as the 1935 case of Salcedo v.
Hernandez,116 the Court found Atty. Vicente J. Francisco
both guilty of contempt and liable administratively for
the following paragraph in his second motion for
reconsideration:
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of
record that the resolution of this court, denying our
motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and
constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner
Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will
expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong,
Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our
power in order that this error may be corrected by the
very court which has committed it, because we should
not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of
the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press
publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial
outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the
victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard
the prestige of this honorable court and of each and
every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at
the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous
decisions like these, which the affected party and his
thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust,
increase the proselytes of 'sakdalism' and make the
public lose confidence in the administration of
justice.117 (Emphases supplied.)
The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as
neither justified nor necessary and further held that:
[I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special
way to the essential points relied upon in his argument
and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons
stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases
in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to
reason and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to
make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente
J. Francisco has done, because both means are annoying
and good practice can never sanction them by reason of
their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free
exercise of a serene and impartial judgment, particularly
in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions
submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a more or less
veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein,
after the author shows the course which the voters of
Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that
they will resort to the press for the purpose of
denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of
which his client has been the victim; and because he
states in a threatening manner with the intention of
predisposing the mind of the reader against the court,
thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in
order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions
of the nature of that referred to in his motion promote
distrust in the administration of justice and increase the
proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and
revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of
public knowledge, occurred in this country a few days
ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the
dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority
thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco,
because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the
sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation,
it would maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that
it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted
erroneously.118 (Emphases supplied.)
Significantly, Salcedo is the decision from which
respondents culled their quote from the minority view
of Justice Malcolm. Moreover, Salcedo concerned
statements made in a pleading filed by a counsel in a
case, unlike the respondents here, who are neither
parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case and therefore, do
not have any standing at all to interfere in
the Vinuya case. Instead of supporting respondents’
theory, Salcedo is authority for the following principle:
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court,
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty
bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend
its integrity, not only because it has conferred upon him
the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158
and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of
justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep., 492, 669), but
also because in so doing, he neither creates nor
promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and
prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging
discontent which, in many cases, is the source of
disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which
rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those
who are aggrieved turn for protection and
relief.119 (Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the lawyer in Salcedo was fined
and reprimanded for his injudicious statements in his
pleading, by accusing the Court of "erroneous ruling."
Here, the respondents’ Statement goes way beyond
merely ascribing error to the Court.
Other cases cited by respondents likewise espouse
rulings contrary to their position. In re: Atty. Vicente
Raul Almacen,120 cited in the Common Compliance and
the Vasquez Compliance, was an instance where the
Court indefinitely suspended a member of the Bar for
filing and releasing to the press a "Petition to Surrender
Lawyer’s Certificate of Title" in protest of what he
claimed was a great injustice to his client committed by
the Supreme Court. In the decision, the petition was
described, thus:
He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal
"peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for
justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues,
who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust
judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims
before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that
he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules
the members of this Court, saying "that justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme
Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then
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vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's
forum," so that "the people may know of the silent
injustices committed by this Court," and that "whatever
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed
must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a
prayer that
"x x x a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to
receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and
counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any
time in the future and in the event we regain our faith
and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the
practice of the noblest profession."121
It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed
foreign jurisprudence on the principle that a lawyer, just
like any citizen, has the right to criticize and comment
upon actuations of public officers, including judicial
authority. However, the real doctrine in Almacen is that
such criticism of the courts, whether done in court or
outside of it, must conform to standards of fairness and
propriety. This case engaged in an even more extensive
discussion of the legal authorities sustaining this
view.1awphi1 To quote from that decision:
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it
shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair
criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate
and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a
lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person
obligations and duties which are not mere flux and
ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places
upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting
and more imperative than that of respectful behavior
toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself
"with all good fidelity x x x to the courts;" and the Rules
of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain
the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers."
The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain
towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake
of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for
the maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
"x x x the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume,
if they do not by express declaration take upon
themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not
merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but
to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of
justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not
discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous
demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of
court from all insulting language and offensive conduct
toward judges personally for their judicial acts."
(Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to
the courts is essential to the orderly administration of
justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights,
lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect — are
enjoined to rein up their tempers.
"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or
more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his
patience and temper to submit to rulings which he
regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are
as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as
they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions
of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal
appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be
the foremost in rendering respectful submission." (In Re
Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
xxxx
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide
his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a
mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an
attorney in private conversations or communications or
in the course of a political campaign, if couched in
insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute
the administration of justice, may subject the attorney
to disciplinary action.122 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied.)
In a similar vein, In re: Vicente Sotto,123 cited in the
Vasquez Compliance, observed that:
[T]his Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:
The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to
a pending cause, respecting the same, has always been
considered as misbehavior, tending to obstruct the
administration of justice, and subjects such persons to
contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right
to have their causes tried fairly in court, by an impartial
tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public clamor.
Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the
enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice
administered by the courts, under the protection and
forms of law, free from outside coercion or interference.
x x x.
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or
wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of
the court in a pending case made in good faith may be
tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the
court and contribute to the correction of an error if
committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously
erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in
reversing or modifying its decision. x x x.
xxxx
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the
last years committing deliberately "so many blunders
and injustices," that is to say, that it has been deciding
in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is
on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in
whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases
decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to
undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty
and integrity of the members of this Court, and
consequently to lower or degrade the administration of
justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to
which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for
their grievances or protection of their rights when these
are trampled upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members
of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their
own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be
the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the
courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court,
to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has
taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in
the administration of justice. Respect to the courts
guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.124 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
That the doctrinal pronouncements in these early cases
are still good law can be easily gleaned even from more
recent jurisprudence.
In Choa v. Chiongson,125 the Court administratively
disciplined a lawyer, through the imposition of a fine, for
making malicious and unfounded criticisms of a judge in
the guise of an administrative complaint and held, thus:
As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in
the sacred task of administering justice, graver
responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other
to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect
to its officers. This does not mean, however, that a
lawyer cannot criticize a judge. As we stated in Tiongco
vs. Hon. Aguilar:
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer
is an officer of the court, he cannot criticize the courts.
That is his right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an
officer of the court to avail of such right. Thus, in In Re:
Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court
explicitly declared:
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Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer
is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to
consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may
abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable
to a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which
would not expose him to legal animadversion as a
citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am Dec. 657, 665).
xxxx
Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as
this Court warned in Almacen:
But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it
shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair
criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate
and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is such a misconduct, that subjects
a lawyer to disciplinary action.
xxxx
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is
guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression
in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised
responsibly, for every right carries with it a
corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from
responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. x x x.
xxxx
Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary
language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts,
creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration
(Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to undermine the
confidence of people in the integrity of the members of
this Court and to degrade the administration of justice
by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of
offensive and abusive language (In re: Rafael Climaco,
55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or abrasive and offensive
language (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975];
or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and
malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter
addressed to the judge (Baja vs. Macandog, 158 SCRA
[1988], citing the resolution of 19 January 1988 in Phil.
Public Schools Teachers Association vs. Quisumbing,
G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA
295 [1984]); or of disparaging, intemperate, and
uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).
Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an
administrative complaint which is clearly unfounded and
impelled by ulterior motive will not excuse the lawyer
responsible therefor under his duty of fidelity to his
client. x x x.126 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
In Saberon v. Larong,127 where this Court found
respondent lawyer guilty of simple misconduct for using
intemperate language in his pleadings and imposed a
fine upon him, we had the occasion to state:
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues,
and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system
has tempted members of the bar to use strong language
in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their
clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his
case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm
does not justify the use of offensive and abusive
language. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded
members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personalityand to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required
by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a
lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be
dignified.128
Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain
portions of the Statement exceeded the limits of fair
comment and cannot be deemed as protected free
speech. Even In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory
Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880,
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,129 relied upon by
respondents in the Common Compliance, held that:
From the language of the specific constitutional
provision, it would appear that the right is not
susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed
abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The
realities of life in a complex society preclude however a
literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an
absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all times
and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered
and unrestrained. There are other societal values that
press for recognition. x x x.130 (Emphasis supplied.)
One such societal value that presses for recognition in
the case at bar is the threat to judicial independence and
the orderly administration of justice that immoderate,
reckless and unfair attacks on judicial decisions and
institutions pose. This Court held as much in Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan and Gonzales,131 where we indefinitely
suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for issuing
to the media statements grossly disrespectful towards
the Court in relation to a pending case, to wit:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional
guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that
right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems
unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression,
like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that
freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted
to and accommodated with the requirements of equally
important public interest. One of these fundamental
public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and
orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There
is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity
of the system of administering justice. For the protection
and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be
secured only within the context of a functioning and
orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context,
in other words, of viable independent institutions for
delivery of justice which are accepted by the general
community. x x x.132 (Emphases supplied.)
For this reason, the Court cannot uphold the view of
some respondents133 that the Statement presents no
grave or imminent danger to a legitimate public interest.
The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with
respondents’ academic freedom.
It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law
and jurisprudence, guaranteed academic freedom and
undisputably, they are free to determine what they will
teach their students and how they will teach. We must
point out that there is nothing in the Show Cause
Resolution that dictates upon respondents the subject
matter they can teach and the manner of their
instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the
principle of academic freedom for this Court to subject
lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for
contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue
intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without
observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in
their capacity as teachers.
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A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it
has not been passed upon in any previous case before
this Court, is the question of whether lawyers who are
also law professors can invoke academic freedom as a
defense in an administrative proceeding for intemperate
statements tending to pressure the Court or influence
the outcome of a case or degrade the courts.
Applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment of the
"free speech" defense in other bar discipline cases,
academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked by
respondents in this case. The implicit ruling in the
jurisprudence discussed above is that the constitutional
right to freedom of expression of members of the Bar
may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers
to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the
public’s faith in the legal profession and the justice
system. To our mind, the reason that freedom of
expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers
applies with greater force to the academic freedom of
law professors.
It would do well for the Court to remind respondents
that, in view of the broad definition in Cayetano v.
Monsod,134lawyers when they teach law are considered
engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in other
disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law,
respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the
ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus, their
actions as law professors must be measured against the
same canons of professional responsibility applicable to
acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their being law
professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they
are lawyers.
Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents’
proposition in the Common Compliance that their
issuance of the Statement was in keeping with their duty
to "participate in the development of the legal system by
initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the
improvement of the administration of justice" under
Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we
cannot agree that they have fulfilled that same duty in
keeping with the demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to
give due respect to legal processes and the courts, and
to avoid conduct that tends to influence the courts.
Members of the Bar cannot be selective regarding which
canons to abide by given particular situations. With more
reason that law professors are not allowed this
indulgence, since they are expected to provide their
students exemplars of the Code of Professional
Responsibility as a whole and not just their preferred
portions thereof.
The Court’s rulings on the submissions regarding the
charge of violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13.
Having disposed of respondents’ main arguments of
freedom of expression and academic freedom, the Court
considers here the other averments in their submissions.
With respect to good faith, respondents’ allegations
presented two main ideas: (a) the validity of their
position regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice
Del Castillo, and (b) their pure motive to spur this Court
to take the correct action on said issue.
The Court has already clarified that it is not the
expression of respondents’ staunch belief that Justice
Del Castillo has committed a misconduct that the
majority of this Court has found so unbecoming in the
Show Cause Resolution. No matter how firm a lawyer’s
conviction in the righteousness of his cause there is
simply no excuse for denigrating the courts and
engaging in public behavior that tends to put the courts
and the legal profession into disrepute. This doctrine,
which we have repeatedly upheld in such cases as
Salcedo, In re Almacen and Saberong, should be applied
in this case with more reason, as the respondents, not
parties to the Vinuya case, denounced the Court and
urged it to change its decision therein, in a public
statement using contumacious language, which with
temerity they subsequently submitted to the Court for
"proper disposition."
That humiliating the Court into reconsidering the Vinuya
Decision in favor of the Malaya Lolas was one of the
objectives of the Statement could be seen in the
following paragraphs from the same:
And in light of the significance of this decision to the
quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but of
women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the
horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of
war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to
the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and
misinterpreted texts.
xxxx
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of
the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial function
of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice
to all those who have been left without legal or equitable
recourse, such as the petitioners therein.135 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied.)
Whether or not respondents’ views regarding the
plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case had valid basis was
wholly immaterial to their liability for contumacious
speech and conduct. These are two separate matters to
be properly threshed out in separate proceedings. The
Court considers it highly inappropriate, if not tantamount
to dissembling, the discussion devoted in one of the
compliances arguing the guilt of Justice Del Castillo. In
the Common Compliance, respondents even go so far as
to attach documentary evidence to support the
plagiarism charges against Justice Del Castillo in the
present controversy. The ethics case of Justice Del
Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC), with the filing of a
motion for reconsideration, was still pending at the time
of the filing of respondents’ submissions in this
administrative case. As respondents themselves admit,
they are neither parties nor counsels in the ethics case
against Justice Del Castillo. Notwithstanding their
professed overriding interest in said ethics case, it is not
proper procedure for respondents to bring up their
plagiarism arguments here especially when it has no
bearing on their own administrative case.
Still on motive, it is also proposed that the choice of
language in the Statement was intended for effective
speech; that speech must be "forceful enough to make
the intended recipients listen."136 One wonders what sort
of effect respondents were hoping for in branding this
Court as, among others, callous, dishonest and lacking
in concern for the basic values of decency and respect.
The Court fails to see how it can ennoble the profession
if we allow respondents to send a signal to their students
that the only way to effectively plead their cases and
persuade others to their point of view is to be offensive.
This brings to our mind the letters of Dr. Ellis and Prof.
Tams which were deliberately quoted in full in the
narration of background facts to illustrate the sharp
contrast between the civil tenor of these letters and the
antagonistic irreverence of the Statement. In truth,
these foreign authors are the ones who would expectedly
be affected by any perception of misuse of their works.
Notwithstanding that they are beyond the disciplinary
reach of this Court, they still obviously took pains to
convey their objections in a deferential and scholarly
manner. It is unfathomable to the Court why
respondents could not do the same. These foreign
authors’ letters underscore the universality of the tenet
that legal professionals must deal with each other in
good faith and due respect. The mark of the true
intellectual is one who can express his opinions logically
and soberly without resort to exaggerated rhetoric and
unproductive recriminations.
As for the claim that the respondents’ noble intention is
to spur the Court to take "constructive action" on the
plagiarism issue, the Court has some doubts as to its
veracity. For if the Statement was primarily meant for
this Court’s consideration, why was the same published
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and reported in the media first before it was submitted
to this Court? It is more plausible that the Statement was
prepared for consumption by the general public and
designed to capture media attention as part of the effort
to generate interest in the most controversial ground in
the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed in the
Vinuya case by Atty. Roque, who is respondents’
colleague on the UP Law faculty.
In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a
lack of observance of fidelity and due respect to the
Court, particularly when respondents knew fully well that
the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the
merits of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the
Statement’s issuance, were still both sub judice or
pending final disposition of the Court. These facts have
been widely publicized. On this point, respondents allege
that at the time the Statement was first drafted on July
27, 2010, they did not know of the constitution of the
Ethics Committee and they had issued the Statement
under the belief that this Court intended to take no action
on the ethics charge against Justice Del Castillo. Still,
there was a significant lapse of time from the drafting
and printing of the Statement on July 27, 2010 and its
publication and submission to this Court in early August
when the Ethics Committee had already been convened.
If it is true that the respondents’ outrage was fueled by
their perception of indifference on the part of the Court
then, when it became known that the Court did intend to
take action, there was nothing to prevent respondents
from recalibrating the Statement to take this
supervening event into account in the interest of
fairness.
Speaking of the publicity this case has generated, we
likewise find no merit in the respondents’ reliance on
various news reports and commentaries in the print
media and the internet as proof that they are being
unfairly "singled out." On the contrary, these same
annexes to the Common Compliance show that it is not
enough for one to criticize the Court to warrant the
institution of disciplinary137 or contempt138 action. This
Court takes into account the nature of the criticism and
weighs the possible repercussions of the same on the
Judiciary. When the criticism comes from persons
outside the profession who may not have a full grasp of
legal issues or from individuals whose personal or other
interests in making the criticism are obvious, the Court
may perhaps tolerate or ignore them. However, when
law professors are the ones who appear to have lost
sight of the boundaries of fair commentary and worse,
would justify the same as an exercise of civil liberties,
this Court cannot remain silent for such silence would
have a grave implication on legal education in our
country.
With respect to the 35 respondents named in the
Common Compliance, considering that this appears to be
the first time these respondents have been involved in
disciplinary proceedings of this sort, the Court is willing
to give them the benefit of the doubt that they were for
the most part well-intentioned in the issuance of the
Statement. However, it is established in jurisprudence
that where the excessive and contumacious language
used is plain and undeniable, then good intent can only
be mitigating. As this Court expounded in Salcedo:
In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that
it was not his intention to offend the court or to be
recreant to the respect thereto but, unfortunately, there
are his phrases which need no further comment.
Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in all places where
the same conditions and practice as those in this
jurisdiction obtain, that want of intention is no excuse
from liability (13 C. J., 45). Neither is the fact that the
phrases employed are justified by the facts a valid
defense:
"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that
the language used was justified by the facts is not
admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office
should always be observed and enforced." (In re
Stewart, 118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or want of
intention constitutes at most an extenuation of liability
in this case, taking into consideration Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco's state of mind, according to him when he
prepared said motion. This court is disposed to make
such concession. However, in order to avoid a recurrence
thereof and to prevent others, by following the bad
example, from taking the same course, this court
considers it imperative to treat the case of said attorney
with the justice it deserves.139 (Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common
Compliance should, notwithstanding their claim of good
faith, be reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons
1, 11 and 13, to give due respect to the courts and to
refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending
to influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate
the courts and the administration of justice.
With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably notes
the differences in his Compliance compared to his
colleagues. In our view, he was the only one among the
respondents who showed true candor and sincere
deference to the Court. He was able to give a
straightforward account of how he came to sign the
Statement. He was candid enough to state that his
agreement to the Statement was in principle and that
the reason plagiarism was a "fair topic of discussion"
among the UP Law faculty prior to the promulgation of
the October 12, 2010 Decision in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC
was the uncertainty brought about by a division of
opinion on whether or not willful or deliberate intent was
an element of plagiarism. He was likewise willing to
acknowledge that he may have been remiss in failing to
assess the effect of the language of the Statement and
could have used more care. He did all this without having
to retract his position on the plagiarism issue, without
demands for undeserved reliefs (as will be discussed
below) and without baseless insinuations of deprivation
of due process or of prejudgment. This is all that this
Court expected from respondents, not for them to
sacrifice their principles but only that they recognize that
they themselves may have committed some ethical lapse
in this affair. We commend Prof. Vaquez for showing that
at least one of the respondents can grasp the true import
of the Show Cause Resolution involving them. For these
reasons, the Court finds Prof. Vasquez’s Compliance
satisfactory.
As for Prof. Lynch, in view of his Manifestation that he is
a member of the Bar of the State of Minnesota and,
therefore, not under the disciplinary authority of this
Court, he should be excused from these proceedings.
However, he should be reminded that while he is
engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school he
should strive to be a model of responsible and
professional conduct to his students even without the
threat of sanction from this Court. For even if one is not
bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility for
members of the Philippine Bar, civility and respect
among legal professionals of any nationality should be
aspired for under universal standards of decency and
fairness.
The Court’s ruling on Dean Leonen’s Compliance
regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10.
To recall, the Show Cause Resolution directed Dean
Leonen to show cause why he should not be disciplinary
dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02
and 10.03 and for submitting a "dummy" that was not a
true and faithful reproduction of the signed Statement.
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies
that Restoring Integrity II was not a true and faithful
reproduction of the actual signed copy, Restoring
Integrity I, because looking at the text or the body,
there were no differences between the two. He attempts
to downplay the discrepancies in the signature pages of
the two versions of the Statement (i.e., Restoring
Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II) by claiming
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that it is but expected in "live" public manifestos with
dynamic and evolving pages as more and more
signatories add their imprimatur thereto. He likewise
stresses that he is not administratively liable because he
did not misrepresent the members of the UP Law faculty
who "had agreed with the Restoring Integrity Statement
proper and/or who had expressed their desire to be
signatories thereto."140
To begin with, the Court cannot subscribe to Dean
Leonen’s implied view that the signatures in the
Statement are not as significant as its contents. Live
public manifesto or not, the Statement was formally
submitted to this Court at a specific point in time and it
should reflect accurately its signatories at that point. The
value of the Statement as a UP Law Faculty Statement
lies precisely in the identities of the persons who have
signed it, since the Statement’s persuasive authority
mainly depends on the reputation and stature of the
persons who have endorsed the same. Indeed, it is
