(T-31) Final Memorandum On Behalf of Respondent Attached

T-31
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

____________________________________________________________
IN THE MATTER OF:
STATE OF SARWALAKA & STATE OF KAPIL WADU ...PETITIONERS

VS.
UNION OF INDIANA ...RESPONDENT
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION NO.- ****/2018
______________________________________________________________
ON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE SC OF INDIANA
UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA

_______________________________________________________________
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
I
5th JUSTICE MURTAZA HUSAIN MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Index Of Authorities .............................................................................................................. III
Statement Of Jurisdiction ................................................................................................... VII
Statement Of Facts .............................................................................................................. VIII
Summary Of Arguments .......................................................................................................XI
Arguments ................................................................................................................................ 1
[1]. That The Special Leave Petition Is Not Maintainable ................................................... 1
1.1. The Scope Of Article 136 Vis-à-vis Article 262. ............................................................ 1
1.1.1. Article 262 read with sect. 11 of 1956 Act bars the jurisdiction of SC to adjudicate
upon water dispute u/s 2 (c) of the Act. .............................................................................. 1
1.1.2. 1956 Act framed by parliament is a complete code in itself. ................................... 2
1.3. Jurisdiction Under Article 136 Is To Be Exercised Sparingly. ...................................... 3
1.3.1. No exceptional or special circumstances exist and substantial justice has been
done. 4
1.4. Inference From A Pure Question Of Fact Is In Itself A Fact And Not Open To
Review. ................................................................................................................................... 4
[2]. That The Delay By Centre In Implementing The Scheme As Per The Directions Of
the Supreme Court Does Not Amount To Contempt Of Court. ......................................... 5
2.1. Union is not bound to frame the scheme. ........................................................................ 5
2.2. Framing Of Scheme Is A Matter Of Legislative Policy .................................................. 6
2.3. Not framing of scheme does not amount to wilful disobedience. ................................... 7
2.4. The Delay In Framing Of The Scheme Does Not Result In Civil Contempt. ................. 8
[3]. That The Structure Of Federalism As Adopted In The C.O.I. Allows The Centre To
Give Directions To State W.R.T. Sharing Of Inter-State Rivers. ....................................... 8
3.1. That the LWDA in ‘pith and substance’ falls within the legislative domain of
Parliament............................................................................................................................... 9
II
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
3.1.1 The object and purpose of the impugned act relates to subject u/a 262, which is an
exclusive power of Parliament. .......................................................................................... 9
3.1.2. The scope of the impugned act relates to subject u/a 262, which is an exclusive
power of Parliament.......................................................................................................... 10
3.1.3 The Effect of the impugned act relates to subject u/a 262, which is an exclusive
power of Parliament.......................................................................................................... 11
3.2 That LWDA is in amplification of the doctrine of salus populi suprema lex. ............... 11
3.3 That possibility of abuse of a statute does not impart it element of invalidity. ............. 12
3.3.1 The provisions of LWDA should be read together and as a whole. ........................ 12
3.3.2 The doctrine of necessity would override the principles of natural justice. ........... 13
[4]. That The Vesting Of Adjudicatory Powers With CMWRI Under LWDA, 2018 Is
Valid And Constitutional. ..................................................................................................... 13
4.1. A Body Having Administrative, Legislative, Judicial Function Is Also Tribunal

W.R.T. Its Judicial Function. ............................................................................................... 14
4.2. Present Situations Demand Sensitive And Flexible Adjudication ................................ 15
[5]. That LWDA Can Be Enforced Retrospectively. .......................................................... 16
5.1. The Legislators Have The Power To Enforce A Law Retrospectively. ........................ 16
5.2. The Provision Clearly Reflects The Legislative Intent To Apply LWDA
Retrospectively. .................................................................................................................... 16
5.3. That The Retrospective Application Of The Act Is Not In Violation Of The Doctrine
Of Basic Structure. ............................................................................................................... 18
[6]. That The Lauperry Water Dispute Act, 2018 Is Not Against Public Policy. ............. 18
6.1. Court cannot review the Act made by central government. .......................................... 19
6.2. The Lauperry Water Dispute Act, 2018 Is Not Against Public Policy. ........................ 21
Prayer ...................................................................................................................................... 22
III
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
I. CONSTITUTION
The Constitution of India 1950………………………………………………………….passim
II. STATUTES
1. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 ........................................................................................ 8

2. The Inter-State River Water Dispute Act, 1956............................................................ passim
III. INDIAN CASES
1. A. S. Krishna v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 297 ............................................................. 9

2. A.C.C. v. P.N. Sharma, AIR 1965 SC 1595. ...................................................................... 14
3. A.P.H.L. Conference, Shilong v. W.A. Sangama, AIR 1977 SC2155. ............................... 14
4. A.V. Papayya Sastryv. Govt. Of A.P., (2007) 4 SCC 221 ..................................................... 4
5. Akhil Bharat Goseva Sangh (3) v. State of A.P., (2006) 4 SCC 162. ................................. 21
6. All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam vs. L.K. Tripathi, (2009) 5 SCC 417 ............ 7
7. Anil Kumar v. Krishan Chand, (2007) 13 SCC 492 ............................................................ 17
8. Anil Ratan Sarkar vs. Hirak Ghosh , (2002) 4 SCC 21 ......................................................... 7
9. Arjan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1970 SC 703 .............................................................. 17
10. Arunalchalam v. Sethuratnam, AIR 1979 SC 1284 ........................................................ 3,11
11. Attorney General for New South Wales v. Quinn, 1990 (64) A LJR 327 ......................... 18
12. B.K. Bhandar v. Dharmagaon Municipality, AIR 1966 SC 249. ...................................... 14
13. Baigana v. Dy. Collector of Consolidation, (1978) 2 SCC 461 ........................................... 4
14. BALCO Employees’ Union v. Union of India,(2002) 2 SCC 333. ................................... 19
15. Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors., 2005 (58) ALR 357 ... 18
16. BCCI v. Cricket Association of Bihar. (2015) 3 SCC 251 ................................................ 21
17. Bhagat Ram Sharma v. Union Of India, AIR 1989 SC 1933 ............................................ 17
18. Bhubaneshwar Singh v. Union of India, 6 SCC 77 (1994)................................................ 16
19. Chinnamar Kathian v. Ayyavoo, AIR 1982 SC137 ............................................................. 6
20. Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Cheetty, [1962] 3 SCR 786 ........... 12
21. Commissioner of Income Tax v P. Mohanakala (2007) 210 CTR 20 (SC) ........................ 5
22. Commissioner of IT v Maganlal Chaganlal (P) Ltd., (1997) 11 SCC 557 (SC).................. 5
23. Commissioner v. Orissa Corp ltd, (1986) 159 ITR 0078 (SC) ............................................ 5
24. Co-operative Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Trade Tax U.P., (2007) 4 SCC 480 ..... 17
25. Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v K. G. S. Bhatt , (1989) AIR 1972 (SC) .... 4
26. D.K. Trivedi v. State of Gujarat, [1986] Supp. SCC 20 .................................................... 12
27. Dental Council of India v. Hari Prakash, AIR 3303 SC 2001 ........................................... 18
28. Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v CIT West Bengal (1955) AIR 65 (SC). ........................... 4
IV
29. Dinesh Kumar Gupta v. United India Insurance Co.Ltd., (2010) 12 SCC 770. .................. 8
30. Dr. Radhakrishna Co-operative Housing Society Limited, Hosur, Hubli and Ors. v.
Government of Karnataka, Housing and Urban Development Department, Bangalore and
Ors., 1999 (2) KarLJ 637 ..................................................................................................... 10
31. Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar v. Union Of India And Others, (1981) 1 SCC 568 ......... 21
32. Food Corporation of India v. M/s Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, AIR 1993 SC 1601.
.............................................................................................................................................. 18
33. Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Its Mazdoor Union, AIR 1980 SC 1896. ............................... 14
34. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests, AIR 1747 SC 1990 . 18
35. Harinagar Sugar Mills v. Sham Sunder Jhunjhunwala, AIR 1961 SC 1669. .................... 14
36. Hukum Chand v. Union of India , 1972 AIR 2427 .............................................................. 6
37. In Re: Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, AIR 1992 SC 552 ......................................... 2,10
38. Indu Bhushan Bose v. Rama Sundari Debi , AIR 1970 SC 228 ........................................ 11
39. ITO v. M.C.Pannoose, 2 SCC 351 (1969). ....................................................................... 16
40. J.K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., AIR 1534 SC 1961 ............................................ 16
41. J.P. Basnal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1405 SC 2004 ....................................................... 18
42. Jamatraj v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 178 ........................................................... 6
43. Jamshed N. Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., AIR 2005 SC 862 .......................... 9
44. Janardan Reddy v. State, AIR 1951 SC 124 ................................................................... 1,17
45. K. Narayanan v. State of Karnataka, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 44. ........................................... 19
46. K.C. Arora v. State of Haryana, 3 SCC 281 (1984); ......................................................... 16
47. K.S Paripoornam v. State of Kerela , JT 1994 (6) SC 182 ................................................ 17
48. Keshvan v. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC 128 ............................................................... 17
49. Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu And Othrs., 1992 SCR (1) 686 .......................................... 15
50. Labour Commr., M.P., v. Burhanpur Tapti Mill , AIR 1964 SC 1687 ................................ 6
51. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 4618. ............................................................ 3
52. M/S . Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala, 1962 SCR (2) 339. .. 15
53. Madanlal Fakirchand Dudhediya v. S. Changdeo Sugar Mills , AIR 1962 SC ................... 6
54. Man Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1985 SC 1737 ............................................................. 15
55. Mohammad Alikhan v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, AIR 1165 SC 1997 ..................... 18
56. Mohapatra & Co. & Anr. V. State of Orissa & Anr., [1984] 4 SCC 103 .......................... 13
57. Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. , (2012) 11 SCC 1 ....................... 17
58. Murlidhar Aggarwal and Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., AIR 1974 SC 1924. .. 21
59. Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 431 .......... 10
60. Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India , (2000) 10 SCC 664, ................................. 20
61. Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development Authority, (2002) 2 SCC 666 ................................... 3
62. Nation Agriculture Cooperative Marketing Federation of India Ltd. Union of India, AIR
1329 SC 2005. ...................................................................................................................... 16
63. Networking of Rivers, In Re, MANU/SC/0155/2012 ......................................................... 2
Nirma Ltd. v. Lurgi Lentges Energietechnik Gmbh, Air 2002 SC 3695 ................................... 3
64. Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Bangalore Development Authority and Ors., (2011) 3 SCC
................................................................................................................................................ 9
65. Orissa Cement Ltd. (M/s) v. State of Orissa , AIR 1991 SC 1676 .................................... 10
V
66. P.J. Irani v. State of Madras, [1962] 2 SCR 169 ................................................................ 12

67. Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee and others v. Bank of Commerce Ltd., Khulna, AIR 1947 ..... 9
68. Premium Granites v. State of T.N, (1994) 2 SCC 691, .................................................... 19
69. Pritam Singh v. The State, 1950 CrLJ 1270 ....................................................................... 4
70. Prof. Yashpal & Anr. v. State of Chhatisgarh & Ors. , AIR 2005 SC 2026 ...................... 11
71. Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., (1999) 4 SCC 727. .................... 18
72. R.K. Garg And Ors. vs Union Of India , (1981) 4 SCC 675. ............................................ 19
73. Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar , AIR 1667 SC 1963. .................................................... 16
74. Ram Swaroop v. S.P. Sahi , [1959] 2 Supp. SCR 583. ...................................................... 11
75. Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and Anr. , MANU/SC/0910/2002. .............................. 3
76. S. Narayanswami v. G. Panneerselvam, AIR 2284 SC 1972 ............................................ 18
77. S.L. Srinivas Jute Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2006) 2 SCC 740 ............................. 18
78. Santosh Hazari v Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 (SC).......................................... 5
79. Sebastian M. Hongray vs. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1026. .......................................... 7
80. Sethi Auto Service Station v. Delhi Development Authority, 2006(87)DRJ166 .............. 18
81. Shakti Tubes Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (2009) 7 SCC 673..................................................... 17
82. Shanbhu Das v. State of Assam , (2010) 10 SCC 374 , 381 ................................................ 4
83. Shashikant Laxman Kale and Anr. v. Union of India (UOI) and Anr., AIR 1990 SC 2114
.............................................................................................................................................. 10
84. Shayam Kishori Deci v. Patna Municipal Corporation, AIR 1678 SC 1966 ..................... 18
85. Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar, AIR 2001 SC 2472 ........................................................... 17
86. State of Bombay v. Vishnu Ramchandra, AIR 1961 SC 307 ............................................ 17
87. State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni, AIR 161 SC 1984 ................................. 16
88. State of H. P. v Kailash Chand Mahajan , (1992) AIR 1277 (SC) ...................................... 4
89. State of Haryana v. State of Punjab and Anr., MANU/SC/0026/2002 ................................ 2
90. State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh, AIR 294 SC 2005. ................................................... 18
91. State of Karnataka v. State of A.P. and Ors., MANU/SC/0297/2000 ................................. 2
92. State of Kerala and Ors. v. Mar Appraem Kuri Company Ltd. and Anr. , AIR 2012 SC
2375 ........................................................................................................................................ 9
93. State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah and Ors., (2008) 13 SCC 5 ...................... 9
94. State of Orissa and Ors. v. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. and Ors., 1996 SCALE (4)229 ...... 10
95. State of Punjab & Ors. V. Ram Lubhaya Bagga & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 1703. .................. 20
96. State of Rajasthan v. G. Chawla , AIR 1959 SC 544 .......................................................... 9
97. State of Tamil Nadu v. Arooran Sugars Ltd., AIR 1815 SC 1997 .................................... 16
98. State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Karnataka and Ors. with Union Territory of Pondicherry
v. State of Karnataka and Ors., MANU/SC/0643/1991 ......................................................... 2
99. State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra, AIR 1996 SC 2173. ......................................................... 3
100. Sundararmier v. State of A.P., AIR 468 SC 1958............................................................ 16
101. T.N. Education Department Ministerial and General Subordinate Services Assn. v. State
of T.N , (1980) 3 SCC 97, .................................................................................................... 21
102. T.R. Sharma v. Prithipal Singh, AIR 1976 SC 367 ........................................................... 6
103. Union of India v. Glaxo India Limited, (2011) 6 SCC 668 ............................................. 18
104. Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, AIR 1951 SC 1933 ................................................... 18
VI
105. Union of India v. Shankalchand, AIR 2328 SC 1977 ...................................................... 18

106. United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum, AIR 16 FC 1941....................................................... 16
107. Vijay v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 6 SCC 289 ........................................................... 17
108. West Bengal v. Union of India , AIR 1963 SC 1241 ....................................................... 10
109. Yashpal & Anr. v. State of Chhatisgarh & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 2026 .............................. 11
110. Zile Singh v. State of Haryana, (2004) 8 SCC 1 .............................................................. 17
IV. FOREIGN CASE
Belfast Corporation v. O.D. Commission, [1950] AC 490 ................................................................... 12
V. BOOKS
1. Dr. D.K. Mukherjea, Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts- Tagore Law Lectures
(5th Ed.). ................................................................................................................................ 11
2. Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution – Cornerstone Of A Nation (2nd ed. 1999) ........ 9
3. Vol. 1, H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, (4th ed., Universal Law Publishing,
Allahabad 2010). .................................................................................................................... 3
4. Vol. 35, Halsbury’s Laws of India (2nd ed.Lexis-Nexis Butterworth Wadhwa, Nagpur,
2007).....................................................................................................................................13
5. De Smith, Judicial Review of Adminstrative Action (4th Edn); G.A. Flick, Natural Justice
(1879). .................................................................................................................................. 13
6. Justice G.P. Singh, Principles Of Statutory Interpretation (13th ed., 2012) ........................ 16
7. M.P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (16th edn Lexis Nexis Butterworth Wadhwa Nagpur,
2011); .................................................................................................................................. 3,4
8. Vol. 8, D.D. BASU, Commentary On The Constitution Of India , (8th ed. C.K. Thakker &
S.S. Subramani & T. S. Doabia & B. P. Banerjee , 2012). .................................................... 9
VI. DICTIONARIES
1. Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edn. ........................................................................................... 7

2. OSBORN : Concise Law Dictionary, ..................................................................................... 17
3. Webster’s III New Internation Dictionary, 3rd edn. ............................................................... 7
VII. JOURNALS
Percy H. Winfield, Public Policy in English Common Law, 42 (Harvard Law Rev.) ............ 21
VIII. ONLINE SOURCE
VII
Chanderhass, Chanderhass, Contempt of court and independence of judiciary in India

Emerging issues and problems, The Concept And Definition Of ‘Contempt Of Court’,
http://hdl.handle.net/10603/129442. ...................................................................................... 7
VIII
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Hon’ble Supreme Court Indiana has jurisdiction to hear the instant matter under Article
136 of Constitution of India. Article 136 of the Constitution of India reads as:
“136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant
special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any
cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed
or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed
Forces.”
The respondent has appeared before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Union of Indiana in
response to the SLP filed by thePetitionersunder article 136 of the constitution of India, 1950.
The respondent humbly submits to the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Supreme Court of U.O.I. .
The Memorandum for the Respondents in the matters of STATE OF SARWALAKA & STATE
OF KAPIL WADU VS. UNION OF INDIANA set forth the Facts, Contentions and Arguments
present in the case.
IX
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Constitution of Indiana provides for a democratic Parliamentary form of governance

along with the inherent concept of co-operative federalism. The Lauperry is a perennial river
which originates in the state of Sarwalaka flowing through the state of Kapil Wadu before
merging with the Bay of Belong.
In order to adjudicate the dispute regarding the equitable sharing of the Lauperry water, the
Centre established the LWDT in 1990. In 2007, the Tribunal came up with a final award
according to which Sarwalaka would get 300 tmcft and KapilWadu 426 tmcft and another 10
tmcft for environmental usage.
In the SLP filed by Sarwalaka, the SC awarded an additional 14.75 tmcft despite the express
bar on its jurisdiction under the Act. Importantly, the SC directed the centre to come up with
a ‘scheme’ to implement the verdict. The centre delayed the framing the scheme. It filed a
petition in the SC to review its order granting special leave to appeal. Kapil Wadu moved the
SC seeking contempt proceedings against the centre. Immediately after this, on July 1 2018,
presidential assent was granted to the enactment Lauperry water Dispute Act, 2018 under
article 262 of the constitution of Indiana.
The Act provided that- (i) the distribution of waters and adjudication of any dispute shall be
done periodically and exclusively by the Central Minister of Water Resources & Irrigation,
(ii) it should be applicable retrospectively, (iii) the Inter-State River Water Dispute Act, 1956
not to be applicable to the distribution of Lauperry water and adjudication of any dispute or
complaint, (iv) the Lauperry Water Dispute Tribunal stood dissolved ab initio, and (v) all
adjudications in relation to to the distribution of waters of Lauperry shall be null & void ab
initio.
Both Kapil Wadu and Sarwalaka challenged the Lauperry Water Dispute Act, 2018, before
the SC as ultra vires and against the public policy.
The Hon’ble SC clubbed all the petitions with regard to Lauperry Water Dispute in the case
of State of Sarwalaka & State of KapilWadu Vs. Union of Indiana.
X
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.
WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE ?
II.
WHETHER THE DELAY BY CENTRE IN IMPLEMENTING THE SCHEME AS

