G.R. No. L-53373
8 A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of
MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT
CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist.,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET
AL., respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court
acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the
Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of
Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may
refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment
and trial on the merits.
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with
the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information
for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal
Court of Lucena City which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77.1 When the case was set
for arraigment the accused filed a motion to defer
arraignment on the ground that there was a pending
petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of
the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for
the filing of the information. In an order of August 1,
1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L.
Mogul, denied the motion. 2 A motion for
reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of
August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to
August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate
the matter to the appellate court. 3
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a
preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in
the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 06978. 4 In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of
Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with
the arraignment of the accused until further orders of
the Court. 5 In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor
General he recommended that the petition be given due
course. 6 On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by
the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually
restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel
the arraignment of the accused in the case until the
Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the
petition for review. 7
On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice,
Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for
review reversed the resolution of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for
immediate dismissal of the information filed against the
accused.
evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10,
1978 with the trial court, 9 attaching thereto a copy of
the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of
August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to
file an opposition thereto.10 On November 24, 1978 the
Judge denied the motion and set the arraigniment
stating:
ORDER
For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase
filed by the procuting fiscal premised on
insufficiency of evidence, as suggested by the
Undersecretary of Justice, evident from Annex
"A" of the motion wherein, among other things,
the Fiscal is urged to move for dismissal for the
reason that the check involved having been
issued for the payment of a pre-existing
obligation the Hability of the drawer can only be
civil and not criminal.
The motion's thrust being to induce this Court
to resolve the innocence of the accused on
evidence not before it but on that adduced
before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter
that not only disregards the requirements of
due process but also erodes the Court's
independence and integrity, the motion is
considered as without merit and therefore
hereby DENIED.
WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is
hereby set for December 18, 1978 at 9:00
o'clock in the moming.
SO ORDERED. 11
The accused then filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance
of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary
restraining order in the Court of Appeals that was
docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-08777. 12 On January 23,
1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of
Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the
accused until further orders from the Court. 13 In a
decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of
January 23, 1979. 14 A motion for reconsideration of said
decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution
of February 19, 1980. 15
Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed
by accused whereby petitioner prays that said decision
be reversed and set aside, respondent judge be
perpetually enjoined from enforcing his threat to
proceed with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in
said criminal case, declaring the information filed not
valid and of no legal force and effect, ordering
respondent Judge to dismiss the said case, and declaring
the obligation of petitioner as purely civil. 16
In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of
this Court without giving due course to the petition
required the respondents to comment to the petition,
not to file a motiod to dismiss, within ten (10) days from
notice. In the comment filed by the Solicitor General he
recommends that the petition be given due course, it
being meritorious. Private respondent through counsel
filed his reply to the comment and a separate conunent
to the petition asking that the petition be dismissed. In
the resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second Division
of this Court resolved to transfer this case to the
Court En Banc. In the resolution of February 26, 1981,
the Court En Banc resolved to give due course to the
petition.
Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective
briefs while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in
lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that
respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information.
It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either
commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the
fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends
upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may
not file the complaint or information, follow or not
fonow that presented by the offended party, according
to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or
not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. 18 The reason for placing the criminal
prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal
is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by
private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the
complainant. 20 Prosecuting officers under the power
vested in them by law, not only have the authority but
also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to
the evidence received from the complainant, are shown
to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction
of their office. 21 They have equally the legal duty not to
prosecute when after an investigation they become
convinced that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to
establish a prima faciecase. 22
It is through the conduct of a preliminary
investigation 23 that the fiscal determines the existence
of a puma facie case that would warrant the prosecution
of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's
discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is
not prudent or even permissible for a Court to compel
the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated
by him on an information, if he finds that the evidence
relied upon by him is insufficient for
conviction. 24 Neither has the Court any power to order
the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a
certain period of time, since this would interfere with
the fiscal's discretion and control of criminal
prosecutions. 25 Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal
of the case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to
do so, and Courts that grant the same commit no
error. 26 The fiscal may re-investigate a case and
subsequently move for the dismissal should the re-
investigation show either that the defendant is innocent
or that his guilt may not be established beyond
reasonable doubt. 27 In a clash of views between the
judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or
between the fiscal and the offended party or the
defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally
prevail. 28 On the other hand, neither an injunction,
preliminary or final nor a writ of prohibition may be
issued by the courts to restrain a criminal
prosecution 29 except in the extreme case where it is
necessary for the Courts to do so for the orderly
administration of justice or to prevent the use of the
strong arm of the law in an op pressive and vindictive
manner. 30
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not
without any limitation or control. The same is subject to
the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief
state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe
elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has
the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or
opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of
Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the rase be
filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed
in Court. 31
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates
a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction
over the case, which is the authority to hear and
determine the case. 32 When after the filing of the
complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the
accused is issued by the trial court and the accused
either voluntarily submited himself to the Court or was
duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the accused. 33
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for
the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case
exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is
terminated upon the filing of the information in the
proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said
information sets in motion the criminal action against
the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the
permission of the Court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the
fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate
action. 34 While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi
judicial discretion to determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the
case had already been brought to Court whatever
disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the
rase thereafter should be addressed for the
consideration of the Court, 35 The only qualification is
that the action of the Court must not impair the
substantial rights of the accused. 36 or the right of the
People to due process of law. 36a
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and
whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a
review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to
dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the
exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it
and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the
proper determination of the case.
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
records of the investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the
opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court,
the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable,
refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal
from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in Court. The matter
should be left entirely for the determination of the
Court.

However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit
the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the without pronouncement as to costs.
directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a
vacuum in the prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle SO ORDERED.
the case cannot possibly be designated by the Secretary
of Justice who does not believe that there is a basis for
prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the
prosecution of the case thereby defying the superior
order of the Secretary of Justice.

The answer is simple.1âwphi1 The role of the fiscal or

prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done
and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the
person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his
opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to
proceed with the presentation of evidence of the
prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at
its own independent judgment as to whether the
accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal
should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for
the People of the Philippines even under such
circumstances much less should he abandon the
prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a
private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will
be null and void. 37 The least that the fiscal should do is
to continue to appear for the prosecution although he
may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the
private prosecutor but still under his direction and
control. 38

