T H O M A S W.

P O G G E

Realizing Rawls

C o r n e l l University P r e s s

Ithaca and London

Copyright © 1989 by Cornell University

All rights reserved. Except for brief q u o t a t i o n s in a review, this book, o r parts thereof,
must not be reproduced in any form w i t h o u t p e r m i s s i o n in writing from t h e publisher.
For information, address Cornell University Press, 124 Roberts Place, Ithaca, N e w York
14850.

First published 1989 by Cornell University Press.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Pogge, T h o m a s Winfried Menko.
Realizing Rawls / T h o m a s W. Pogge.
p. c m .
Bibliography: p
Includes index.
ISBN 0-8014-2124-1 talk, paper). — ISBN 0-8014-9685-3 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Rawls, John, 1 9 2 1 - Theory of justice. 2. Justice. I. Title.
JC578.R383P64 1989 320'.o'l'l—dc20 89-42879

Printed in the United States of America

0 0
The paper u s e d in this publication m e e t s t h e m i n i m u m r e q u i r e m e n t s of the
American National Standard for P e r m a n e n c e of Paper for Printed Library Materials
Z39.48-1984.
FOR JOHN RAWLS,
w h o m a d e it p o s s i b l e
and necessary
Contents

Acknowledgments ix
Abbreviations xi
Introduction 1

Part One: Defending the Main Ideas

1. N o z i c k a n d t h e F o c u s o n t h e B a s i c S t r u c t u r e 15
§1 T h e P r o b l e m of Justice 15
§2 T h e Relevance of Patterns 28
§3 T h e C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m of Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n of Justice 36
§4 Nozick's D e o n t o l o g i c a l Alternative 48

2 . S a n d e l a n d t h e C o n c e p t i o n of t h e P e r s o n 63
§5 Natural E n d o w m e n t s 63
§6 Natural E n d o w m e n t s a n d Desert 73
§7 Desert 81
§8 T h e " D e o n t o l o g i c a l " Self 86
§9 Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n of t h e P e r s o n 94

Part T w o : D e v e l o p i n g Rawls's Criterion of Justice

3. T h e First P r i n c i p l e of Justice 109

§10 The General Parameters 109
§11 T h e Split i n t o T w o P r i n c i p l e s of J u s t i c e 122
viii Contents

§12 T h e Package of Basic Rights a n d Liberties 134

§13 T h e Political P r o c e s s 148

4. T h e S e c o n d P r i n c i p l e o f J u s t i c e
§14 Rawls's O p p o r t u n i t y Principle 161
§15 Educational and Employment Opportunities 173
§16 Medical Opportunities 181
§17 The Difference Principle 196

Part T h r e e : Globalizing t h e Ravvlsian C o n c e p t i o n of

Justice

5. F r o m M o d u s Vivendi to V a l u e O v e r l a p 211
§18 T h e Practical I m p o r t a n c e of J u s t i c e 211
§19 International Relations as a M o d u s Vivendi 218
§20 A Value-Based World Order 227

6. A C r i t e r i o n of G l o b a l J u s t i c e 240
§21 T h e T r a d i t i o n a l L a w of N a t i o n s 240
§22 T h e Internal A r g u m e n t 246
§23 T h e External A r g u m e n t 259
§24 Conclusion 273

Selected Bibliography 281

Index 285
Acknowledgments

H o w e v e r critical a n d revisionist, this b o o k is i n s p i r e d b y a d e e p