PER THE DIRECTIONS OF THE SC AMOUNTS TO CONTEMPT OF COURT?
III.
WHETHER THE STRUCTURE OF FEDERALISM AS ADOPTED IN THE C.O.I. ALLOWS

THE CENTRE TO GIVE DIRECTIONS TO STATE W.R.T. SHARING OF INTER-STATE
RIVERS?
IV.
WHETHER THE VESTING OF ADJUDICATORY POWERS WITH CMWRI UNDER

LWDA, 2018 IS VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL?
V.
WHETHER LWDA CAN BE ENFORCED RETROSPECTIVELY?
VI.
WHETHER THE LAUPERRY WATER DISPUTE ACT, 2018 IS AGAINST PUBLIC

POLICY?
XI
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
[1]. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?
It is humbly submitted that the present SLP filed by Petitioners in The SC from the impugned
order of the LWDT is not maintainable under Article136 of Constitution. It is humbly
submitted that no jurisdiction to grant leave in this case, is conferred on Supreme Court,
when the scope of Article 136 is perused vis-a-vis Article 262. Even if jurisdiction of SC u/a
136 is allowed then also it is barred by certain inherent limitations. Firstly, presence of
alternative remedy is a self-imposed restriction on powers u/a 136. ; Secondly, jurisdiction
under Article 136 is to be exercised sparingly. In addition, inference from a pure question of
fact is in itself a fact and which is entitled to be dismissed as per the test laid down under the
case of Chunni Lal.
Hence, the special leave to appeal should not be allowed in this case.
[2]. WHETHER THE DELAY BY CENTRE IN IMPLEMENTING THE SCHEME AS PER THE
DIRECTIONS OF THE SC AMOUNTS TO CONTEMPT OF COURT?
It is humbly submitted that the delay by the centre in implementing the scheme as per the
directions of the Supreme Court does not amount to contempt of court. The centre is not
bound to frame a scheme under section 6 A of the The Inter-State River Water Disputes Act,
1956. It is a matter of legislative policy and SC has no jurisdiction in the present matter.
According to section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, the delayed action of centre doesn’t
amount to civil contempt. The necessary element of willful disobedience required to prove
the civil contempt is not found in this case and thus, no case of contempt arises in this matter.
[3]. WHETHER THE STRUCTURE O F FEDERALISM AS ADOPTED IN THE C.O.I. ALLOWS

THE CENTRE TO GIVE DIRECTIONS TO STATE W.R.T. SHARING OF INTER-STATE RIVERS?
As a component of the Federal Structure of the, C.O.I., legislative powers have been divided
between the Parliament and State Legislatures. The competing legislatures may not infringe
upon the each other’s legislative domain, though Parliament is legislatively supreme to the
XII
State Legislatures. The constitutional vires of LWDA has been challenged on the grounds of
legislative competence. It is submitted that the said provisions are not ultra vires the
Constitution since: The ‘pith and substance’ of LWDA falls within the legislative domain of
the Parliament. Intra-state rivers fall under purview of states whereas, inter-state rivers are a
central subject. In addition, it has been enacted by parliament in capacity of Parens Patriae in
amplification of salus populi suprema lex. Moreover, the mere possibility of abuse of a
statute does not impart it an element of invalidity.
[4]. WHETHER THE VESTING OF ADJUDICATORY POWERS WITH CMWRI UNDER LWDA,
2018 IS VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL?
It is humbly submitted that the vesting of adjudicatory powers with the CMWRI is valid and
constitutional. It has been established that a body having administrative, legislative, judicial
function is also tribunal w.r.t. its judicial function. The power of adjudication must be derived
from a stature or a statutory rule. Therefore, CMWRI can legitimately be regarded as a part of
the infrastructure of the sovereign’s dispensation of justice and he thus falls within the
rainbow of statutory tribunals. Further, present situations demand sensitive and flexible
adjudication. Consequently, it was appropriate for the legislature to vest exclusive
adjudicatory power with CMWRI.
[5]. WHETHER LWDA CAN BE ENFORCED RETROSPECTIVELY?
It is humbly submitted that Lauperry Water Dispute Act, 2018 can apply retrospectively as
the legislators have the power to enforce a law retrospectively and the provision clearly
reflects the legislative intent to that effect. Also, the retrospective application of the act is not
in violation of Basic Structure Doctrine of the Constitution.
[6]. WHETHER THE LAUPERRY WATER DISPUTE ACT, 2018 IS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY ?
It is humbly submitted before this hon’ble court that the Lauperry Water Dispute Act, 2018 is
not against public policy. For testing the correctness of a policy, appropriate forum is
parliament and not the courts. Hence, SC cannot review the LWDA made by Central
Government. The centre had framed the act for public good and in public interest and it is not
against public policy.
XIII
ARGUMENTS
[1]. THAT THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE
1. It is humbly submitted that the present Special Leave Petition [hereinafter referred to as
SLP] filed by Petitioners in The Supreme Court of Indiana [hereinafter referred to as SC]
from the impugned order of the Lauperry Water Dispute Tribunal [ hereinafter referred to as
Tribunal] is not maintainable under Article 136 of Constitution. It is humbly submitted that
no jurisdiction to grant leave in this case is conferred on Supreme Court, when the scope of
Article 136 is perused vis-a-vis Article 262. [1.1.] Even if jurisdiction of SC u/a 136 is
allowed then also it is barred by certain inherent limitations. Firstly, presence of alternative
remedy is a self-imposed restriction on powers u/a 136.[1.2.], Secondly, jurisdiction under
Article 136 is to be exercised sparingly. [1.3.], In addition, inference from a pure question of
fact is in itself a fact and hence not open to review [1.4.].
1.1. The Scope Of Article 136 Vis-à-vis Article 262.
2. In the exercise of the extraordinary powers, the Supreme Court will not assume a
jurisdiction which is unwarranted by the provision of the constitution nor offer to provide a
relief which has been omitted in the constitution, for, that will tantamount to making
legislation.1 It is humbly submitted that Article 262 read with sect. 112 of 1956 Act bars the
jurisdiction of SC to adjudicate upon water dispute u/s 2 (c)3 of the Act. [1.1.1.], Also, 1956
Act framed by Parliament is a complete code in itself [1.1.2.]
1.1.1. Article 262 read with sect. 11 of 1956 Act bars the jurisdiction of SC to adjudicate
upon water dispute u/s 2 (c) of the Act.
3. Article 262 begins with a non-obstante Clause and authorizes the Parliament to provide by
law to exclude the jurisdiction of SC or any other court in respect of a dispute or complaint
1
Janardhan Reddy v. The State , AIR 1951 SC 124
2
The Inter-State River Water Disputes Act 1956, Section 11.
3
The Inter-State River Water Disputes Act 1956, Section 2(c).
1
that has been referred to in Clause (1) of Article2624. And hence, Supreme Court does not
have the jurisdiction to decide anything that pertains to or emerges from water dispute.
It has been held in myriad of cases that the SC Court does not have power to deal with the lis
pertaining to water disputes either Under Article131 or Article 32 of the Constitution.5
Therefore, it cannot entertain an appeal by special leave Under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India that assails the final order of the tribunal.
1.1.2. 1956 Act framed by parliament is a complete code in itself.

4. The purpose of enacting the 1956 Act is to provide a mechanism for adjudication of water
disputes arising among the various States and the 1956 Act framed by Parliament is a
complete code in itself. A con-joint reading of Sections 46, 67, 6 A8 and 119 provides for the
constitution of a Tribunal to hear water disputes, the power to make a scheme to implement
the decision of the Tribunal and further there is a constitutional bar on the jurisdiction of SC
and other courts in respect of such water disputes. Such extensive provisions highlight that
the Act is a complete code in itself.
5. If the scheme of the said act is scrutinized and appreciated in proper perspective, it is clear
as crystal that this Court has no jurisdiction to exercise the appellate power by granting leave.
The said submission is sought to be pyramided by placing reliance on Section 6(2) 10 of the
1956 act, which provides that decision of the tribunal after its publication in the Official
Gazette by the Central Government shall have the force of an order or decree of the Supreme
Court.
6. Elucidating the said aspect it is contended that, once the statutory provision postulates that
the award has the same force as that of the decree of this Court. Therefore, there cannot be an
appeal assailing the same, for the simon pure reason that the concept of intra-court appeal is
4
The Constitution of India 1950, Article 262.
5
In Re:Cauvery Water Dispute Tribunal, MANU/SC/0097/1992, State of Karnataka v. State of A.P. and Ors.,
MANU/SC/0297/2000, State of Haryana v. State of Punjab and Anr., MANU/SC/0026/2002, Networking of
Rivers, In Re, MANU/SC/0155/2012, State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Karnataka and Ors. with Union Territory
of Pondicherry v. State of Karnataka and Ors., MANU/SC/0643/1991.
6
7
8
The Inter-State River Water Disputes Act 1956, Section 6 A.
9
10
The Inter-State River Water Disputes Act 1956, Section 6(2).
2
alien to the adjudicatory process of this Court and remotely not conceived of under the
constitutional scheme or by any precedent.11
1.2. Presence Of Alternative Remedy Is A Self-Imposed Restriction On Powers U/A

136.
7. The Court has imposed on itself a restriction that the aggrieved party must exhaust any
remedy which may be available under the law before the lower appellate authority or High
Court.12 Ordinarily the SC does not hear an appeal ought to go to the Division Bench from
Single judge of the HC.13 Generally, the court after pointing out the legal error remands the
matter back to the HC, Tribunal or authority for ascertaining the facts or applying the law
indicated by it to the ascertained facts.14 In the present case, that after the declaration of the
final award in 2007, the contending states had the right to go back to the tribunal with a
review petition for a supplementary award and therefore the SC could have directed the SLPs
to the tribunal.15 Petitioners have not exhausted the present remedy, which is easy to avail,
and rather chose to invoke these powers, which are to be exercised sparingly for, further
review. Moreover, a review of such petition is a suitable remedy for examination of facts at
hand and validity of order passed.
1.3. Jurisdiction Under Article 136 Is To Be Exercised Sparingly.