apparent from respondents’ explanations that their own
belief in the "importance" of their positions as UP law
professors prompted them to publicly speak out on the
matter of the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case.
Further, in our assessment, the true cause of Dean
Leonen’s predicament is the fact that he did not from the
beginning submit the signed copy, Restoring Integrity I,
to this Court on August 11, 2010 and, instead, submitted
Restoring Integrity II with its retyped or "reformatted"
signature pages. It would turn out, according to Dean
Leonen’s account, that there were errors in the retyping
of the signature pages due to lapses of his unnamed
staff. First, an unnamed administrative officer in the
dean’s office gave the dean inaccurate information that
led him to allow the inclusion of Justice Mendoza as
among the signatories of Restoring Integrity II. Second,
an unnamed staff also failed to type the name of Atty.
Armovit when encoding the signature pages of Restoring
Integrity II when in fact he had signed Restoring
Integrity I.
The Court can understand why for purposes of posting
on a bulletin board or a website a signed document may
have to be reformatted and signatures may be indicated
by the notation (SGD). This is not unusual. We are willing
to accept that the reformatting of documents meant for
posting to eliminate blanks is necessitated by vandalism
concerns.
However, what is unusual is the submission to a court,
especially this Court, of a signed document for the
Court’s consideration that did not contain the actual
signatures of its authors. In most cases, it is
the original signed document that is transmitted to the
Court or at the very least a photocopy of the actual
signed document. Dean Leonen has not offered any
explanation why he deviated from this practice with his
submission to the Court of Restoring Integrity II on
August 11, 2010. There was nothing to prevent the dean
from submitting Restoring Integrity I to this Court even
with its blanks and unsigned portions. Dean Leonen
cannot claim fears of vandalism with respect to court
submissions for court employees are accountable for the
care of documents and records that may come into their
custody. Yet, Dean Leonen deliberately chose to submit
to this Court the facsimile that did not contain the actual
signatures and his silence on the reason therefor is in
itself a display of lack of candor.
Still, a careful reading of Dean Leonen’s explanations
yield the answer. In the course of his explanation of his
willingness to accept his administrative officer’s claim
that Justice Mendoza agreed to be indicated as a
signatory, Dean Leonen admits in a footnote that other
professors had likewise only authorized him to indicate
them as signatories and had not in fact signed the
Statement. Thus, at around the time Restoring Integrity
II was printed, posted and submitted to this Court, at
least one purported signatory thereto had not actually
signed the same. Contrary to Dean Leonen’s proposition,
that is precisely tantamount to making it appear to this
Court that a person or persons participated in an act
when such person or persons did not.
We are surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with
his reputation for perfection and stringent standards of
intellectual honesty, could proffer the explanation that
there was no misrepresentation when he allowed at least
one person to be indicated as having actually signed the
Statement when all he had was a verbal communication
of an intent to sign. In the case of Justice Mendoza, what
he had was only hearsay information that the former
intended to sign the Statement. If Dean Leonen was truly
determined to observe candor and truthfulness in his
dealings with the Court, we see no reason why he could
not have waited until all the professors who indicated
their desire to sign the Statement had in fact signed
before transmitting the Statement to the Court as a duly
signed document. If it was truly impossible to secure
some signatures, such as that of Justice Mendoza who
had to leave for abroad, then Dean Leonen should have
just resigned himself to the signatures that he was able
to secure.
We cannot imagine what urgent concern there was that
he could not wait for actual signatures before submission
of the Statement to this Court. As respondents all
asserted, they were neither parties to nor counsels in the
Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del
Castillo. The Statement was neither a pleading with a
deadline nor a required submission to the Court; rather,
it was a voluntary submission that Dean Leonen could do
at any time.
In sum, the Court likewise finds Dean Leonen’s
Compliance unsatisfactory. However, the Court is willing
to ascribe these isolated lapses in judgment of Dean
Leonen to his misplaced zeal in pursuit of his objectives.
In due consideration of Dean Leonen’s professed good
intentions, the Court deems it sufficient to admonish
Dean Leonen for failing to observe full candor and
honesty in his dealings with the Court as required under
Canon 10.
Respondents’ requests for a hearing, for
production/presentation of evidence bearing on the
plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in G.R. No.
162230 and A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, and for access to the
records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are unmeritorious.
In the Common Compliance, respondents named therein
asked for alternative reliefs should the Court find their
Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that the Show Cause
Resolution be set for hearing and for that purpose, they
be allowed to require the production or presentation of
witnesses and evidence bearing on the plagiarism and
misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No.
162230) and the plagiarism case against Justice Del
Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the
records of, and evidence that were presented or may be
presented in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo.
The prayer for a hearing and for access to the records of
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was substantially echoed in Dean
Leonen’s separate Compliance. In Prof. Juan-Bautista’s
Compliance, she similarly expressed the sentiment that
"[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered
indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, such may be punished only after charge
and hearing."141 It is this group of respondents’ premise
that these reliefs are necessary for them to be accorded
full due process.
The Court finds this contention unmeritorious.
Firstly, it would appear that the confusion as to the
necessity of a hearing in this case springs largely from
its characterization as a special civil action for indirect
contempt in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sereno (to
the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution) and her
reliance therein on the majority’s purported failure to
follow the procedure in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as
her main ground for opposition to the Show Cause
Resolution.
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However, once and for all, it should be clarified that this
is not an indirect contempt proceeding and Rule 71
(which requires a hearing) has no application to this
case. As explicitly ordered in the Show Cause Resolution
this case was docketed as an administrative matter.
The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-
B, Section 13, on disciplinary proceedings initiated motu
proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit:
SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.—In proceedings
initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in other
proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the
Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to
the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme
Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the
investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided
in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the
report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the
Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a
formal investigation, through a referral to the specified
officers, is merely discretionary, not mandatory on the
Court. Furthermore, it is only if the Court deems such an
investigation necessary that the procedure in Sections 6
to 11 of Rule 139-A will be followed.
As respondents are fully aware, in general,
administrative proceedings do not require a trial type
hearing. We have held that:
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to
be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the
opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign
denial of due process where he had been afforded the
opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential
to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied
where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy.142 (Emphases supplied.)
In relation to bar discipline cases, we have had the
occasion to rule in Pena v. Aparicio143 that:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not
involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in
no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is
neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view
of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have
proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of
an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no
occasion to speak of a complainant or a themselves supplied to this Court in their Common
prosecutor.144 (Emphases supplied.)
In Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk
of Court – Br. 81, Romblon – On the Prohibition from
Engaging in the Private Practice of Law,145 we further
observed that:
[I]n several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers
without further inquiry or resort to any formal
investigation where the facts on record sufficiently
provided the basis for the determination of their
administrative liability.
In Prudential Bank v. Castro, the Court disbarred a
lawyer without need of any further investigation after
considering his actions based on records showing his
unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast
dishonor on the image of both the Bench and the Bar,
but was also inimical to public interest and welfare. In
this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several
cases handled by the errant lawyer and his cohorts that
revealed their modus operandi in circumventing the
payment of the proper judicial fees for the astronomical
sums they claimed in their cases. The Court held that
those cases sufficiently provided the basis for the
determination of respondents' administrative liability,
without need for further inquiry into the matter under
the principle of res ipsa loquitur.
Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards
v. Asoy, that no evidentiary hearing is required before
the respondent may be disciplined for professional
misconduct already established by the facts on record.
xxxx
These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal
charge against and/or formal investigation of an errant
lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately
exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the errant
lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be
heard. As we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe has been
afforded the opportunity to be heard on the present
matter through her letter-query and Manifestation filed
before this Court.146(Emphases supplied.)
Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly
had no right to a hearing and their reservation of a right
they do not have has no effect on these proceedings.
Neither have they shown in their pleadings any
justification for this Court to call for a hearing in this
instance. They have not specifically stated
what relevant evidence, documentary or testimonial,
they intend to present in their defense that will
necessitate a formal hearing.
Instead, it would appear that they intend to present
records, evidence, and witnesses bearing on the
plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in
the Vinuya case and in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC on the
assumption that the findings of this Court which were the
bases of the Show Cause Resolution were made in A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC, or were related to the conclusions of
the Court in the Decision in that case. This is the primary
reason for their request for access to the records and
evidence presented in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
This assumption on the part of respondents is erroneous.
To illustrate, the only incident in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC
that is relevant to the case at bar is the fact that the
submission of the actual signed copy of the Statement
(or Restoring Integrity I, as Dean Leonen referred to it)
happened there. Apart from that fact, it bears repeating
that the proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethics
case against Justice Del Castillo, is a separate and
independent matter from this case.
To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the
Show Cause Resolution that the respondents issued a
Statement with language that the Court deems
objectionable during the pendency of the Vinuya case
and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo,
respondents need to go no further than the four corners
of the Statement itself, its various versions, news
reports/columns (many of which respondents
Compliance) and internet sources that are already of
public knowledge.
Considering that what respondents are chiefly required
to explain are the language of the Statement and the
circumstances surrounding the drafting, printing,
signing, dissemination, etc., of its various versions, the
Court does not see how any witness or evidence in the
ethics case of Justice Del Castillo could possibly shed
light on these facts. To be sure, these facts are within
the knowledge of respondents and if there is any
evidence on these matters the same would be in their
possession.
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We find it significant that in Dean Leonen’s Compliance of justice and warned that the same or similar act in the
he narrated how as early as September 2010, i.e., before future shall be dealt with more severely.
the Decision of this Court in the ethics case of Justice Del (3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F.
Castillo on October 12, 2010 and before the October 19, Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 is
2010 Show Cause Resolution, retired Supreme Court found UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, after being shown a copy of be more mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an
the Statement upon his return from abroad, predicted officer of the Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to
that the Court would take some form of action on the observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the
Statement. By simply reading a hard copy of the Court and warned that the same or similar act in the
Statement, a reasonable person, even one who future shall be dealt with more severely.
"fundamentally agreed" with the Statement’s principles, (4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine
could foresee the possibility of court action on the same bar, is excused from these proceedings. However, he is
on an implicit recognition that the Statement, as worded, reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a
is not a matter this Court should simply let pass. This Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of
belies respondents’ claim that it is necessary for them to responsible and professional conduct to his students
refer to any record or evidence in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC even without the threat of sanction from this Court.
in order to divine the bases for the Show Cause (5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for
Resolution. access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are denied
If respondents have chosen not to include certain pieces for lack of merit.
of evidence in their respective compliances or chosen not SO ORDERED.
to make a full defense at this time, because they were
counting on being granted a hearing, that is respondents’
own look-out. Indeed, law professors of their stature are
supposed to be aware of the above jurisprudential
doctrines regarding the non-necessity of a hearing in
disciplinary cases. They should bear the consequence of
the risk they have taken.
Thus, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access
to the records of, and evidence presented in, A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC should be denied for lack of merit.
A final word
In a democracy, members of the legal community are
hardly expected to have monolithic views on any subject,
be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers
passionately and vigorously propound their points of
view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the
legal profession. This Court is certainly not claiming that
it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court
demands is the same respect and courtesy that one
lawyer owes to another under established ethical
standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court
employees, professors or private practitioners, are
officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath,
as an indispensable qualification for admission to the
Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards
the courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty
for law professors, regardless of their status in the
academic community or the law school to which they
belong.
WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as
follows:
(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting
his submission, the Court finds his Compliance to be
satisfactory.
(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely,
Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan,
Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T.
Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway,
Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay,
Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De
Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo
A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa
Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan
A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo,
Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C.
Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo,
Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas
Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and
Dina D. Lucenario, is found UNSATISFACTORY. These 35
respondent law professors are reminded of their lawyerly
duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the
Court and to refrain from intemperate and offensive
language tending to influence the Court on pending
matters or to denigrate the Court and the administration