a d m i r a t i o n for J o h n Rawls's t h e o r y of justice, in w h i c h I s e e , d e s p i t e
its s h o r t c o m i n g s , a b a s i c framework of c o m p e l l i n g s c o p e a n d m o r a l
b e a u t y . My f o r e m o s t a i m w a s t o e x p r e s s t h i s vision.
My w o r k in political p h i l o s o p h y h a s greatly benefited over t h e y e a r s
from t h e critical a t t e n t i o n it received from Rawls a n d later from S i d n e y
M o r g e n b e s s e r , C h a r l e s L a r m o r e , a n d B r u c e A c k e r m a n . T h a t n o n e of
t h e m is p a r t i c u l a r l y s y m p a t h e t i c t o m y a p p r o a c h a n d c o n c l u s i o n s h a s
m a d e o u r d i s c u s s i o n s all t h e m o r e v a l u a b l e t o m e . A c k e r m a n b e a r s a n
a d d i t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y : W h e n I h a d a b a n d o n e d p l a n s for t h i s book,
h e i n s i s t e d , a m i c a b l y b u t very firmly, t h a t it b e w r i t t e n . He cheerfully
a d d e d t h a t it w o u l d n ' t b e great, b u t it w o u l d still b e a g o o d b o o k .
T h e a c t u a l w r i t i n g w a s d o n e in t h e a d v e n t u r o u s fluvial e n v i r o n m e n t
of Wolfson College, O x f o r d — a p l a c e of w o n d e r f u l p e o p l e a n d i d e a s t h a t
proved most inspiring a n d hospitable. Upon m y return, I received
e x t e n s i v e c o m m e n t s o n t h e e n t i r e t y p e s c r i p t from C h a r l e s L a r m o r e ,
A n d r e a s Follesdal, B r u c e A c k e r m a n , a n d Ling T o n g . H e n r y R i c h a r d s o n
a n d O s c a r S c h a c h t e r p r o v i d e d a d d i t i o n a l feedback o n C h a p t e r s 2 a n d 5
respectively. T h e s e b e n e v o l e n t critics h a v e t a u g h t m e m u c h a n d , I
h o p e , e n a b l e d m e t o give c l e a r e r e x p r e s s i o n t o m y t h o u g h t s .

T h o m a s W. Pogge
New York, New York

ix
Abbreviations

Works by J o h n Rawls are abbreviated as follows:

BLP " T h e B a s i c L i b e r t i e s a n d T h e i r P r i o r i t y , " i n S. M . M c M u r r i n , e d . , The

Tanner Lectures on Human Value, 3 (Salt L a k e C i t y : U n i v e r s i t y o f U t a h
Press, 1982).
BSS " T h e B a s i c S t r u c t u r e a s S u b j e c t , " i n A. I. G o l d m a n a n d J. K i m , e d s . ,
Values and Morals (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978).
DPOC " T h e D o m a i n o f t h e P o l i t i c a l a n d O v e r l a p p i n g C o n s e n s u s , " i n New
York University Law Review 6 4 ( J u n e 1 9 8 9 ) .
FG " F a i r n e s s t o G o o d n e s s , " Philosophical Review 8 4 (1975), 5 3 6 - 5 4 .
IMT " T h e I n d e p e n d e n c e o f M o r a l T h e o r y , " Proceedings and Addresses of
the American Philosophical Association 4 8 ( N o v e m b e r 1975), 5 - 2 2 .
IOC " T h e I d e a o f a n O v e r l a p p i n g C o n s e n s u s , " Orford Journal of Legal
Studies 7 (Spring 1987), 1 - 2 5 .
JF " J u s t i c e a s F a i r n e s s , " Philosophical Review 6 7 (April 1 9 5 8 ) , 1 6 4 - 9 4 .
JFFM "Justice a s Fairness: Political n o t Metaphysical,"P/iz7osop/7yandP(jfo/f'c
Affairs 1 4 ( S u m m e r 1 9 8 5 ) , 2 2 3 - 5 1 .
JR " J u s t i c e a s R e c i p r o c i t y , " i n S. G o r o w i t z , e d . , Utilitarianism: John Stuart
Mill, with Critical Essays ( I n d i a n a p o l i s : Bobbs-Merrill, 1971).
KCMT " K a n t i a n C o n s t r u c t i v i s m i n M o r a l T h e o r y , " Journal of Philosophy 77
( S e p t e m b e r 1980), 5 1 5 - 7 2 .
ODPE " O u t l i n e o f a D e c i s i o n P r o c e d u r e f o r E t h i c s , " Philosophical Review 60
(1951), 1 7 7 - 9 7 .
PFE " P r e f a c e f o r t h e F r e n c h E d i t i o n " o f TJ, E n g l i s h t y p e s c r i p t ( A u g u s t
1 9 8 6 ) , p p . 1 - 6 . F r e n c h v e r s i o n i n Theorie de la justice, trans. Catherine
A u d a r d (Paris: Seuil, 1987).
PRIG " T h e P r i o r i t y o f R i g h t a n d I d e a s o f t h e G o o d , " Philosophy and Public
Affairs 1 7 (Fall 1 9 8 8 ) , 2 5 1 - 7 6 .
RAM " R e p l y t o A l e x a n d e r a n d M u s g r a v e , " Quarterly Journal of Economics
88 ( N o v e m b e r 1974), 6 3 3 - 5 5 .