8. The Hon’ble Apex Court has pointed out in its judgment16 that “the exercise of jurisdiction
conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution on this Court is discretionary. It does not confer
a right on the petitioner to appeal. However, it is an exceptional powers to be exercised
sparingly with caution and care.”Further, it is not possible to define the limitations on the
exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the SC under Article 136. But, being an
exceptional and overriding power,17 naturally it has to be exercised sparingly with caution
only in special and extraordinary situations.18,19 The provision does not give right to the party
11
Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and Anr. , MANU/SC/0910/2002.
12
Nirma Ltd. v. Lurgi Lentges Energietechnik Gmbh, AIR 2002 SC 3695.
13
State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra, AIR 1996 SC 2173.
14
M.P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law 234, (16th edn Lexis Nexis Butterworth Wadhwa Nagpur, 2011);
Constitution of India,1950.
15
Moot Proposition ¶ 11, p. 3.
16
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 4618.
17
Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development Authority, (2002) 2 SCC 666.
18
Arunalchalam v. Sethuratnam, AIR 1979 SC 1284.
19
Vol. 1, H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, 252 (4th ed., Universal Law Publishing, Allahabad 2010).
3
to appeal to the SC rather it confers a wide discretionary power on the SC to interfere in

suitable cases.20
1.3.1. No exceptional or special circumstances exist and substantial justice has been done.
9. It is humbly submitted that, the court would exercise its overriding powers under Article
136 only when the petitioner has shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist, and
that without the interference of the court, substantial and grave injustice will be the result.21
Special leave will not be granted when there is no failure of justice22 or when substantial
justice is done, even though the decision may suffer from some legal errors. 23
10. The power under Article136 being an exceptional and overriding power, naturally, has to
be exercised sparingly and with caution and only in special and extraordinary situations.24
Article 136, however, does not confer a right to appeal on any party. It confers discretion on
the SC to grant leave to appeal in appropriate cases. In other words, the constitution has not
made the SC a regular court of appeal or a Court of error. The Apex Court intervenes only
where justice, equity and good conscience require such intervention25, or where grave
miscarriage of justice has resulted from illegality or misapprehension or mistake in reading
evidence or from ignoring, excluding or illegally admitting material evidence.26
11. It is submitted that no exceptional and special circumstances have been shown by the
petitioners. In the case at hand, the decision of Cauvery Water Dispute Tribunal was adequate
as it was justified with reasoning. Meaning thereby, there is no gross injustice has been meted
out to the parties and the case does not falls in the category of “exceptional circumstances.”27
Hence, the special leave to appeal should not be allowed in this case.
1.4. Inference From A Pure Question Of Fact Is In Itself A Fact And Not Open To
Review.
12. It is contended by the Respondent that the case does not involve any substantial question
of law rather it involves pure question of fact and hence, is not maintainable. Generally, on
20
Supra 11.
21
Jain, Supra 14 at 5776.
22
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v K. G. S. Bhatt , (1989) AIR 1972 (SC); State of H. P. v
Kailash Chand Mahajan , (1992) AIR 1277 (SC); M.P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law 5776, (16th edn Lexis
Nexis Butterworth Wadhwa Nagpur, 2011); Constitution of India,1950.
23
Id.
24
Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v CIT West Bengal (1955) AIR 65 (SC).
25
A.V. Papayya Sastryv. Govt. Of A.P., (2007) 4 SCC 221, 238 (¶ 44) , relying on Baigana v. Dy. Collector of
Consolidation, (1978) 2 SCC 461.
26
Shanbhu Das v. State of Assam , (2010) 10 SCC 374 , 381 (¶ 16).
27
Pritam Singh v. The State, 1950 CrLJ 1270.
4
finding of fact, no interference will be made.28 Even in cases where conclusions are reached
without proper discussion, yet if it involves finding on fact, no interference of SC is called
for.29 In the present case, what is sought to be reviewed is only finding of facts.
13. No substantial question of law- To be ‘substantial’ a question of law must be debatable,

not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material
bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties
before it are concerned.30 Re-appreciation of evidence and substitution of the findings by the
HC is impermissible.31 In the present case, what is sought to be done is only a re-examination
of facts and nothing more. No question of law is involved in the present case as already
stated. Therefore, they cannot be granted leave to appeal in Article 136.
[2]. THAT THE DELAY BY CENTRE IN IMPLEMENTING THE SCHEME AS PER THE
DIRECTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT DOES NOT AMOUNT TO CONTEMPT OF COURT.
14. It is humbly submitted that the delay by the centre in implementing the scheme as per the
directions of the Supreme Court does not amount to contempt of court. The centre is not
bound to frame a scheme under section 6 A of the The Inter-State River Water Disputes Act,
1956. [2.1.] It is a matter of legislative policy [2.2] and SC has no jurisdiction in the present
matter. According to section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, the delayed action of centre
doesn’t amount to civil contempt. [2.3.] The necessary element of willful disobedience
required to prove the civil contempt is not found in this case [2.4.] and thus, no case of
contempt arises in this matter.
2.1. Union is not bound to frame the scheme.

15. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the section 6 A of 1956 Act 32,
nowhere impose mandatory obligation over Union of Indiana to frame scheme. The word
used under said section is “may” instead of “shall”, has a purpose because in certain
situations there may be no necessity to frame a scheme for implementation of the awards
passed by the Tribunal.
28
Commissioner of IT v Maganlal Chaganlal (P) Ltd., (1997) 11 SCC 557 (SC).
29
Commissioner v. Orissa Corp ltd, (1986) 159 ITR 0078 (SC).
30
Santosh Hazari v Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 (SC).
31
Commissioner of Income Tax v P. Mohanakala (2007) 210 CTR 20 (SC).
32
The Inter-State River Water Disputes Act 1956, Section 6 A.
5
16. ‘May’ is an enabling word and they only confer capacity, power or authority and imply
discretion.33 It is used in a statute to indicate that something may be done which prior to it
could not be done.34
17. ‘May’ confers a discretionary power35 and thus according to the discretion vested in the
hands of the centre by section 6 A of the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, the centre is
not obliged to frame a scheme as per the direction of the court.
18. In the light of above arguments, there is humble submission that framing of a scheme is
not mandatory and the Central Government being alive to its role shall do the needful at the
relevant time.
2.2. Framing Of Scheme Is A Matter Of Legislative Policy

19. It is humble submission before this Hon’ble court that if this court refers the Craies on
Statute Law Interpretation, which has been noticed with approval in Hukum Chand v. Union
of India36, which speaks that there are three kinds of laying, namely:
a) laying without further procedure;
b) laying subject to negative resolution; and
c) laying subject to affirmative resolution.
20. Since, the scheme once formed, as according to Section 6 A (7)37, is laid on the table of
both the houses of the Parliament and is subsequently debated upon and amended, if needed,
it thus, acquires the character of legislative policy. And, it is a cardinal rule that the Courts
cannot interfere in the matters of legislative policy and hence, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has got no jurisdiction to issue direction to the Central Government for the formulation of the
scheme to implement the award of the tribunal. Further, emphasizing on ‘subject to
affirmative resolution’, the Section 6 A (7) of the 1956 Act, essentially commands that this
Court should not issue a mandamus to the executive to enact a particular law in a particular
manner at particular time or a stipulated time frame. It is pertinent to mention before this
Hon’ble court that Section 6A is a complete code in itself and, therefore, this Court should
leave it to the discretion of the Central Government.
33
Madanlal Fakirchand Dudhediya v. S. Changdeo Sugar Mills , AIR 1962 SC 1543, p. 1557: Chinnamar
Kathian v. Ayyavoo, AIR 1982 SC137, p. 140.
34
Id.
35
Labour Commr., M.P., v. Burhanpur Tapti Mill , AIR 1964 SC 1687, p. 1689; Jamatraj v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 178, p. 181; T.R. Sharma v. Prithipal Singh, AIR 1976 SC 367, p. 370.
36
Hukum Chand v. Union of India , 1972 AIR 2427
37
The Inter-State River Water Disputes Act 1956, Section 6 A (7).
6
2.3. Not framing of scheme does not amount to wilful disobedience.

21. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the non-framing the scheme by the
central government does not amount to wilful disobedience.
According to Webster‟s III New Internation Dictionary38, ‘wilful’ means governed by will
without yielding to reason or without regard to reason, obstinately or perversely self-willed,
done deliberately.39
22. According to Black‟s Law Dictionary40, ‘Wilful’ means ‘voluntarily and intentional, but
necessarily malicious’ and ‘wilfulness’ means,
“1. The fact or quality of acting purposely or by design; deliberateness; intention; wilfulness
does not necessarily imply malice, but it involves more than just knowledge.
2. The voluntary, intentional violation or disregard of a known legal duty.”41
23. Mere disobedience of an order, judgement or decree of a court may not be sufficient to
amount to a civil contempt; the element of willingness is an indispensible requirement to
bring home the charge within the Act.42
The central government did not wilfully disobey the order of the Supreme Court, this issue
was an emotive issue which was related to the people living in the state of kapil wadu and
sarwalaka and the framing of the scheme by the centre would have created unrest among the
people of the state.43
24. Wilful ‘means an act or omission which is done voluntarily and intentionally and with the
specific intent to do something the law forbids or with the specific intent to fail to do
something the law requires to be done, that is to say with bad purpose either to disobey or to
disregard the law. It signifies a deliberate action done with evil intent or with a bad motive or
purpose.’44
25. The delay by the centre in framing the scheme was not done intentionally and with intent
to do something the law forbids or with the intent to fail to do something the law requires to
38
Webster’s III New Internation Dictionary, 3rd edn.
39
Sebastian M. Hongray vs. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1026.
40
Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edn.
41
All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam vs. L.K. Tripathi, (2009) 5 SCC 417 at p. 438.
42
Anil Ratan Sarkar vs. Hirak Ghosh , (2002) 4 SCC 21:2002 Cr.LJ 1814.
43
Moot Proposition,¶ 11, p.3.
44
Chanderhass, Chanderhass, Contempt of court and independence of judiciary in India Emerging issues and
problems, The Concept And Definition Of ‘Contempt Of Court’ (25-8-18,19:14p.m.),
http://hdl.handle.net/10603/129442.
7
do. The centre had valid reasons and had a bona fide intention in delay in framing the
scheme.
2.4. The Delay In Framing Of The Scheme Does Not Result In Civil Contempt.
26. An important statutory ingredient of contempt of a civil nature given under section 2(b) of
the contempt of courts act, 197145 is that the disobedience to the order alleging contempt has
46
to satisfy the test that it is a willful disobedience, which in the present case has not been
satisfied by the centre. In terms of definition of contempt, it is very clear that there has to be a
willful disobedience of the direction of the court in order to take action against the
contemnor.47
27. Contempt of a civil nature can be held to have been made out only if there has been a
willful disobedience of the order and even though there may be disobedience, a case of
contempt cannot be held to have been made out. 48Thus with the case at hand the case cannot
be made out as it does not satiates the conditions required for the civil contempt of court.
28. If the person alleged to have committed contempt is able to show the court the sufficient
reason to conclude that it is impossible to obey the order, the court will not justified in
punishing the alleged contemnor.
29. Noting the divergent views of states over what shape the scheme should take, if any
scheme is framed by the Central government on itself, States may again approach the
Supreme Court and also encourage disputing states to revisit stakes and claims before other
water tribunals.49
[3]. THAT THE STRUCTURE OF FEDERALISM AS ADOPTED IN THE C.O.I. ALLOWS THE
CENTRE TO GIVE DIRECTIONS TO STATE W.R.T. SHARING OF INTER-STATE RIVERS.
30. As a component of the Federal Structure of the, C.O.I., legislative powers have been
divided between the Parliament and State Legislatures.50 The competing legislatures may not
infringe upon the each other’s legislative domain,51 though Parliament is legislatively
45
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Section 2(b).
46
Dinesh Kumar Gupta v. United India Insurance Co.Ltd., (2010) 12 SCC 770.
47
Moot proposition, ¶ 11, pg. 3.
48
Supra 44.
49
50
Vol. 8, D.D. BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 8626 , (8th ed. C.K. Thakker & S.S.
Subramani & T. S. Doabia & B. P. Banerjee , 2012).
51
State of Kerala and Ors. v. Mar Appraem Kuri Company Ltd. and Anr. , AIR 2012 SC 2375, ¶12.
8
supreme to the State Legislatures.52 The constitutional vires of LWDA has been challenged
on the grounds of legislative competence.53 Intra-state rivers fall under purview of states
whereas, inter-state rivers are a central subject. It is submitted that the said provisions are not
ultra vires the Constitution since: The ‘pith and substance’ of LWDA falls within the
legislative domain of the Parliament. [3.1.] And, it has been enacted by parliament in capacity
of Parens Patriae in amplification of salus populi suprema lex. [3.2.] Moreover, the mere
possibility of abuse of a statute does not impart it an element of invalidity. [3.3.]
3.1. That the LWDA in ‘pith and substance’ falls within the legislative domain of
Parliament.
31. The doctrine of ‘pith and substance’ is one of the key principles of interpretation used to
construe entries classified under the three lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.54
In order to determine whether a particular statute comes within the purview of one legislature
or the other, the pith and substance of the enactment is to be looked into. 55 If the ‘true nature
and character’ of a legislation falls outside the permissible limits assigned to the respective
legislature then such law is ultra vires the constitution.56 The relevant factors which must be
considered in order to ascertain the pith and substance of a statute are: (i) the object and
purpose; (ii) the scope and; (iii) the effect of the provisions.57
3.1.1 The object and purpose of the impugned act relates to subject u/a 262, which is an
exclusive power of Parliament.
32. In State of Rajasthan v. G. Chawla,58 giving significant importance to the object of

legislation in determining its pith and substance,59 it was held that a legislation controlling the
use of amplifiers was public health legislation under List II rather than a broadcasting
legislation under List I.60
52
GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION – CORNERSTONE OF A NATION 195, (2nd ed. 1999).
53
54
Basu, Supra 32 at 11731.
55
Jamshed N. Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., AIR 2005 SC 862 at ¶ 88; Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee
and others v. Bank of Commerce Ltd., Khulna, AIR 1947 PC 60 at ¶¶ 35-38.
56
State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah and Ors., (2008) 13 SCC 5 at ¶ 30.
57
Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Bangalore Development Authority and Ors., (2011) 3 SCC 139 at ¶ 64; A. S.
Krishna v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 297 at ¶16.
58
State of Rajasthan v. G. Chawla , AIR 1959 SC 544.
59
Id ¶ 14.
60
Supra 40 at ¶ 15.
9
33. In order to determine the object and purpose of a statute, we may refer to the
circumstances which prevailed at the time and necessitated the passing of the Act.61 In State
of West Bengal v. Union of India,62 the existing dearth of coal in the country shaped the
Court’s understanding of the object of Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development)
Act, 1957.63
34. We must refer to the various legislative fields under the seventh schedule to ascertain
which relevant subject matters fall under the exclusive competence of the States.64 In Re:
Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal,65 the Hon’ble bench in interpreting the competing entries
observed that the States cannot pass legislation which affects water present beyond its own
territorial limits.66
35. There exists an inter-state river water dispute67 between the states of Tamil Wadu and
Sarwalaka. In light of the above, it is submitted that the primary objective of impugned act is
the adjudication of Inter-state river water dispute, which would address a number of socio-
economic problems plaguing the states. The power lawmaking in relation to adjudication of
inter-state river water disputes in enumerated under Article 26268, which is an exclusive
power of the Parliament.
3.1.2. The scope of the impugned act relates to subject u/a 262, which is an exclusive power
of Parliament.
36. The meaning and import of the provisions of an Act have to be enquired into in order to
determine its scope.69 The scope of a parliamentary statute must not fall within the ambit of
legislative fields enumerated in List II.70 The supply of water is a subject matter within the
ambit of Entry 17 of List II.71 However, as has been noted above, the power to legislate u/a
262 vests exclusively in the hands of parliament.72 In the event that an entry under List II
confers a general power to State Legislatures whereas specific power relating to the same
61
Shashikant Laxman Kale and Anr. v. Union of India (UOI) and Anr., AIR 1990 SC 2114 at ¶ 16, State of
Orissa and Ors. v. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. and Ors., 1996 SCALE (4)229 at ¶ 5-7.
62
West Bengal v. Union of India , AIR 1963 SC 1241.
63
Id ¶ 7-9.
64
Jain, Supra 14 at 533.
65
In Re: Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, AIR 1992 SC 552.
66
Id at ¶47-50.
67
The Inter-State River Water Dispute Act, 1956
68
The Constitution of India1950, Article 262.
69
Orissa Cement Ltd. (M/s) v. State of Orissa , AIR 1991 SC 1676 at ¶ 37.
70
Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India , AIR 1998 SC 431 at ¶ 25.
71
Supra No. 19; See also, Dr. Radhakrishna Co-operative Housing Society Limited, Hosur, Hubli and Ors. v.
Government of Karnataka, Housing and Urban Development Department, Bangalore and Ors., 1999 (2) KarLJ
637 at ¶ 8-9.
72
Supra 18 at 551.
10
subject matter has been conferred to the Parliament,73 then the general power would be
limited to the extent of the special power.74
37. In, Prof Yashpal & Anr. v. State of Chhatisgarh & Ors.,75 it was held that despite
‘university’ being a subject-matter within the State List, the power to legislate with regard to
educational standards vested with the Parliament.76 Similarly, Parliament reserves the power
to legislate with regard to water insofar as it has implications outside the boundaries of
individual states.77 In the present case, LWDA relates to the adjudication of inter-state river
water dispute.78 Thereby, it is submitted that the scope of the said provision lies outside the
legislative ambit of State Legislatures.
3.1.3 The Effect of the impugned act relates to subject u/a 262, which is an exclusive power
of Parliament.
38. Reflecting the object and purpose of act, the ostensible effect of the impugned act would
be on matters within the auspices of the Parliament which is adjudication of inter-state water
dispute between states of Kapil Wadu and Sarwalaka.79 It is therefore submitted that the ‘pith
and substance’ of the impugned act relates to subject u/a 262, which is an exclusive power of
Parliament.
3.2 That LWDA is in amplification of the doctrine of salus populi suprema lex.
39. There is a concept of “Parens Patriae”80 noted in English Law. In India, the same was
recognised by court in Ram Swaroop v. S.P. Sahi.81 Parens patriae is the inherent power and
authority of a Legislature to provide protection to the person and property of persons non
suijuris, the words “parens patriae” means thereby, “the father of the country”. Our
constitution makes it imperative for the state to secure to all its Citizens the rights guaranteed
by the constitution and where the citizens are not in position to assert and secure their rights,
the State must come into picture and protect and fight for the citizens.
40. It is comprehended in the maxim salus populi suprema lex – regard for public welfare is
the highest law. This is as broad as public welfare and as strong as the arm of state, this can
73
For example, Entry 17, 18, 23, 33 of List II limited by Entry 56, 3, 54, 60 of List I respectively.
74
Indu Bhushan Bose v. Rama Sundari Debi , AIR 1970 SC 228 at ¶12;
75
Prof. Yashpal & Anr. v. State of Chhatisgarh & Ors. , AIR 2005 SC 2026.
76
Id at ¶ 20.
77
Supra 47 at ¶47-50.
78
79
Id.
80
Dr. D.K. Mukherjea, Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts- Tagore Law Lectures 404 (5th Ed.).
81
Ram Swaroop v. S.P. Sahi , [1959] 2 Supp. SCR 583.
11
only be measured by the legislative will of people, subject to the fundamental rights and
constitutional limitations. And the impugned act is in absolute regard of the welfare of the
common people.
3.3 That possibility of abuse of a statute does not impart it element of invalidity.
41. The possibility of abuse of a statute does not impart to it any element of invalidity. It is
emphasised that validity of a measure is not to be determined by its application to particular
cases.82 Further, in Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Cheetty,83 the Court
emphasised that the constitutional validity of the statute would have to be determined on the
basis of its provisions and on the ambit of its operation as reasonably constructed. It has to be
borne in mind that if it passes the test of reasonableness, then the possibility of the powers
conferred being improperly used is no ground for pronouncing the law itself invalid.84
Moreover, the LWDA should be read together as a whole. [3.3.1] And even if there was any
remote possibility of conflict of interest between the Centre and the States, the doctrine of
necessity would override the principles of natural justice. [3.3.2]
3.3.1 The provisions of LWDA should be read together and as a whole.

