Greater Balanga Development Corp.

v Balanga
Greater Balanga Development Corporation v. Municipality of Balanga, Bataan (1998)

Facts:
• The case involves a parcel of land, Lot 261-B-6-A-3 located behind the public market in the Municipality of Balanga,
Province of Bataan. It is registered in the name of Greater Balanga Development, Corp., owned and controlled by the
Camacho family. The lot was part of Lot 261-B, formerly registered in the name of Aurora Banzon Camacho, which
was later subdivided into certain lots, some of which were sold, others donated. Five buyers of the lot filed a civil case
against Camacho for partition and delivery of titles.
• Petitioner applied for and was granted a business permit by the Office of the Mayor of Balanga but failed to mention
the existence of the civil case for partition and delivery of titles. The permit was granted the privilege of a “real estate
dealer/privately-owned market operator.” However, the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) passed Resolution No. 12 s-88,
annulling the Mayor's permit issued to Petitioner, on the ground that the issue as to the ownership of the lot caused
“anxiety, uncertainty and restiveness among the stallholders and traders in the lot,” and advising the Mayor to revoke
the permit “to operate a public market.” The Mayor then revoked the permit through EO No. 1 s-88.
• Petitioner filed this petition with prayer for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction or restraining order and to
reinstate the Mayor's permit and to curtail the municipality's collection of market and entrance fees from the lot
occupants. He alleges that: 1) it didn't violate any law, thus, there's no reason for revocation of the permit; 2)
Respondents failed to observe due process in the revocation; 3) the collection of market fees is illegal.
• On the other hand, Respondents assert that the Mayor as the local chief executive has the power to issue, deny or
revoke permits. They claim that the revocation was due to the violation by Petitioner of Section 3A-06(b) of the
Balanga Revenue Code when it: 1) made false statement in the application form, failing to disclose that the lot was
subject to adverse claims for which a civil case was filed; 2) failed to apply for 2 separate permits for the 2 lines of
business (real estate and public market).

Issue: W/N the revocation of the Mayor's permit was valid.

Held: NO.
• The powers of municipal corporations are to be construed in strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity must be
construed against the municipality. The authority of the Mayor to revoke permits is premised on a violation by the
grantee of any of its conditions for its grant. For revocation to be justified under the Balanga Revenue Code, there
must be: 1) proof of willful misrepresentation, and 2) deliberate intent to make a false statement. Good faith is
always presumed.
◦ In this case, the application for Mayor's permit requries the applicant to state the “type of business, profession,
occupation, privileges applied for.” Petitioner left this entry bank in its application form. It is only in the Mayor's
permit itself that petitioner's lines of business appear. Revocation is not justified because Petitioner did not
make any false statement therein.
◦ Neither was petitioner's applying for two businesses in one permit a ground for revocation. The second
paragraph of Section 3A-06(b) does not expressly require two permits for their conduct of two or more
businesses in one place, but only that separate fees be paid for each business. Granting, however, that
separate permits are actually required, the application form does not contain any entry as regards the number
of businesses the applicant wishes to engage in.
• The SB's Resolution merely mentioned the plan to acquire the Lot for expansion of the Balanga Public Market
adjacent thereto. The SB doesn't actually maintain a public market on the area. Until expropriation proceedings
are instituted in court, the
landowner cannot be deprived of its right over the land.
• Of course, the SB has the duty in the exercise of its police powers to regulate any business subject to municipal
license fees and prescribe the conditions under which a municipal license already issued may be revoked (B.P.
Blg. 337, Sec. 149 [1] [r]), but the "anxiety, uncertainty, restiveness" among the stallholders and traders doing
business on a property not owned by the Municipality cannot be a valid ground for revoking the permit of Petitioner.
• Also, the manner by which the Mayor revoked the permit transgressed petitioner's right to due process. The
alleged violation of Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code was not stated in the order of revocation, and
neither was petitioner informed of this specific violation. Moreover, Respondent Municipality isn't the owner of Lot
261 B-6-A-3, and thus cannot collect market fees, which only an owner can do.

Tano v Socrates

Facts:

Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted:

Ordinance No. 15-92: AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER
OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998

Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Provincial Government of Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33 entitled:

A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND

SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS

The petitioner Tano, among others, were charged criminally for violation of said ordinances. They contend that:

First, the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the
practice of their trade.

Second, It altogether prohibited the catching of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction
whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing method, the Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-
fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline Shippers
Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering into contracts
which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion.

Public respondent is the Governor of Palawan. He and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan
defended the validity of Ordinance as a valid exercise of the Provincial Governments power under the general
welfare clause and its specific power to protect the environment. The Ordinance, they further asserted, covered only
live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms which were enumerated in the ordinance and excluded other kinds of
live marine aquatic organisms not dwelling in coral reefs; besides the prohibition was for only five (5) years to
protect and preserve the pristine coral and allow those damaged to regenerate.

Issue:

WON the ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City and Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Provincial Government of Palawan valid?

Held:

Yes. There is no violation of the Constitution

Petitioners specifically point to Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7, Article XIII of the Constitution as
having been transgressed by the Ordinances.

Section 2, Art XII:

xxx

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

Sec. 2, Art XIII: The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities
based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.

xxx

SEC. 7, Art XIII. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the
preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to
such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing
assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection
shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive
a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. In their
petition, petitioner Airline Shippers Association of Palawan is described as a private association composed of
Marine Merchants; petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, as merchants; while the rest of the petitioners claim to
be fishermen, without any qualification, however, as to their status.

Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the terms subsistence or marginal
fishermen,[18] they should be construed in their general and ordinary sense. A marginal fisherman is an individual
engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by existing price levels is
barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering the fish,[19] while a subsistence fisherman is one
whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood.

Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay
stress on the duty of the State to protect the nations marine wealth. What the provision merely recognizes is that the
State may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers,
lakes, bays, and lagoons.

Our survey of the statute books reveals that the only provision of law which speaks of the preferential right of
marginal fishermen is Section 149 of the LGC of 1991.

SEC. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges. -- x x x

(b) The sangguniang bayan may:

(1) Grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry areas, within a
definite zone of the municipal waters, as determined by it: Provided, however, That duly registered organizations
and cooperatives of marginal fishermen shall have preferential right to such fishery privileges.

The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all
absolute.