xi
xii Abbreviations

RMC " S o m e R e a s o n s for t h e M a x i m i n C r i t e r i o n , " American Economic Re­

view 6 4 ( M a y 1 9 7 4 ) , 1 4 1 - 4 6 .
SUPG "Social U n i t y a n d P r i m a r y G o o d s , " in A. K. S e n a n d B. W i l l i a m s , e d s . ,
Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1982).
TCR " T w o C o n c e p t s o f R u l e s , " i n S. G o r o w i t z , e d . , Utilitarianism: John
Stuart Mill, with Critical Essays ( I n d i a n a p o l i s : B o b b s - M e r r i l l , 1 9 7 1 ) .
TG Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, t r a n s . H e r m a n n Vetter (Frankfurt:
S u h r k a m p , 1 9 7 5 ) . All t r a n s l a t i o n s o f TJ w e r e p r e p a r e d f r o m a r e v i s e d
E n g l i s h t e x t c o m p l e t e d in M a r c h o f 1 9 7 5 (cf. P F E 1 ) . H a v i n g c h e c k e d all
p a s s a g e s c i t e d f r o m TJ a g a i n s t t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s i n T G , I n o t e a n y
relevant d i s c r e p a n c i e s .
TJ A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).
WOS "A W e l l - O r d e r e d S o c i e t y , " i n P. L a s l e t t a n d J. F i s h k i n , e d s . , Philosophy,
Politics, and Society, 5th s e r i e s ( N e w Haven: Yale University Press,
1979), first p u b l i s h e d a s "A K a n t i a n C o n c e p t i o n o f E q u a l i t y , " Cam­
bridge Review ( F e b r u a r y 1 9 7 5 ) , 9 4 - 9 9 .
REALIZING RAWLS
 Introduction

T h i s b o o k is b o t h a d e f e n s e a n d a c o n s t r u c t i v e c r i t i q u e of t h e w o r k of
J o h n Rawls. T h e s e t w o a s p e c t s p r e s u p p o s e e a c h o t h e r . T h e c o n s t r u c ­
tive c r i t i q u e is n e c e s s a r y to s h o w t h a t c e r t a i n c o r e i d e a s of Rawls's
t h e o r y of j u s t i c e c a n b e d e v e l o p e d in a w a y t h a t m a k e s t h e m w o r t h
d e f e n d i n g . After all, t h e r e is little i n t e r e s t in j u s t k e e p i n g t h e s c o r e
straight. T h e d e f e n s e is n e c e s s a r y t o s h o w t h a t t h e s e i d e a s h a v e re­
m a i n e d u n d a m a g e d — a n d e v e n largely u n r e c o g n i z e d — i n t h e b a r r a g e
of criticism Rawls h a s p r o v o k e d . T h e b o o k as a w h o l e is m e a n t to s h o w
t h a t Rawls offers a s o u n d b a s i s for p r o g r e s s in political p h i l o s o p h y as
well a s for political p r o g r e s s .
1
I d o n ' t a i m for a c o m p r e h e n s i v e c o m m e n t a r y o n Rawls. I n s t e a d , I
c o n c e n t r a t e o n t w o c e n t r a l Rawlsian i d e a s : first, t h e focus o n t h e b a s i c
s t r u c t u r e , for m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y m u s t i n c l u d e , even b e g i n from, a reflec­
t i o n u p o n t h e j u s t i c e of o u r b a s i c social i n s t i t u t i o n s ; s e c o n d , t h e m a x -
i m i n i d e a t h a t a s c h e m e of social i n s t i t u t i o n s is t o b e a s s e s s e d b y t h e
w o r s t p o s i t i o n it g e n e r a t e s , t h a t its j u s t i c e d e p e n d s o n h o w well it d o e s
b y its least a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s . My m a i n i n t e r e s t is t h u s in o n e
p a r t of Rawls's t h e o r y , h i s c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . I a m centrally c o n ­
c e r n e d w i t h t h e m e a n i n g of t h e c r i t e r i o n of justice h e h a s p r o p o s e d ,
w i t h t h e r a t i o n a l e for this criterion, a n d w i t h its a p p l i c a t i o n to existing
a n d feasible i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s .
M a t t e r s p e r i p h e r a l to t h e s e e m i n e n t l y p r a c t i c a l political c o n c e r n s ,
h o w e v e r i m p o r t a n t t h e y m a y b e to Rawls, figure o n l y p e r i p h e r a l l y h e r e .