42. The provisions of the LWDA should be read together and as a whole.85 These should be
appreciated in the context of the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The Act gave
adjudicatory powers to CMWRI in cases of inter-state water dispute.86 It was so designed that
the stakeholders and the persons so affected are fully protected and their claims are processed
speedily, effectively, equitably and to the best advantage of claimants. The act was passed to
remedy the previous mischief.
43. The Act was passed replacing the earlier act at a time when various suits in relation to the
dispute lay pending in the SC. In such a situation Central Government, acting in compliance
of DPSP and in fulfilment of its obligation, should have right to come with a new Act i.e.
LWDA. It is submitted that a new mechanism of solving the dispute is necessary. In addition,
the deadlock situation insists on a condition that the previous developments, which were the
root cause of dispute are erased and new roads to justice are created. Therefore, the act
engrafted a provision of nullity of all adjudications, both by LWDT and SC is aimed at
82
Belfast Corporation v. O.D. Commission, [1950] AC 490 at 520-21.
83
Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Cheetty, [1962] 3 SCR 786 at 825.
84
P.J. Irani v. State of Madras, [1962] 2 SCR 169 at 178 to 181; D.K. Trivedi v. State of Gujarat, [1986] Supp.
SCC 20 at 60-61.
85
Philips India Ltd. v. Labour Court, (1985) 3 SCC 103, p. 112.
86
12
achieving justice, fairness and equity. The act if not so tailored would deplete the case of its
vigour, urgency and sense of purpose.
44. It is submitted that if the contentions of the petitioners are entertained, the rights
theoretically might be upheld but the ends of justice would stand sacrificed.
3.3.2 The doctrine of necessity would override the principles of natural justice.
45. ARGUENDO
Even if there was any remote possibility of conflict of interest between the Centre and the
States, the doctrine of necessity would override the principles of natural justice- that no man
should be judge in his own case. It has been amplified to the extent that if the members of
only tribunal competent to determine a matter are subject to disqualification, they may be
authorised or oblidged to hear that matter by virtue of operation of common law doctrine of
necessity.87
46. The court recognised the principle of necessity in the case of Mohapatra & Co. & Anr. V.
State of Orissa & Anr.88 Here it was said that these were situations where on the principle of
doctrine of necessity a person interested was held not disqualified to adjudicate on his rights.
Moreover, in the present case the Central government has no interest other than the resolution
of this century long dispute.
[4]. THAT THE VESTING OF ADJUDICATORY POWERS WITH CMWRI UNDER LWDA, 2018
IS VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL.
47. It is humbly submitted that the vesting of adjudicatory powers with the CMWRI is valid
and constitutional. It has been established that a body having administrative, legislative,
judicial function is also tribunal w.r.t. its judicial function.[A] Further, present situations
demand sensitive and flexible adjudication.[B]
87
Vol. 35, Halsbury’s Laws of India 89 ¶73, (2nd ed.Lexis-Nexis Butterworth Wadhwa, Nagpur, 2007); De
Smith, Judicial Review of Adminstrative Action 276-277, (4th Edn); G.A. Flick, Natural Justice138-141, (1879).
88
Mohapatra & Co. & Anr. V. State of Orissa & Anr., [1984] 4 SCC 103 at page 112.
13
4.1. A Body Having Administrative, Legislative, Judicial Function Is Also Tribunal

W.R.T. Its Judicial Function.
48. It is humbly submitted that the SC has held that even the government of India while
exercising adjudicatory powers under statutes may be characterised as a tribunal.89 The first
essential requisite before a body can be characterized as a “tribunal” is that it should be a
quasi-judicial body exercising some judicial function.90
49. The main test to determine whether a body was tribunal or not was whether it was
exercising inherent judicial powers of the state, and the presence of all or some trappings of
court was really not a decisive factor.91 “The presence of some trappings may assist the
determination of the question as to whether the power exercised by the authority which
possesses the said trappings is the judicial power of the state or not.”92
50. The “non- failing test” , the court stated , “which must necessarily be present in
determining the character of authority as tribunal is whether that authority is empowered to
exercise any adjudicating power of the State and whether the same has been conferred on it
by any statute or a statutory rule.” The court further clarified that to be “tribunal”, it does not
mean that a body must exercise only the state judicial power or that it must exclusively
exercise an adjudicatory function. A body may have multiple functions administrative,
legislative or judicial. It can be regarded as a tribunal in respect of its judicial function
howsoever fractional the same may be.93
51. The power of adjudication must be derived from a stature or a statutory rule and from an
agreement of the parties. CMWRI derives his powers in essence from the state-made statute.
Beyond this, if he functions within the four walls of the statute in question; his status has
been recognised by the court itself as being higher than that of an ordinary arbitrator under
the Arbitration Act. 94 He can legitimately be regarded as a part of the infrastructure of the
sovereign’s dispensation of justice and he thus falls within the rainbow of statutory
tribunals.95
89
Harinagar Sugar Mills v. Sham Sunder Jhunjhunwala, AIR 1961 SC 1669.
90
B.K. Bhandar v. Dharmagaon Municipality, AIR 1966 SC 249.
91
A.C.C. v. P.N. Sharma, AIR 1965 SC 1595.
92
Id.
93
A.P.H.L. Conference, Shilong v. W.A. Sangama, AIR 1977 SC2155.
94
Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Its Mazdoor Union, AIR 1980 SC 1896.
95
Id.
14
4.2. Present Situations Demand Sensitive And Flexible Adjudication

52. The apex Court has also reiterated that in situation which calls for adjustment from time
to time in view of varying economic and social factors, a sufficient degree of flexibility is
needed.96 Consequently, it was appropriate for the legislature to vest exclusive adjudicatory
power with CMWRI. The inter-state river water dispute is a subject where functions and
powers of the authority cannot be determined and they are subject to change with the
subsequent consequence.
53. ARGUENDO
Apart from this, that only such body could be regarded as tribunal which autonomous and
outside control of government department involved in dispute before it either because it is
under the control of some other department97 or because of nature of its composition.98
However, the SC has not adopted this narrow approach, and correctly, so, because it would
have very much restricted the scope of Article136 as such autonomous adjudicative bodies
are not very many in India. Most of the bodies now characterised as “tribunals” for purposes
of Article136 are, to some extent, aligned with the administration and could not be treated as
tribunals in strict sense.99
54. All tribunals are not court though all courts are tribunals.100 The word “courts” is used to
designate those tribunals which are set up in an organized State for the administration of
justice. By administration of justice is meant the exercise of judicial power of the State to
maintain and uphold rights and to punish wrong. Whenever there is lis- an affirmation by one
party and denial by another – and the dispute necessarily involves a decision on the rights and
obligations of parties to it and the authority is called upon to decide it, there is an exercise of
judicial power. That authority is called a Tribunal, if it does not have all the trappings of a
court.101
55. In light of above arguments, the CMWRI be regarded as a tribunal functioning under the
LWDA. Hence, the power of adjudication vested with CMWRI is valid and constitutional.
96
Man Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1985 SC 1737, ¶ 18
97
The Income Tax Tribunal is under Ministry of Law not under Ministry of Finance.
98
The Chairman of Railway Rates Tribunal is to be a person, who is, or has been a judge of Supreme Court or
of a High Court.
99
E.g.,Central or state government exercising adjudicatory powers under the law.
100
M/S . Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala, 1962 SCR (2) 339.
101
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu And Othrs., 1992 SCR (1) 686.
15
[5]. THAT LWDA CAN BE ENFORCED RETROSPECTIVELY.