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A.M. No. 03-7-170-MCTC July 14, 2009
RE: REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED
IN THE
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURT, JIMENEZ-SINACABAN,
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL/JUDGE
PRISCILLA HERNANDEZ.
On February 26 to 28, 2003, a judicial audit of the Fourth
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Jimenez-
Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental, presided by respondent
Judge Priscilla Hernandez, was conducted. As a result, a
resolution dated August 13, 2003[1] was issued directing
respondent to:
1) submit her explanation on her failure to regularly
report for work at the 4th MCTC, Jimenez-Sinacaban,
Misamis Occidental and why she reports for work only in
the afternoon of her scheduled dates of hearings in said
court;
2) submit her explanation on her failure to decide [nine
civil cases and 16 criminal cases][2] and to decide the
same within 30 days from notice;
3) submit her explanation on her failure to resolve the
pending incidents in [three civil cases and one criminal
case][3] and to resolve the same within 30 days from
notice;
4) submit her explanation on her failure to resolve the
preliminary investigation in [six criminal cases][4] and to
resolve the same within 30 days from notice;
5) submit her explanation on her failure to take further
action on [11 civil cases and 19 criminal cases][5] and to
take appropriate action thereon within 30 days from
notice;
6) submit her explanation on her failure to transmit the
resolutions and case folders in [two criminal cases][6] to
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Misamis
Occidental within the 10-day period in violation of
Section 5, Rule 11 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure and
7) submit her explanation on the apparent loss of
[records of one civil case and two criminal cases].[7]
However, respondent failed to comply with these
directives.[8] The Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA)[9] issued a memorandum dated October 18, 2004
directing her anew to comply with the same but there
was no response.[10] In this Courts resolution dated
October 3, 2005, she was directed to show cause why
she should not be administratively dealt with or held in
contempt for failure to comply with the August 13, 2003
resolution.[11]
Meanwhile, on October 10, 2005, a second audit was
conducted on the 4th MCTC of Jimenez-Sinacaban, as
well as on the 5th MCTC of Clarin-Tudela, Misamis
Occidental where respondent was also Acting Presiding
Judge.[12] The OCA reported its findings in its
Memorandum dated January 6, 2006:[13]
In summary, out of the 130 caseload of this court at the
time of the second audit, [10] criminal and civil cases
have unresolved pending incidents, [27] criminal and
civil cases are still undecided despite the lapse of the
[90-day] reglementary period, [one] civil case which the
court failed to take any action from the time of its filing
and [47] criminal and civil cases without further action
or setting for a considerable length of time or a total of
[85] problematic cases. Thus, only [34.616%] of
cases are moving and [65.384%] of these cases need
the required appropriate action from [respondent].
[Respondent] is complemented with [seven] staff
members headed by Mr. Michael Angelo O. Saa, Court
Interpreter who acts as the courts Officer-in-Charge.
The team was not able to audit the [five] criminal and
[seven] civil cases which according to Mr. Michael Saa
were in the possession of [respondent].
xxx xxx xxx
Aside from these cases, [two civil cases and eight
criminal cases][14] included in the first audit, were also
not presented to the second audit team. Verification
from the courts Monthly Report of Cases starting from
January 2004 to August 2005 (excepting June 2005
wherein the court did not submit any report) failed to
show that these cases were either decided, disposed of,
archived or in any way acted upon by the court.
It was also noted that no orders were issued in some
cases that would indicate whether or not these cases are
being tried under the New Rules on Summary Procedure,
the folders/rollo/expediente are not paginated; the
marked exhibits are not signed and dated; the minutes
are not properly filled up (without indicating the personal
circumstances and the substance of the testimonies of
witnesses), the certificates of arraignment are unsigned
by the accused and his/her counsel and the docket books
need to be updated.
It is quite manifest that [respondent], instead of acting
on the cases subject of the adverse findings of the first
audit, continuously added unacted cases to her file.
xxx xxx xxx
In a letter dated April 14, 2005, Atty. Benjamin C.
Galindo, then a Sangguniang member of the Municipality
of Jimenez during the May 2004 elections, reminded the
[OCA] that the audit of the [MCTCs] in Jimenez-
Sinacaban and Aloran-Panaon was made upon the
request of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Misamis
Occidental Chapter) wherein [respondent] was directed
to resolve some [70] pending cases in her sala which
remained undecided long after the [90] day period
per memorandum of the court. Even the Sangguniang
Bayan passed a resolution requesting [respondent] to
decide these cases which remains unheeded.[15]
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis in the original)
Regarding the first audit of the 5th MCTC of Clarin-
Tudela, the findings were as follows:
An analysis of the data above shows that out of
the 186 pending cases at the time of [audit,] there are
[11] criminal and civil cases with unresolved motions,
[33] undecided criminal and civil cases submitted for
decision, [six] unacted criminal and civil cases and [64]
criminal and civil cases without further action or setting
or a total of one hundred fourteen [114] cases or
[61.29%]of the courts total case load need to be acted
upon by respondent.
[Respondent] is complemented with [eight] staff
members headed by Ms. Merilla O. Adecir, Clerk of
Court II. [Respondent] holds hearings in both
courts only in the afternoons claiming the non-
availability of prosecutors and public
attorneys. However, she was not able to explain her
failure to report to the courts concerned during
mornings.
Further findings of the team show that case records/rollo
are not chronologically arranged; documents/pleadings
received are not properly stamped as to date, time and
staff who received the same; marked exhibits are not
initialed by the interpreter; certificates of arraignment
are unsigned by accused and his/her counsel; and some
cases have no orders indicating whether or not these
cases are governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure
as mandated by Section 2 thereof.[16]
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis in the original)
The OCA, in its recommendation, stated:
[Respondent] was appointed Presiding Judge [of MCTC],
Jimenez-Sinacaban on October 29, 1993 and assumed
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her duties on December 1, 1993 per her service
[record]. In connection with her designation as Acting
Presiding Judge of the [5th MCTC of Clarin-Tudela],
records were unavailable as to her exact date of
assumption although according to [Ms. Merilla O.
Adecir], [respondent] assumed as Acting Presiding Judge
of the 5th MCTC on August 1, 1994.
Taking into consideration her date of assumption,
the adverse findings of the audit teams are clearly
attributable to her gross incompetence,
inefficiency, negligence and dereliction of duty. To
reiterate, out of the [27] criminal and civil cases
submitted for decision in the 4th MCTC, Jimenez-
Sinacaban, [four] were submitted for decision as early
as 1996 and still remain undecided, [10] motions
remain unresolved with at least [one] motion being filed
as early as 1996 and out of the [47] cases that remain
unacted upon, [six] cases remain at the preliminary
investigation stage since 1996. With regard to the cases
at the [5th MCTC of Clarin-Tudela], cases should have
been decided, resolved or set for hearing as early as
1996. Out of the [40] cases submitted for decision,
[three] cases were submitted as early as 1996, in the
[11] unresolved motions, [one] was filed as early as
1997 and of the [64] cases without further action or
setting, [one] case remains at the preliminary
investigation stage since 1997. Furthermore, a sampling
of the consolidated certificates of service of [respondent[
in the 4th and 5th MCTCs failed to disclose that there were
undecided cases submitted for decision and unresolved
motions submitted for resolution.
xxx xxx xxx
With regard to [the] problematic state of cases in the
[5th MCTC of Clarin-Tudela] and the corresponding plight
of the parties and their [counsels,] the revocation of the
designation of [respondent] and the consequent
designation of another in her [place] is not only
appropriate but also imperative.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering the case loads of [the other] judges and the
distance to the [5th MCTC of Clarin-Tudela], Judge
Teresita Saa may be designated as Acting Presiding
Judge thereat.[17]
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis in the original)
It recommended that respondent be dismissed on
grounds of gross incompetence, inefficiency, negligence
and dereliction of duty and that her designation as Acting
Presiding Judge of the 5th MCTC of Clarin-Tudela be
revoked.[18] Consequently, pursuant to Administrative
Order No. 05-2006, respondents designation was
revoked.[19]
Despite a long interregnum, respondent still did not
comply with the Courts directives. Because of such
inaction, the OCA, in its memorandum dated August 9,
2007, not only reiterated its earlier recommendation for
respondents dismissal but also recommended her
immediate suspension pending the resolution of this
administrative matter.[20] As a result, the Court
suspended respondent in a resolution dated October 10,
2007.[21]
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration dated
November 19, 2007. She admitted her culpability in the
delay of the disposition of cases but claimed as
contributory factors the volume of her work and
designations in other courts. She begged for the Courts
compassion in the resolution of her motion.[22] Her
motion was denied in a resolution dated January 28,
2008.[23]
In the meantime, Judge Henry B. Damasing, Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City,
Misamis Occidental, Branch 14, furnished the OCA a copy
of his letter dated November 21, 2007 to respondent
requesting her to forward or return certain records of
seven criminal and eight civil cases in her
possession.[24] Later, records of one of the criminal cases
were found in the 4th MCTC of Jimenez-Sinacaban.[25] On
the rest, respondent said nothing. Neither did she return
the said case records.[26] It was only on September 26,
2008 that the OCA was informed that respondent
personally returned all the missing records except for
one.[27] Thus, the OCA again recommended that
respondent be dismissed from the service.
We approve the findings and recommendations of the
OCA.
Respondent continually failed to comply fully with the
Courts directives. After several orders and reminders to
submit her explanation, her one and only move was to
file a two-page motion for reconsideration of the
resolution ordering her suspension:
Respondent admits her culpability in the delay of the
disposition of the cases as reported, and begged for the
courts compassion to consider the volume of her work as
contributory factor for the delay.
The respondent, aside from presiding at 4th [MCTC],
Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, had also been designated
presiding judge of 5th [MCTC] Clarin-Tudela from August
1995 to February 2005, respondent was also designated
presiding judge of Branch III MTCC Ozamiz City on
January 27, 1998 until December 2000 as well as
designated Executive Judge of MTCC Ozamiz City from
November, 1998 to November, 2000.
The [respondent,] after the revocation of all her
[designations] to preside over the other courts, had been
working for unclogging the caseload of the 4th [MCTC],
Jimenez-Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental. In support of
this [allegation,] respondent attached a copy of the
certification issued by the clerk of court to the fact that
respondent had decided seventy-seven (77) cases over
the period stated therein.[28]
As early as August 2003, the Court had already ordered
respondent to explain and resolve the problems in her
court. But it was only in November 2007, or three long
years after when the Court finally suspended her, that
she decided to give the Court a two-page motion. She
never complied with the Courts directives, not even
partially, and did not offer any reason for her non-
compliance. She made a bare statement that she
allegedly decided 77 cases from November 2006 to
October 2007 but did not elaborate what these cases
were.
The Court will not tolerate the indifference of respondent
judges to resolutions requiring their written
explanations. An order or resolution of this Court is not
to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be
complied with partially, inadequately or
selectively.[29] To do so shows disrespect to the Court,
an act only too deserving of reproof.[30]
[Respondent] refused to heed the directives of this Court
and the OCA to explain his shortcomings. Respondent
ought to know that a resolution of the Court is not to be
construed as a mere request not should it be complied
with partially, inadequately or selectively. At the core of
the judges esteemed position is obedience to the dictates
of law and justice. A judge must be first to exhibit
respect for authority.[31]
Moreover, the findings of the OCA show that respondent
was clearly remiss in the performance of her judicial
duties. Despite the lapse of more than two years from
the time the first audit was made, there was no
improvement in the resolution of cases in her sala. At
the time of the second audit, she had only 130 pending
cases (indeed a light load by the usual standards) but
28 | P a g e
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CASES BATCH # 4
more than half of those (65.384% or 85 cases) were
unacted upon.
Even respondent admitted that she was in delay but cited
as excuse her designations in other courts resulting in a
heavy caseload. This explanation is far from
acceptable.She cannot hide behind the much-abused
excuse of heavy caseload to justify her failure to decide
and resolve cases promptly.[32] She could have asked the
Court for a reasonable period of extension to dispose of
the cases but she did not.
That a judge had been given additional work as acting
presiding judge in other courts, as in the case of Judge
Ramos, cannot justify his failure to resolve any pending
incident. In Casia v. Gestopa, we already held a similar
contention as unmeritorious. We even reminded
respondent judge therein that:
. . . if his caseload prevented the disposition of cases
within the reglementary period, all he had to do was ask
from this Court for a reasonable extension of time to
dispose of the cases involved. The Court, cognizant of
the caseload of judges and mindful of the difficulty
encountered by them in the reasonable disposition of