J
N o r d o I aim to p r o v i d e a c o m p r e h e n s i v e c o m m e n t a r y o n the s e c o n d a r y literature o n
Rawls. I d o cite s o m e of t h e s e s o u r c e s w h e r e it m a y b e illuminating to s e e h o w I agree or
disagree w i t h t h e m , b u t I make n o effort to a c k n o w l e d g e a n d d i s c u s s every previous
c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e i s s u e s I a m c o n c e r n e d w i t h . Given the a m o u n t of s e c o n d a r y writing
o n Rawls, s u c h a n e n d e a v o r w o u l d have m a d e this b o o k u n r e a d a b l e .

1
2 Introduction
I d o not, for example, treat t h e c o n s t r u c t of t h e original p o s i t i o n in a n y
detail, t h o u g h I d o s o m e t i m e s e m p l o y it t o d r a m a t i z e t h e priority
c o n c e r n for t h e least a d v a n t a g e d ( u n d e r v a r i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s ) ,
w h o m t h e p a r t i e s take t h e m s e l v e s t o b e r e p r e s e n t i n g . N o r d o 1 offer a n
elaboration, either critical or defensive, of K a n t i a n c o n s t r u c t i v i s m o r of
t h e m e t h o d of w i d e reflective e q u i l i b r i u m , t h o u g h I a p p e a l t o t h e m
occasionally to s h o w t h a t Rawls h a s r e a s o n to agree w i t h m e o n s o m e
point. I avoid extensive d i s c u s s i o n of t h e s e t o p i c s b e c a u s e it is n o t
essential to m y objective. I w a n t t o explicate a n d d e v e l o p w h a t I take to
b e Rawls's two m o s t powerful a n d i m p o r t a n t i d e a s , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e i r
practical political implications (as I see t h e m ) . All t h i s c o u l d b e d o n e
w i t h o u t even m e n t i o n i n g t h e "expository device" (TJ 21) of t h e original
position, a n d o n e c a n fully a c c e p t m y c o n c l u s i o n s r e g a r d l e s s of
w h e t h e r o n e a c c e p t s or rejects (or is even a c q u a i n t e d with) K a n t i a n
constructivism or t h e m e t h o d of w i d e reflective e q u i l i b r i u m .
My a t t e m p t to d e v e l o p a s y s t e m a t i c a n d c o n c r e t e c o n c e p t i o n of
justice b a s e d on Rawlsian i d e a s g o e s against a p o p u l a r t r e n d in Anglo-
American a c a d e m i a . T h e r e is a w i d e s p r e a d s e n s e t h a t Rawls's w o r k is
in s h a m b l e s b e c a u s e h i s critics have s h o w n its f o u n d a t i o n s to b e
essentially a n d irremediably flawed. Since Rawls's m i s t a k e is t h o u g h t t o