In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and, pursuant to the first paragraph
of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their exploration, development and utilization ... shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State.

Moreover, their mandated protection, development, and conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers of the
Constitution, imply certain restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone.

On the invocation of the right to a healthful and balanced ecology

The LGC provisions invoked by private respondents merely seek to give flesh and blood to the right of the people to
a balanced and healthful ecology. In fact, the General Welfare Clause, expressly mentions this right.

Moreover, LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of the LGC shall be liberally interpreted to
give more powers to the local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of
life for the people of the community.

The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters.

On Devolution

The centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization[26] as expressly mandated by the

Constitution.[27] Indispensable thereto is devolution and the LGC expressly provides that [a]ny provision on a
power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon
shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable
doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned.
One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws
in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves.[30] This necessarily includes enactment of ordinances
to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters.

In this case, It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a
closed season for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years, and (2) to protect
the corals of the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction
due to illegal fishing activities.

The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal
waters, such as P.D. No. 1015, which allows the establishment of closed seasons.

The realization of the second objective falls within both the general welfare clause of the LGC and the express
mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts
which endanger the environment.[33]

Padilla v COMELEC

Facts:

• Republic Act No. 7155 approved on September 6, 1991 creates the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the
Province of Camarines Norte to be composed of Barangays Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I,
Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa, all in the Municipality of Labo,
same province.

• Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7155, the Commission on Elections promulgated Resolution No. 2312 that the
the creation of a municipality shall be subject to approval by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected, and pursuant to Section 134 of the Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa
Blg. 337) said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections;

• In the plebiscite held on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo, only 2,890 votes favored
its creation while 3,439 voters voted against the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa.
Consequently, the day after the political exercise, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection
and disapproval of the independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa by a majority of votes.

• In this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner as Governor of Camarines Norte, seeks to set aside the
plebiscite conducted on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo and prays that a new
plebiscite be undertaken as provided by RA 7155. It is the contention of petitioner that the plebiscite was a
complete failure and that the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by
COMELEC Resolution No. 2312 should have been conducted only in the political unit or units
affected, Petitioner stresses that the plebiscite should not have included the remaining area of the mother unit
of the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.

Issues:

1. Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No.
2312
2. whether or not the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa
and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo is valid.

Held:
 1. No, COMELEC did not commit abuse of discretion.

Petitioner's contention that our ruling in Tan vs. COMELEC has been superseded with the ratification of the
1987 Constitution, thus reinstating our earlier ruling in Paredes vs. COMELEC is untenable. Petitioner
opines that since Tan vs. COMELEC was based on Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution our ruling
in said case is no longer applicable under Section 10 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, especially since
the latter provision deleted the words "unit or."
The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution from its precursor,
Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution not affected our ruling in Tan vs.Comelec as explained by
then CONCOM Commissioner Associate Justice Hilario Davide, who precisely asked for the deletion of the
words "unit or" because in the plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the units affected. If it is the
creation of a barangay plebiscite because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a territory.

2. Yes, it is valid.

The plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the
political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to
vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected," is the
plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such
political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well
as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.

Cawaling v COMELEC

Facts:

Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806 which created the
City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.

On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an Act Creating The City
Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And
Appropriating Funds Therefor.[1]

Pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,[2] the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on December
16, 2000, conducted a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for
ratification.

On December 17, 2000, the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC) proclaimed[3] the creation of the City of
Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.[4]

Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of Sorsorgon, Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr.
filed on January 2, 2001 the present petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 146319) seeking the annulment of the plebiscite
on the following grounds:

A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period from the approval of R.A.
8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and
B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensive information
campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite.
Two days after filing the said action, or on January 4, 2001, petitioner instituted another petition (G.R. No. 146342),
this time for prohibition, seeking to enjoin the further implementation of R.A. No. 8806 for being unconstitutional,
contending, in essence, that:

1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only a municipality or a
cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city; and
2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of
the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the one subject-one bill rule prescribed by Section
26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
Hence, the present petitions which were later consolidated.

Issues:

1) WON the two municipalities can be merged creating a component city.

2) WON the R.A. No. 8806 contravenes the one subject-one bill rule enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI
of the Constitution.
3) WON the reckoning point of the 120 day period for the conduct of plebiscite is the date of approval.

Held:

1) Yes.

Petitioner is not concerned whether the creation of Sorsogon City through R.A. No. 8806 complied with the
criteria set by the Code as to income, population and land area. What he is assailing is its mode of creation.
He contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be created only by converting a
municipality or a cluster of barangays, not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done.

This contention is devoid of merit.

Petitioners constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase A municipality or a
cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city is not a criterion but simply one of the modes
by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, quoted earlier and which
petitioner cited in support of his posture, allows the merger of local government units to create a province,
city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code.

The creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of existing local
government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply
with the requirements prescribed by the Code.

Petitioner further submits that, in any case, there is no compelling reason for merging the Municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon in order to create the City of Sorsogon considering that the Municipality of Sorsogon
alone already qualifies to be upgraded to a component city. This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A.
No. 8806, a matter which we are not competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,[12] this Court,
through Justice Jose P. Laurel, made it clear that the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation. In the exercise of judicial power, we are allowed only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,[13] and may not annul an act
of the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or impractical.[14]

2) No.

Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 8806 actually embraces two principal subjects which are: (1) the creation
of the City of Sorsogon, and (2) the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. While the title
of the Act sufficiently informs the public about the creation of Sorsogon City, petitioner claims that no such
information has been provided on the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon.

The argument is far from persuasive. Contrary to petitioners assertion, there is only one subject embraced
in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate
existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and
 distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and
inevitable consequence of the merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary means by which the City of
Sorsogon was created. Hence, the title of the law, An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds Therefor,
cannot be said to exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be considered
to have deprived the public of fair information on this consequence.

It is well-settled that the one title-one subject rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein.[15] The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include
the general object which the statute seeks to effect,[16] and where, as here, the persons interested are
informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.[17] Moreover, this
Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule so as not to cripple or
impede legislation.[18]

3) No.

Petitioner asserts that the plebiscite required by R.A. No. 8806 should be conducted within 120 days from
the approval of said Act per express provision of its Section 54.