cases, would almost always grant the request.[33]
The Constitution mandates that all cases or matters filed
before all lower courts shall be decided or resolved within
90 days from the time they are submitted for
decision.[34] Respondent repeatedly ignored this
mandate. She also violated Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct which requires judges to
dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods.
Failure to comply within the mandated period constitutes
a serious violation of the constitutional right of the
parties to a speedy disposition of their cases.[35] The
Court has always considered a judges delay in deciding
cases within the prescribed period of three months as
gross inefficiency.[36] It undermines the peoples faith and
confidence in the judiciary,[37] lowers its standards and
brings it to disrepute.[38] Undue delay cannot be
countenanced at a time when the clogging of the court
dockets is still the bane of the judiciary.[39] The raison d'
etre of courts lies not only in properly dispensing justice
but also in being able to do so seasonably.[40]
Delay derails the administration of justice. It postpones
the rectification of wrong and the vindication of the
unjustly prosecuted. It crowds the dockets of the courts,
increasing the costs for all litigants, pressuring judges to
take short cuts, interfering with the prompt and
deliberate disposition of those causes in which all parties
are diligent and prepared for trial, and overhanging the
entire process with the pall of disorganization and
insolubility. More than this, possibilities for error in fact-
finding multiply rapidly as time elapses between the
original fact and its judicial determination. If the facts
are not fully and accurately determined, then the wisest
judge cannot distinguish between merit and demerit. If
courts do not get the facts right, there is little chance for
their judgment to be right.[41]
Additionally, respondent was repeatedly asked to explain
the whereabouts of certain missing case records. She
never bothered to do so and worse, it took her five years
to return such records. Section 14 of Rule 136 of the
Rules of Court expressly provides that [no] record shall
be taken from the clerks office without an order of the
court except as otherwise provided by these
rules. Further, Article 226 of the Revised Penal Code
punishes any public officer who removes, conceals or
destroys documents or papers officially entrusted to
him. With such heavy responsibilities, judges are
therefore expected to exercise utmost diligence and care
in handling the records of cases.[42]
Considering the gravity of respondents omissions and
the absence of any explanation whatsoever on her part,
her dismissal from the service is called for.[43] The
administration of justice demands that those who don
judicial robes be able to comply fully and faithfully with
the task set before them.[44] In this regard, respondent
miserably failed.[45] The wheels of justice would hardly
move if respondent is allowed to continue working in the
judiciary.[46] Therefore, as recommended by the OCA,
after a thorough judicial audit, and considering the
unrebutted audit reports on record, the penalty of
dismissal from the service is in order.[47]
For her repeated violations of Supreme Court directives
and rules (a less serious offense punishable with
suspension for not less than one month nor more than
three months or a fine of more than P10,000 but not
exceeding P20,000), she is fined the maximum amount
of P20,000.
Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,[48] this administrative
case against respondent as a judge based on grounds
which are also grounds for the disciplinary action against
members of the Bar, shall be considered as disciplinary
proceedings against such judge as a member of the
Bar.[49]
Violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct
embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes a
breach of Canons 1 and 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR):
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL
PROCESSES.
CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN
THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL
OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT
BY OTHERS.
Certainly, a judge who falls short of the ethics of the
judicial office tends to diminish the peoples respect for
the law and legal processes. She also fails to observe and
maintain the esteem due to the courts and judicial
officers.[50] Respondent must always bear in mind that it
is a magistrates duty to uphold the integrity of the
judiciary at all times.
Respondents delay also runs counter to Canon 12 and
Rule 12.04 of the CPR which provides:
CANON 12 A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND
CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND
EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 12.04 A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case,
impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court
processes.
For such violation of Canons 1, 11, 12 and Rule 12.04 of
the CPR, she should be further fined the amount
of P5,000.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Priscilla T. Hernandez,
Presiding Judge of the Fourth Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Jimenez-Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental is
found LIABLE for gross neglect of judicial duty and
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CASES BATCH # 4
gross inefficiency. She is hereby
ordered DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of
all benefits except accrued leave credits, if any, and with
prejudice to re-employment in any government branch
or instrumentality, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. For her repeated violations of
Supreme Court directives and Section 14 of Rule 136 of
the Rules of Court, she is FINED P20,000.
Respondent is further hereby FINED P5,000 for her
violation of Canons 1, 11, 12 and Rule 12.04 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility payable within the same
period stated above. She is STERNLY WARNED that
commission of the same or similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the
Court Administrator and the Office of the Bar Confidant
to be attached to respondents records.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000]
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I.
BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and
JANE DOE, respondents. Mesm
[G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000]
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I.
BILDNER, and SYLVIA ILUSORIO, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K.
ILUSORIO, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her
husband to live with her in conjugal bliss? The answer is
no. Marital rights including coverture and living in
conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-
ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention,[1] or by which the rightful
custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled
thereto.[2] Slx
"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining
another, commanding him to produce the body of the
prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day
and cause of his capture and detention, to do, submit to,
and receive whatsoever the court or judge awarding the
writ shall consider in that behalf."[3]
It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient
origin, the great object of which is the liberation of those
who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause.[4] It is
issued when one is deprived of liberty or is wrongfully
prevented from exercising legal custody over another
person.[5]
The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio[6] is to reverse the
decision[7] of the Court of Appeals and its
resolution[8] dismissing the application for habeas
corpus to have the custody of her husband, lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio and enforce consortium as the wife.
On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano
Ilusorio[9] is to annul that portion of the decision of the
Court of Appeals giving Erlinda K. Ilusorio visitation
rights to her husband and to enjoin Erlinda and the Court
of Appeals from enforcing the visitation rights.
The undisputed facts are as follows: Scslx
Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio.
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed
of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For
many years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of
the Board and President of Baguio Country Club.
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio
contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of
thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated from bed and
board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at
Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he
was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country
Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand,
Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children,
namely: Ramon Ilusorio (age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio
Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age 50); Sylvia (age 49);
Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39).
On December 30, 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from
the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about five
(5) months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and
Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother
gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100
mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed by his
doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a consequence,
Potencianos health deteriorated.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Antipolo City a petition[10] for guardianship
over the person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due
to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight
and impaired judgment.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in
Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to
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CASES BATCH # 4
Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration,
Condominium, Makati. Slxsc and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of
of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of
respondents[11] refused petitioners demands to see and visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we
visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say,
returning to Antipolo City. this will run against his fundamental constitutional
After due hearing, on April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals right. Es m
rendered decision the dispositive portion of which reads: The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas
judgment is hereby rendered: corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right.
"(1) Ordering, for humanitarian consideration and upon The ruling is not consistent with the finding of subjects
petitioners manifestation, respondents Erlinda K. sanity.
Ilusorio Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio-Yap, the When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it
administrator of Cleveland Condominium or anywhere in also emphasized that the same shall be enforced under
its place, his guards and Potenciano Ilusorios staff penalty of contempt in case of violation or refusal to
especially Ms. Aurora Montemayor to allow visitation comply. Such assertion of raw, naked power is
rights to Potenciano Ilusorios wife, Erlinda Ilusorio and unnecessary.
all her children, notwithstanding any list limiting visitors The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did
thereof, under penalty of contempt in case of violation of not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but
refusal thereof; xxx the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband
"(2) ORDERING that the writ of habeas corpus previously refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty
issued be recalled and the herein petition for habeas to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the
corpus be DENIED DUE COURSE, as it is hereby exercise of his right.
DISMISSED for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel
the subject of the petition. a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be
"SO ORDERED."[12] enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas
Hence, the two petitions, which were consolidated and corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne
are herein jointly decided. process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and
As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to is best left to the man and womans free choice.
all cases of illegal confinement or detention,[13] or by WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Court
which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit. No costs.
the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and
continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his nullifies the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it
constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due gives visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio.
process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary No costs.
but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom SO ORDERED.
originally valid has later become arbitrary.[14] It is
devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom.[15] Jksm
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal.[16]
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty
must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom
of action.[17] The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual
and effective, not merely nominal or moral.[18]
The evidence shows that there was no actual and
effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorios liberty that would justify the issuance of the
writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86
years of age, or under medication does not necessarily
render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind
does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the
capacity of the individual to discern his actions.
After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that
there was no unlawful restraint on his liberty.
The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio did not request the administrator of
the Cleveland Condominium not to allow his wife and
other children from seeing or visiting him. He made it
clear that he did not object to seeing them.
As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios mental state, the Court
of Appeals observed that he was of sound and alert mind,
having answered all the relevant questions to the
satisfaction of the court.
Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the
capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices
revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see
or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to
some of his family members but these are choices which
exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before
the Court of Appeals that he was not prevented from