b e a d e e p o n e , t h e collapse of h i s t h e o r y is s a i d t o i n d i c a t e s o m e t h i n g
larger, to m a r k t h e e n d of a n era, p e r h a p s t h e d e a t h of liberalism, t h e
d e m i s e of t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t tradition, or even t h e b a n k r u p t c y of s y s ­
tematic m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y . W h a t w e n e e d is a radical r e o r i e n t a t i o n in
o u r ethical thinking, or so t h e story goes. Several a u t h o r s h a v e a l r e a d y
v o l u n t e e r e d t o set t h e a g e n d a for t h e d a w n i n g p o s t - R a w l s i a n era, a n
a g e n d a b a s e d o n t h e r e n u n c i a t i o n not m e r e l y of Rawls's c o n c l u s i o n s
2
b u t of his goals a n d entire a p p r o a c h .
Rather t h a n directly confront t h e s e n e w a g e n d a s h e r e , I e x a m i n e o n e
m a i n s o u r c e of t h e i r popularity, t h e n o t i o n t h a t Rawls's t h e o r y h a s
collapsed. My defense of t h a t t h e o r y in Part O n e is m e a n t t o s h o w t h a t
t h e obituaries are p r e m a t u r e , t h a t Rawls's critics have n o t e x p o s e d a n y
d e e p flaw i n h i s w o r k at all; t h e y have m e r e l y m i s u n d e r s t o o d it (albeit
deeply). T h a t Rawls's t h e o r y easily survives t h e c o m m o n c r i t i c i s m s
directed against it d o e s not, of c o u r s e , g u a r a n t e e t h a t it i s n ' t d e e p l y
flawed in o t h e r w a y s . But j u d g m e n t o n its u l t i m a t e tenability is b e s t
deferred until w e have a better u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e t h e o r y , t o g e t h e r
w i t h its p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d practical i m p l i c a t i o n s , t h a n h a s y e t b e e n
achieved.
However u n d a m a g e d phUosophically, Rawls's w o r k is i n d e c l i n e a s a
m a t t e r of a c a d e m i c politics. T h e critics have clearly w o n i n t h e a r e n a of
public relations. We are well b e y o n d t h e stage w h e n , in Robert Nozick's
w o r d s , political p h i l o s o p h e r s n o w m u s t e i t h e r w o r k w i t h i n R a w l s '
8 X m p l e A l 3 S d a i r M a c I n
SandTi^M- h u ' ^ Bernard Williams, M i c h a e l
W a t e r w h w a n t C t l 3 i e & l b e c e n t r a U
SSS' with m ™ H , ' ° - ° y concerned with h u m a n
virtues, w i t h g r o u n d p , e c t s and d e e p c o m m i t m e n t s , or w i t h a n o t i o n of c o m m u n i t y .
r o
 Introduction 3