The Act was approved on August 16, 2000 by former President Joseph E. Estrada. Thus, petitioner claims,
the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted one (1) day late from the expiration of the 120-day period
after the approval of the Act. This 120-day period having expired without a plebiscite being conducted, the
Act itself expired and could no longer be ratified and approved in the plebiscite held on December 16,
2000.

The law was first published in the August 25, 2000 issue of TODAY, a newspaper of general circulation.
Then on September 01, 2000, it was published in a newspaper of local circulation in the Province of
Sorsogon. Thus, the publication of the law was completed on September 1, 2000, which date, according to
the COMELEC, should be the reckoning point in determining the 120-day period within which to conduct
the plebiscite, not from the date of its approval (August 16, 2000) when the law had not yet been published.
The COMELEC argues that since publication is indispensable for the effectivity of a law, citing the
landmark case of Taada vs. Tuvera,[19] it could only schedule the plebiscite after the Act took effect. Thus,
the COMELEC concludes, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was well within the 120-day period from the
effectivity of the law on September 1, 2000.

The COMELEC is correct.

In addition, Section 10 of the Code provides:

Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Such plebiscite shall be
conducted by the Commission on Elections within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the
effectivity of the law or ordinance affecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.
(Emphasis ours)
Quite plainly, the last sentence of Section 10 mandates that the plebiscite shall be conducted within 120
days from the date of the effectivity of the law, not from its approval. While the same provision allows a
law or ordinance to fix another date for conducting a plebiscite, still such date must be reckoned from the
date of the effectivity of the law.
Pelaez v Auditor General

Tan v COMELEC

Facts:

Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to
be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, which took effect on December 3, 1985. Petitioners herein, who are
residents of the Province of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and municipalities therein, on December 23, 1985,
filed with this Court a case for Prohibition for the purpose of STOPPING respondents Commission on Elections from
conducting the plebiscite which, pursuant to and in implementation of the aforesaid law, was scheduled for January
3, 1986.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 – An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of
Negros del Norte – was ENACTED in to law

o Sec. 4 thereof provided that a plebiscite shall be conducted [ONLY] in the proposed new province
which are the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of
this Act.

Thus, Petitioners, on December 23, 1985, filed with the Supreme Court a case for Prohibition for the purpose of
STOPPING respondents Commission on Elections from conducting the plebiscite

Petitioners argued that Pambansa Blg. 885 is unconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with the Local
Government Code as in Article XI, Section 3 of our Constitution, it is expressly mandated that—

See. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and
subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the UNIT OR UNITS AFFECTED.

The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte, would ONLY be about 2,856.56 square
kilometers whereas the Code provided for the requisite area of 3,500 square kilometers

Public respondents’ argued that the Batas Pambansa 885, should be accorded the presumption of legality. Moreover,
Batas Pambansa Big. 885 does not infringe the Constitution because the requisites of the Local Government Code
have been complied with.

Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 88 plainly declares that the territorial boundaries of Negros del Norte comprise an
area of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less.

What is contemplated in Sec. 197 of the Code is not only the land area but also the land and water over which the said
province has jurisdiction and control and even the MARGINAL SEA within the three mile limit.

Invoking and citing the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus the Honorable Executive Secretary to the President,
et al.:

“the acceptable construction is for those voters, who are not from the barangays to be separated, should be
excluded in the plebiscite”

Thus, applying to this case, the remaining cities and municipalities of the Province of Negros Occidental
NOT INCLUDED in the area of the new Province of Negros del Norte, do not fall within the meaning and
scope of the term "unit or units affected"

This case has now become MOOT AND ACADEMIC with the proclamation of the new Province of Negros del Norte.
Issues:

1. WON the inhabitants of the parent province of Negros Occidental shall be included in the plebiscite?
2. WON the creation of the new Province of Negros del Norte met the area requirement for creation of province
under the law?

Held:

1. WON the inhabitants of the parent province of Negros Occidental shall be included in the plebiscite?

YES, they should also be included.

Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected. The first would be
the PARENT PROVINCE of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be SUBSTANTIALLY ALTERED.
The OTHER AFFECTED ENTITY would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to
constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.

To form the new province of Negros del Norte, NO LESS THAN THREE CITIES AND EIGHT MUNICIPALITIES
WILL BE SUBTRACTED from the parent province of Negros Occidental.

This will result in the removal of approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from the land area of an existing province
whose boundaries will be consequently substantially altered.

The economy of the parent province as well as that of the new province will be inevitably affected, either for the better
or for the worse.

Whatever be the case, either or both of these political groups will be affected and they are, therefore, the unit or units
referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution which must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein.

Moreover, as this draft legislation speaks of "areas," what was contemplated evidently are plurality of
areas to participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be INCLUDED in such plebiscite would be the people living
in the area of the PROPOSED NEW PROVINCE and those living in the PARENT PROVINCE. This assumption will
be consistent with the requirements set forth in the Constitution.

The Paredes case is DIFFERENT from the case at hand: In the case of Paredes, what was involved was a division of
a barangay which is the SMALLEST POLITICAL UNIT in the Local Government Code. Understandably, few and
lesser problems are involved.

In the case at bar, creation of a new province relates to the LARGEST POLITICAL UNIT contemplated in Section 3,
Art. XI of the Constitution which will involve larger problems as aforestated.

The Paredes case is an exceptional one and its doctrine now abandoned

The prefatory statements therein stating that said case is "one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is
allowed considerable leeway" and that "there is indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the expression unit or
units affected."

Thus, it should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. In fact, it it is acknowledged therein that "IT IS
PLAUSIBLE TO ASSERT, as petitioners do, that when certain Barangays are separated from a parent municipality
to form a new one, all the voters therein are affected."

Meanwhile, the Court gave credence to the very lucidly expressed strong dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad
Santos to the Paredes case:
 ‘when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all of the people of the
municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or an of the people
of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. I see no ambiguity in the Constitutional
provision.’

This dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos is the forerunner of the ruling which the Court now consider
applicable to the case at bar.

2. WON the creation of the new Province of Negros del Norte met the area requirement for creation of
province under the law?

NO, the created province does not even satisfy the area requirement prescribed in Section 197. Their
interpretation that “territory” includes bodies of water is INCORRECT.

The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so stated therein, the "territory
need not be CONTIGUOUS if it comprises two or more islands." The use of the word territory in this particular
provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last sentence thereof, clearly reflects that "territory" as
therein used, HAS REFERENCE ONLY TO THE MASS OF LAND AREA and excludes the waters over which the
political unit exercises control.