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A.C. No. 4428 December 12, 2011
ELPIDIO P. TIONG,
Complainant,
- versus -
ATTY. GEORGE M. FLORENDO,
Respondent.
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for
disbarment filed by Elpidio P. Tiong against Atty. George
M. Florendo for gross immorality and grave misconduct.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Complainant Elpidio P. Tiong, an American Citizen, and
his wife, Ma. Elena T. Tiong, are real estate lessors in
Baguio City. They are likewise engaged in the assembly
and repair of motor vehicles
in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. In 1991, they engaged the
services of respondent Atty. George M. Florendo not only
as legal counsel but also as administrator of their
businesses whenever complainant would leave for the
United States of America (USA).
Sometime in 1993, complainant began to suspect that
respondent and his wife were having an illicit affair. His
suspicion was confirmed in the afternoon of May 13,
1995 when, in their residence, he chanced upon a
telephone conversation between the two. Listening
through the extension phone, he heard respondent utter
the words "I love you, I'll call you later". When
confronted, his wife initially denied any amorous
involvement with respondent but eventually broke down
and confessed to their love affair that began in 1993.
Respondent likewise admitted the relationship.
Subsequently, at a meeting initiated by respondent and
held at the Salibao Restaurant in Burnham Park, Baguio
City, respondent and complainant's wife,
Ma. Elena, confessed anew to their illicit affair before
their respective spouses.
On May 15, 1995, the parties met again at the Mandarin
Restaurant in Baguio City and, in the presence of a
Notary Public, Atty. Liberato Tadeo, respondent and Ma.
Elena executed and signed an affidavit2 attesting to their
illicit relationship and seeking their respective spouses'
forgiveness, as follows:
"WE, GEORGE M. FLORENDO, a resident of Baguio City
and of legal age and MA. ELENA T. TIONG, likewise a
resident of Baguio City, of legal age, depose and state:
We committed adultery against our spouses from May
1993 to May 13, 1995 and we hereby ask forgiveness
and assure our spouses that this thing will never happen
again with us or any other person. We assure that we
will no longer see each other nor have any
communication directly or indirectly. We shall comply
with our duties as husband and wife to our spouses and
assure that there will be no violence against them. That
any behaviour unbecoming a husband or wife henceforth
shall give rise to legal action against us; We shall never
violate this assurance;
We, the offended spouses Elizabeth
F. Florendo and Elpidio Tiong forgive our spouses and
assure them that we will not institute any criminal or
legal action against them because we have forgiven
them. If they violate this agreement we will institute
legal action.
This document consists of four (4) typewritten copies
and each party has been furnished a copy and this
document shall have no validity unless signed by all the
parties.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have set out hands this 15th
day of May 1995 at Baguio City, Philippines.
(SIGNED) (SIGNED)
GEORGE M. FLORENDO ELPIDIO TIONG
(SIGNED) (SIGNED)
MA. ELENA T. TIONG ELIZABETH F. FLORENDO"
Notwithstanding, complainant instituted the present suit
for disbarment on May 23, 1995 charging respondent of
gross immorality and grave misconduct. In his Answer3,
respondent admitted the material allegations of the
complaint but interposed the defense of pardon.
In the Resolution4 dated September 20, 1995, the Court
resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation and decision.
Finding merit in the complaint, the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Agustinus V.
Gonzaga, submitted its Report and
Recommendation5 dated September 21, 2007 for the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for
one (1) year, which was adopted and approved by the
IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution6 dated October
19, 2007. Respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration7 therefrom was denied in the
Resolution8 dated June 26, 2011.
Hence, the instant petition on the sole issue whether the
pardon extended by complainant in the Affidavit dated
May 15, 1995 is sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the
present disbarment case against respondent for gross
immoral conduct.
After due consideration, the Court resolves to adopt the
findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD except as
to the penalty imposed.
The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional
Responsibility provide, thus:
"CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR.
xxxx
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession."
32 | P a g e
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It has been consistently held by the Court that Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal
possession of good moral character is not only a record of respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar
condition for admission to the Bar but is a continuing and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
requirement to maintain one's good standing in the legal Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court
profession. It is the bounden duty of law practitioners to Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
observe the highest degree of morality in order to
safeguard the integrity of the Bar.9 Consequently, any
errant behaviour on the part of a lawyer, be it in his SO ORDERED.
public or private activities, which tends to show him
deficient in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor, is sufficient to warrant his suspension or
disbarment.