t h e o r y o r e x p l a i n w h y n o t " (ASU 183). T o d a y it is m o r e c o m m o n for

political p h i l o s o p h e r s to m a k e d o w i t h a brief r e m i n d e r t h a t Rawls's
t h e o r y c a n b e set a s i d e b e c a u s e of its i r r e m e d i a b l e failure to c o m e to
t e r m s w i t h this o r t h a t f u n d a m e n t a l difficulty.
T h i s shift in a c a d e m i c p r e p o s s e s s i o n s is in large p a r t d u e t o t h e w o r k
of Rawls's t w o m o s t influential critics, Nozick a n d M i c h a e l Sandel,
w h o m I c o n f r o n t in detail in Part O n e . I a m o n l y m a r g i n a l l y i n t e r e s t e d
3
in t h e i r o w n p o s i t i o n s , w h i c h I m a k e n o claim t o h a v e u n d e r m i n e d .
Rather, m y c o n c e r n is to s h o w in all clarity h o w t h e i r r e a d i n g a n d
criticism of Rawls a r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y m i s t a k e n . B e g i n n i n g in t h i s w a y
allows m e to s h o w t h a t Rawls is still w o r t h taking seriously a n d to
c o r r e c t s o m e b a s i c m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s t h a t are o n t h e verge of b e c o m ­
i n g official Rawls d o c t r i n e .
Nozick a n d Sandel, t h e libertarian a n d t h e c o m m u n i t a r i a n , s h a r e t h e
m o s t i m p o r t a n t m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of Rawls. Both fail t o a p p r e c i a t e his
d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n j u s t i c e a n d morality, b e t w e e n t h e focus o n b a s i c
social i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d t h e focus o n p e r s o n s ' c o n d u c t a n d c h a r a c t e r .
But in C h a p t e r 1, w h e n I explicate a n d d e v e l o p t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n a n d t h e
R a w l s i a n focus o n t h e basic s t r u c t u r e , I d r a w u p o n Nozick's criticism
only, b e c a u s e S a n d e l , heavily i n f l u e n c e d b y Nozick, offers n o t h i n g es­
sentially n e w o n this s c o r e . S a n d e l figures p r o m i n e n t l y in C h a p t e r 2,
b e c a u s e of a s e c o n d , i n d e p e n d e n t m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of Rawls, p a r t l y
i n s p i r e d b y Nozick, w h i c h h e h a s d e v e l o p e d a n d grafted o n t o t h e first.
T h i s s e c o n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g involves Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r ­
s o n as, s u p p o s e d l y , a b a r r e n , u n e n c u m b e r e d self, d e v o i d of c o n s t i t u t i v e
c o m m i t m e n t s a n d a t t a c h m e n t s . I s h o w t h a t Rawls is n o t c o m m i t t e d to
s u c h a c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n a n d t h a t t h e tenability of his c o n c e p ­
tion of j u s t i c e e v e n d e p e n d s , in part, o n t h e d e n i a l of t h e c o n c e p t i o n of
t h e p e r s o n that S a n d e l a t t r i b u t e s to h i m .
T h e critics' s u c c e s s , h o w e v e r unjustified, h a s stifled w h a t , in m y
view, w o u l d h a v e b e e n t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t u p s h o t of Rawls's w o r k — a
b r o a d d e b a t e a b o u t t h e j u s t i c e of existing i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d feasible
a v e n u e s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform. I n d e e d , Rawls's w o r k h a s a u n i q u e
affinity for a c o n c r e t e d e b a t e a b o u t j u s t i c e b e c a u s e of its c o m m i t m e n t
to t h e p r i m a c y of t h e practical:

T h e s e a r c h for r e a s o n a b l e g r o u n d s for r e a c h i n g a g r e e m e n t r o o t e d i n o u r
c o n c e p t i o n of o u r s e l v e s a n d in o u r r e l a t i o n t o s o c i e t y r e p l a c e s t h e s e a r c h
f o r m o r a l t r u t h i n t e r p r e t e d a s fixed b y a p r i o r a n d i n d e p e n d e n t o r d e r o f
objects a n d relations, w h e t h e r natural or divine, an order apart a n d dis­
t i n c t f r o m h o w w e c o n c e i v e o f o u r s e l v e s . T h e t a s k is t o a r t i c u l a t e a p u b l i c

3
N o z i c k h a s p r e s e n t e d a crisp a n d interesting political p h i l o s o p h y of h i s o w n , a n d
Sandel is d e v e l o p i n g h i s . T h e s e p o s i t i o n s are w o r t h s t u d y i n g (for s o m e s e c o n d a r y litera­
ture, s e e , e.g., Paul, RN; G u t m a n n , CCL; a n d Larmore, PMC 1 2 1 - 2 9 ) . My claim that Nozick
a n d Sandel have m i s u n d e r s t o o d Rawls d o e s not e x p r e s s d i s r e s p e c t for their positive
a c h i e v e m e n t s . Moreover, t h e mere fact that m a n y h a v e followed their m i s r e a d i n g s s h o w s
that t h e s e m u s t h a v e s o m e plausibility, b o t h as r e a d i n g s of Rawls a n d in their o w n right.
4 Introduction
c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i c e t h a t all c a n live w i t h w h o r e g a r d t h e i r p e r s o n and
their relation to society in a certain w a y . A n d t h o u g h d o i n g t h i s may
i n v o l v e s e t t l i n g t h e o r e t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s , t h e p r a c t i c a l s o c i a l t a s k is p r i m a r y .
[KCMT 519]