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a

complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition
of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal
of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of
the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the
trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what
to do with the case before it. The determination of the
case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence.
A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or
deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before
or after the arraignment of the accused or that the
motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
G.R. No 166995 January 13, 2014
DENNIS T. VILLAREAL, Petitioner,
vs.
CONSUELO C. ALIGA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
(Rules) are the April 27, 2004 Decision1 and August 10,
2004 Resolution,2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
R No. 25581entitled People of he Philippines v. Consuelo
Cruz Aliga which acquitted respondent Consuelo C. Aliga
(Aliga) from the offense charged and, in effect, reversed
and set aside the July 12, 2001 Decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court RTC), Branch 147, Makati City.
On October 31, 1996, an Information was filed against
respondent Aliga for the crime of Qualified Theft thru
Falsification of Commercial Document, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 30th day of October 1996, in the
City of Makati, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being then an accountant of Dentrade Inc., herein
represented by Dennis T. Villareal, and who has access
to the company’s checking accounts did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with grave abuse of
confidence, with intent [to] gain and without the
consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away
from complainant’s office, United Coconut Planters Bank
Check No. HOF 681039 dated October 24, 1996 in the
amount of ₱5,000.00, once in possession of said check,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
falsify the amount by changing it to ₱65,000.00 and
having the same encashed with the bank, thereafter
misappropriate and convert to her own personal use and
benefit the amount of ₱60,000.00 to the damage and
prejudice of the herein complainant, Dentrade Inc., in
the aforementioned amount of ₱60,000.00.4
During her arraignment on December 6, 1996,
respondent Aliga pleaded not guilty.5 After the RTC
resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for issuance of a
hold departure order against respondent Aliga and the
latter’s motion to suspend proceedings,6 trial on the
merits ensued. Both the prosecution and the defense
were able to present the testimonies of their witnesses
and their respective documentary exhibits.
The Court of Appeals, substantially adopting the trial
court’s findings, narrated the relevant facts as follows:
Apart from the documentary exhibits "A" to "F", the
combined testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Elsa
Doroteo, Diosdado Corompido, Yolanda Martirez and
NBI agent John Leonard David tend to establish the
following factual milieu:
Complainant Dennis T. Villareal is the President and
General Manager of Dentrade, Inc., a corporation with
principal office address at the 7/F Citibank Center 8741
Paseo de Roxas, Makati City. As a businessman, Villareal
maintains checking accounts with the head office of
China Banking Corporation (Chinabank) in Paseo de
Roxas and United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) in
Makati Avenue, both banks are located in Makati City.
He has under his employ, Elsa Doroteo, as executive
secretary, Diosdado Corompido, as messenger, Yolanda
Martirez, as chief accountant, [respondent] Consuelo
Cruz Aliga and Annaliza Perez, as accounting clerks.
[Respondent] has custody of the personal checks of
Villareal. She prepares the personal checks by typing its
contents and submits them to Villareal for his signature.
After the signed checks are delivered to her, she in turn,
gives the checks to the messenger for encashment with
the bank.
Sometime in October 1996, Villareal’s governess asked
Doroteo for the payment covering the year 1995 for his
children’s teacher in horseback riding. Doroteo replied
that the said fees had been paid. To verify the matter,
Doroteo instructed Perez, one of the accounting clerks,
to produce the originals of the returned checks from
[the] personal account of Villareal. Upon examining the
returned checks, Doroteo found out that the fees for the
horseback riding instructor had indeed been paid and
that there were large encashments reflected on the
checks in typewritten form. Doroteo informed Villareal
of her findings. Villareal examined the returned checks
and was surprised as he never authorized the large
encashments.
Upon advice of his lawyer, Atty. Victor Lazatin of the
ACCRA Law Offices, Mr. Villareal sent a letter to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) asking for
assistance in the investigation of the matter (Exh. "A"). A
few days thereafter, NBI agents John Leonard David and
Rafael Ragos arrived at the Dentrade office. They
examined the particular checks which involved large
amounts and interviewed Doroteo.
When asked by the two NBI agents, Villareal told them
that there were three (3) checks pending for his
signature, UCPB checks, all in petty cash: one check was
for ₱1,000.00, another for ₱5,000.00, and the last one
for ₱6,000.00. They were all in typewritten form which
[respondent] prepared. As suggested by the NBI agents,
Villareal signed the three (3) checks. Doroteo had the
three checks photocopied then released their originals
to [respondent].
On instruction of Villareal, Doroteo and NBI agent David
went to UCPB the next day hoping that one of the checks
will be encashed. At or about 3:00 p.m. on that day,
Doroteo asked the bank teller if Villareal’s three checks
were encashed. The bank teller informed Doroteo that
UCPB check in the amount of ₱65,000.00 was encashed.
Doroteo was surprised because she was then holding a
photocopy of the original check for ₱5,000.00 while she
saw the teller holding a check for ₱65,000.00 but the
check number and date were exactly the same as that of
its photocopy. Obviously, the number "6" was
intercalated in the check by adding the said number
before the digits "5,000.00." Upon Doroteo’s request,
the teller gave her a photocopy of the supposedly
altered check.
Doroteo reported back to the Dentrade office and
handed to Villareal the photocopy of the check bearing
the amount of ₱65,000.00. When summoned,
[respondent] arrived then executed a statement
voluntarily giving back the amount of ₱60,000.00 to
Villareal in the presence of his lawyers Lazatin and
Vallente, and Doroteo. The said statement was in the
handwriting of [respondent] (Exh. "D"), which reads:
"After being confronted by Mr. Dennis T. Villareal, I am
voluntarily surrendering the ₱60,000.00 as part of the
proceeds of UCPB check # 681039 dated October 30,
1996 as follows (in ₱1,000.00 bills) (serial no. of
₱1,000.00 bills subject of the statement)."
Doroteo photocopied the ₱1,000.00 bills (Exh. "E"). After
[respondent] admitted the taking of the excess amount
of ₱60,000.00, the NBI agents placed her under arrest
and took her to the NBI detention center.
According to witness Corompido, Villareal’s messenger,
at 10:00 a.m. of October 30, 1996, he was bound for
UCPB, Makati Avenue branch. [Respondent] requested
him to pay her "Extelcom" bill and asked him to meet
her at the UCPB bank. After several minutes, the two
met at the bank. [Respondent] handed to Corompido
her "Extelcom" bill and one personal check of Villareal in
the amount of ₱65,000.00. [Respondent] returned to the
Dentrade [office]. Corompido gave to the teller
[respondent’s] "Extelcom" payment and also the
personal check of Villareal for ₱65,000.00. The teller
release the ₱65,000.00 to Corompido who signed on the
stamped portion of the check. [Respondent] Aliga has a
different version for her defense. She claimed that on
October 30, 1996 at around 2:30 p.m., the NBI agents
arrested her but they did [not] inform [her] of her
constitutional rights to remain silent and to be assisted
by counsel; that she was actually an accounting assistant
to Dentrade’s chief accountant, Yolanda Martirez, the
accounting clerk being Annaliza Perez; that she was not
in charge of Villareal’s personal checking account, but
Martirez; that Perez was the one in custody of the
[checkbooks] pertaining to the personal checking
accounts of Villareal with UCPB and [Chinabank]; that
Doroteo was in possession of another [checkbook] and
kept it in Villareal’s residence.
[Respondent] admitted that the UCPB and Chinabank
checks were also used for the replenishment of the cash
advances made by Villareal; that the replenishment was
prepared using a typewriter by Martirez, Perez, Doroteo
and herself; that there was no regulation or control
mechanism in their office where the responsibility for
preparing any particular check on the personal account
of Villareal could be identified; that the issuance of
checks against the personal checking accounts at the
UCPB and Chinabank were frequent, from 5 to 12 checks
daily; and that there were no accompanying vouchers to
record the purposes for which the checks were issued;
and that it was Martirez who monitors Villareal’s
personal checks at the UCPB and Chinabank.7
Additionally, respondent Aliga claimed that Perez,
Doroteo, and Martirez are also using typewriter in the
check preparation.8 Moreover, at the time she was
summoned by Villareal inside his office, the two NBI
agents (David and Ragos) and Villareal’s counsels (Attys.
Lazatin and Vallente) were joined in by NBI Director
Toledo.9 The extent of the NBI’s participation is
disputed. While respondent Aliga10 maintained that she
was already arrested by the NBI at the moment she was
called to the office of Villareal, David11 testified that they
were merely silent spectators therein, just witnessing
the confrontation or interview conducted by Villareal
and not even talking to respondent Aliga.
The RTC succinctly opined that the evidence of the
prosecution is very clear that respondent Aliga must
have been the one who made the intercalation in the
subject check, and that even without her written
admission (Exhibit "D"), the evidence presented
constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt. The July 12,
2001 Decision disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court, finding
the accused CONSUELO CRUZ ALIGA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, hereby
sentences her to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 14
years, 8 months of reclusion temporal as the minimum
to 20 years of reclusion temporal as the maximum.
It appearing that the amount of ₱60,000.00 subject of
the offense was already returned by the accused, the
Court hereby absolves the accused of civil liability in this
case.
SO ORDERED.12
Respondent Aliga appealed to the CA, which, on April 27,
2004, reversed and set aside the judgment of the RTC on
the grounds that: (1) her admission or confession of guilt
before the NBI authorities, which already qualifies as a
custodial investigation, is inadmissible in evidence
because she was not informed of her rights to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of her own choice; and (2) the totality of the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is
insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence
of the accused.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by
the CA on August 10, 2004; hence, this petition raising
the issues for resolution as follows:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING
INADMISSIBLE RESPONDENT’S VOLUNTARY ADMISSION
OF GUILT, ON ITS CLEARLY SPECULATIVE AND
CONJECTURAL PREMISE THAT RESPONDENT’S FREEDOM
OF ACTION WAS IMPAIRED WHEN SHE MADE THE
ADMISSION, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. AS LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT,
AN ADMISSION OF GUILT SHIFTS THE BURDEN
TO THE DEFENSE TO SHOW THAT IT WAS
EXTRACTED BY FORCE OR DURESS.
B. CONTRARY TO THE JURISPRUDENTIAL
GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE
COURT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY
CONCLUDED THAT RESPONDENT WAS
"EFFECTIVELY PLACED UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION" BY THE SHEER PHYSICAL
PRESENCE OF THE NBI AGENTS WHEN THE
ADMISSION WAS MADE. C. RESPONDENT’S
VOLUNTARY ADMISSION WAS MADE TO A
PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL, I.E., PETITIONER HEREIN.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, IF NOT ACTED
IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION, WHEN IT CONCLUDED
THAT THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT
TO OVERCOME RESPONDENT’S PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S
JURISPRUDENTIAL RULING, THE COURT OF
APPEALS ENTIRELY OVERLOOKED THE EVIDENCE
ON RECORD AND EXACTED DIRECT EVIDENCE
FROM THE PROSECUTION.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ ERRONEOUS
CONCLUSION THAT RESPONDENT IS INNOCENT
IS BASED ON ITS FINDING OF A SUPPOSED
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE WHICH IS
CONTRADICTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM
SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE, REQUIRING FROM
THE PROSECUTION A QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE
GREATER THAN PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT, WHEN IT:
1. ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO DISCOUNT
THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOMEONE ELSE
COULD HAVE CAUSED THE ALTERATION
ON THE CHECK; AND
2. FAULTING THE PROSECUTION FOR
NOT PRESENTING PETITIONER AS A
WITNESS.
D. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN,
BASED ON NOTHING MORE THAN RESPONDENT’S
DENIALS, IT DEPARTED FROM THE WELL-SETTLED RULE
LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT THAT THE
TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
BASED THEREON, AS WELL AS ITS ASSESSMENT OF THE
CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES, ARE CONCLUSIVE UPON
APPELLATE COURTS.13
On the other hand, respondent Aliga countered that:
I.
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI SHOULD BE
DISMISSED FOR RAISING ONLY QUESTIONS OF FACTS.
II.
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI SHOULD BE
DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
III.
PETITIONER HAS NO STANDING TO FILE THE INSTANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI.
IV.
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS,
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI SHOULD BE
DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO SHOW THAT THE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED GRIEVOUS ERROR IN ISSUING THE
27 APRIL 2004 AND 10 AUGUST 2004 DECISIONS; ON
THE CONTRARY, THE DECISIONS APPEAR TO BE IN
ACCORD WITH THE FACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE.14
The petition is unmeritorious.
The petition should have been filed
by the State through the OSG
Petitioner took a procedural misstep when he filed the
present petition without the representation of the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG). In Bautista v. Cuneta-
Pangilinan,15 We underscored:
x x x The authority to represent the State in appeals of
criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is
solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG
shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have
specific powers and functions to represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and
the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions
and special proceedings in which the Government or any
officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. The OSG
is the law office of the Government.
To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused
or the dismissal of the case against him can only be
appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the
State. The private complainant or the offended party
may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as
the civil liability of the accused is concerned. In a catena
of cases, this view has been time and again espoused
and maintained by the Court. In Rodriguez v. Gadiane, it
was categorically stated that if the criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the
appeal on the criminal aspect of the case must be
instituted by the Solicitor General in behalf of the State.
The capability of the private complainant to question
such dismissal or acquittal is limited only to the civil
aspect of the case. The same determination was also
arrived at by the Court in Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company v. Veridiano II. In the recent case of Bangayan,
Jr. v. Bangayan, the Court again upheld this guiding
principle.
Worthy of note is the case of People v. Santiago,
wherein the Court had the occasion to bring this issue to
rest. The Court elucidated:
It is well settled that in criminal cases where the
offended party is the State, the interest of the private
complainant or the private offended party is limited to
the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense,
the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for
the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the
trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom
on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the
State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor
General may represent the People of the Philippines on
appeal. The private offended party or complainant may
not take such appeal. However, the said offended party
or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the
acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section
1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that
the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other
jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition
may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the
aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended
party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in
the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special
civil action questioning the decision or action of the
respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing,
complainant should not bring the action in the name of
the People of the Philippines. The action may be
prosecuted in [the] name of said complainant.
Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal
case in which the offended party is the State, the
interest of the private complainant or the private
offended party is limited to the civil liability arising
therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial
court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal
aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible,
only by the State through the Solicitor General. As a rule,
only the Solicitor General may represent the People of
the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or
complainant may not undertake such appeal.16
In the case at bar, the petition filed essentially assails the
criminal, not the civil, aspect of the CA Decision. It must
even be stressed that petitioner never challenged before
the CA, and in this Court, the RTC judgment which
absolved respondent Aliga from civil liability in view of
the return of the ₱60,000.00 subject matter of the
offense on October 30, 1996. Therefore, the petition
should have been filed only by the State through the
OSG. Petitioner lacks the personality or legal standing to
question the CA Decision because it is only the OSG
which can bring actions on behalf of the State in criminal
proceedings before the Supreme Court and the CA.
Unlike in Montañez v. Cipriano17where we adopted a
liberal view, the OSG, in its Comment on this
case,18 neither prayed that the petition be granted nor
expressly ratified and adopted as its own the petition for
the People of the Philippines. Instead, it merely begged
to excuse itself from filing a Comment due to conflict of
interest and for not having been impleaded in the case.
A judgment of acquittal may be
assailed only in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
Petitioner also committed another procedural blunder. A
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules should
have been filed instead of herein petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. The People may assail a
judgment of acquittal only via petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules. If the petition, regardless of
its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of
the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right of
the accused against double jeopardy would be
violated.19 The Court made this clear in People v.
Sandiganbayan (First Div.),20 thus:
x x x A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court and a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are two and separate
remedies. A petition under Rule 45 brings up for review
errors of judgment, while a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 covers errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground
under Rule 45. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is a mode of appeal. Under Section 1 of
the said Rule, a party aggrieved by the decision or final
order of the Sandiganbayan may file a petition for
review on certiorari with this Court:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party
desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final
order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The
petition shall raise only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth.
However, the provision must be read in relation to
Section 1, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides that any party may appeal from a judgment or
final order "unless the accused will thereby be placed in
double jeopardy." The judgment that may be appealed
by the aggrieved party envisaged in the Rule is a
judgment convicting the accused, and not a judgment of
acquittal. The State is barred from appealing such
judgment of acquittal by a petition for review.
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides that
"no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense." The rule is that a judgment
acquitting the accused is final and immediately
executory upon its promulgation, and that accordingly,
the State may not seek its review without placing the
accused in double jeopardy. Such acquittal is final and
unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy whether
it happens at the trial court or on appeal at the CA. Thus,
the State is proscribed from appealing the judgment of
acquittal of the accused to this Court under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
xxxx
A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy.
However, in such case, the People is burdened to
establish that the court a quo, in this case, the
Sandiganbayan, acted without jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion generally refers to
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty
imposed by law, or to act in contemplation of law or
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. No
grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court
simply because of its alleged misapplication of facts and
evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on said
evidence. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of
jurisdiction, and not errors or mistakes in the findings
and conclusions of the trial court.21
The nature of certiorari action was expounded in People
v. Court of Appeals (Fifteenth Div.):22
x x x Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion is an
extraordinary remedy. Its use is confined to
extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior
court is wholly void. Its aim is to keep the inferior court
within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it
from committing such a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. No grave
abuse of discretion may be attributed to the court
simply because of its alleged misappreciation of facts
and evidence. While certiorari may be used to correct an
abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such extraordinary
proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the lower
court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as
to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.23
and further in First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division
of the Court of Appeals:24
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts
and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem – beyond
the ambit of appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial
review does not go as far as to examine and assess the
evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative value
thereof. It does not include an inquiry as to the
correctness of the evaluation of evidence. x x x It is not
for this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-
evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or substitute the
findings of fact of the court a quo.25
The case does not fall within the
exception to rule on double jeopardy
Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the
trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and
immediately executory upon its promulgation.26 The
rationale for the rule is elucidated in the oft-cited case of
People v. Hon. Velasco:27
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of
an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the
humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over
the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal
contest with the State. x x x." Thus, Green expressed the
concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply
ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and
power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent, he may be found
guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and
justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of
repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his
acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule
establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of
the paramount importance criminal justice system
attaches to the protection of the innocent against
wrongful conviction." The interest in the finality-of-
acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not
guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose," a
desire to know the exact extent of one's liability. With
this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built
in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those
whose innocence rests upon a jury’s leniency, will not be
found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.
Related to his right of repose is the defendant’s interest
in his right to have his trial completed by a particular
tribunal. This interest encompasses his right to have his
guilt or innocence determined in a single proceeding by
the initial jury empanelled to try him, for society’s
awareness of the heavy personal strain which the
criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is
manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a
single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital
interest in enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate
goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal
finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. As
observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, "(t)he fundamental tenet
animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State
should not be able to oppress individuals through the
abuse of the criminal process." Because the innocence of
the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the
Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial
would be unfair.28
People v. Court of Appeals (Fifteenth Div.)29 also stated:
x x x The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several
avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from
using its criminal processes as an instrument of
harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of
cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the
additional purpose of precluding the State, following an
acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the
hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the
State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant
again in the hope of securing a greater penalty. In People
v. Velasco, we stressed that an acquitted defendant is
entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of
the finality of his acquittal x x x.30
However, the rule against double jeopardy is not
without exceptions, which are: (1) Where there has been
deprivation of due process and where there is a finding
of a mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse
of discretion under exceptional
circumstances.31 Unfortunately for petitioner, We find
that these exceptions do not exist in this case.
First, there is no deprivation of due process or a
mistrial.1âwphi1 In fact, petitioner did not make any
allegation to that effect. What the records show is that
during the trial, both parties had more than sufficient
occasions to be heard and to present their evidence. The
same is true during the appeal before the CA. The State,
represented by the OSG, was not deprived of a fair
opportunity to prove its case.
And second, no grave abuse of discretion could be
attributed to the CA. It could not be said that its
judgment was issued without jurisdiction, and, for this
reason, void. Again, petitioner did not even allege that
the CA gravely abused its discretion. Instead, what he
asserted was that the CA "gravely erred" in the
evaluation and assessment of the evidence presented by
the parties. Certainly, what he questioned was the
purported errors of judgment or those involving
misappreciation of evidence or errors of law, which, as
aforesaid, cannot be raised and be reviewed in a Rule 65
petition. To repeat, a writ of certiorari can only correct
errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission
of grave abuse of discretion, not those which call for the
evaluation of evidence and factual findings.
x x x Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence
is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied
by certiorari. An error of judgment is one in which the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An
error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of
was issued by the court without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is
tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which
error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of
certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by
the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the
parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings
and its conclusions of law. Since no error of jurisdiction
can be attributed to public respondent in her
assessment of the evidence, certiorari will not lie.32
Upon perusal of the records, it is Our considered view
that the conclusions arrived at by the CA cannot, by any
measure, be characterized as capricious, whimsical or
arbitrary. While it may be argued that there have been
instances where the appreciation of facts might have
resulted from possible lapses in the evaluation of the
evidence, nothing herein detracts from the fact that
relevant and material evidence was scrutinized,
considered and evaluated as proven by the CA’s lengthy
discussion of its opinion. We note that the petition
basically raises issues pertaining to alleged errors of
judgment not errors of jurisdiction which is tantamount
to an appeal contrary to the express injunction of the
Constitution the Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence. Conformably then we need not embark
upon review of the factual and evidentiary issues raised
by petitioner as these are obviously not within the realm
of Our jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack

of merit. The acquittal of herein respondent Consuelo C.
Aliga by the Court of Appeals in its April 27, 2004
Decision and August 10, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR
No. 25581 entitled People of the Philippines v. Consuelo
Cruz Aliga is AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160451 February 9, 2007
EDUARDO G. RICARZE, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC., PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL
AND INDUSTRIAL BANK (PCIBANK), Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
68492, and its Resolution2 which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Eduardo G. Ricarze was employed as a
collector-messenger by City Service Corporation, a
domestic corporation engaged in messengerial services.
He was assigned to the main office of Caltex Philippines,
Inc. (Caltex) in Makati City. His primary task was to
collect checks payable to Caltex and deliver them to the
cashier. He also delivered invoices to Caltex’s
customers.3
On November 6, 1997, Caltex, through its Banking and
Insurance Department Manager Ramon Romano, filed a
criminal complaint against petitioner before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Makati City for estafa through
falsification of commercial documents. Romano alleged
that, on October 16, 1997, while his department was
conducting a daily electronic report from Philippine
Commercial & Industrial Bank (PCIB) Dela Rosa, Makati
Branch, one of its depositary banks, it was discovered
that unknown to the department, a company check,
Check No. 74001 dated October 13, 1997 in the amount
of ₱5,790,570.25 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, had
been cleared through PCIB on October 15, 1997. An
investigation also revealed that two other checks (Check
Nos. 73999 and 74000) were also missing and that in
Check No. 74001, his signature and that of another
signatory, Victor S. Goquinco, were forgeries. Another
check, Check No. 72922 dated September 15, 1997 in
the amount of ₱1,790,757.25 likewise payable to Dante
R. Gutierrez, was also cleared through the same bank on
September 24, 1997; this check was likewise not issued
by Caltex, and the signatures appearing thereon had also
been forged. Upon verification, it was uncovered that
Check Nos. 74001 and 72922 were deposited at the
Banco de Oro’s SM Makati Branch under Savings
Account No. S/A 2004-0047245-7, in the name of a
regular customer of Caltex, Dante R. Gutierrez.
Gutierrez, however, disowned the savings account as
well as his signatures on the dorsal portions thereof. He
also denied having withdrawn any amount from said
savings account. Further investigation revealed that said
savings account had actually been opened by petitioner;
the forged checks were deposited and endorsed by him
under Gutierrez’s name. A bank teller from the Banco de
Oro, Winnie P. Donable Dela Cruz, positively identified
petitioner as the person who opened the savings
account using Gutierrez’s name.4
In the meantime, the PCIB credited the amount of
₱581,229.00 to Caltex on March 29, 1998. However, the
City Prosecutor of Makati City was not informed of this
development. After the requisite preliminary
investigation, the City Prosecutor filed two (2)
Informations for estafa through falsification of
commercial documents on June 29, 1998 against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, Branch 63. The Informations are worded as
follows:
Criminal Case No. 98-1611
That on or about the 24th day of September 1997 in the
City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, a private individual, with intent to
defraud and intent to gain, without the knowledge and
consent of Caltex Philippines, Inc. through its duly
authorized officers/representatives, and by means of
falsification of commercial document, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Caltex Phils.,
Inc., in the following manner, to wit: said accused,
having obtained possession of PCIBank check no. 72922
dated September 15, 1997 payable to Dante R.
Gutierrez, in the amount of Php1,790,757.50 with intent
to defraud or cause damage to complainant Caltex Phils.,
Inc., willfully, unlawfully and feloniously affixed or
caused to be affixed signatures purporting to be those of
Ramon Romano and Victor Goquingco, Caltex authorized
officers/signatories, and of payee Dante R. Gutierrez,
causing it to appear that Ramon Romano and Victor
Goquingco have participated in the issuance of PCIBank
check no. 72922 and that Dante R. Gutierrez had
endorsed it, when in truth and in fact, as said accused
well knew, such was not the case, since said check
previously stolen from Payables Section of CALTEX, was
neither duly signed by Ramon Romano and Victor
Goquingco nor endorsed by Dante R. Gutierrez, after the
check, a commercial document, was falsified in the
manner above set forth, the said accused purporting
himself to be the payee, Dante R. Gutierrez, deposited
the check with Banco De Oro under Account No. 2004-
0047245-7, thereby appropriating the proceeds of the
falsified but cleared check, to the damage and prejudice
of complainant herein represented by Ramon Romano,
in the amount of Php1,790,757.50.
Criminal Case No. 98-1612
That on or about the 15th day of October 1997 in the
City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, a private individual, with intent to
defraud and intent to gain, without the knowledge and
consent of Caltex Philippines, Inc. through its duly
authorized officers/representatives, and by means of
falsification of commercial document, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Caltex Phils.,
Inc., in the following manner, to wit: said accused,
having obtained possession of PCIBank check no. 74001
dated October 13, 1997 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, in
the amount of Php5,790,570.25 with intent to defraud
or cause damage to complainant Caltex Phils., Inc.,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously affixed or caused to
be affixed signatures purporting to be those of Ramon
Romano and Victor Goquingco, Caltex authorized
officers/signatories, and of payee Dante R. Gutierrez,
causing it to appear that Ramon Romano and Victor
Goquingco have participated in the issuance of PCIBank
check no. 74001 and that Dante R. Gutierrez had
endorsed it, when in truth and in fact, as said accused
well knew, such was not the case, since said check
previously stolen from Payables Section of CALTEX, was
neither duly signed by Ramon Romano and Victor
Goquingco nor endorsed by Dante R. Gutierrez, after the
check, a commercial document, was falsified in the
manner above set forth, the said accused purporting
himself to be the payee, Dante R. Gutierrez, deposited
the check with Banco De Oro under Account No. 2004-
0047245-7, thereby appropriating the proceeds of the
falsified but cleared check, to the damage and prejudice
of complainant herein represented by Ramon Romano,
in the amount of Php5,790,570.25.5
Petitioner was arraigned on August 18, 1998, and
pleaded not guilty to both charges.6 Pre-trial ensued and
the cases were jointly tried. The prosecution presented
its witnesses, after which the Siguion Reyna, Montecillio
and Ongsiako Law Offices (SRMO) as private prosecutor
filed a Formal Offer of Evidence.7 Petitioner opposed the
pleading, contending that the private complainant was
represented by the ACCRA Law Offices and the Balgos
and Perez Law Office during trial, and it was only after
the prosecution had rested its case that SRMO entered
its appearance as private prosecutor representing the
PCIB. Since the ACCRA and Balgos and Perez Law Offices
had not withdrawn their appearance, SRMO had no
personality to appear as private prosecutor. Under the
Informations, the private complainant is Caltex and not
PCIB; hence, the Formal Offer of Evidence filed by SRMO
should be stricken from the records.
Petitioner further averred that unless the Informations
were amended to change the private complainant to
PCIB, his right as accused would be prejudiced. He
pointed out, however, that the Informations can no
longer be amended because he had already been
arraigned under the original Informations.8 He insisted
that the amendments of the Informations to substitute
PCIB as the offended party for Caltex would place him in
double jeopardy.
PCIB, through SRMO, opposed the motion. It contended
that the PCIB had re-credited the amount to Caltex to
the extent of the indemnity; hence, the PCIB had been
subrogated to the rights and interests of Caltex as
private complainant. Consequently, the PCIB is entitled
to receive any civil indemnity which the trial court would
adjudge against the accused. Moreover, the re-credited
amount was brought out on cross-examination by
Ramon Romano who testified for the Prosecution. PCIB
pointed out that petitioner had marked in evidence the
letter of the ACCRA Law Office to PCIBank dated October
10, 1997 and the credit memo sent by PCIB to Caltex.9
Petitioner filed a Motion to Expunge the Opposition of
SRMO.10 In his Rejoinder, he averred that the
substitution of PCIB as private complainant cannot be
made by mere oral motion; the Information must be
amended to allege that the private complainant was
PCIB and not Caltex after the preliminary investigation of
the appropriate complaint of PCIB before the Makati City
Prosecutor.
In response, the PCIB, through SRMO, averred that as
provided in Section 2, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the erroneous designation of the
name of the offended party is a mere formal defect
which can be cured by inserting the name of the
offended party in the Information. To support its claim,
PCIB cited the ruling of this Court in Sayson v. People.11
On July 18, 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting the
motion of the private prosecutor for the substitution of
PCIB as private complainant for Caltex. It however
denied petitioner’s motion to have the formal offer of
evidence of SRMO expunged from the
record.12 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which the RTC denied on November 14, 2001.13
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with Urgent Application for
Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals
(CA,) praying for the annulment of the RTC’s Orders of
July 18, 2001 and November 14, 2001. The petitioner
averred that:
I
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRIEVEOUSLY (SIC) ERRED IN
RENDERING ITS ORDER ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION BY ALLOWING THE SUBSTITUTION OF
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, AFTER THE ACUSED WAS
ALREADY ARRAIGNED AND PROSECUTION HAS ALREADY
TERMINATED PRESENTING ITS EVIDENCE THEREBY
PATENTLY VIOLATING THE STRICT CONDITION IMPOSED
UPON BY RULE 110 SEC. 14 RULES ON CRIMINAL
ROCEDURE.
II
AND AS A COROLLARY GROUND RESPONDENT JUDGE
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN RENDERING AN ORDER
RECOGNIZING THE APPEARANCE OF A NEW
PROSECUTOR WITHOUT WRITTEN OR EVEN ORAL
WITHDRAWAL OF THE COUNSEL ON RECORD.14
According to petitioner, damage or injury to the
offended party is an essential element of estafa. The
amendment of the Informations substituting the
PCIBank for Caltex as the offended party would
prejudice his rights since he is deprived of a defense
available before the amendment, and which would be
unavailable if the Informations are amended. Petitioner
further insisted that the ruling in the Sayson case did not
apply to this case.
On November 5, 2002, the appellate court rendered
judgment dismissing the petition. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition to annul
the orders dated July 18, 2001 and November 14, 2001
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City in
Criminal Case Nos. 98-1611 and 98-1612 is hereby
DENIED and consequently DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.15
The appellate court declared that when PCIB restored
the amount of the checks to Caltex, it was subrogated to
the latter’s right against petitioner. It further declared
that in offenses against property, the designation of the
name of the offended party is not absolutely
indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in
the complaint or information can be properly identified.
The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in
People v. Ho16 and People v. Reyes.17
On October 17, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.18
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition which is
anchored on the following grounds:
I. THE PEOPLE V. YU CHAI HO 53 PHILIPPINES
874 IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR
CONSIDERING THE PACTS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY
DIFFERENT.
II. LIKEWISE, THE CASE OF PEOPLE VS. REYES CA,
50 (2) OG 665, NOVEMBER 11, 1953 HAS NO
MATERIAL BEARING TO THE PRESENT CASE.
III. THE SUBSTITUTION OF PCIBANK WILL
SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS OF THE
PETITIONER HENCE, IT IS PROHIBITED BY SEC. 14
OF RULE 110.
IV. THERE IS NO VALID SUBROGATION BETWEEN
CALTEX AND PCIBANK. ASSUMING THERE IS,
THE CIVIL CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED TO
PROSECUTE.
V. THE TWIN INFORMATIONS UPON WHICH
PETITIONER WAS INDICTED, ARRAIGNED, PRE-
TRIAL HELD AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
TERMINATED THE PRESENTATION OF ITS
EVIDENCE IN CHIEF ARE DEFECTIVE AND VOID,
HENCE THE DISMISSAL IS IN ORDER.
VI. PETITIONER TIMELY OBJECTED TO THE
APPEARANCE OF PRIVATE PROSECUTOR FOR
PCIBANK.
VII. THE FINDINGS OF MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT
SUPORTED BY THE RECORD NOR EVIDENCE AND
BASED ON MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS.
VIII. PETITIONER’S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION DID NOT VIOLATE THE
OMNIBUS MOTION RULE UNDER SEC. 8, RULE
15 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.19
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner argues that the substitution of Caltex by PCIB
as private complainant at this late stage of the trial is
prejudicial to his defense. He argues that the
substitution is tantamount to a substantial amendment
of the Informations which is prohibited under Section
14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 5, Rule 11020 of the Revised Rules of
Rules, all criminal actions covered by a complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the direct
supervision and control of the public prosecutor. Thus,
even if the felonies or delictual acts of the accused result
in damage or injury to another, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability based on the said criminal acts is
impliedly instituted, and the offended party has not
waived the civil action, reserved the right to institute it
separately or instituted the civil action prior to the
criminal action, the prosecution of the action (including
the civil) remains under the control and supervision of
the public prosecutor. The prosecution of offenses is a
public function. Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene
in the criminal action personally or by counsel, who will
act as private prosecutor for the protection of his
interests and in the interest of the speedy and
inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action
for the purpose would only prove to be costly,
burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and
further delay the final disposition of the case. The
multiplicity of suits must be avoided. With the implied
institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the
two actions are merged into one composite proceeding,
with the criminal action predominating the civil. The
prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the
offender in order to deter him and others from
committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him
from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general,
to maintain social order.21
On the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil action is
for the resolution, reparation or indemnification of the
private offended party for the damage or injury he
sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of
the accused.22 Under Article 104 of the Revised Penal
Code, the following are the civil liabilities of the accused:
ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. – The civil
liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102 and 103 of
this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
On the other hand, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or
information may be amended, in form or in substance,
without leave of court, at any time before the accused
enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a
formal amendment may only be made with leave of
court and when it can be done without causing prejudice
to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which
downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the complaint or information,
can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with
notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The
court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and
copies of its order shall be furnished all parties,
especially the offended party.
Thus, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or
substantial amendment of the complaint or information
may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a
plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with
leave of court and if it does not prejudice the rights of
the accused. After arraignment, a substantial
amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial
to the accused.23
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of
the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely
of form.24 The following have been held to be mere
formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate
only to the range of the penalty that the court might
impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment
which does not charge another offense different or
distinct from that charged in the original one; (3)
additional allegations which do not alter the
prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise
to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or
will assume; (4) an amendment which does not
adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and
(5) an amendment that merely adds specifications to
eliminate vagueness in the information and not to
introduce new and material facts, and merely states with
additional precision something which is already
contained in the original information and which adds
nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.25
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the
amendment is whether a defense under the information
as it originally stood would be available after the
amendment is made, and whether any evidence
defendant might have would be equally applicable to the
information in the one form as in the other. An
amendment to an information which does not change
the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect
the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive
the accused of an opportunity to meet the new
averment had each been held to be one of form and not
of substance.26
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as
private complaint is not a substantial amendment. The
substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both
Informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to
petitioner. The documentary evidence in the form of the
forged checks remained the same, and all such evidence
was available to petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he
cannot claim any surprise by virtue of the substitution.
Petitioner next argues that in no way was PCIB
subrogated to the rights of Caltex, considering that he
has no knowledge of the subrogation much less gave his
consent to it. Alternatively, he posits that if subrogation
was proper, then the charges against him should be
dismissed, the two Informations being "defective and
void due to false allegations."
Petitioner was charged of the crime of estafa complex
with falsification document. In estafa one of the
essential elements "to prejudice of another" as
mandated by article 315 of the Revise Penal Code.
The element of "to the prejudice of another" being as
essential element of the felony should be clearly
indicated and charged in the information with TRUTH
AND LEGAL PRECISION.
This is not so in the case of petitioner, the twin
information filed against him alleged the felony
committed " to the damage and prejudice of Caltex."
This allegation is UNTRUE and FALSE for there is no
question that as early as March 24, 1998 or THREE (3)
LONG MONTHS before the twin information were filed
on June 29, 1998, the prejudice party is already PCIBank
since the latter Re-Credit the value of the checks to
Caltex as early as March 24, 1998. In effect, assuming
there is valid subrogation as the subject decision
concluded, the subrogation took place an occurred on
March 24, 1998 THREE (3) MONTHS before the twin
information were filed.
The phrase "to the prejudice to another" as element of
the felony is limited to the person DEFRAUDED in the
very act of embezzlement. It should not be expanded to
other persons which the loss may ultimately fall as a
result of a contract which contract herein petitioner is
total stranger.
In this case, there is no question that the very act of
commission of the offense of September 24, 1997 and
October 15, 1997 respectively, Caltex was the one
defrauded by the act of the felony.
In the light of these facts, petitioner submits that the
twin information are DEFECTIVE AND VOID due to the
FALSE ALLEGATIONS that the offense was committed to
the prejudice of Caltex when it truth and in fact the one
prejudiced here was PCIBank.
The twin information being DEFECTIVE AND VOID, the
same should be dismissed without prejudice to the filing
of another information which should state the offense
was committed to the prejudice of PCIBank if it still
legally possible without prejudicing substantial and
statutory rights of the petitioner.27
Petitioner’s argument on subrogation is misplaced. The
Court agrees with respondent PCIB’s comment that
petitioner failed to make a distinction between legal and
conventional subrogation. Subrogation is the transfer of
all the rights of the creditor to a third person, who
substitutes him in all his rights.28 It may either be legal or
conventional. Legal subrogation is that which takes place
without agreement but by operation of law because of
certain acts.29 Instances of legal subrogation are those
provided in Article 130230 of the Civil Code. Conventional
subrogation, on the other hand, is that which takes place
by agreement of the parties.31 Thus, petitioner’s
acquiescence is not necessary for subrogation to take
place because the instant case is one of legal
subrogation that occurs by operation of law, and
without need of the debtor’s knowledge.
Contrary to petitioner’s asseverations, the case of
People v. Yu Chai Ho32 relied upon by the appellate court
is in point. The Court declared –
We do not however, think that the fiscal erred in alleging
that the commission of the crime resulted to the
prejudice of Wm. H. Anderson & Co. It is true that
originally the International Banking Corporation was the
prejudiced party, but Wm. H. Anderson & Co.
compensated it for its loss and thus became subrogated
to all its rights against the defendant (article 1839, Civil
Code). Wm. H. Anderson & Co., therefore, stood exactly
in the shoes of the International Banking Corporation in
relation to the defendant's acts, and the commission of
the crime resulted to the prejudice of the firm previously
to the filing of the information in the case. The loss
suffered by the firm was the ultimate result of the
defendant's unlawful acts, and we see no valid reason
why this fact should not be stated in the information; it
stands to reason that, in the crime of estafa, the damage
resulting therefrom need not necessarily occur
simultaneously with the acts constituting the other
essential elements of the crime.
Thus, being subrogated to the right of Caltex, PCIB,
through counsel, has the right to intervene in the
proceedings, and under substantive laws is entitled to
restitution of its properties or funds, reparation, or
indemnification.
Petitioner’s gripe that the charges against him should be
dismissed because the allegations in both Informations
failed to name PCIB as true offended party does not hold
water.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
states:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense by
the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense; and the place wherein the offense was
committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one
person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information.
On the other hand, Section 12 of the same Rule
provides:
Section. 12. Name of the offended party. –The complaint
or information must state the name and surname of the
person against whom or against whose property the
offense was committed, or any appellation or nickname
by which such person has been or is known. If there is no
better way of identifying him, he must be described
under a fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property, if the name of
the offended party is unknown, the property
must be described with such particularity as to
properly identify the offense charged.
(b) If the true name of the person against whom
or against whose property the offense was
committed is thereafter disclosed or
ascertained, the court must cause such true
name to be inserted in the complaint or
information and the record.
(c) If the offended party is a juridical person, it is
sufficient to state its name, or any name or
designation by which it is known or by which it
may be identified, without need of averring that
it is a juridical person or that it is organized in
accordance with law. (12a)
In Sayson v. People,33 the Court held that in case of
offenses against property, the designation of the name
of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for
as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or
information can be properly identified:
The rules on criminal procedure require the complaint or
information to state the name and surname of the
person against whom or against whose property the
offense was committed or any appellation or nickname
by which such person has been or is known and if there
is no better way of Identifying him, he must be described
under a fictitious name (Rule 110, Section 11, Revised
Rules of Court; now Rule 110, Section 12 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure.] In case of offenses against
property, the designation of the name of the offended
party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the
criminal act charged in the complaint or information can
be properly identified. Thus, Rule 110, Section 11 of the
Rules of Court provides that:
Section 11. Name of the offended party-
…
(a) In cases of offenses against property, if the
name of the offended party is unknown, the
property, subject matter of the offense, must be
described with such particularity as to properly
Identify the particular offense charged.
(b) If in the course of the trial, the true name of
the person against whom or against whose
property the offense was committed is disclosed
or ascertained, the court must cause the true
name to be inserted in the complaint or
information or record.
…
In U.S. v. Kepner [1 Phil. 519 (1902)], this Court laid
down the rule that when an offense shall have been
described in the complaint with sufficient certainty as to
Identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person
injured shall be deemed immaterial as the same is a
mere formal defect which did not tend to prejudice any
substantial right of the defendant. Accordingly, in the
aforementioned case, which had a factual backdrop
similar to the instant case, where the defendant was
charged with estafa for the misappropriation of the
proceeds of a warrant which he had cashed without
authority, the erroneous allegation in the complaint to
the effect that the unlawful act was to the prejudice of
the owner of the cheque, when in reality the bank which
cashed it was the one which suffered a loss, was held to
be immaterial on the ground that the subject matter of
the estafa, the warrant, was described in the complaint
with such particularity as to properly Identify the