In this case, respondent admitted his illicit relationship

with a married woman not his wife, and worse, that of
his client. Contrary to respondent's claim, their
consortium cannot be classified as a mere "moment of
indiscretion"10 considering that it lasted for two (2) years
and was only aborted when complainant overheard their
amorous phone conversation on March 13, 1995.

Respondent's act of having an affair with his client's wife

manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of
marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed
his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the ethics
of his profession.11 Likewise, he violated the trust and
confidence reposed on him by complainant which in itself
is prohibited under Canon 1712 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Undeniably, therefore, his
illicit relationship with Ma. Elena amounts to a
disgraceful and grossly immoral conduct warranting
disciplinary action from the Court.13 Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court provides that an attorney may be
disbarred or suspended from his office by the Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
office, grossly immoral conduct, among others.

Respondent, however, maintains that he cannot be

sanctioned for his questioned conduct because he and
Ma. Elena had already been pardoned by their respective
spouses in the May 15, 1995 Affidavit14.

The Court disagrees.

It bears to stress that a case of suspension or disbarment

is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a
complainant as in a civil case but is intended to cleanse
the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable
members in order to protect the public and the courts. It
is not an investigation into the acts of respondent as a
husband but on his conduct as an officer of the Court and
his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.15 Hence,
the Affidavit dated March 15, 1995, which is akin to an
affidavit of desistance, cannot have the effect of abating
the instant proceedings.16

However, considering the circumstances of this case, the

Court finds that a penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for six (6) months, instead of one (1) year
as recommended by the IBP-CBD, is adequate sanction
for the grossly immoral conduct of respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GEORGE M.

FLORENDO is hereby found GUILTY of Gross
Immorality and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for SIX (6) MONTHSeffective upon notice hereof, with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

33 | P a g e
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CASES BATCH # 4
A.C. No. 7399 August 25, 2009
ANTERO J. POBRE,
Complainant,
- versus -
Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR- SANTIAGO,
Respondent.
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006,
with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the Courts
attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered on the Senate
floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the
mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,
debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like
throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of
this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the
Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position
[of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I
would rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total
disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of
the Court and constituted direct contempt of court.
Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or
other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady
senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007,
Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny
making the aforequoted statements. She, however,
explained that those statements were covered by the
constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity,
being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of
her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The
purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out
in the open controversial anomalies in governance with
a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that
she wanted to expose what she believed to be an unjust
act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC], which, after sending
out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be
vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually
inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the
Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt
that the JBC should have at least given an advanced
advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her,
would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted
primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the
Constitution, which provides: A Senator or Member of
the House of Representative shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No member shall be questioned nor be held
liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof. Explaining the
import of the underscored portion of the provision, the
Court, in Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity
which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as
the English Parliament, its purpose is to enable and
encourage a representative of the public to discharge his
public trust with firmness and success for it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest
liberty of speech and that he should be protected from
resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom
the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.[1]
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative
privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as
a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning
process of the legislative department. Without
parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent,
would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating
forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the
uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for
their private indulgence, but for the public good. The
privilege would be of little value if they could be
subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions
of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the
hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judges
speculation as to the motives.[2]
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in
the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary
immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the
Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and
oversight functions of the Congress that enable this
representative body to look diligently into every affair of
government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and
talk about how the country and its citizens are being
served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its
members in the manner they perform their functions in
the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of
an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of
the statement uttered by the member of the Congress
does not destroy the privilege.[3] The disciplinary
authority of the assembly[4] and the voters, not the
courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses
committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.[5]
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for
the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or
disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege
speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however,
that this could not be the last word on the matter.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the
language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used
in her speech and its effect on the administration of
justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly
crossed the limits of decency and good professional
conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in
question were intemperate and highly improper in
substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that
she wanted to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, and
calling the Court a Supreme Court of idiots.
The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.[6] We
draw her attention to the ensuing passage in Sotto that
she should have taken to heart in the first place:
x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty
and integrity of this Court and believe that they cannot
expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take
the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps
chaos would be the result.
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect
due to the courts should be allowed to erode the peoples
faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator
clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively
provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.
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CASES BATCH # 4
Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most
lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves. She
was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor,
an oft-cited authority on constitutional and international
law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an
elected senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator
Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the
court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity
and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect
due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers
of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree
of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their
brethren in private practice.[7] Senator Santiago should
have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her
statements would make on the peoples faith in the
integrity of the courts.
As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege
speech as a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on
the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an
afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of what she
said. We quote the passage once more:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the
mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,
debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like
throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of
this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the
Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position
[of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by
idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not
in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)
A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show
that her statements were expressions of personal anger
and frustration at not being considered for the post of
Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were
outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions.
Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be
used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the
reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor
for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed
that parliamentary immunity is not an individual
privilege accorded the individual members of the
Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but
rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the
institution that represents them.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to
her anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric and
offensive personalities.
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiagos outburst was
directly traceable to what she considered as an unjust
act the JBC had taken in connection with her application
for the position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC
functions under the Courts supervision, its individual
members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as
the JBCs ex-officiochairperson,[8] have no official duty to
nominate candidates for appointment to the position of
Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand
Senator Santiagos wholesale and indiscriminate assault
on the members of the Court and her choice of critical
and defamatory words against all of them.
At any event, equally important as the speech and
debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution is
Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)
The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules
governing the Integrated Bar with the end in view that
the integration of the Bar will, among other things:
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot
defend itself except within its own forum, from the
assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and
assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and
independence;
xxxx
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.[9]
In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S.
Sorreda,[10] we reiterated our pronouncement in Rheem
of the Philippines v. Ferrer[11] that the duty of attorneys
to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no
service involving any disrespect to the judicial office
which they are bound to uphold. The Court wrote
in Rheem of the Philippines:
x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which
pronounces that [i]t is the duty of a lawyer to maintain
towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake
of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for
the maintenance of its supreme importance. That same
canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent
upon lawyers to support the courts against unjust
criticism and clamor. And more. The attorneys oath
solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be with all
good fidelity x x x to the courts.
Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding
in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel[12] that:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court
itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of
justice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of
the courts to which he owes fidelity, not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice. Faith in the
courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to
undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the
continuity of government and to the attainment of the
liberties of the people. Thus has it been said of a lawyer
that [a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral
duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that
high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential
to the proper administration of justice.[13]
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound
by the exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has
entrusted that profession with the administration of the
law and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a
lawyer holding a government office may not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct
committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless
said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her
oath as a lawyer.[14]
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct
committed in their private capacity, as long as their
misconduct reflects their want of probity or good
demeanor,[15] a good character being an essential
qualification for the admission to the practice of law and
35 | P a g e
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for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of she has not categorically denied making such
Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks statements, she has unequivocally said making them as
of conduct or misconduct, the reference is not confined part of her privilege speech. Her implied admission is
to ones behavior exhibited in connection with the good enough for the Court.
performance of lawyers professional duties, but also
covers any misconduct, whichalbeit unrelated to the WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre
actual practice of their professionwould show them to be against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago
unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the
their license and the law invest in them.[16] Constitution, DISMISSED.

This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the peoples

faith in courts and trust in the rule of law, has
consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on
lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or personal malice,
attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice,
trifle with the integrity of courts, and embarrass or,
worse, malign the men and women who compose them.
We have done it in the case of former Senator Vicente
Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda
in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B.
Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang[17] who repeatedly insulted and
threatened the Court in a most insolent manner.

The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of

disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what
otherwise would have constituted an act of utter
disrespect on her part towards the Court and its
members. The factual and legal circumstances of this
case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even
without any sign of remorse from her. Basic
constitutional consideration dictates this kind of
disposition.