Contiguous, when employed as an adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used when it describes physical
contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. Therefore, in the context of the sentence above, what
need not be "contiguous" is the "territory" the physical mass of land area.

Torralba v Municipality of Sibagat

Facts:

• Challenged in the instant Petition, as violative of Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, is Batas
Pambansa Blg. 56, enacted on 1 February 1980, creating the Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan
del Sur.

• Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, said to have been infringed, provides that: No province, city,
municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.

• The thrust of petitioners' argument is that under the aforequoted provision, the Local Government Code must
first be enacted to determine the criteria for the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration
of the boundary of any province, city, municipality, or barrio; and that since no Local Government Code had
as yet been enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, that statute could not have possibly complied with any
criteria when respondent Municipality was created, hence, it is null and void.

• It is a fact that the Local Government Code came into being only on 10 February 1983 so that when BP 56
was enacted, the code was not yet in existence. The evidence likewise discloses that a plebiscite had been
conducted among the people of the unit/units affected by the creation of the new Municipality, who expressed
approval thereof; and that officials of the newly created Municipality had been appointed and had assumed
their respective positions as such.

Issues:

1. WON BP 56 is violative of Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution.

 2. What are the differences of this case and the Tan case?

Held:

1. No, it did not violate.

The absence of the Local Government Code at the time of its enactment did not curtail nor was it intended to cripple
legislative competence to create municipal corporations. Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution does not
proscribe nor prohibit the modification of territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the Local
Government Code. It contains no requirement that the Local Government Code is a condition sine qua non for the
creation of a municipality, in much the same way that the creation of a new municipality does not preclude the
enactment of a Local Government Code.

What the Constitutional provision means is that once said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or dissolution
of local government units should conform with the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum before the enactment
of such Code, the legislative power remains plenary except that the creation of the new local government unit should
be approved by the people concerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose.

The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and the
people of the unit/units affected endorsed and approved the creation of the new local government unit. In fact, the
conduct of said plebiscite is not questioned herein. The officials of the new Municipality have effectively taken their
oaths of office and are performing their functions. A dejure entity has thus been created.

It is a long-recognized principle that the power to create a municipal corporation is essentially legislative in nature. In
the absence of any constitutional limitations a legislative body may Create any corporation it deems essential for the
more efficient administration of government. The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat was a valid exercise of
legislative power then vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Interim Batasang Pambansa.

2. In the Tan case, the Local Government Code already existed at the time that the challenged statute was enacted on
3 December 1985; not so in the case at bar.

Secondly, BP Blg. 885 in the Tan case confined the plebiscite to the "proposed new province" to the exclusion of the
voters in the remaining areas, in contravention of the Constitutional mandate and of the Local Government Code that
the plebiscite should be held "in the unit or units affected." In contrast, BP 56 specifically provides for a plebiscite "in
the area or areas affected." In fact, as previously stated, no question is raised herein as to the legality of the plebiscite
conducted.

Thirdly, in the Tan case, even the requisite area for the creation of a new province was not complied with in BP Blg.
885. No such issue in the creation of the new municipality has been raised here. And lastly, "indecent haste" attended
the enactment of BP Blg. 885 and the holding of the plebiscite thereafter in the Tan case; on the other hand, BP 56
creating the Municipality of Sibagat, was enacted in the normal course of legislation, and the plebiscite was held
within the period specified in that law.

Bai Sema v COMELEC

Facts:

The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for the Province of
Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.[3] Maguindanao forms
part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No.
6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054).[4] Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato
City forms part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having
voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989.
On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create
provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,[5] enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA
Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of
Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides:

Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat,
Sultan Mastura, and Upi are hereby separated from the Province of Maguindanao and constituted into a distinct and
independent province, which is hereby created, to be known as the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.

xxxx

Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this province shall commence upon the appointment by the Regional Governor or
election of the governor and majority of the regular members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

The incumbent elective provincial officials of the Province of Maguindanao shall continue to serve their unexpired
terms in the province that they will choose or where they are residents: Provided, that where an elective position in
both provinces becomes vacant as a consequence of the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, all
incumbent elective provincial officials shall have preference for appointment to a higher elective vacant position and
for the time being be appointed by the Regional Governor, and shall hold office until their successors shall have
been elected and qualified in the next local elections; Provided, further, that they shall continue to receive the
salaries they are receiving at the time of the approval of this Act until the new readjustment of salaries in accordance
with law. Provided, furthermore, that there shall be no diminution in the number of the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the mother province.

Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato as a part
thereof, shall remain.

Later, three new municipalities[6] were carved out of the original nine municipalities constituting Shariff
Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the
municipalities constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanaos first
legislative district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao.

The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.

On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the
COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into
a regular province under MMA Act 201.

In answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining
the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.

However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated on 29 March 2007 Resolution
No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the
enactment of MMA Act 201.[8]

On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending Resolution No.
07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly
First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).[9]

In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of Shariff
Kabunsuan with Cotabato City, prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion
from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled
to one representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution[10] and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution.[11] Thus, Sema asserted that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the status quo in Maguindanaos first legislative
district despite the COMELECs earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as the lone
component of Maguindanaos reapportioned first legislative district.[12] Sema further claimed that in issuing
Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts.

Issues:

1) Whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces, is constitutional; and

2) If in the affirmative, whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district
for such new province.[15]

Held:

The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.

The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply
with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local
Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must
be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate
to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary
legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units,
subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact,
Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within
their jurisdiction,[25] subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the
plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code,
only x x x an Act of Congress can create provinces, cities or municipalities.[26]

Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary
legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not one of the express legislative powers
granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies.[27] In the present case, the question arises whether the
delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.

There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the
power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed.
However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
provides, Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
provides, Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more
than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.

Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with
a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a
province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even
the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because
once the citys population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the
power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.

For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate at the same
time the power to create a legislative district. The threshold issue then is, can Congress validly delegate to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of Representatives? The answer is
in the negative.

Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned

Only by an Act of Congress

Under the present Constitution, as well as in past[28] Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable membership
in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution provides:

SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

xxxx

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards provided in this section. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts.
The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of
existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that
regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be
increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress.
In Montejo v. COMELEC,[29] we held that the power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the
power (of Congress) to make laws, and thus is vested exclusively in Congress.