particular offense charged. In the instant suit for estafa
which is a crime against property under the Revised
Penal Code, since the check, which was the subject-
matter of the offense, was described with such
particularity as to properly identify the offense charged,
it becomes immaterial, for purposes of convicting the
accused, that it was established during the trial that the
offended party was actually Mever Films and not Ernesto
Rufino, Sr. nor Bank of America as alleged in the
information.
Lastly, on petitioner’s claim that he timely objected to
the appearance of SRMO34 as private prosecutor for
PCIB, the Court agrees with the observation of the CA
that contrary to his claim, petitioner did not question the
said entry of appearance even as the RTC acknowledged
the same on October 8, 1999.35 Thus, petitioner cannot
feign ignorance or surprise of the incident, which are "all
water under the bridge for [his] failure to make a timely
objection thereto."36
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED. This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 63, for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. RODELIO AQUINO y RODA, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Rodelio Aquino y Roda filed this Motion
for Reconsideration asking the Court to reconsider its
Decision of April 17, 2002, which held him guilty of
qualified rape. The relevant portion of the Decision
reads:
To warrant the imposition of the supreme penalty of
death in qualified rape under Article 266-B (1) of the
Revised Penal Code, the concurrence of the minority of
the victim and her relationship to the offender must be
specifically alleged and proved with equal certainty as
the crime itself.
In the instant case, the Information alleges that the
child-victim was a five-year old minor and appellant was
the child-victims uncle. The prosecution presented
Charlaines birth certificate to prove her age.This
undisputed circumstance standing alone, qualifies the
rape. Under Article 266-B (5) of the Revised Penal Code,
the death penalty is mandated in rape cases "when the
victim is a child below seven (7) years old. The qualifying
circumstance of relationship was also undisputedly
proven by the prosecution. The child-victims mother,
Winnie Bautista, testified in court that appellant is her
brother, making appellant a blood relative of the victim
within the third civil degree. Moreover, appellant
categorically admitted during trial that the child-victim is
his niece. (Decision, pp. 19-20)
Appellant argues that he should only be convicted
of simple rape because while the age of the
complainant(s) as well as their relationship to the
accused-appellant were (sic) stated in the
Information(s), the same were not alleged particularly to
qualify the offense charged.[1] Appellant contends that
this failure to charge him specifically with the qualified
offense bars the imposition of the death penalty upon
him.
We deny the Motion for Reconsideration.
Appellant anchors his Motion for Reconsideration
on two recent cases -People v. Manlansing[2] and People
v. Alba.[3] In People v. Manlansing, the Court,
citing People v. Alba, disregarded the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, ruling that -
We noted in Gario Alba, that although the circumstance
of treachery was stated in the Information, it was not
alleged with specificity as qualifying the killing to
murder. Since the Information in Gario Alba failed to
specify treachery as a circumstance qualifying the killing
to murder, treachery was considered only a generic
aggravating circumstance, hence, we said that the crime
committed in Gario Alba was homicide and not
murder.[4] (Emphasis supplied)
However, the Court has repeatedly held,[5] even
after the recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, that qualifying circumstances need not be
preceded by descriptive words such as qualifying or
qualified by to properly qualify an offense. The Court has
repeatedly qualified cases of rape[6] where the twin
circumstances of minority and relationship have been
specifically alleged in the Information even without the
use of the descriptive words qualifying or qualified by.
In the recent case of People v. Lab-eo,[7] the
appellant there questioned the decision of the lower
court raising the killing to murder. The appellant there
argued that he could only be convicted of homicide since
the Information merely stated that the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery,
abuse of superior strength and craft attended the
commission of the offense. The appellant also asserted
that since the circumstances were merely described as
aggravating and not qualifying, he should only be
convicted of the lesser crime of homicide. On this score,
the Court ruled that -
The fact that the circumstances were described as
aggravating instead of qualifying does not take the
Information out of the purview of Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. Article 248 does not use the word
qualifying or aggravating in enumerating the
circumstances that raise a killing to the category of
murder. Article 248 merely refers to the enumerated
circumstances as the attendant circumstances. [8]
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by RA No. 8353,[9] states that the death
penalty shall be imposed in the crime of rape if any of
the aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in
Article 266-B is present. Prior to RA No. 8353, Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No.
7659,[10] penalized qualified rape with the death penalty
when any of the attendant circumstances mentioned in
Article 335 was present. The present law uses the words
aggravating/qualifying circumstances in referring to the
attendant circumstances that qualify rape to a heinous
crime punishable by death. The old law referred to these
circumstances as the attendant circumstances.
The change in the wording did not make the use of
the words aggravating/qualifying circumstances an
essential element in specifying the crime in the
Information. As in the old law, the essential element that
raises rape to a heinous crime is the attendance of a
circumstance mentioned in Article 266-B. As an essential
element of the heinous crime, such attendant
circumstance must be specifically alleged in the
Information to satisfy the constitutional requirement
that the accused must be informed of the nature of the
charge against him.
The use of the words aggravating/qualifying
circumstances will not add any essential element to the
crime. Neither will the use of such words further apprise
the accused of the nature of the charge. The specific
allegation of the attendant circumstance in the
Information, coupled with the designation of the offense
and a statement of the acts constituting the offense as
required in Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110, is sufficient to
warn the accused that the crime charged is qualified
rape punishable by death.
The change in the wording from attendant
circumstances to aggravating/qualifying circumstances
did not signify a change in the law. As used in Article 335
(old provision on qualified rape), the words attendant
circumstances referred to the circumstances that
changed the nature of the crime when these
circumstances were present in the commission of the
crime. As used in Article 266-B (new provision on
qualified rape), the words aggravating/qualifying
circumstances also refer to the circumstances that
change the nature of the crime when these
circumstances are present in the commission of the
crime. The words aggravating circumstances include
qualifying circumstances.[11] Qualifying circumstances are
aggravating circumstances which, by express provision of
law, change the nature of the crime to a higher
category. The words attendant circumstances, which still
appear in Article 248 (raising homicide to murder), refer
to qualifying circumstances -those aggravating
circumstances that, by express provision of law, change
the nature of the crime when present in the commission
of the crime.
Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure states that the-
x x x qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in
terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know x x x (the) qualifying and
aggravating circumstances x x x.
Thus, even the attendant circumstance itself, which is
the essential element that raises the crime to a higher
category, need not be stated in the language of the
law. With more reason, the words aggravating/qualifying
circumstances as used in the law need not appear in the
Information, especially since these words are merely
descriptive of the attendant circumstances and do not
constitute an essential element of the crime. These
words are also not necessary in informing the accused
that he is charged of a qualified crime. What properly
informs the accused of the nature of the crime charged
is the specific allegation of the circumstances mentioned
in the law that raise the crime to a higher category.
The rules require the qualifying circumstances to be
specifically alleged in the Information in order to comply
with the constitutional right of the accused to be
properly informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.[12] The purpose is to allow the
accused to prepare fully for his defense to prevent
surprises during the trial.[13]
The Information in the instant case passes this
test. The Information reads-
Sometime in October 1999, in Taguig, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, being the uncle of the 5-year old Charlaine
Bautista, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
said Charlaine Bautista, by then and there touching her
vagina and inserting his penis in her vagina, against the
latters will and consent.
Contrary to law.
The Information clearly forewarns the accused that the
circumstances of minority and relationship attended the
commission of the crime. It specifically states that the
child-victim is a five-year old minor while also specifically
alleging that the accused is the child-victims uncle. These
allegations, once proven beyond reasonable doubt,
qualify the rape to a heinous crime. The appellant never
raised in the trial court the argument that he was not
apprised of the charges against him because of an
alleged defect in the Information. Not even in his
appellants brief did he remotely suggest that the
Information was defective or insufficient.
Section 8 of Rule 110 requires that the Information
shall state the designation of the offense given by the
statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. (Emphasis supplied) Section 8 merely
requires the Information to specify the
circumstances. Section 8 does not require the use of the
words qualifying or qualified by to refer to the
circumstances which raise the category of an offense. It
is not the use of the words qualifying or qualified by that
raises a crime to a higher category, but the specific
allegation of an attendant circumstance which adds the
essential element raising the crime to a higher category.
In the instant case, the attendant circumstances of
minority and relationship were specifically alleged in the
Information precisely to qualify the offense of simple
rape to qualified rape.The absence of the words
qualifying or qualified by cannot prevent the rape from
qualifying as a heinous crime provided these two
circumstances are specifically alleged in the Information
and proved beyond reasonable doubt.
We therefore reiterate that Sections 8 and 9 of Rule
110 merely require that the Information allege,
specify or enumerate the attendant circumstances
mentioned in the law to qualify the offense. These
circumstances need not be preceded by the words
aggravating/qualifying, qualifying, or qualified by to be
considered as qualifying circumstances. It is sufficient
that these circumstances be specified in the Information
to apprise the accused of the charges against him to
enable him to prepare fully for his defense, thus
precluding surprises during the trial.When the
prosecution specifically alleges in the Information the
circumstances mentioned in the law as qualifying the
crime, and succeeds in proving them beyond reasonable
doubt, the Court is constrained to impose the higher
penalty mandated by law. This includes the death
penalty in proper cases.
Unfortunately, this is one of those cases. The
allegation of the twin circumstances of minority and
relationship in the Information, which were proven
beyond reasonable doubt during the trial, compels the
Court to impose the death penalty.
To guide the bench and the bar, this Resolution
clarifies and resolves the issue of how to allege or
specify qualifying or aggravating circumstances in the
Information. The words aggravating/qualifying,
qualifying, qualified by, aggravating, or aggravated by
need not be expressly stated as long as the particular
attendant circumstances are specified in the
Information.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is
DENIED and the Decision of the Court dated April 17,
2002 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. NO. 170863 : March 20, 2013
ENGR. ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by
petitioner Engr. Anthony V. Zapanta, challenging the
June 27, 2005 decision2 and the November 24, 2005
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 28369. The CA decision affirmed the January 12,
2004 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Baguio City, Branch 3, in Criminal Case No. 20109-R,
convicting the petitioner of the crime of qualified theft.
The CA resolution denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The Factual Antecedents
An April 26, 2002 Information filed with the RTC charged
the petitioner, together with Concordia O. Loyao, Jr.,
with the crime of qualified theft, committed as
follows:That sometime in the month of October, 2001, in
the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of [the] Honorable Court, xxx accused
ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA, being then the Project Manager
of the Porta Vaga Building Construction, a project being
undertaken then by the Construction Firm, ANMAR, Inc.
under sub-contract with A. Mojica Construction and
General Services, with the duty to manage and
implement the fabrication and erection of the structural
steel framing of the Porta Varga building including the
receipt, audit and checking of all construction materials
delivered at the job site a position of full trust and
confidence, and CONCORDIO O. LOYAO, JR., alias "JUN",
a telescopic crane operator of ANMAR, Inc., conspiring,
confederating, and mutually aiding one another, with
grave abuse of confidence and with intent of gain, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and carry away from the Porta Vaga project site
along Session road, Baguio City, wide flange steel beams
of different sizes with a total value of P2,269,731.69
without the knowledge and consent of the owner
ANMAR, Inc., represented by its General Manager
LORNA LEVA MARIGONDON, to the damage and
prejudice of ANMAR, Inc., in the aforementioned sum
of P2,269,731.69, Philippine
Currency.5chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Arraigned on November 12, 2002, the petitioner entered
a plea of "not guilty."6 Loyao remains at-large.
In the ensuing trial, the prosecution offered in evidence
the oral testimonies of Danilo Bernardo, Edgardo Cano,
Roberto Buen, Efren Marcelo, private complainant Engr.
Lorna Marigondon, and Apolinaria de Jesus,7 as well as
documentary evidence consisting of a security logbook
entry, delivery receipts, photographs, letters, and sworn
affidavits. The prosecution's pieces of evidence, taken
together, established the facts recited below.
In 2001, A. Mojica Construction and General Services
(AMCGS) undertook the Porta Vaga building
construction in Session Road, Baguio City. AMCGS
subcontracted the fabrication and erection of the
building's structural and steel framing to Anmar, owned
by the Marigondon family. Anmar ordered its
construction materials from Linton Commercial in Pasig
City. It hired Junio Trucking to deliver the construction
materials to its project site in Baguio City. It assigned the
petitioner as project manager with general managerial
duties, including the receiving, custody, and checking of
all building construction
materials.8chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On two occasions in October 2001, the petitioner
instructed Bernardo, Junio Trucking's truck driver, and
about 10 Anmar welders, including Cano and Buen, to
unload about 10 to 15 pieces of 20 feet long wide flange
steel beams at Anmar's alleged new contract project
along Marcos Highway, Baguio City. Sometime in
November 2001, the petitioner again instructed
Bernardo and several welders, including Cano and Buen,
to unload about 5 to 16 pieces of 5 meters and 40 feet
long wide flange steel beams along Marcos Highway, as
well as on Mabini Street, Baguio
City.9chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Sometime in January 2002, Engr. Nella Aquino, AMCGS'
project manager, informed Engr. Marigondon that
several wide flange steel beams had been returned to
Anmar's warehouse on October 12, 19, and 26, 2001, as
reflected in the security guard's logbook. Engr.
Marigondon contacted the petitioner to explain the
return, but the latter simply denied that the reported
return took place. Engr. Marigondon requested Marcelo,
her warehouseman, to conduct an inventory of the
construction materials at the project site. Marcelo
learned from Cano that several wide flange steel beams
had been unloaded along Marcos Highway. There,
Marcelo found and took pictures of some of the missing
steel beams. He reported the matter to the Baguio City
police headquarters and contacted Anmar to send a
truck to retrieve the steel beams, but the truck came
weeks later and, by then, the steel beams could no
longer be found. The stolen steel beams amounted
to P2,269,731.69.10chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In his defense, the petitioner vehemently denied the
charge against him. He claimed that AMCGS, not Anmar,
employed him, and his plan to build his own company
had been Engr. Marigondon's motive in falsely accusing
him of stealing construction
materials.11chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
 The RTC's Ruling
In its January 12, 2004 decision,12 the RTC convicted the
petitioner of qualified theft. It gave credence to the
prosecution witnesses' straightforward and consistent
testimonies and rejected the petitioner's bare denial. It
sentenced the petitioner to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment from 10 years and 3 months, as minimum,
to 20 years, as maximum, to indemnify
Anmar P2,269,731.69, with legal interest from
November 2001 until full payment, and to pay Engr.
Marigondon P100,000.00 as moral damages.
The CA's Ruling
On appeal, the petitioner assailed the inconsistencies in
the prosecution witnesses' statements, and reiterated
his status as an AMCGS
employee.13chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In its June 27, 2005 decision,14 the CA brushed aside the
petitioner's arguments and affirmed the RTC's decision
convicting the petitioner of qualified theft. It found that
the prosecution witnesses' testimonies deserve full
credence in the absence of any improper motive to
testify falsely against the petitioner. It noted that the
petitioner admitted his status as Anmar's employee and
his receipt of salary from Anmar, not AMCGS. It rejected
the petitioner's defense of denial for being self-serving.
It, however, deleted the award of moral damages to
Engr. Marigondon for lack of justification.
When the CA denied15 the motion for
reconsideration16 that followed, the petitioner filed the
present Rule 45 petition.
The Petition
The petitioner submits that, while the information
charged him for acts committed "sometime in the
month of October, 2001," he was convicted for acts not
covered by the information, i.e., November 2001, thus
depriving him of his constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
He further argues that the prosecution failed to establish
the fact of the loss of the steel beams since the corpus
delicti was never identified and offered in evidence.
The Case for the Respondent
The respondent People of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, counters that the issues
raised by the petitioner in the petition pertain to the
correctness of the calibration of the evidence by the
RTC, as affirmed by the CA, which are issues of fact, not
of law, and beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition. In
any case, the respondent contends that the evidence on
record indubitably shows the petitioner's liability for
qualified theft.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA
committed a reversible error in affirming the RTC's
decision convicting the petitioner of the crime of
qualified theft.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Sufficiency of the allegation of date of the
commission of the crime
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which lays down the guidelines in determining the
sufficiency of a complaint or information,
provides:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one
person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information. (italics supplied; emphasis ours)
As to the sufficiency of the allegation of the date of the
commission of the offense, Section 11, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure
adds:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not
necessary to state in the complaint or information the
precise date the offense was committed except when it
is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may
be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as
possible to the actual date of its commission. [italics
supplied; emphasis ours]
Conformably with these provisions, when the date given
in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, it
need not be proven as alleged; thus, the complaint will
be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was
committed at any date within the period of the statute
of limitations and before the commencement of the
action.
In this case, the petitioner had been fully apprised of the
charge of qualified theft since the information stated the
approximate date of the commission of the offense
through the words "sometime in the month of October,
2001." The petitioner could reasonably deduce the
nature of the criminal act with which he was charged
from a reading of the contents of the information, as
well as gather by such reading whatever he needed to
know about the charge to enable him to prepare his
defense.
We stress that the information did not have to state the
precise date when the offense was committed, as to be
inclusive of the month of "November 2001" since the
date was not a material element of the offense. As such,
the offense of qualified theft could be alleged to be
committed on a date as near as possible to the actual
date of its commission.17 Clearly, the month of
November is the month right after October.
The crime of qualified theft was
committed with grave abuse of discretion
The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article
310 in relation to Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), are: (a) the taking of personal
property; (b) the said property belongs to another; (c)
the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done
without the owner's consent; (e) it be accomplished
without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done
under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article
310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of
confidence.18chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
All these elements are present in this case. The
prosecution's evidence proved, through the
prosecution's eyewitnesses, that upon the petitioner's
instruction, several pieces of wide flange steel beams
had been delivered, twice in October 2001 and once in
November 2001, along Marcos Highway and Mabini
Street, Baguio City; the petitioner betrayed the trust and
confidence reposed on him when he, as project
manager, repeatedly took construction materials from
the project site, without the authority and consent of
Engr. Marigondon, the owner of the construction
materials.
Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission
of the crime
The petitioner argues that his conviction was improper
because the alleged stolen beams or corpus delicti had
not been established. He asserts that the failure to
present the alleged stolen beams in court was fatal to
the prosecution's cause.
The petitioner's argument fails to persuade us.
"Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of
the crime charged or to the body or substance of the
crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom
money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to the
body of the person murdered" or, in this case, to the
stolen steel beams. "Since the corpus delicti is the fact of
the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled that
even a single witness' uncorroborated testimony, if
credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction
therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by
circumstantial evidence."19 "In theft, corpus delicti has
two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by
the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious
taking."20chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In this case, the testimonial and documentary evidence
on record fully established the corpus delicti. The
positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
particularly Bernardo, Cano and Buen, stating that the
petitioner directed them to unload the steel beams
along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street on the pretext
of a new Anmar project, were crucial to the petitioner's
conviction. The security logbook entry, delivery receipts
and photographs proved the existence and the
unloading of the steel beams to a different location
other than the project site.
Proper Penalty
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, sentenced the petitioner
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from 10 years and
three months, as minimum, to 20 years, as maximum,
and to indemnify Anmar P2,269,731.69, with legal
interest from November 2001 until full payment.
Apparently, the RTC erred in failing to specify the
appropriate name of the penalty imposed on the
petitioner.
We reiterate the rule that it is necessary for the courts
to employ the proper legal terminology in the imposition
of penalties because of the substantial difference in their
corresponding legal effects and accessory penalties. The
appropriate name of the penalty must be specified as
under the scheme of penalties in the RPC, the principal
penalty for a felony has its own specific duration and
corresponding accessory penalties.21 Thus, the courts
must employ the proper nomenclature specified in the
RPC, such as "reclusion perpetua" not "life
imprisonment," or "ten days of arresto menor" not "ten
days of imprisonment." In qualified theft, the
appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetua based on
Article 310 of the RPC which provides that "the crime of
qualified theft shall be punished by the penalties next
higher by two degrees than those respectively specified
in Article 309."22chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
To compute the penalty, we begin with the value of the
stolen steel beams, which is P2,269,731.69. Based on
Article 309 of the RPC, since the value of the items
exceeds P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in
its minimum and medium periods, to be imposed in the
maximum period, which is eight years, eight months and
one day to 10 years of prision mayor.
To determine the additional years of imprisonment, we
deduct P22,000.00 from P2,269,731.69, which gives
us P2,247,731.69. This resulting figure should then be
divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less
than P10,000.00. We now have 224 years that should be
added to the basic penalty. However, the imposable
penalty for simple theft should not exceed a total of 20
years. Therefore, had petitioner committed simple theft,
the penalty would be 20 years of reclusion temporal. As
the penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher, the
correct imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.