56. It is humbly submitted that Lauperry Water Dispute Act, 2018 can apply retrospectively
as the legislators have the power to enforce a law retrospectively [5.1]; and the provision
clearly reflects the legislative intent to that effect [5.2]. In addition, the retrospective
application of the act is not in violation of Basic Structure Doctrine of the Constitution [5.3].
5.1. The Legislators Have The Power To Enforce A Law Retrospectively.

57. It is humbly submitted that the legislators have the power to enforce a law retrospectively.
Retrospective law means a law which looks backward or contemplates the past; one which is
made to affect acts or facts occurring, or rights occurring, before it come into force. 102 The
Union Parliament and State Legislatures have under Art 245103 of the Constitution plenary
powers of legislation within the fields assigned to them and subject to certain constitutional
and judicially recognized restrictions104 can legislate prospectively as well as
retrospectively.105
58. In Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar106, it was held that “the legislative power conferred
on the appropriate legislators to enact law in respect of topics covered by the several entries
in the three lists can be exercised both prospectively and retrospectively. Where the
legislature can make a valid law, it may provide not only for the prospective operation of the
material provisions of the said law but it can also provide for the retrospective operation of
the said provision.” Further, in the case of ITO v. M.C.Pannoose,107 the Court held that it is
open to a sovereign legislature to enact laws which have retrospective operation. Thus, the
legislators have the power to enforce law retrospectively.
5.2. The Provision Clearly Reflects The Legislative Intent To Apply LWDA
Retrospectively.
59. It is humbly submitted that the Lauperry Water Dispute Act, 2018 has provisions that
indicate the legislative intent regarding the retrospective application of the act.108 The
102
Justice G.P. Singh, Principles Of Statutory Interpretation 532 (13th ed., 2012).
103
The Constitution Of India 1950, Article 245.
104
State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni, AIR 161 SC 1984; State of Tamil Nadu v. Arooran Sugars
Ltd., AIR 1815 SC 1997; Nation Agriculture Cooperative Marketing Federation of India Ltd. Union of India,
AIR 1329 SC 2005.
105
United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum, AIR 16 FC 1941; Sundararmier v. State of A.P., AIR 468 SC 1958; J.K.
Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., AIR 1534 SC 1961; K.C. Arora v. State of Haryana, 3 SCC 281 (1984);
Bhubaneshwar Singh v. Union of India, 6 SCC 77 (1994).
106
Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar , AIR 1667 SC 1963.
107
ITO v. M.C.Pannoose, 2 SCC 351 (1969).
108
16
respondent humbly accepts the fact that it is a cardinal principle of construction that every
statute is prima facie prospective.109 Unless there are words in statute sufficient to show the
intention of Legislature to affect existing rights, it is “deemed to be prospective only”- ‘nova
constitution futuris forman imponere debet non praeteritis’.110,111
60. However, this cardinal principle has two exceptions: firstly, there should be expressed or
necessary implication to indicate that the Act operates retrospectively112 and secondly, that
the statute enacted for the benefit of the community as a whole may be construed to have
retrospective application.113
61. In Zile Singh v. State of Haryana114, the Apex Court held that the rule against
retrospective application is a presumption only, and as such it “may be overcome, not only by
express words in the Act, but also by circumstances sufficiently strong to displace it.” In the
matter of substantive right, the Apex Court in the case of Anil Kumar v. Krishan Chand,115
held that all laws that affect substantive rights generally operate prospectively and there is a
presumption against their retrospectivity if they affect vested rights and obligations unless the
legislative intent is clear and compulsive. Such retrospective effect may be given where they
are express words giving retrospective effect or where the language used necessarily implies
that retrospective operation is intended.116
62. The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used117,
which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been
said.118 As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support addition or
109
Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. , (2012) 11 SCC 1, p. 90.
110
‘A new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past’. OSBORN : Concise Law Dictionary, p. 224.
111
K.S Paripoornam v. State of Kerela , JT 1994 (6) SC 182, pp. 213,214; Shakti Tubes Ltd. v. State of Bihar,
(2009) 7 SCC 673 ¶ 24.
112
Keshvan v. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC 128, p. 130; Janardan Reddy v. State, AIR 1951 SC 124, p. 127;
State of Bombay v. Vishnu Ramchandra, AIR 1961 SC 307, p. 309; Arjan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1970
SC 703, p. 705.
113
Vijay v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 6 SCC 289.
114
Zile Singh v. State of Haryana, (2004) 8 SCC 1, p. 9.
115
Anil Kumar v. Krishan Chand, (2007) 13 SCC 492.
116
Bhagat Ram Sharma v. Union Of India, AIR 1989 SC 1933, p. 1948; Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar, AIR
2001 SC 2472, pp. 2481-2482; Co-operative Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Trade Tax U.P., (2007) 4 SCC
480 (¶ 29).
117
Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, AIR 1951 SC 1933, p. 1948; S.L. Srinivas Jute Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of
India, (2006) 2 SCC 740 (¶ 18); Union of India v. Glaxo India Limited, (2011) 6 SCC 668 (¶ 40).
118
Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests, AIR 1747 SC 1990; Mohammad Alikhan
v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, AIR 1165 SC 1997; Dental Council of India v. Hari Prakash, AIR 3303 SC
2001; J.P. Basnal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1405 SC 2004; State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh, AIR 294 SC
2005.
17
substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be