This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical.
Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership
through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law.
It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a
national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change
the membership of the superior legislative body.
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did
not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and
the ARMM Organic Act, as amended. Thus, Section 20, Article X of the Constitution provides:

SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws,
the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:

(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;

(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;

(4) Personal, family, and property relations;

(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;

(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;

(7) Educational policies;

(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the
region.

Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to
create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.

On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides, The Regional
Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x except on the following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x.
Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot
create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law
creating a legislative district, the first representative is always elected in the next national elections from the
effectivity of the law.[30]

Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member
of the House of Representatives, is a national official.[31] It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body
like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers extend only to its regional
territory. The office of a district representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid
out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional
legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national
office.

To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate
outside the ARMMs territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly
limits the coverage of the Regional Assembly legislative powers [w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x.

The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan, recognized the exclusive nature of Congress
power to create or reapportion legislative districts by abstaining from creating a legislative district for Shariff
Kabunsuan. Section 5 of MMA Act 201 provides that:

Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato City as a part
thereof, shall remain. (Emphasis supplied)

However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that
each province shall have at least one representative. Thus, the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without
a legislative district is unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and
cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID

Municipality of Nueva Era v Municipality of Marcos

League of Cities of the Philippines v COMELEC

Facts:
The consolidated petitions for prohibition commenced by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City
of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas[8] assail the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, [9] each converting
the municipality covered thereby into a city (cityhood laws, hereinafter) and seek to enjoin the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to subject laws.
The Undisputed Factual Antecedents in Brief

During the 11th Congress,[21] fifty-seven (57) cityhood bills were filed before the House of
Representatives.[22] Of the fifty-seven (57), thirty-three (33) eventually became laws. The twenty-four (24) other bills
were not acted upon.
Later developments saw the introduction in the Senate of Senate Bill (S. Bill) No. 2157 [23] to amend Sec. 450 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. The proposed
amendment sought to increase the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from PhP 20 million
average annual income to PhP 100 million locally generated income.

In March 2001, S. Bill No. 2157 was signed into law as RA 9009 to take effect on June 30, 2001. As thus
amended by RA 9009, Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 now provides that [a] municipality x x x may be converted into a
component city if it has a [certified] locally generated average annual income x x x of at least [PhP 100 million] for
the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the Lower House of the 12th Congress adopted in July 2001 House (H.)
Joint Resolution No. 29[24] which, as its title indicated, sought to exempt from the income requirement prescribed in
RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose conversions into cities were not acted upon during the previous Congress. The
12thCongress ended without the Senate approving H. Joint Resolution No. 29.

Then came the 13th Congress (July 2004 to June 2007), which saw the House of Representatives re-adopting
H. Joint Resolution No. 29 as H. Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarding it to the Senate for approval.

The Senate, however, again failed to approve the joint resolution. During the Senate session held on
November 6, 2006, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. asserted that passing H. Resolution No. 1 would, in net effect, allow
a wholesale exemption from the income requirement imposed under RA 9009 on the municipalities. For this reason,
he suggested the filing by the House of Representatives of individual bills to pave the way for the municipalities to
become cities and then forwarding them to the Senate for proper action. [25]

Heeding the advice, sixteen (16) municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood
bills. Common to all 16 measures was a provision exempting the municipality covered from the PhP 100 million
income requirement.

As of June 7, 2007, both Houses of Congress had approved the individual cityhood bills, all of which eventually lapsed
into law on various dates. Each cityhood law directs the COMELEC, within thirty (30) days from its approval, to hold
a plebiscite to determine whether the voters approve of the conversion.

As earlier stated, the instant petitions seek to declare the cityhood laws unconstitutional for violation of Sec. 10, Art.
X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal-protection clause. The wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities, the petitioners bemoan, will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA), since more cities will partake of the internal revenue set aside for all cities under Sec. 285 of the
LGC of 1991.[26]

Issue: whether or not the cityhood laws violate (1) Sec. 10. Art. X of the Constitution and (2) the equal protection

clause.

Held:
A. Issue re Section 10. Art. X: No, it does not violate the constitution.

By constitutional design and as a matter of long-established principle, the power to create political subdivisions or
LGUs is essentially legislative in character.[28] But even without any constitutional grant, Congress can, by law, create,
divide, merge, or altogether abolish or alter the boundaries of a province, city, or municipality. We said as much in
the fairly recent case, Sema v. CIMELEC.[29]

The 1987 Constitution, under its Art. X, Sec. 10, nonetheless provides for the creation of LGUs, thus:

Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied.)

As may be noted, the afore-quoted provision specifically provides for the creation of political subdivisions in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, subject to the approval of the voters in the
unit concerned. The criteria referred to are the verifiable indicators of viability, i.e., area, population, and income, now
set forth in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, as amended by RA 9009. The petitioners would parlay the thesis that these
indicators or criteria must be written only in the LGC and not in any other statute. Doubtless, the code they are referring
to is the LGC of 1991. Pushing their point, they conclude that the cityhood laws that exempted the respondent LGUs
from the income standard spelled out in the amendatory RA 9009 offend the Constitution.

Petitioners posture does not persuade.

The supposedly infringed Art. X, Sec. 10 is not a new constitutional provision. Save for the use of the
term barrio in lieu of barangay, may be instead of shall, the change of the phrase unit or units to political unit and
the addition of the modifier directly to the word affected, the aforesaid provision is a substantial reproduction of Art.
XI, Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution, which reads:

It bears notice, however, that the code similarly referred to in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions is clearly but
a law Congress enacted. This is consistent with the aforementioned plenary power of Congress to create political
units. Necessarily, since Congress wields the vast poser of creating political subdivisions, surely it can exercise the
lesser authority of requiring a set of criteria, standards, or ascertainable indicators of viability for their creation. Thus,
the only conceivable reason why the Constitution employs the clause in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code is to lay stress that it is Congress alone, and no other, which can impose the criteria.

B. On equal protection: No Violation of the equal protection clause

To the petitioners, the cityhood laws, by granting special treatment to respondent municipalities/LGUs by
way of exemption from the standard PhP 100 million minimum income requirement, violate Sec.1, Art. III of the
Constitution, which in part provides that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.