The petitioner should thus be convicted of qualified

theft with the corresponding penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The June 27,

2005 decision and the November 24, 2005 resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28369
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Engr.
Anthony V. Zapanta is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. FERNANDO
VIL PAMINTUAN, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 3; ANTHONY DE LEON and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review
on certiorari of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] in
CA-G.R. SP No. 70629 dismissing the petition
for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner Victor C.
Agustin which, in turn, assailed the Order of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, denying the
motion to quash the Informations in Criminal Case Nos.
17892-R to 17895-R, for libel.
On June 13, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Baguio City, filed four separate
Informations[2] charging the petitioner, a Philippine Daily
Inquirer columnist, with libel. The inculpatory portion of
that in Criminal Case No. 17892-R is quoted infra, as
follows:
That on or about the 17th day of March 2000, in the City
of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate
intent and malicious intent and evil motive of attacking,
injuring and impeaching the character, honesty,
integrity, virtue and reputation of one Anthony De Leon
the acting general manager of the Baguio Country Club,
and as a private citizen of good standing and reputation
in the community and with malicious intent of exposing
the (sic) Anthony De Leon to public hatred, contempt,
ridicule, discredit and dishonor, without any justifiable
motive, did then and there willfully, maliciously and
criminally prepare or cause to prepare, write in his
column Cocktails and publish in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of
Baguio and in the entire Philippines, wherein in said
column the said accused did then and there defame the
complainant Anthony De Leon by branding and imputing
upon him the following defamatory and libelous
statements, to wit:
The trysting place between the President Marcos and
Hollywood actress Dovie Beams is not the subject of a
high level tax evasion investigation ordered by no less
than the new BIR Commissioner, Dakila Fonacier.
That bungalow on Northwestern Street had hastily
changed hands in the last two years, and had supposedly
been sold to, first Anthony De Leon, the acting general
manager of the exclusive Baguio Country Club, who in
turn disposed of it to an unwitting Chinoy couple.
According to preliminary BIR findings, the transfer to Mr.
De Leon is already spurious since the cook De Leon had
been missing and had gone TNT in New York more than
eight years ago. The spurious sale to the male De Leon
who is not related to the cook, was necessary to make it
appear that it had been an intra-family transfer.
Second, the Baguio Country Club manager made it
appear that he and his family had been using the house
himself, but the BIR had now gotten a certification from
the Greenhills homeowners association that the said
bungalow has all these years been rented to third
parties, the last of which was an ADB executive.
The most damaging of the findings was the supposed
transfer price of the bungalow between the De Leons and
how much the bungalow was later palmed off to the
Chinese-Filipino couple.
We will leave those details for the BIR Commissioner to
announce himself, that, if he could overcome the
tremendous and well-oiled lobbying efforts by De Leons
principals.
Tip: One of the principals is a lawyer and self-proclaimed
best friend of Lenny Dragon Lady de Jesus.
which aforesaid defamatory, malicious and libelous
words and statements have been read by the personnel
of the Baguio Country Club, by the residents of the City
of Baguio, and by the public in the other parts of the
country, and that those libelous and defamatory words
and statements aforementioned are untrue, false and
malicious tending to impeach the character, integrity,
virtue and reputation of the said Anthony De Leon as
Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club,
thus, placing and causing said Anthony De Leon to public
hatred, contempt, dishonor, discredit and ridicule which
acts are serious and insulting in nature, to the damage
and prejudice of the said Anthony De Leon.[3]
Except for the alleged libelous articles, as well as
the dates of the commission of the crimes charged
therein, the three other Informations are similarly
worded.
Agustin was arraigned on September 10, 2001, and
pleaded not guilty to all the charges.[4]
Agustin then filed a Motion to Quash the
Informations, on the sole ground that the court had no
jurisdiction over the offenses charged. He pointed out
that the said Informations did not contain any allegation
that the offended party, Anthony de Leon, was actually
residing in Baguio City, or that the alleged libelous
articles were printed and first published in a newspaper
of general circulation in Baguio City.
Private complainant De Leon, through counsel,
opposed the motion, alleging that he was a bona
fide resident of the Baguio Country Club located at the
Country Club Road, Baguio City; he was also the acting
general manager of the club at the time the alleged
libelous article was published. He emphasized that the
Informations alleged that he was of good standing and
reputation in the community, and that the word
community meant Baguio City, where he was residing.
Moreover, Agustin was estopped from assailing the
courts lack of jurisdiction since he was arraigned before
he filed his motion to quash the Information. Even if it
may be assumed that there was some ambiguity in the
Informations as to whether he was an actual resident of
Baguio City, amending them would suffice; based on the
entirety of the context and applying the doctrine of
necessary implication, there can be no other conclusion
than that he was a resident of Baguio City.
By way of Reply, Agustin averred that the
allegations in the Informations (that the private
complainant was the acting general manager of the
Baguio Country Club and was a private citizen of good
standing and reputation in the community) do not
constitute an allegation that the private complainant
was an actual resident of Baguio City. He insisted that to
construe the word community in the Informations to
mean the community in Baguio City would be to unduly
strain the limits of a fair interpretation; there must be
clear and positive allegations in the Informations that
the private complainant actually resided in Baguio City.
He argued that he was not estopped from assailing the
courts jurisdiction over the crimes charged even after his
arraignment because lack of jurisdiction is a matter
which can be dealt with at any time.
On January 16, 2002, the trial court issued an
Order[5] denying the motion to quash, holding that in the
light of the petitioners admission that the private
complainant was the General Manager of the Baguio
Country Club, it was reasonable to infer therefrom that
the private complainant was actually a resident of
Baguio City at the time the alleged libelous articles were
published.
Agustin filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Order, insisting that the mere fact that the private
complainant was the General Manager of the Baguio
Country Club did not necessarily mean that the latter
was actually residing in Baguio City, as it was also
possible that he was actually residing in a place nearby.
The trial court, however, denied the motion on April 1,
2002.
Agustin forthwith filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with a plea for an injunctive relief before the
Court of Appeals (CA), claiming that the trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in denying his Motion to Quash.
On February 24, 2004, the CA rendered a decision
dismissing the petition. It disagreed with Agustin, and
held that the trial court did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
so ruling. According to the CA, while the Informations
filed by the prosecution did not contain allegations that
the complainant was actually a resident of Baguio City at
the time the alleged libelous articles were printed and
first published, and that the alleged libelous articles
were printed and first published in Baguio City, such
defects were merely of form and not of substance. Thus,
there is no need to quash the Informations, as they may
merely be amended pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides
that an amendment, either of form or substance, may be
made at any time before the accused enters a plea to
the charge, and thereafter, as to all matters of form with
leave of court.[6] The CA further ruled that any
amendment that would be made to conform to the
private complainants residency requirements would not
place the accused at a disadvantage.
Agustin filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision, which the appellate court denied for lack of
merit.[7]
Agustin, now the petitioner, insists that the CA
erred in dismissing his petition for certiorari and
prohibition, it appearing that the trial court committed a
grave abuse of its discretion in denying his Motion to
Quash the Informations, as well as his motion for
reconsideration of the trial courts order denying the
same.
The petitioner maintains that in the absence of any
allegations in the Informations that the private
respondent was actually residing in Baguio City, or that
the alleged libelous articles were printed and first
published in Baguio City as mandated by Article 360 of
the Revised Penal Code, the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the offenses charged. He asserts that
the amendments of the Informations would likewise be
improper, considering that the defects of the
Informations were not merely of form but of substance.
The petitioner posits that venue in criminal cases is
jurisdictional and mandatory; hence, conformably with
the decisions of the Court in Lopez v. City
Judge,[8] and Agbayani v. Sayo,[9] the Informations must
be quashed.
In its Comment on the petition, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the failure of the
Informations to allege that the private respondent is a
resident of Baguio City (where the Informations were
filed) is not a jurisdictional defect. It asserts that the
averment in the Informations that the crimes charged
were committed within the jurisdiction of the trial court
in Baguio City, taken in conjunction with the other
allegations therein, are sufficient to vest jurisdiction over
the subject cases in the RTC of Baguio City.
For his part, the private complainant reiterated his
arguments in the RTC and in the CA in his Comment on
the Petition.
The threshold issues in the present petition are (1)
whether or not the RTC of Baguio City has jurisdiction
over the offenses charged in the four Informations on
the premise that the Informations are defective; and (2)
whether the Informations may be amended to cure the
said defects.
The petition is meritorious.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of
jurisdiction.[10] The jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or Information, and the offense must have
been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court.[11]
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code provides
ART. 360. Persons responsible. Any person who shall
publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of
any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be
responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor
or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or
serial publication, shall be responsible for the
defamations contained therein to the same extent as if
he were the author thereof.
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of
written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall
be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of
First Instance of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense; Provided, however, That
where one of the offended parties is a public officer
whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the
city or province where the libelous article is printed and
first published, and in case such public officer does not
hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed
in the Court of First Instance or the province or city
where he held office at the time of the commission of
the offense or where the libelous article is printed and
first published and in case one of the offended parties is
a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court
of First Instance of the province or city where he actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense or
where the libelous matter is printed and first
published: Provided, further, That the civil action shall be
filed in the same court where the criminal action is filed
and vice versa: Provided, furthermore, That the court
where the criminal action or civil action for damages is
first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of
other courts: And provided, finally, That this amendment
shall not apply to cases of written defamations, the civil
and/or criminal actions to which have been filed in court
at the time of the effectivity of this law.
Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written
defamations as provided for in the chapter shall be
conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province
or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of
the province where such actions may be instituted in
accordance with the provisions of this article.
No criminal action for defamation which consists in the
imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de
oficio shall be brought except at the instance of and
upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party.
Thus, the rules on venue in Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code are as follows:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a
private person, the criminal action may be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the
criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province where he actually resided at the
time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is
in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense,
the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office
outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province or city where he held office
at the time of the commission of the offense.[12]
Experience has shown that under the old rule, the
offended party could harass the accused in a libel case
by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or
distant places.[13] To obviate controversies as to the
venue of the criminal action from written defamation,
the complaint or Information should contain allegations
as to whether the offended party was a public officer or
a private individual at the time the offense was
committed, and where he was actually residing at that
time; whenever possible, the place where the written
defamation was printed and first published should
likewise be alleged.[14]
In this case, the Informations did not allege that the
offended party was actually residing in Baguio City at the
time of the commission of the offenses, or that the
alleged libelous articles were printed and first published
in Baguio City. It cannot even be inferred from the
allegation the offended party was the Acting General
Manager of the Baguio Country Club and of good
standing and reputation in the community that the
private respondent (complainant) was actually residing
in Baguio City.
The residence of a person is his personal, actual or
physical habitation or his actual residence or place of
abode provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency; no particular length of time of residence is
required. However, the residence must be more than
temporary.[15] The term residence involves the idea of
something beyond a transient stay in the place; and to
be a resident, one must abide in a place where he had a
house therein.[16] To create a residence in a particular
place, two fundamental elements are essential: The
actual bodily presence in the place, combined with a
freely exercised intention of remaining there
permanently or for an indefinite time.[17] While it is
possible that as the Acting General Manager of the
Baguio Country Club, the petitioner may have been
actually residing in Baguio City, the Informations did not
state that he was actually residing therein when the
alleged crimes were committed. It is entirely possible
that the private complainant may have been actually
residing in another place. One who transacts business in
a place and spends considerable time thereat does not
render such person a resident therein.[18] Where one
may have or own a business does not of itself constitute
residence within the meaning of the statute. Pursuit of
business in a place is not conclusive of residence there
for purposes of venue.[19]
We do not agree with the ruling of the CA that the
defects in the Informations are merely formal. Indeed,
the absence of any allegations in the Informations that
the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City,
where the crimes charged were allegedly committed, is a
substantial defect. Indeed, the amendments of the
Informations to vest jurisdiction upon the court cannot
be allowed.[20]
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is
GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 70629 are SET ASIDE. The Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, is hereby DIRECTED
TO QUASH the Informations and DISMISS the cases
against petitioner Victor C. Agustin in Criminal Case Nos.
17892-R to 17895-R.
SO ORDERED.
SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY, G.R. NO. 157472 However, on the same day and after the arraignment,
Petitioner, the respondent judge issued another Order,[6] likewise
Present: dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial prosecutor
to correct and amend the Information to Murder in view
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank
Chairperson, alleged in the Information which public respondent
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, registered as having qualified the crime to Murder.
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his
REYES, JJ. amendment by crossing out the word Homicide and
instead wrote the word Murder in the caption and in the
HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, opening paragraph of the Information. The accusatory
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES portion remained exactly the same as that of the original
and OLYMPIO L. ESCUETA, Promulgated: Information for Homicide, with the correction of the
Respondents. September 28, 2007 spelling of the victims name from Escuita to Escueta.[7]
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
--------x On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for pre-trial
conference and trial, petitioner was to be re-arraigned
for the crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected
DECISION on the ground that the latter would be placed in double
jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: terminated without his express consent, resulting in the
dismissal of the case. As petitioner refused to enter his
plea on the amended Information for Murder, the public
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty.[8]
Rules of Court filed by SSGT. Jose M. Pacoy[1] (petitioner)
seeking to annul and set aside the Orders dated October On October 28, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash
25, 2002[2] and December 18, 2002[3] issued by Presiding with Motion to Suspend Proceedings Pending the
Judge Afable E. Cajigal (respondent judge) of the Resolution of the Instant Motion[9] on the ground of
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac in double jeopardy. Petitioner alleged that in the
Criminal Case No. 02-42. Information for Homicide, he was validly indicted and
arraigned before a competent court, and the case was
On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in terminated without his express consent; that when the
the RTC against petitioner committed as follows: case for Homicide was terminated without his express
consent, the subsequent filing of the Information for
That on or about the 18th day of Murder in lieu of Homicide placed him in double