avoided.119
63. The Lauperry Water Dispute Act, 2018, clearly states that the act shall be applicable
retrospectively.120 By incorporating this provision, the legislators have shown their legislative
intent expressly to apply the Act retrospectively.
5.3. That The Retrospective Application Of The Act Is Not In Violation Of The
Doctrine Of Basic Structure.
64. The doctrine of legitimate expectation has no application provided that State action is as a
public policy or in the public interest and does not amount to abuse of power.121 Provided that
the decision of the public authority is bona fide122 and based on public interest that outweighs
the claimant's legitimate expectation123 and the decision withstands the Wednesbury
reasonableness test124 it cannot be questioned on grounds of violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution.
65. In the instant case, the Act has been brought about keeping in mind the compelling public
interest in adjudication of disputes related to inter-state river water.125 Further, as this marks a
policy change, it cannot be questioned under the doctrine of legitimate expectation. As has
been noted by the Court, the doctrine of legitimate expectation must not be used extensively
and must be restricted to legal limitations only.126
[6]. THAT THE LAUPERRY WATER DISPUTE ACT, 2018 IS NOT AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.
66. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the Lauperry Water Dispute Act,
2018 is not against public policy. For testing the correctness of a policy, appropriate forum is
parliament and not the courts. Hence, SC cannot review the LWDA made by Central
Government. [6.1.] The centre had framed the act for public good and in public interest and it
is not against public policy. [6.2]
119
Shayam Kishori Deci v. Patna Municipal Corporation, AIR 1678 SC 1966; Union of India v. Shankalchand,
AIR 2328 SC 1977; S. Narayanswami v. G. Panneerselvam, AIR 2284 SC 1972; J.P. Basnal v. State of
Rajasthan, AIR 1405 SC 2004; State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh, AIR 294 SC 2005.
120
121
Sethi Auto Service Station v. Delhi Development Authority, 2006(87)DRJ166.
122
Food Corporation of India v. M/s Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, AIR 1993 SC 1601.
123
Id.; Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors., 2005 (58) ALR 357.
124
Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., (1999) 4 SCC 727.
125
126
Attorney General for New South Wales v. Quinn, 1990 (64) A LJR 327; Sethi Auto Service Station,supra
note 119.
18
6.1. Court cannot review the Act made by central government.
67. It is not for the courts, opined the SC, to consider the relative merit of the policy and to
strike it down merely on the ground that another policy would have been fairer and better.
For testing the correctness of a policy, appropriate forum is parliament and not the courts. 127
68. “What has been said in respect of legislations is applicable even in respect of policies
which have been adopted by Parliament. They cannot be tested in court of law. The courts
cannot express their opinion as to whether at a particular juncture or under a particular
situation prevailing in the country any such national policy should have been adopted or
not128
69. A policy decision taken by the Government is not liable to interference, unless the Court
is satisfied that the rule-making authority has acted arbitrarily or in violation of the
fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16.129However, with the case in hand no
such violation of fundamental right or arbitrary action of the rule making authority has been
found. The Act was made on the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.130
70. In Premium Granites v. State of T.N.131, while considering the court’s powers in
interfering with the policy decision, it was observed that: It is not the domain of the Court to
embark upon unchartered ocean of public policy in an exercise to consider as to whether a
particular public policy is wise or a better public policy can be evolved. Such exercise must
be left to the discretion of the executive and legislative authorities as the case may be.
71. Thus, the court in this case cannot question upon the validity of the policy made by the
central government and it must be left in the hands of the executives.
72. It was expressly satated by the court in the case of State of Punjab & Ors. V. Ram
Lubhaya Bagga & Ors.132 that,
So far as questioning the validity of governmental policy is concerned in our view it is not
normally within the domain of any court, to weigh the pros and cons of the policy or to
scrutinise it and test the degree of its beneficial or equitable disposition for the purpose of
127
BALCO Employees’ Union v. Union of India,(2002) 2 SCC 333.
128
R.K. Garg And Ors. vs Union Of India , (1981) 4 SCC 675.
129
K. Narayanan v. State of Karnataka, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 44.
130
Moot Proposition ¶ 10, pg. 2.
131
Premium Granites v. State of T.N, (1994) 2 SCC 691, 714, ¶ 54.
132
State of Punjab & Ors. V. Ram Lubhaya Bagga & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 1703.
19
varying, modifying or annulling it, based on howsoever sound and good reasoning, except
whether it is arbitrary or violative of any constitutional, statutory or any other provision of
law.
73. When Government forms its policy, it is based on a number of circumstances on facts,
law including constraints based on its resources. It is also based on expert opinion. It would
be dangerous if court is asked to test the utility, beneficial effect of the policy or its appraisal
based on facts set out on affidavits. The court would dissuade itself from entering into this
realm which belongs to the executive.133
74. In Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India134, there was a challenge to the validity of
the establishment of a large dam. It was held by the majority that:
It is now well settled that the courts, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, will not transgress
into the field of policy decision. Whether to have an infrastructural project or not and what is
the type of project to be undertaken and how it has to be executed, are part of policy-making
process and the courts are ill-equipped to adjudicate on a policy decision so undertaken.
75. Thus, the present matter cannot be adjudicated by the Supreme Court as it is a policy
decision which cannot be decided by the court.
76. In T.N. Education Department Ministerial and General Subordinate Services Assn. v.
State of T.N.135, noticing the jurisdictional limitations to analyse and fault a policy, the Court
opined that:
The court cannot strike down a G.O., or a policy merely because there is a variation or
contradiction. Life is sometimes contradiction and even consistency is not always a virtue.
What is important is to know whether mala fides vitiates or irrational and extraneous factor
fouls.
77. The Lauperry Water Dispute Act, 2018 did not have any variation contradiction nor it
was malafide or irrational and nor had any extraneous factor, thus leaving the out of
jurisdiction of this act.
78. In the case of Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar vs Union Of India and Others, the court had
said that:
133
Id.
134
Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India , (2000) 10 SCC 664, 762, ¶ 229.
135
T.N. Education Department Ministerial and General Subordinate Services Assn. v. State of T.N , (1980) 3
SCC 97, 102, ¶ 16.
20
We certainly agree that judicial interference with the administration cannot be meticulous in
our Montesquien system of separation of powers. The court cannot usurp or abdicate, and the
parameters of judicial review must be clearly defined and never exceeded.136
6.2. The Lauperry Water Dispute Act, 2018 Is Not Against Public Policy.
79. “It is also well settled that policy decision of the Government cannot be interfered with or
struck down merely on certain factual disputes in the matter. It is not open to the court to
strike down such decision until and unless a serious and grave error is found on the part of the
Central Government or the State Government.” 137
80. Fundamental policy of law would also constitute a facet of public policy. This would
imply that all those principles of law that ensure justice, fair play and being transparency and
objectivity and promote probity in the discharge of public functions would also constitute
public policy.138
81. “Public Policy” has been defined by Winfield as “a principle of judicial legislation or
interpretation founded on the current needs of the community”.139 What is against public
good and public interest cannot be held to be consistent with public policy.140
82. The centre had framed the act for public good and in public interest. The act would solve
the states to resolve their relation which had suffered a rough period from ages. The
government did commit any error in framing the scheme rather took a step towards resolution
of the dispute which was going on from ages.
136
Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar v. Union Of India And Others, (1981) 1 SCC 568, 584, ¶ 35.
137
Akhil Bharat Goseva Sangh (3) v. State of A.P., (2006) 4 SCC 162.
138
BCCI v. Cricket Association of Bihar. (2015) 3 SCC 251.
139
Percy H. Winfield, Public Policy in English Common Law, 42 (Harvard Law Rev.) ; See also, Murlidhar
Aggarwal and Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., AIR 1974 SC 1924.
140
Supra 136.
21
PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
humbly prayed that this Honorable Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare that:
1. The Special Leave Petition by State of Sarwalaka & State of Kapil Wadu is not
maintainable.
2. The delay by centre in implementing the scheme as per the directions of the SC
does not amount to Contempt Of Court.
3. The structure of federalism as adopted in the C.O.I. allows the centre to give
directions to state w.r.t. sharing of inter-state rivers.
4. The vesting of adjudicatory powers with CMWRI under LWDA, 2018 is valid and
constitutional.
5. The LWDA can be enforced retrospectively.
6. The Lauperry Water Dispute Act, 2018 is not against public policy.
And pass any other order that this Honorable Court may deem fit in the interests of
justice, equity and good conscience.
ALL OF WHICH IS HUMBLY PRAYED,

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT
22

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BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

IN THE MATTER OF:

STATE OF SARWALAKA & STATE OF KAPIL WADU ...PETITIONERS

UNION OF INDIANA ...RESPONDENT

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION NO.- ****/2018

UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

Index Of Authorities .............................................................................................................. III

Statement Of Jurisdiction ................................................................................................... VII

Statement Of Facts .............................................................................................................. VIII

Summary Of Arguments .......................................................................................................XI

[1]. That The Special Leave Petition Is Not Maintainable ................................................... 1

1.1. The Scope Of Article 136 Vis-à-vis Article 262. ............................................................ 1

1.1.2. 1956 Act framed by parliament is a complete code in itself. ................................... 2

1.3. Jurisdiction Under Article 136 Is To Be Exercised Sparingly. ...................................... 3

2.1. Union is not bound to frame the scheme. ........................................................................ 5

2.2. Framing Of Scheme Is A Matter Of Legislative Policy .................................................. 6

4.1. A Body Having Administrative, Legislative, Judicial Function Is Also Tribunal

4.2. Present Situations Demand Sensitive And Flexible Adjudication ................................ 15

[5]. That LWDA Can Be Enforced Retrospectively. .......................................................... 16

The Constitution of India 1950………………………………………………………….passim

1. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 ........................................................................................ 8

III. INDIAN CASES

1. A. S. Krishna v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 297 ............................................................. 9

66. P.J. Irani v. State of Madras, [1962] 2 SCR 169 ................................................................ 12

105. Union of India v. Shankalchand, AIR 2328 SC 1977 ...................................................... 18

IV. FOREIGN CASE

Belfast Corporation v. O.D. Commission, [1950] AC 490 ................................................................... 12

1. Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edn. ........................................................................................... 7

VIII. ONLINE SOURCE

Chanderhass, Chanderhass, Contempt of court and independence of judiciary in India

The Constitution of Indiana provides for a democratic Parliamentary form of governance

WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE ?

WHETHER THE DELAY BY CENTRE IN IMPLEMENTING THE SCHEME AS

WHETHER THE STRUCTURE OF FEDERALISM AS ADOPTED IN THE C.O.I. ALLOWS

WHETHER THE VESTING OF ADJUDICATORY POWERS WITH CMWRI UNDER

WHETHER LWDA CAN BE ENFORCED RETROSPECTIVELY?

WHETHER THE LAUPERRY WATER DISPUTE ACT, 2018 IS AGAINST PUBLIC

[1]. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?

[3]. WHETHER THE STRUCTURE O F FEDERALISM AS ADOPTED IN THE C.O.I. ALLOWS

[5]. WHETHER LWDA CAN BE ENFORCED RETROSPECTIVELY?

[1]. THAT THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE

1.1. The Scope Of Article 136 Vis-à-vis Article 262.

1.1.2. 1956 Act framed by parliament is a complete code in itself.

1.2. Presence Of Alternative Remedy Is A Self-Imposed Restriction On Powers U/A

1.3. Jurisdiction Under Article 136 Is To Be Exercised Sparingly.

to appeal to the SC rather it confers a wide discretionary power on the SC to interfere in

13. No substantial question of law- To be ‘substantial’ a question of law must be debatable,

2.1. Union is not bound to frame the scheme.

2.2. Framing Of Scheme Is A Matter Of Legislative Policy

2.3. Not framing of scheme does not amount to wilful disobedience.

32. In State of Rajasthan v. G. Chawla,58 giving significant importance to the object of

3.3.1 The provisions of LWDA should be read together and as a whole.

4.1. A Body Having Administrative, Legislative, Judicial Function Is Also Tribunal

4.2. Present Situations Demand Sensitive And Flexible Adjudication

[5]. THAT LWDA CAN BE ENFORCED RETROSPECTIVELY.

5.1. The Legislators Have The Power To Enforce A Law Retrospectively.

substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be

6.1. Court cannot review the Act made by central government.

ALL OF WHICH IS HUMBLY PRAYED,

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