As a matter of settled legal principle, the fundamental right of equal protection does not require absolute equality. It
is enough that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights or privileges conferred
and responsibilities or obligations imposed. The equal protection clause does not preclude the state from recognizing
and acting upon factual differences between individuals and classes.

It recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is the right to classify, [51] necessarily implying that the equality
guaranteed is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must
(1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. [52] The Court finds that all these
requisites have been met by the laws challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory under the equal protection
clause.
 As things stand, the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen (16) municipalities by the cityhood laws
rests on substantial distinction. Indeed, respondent LGUs, which are subjected only to the erstwhile
PhP 20 million income criterion instead of the stringent income requirement prescribed in RA 9009, are
substantially different from other municipalities desirous to be cities. Looking back, we note that
respondent LGUs had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009. There lies part of the
tipping difference. And years before the enactment of the amendatory RA 9009, respondents LGUs had
already met the income criterion exacted for cityhood under the LGC of 1991. Due to extraneous
circumstances, however, the bills for their conversion remained unacted upon by Congress. As aptly
observed by then Senator, now Manila May

In the proceedings at bar, petitioner LCP and the intervenors cannot plausibly invoke the equal protection
clause, precisely because no deprivation of property results by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws. The LCPs
claim that the IRA of its member-cities will be substantially reduced on account of the conversion into cities of the
respondent LGUs would not suffice to bring it within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. Indeed, it is
presumptuous on the part of the LCP member-cities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their property,
as the IRA is yet to be allocated. For the same reason, the municipalities that are not covered by the uniform exemption
clause in the cityhood laws cannot validly invoke constitutional protection. For, at this point, the conversion of a
municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as such.

Navarro v Ermita

Sarangani v COMELEC

Salva v Macalintal

Facts:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Order dated
February 25, 1998,[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI, [2] in Civil Case No. 3442, denying
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to enjoin the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) from holding the plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Batangas enacted Ordinance No. 05[3] declaring the abolition of barangay San Rafael
and its merger with barangay Dacanlao, municipality of Calaca, Batangas and accordingly instructed the COMELEC
to conduct the required plebiscite.

Ordinance No. 05 was vetoed by the governor of Batangas for being ultra vires, particularly, as it was not shown that
the essential requirements under Section 9, in relation to Section 7, of Republic Act No. 7160, referring to the
attestations or certifications of the Department of Finance (DOF), National Statistics Office (NSO) and the Land
Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), were obtained.

Resolution No. 345 series of 1997 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas affirmed the effectivity of
Ordinance No. 05, thereby overriding the veto exercised by the governor of Batangas.

On February 10, 1998, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987, providing for the rules and regulations
governing the conduct of the required plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998.
On February 23, 1998, petitioners, as officials and residents of barangay San Rafael, Calaca, Batangas, filed a class
suit against the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas, and the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Simultaneous with the filing of the action before the trial court, petitioners
also filed an ex parte motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondents from enforcing
the assailed issuances.
The trial court denied the ex parte motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court ruled that any petition or action questioning an act, resolution or
decision of the COMELEC must be brought before the Supreme Court.
• On February 27, 1998, petitioners filed the instant petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order.
• In a Resolution dated March 10, 1998, the Court directed the parties to maintain the status quo prevailing at
the time of the filing of the petition.
• On August 28, 1998, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment, declaring
that he concurs with petitioners cause and recommending that the instant petition be given due course.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to rule on the validity of Resolution 2987.

Held:

YES

COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the
required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELECs quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of
its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a
final order reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be
well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
In Garces vs. Court of Appeals (259 SCRA 99 [1996]) and Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs.
Ferrer (135 SCRA 25 [1985]), we found occasion to interpret the foregoing provision in this wise:
xxx. What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC reviewable by
certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the
COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers.

After the COMELEC ascertained the issuance of the ordinance and resolution declaring the abolition of barangay San
Rafael, it issued COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 calling for a plebiscite to be held in the affected barangays, pursuant
to the provisions of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7160. The issuance of [COMELEC] Resolution No. 2987 is
thus a ministerial duty of the COMELEC that is enjoined by law and is part and parcel of its
administrative functions. It involves no exercise of discretionary authority on the part of respondent COMELEC; let
alone an exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power to hear and resolve controversies defining the rights and
duties of party-litigants, relative to the conduct of elections of public officers and the enforcement of the election laws.

In view of the foregoing, the other contentions of the respondents deserve scant consideration.

The Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI is ordered to proceed with dispatch in resolving Civil
Case No. 3442. The execution of the result of the plebiscite held on February 28, 1998 shall be deferred depending on
the outcome of Civil Case No. 3442.

Even the cases cited by the public respondent in support of its contention that the power to review or reverse
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 solely belongs to this Court are simply not in point. Zaldivar vs. Estenzo[32] speaks
of the power of the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections to the exclusion
of the judiciary. In the present case, petitioners are not contesting the exclusive authority of the COMELEC to enforce
and administer election laws.
 Luison vs. Garcia[33] refers to this Courts power to review administrative decisions, particularly referring to a
COMELEC resolution declaring a certain certificate of candidacy null and void, based on Article X, Section 2 of the
1935 Constitution.
In Macud vs. COMELEC,[34] we reiterated that when a board of canvassers rejects an election return on the
ground that it is spurious or has been tampered with, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to the COMELEC for
appropriate relief, and if the COMELEC sustains the action of the board, the aggrieved party may appeal to this
Court. In both Luison and Macud, the assailed COMELEC resolutions fall within the purview of final orders, rulings
and decisions of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by this Court.
In view of the foregoing, public respondents other contentions deserve scant consideration.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Order dated February 25, 1998, of
the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI is hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.

Lopez Jr. v COMELEC

Facts:
• Presidential Decree No. 824 was a response to a felt need for a "central government to establish and
administer program and provide services common to" the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, and Caloocan as
well as thirteen municipalities in the surrounding area.
• A public corporation was thus created "to be known as the Metropolitan Manila, vested with powers and
attributes of a corporation including the power to make contracts, sue and be sued, acquire, purchase,
expropriate, hold, transfer and dispose of property and such other powers as are necessary to carry out its
purposes." 4 It is administered by a Commission.
• Petitioners 6 in the second of the above cases 7 assail the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 824.
They rely on this provision: "No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units
affected." 8 The Local Government Code was not enacted until 1983.(Old LGC ni)

Issue: Whether or not the creation of Metropolitan Manila is constitutional

Held: YES

The recognition of the existence to Metropolitan Manila cannot be expressed any clearer. There can be no legal
justification then for a declaration of unconstitutionality. Presidential Decree No. 824 is not tainted with constitutional
infirmity. Moreover, the last vestige of doubt has been removed by the present constitutional provision adopted in the
plebiscite on January 27, 1984.