March 2002, in the Municipality jeopardy.
of Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of In an Order[10] dated October 25, 2002,[11] the
this Honorable Court, the said accused respondent judge denied the Motion to Quash. He ruled
with intent to kill, did then and that a claim of former acquittal or conviction does not
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously constitute double jeopardy and cannot be sustained
shot his commanding officer 2Lt. unless judgment was rendered acquitting or convicting
Frederick Esquita with his armalite rifle the defendant in the former prosecution; that petitioner
hitting and sustaining upon 2Lt. was never acquitted or convicted of Homicide, since the
Frederick Esquitamultiple gunshot Information for Homicide was merely corrected/or
wounds on his body which caused his amended before trial commenced and did not terminate
instantaneous death. the same; that the Information for Homicide was
With the aggravating patently insufficient in substance, so no valid
circumstance of killing, 2Lt. proceedings could be taken thereon; and that with the
Frederick Esquita in disregard of his allegation of aggravating circumstance of disregard of
rank.[4] rank, the crime ofHomicide is qualified to Murder.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion
for Reconsideration. In his Motion to Inhibit, he alleged
On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, that the respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an
duly assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to arbitrary, capricious and partial manner in mandating
the charge of Homicide. Respondent Judge set the pre- the amendment of the charge from Homicide to Murder
trial conference and trial on October 8, 2002.[5] in disregard of the provisions of the law and existing
jurisprudence.
In his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner reiterated
that the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent, which
constitutes a ground to quash the information for
murder; and that to try him again for the same offense
constitutes double jeopardy. Petitioner stated that
contrary to respondent judge's conclusion that disregard
of rank qualifies the killing to Murder, it is a generic
aggravating circumstance which only serves to affect the
imposition of the period of the penalty. Petitioner also
argued that the amendment and/or correction ordered
by the respondent judge was substantial; and under
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, this cannot be done, since petitioner had
already been arraigned and he would be placed in
double jeopardy.
In his Order dated December 18, 2002,[12] the
respondent judge denied the Motion to Inhibit and
granted the Motion for Reconsideration, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the Motion to Inhibit is hereby
DENIED while the Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED.
Unless ordered otherwise by
the Highest Court, the presiding judge
shall continue hearing this case. Further,
the Order dated October 25, 2002 is
reconsidered and the original
information charging the crime of
homicide stands.[13]
In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent
judge found that a close scrutiny of Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code shows that disregard of rank is
merely a generic mitigating[14] circumstance which
should not elevate the classification of the crime of
homicide to murder.
On April 30, 2003, petitioner filed herein petition
for certiorari on the following grounds:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED
HIS JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE
AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION
FROM HOMICIDE TO MURDER.
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND VIOLATED
THE LAW IN DENYING THE MOTION TO
QUASH THE INFORMATION FOR
MURDER.
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED
HIS JURISDICTION AND VIOLATED THE
LAW IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT
OF THE INFORMATION FOR HOMICIDE
WHICH WAS ALREADY TERMINATED.[15]
Petitioner alleges that despite having entered his plea of
not guilty to the charge of Homicide, the public
respondent ordered the amendment of the Information
from Homicide to Murder because of the presence of
the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank, which
is in violation of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure; that the public respondents
ruling that disregard of rank is a qualifying aggravating
circumstance which qualified the killing of
2Lt. Escueta to murder is erroneous since, under
paragraph 3, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code,
disregard of rank is only a generic aggravating
circumstance which serves to affect the penalty to be
imposed upon the accused and does not qualify the
offense into a more serious crime; that even assuming
that disregard of rank is a qualifying aggravating
circumstance, such is a substantial amendment which is
not allowed after petitioner has entered his plea.
Petitioner next contends that the respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion when he denied the
Motion to Quash the Information for Murder,
considering that the original Information for Homicide
filed against him was terminated without his express
consent; thus, prosecuting him for the same offense
would place him in double jeopardy.
Petitioner further argues that although the respondent
judge granted his Motion for Reconsideration, he did not
in fact grant the motion, since petitioner's prayer was for
the respondent judge to grant the Motion to Quash the
Information for Murder on the ground of double
jeopardy; that his Motion for Reconsideration did not
seek the reinstatement of the Information for Homicide
upon the dismissal of the Information for Murder, as he
would again be placed in double jeopardy; thus, the
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
in reinstating the Homicide case.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that the
respondent judge's Order reinstating the Information to
Homicide after initially motu proprio ordering its
amendment to Murder renders herein petition moot
and academic; that petitioner failed to establish the
fourth element of double jeopardy, i.e., the defendant
was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his consent;
that petitioner confuses amendment with substitution
of Information; that the respondent judge's Order dated
September 12, 2002 mandated an amendment of the
Information as provided under Section 14, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; and that
amendments do not entail dismissal or termination of
the previous case.
Private respondent Col. Olimpio Escueta, father of the
victim, filed his Comment alleging that no grave abuse of
discretion was committed by the respondent judge
when he denied petitioner's Motion to Quash the
Amended Information, as petitioner was not placed in
double jeopardy; that the proceedings under the first
Information for homicide has not yet commenced, and
the case was not dismissed or terminated when the
Information was amended.
In his Reply, petitioner reiterates his contention that the
amendment of the charge of Homicide to Murder after
his arraignment would place him in double jeopardy,
considering that said amendment was without his
express consent; and that such amendment was
tantamount to a termination of the charge of Homicide.
The parties filed their respective Memoranda.
Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition
for certiorari is highly improper, for it violates the
established policy of strict observance of the judicial
hierarchy of courts. However, the judicial hierarchy of
courts is not an iron-clad rule.[16] A strict application of
the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the
cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve
factual but legal questions.[17]
In the present case, petitioner submits pure questions of
law involving the proper legal interpretation of the
provisions on amendment and substitution of
information under the Rules of Court. It also involves the
issue of double jeopardy, one of the fundamental rights
of the citizens under the Constitution which protects the
accused not against the peril of second punishment but
against being tried for the same offense. These
important legal questions and in order to prevent
further delay in the trial of the case warrant our
relaxation of the policy of strict observance of the
judicial hierarchy of courts.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
We find no merit in petitioner's contention that the
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
in amending the Information after petitioner had already
pleaded not guilty to the charge in the Information for
Homicide. The argument of petitioner --
Considering the fact that the case for
Homicide against him was already
terminated without his express
consent, he cannot anymore be
charged and arraigned for Murder
which involve the same offense. The
petitioner argued that the termination
of the information for Homicide
without his express consent is
equivalent to his acquittal. Thus, to
charge him again, this time for Murder,
is tantamount to placing the petitioner
in Double Jeopardy.[18]
is not plausible. Petitioner confuses the procedure and
effects of amendment or substitution under Section 14,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, to wit --
SEC. 14. Amendment or
substitution. A complaint or information
may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any
time before the accused enters his plea.
After the plea and during the trial, a
formal amendment may only be made
with leave of court and when it can be
done without causing prejudice to the
rights of the accused.
xxx
If it appears at any time before judgment
that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court
shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in
accordance with Rule 119, Section 11,
provided the accused would not be
placed thereby in double jeopardy, and
may also require the witnesses to give
bail for their appearance at the trial.
with Section 19, Rule 119 of which provides:
SEC. 19. When mistake has
been made in charging the proper
offense. - When it becomes manifest at
any time before judgment that a
mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense and the accused cannot
be convicted of the offense charged or
any other offense necessarily included
therein, the accused shall not be
discharged if there appears good cause
to detain him. In such case, the court
shall commit the accused to answer for
the proper offense and dismiss the
original case upon the filing of the
proper information.
First, a distinction shall be made between amendment
and substitution under Section 14, Rule 110. For this
purpose, Teehankee v. Madayag[19] is instructive, viz:
The first paragraph provides
the rules for amendment of the
information or complaint, while the
second paragraph refers to
the substitution of the information or
complaint.
It may accordingly be posited
that both amendment and substitution
of the information may be made before
or after the defendant pleads, but they
differ in the following respects:
1. Amendment may involve
either formal or substantial changes,
while substitution necessarily involves a
substantial change from the original
charge;
2. Amendment before plea has
been entered can be effected without
leave of court, but substitution of
information must be with leave of court
as the original information has to be
dismissed;
3. Where the amendment is
only as to form, there is no need for
another preliminary investigation and
the retaking of the plea of the
accused; in substitution of information,
another preliminary investigation is
entailed and the accused has to plead
anew to the new information; and
4. An amended information
refers to the same offense charged in
the original information or to an
offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the original
charge, hence substantial amendments
to the information after the plea has
been taken cannot be made over the
objection of the accused, for if the
original information would be
withdrawn, the accused could invoke
double jeopardy. On the other hand,
substitution requires or presupposes
that the new information involves a
different offense which does not
include or is not necessarily included in
the original charge, hence the accused
cannot claim double jeopardy.
In determining, therefore,
whether there should be an
amendment under the first paragraph
of Section 14, Rule 110, or a
substitution of information under the
second paragraph thereof, the rule is
that where the second information
involves the same offense, or an
offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first
information, an amendment of the
information is sufficient; otherwise,
where the new information charges an
offense which is distinct and different
from that initially charged, a
substitution is in order.
There is identity between the
two offenses when the evidence to
support a conviction for one offense
would be sufficient to warrant a
conviction for the other, or when the
second offense is exactly the same as
the first, or when the second offense is
an attempt to commit or a frustration
of, or when it necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in, the offense
charged in the first information. In this
connection, an offense may be said to
necessarily include another when some
of the essential elements or ingredients
of the former, as this is alleged in the
information, constitute the latter. And,
vice-versa, an offense may be said to be
necessarily included in another when
the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form a part of those
constituting the latter.[20]
In the present case, the change of the offense
charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal
amendment and not a substantial amendment or a
substitution as defined in Teehankee.
While the amended Information was for Murder, a
reading of the Information shows that the only change
made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening
paragraph or preamble of the Information, with the
crossing out of word Homicide and its replacement by
the word Murder. There was no change in the recital of
facts constituting the offense charged or in the
determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The
averments in the amended Information for Murder are
exactly the same as those already alleged in the original
Information for Homicide, as there was not at all
any change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the
killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying
circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made
in the caption and preamble from Homicide to Murder
as purely formal.[21]
Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing
formal amendments in cases in which the accused has
already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do
not prejudice the rights of the accused. The test of
whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the
amendment of a complaint or information is whether a
defense under the complaint or information, as it
originally stood, would no longer be available after the
amendment is made; and when any evidence the
accused might have would be inapplicable to the
complaint or information.[22] Since the facts alleged in
the accusatory portion of the amended Information are
identical with those of the original Information for
Homicide, there could not be any effect on the
prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there be
any possible prejudice to the rights or defense of
petitioner.
While the respondent judge erroneously thought that
disrespect on account of rank qualified the crime to
murder, as the same was only a generic aggravating
circumstance,[23]we do not find that he committed any
grave abuse of discretion in ordering the amendment of
the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not
guilty to the charge of Homicide, since the amendment
made was only formal and did not adversely affect any
substantial right of petitioner.
Next, we determine whether petitioner was placed in
double jeopardy by the change of the charge from
Homicide to Murder; and subsequently, from Murder
back to Homicide. Petitioner's claim that the respondent
judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his
Motion to Quash the Amended Information for Murder
on the ground of double jeopardy is not meritorious.
Petitioner's Motion to Quash was anchored on Section 3,
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 3. Grounds. - The accused
may move to quash the complaint
or information on any of the following
grounds:
xxxx
(i) That the accused has been previously
convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
Section 7 of the same Rule lays down the requisites in
order that the defense of double jeopardy may prosper,
to wit:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or
acquittal; double jeopardy. When an
accused has been convicted or acquitted,
or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his
express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction and after the
accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or
the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit
the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or
is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or
information.
Thus, there is double jeopardy when the
following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has
been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for
the same offense as in the first.[24]
As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only
(a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent
court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has
been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted
or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.[25]
It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal or termination of the case that bars further
prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to
commit the same or the frustration
thereof; or prosecution for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or
information.[26]
Petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge
dismissed or terminated his case for homicide without
his express consent, which is tantamount to an acquittal,
is misplaced.
Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7
presupposes a definite or unconditional dismissal which
terminates the case.[27] And for the dismissal to be a bar
under the jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of
acquittal.
The respondent judge's Order dated September 12,
2002 was for the trial prosecutor to correct and amend
the Information but not to dismiss the same upon the
filing of a newInformation charging the proper offense
as contemplated under the last paragraph of Section 14,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court -- which, for convenience,
we quote again --
If it appears at anytime before
judgment that a mistake has been made
in charging the proper offense, the court
shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in
accordance with section 19, Rule 119,
provided the accused shall not be placed
in double jeopardy. The court may
require the witnesses to give bail for
their appearance at the trial.
and Section 19, Rule 119, which provides:
SEC. 19.- When mistake has been
made in charging the proper offense -
 When it becomes manifest at any time
before judgment that a mistake has been
made in charging the proper offense and
the accused cannot be convicted of the
offense charged or any other offense
necessarily included therein, the accused
shall not be discharged if there appears
good cause to detain him. In such case,
the court shall commit the accused to
answer for the proper offense and
dismiss the original case upon the filing of
the proper information.
reinstating the original Information for Homicide. The
requisite of double jeopardy that the first jeopardy must
have attached prior to the second is not present,
considering that petitioner was neither convicted nor
acquitted; nor was the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.[29]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there
being no grave abuse of discretion committed by
respondent Judge.
SO ORDERED.

Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110,

applies only when the offense charged is wholly
different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused
cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not
charged in the information even if it be proven, in which
case, there must be a dismissal of the charge and a
substitution of a new information charging the proper
offense. Section 14 does not apply to a
second information, which involves the same offense or
an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the first information. In this connection, the
offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved
when some of the essential elements or ingredients of
the former, as alleged in the complaint or information,
constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved when
the essential ingredients of the former constitute or
form a part of those constituting the latter.[28]

Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder;

thus, the respondent judge merely ordered the
amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of
the original Information. To repeat, it was the same
original information that was amended by merely
crossing out the word Homicide and writing the word
Murder, instead, which showed that there was no
dismissal of the homicide case.

Anent the last issue, petitioner contends that

respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in
ordering that the original Information for Homicide
stands after realizing that disregard of rank does not
qualify the killing to Murder. That ruling was again a
violation of his right against double jeopardy, as he will
be prosecuted anew for a charge of Homicide, which has
already been terminated earlier.

We are not convinced. Respondent judge did not

commit any grave abuse of discretion.

A reading of the Order dated December 18,

2002 showed that the respondent judge granted
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, not on the
ground that double jeopardy exists, but on his
realization that disregard of rank is a generic aggravating
circumstance which does not qualify the killing of the
victim to murder. Thus, he rightly corrected himself by
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. DANILO CATUBIG y HORIO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
In an information, dated 29 January 1998, the
accused, Danilo Catubig y Horio, was charged with the
crime of rape before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
of Malolos, Bulacan; viz:
The undersigned Asst. Provincial Prosecutor on
complaint of the offended party Dannilyn Catubig y
Lazaro accuses Danilo Catubig y Horio of the crime of
rape, penalized under the provisions of Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of November, 1997, in the
municipality of San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force,
threats and intimidation and with lewd design have
carnal knowledge of the said offended party against her
will.[1]
When arraigned on 16 July 1998, accused Catubig,
represented by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged; forthwith, trial ensued.
The case for the prosecution was laid bare in
Appellees Brief submitted by the Office of the Solicitor
General.
On November 27, 1997, at around 4:00 oclock in the
afternoon, private complainant Dannilyn Catubig, who
was born on August 9, 1985, and her four (4) younger
siblings were watching television in the sala of their
house located at Sunlife Subdivision, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan.
After an hour, Dannilyns father, herein appellant Danilo
Catubig, arrived and told Dannilyns siblings to proceed,
as in fact they did proceed, to her aunts house which is
just located nearby. Thereafter, appellant told Dannilyn
to go inside a room and to lie down on the bed. After
Dannilyn had complied, appellant removed Dannilyns
shorts and panty, while appellant, after removing his
brief and t-shirt, [laid] on top of Dannilyn. Afraid of
appellant who beat and raped her in the past, Dannilyn
was not able to resist appellant who succeeded in
inserting his penis into Dannilyns vagina.
However, Dannilyns aunt, who got suspicious of what
appellant was doing to Dannilyn, informed the latters
mother, Jocelyn Catubig, about the said suspicion. Thus,
when confronted by her mother, Dannilyn was forced to
reveal that she was indeed raped by appellant. The
sexual assault was reported to the San Jose del Monte
Police Station where Dannilyns sworn statement was
subsequently taken on December 3, 1997.
Upon the request of the police authorities, Dannilyn was
examined on December 1, 1997 by Dr. Wilfredo E. Tiera,
Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, who found out that Dannilyns healed
laceration in the hymen was caused by sexual
intercourse.[2]
The accused denied the accusation against him. He
claimed that the rape charge was brought about only
because of the ill-will between him, on the one hand,
and his wife and daughter Dannilyn, on the other hand,
following a quarrel. On 27 November 1997, he
asseverated, he had fought with his wife, hitting her and
his daughter. His wife then threatened him that it was
the last time that she would allow him to harm her and
that he would regret what he did. True to her
foreboding, the next day, he was arrested and a
complaint for rape was filed against him.
On 11 December 1998, the Regional Trial Court
rendered a decision holding the accused guilty of the
crime of rape; it adjudged:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby
finds accused DANILO CATUBIG Y HORIO GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and to
pay private complainant Dannilyn Catubig the amount of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages.[3]
With the imposition of the death penalty by the
trial court, the records were elevated to this Court for
automatic review.
In his brief, appellant submitted thusly:
1. The lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of
the crime of rape in violation of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659.
2. The lower court erred in not taking into consideration
the fact that the information was defective for failure to
state that the accused is the father of the victim and that
the victim was under 18 years [of] age at the time of the
commission of the alleged rape.[4]
Private complainant Dannilyn Catubig narrated how
she was repeatedly abused by her own father; she
testified:
Q Now, after your sisters and brother [went] to the
house of your aunt, what did your father do?
A He instructed me to go inside the room.
Q How many rooms were there in your house?
A Only one.
Q Did you go to the room per instruction?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what happened inside the room?
A My father entered the room.
Q And when your father entered the room, what did
he do next?
A He removed my short [pants] and my panty.
Q What was your position at that time when your
father removed your short pants and panty?
A I was lying.
Q When you entered the room, did you lie
immediately?
A No, I just sat.
Q How come as you claimed a while ago, you were
lying when your father removed your short
pants and panty?
A Once I entered the room, I was sitting then he
removed my short [pants] and panty.
Q You said upon entering the room, you sat and
while sitting, all of a sudden your father
removed your short pants and panty while
already lying at that time, how come you were
lying when according to you, you were sitting
inside the room?
A I was sitting first and he instructed me to lie down.
Q While you were sitting inside the room and you
were instructed by your father to lie, what
comes to your mind?
A That he will rape me.
Q How did you come to know that?
A He was raping me before, doing that before.
Q In other words, that was not the first time your
father raped you on that particular date?
A No, sir.
Q When was the first time, if you remember?
A When I was still in grade 1.
Q How many times were you raped by your father?
A I can no longer remember how many it was -
several.
Q When was the last time your father raped you?
A November 27.
Q Now, when your father removed your short pants
and panty, what did he do next?
A He removed his brief and shirt.
Q After removing his brief and shirt, what did he do?
A He [laid] on top me.
Q When your father [laid] on top of you, what did he
do?
A He was inserting his penis to my vagina.
Q At this juncture, may we make of record that
witness starts to cry.
Q How did you know your father inserted his penis to
your vagina?
A I can feel it and it is painful.
Q That was the time when your father was already
lying on top of you?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what was the movement of the body of your
father while he was lying on top of you?
A Push and pull movement.
Q For how long did your father stay on top of you
doing that push and pull movement?
A That must be about 1 hour, but my aunt arrived.
Q Aside from the pain, what else did you feel?
A Mahapdi at parang may pumipitik sa loob ng ari ko.
Q Did you not try to resist?
A No, because I am afraid of him.
Q You are afraid of your father?
A Yes, sir.
Q Afraid of what?
A Because he was beating us, hitting us.
Q Why, what was the reason why your father was
hitting you?
A To threaten us.
Q For what purpose?
A Whenever my mother sided with us, my father and
mother engaged in a fight.
Q In this case, you were raped and sexually abused
by your father, what made you afraid of him?
A Because we were afraid of my father since
childhood.[5]
Dannilyn has given her testimony in a plain,
categorical, spontaneous and frank manner, remaining
consistent throughout, and there is hardly anything on
record that can cast doubt on her sincerity. The
revelations of an innocent child whose chastity has been
abused, coupled with her willingness to face police
investigation and to undergo the trouble and humiliation
of a public trial, should merit credence unless strong
justifications dictate otherwise. Indeed, it would take a
most senseless kind of depravity for a young daughter to
just make up a story which could put her own father to
an undeserved indictment and to even possibly face
death in the hands of the law.[6]
When rape is committed against ones own
daughter, the moral ascendancy and influence of the
father, that necessarily flows from his parental authority,
can sufficiently cow the child to submission and can
rightly be held to substitute for the requisite violence or
intimidation that, normally, would be characterized by
physical acts and uttered threats made on the victim.
The trite defenses of alibi and denial proferred by
appellant cannot prevail over the positive and
categorical statements of private complainant. Alibi is
often viewed with suspicion and received with caution
not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but
also because it is easy to fabricate. In order that this
defense can prosper, it must be convincing to preclude
any doubt on the physical impossibility of the presence
of the accused at the locus criminis at the time of the
incident. These conditions have not been met in the case
at bar.
The contention of appellant that his wife and
daughter Dannilyn have accused him merely because of
his violent ways is much too flimsy to be believed. The
mere resentment of a wife and daughter is not so
compelling as to have motivated them to wrongly lodge
a complaint for a crime much more serious than might, if
at all, be expected.
It is likewise a settled doctrine that the assessment
made by the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
deserves great regard and weight on appeal. The rule is
not without reason; the trial judge has a unique position
of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their
deportment, conduct and attitude during the course of
the testimony in open court. There is no valid reason to
now ignore this long accepted jurisprudence in this
instance.
This Court, however, finds the second assignment
of error impressed with merit.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, at times also
referred to as the Death Penalty Law, states in part:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. x x x
xxxxxxxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of
rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.
The concurrence of the minority of the victim and her
relationship to the offender are special qualifying
circumstances that are needed to be alleged in the
complaint or information for the penalty of death to be
decreed.[7] The Constitution guarantees to be inviolable
the right of an accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.[8] It is a requirement
that renders it essential for every element of the offense
with which he is charged to be properly alleged in the
complaint or information.
Here, the information failed to state the minority of
the victim and her relationship with the offender, both
special qualifying circumstances under Republic Act No.
7659, and for want of such allegations, the trial court
erred in imposing the death penalty on the
accused.[9] Appellant could only thus be convicted under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, of
simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua.
Anent the award of damages, the trial court has
correctly awarded P50,000.00 moral damages, an award
that rests on the jural foundation that the crime of rape
necessarily brings with it shame, mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, moral shock and social
humiliation to the offended party.[10] In addition, the
offended party deserves to receive the amount of
P50,000.00 civil indemnity,[11] the equivalent of
compensatory damages, and exemplary damages in the
amount of P25,000.00.
An apparent discord in the award of exemplary
damages in simple and qualified rape cases perhaps
deserves more than just a passing remark.
The Civil Code of the Philippines provides, in
respect to exemplary or corrective damages, thusly:
ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are
imposed, by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.
ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a
part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct
from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
ART. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
ART. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court
may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in
a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner.
ART. 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a
matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they
should be adjudicated.
ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages
need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is
entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages
before the court may consider the question of whether
or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case
liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no
proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated
damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the
court may consider the question of granting exemplary
in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must
show that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation
for liquidated damages.
ART. 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages
are renounced in advance shall be null and void.
The attendance of aggravating circumstances in the
perpetration of the crime serves to increase the penalty
(the criminal liability aspect),[12] as well as to justify an
award of exemplary or corrective damages (the civil
liability aspect),[13] moored on the greater perversity of
the offender manifested in the commission of the felony
such as may be shown by (1) the motivating power itself,
(2) the place of commission, (3) the means and ways
employed, (4) the time, or (5) the personal
circumstances of the offender or the offended party or
both. There are various types of aggravating
circumstances, among them, the ordinary and the
qualifying. Relationship is an alternative circumstance
under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code.
Art. 15. Their concept. --Alternative circumstances are
those which must be taken into consideration as
aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and
effects of the crime and other conditions attending its
commission. They are relationship, intoxication, and
degree of instruction and education of the offender.
The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be
taken into consideration when the offended party is the
spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or
adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the
same degree of the offender.
As a rule, relationship is held to be aggravating in
crimes against chastity, such as rape and acts of
lasciviousness, whether the offender is a higher or a
lower degree relative of the offended party.[14]
Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659,
amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the
death penalty is to be imposed in rape cases when the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim. The Court has since held that the circumstances
enumerated by the amendatory law are to be regarded
as special qualifying (aggravating)
circumstances. Somehow doubts linger on whether
relationship may then be considered to warrant an
award for exemplary damages where it is used to qualify
rape as a heinous crime, thereby becoming an element
thereof, as would subject the offender to the penalty of
death. Heretofore, the Court has not categorically laid
down a specific rule, preferring instead to treat the issue
on a case to case basis.
In People vs. Fundano,[15] People vs.
[16]
Ramos, People vs. Medina,[17] People vs.
Dimapilis,[18] People vs. Calayca,[19] People vs.
[20] [21]
Tabion, People vs. Bayona, People vs. Bayya, and [22]
People vs. Nuez,[23] along with still other cases, the Court
has almost invariably appreciated relationship as an
ordinary aggravating circumstance in simple rape and
thereby imposed exemplary damages upon the offender
whether or not the offense has been committed prior to
or after the effectivity of Republic Act No.
7659. Exceptionally, as in People vs. Decena,[24] People
vs. Perez,[25] People vs. Perez,[26] and People vs.
Ambray,[27] the Court has denied the award of exemplary
damages following the effectivity of that law. In qualified
rape cases, such as in People vs. Magdato,[28] People vs.
Arizapa,[29] and People vs. Alicante,[30] the Court decreed
the payment of exemplary damages to the offended
party but it did not so do as in People vs. Alba,[31] People
vs. Mengote,[32] and People vs. Maglente.[33]
It may be time for the Court to abandon its pro hac
vice stance and provide, for the guidance of the bar and
the bench, a kind of standard on the matter.
Also known as punitive or vindictive damages,
exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve
as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a
vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of
the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty
of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but
not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there
is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the
award is to account for injury to feelings and for the
sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person
as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and
wantonly inflicted,[34] the theory being that there should
be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly
reprehensible conduct of the defendant - associated
with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness,
malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression,
insult or fraud or gross fraud[35]- that intensifies the
injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are
often used to refer to those species of damages that
may be awarded against a person to punish him for his
outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are circumstances if the complaint or information is bereft
intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and of any allegation of the presence of such circumstances.
others like him from similar conduct in the future.[36]
The retroactive application of procedural rules,
The term aggravating circumstances used by the nevertheless, cannot adversely affect the rights of the
Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to private offended party that have become vested prior to
be understood in its broad or generic sense. The the effectivity of said rules. Thus, in the case at bar,
commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one although relationship has not been alleged in the
on the public as it breaches the social order and the information, the offense having been committed,
other upon the private victim as it causes personal however, prior to the effectivity of the new rules, the
sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, civil liability already incurred by appellant remains
the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused unaffected thereby.
and by an award of additional damages to the
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is
victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that appellant Danilo
felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by
Catubig y Horio is found guilty only of simple rape and
the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether
not in its qualified form, and he is hereby sentenced to
ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the
complainant Dannilyn Catubig P50,000.00 civil
award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily,
indemnity, P50,000.00 moral damages and P25,000.00
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It
exemplary damages. Costs de oficio.
would make little sense for an award of exemplary
damages to be due the private offended party when the SO ORDERED.
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld
when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying
nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction
that should only be of consequence to the criminal,
rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine,
relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should
entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of
the Civil Code.
Relevantly, the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, made effective on 01 December 2000,
requires aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or
qualifying, to be stated in the complaint or
information. Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court now provide:

Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or

information shall state the designation of the offense
given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of
the offense, reference shall be made to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it.

Sec. 9. Cause of the accusations. - The acts or omissions

complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in
terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged
as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances
and for the court to pronounce judgment.