We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the

Senators offensive and disrespectful language that
definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It
is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty.
Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially
this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the
parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to
members of Congress is not to protect them against
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them,
as the peoples representatives, to perform the functions
of their office without fear of being made responsible
before the courts or other forums outside the
congressional hall.[18] It is intended to protect members
of Congress against government pressure and
intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making
prerogatives of Congress and its members.

The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision

on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a
Senator from using, under any circumstance, offensive
or improper language against another Senator or against
any public institution.[19] But as to Senator Santiagos
unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not
apparently called her to order, let alone referred the
matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate
disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such
circumstance.[20] The lady senator clearly violated the
rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her
peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own
rules on her.

Finally, the lady senator questions Pobres motives in

filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary proceedings
must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We
cannot agree with her more. We cannot overstress that
the senators use of intemperate language to demean and
denigrate the highest court of the land is a clear violation
of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts.[21]

Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has

failed to prove that she in fact made the statements in
question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although

36 | P a g e
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A.C. No. 7269 November 23, 2011
ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, Complainant,
- versus -
ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE, Respondent.
The Case
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by
Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana (Noe-Lacsamana) against
Atty. Yolando F. Busmente (Busmente) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The Antecedent Facts
Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was
the counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in Civil Case No.
SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 167, while Busmente was the counsel for the
defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana
alleged that Ulasos deed of sale over the property
subject of Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was annulled, which
resulted in the filing of an ejectment case before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, docketed as
Civil Case No. 9284, where Busmente appeared as
counsel. Another case for falsification was filed against
Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-
Lacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or
Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso
in court, projecting herself as Busmentes collaborating
counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the court
proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284 nine times from 25
November 2003 to 8 February 2005. Noe-Lacsamana
further alleged that the court orders and notices
specified Dela Rosa as Busmentes collaborating counsel.
Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon verification with this
Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she
discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and
was his paralegal assistant for a few years. Busmente
alleged that Dela Rosas employment with him ended in
2000 but Dela Rosa was able to continue
misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help of
Regine Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmentes former
secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not represent
Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the
Answer1 presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was
forged.
The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline
In its Report and Recommendation,2 the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found that Dela
Rosa was not a lawyer and that she represented Ulaso
as Busmentes collaborating counsel in Civil Case No.
9284. The IBP-CBD noted that while Busmente claimed
that Dela Rosa no longer worked for him since 2000,
there was no proof of her separation from employment.
The IBP-CBD found that notices from the MTC San Juan,
as well as the pleadings of the case, were all sent to
Busmentes designated office address. The IBP-CBD
stated that Busmentes only excuse was that Dela Rosa
connived with his former secretary Macasieb so that the
notices and pleadings would not reach him.
The IBP-CBD rejected the affidavit submitted by Judy M.
Ortalez (Ortalez), Busmentes staff, alleging Macasiebs
failure to endorse pleadings and notices of Civil Case No.
9284 to Busmente. The IBP-CBD noted that Ortalez did
not exactly refer to Ulasos case in her affidavit and that
there was no mention that she actually witnessed
Macasieb withholding pleadings and notices from
Busmente. The IBP-CBD also noted that Macasieb was
still working at Busmentes office in November 2003 as
shown by the affidavit attached to a Motion to Lift Order
of Default that she signed. However, even if Macasieb
resigned in November 2003, Dela Rosa continued to
represent Ulaso until 2005, which belied Busmentes
allegation that Dela Rosa was able to illegally practice
law using his office address without his knowledge and
only due to Dela Rosas connivance with Macasieb. As
regards Busmentes allegation that his signature on the
Answer was forged, the IBP-CBD gave Busmente the
opportunity to coordinate with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to prove that his signature was
forged but he failed to submit any report from the NBI
despite the lapse of four months from the time he
reserved his right to submit the report.
The IBP-CBD recommended Busmentes suspension from
the practice of law for not less than five years. On 26
May 2006, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-271,3 the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the
recommendation of the IBP-CBD, with modification by
reducing the period of Busmentes suspension to six
months.
Busmente filed a motion for reconsideration and
submitted a report4 from the NBI stating that the
signature in the Answer, when compared with
standard/sample signatures submitted to its office,
showed that they were not written by one and the same
person. In its 14 May 2011 Resolution No. XIX-2011-
168, the IBP Board of Governors denied Busmentes
motion for reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of
directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal
practice of law that warrants his suspension from the
practice of law.
The Ruling of this Court
We agree with the IBP.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states:
Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist
in the unauthorized practice of law.
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CASES BATCH # 4
The Court ruled that the term practice of law implies
customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public
as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or
in consideration of his services.5 The Court further ruled
that holding ones self out as a lawyer may be shown by
acts indicative of that purpose, such as identifying
oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation
of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law
office for the general practice of law.6
The Court explained:
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to
assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on
public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the
practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive
right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain
proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The
purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and
the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a
lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the
canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to
permit his professional services or his name to be used
in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice
of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the
law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to
disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law.7
In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who
is not a member of the Bar, misrepresented herself as
Busmentes collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284.
The only question is whether Busmente indirectly or
directly assisted Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosas employment in his
office ended in 2000 and that Dela Rosa was able to
continue with her illegal practice of law through
connivance with Macasieb, another member of
Busmentes staff. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD,
Busmente claimed that Macasieb resigned from his office
in 2003. Yet, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso
until 2005. Pleadings and court notices were still sent to
Busmentes office until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted that
Dela Rosas practice should have ended in 2003 when
Macasieb left.
We agree. Busmentes office continued to receive all the
notices of Civil Case No. 9284. The 7 December 2004
Order8 of Judge Elvira DC. Panganiban (Judge
Panganiban) in Civil Case No. 9284 showed that Atty.
Elizabeth Dela Rosa was still representing Ulaso in the
case. In that Order, Judge Panganiban set the
preliminary conference of Civil Case No. 9284 on 8
February 2005. It would have been impossible for Dela
Rosa to continue representing Ulaso in the case,
considering Busmentes claim that Macasieb already
resigned, if Dela Rosa had no access to the files in
Busmentes office.
Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration of
Resolution No. XVII-2006-271, submitted a copy of the
NBI report stating that the signature on the Answer
submitted in Civil Case No. 9284 and the specimen
signatures submitted by Busmente were not written by
one and the same person. The report shows that
Busmente only submitted to the NBI the questioned
signature in the Answer. The IBP-CBD report, however,
showed that there were other documents signed by
Busmente, including the Pre-Trial Brief dated 14
November 2003 and Motion to Lift Order of Default dated
22 November 2003. Noe-Lacsamana also submitted a
letter dated 14 August 2003 addressed to her as well as
three letters dated 29 August 2003 addressed to the
occupants of the disputed property, all signed by
Busmente. Busmente failed to impugn his signatures in
these other documents.
Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware
of Civil Case No. 9284 and he only came to know about
the case when Ulaso went to his office to inquire about
its status. Busmentes allegation contradicted the Joint
Counter-Affidavit9 submitted by Ulaso and Eddie B.
Bides stating that:
a. That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE
of the YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE AND ASSOCIATES LAW
OFFICES with address at suite 718 BPI Office Cond. Plaza
Cervantes, Binondo Manila.
b. That ELIZABETH DELA ROSA is not our legal counsel
in the case which have been filed by IRENE BIDES and
LILIA VALERA in representation of her sister AMELIA
BIDES for Ejectment docketed as Civil Case No. 9284
before Branch 58 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San
Juan, Metro Manila.
c. That we never stated in any of the pleadings filed in
the cases mentioned in the Complaint-Affidavit that
ELIZABETH DELA ROSA was our lawyer;
d. That if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed her
signature in the notices or other court records as our
legal counsel the same could not be taken against us for,
we believed in good faith that she was a lawyer; and we
are made to believe that it was so since had referred her
to us (sic), she was handling some cases of Hortaleza
and client of Atty. Yolando F. Busmente;
e. That we know for the fact that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA
did not sign any pleading which she filed in court in
connection with our cases at all of those were signed by
Atty. YOLANDO BUSMENTE as our legal counsel; she just
accompanied us to the court rooms and/or hearings;
f. That we cannot be made liable for violation of Article
171 (for and in relation to Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code) for the reason that the following elements
of the offense are not present, to wit:
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CASES BATCH # 4
1. That offender has a legal obligation to disclose the
truth of the facts narrated;

2. There must be wrongful intent to injure a 3rd party;

3. Knowledge that the facts narrated by him are

absolutely false;

4. That the offender makes in a document untruthful

statements in the narration of facts.

And furthermore the untruthful narrations of facts must

affect the integrity which is not so in the instant case.

g. That from the start of our acquaintance with

ELIZABETH DELA ROSA we never ask her whether she
was a real lawyer and allowed to practice law in the
Philippines; it would have been unethical and shameful
on our part to ask her qualification; we just presumed
that she has legal qualifications to represent us in our
cases because Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE allowed her
to accompany us and attend our hearings in short, she
gave us paralegal assistance[.] (Emphasis supplied)

The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was

the legal counsel in Civil Case No. 9284 and that he
allowed Dela Rosa to give legal assistance to Ulaso.

Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that

there was sufficient evidence to prove that Busmente
was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. We agree with the
recommendation of the IBP, modifying the
recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that Busmente should
be suspended from the practice of law for six months.

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente

from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty.

Busmentes personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished
to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

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