Reasons:

1. In Presidential Decree No 824 reference was made to "the referendum held on February 27, 1975 [wherein]
the residents of the Greater Manila Area authorized the President to restructure the local governments of the
four cities and 13 municipalities thereof into an integrated unit of the manager or commission form of
government," with the terms and conditions being left to the discretion of the President. It "is Vital to the
survival and growth of the aforementioned Greater Manila Area that a workable and effective system be
established for the coordination, integration and unified management of such local government services or
functions" 14therein, There is necessity for "the unified metropolitan services or functions [to] be planned,
administered, and operated [based on] the highest professional technical standards." 15 The foregoing
constitutes the justification for and the objective of such Presidential Decree.

Who should vote in the plebiscite?

2. There is relevance to this opening paragraph in the recent case of Paredes v. Executive Secretary (a proclamation
by the President, directing that a plebiscite be conducted in certain barangays, all within the municipality of Mayoyao,
Province of Ifugao, segregated under a Batas Pambansa, "to determine whether the said barangays shall become a new
municipality be known as the Municipality of Aguinaldo, Province of Ifugao.") In the case, the basis for such
contention is that the statute excluded from the plebiscite the voters from the poblacion and other barangays of the
Municipality of Mayoyao except those mentioned in the Act."

Justice Abad Santos dissented on the ground that the people in the barangay of the municipality of Aguinaldo should
likewise have voted in the plebiscite, not only those of the barangays that constituted the new municipality. The Court
did take note of the plausibility of such an approach but came to the conclusion that the constitutional provision on
the need for a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected would be satisfied even if "those
voters who are not from the barangay to be separated [were] excluded in the plebiscite." 20 It cannot be argued therefore
that the plebiscite held in the areas affected to constitute Metropolitan Manila, having manifested their will, the
constitutional provision relied upon by petitioners has been satisfied.

It is to be noted likewise that at the time of such plebiscite in February, 1975, there was no Local Government Code.

3. Authority of Marcos to create MM through a PD: So it was held in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections, 21 decided in January of 1975. The ponencia of Justice Makasiar dispelled "all doubts as to the legality of
such law-making authority by the President during the period of Martial Law

4. Mandamus will not lie

Sole petitioner in the other case 24 is likewise now Assemblyman Gemiliano C Lopez, Jr, of Metropolitan Manila. It
is a mandamus petition to require respondent Commission on Elections to order the elections for members of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod and Sangguniang Bayan in the four cities and thirteen towns of Metropolitan Manila.

As was ,stated in the Memorandum of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, the fact that it is a suit for mandamus
is an admission of the validity of Presidential Decree No. 824. 25 Nor would mandamus lie, it being provided therein
that "the Sangguniang Bayan shall be composed of as many barangay captains as may be determined and chosen by
the Commission, and such number of representatives from other sectors of the society as may be appointed by the
President upon recommendation of the Commission."

The petition's charge, that there is no duly constituted Sangguniang Bayan, in Metro Manila Area is untrue, and that
the citizenry therein do have a voice in decision-making, through the respective Sangguniang Bayans of each of the
political units therein."

5. Unless Presidential Decree No. 824 be construed in such a way that along with the rest of the other cities and
municipalities, there should be elections for the Sangguniang Bayan, then there is a denial of the equal protection
provision of the Constitution.

It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all
persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the priveleges conferred and
the liabilities imposed.

The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinction which make real differences; it
must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally
to each member of the class." 31 All such elements are present. There is no need to set forth anew the compelling
reasons that called for the creation of Metropolitan Manila. It is quite obvious that under the conditions then existing
— still present and, with the continued growth of population, attended with more complexity — what was done a
response to a great public need. The government was called upon to act. Presidential Decree No. 824 was the result.
It is not a condition for the validity of the Sangguniang Bayans provided for in the four cities and the thirteen
municipalities that the membership be Identical with those of other cities or municipalities.

6. Reference to Metro Manila in other laws:

 • Reference was made earlier to Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution where there is express recognition
of the juridical entity known as Metropolitan Manila
• Election Code of 1978
• Presidential Decree No. 1396 creating the Ministry of Human Settlements"
• April 7, 1981 amendments to the Constitution
• Lastly, in addition to Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution as approved on January 27, 1984, its
accompanying ordinance

7. Authority of the President over the Metro Manila Commission

There is, however, a question that may arise in connection with the powers of the President over the Commission.
According to Presidential Decree No. 824: "The Commission, the General Manager and any official of the
Commission shall be under the direct supervision and control of the President. Notwithstanding any provision in this
Decree, the President shall the power to revoke, amend or modify any ordinance, resolution or act of the Commission,
the General and the Commissioners."

It may give rise to doubts as to its validity insofar as it confers the power of control on the President. That control he
certainly exercises under the present Constitution over the ministries. 38 His power over local governments does not
go that far. It extends no further than general supervision. 39 These doubts, however, do not suffice to nullify such a
provision. They can be set at rest. Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad 40 shows the way. After reiterating the classic doctrine of
the presumption being always in favor of constitutionality, Justice Malcolm, as ponente, categorically declared: "To
doubt is to sustain."

Accordingly, the presidential power of control over acts of the Metro Manila Commission is limited to those that may
be considered national in character.

There is significance to the fact that the Local Government Code 51 does not include the Metro Manila Commission.
That is clear recognition that some of its attributes are those of a national character. Where, however, the acts of the
Metro Manila Commission may be considered as properly appertaining to local government functions, the power of
the President is confined to general supervision.

MMDA v Bel Air

Facts:

Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent
Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in
Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street,
a road inside Bel-Air Village.

On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December 22,
1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996.

On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent
Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.

On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 136, Makati
City, Civil Case No. 96-001 for injunction. Respondent prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order the following day.

On January 23, 1996, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction.[2] Respondent
questioned the denial before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549. The appellate court conducted an
ocular inspection of Neptune Street[3] and on February 13, 1996, it issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
the implementation of the MMDAs proposed action.[4]
On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a Decision on the merits of the case finding that the MMDA has
no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its
perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.

The Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was denied on September 28, 1998. Hence, this recourse.

Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of
the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is
traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and
welfare of the general public. It is alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the
consolidated cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court.[8] From the premise that it has police power, it is
now urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public.[9]

Issue:

WON the MMDA has the power to enact ordinances and can exercise the police power.

Held:

NO.

Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in
the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances,
either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare
of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.[10] The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive,
reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.[11]

It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature.[12] It cannot be exercised by any
group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power.[13] The National Legislature, however, may delegate
this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or
local government units.[14] Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on
them by the national lawmaking body.[15]

A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial
control of local affairs."[16] The Local Government Code of 1991 defines a local government unit as a "body politic
and corporate"[17]-- one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a
corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory.[18] Local government units are the provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays.[19] They are also the territorial and political subdivisions of the state.[20]

Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the Local Government Code of 1991.

Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. The legislative body of the
provincial government is the sangguniang panlalawigan, that of the city government is the sangguniang panlungsod,
that of the municipal government is the sangguniang bayan, and that of the barangay is the sangguniang barangay.
The Local Government Code of 1991 empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and
sangguniang bayan to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
[province, city or municipality, as the case may be], and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the
proper exercise of the corporate powers of the [province, city municipality] provided under the Code x x x."[22] The
same Code gives the sangguniang barangay the power to "enact ordinances as may be necessary to discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law or ordinance and to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants thereon.

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units - i.e., twelve (12) cities and
five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities of Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon,
Muntinlupa, Las Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and Valenzuela, and the municipalities of Malabon, , Navotas, ,
Pateros, San Juan and Taguig. With the passage of Republic Act (R. A.) No. 7924[24] in 1995, Metropolitan Manila
was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the Administration of "metro-wide" basic
services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA.[25]

"Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local political boundaries or
entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual local
government units comprising Metro Manila."[26] There are seven (7) basic metro-wide services and the scope of
these services cover the following: (1) development planning; (2) transport and traffic management; (3) solid waste
disposal and management; (4) flood control and sewerage management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use
planning, and shelter services; (6) health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control; and (7) public safety.

Clearly, the scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of these is
transport and traffic management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects
to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion
of the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass transport system and the institution of a system
of road regulation, the administration of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic
education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations.
Under this service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and
regulate the implementation of all traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install and
administer a single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations.

It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination,
regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies
of the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to
"enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority."[30] It is an agency created for the
purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, peoples
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of
basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually
summed up in the charter itself

Contrary to petitioners claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at bar. Firstly, both involved zoning
ordinances passed by the municipal council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for the proposed
opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA,
through its president. The notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA
simply relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and
convenient movement of persons." Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within
the scope of transport and traffic management. By no stretch of the imagination, however, can this be interpreted as
an express or implied grant of ordinance-making power, much less police power.

Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the
present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the
latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA.

Metropolitan Manila was first created in 1975 by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 824. It comprised the Greater
Manila Area composed of the contiguous four (4) cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay and Caloocan, and the thirteen
(13) municipalities of Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Las Pinas, Malabon, Navotas, Pasig, Pateros, Paranaque,
Marikina, Muntinlupa and Taguig in the province of Rizal, and Valenzuela in the province of Bulacan.[40]
Metropolitan Manila was created as a response to the finding that the rapid growth of population and the increase of
social and economic requirements in these areas demand a call for simultaneous and unified development; that the
public services rendered by the respective local governments could be administered more efficiently and
economically if integrated under a system of central planning; and this coordination, "especially in the maintenance
of peace and order and the eradication of social and economic ills that fanned the flames of rebellion and discontent
[were] part of reform measures under Martial Law essential to the safety and security of the State."[41]

Metropolitan Manila was established as a "public corporation".

The MMC was the "central government" of Metro Manila for the purpose of establishing and administering
programs providing services common to the area. As a "central government" it had the power to levy and collect
taxes and special assessments, the power to charge and collect fees; the power to appropriate money for its
operation, and at the same time, review appropriations for the city and municipal units within its jurisdiction. It was
bestowed the power to enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and fix penalties for violation of such ordinances
and resolutions. It also had the power to review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts of any
of the four (4) cities and thirteen (13) municipalities comprising Metro Manila.

The creation of the MMC also carried with it the creation of the Sangguniang Bayan. This was composed of the
members of the component city and municipal councils, barangay captains chosen by the MMC and sectoral
representatives appointed by the President. The Sangguniang Bayan had the power to recommend to the MMC the
adoption of ordinances, resolutions or measures. It was the MMC itself, however, that possessed legislative powers.
All ordinances, resolutions and measures recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan were subject to the MMCs
approval. Moreover, the power to impose taxes and other levies, the power to appropriate money, and the power to
pass ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions were vested exclusively in the MMC.

Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a "central government," i.e., the MMC which fully possessed legislative and police
powers. Whatever legislative powers the component cities and municipalities had were all subject to review and
approval by the MMC.

The Constitution itself expressly provides that Congress may, by law, create "special metropolitan political
subdivisions" which shall be subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected; the jurisdiction of this subdivision shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination; and the
cities and municipalities comprising this subdivision shall retain their basic autonomy and their own local executive
and legislative assemblies.[

In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 and constituted the Metropolitan Manila
Authority (MMA). The powers and functions of the MMC were devolved to the MMA.[46] It ought to be stressed,
however, that not all powers and functions of the MMC were passed to the MMA. The MMAs power was limited to
the "delivery of basic urban services requiring coordination in Metropolitan Manila."[47] The MMAs governing
body, the Metropolitan Manila Council, although composed of the mayors of the component cities and
municipalities, was merely given the power of: (1) formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring
coordination and consolidation; and (2) promulgation of resolutions and other issuances, approval of a code of basic
services and the exercise of its rule-making power.

The MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro
Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs functions.
There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the
metropolis.

It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with
legislative power. It is not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11, Article
X of the Constitution. The creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.[56] R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted
to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the
people, but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function
is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the President,[57] whereas in local government units,
the President merely exercises supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA.

Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike the
MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government
units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. In the
case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the
opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of
Appeals did not err in so ruling. We desist from ruling on the other issues as they are unnecessary.