A court would thus be precluded from considering in its

judgment the attendance of qualifying or aggravating

THIRD DIVISION
LOURDES BALTAZAR andEDISON BALTAZAR,
Petitioners, - versus - JAIME CHUA y IBARRA,
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92671, which
annulled the 7 December 2004 Order[2] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 37, directing the filing
of Informations for Murder and Frustrated Murder
against Jaime Chua (Jaime) and Jovito Armas, Jr. (Jovito).
Jaime and Jovito were charged before the RTC
Manila, Branch 27 with the crimes of homicide and
frustrated homicide for the death of Ildefonso Baltazar
and the wounding of Edison Baltazar. The cases, which
were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 97-154966 and No.
97-154967, were presided by Judge Edgardo P. Cruz
(Judge Cruz).[3]
On 13 February 1997, petitioners Lourdes
Baltazar (Lourdes) and Edison Baltazar (Edison), through
counsel, filed a motion for reinvestigation of the cases,
praying that Jaime and Jovito be charged with the crimes
of murder and frustrated murder, instead of homicide
and frustrated homicide.
In a Resolution dated 2 July 1997, the City
Prosecutors Office, upon reinvestigation, found that the
appropriate charges against Jaime and Jovito were
murder and frustrated murder. With this, the City
Prosecutor filed a motion for admission of amended
Informations for Murder and Frustrated Murder, which
was granted by Judge Cruz in an Order dated 9
September 1997.
Jaime and Jovito appealed the 2 July
1997 Resolution of the City Prosecutor to the
Department of Justice (DOJ).
The Secretary of the DOJ (Secretary of Justice),
in his Resolution dated 20 October 1997, modified the 2
July 1997 resolution of the City Prosecutor by directing
the latter to amend the Informations for Murder and
Frustrated Murder to Homicide and Frustrated Homicide
against Jovito and to drop Jaime from the charges. On 13
November 1997, Lourdes and Edison filed a motion for
reconsideration of the 20 October 1997 Resolution of
the Secretary of Justice, which was denied by the latter
on 15 December 1997.
Meanwhile, on 11 November 1997, in
obedience to the directive of the Secretary of the DOJ,
the City Prosecutor filed with the RTC a Manifestation
and Motion for the Withdrawal of the Informations for
Murder and Frustrated Murder and for the Admission of
New Informations for Homicide and Frustrated Homicide.
Over the objections of Lourdes and Edison,
Judge Cruz granted the said manifestation and motion in
an Order dated 18 November 1997, thereby leaving
Jovito as the lone accused. The Order partly provides:
Having been presented prior to
arraignment, the motion for withdrawal
of the information for murder and
frustrated murder is granted pursuant
to Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Consequently, the
amended information for murder and
frustrated murder in Crim. Cases Nos.
97-154966 and 97-154967, respectively,
are considered withdrawn.[4]
Unconvinced of the correctness of the dismissal
of the charges against Jaime and the downgrading of the
charges against Jovito, Lourdes and Edison moved for a
reconsideration. They asked the RTC to maintain the
informations for murder and frustrated murder against
Jovito and Jaime and asked the RTC to determine the
existence of probable cause for these charges, pursuant
to the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul,[5] which ruled that once
an information is filed in court, the disposition of said
case lies in the discretion of the trial court.
In the meantime, the cases were re-raffled to
Branch 37 of the Manila RTC presided over by Judge
Vicente A. Hidalgo (Judge Hidalgo) and docketed as
Criminal Cases No. 97-161168 and No. 97-161169.
Despite the transfer of the cases to the sala of
Judge Hidalgo, Judge Cruz, nonetheless, acted
on Lourdes and Edisons motion for reconsideration of
the Order dated 18 November 1997. In his order dated
16 February 1998, Judge Cruz denied the said motion on
the ground that the proper motion to amend the
informations for homicide and frustrated homicide to
murder and frustrated murder should be filed before
Branch 37, presided by Judge Hidalgo, where said cases
were transferred; and that the amendment of
informations was a matter of right of the prosecution
before arraignment, thus:
[T]he Court is in no position to
favorably act on the instant motion. If,
indeed, there is probable cause for
indicting both accused for the crimes of
murder and frustrated murder, the
appropriate motion (e.g. amendment
of the information) should be filed in
Criminal Cases Nos. 97-161168 and 97-
161169 and not in these cases. To rule
otherwise would sanction multiple
charges (murder and homicide; and
frustrated murder and frustrated
homicide) for a single offense, thereby
places accused in double jeopardy x x
x.[6] (Emphasis supplied.)
On 4 March 1998, Lourdes and Edison filed
before Judge Cruz a Motion to Maintain the Amended
Informations for Murder and Frustrated Murder. This
motion mainly reiterates Lourdes and Edisons objection
to the dismissal of the charges against Jaime and the
downgrading of the charges against Jovito.
On 1 April 1998, Judge Cruz denied the
foregoing motion on the ground that the same was, in
effect, a second motion for reconsideration of the Order
dated 18 November 1997, and that to act on the said
motion would interfere with the prerogative of
Judge Hidalgo of RTC Branch 37, where the cases were
transferred. The 1 April 1998 Order partly reads:
[T]his branch cannot act on the motion
to dismiss or consider withdrawn the
informations for homicide and
frustrated homicide, otherwise, it
would be interfering with the
prerogatives of the other branch of this
Court where those criminal actions are
pending.[7]
On 30 April 1998, Lourdes and Edison filed this
time before Judge Hidalgo a Motion for the Amendment
of the Informations for Homicide and Frustrated
Homicide, which actually contained arguments identical
with those in the Motion to Maintain the Amended
Informations for Murder and Frustrated Murder filed by
them on 4 March 1998; i.e., that the RTC should assert
its authority over said cases, independently of the
opinion of the Secretary of Justice, and make its own
assessment whether there is sufficient evidence to hold
both Jaime and Jovito liable for the crime of murder and
frustrated murder.
In an Order dated 7 December 2004, Judge
Hidalgo, after making his own assessment of the
documents presented by both the prosecution and the
defense, granted the motion and ordered the
reinstatement of the informations for murder and
frustrated murder. The decretal portion of the Order
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the Informations for
Homicide and Frustrated Homicide are
considered withdrawn and the Court
hereby orders the reinstatement of the
Informations for murder and frustrated
murder x x x.[8]
On 26 April 2005, Jaime and Jovito filed a
motion for reconsideration. They argued that the RTC
had no authority to make its own independent findings
of facts to determine probable cause against them, apart
from the findings made by the Secretary of
Justice. Judge Hidalgo denied the said motion, opining
that the RTC had the power and duty to make an
evaluation to determine the existence of probable cause
for the charges, independent of the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice. The dispositive part of the Order
provides:
Accordingly, the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the accused is
hereby DENIED for lack of basis x x
x. Asst. City Prosecutor Ronaldo Hubilla
is hereby directed within 10 days from
receipt hereof to file amended
Informations for Murder and Frustrated
Murder against Jovito Armas, Jr. and
Jaime Chua, respectively.[9]
Jaime then filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals. Again, Jaime
contended that Judge Hidalgo had no authority to order
the amendment of the informations and to include him
as co-accused, since such powers and prerogatives
revolved exclusively on the Department of Justice and
the City Prosecutor.
In a Decision dated 24 January 2007, the Court
of Appeals granted Jaimes petition and nullified the 7
December 2004 Order of Judge Hidalgo, ruling that the
same were issued in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction. In nullifying
Judge Hidalgos Order, the Court of Appeals held
that Crespo was not applicable to the instant case, since
Judge Hidalgo, unlike in the Crespo case, was not
confronted with a motion to dismiss or tasked to convict
or to acquit an accused. It maintained that the trial court
could only exercise its sound discretion on what to do
with cases filed before it in line with Crespo, when there
was a pleading calling for the dismissal, conviction or
acquittal of the
accused. Since Lourdes and Edisons Motion for the
Amendment of the Informations for Homicide and
Frustrated Homicide filed on 30 April 1998 was not a
motion to dismiss nor one aimed at convicting or
acquitting the accused, then Crespo found no relevance.
The Court of Appeals likewise stressed that the
7 December 2004 Order of Judge Hidalgo was a patent
nullity since it revived the earlier 18 November 1997
Order of Judge Cruz withdrawing the charges against
Jaime, which had already attained finality on 6 October
1998.
Aggrieved, Lourdes and Edison filed the instant
petition.
We grant the petition.
The basic issue at hand is whether
Judge Hidalgo may review the finding of the Secretary of
Justice on the existence or non-existence of probable
cause sufficient to hold Jaime for trial and substitute his
judgment for that of the Secretary of Justice.
The rule is that once an information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case, be it dismissal, conviction, or
acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of
the court. Crespo v. Mogul[10] laid down this basic
precept in this wise:
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is
that once a complaint or information is
filed in Court any disposition of the case
as [to] its dismissal or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the court. Although
the fiscal retains the direction and
control of the prosecution of criminal
cases even while the case is already in
court he cannot impose his opinion on
the trial court. The court is the best and
sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case
is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. A motion to dismiss the
case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who has the
option to grant or deny the same.
In observance of the tenet spelled out in Crespo,
the Court in Martinez v. Court of Appeals[11] lamented
the trial courts grant of the motion to dismiss filed by
the prosecution, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice, as the judge merely relied on the
conclusion of the prosecution, thereby failing to perform
his function of making an independent evaluation or
assessment of the merits of the case.
Crespo and Martinez mandated the trial courts
to make an independent assessment of the merits of the
recommendation of the prosecution dismissing or
continuing a case. This evaluation may be based on the
affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence
appended to the information; the records of the public
prosecutor which the court may order the latter to
produce before the court; or any evidence already
adduced before the court by the accused at the time the
motion is filed by the public prosecutor.[12]Reliance on
the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone is
considered an abdication of the trial courts duty and
jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. While the
ruling of the Justice Secretary is persuasive, it is not
binding on courts.[13] The trial court is not bound by the
Resolution of the Justice Secretary, but must evaluate it
before proceeding with the trial.
Considering that the trial court has the power
and duty to look into the propriety of the prosecutions
motion to dismiss, with much more reason is it for the
trial court to evaluate and to make its own appreciation
and conclusion, whether the modification of the charges
and the dropping of one of the accused in the
information, as recommended by the Justice Secretary,
is substantiated by evidence. This should be the state of
affairs, since the disposition of the case -- such as its
continuation or dismissal or exclusion of an accused -- is
reposed in the sound discretion of the trial court.[14]
In the case under consideration, the City
Prosecutor indicted Jaime and Jovito for the crimes of
murder and frustrated murder. However, upon review,
the Secretary of Justice downgraded the charges to
homicide and frustrated homicide. The Secretary also
dropped Jaime from the charges. This resolution
prompted the City Prosecutor to file a Manifestation and
Motion for the Withdrawal of the Informations for
Murder and Frustrated Murder and for the Admission of
New Informations for Homicide and Frustrated
Homicide against Jovito only, which was granted by
Judge Cruz in his Order dated 18 November 1997. Judge
Cruz, however, failed to make an independent
assessment of the merits of the cases and the evidence
on record or in the possession of the public
prosecutor. In granting the motion of the public
prosecutor to withdraw the Informations, the trial court
never made any assessment whether the conclusions
arrived at by the Secretary of Justice was supported by
evidence. It did not even take a look at the bases on
which the Justice Secretary downgraded the charges
against Jovito and excluded Jaime therefrom. The said
order reads:
For resolution is the
prosecutions motion to withdraw the
amended information for murder and
frustrated murder and to admit, in lieu
thereof, the information for homicide
and frustrated homicide. (Manifestation
and Motion dated November 6, 1997).
The motion was filed in compliance
with the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice dated October 20,
1997 directing the City Prosecutor to
amend the information from murder
and frustrated murder to homicide and
frustrated homicide against Jovito
Armas, Jr. and to drop Jaime Chua from
the charges.
Having been presented prior to
arraignment, the motion for withdrawal
of the information for murder and
frustrated murder is granted pursuant
to Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Consequently, the
amended information for murder and
frustrated murder in Crim. Cases Nos.
97-154966 and 97-154967, respectively
are considered withdrawn.[15]
In so doing, the trial court relinquished its
judicial power in contravention to the pronouncement of
the Court in Crespo and in Martinez.
Judge Cruz did not have a chance to correct his
error since, during the pendency of the motion for
reconsideration questioning his order dated 18
November 1997, the cases were subsequently
transferred to another branch which was presided by
Judge Hidalgo. Thus, in his supposed order resolving the
said motion for reconsideration, Judge Cruz merely
recommended to the movants to go to Judge Hidalgo,
who now had jurisdiction over the cases, and to question
therein whether the downgrading of the crimes charged
against Jovito and the exclusion of Jaime therefrom were
proper. Judge Cruz ruled in this wise:
[T]he Court is in no position to
favorably act on the instant motion. If,
indeed, there is probable cause for
indicting both accused for the crimes of
murder and frustrated murder, the
appropriate motion (e.g. amendment
of the information) should be filed in
Criminal Cases Nos. 97-161168 and 97-
161169 and not in these cases. To rule
otherwise would sanction multiple
charges (murder and homicide; and
frustrated murder and frustrated
homicide) for a single offense, thereby
placing accused in double jeopardy x x
x.[16] (Emphasis supplied.)
Heeding the advice of Judge
Cruz, Lourdes and Edison, went to Judge Hidalgo where
they questioned anew the downgrading by the Justice
Secretary of the charges against Jovito and the exclusion
of Jaime from the charges. After a thorough evaluation
of the evidence available vis-a-vis the Resolution of the
Justice Secretary, Judge Hidalgodisagreed with those
findings. He found that the proper charges against Jovito
were murder and frustrated murder and not homicide
and frustrated homicide. He, likewise, believed that
Jaime was involved in these crimes. The discussion of
Judge Hidalgos Order dated 7 December 2004 is as
follows:
In the affidavit executed by the private
complainant Lourdes Baltazar, she
positively identified Jaime Chua, who
was just outside the door of the subject
apartment, as the one who handed the
gun to Jovito Armas, Jr. simultaneously
directing the latter to fire the same to
the deceased by telling iyan tirahin
mo. This was confirmed by Edison
Baltazar, the son of the deceased, who
has a more vivid recollection of the
incident, he being present in the scene
when the incident occurred and more
so, a victim too, who was mortally
wounded in the crime complained
of. He declared that his father was shot
while both his hands were already
raised as a manifestation that he has
(sic) no intention to fight Jaime Chua
and Jovito Armas, Jr. Ildefonso turned
his back to back off and leave the
aggressors but despite thereof Jovito
Armas, Jr. proceeded to carry out the
commands of his boss Jaime Chua,
resulting in the death of helpless
Ildefonso Baltazar.
When his father fell on the ground, he
saw Jovito Armas who was about to
shoot again his father. So, he surged to
his father and covered the latter with
his own body as a shield causing him to
be shot in the process.
The summary of evidence demonstrates
that there is a prima facie facts showing
the presence of the element of
treachery in the case at bar. The
circumstance shows that the shooting
was sudden and unexpected to the
deceased constituting the element of
alevosia necessary to raise homicide to
murder, it appearing that the aggressor
adopted such mode of attack to
facilitate the perpetration of the killing
without risk to himself. This is evident
since Jovito Armas, Jr. could have fired
the gun to the anterior body of
Ildefonso Baltazar while the latter was
still facing him.But to insure the
commission of the killing or to make it
impossible or difficult for Ildefonso to
retaliate or defend himself, Jovito did
the shooting when Ildefonso
manifested to retreat. The postmortem
findings confirmed that he was shot at
the right side of his abdomen. The
position of the victim, and the part of
his body where the bullet passed
through show that the sudden (sic) the
act of shooting made by Jovito Armas,
Jr. was purposely carried out without
danger to himself of any retaliation
from the victim. Hence, element of
treachery apparently exist.
From the statements of the witnesses
for the prosecution, a prima facie
evidence sufficient to form a
reasonable belief that Jaime Chua is
likewise criminally liable as principal by
induction.
In the incipiency, Jaime Chua appears to
be the only adversary of Clarita Tan and
thereafter the Baltazars whom Tan
called up for intervention in that
afternoon. There was an admission that
Jaime Chua is the brother-in-law of
Jovito Armas, Jr. and the latter likewise
work for the former as
bodyguard. Futhermore, Chua was
present when the incident happened
being just a few meters from Jovito
Armas and from Ildefonso who was at
the door of Chuas apartment when the
altercation between him and Ildefonso
began. Edison who was beside his
father narrated that he saw Chua
handed the gun to Jovito Armas
simultaneously commanding the
latter: Tirahin mo iyan pointing at his
father. Clearly, a prima facie evidence
shows that Jovito Armas could not have
shot the deceased had not Chua
ordered him to do so. Jovito Armas had
no existing animosity with the deceased
nor with Clarita Tan. Rather, it was
Chua who apparently infuriated to the
Clarita Tan and the persons who came
to her assistance in that afternoon.
The positive and direct testimony of
victim Edison Baltazar and other
witnesses for the prosecution indeed
support a finding of probable
cause. Settled is the rule that the
finding of probable cause is based
neither on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt nor evidence
establishing absolute certainty of
guilt. It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief, and so it is enough
that there exists such state of facts as
would lead a person of ordinary caution
and prudence to believe or entertain an
honest or strong suspicion that the
accused committed the crime imputed.
Upon the other hand, the version of the
defense that it was Ildefonso himself
who shot his own son is, at the stage of
the proceeding, incredible considering
 the close distance of the Ildefonso from
Jovito Armas and Jaime Chua. Had he
really willed to fire the gun, which the
defense alleges Ildefonso possessed, to
Chua and Armas there is a slim chance
of missing them in four successive
shots. Besides, the statements of the
witnesses for the defense failed to
provide clear details on how the
shooting transpired in contract with the
clear testimonies of the witnesses for
the prosecution. At most the
statements made for the defense are
generally summation of facts, the
details of which is yet to be supported
by evidence to be presented and which
should properly be ventilated in the
course of the trial on the
merits. Further, the Court is of the
opinion that discussing the merits of
the defense at this stage of the
proceedings would result on probable
prejudgment of the case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the Informations for Homicide and
Frustrated Homicide are considered
withdrawn and the Court hereby orders
the reinstatement of the Informations
for murder and frustrated murder in
Criminal Case Nos. 97454966 and
9745496, respectively.[17]
In its questioned Decision, the Court of Appeals
held that Judge Hidalgo gravely abused his discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
foregoing order.
There is excess of jurisdiction where, being
clothed with the power to determine the case, the
tribunal, board or officer oversteps its/his authority as
determined by law.[18]And there is grave abuse of
discretion where the capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or
despotic manner in which the court, tribunal, board or
officer exercises its/his judgment is said to be equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction.[19]
Judge Hidalgo is far from being abusive in rendering his
questioned Order. He was merely following the
injunctions of this Court that whenever a court is
presented with a motion to dismiss or to withdraw an
information or to exclude an accused from the charge
(as heretofore discussed) upon the behest of the
Secretary of Justice, the trial court has to determine the
merits of the same, and not be subservient to the
former.
The Court of Appeals insisted that the instant case did
not involve a disposal that would call for the trial courts
power to grant or deny the same.
This is inaccurate. Lourdes and Edisons Motion for the
Amendment of the Informations for Homicide and
Frustrated Homicide, filed on 30 April 1998, was
questioning the dismissal of the cases against Jaime and
the downgrading of the charges against Jovito. The
exclusion of Jaime from the charges was not only
disposing the cases against him, but also letting him free
from any criminal liabilities arising from the death of
Ildefonso Baltazar and the wounding of Edison.
As to the appellate courts holding that the 7 December
2004 Order of Judge Hidalgo revived the final order of
Judge Cruz dated 18 November 1997, the same needs
clarification.
It must be noted that the 18 November 1997
Order of Judge Cruz granting the motion of the
prosecution to Withdraw the Information for Murder
and Frustrated Murder was in effect an affirmation by
the trial court of the Justice Secretarys directive
to downgrade the crimes against Jovito and to exclude
Jaime from these crimes. As discussed earlier, such grant
by Judge Cruz, absent any independent evaluation on his
part of the merits of the resolution of the Justice
Secretary, constituted an abdication of his power,
rendering the said Order void. The rule in this
jurisdiction is that orders which are void can never attain
finality.[20] Since the 18 November 1997 Order is void,
the same has never attained finality. Besides,
assuming arguendo that the 18 November 1997 Order
was valid, the same could not have an adverse effect on
the 7 December 2004 Order of Judge Hidalgo. As has
been noted, a timely motion for reconsideration was
filed on the 18 November 1997 Order and Judge Cruz
merely stated therein that he could not resolve the
merits of the dropping of Jaime from all the cases and
the downgrading of the crimes charged since the subject
cases were already transferred to Judge Hidalgo. In the
subject order of Judge Cruz, he even stated that the said
issues could only be resolved by Judge Hidalgo, before
whom the cases were pending. In other words, since
Judge Cruz was divested of jurisdiction, the issue of the
dropping of Jaime from all charges and the downgrading
of the charges against Jovito was not resolved by the 18
November 1997 Order. It was therefore proper for
Judge Hidalgo to resolve such issue since he had
jurisdiction over the cases.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals

dated 24 January 2007 nullifying the 7 December
2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
37 is hereby SET ASIDE. The 7 December 2004 Order of
RTC Branch 37, directing the filing of Informations for
Murder and Frustrated Murder against Jovito Armas, Jr.
and Jaime Chua, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.