Previous writers o n justice c o u l d derive comfort from t h e fact t h a t t h e i r

work, w h a t e v e r its political i m p a c t or lack thereof, w o u l d at least h e l p
elucidate w h a t justice is a n d r e q u i r e s . T h e y v i e w e d t h e truth of a t h e o r y
as i n d e p e n d e n t of its p o p u l a r a p p e a l a n d political s u c c e s s , a n d t h u s
c o n s i d e r e d it a great a c h i e v e m e n t to c o n s t r u c t t h e just s o c i e t y "as a
m o d e l laid u p in heaven. . . . It m a k e s n o difference w h e t h e r it exists
a n y w h e r e o r will exist" (Plato, Republic 592b).
Rawls c a n derive n o s u c h comfort, for h e c l a i m s n o t r u t h for his
c o n c e p t i o n b e y o n d its p o t e n t i a l to serve a s t h e c o r e of a n o v e r l a p p i n g
c o n s e n s u s . W h e t h e r his c o n c e p t i o n of justice h a s t h i s p o t e n t i a l is n o t a
theoretical m a t t e r that c o u l d b e d e c i d e d t h r o u g h f u r t h e r a r g u m e n t s
within t h e theory itself. Rather, it is a p r a c t i c a l q u e s t i o n that c a n b e
settled conclusively only by t h e a c t u a l s u c c e s s of t h e c o n c e p t i o n in t h e
role for w h i c h it w a s i n t e n d e d . Here a great d e a l of w o r k r e m a i n s t o b e
d o n e before Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n will h a v e e v e n a c h a n c e t o s u c c e e d .
Some of this w o r k I a t t e m p t to d o h e r e . My c o n s t r u c t i v e c r i t i q u e of
-Rawls in Parts T w o a n d T h r e e d e v e l o p s h i s c o n c e p t i o n in a w a y t h a t
r e n d e r s it mpre_concrete a n d m a k e s its full progressive p o t e n t i a l m o r e
visible. Both t h e s e aims go a g a i n s t t h e t r e n d of Rawls's l a t e r w o r k
t o w a r d abstraction, v a g u e n e s s , a n d c o n s e r v a t i s m . I s e e this t r e n d as
d u e , in large part, to t h e w i d e s p r e a d criticism of his work, w h i c h , in this
d e c a d e at least, h a s b e e n p r e d o m i n a n t l y conservative. Rawls h a s b e e n
exceptionally unwilling t o disagree s h a r p l y w i t h h i s critics. R e l u c t a n t
to claim privileged a c c e s s to h i s work, h e h a s s h i e d a w a y from s a y i n g
(and showing) clearly a n d straightforwardly t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r r e a d i n g of
it is just p l a i n w r o n g . Instead, a i m i n g for a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s
a m o n g political p h i l o s o p h e r s a s well, h e h a s m a d e every c o n c e i v a b l e
effort to a c c o m m o d a t e t h e m o r a l p o s i t i o n s of o t h e r s , e v e n w h e r e s u c h
a c c o m m o d a t i o n h a s d i l u t e d t h e c e n t r a l m o r a l s t a t e m e n t of h i s o w n
c o n c e p t i o n of justice.
With h i n d s i g h t it s e e m s fair t o say that this h a s n o t b e e n a w i n n i n g
strategy. It h a s certainly not s t o p p e d t h e criticism a n d r e j e c t i o n of h i s
work; o n t h e contrary, by s h o w i n g Rawls o n t h e defensive, it h a s p e r ­
h a p s even e n c o u r a g e d attack. M o r e i m p o r t a n t , t h i s strategy h a s m o v e d
t h e d e b a t e in exactly t h e w r o n g direction. As t h e political c o n t e n t of
Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n h a s b e c o m e m o r e a n d m o r e vague a n d i n d e t e r m i ­
nate, a t t e n t i o n h a s shifted to t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l u n d e r p i n n i n g s of t h e
theory. We are back to issues in m o r a l psychology, m e t a e t h i c s , a n d
m o r a l e p i s t e m o l o g y — t o d e b a t e s that are m e t a p h y s i c a l i n s t v l e , if n o t in
J
substance.
T h o s e for w h o m t h e practical social task is p r i m a r y w o u l d take j u s t
 Introduction 5

t h e o p p o s i t e a p p r o a c h to t h e subject. T h e y w o u l d n o t begin w i t h t h e
f o u n d a t i o n s u p o n w h i c h a w h o l e edifice of m o r a l k n o w l e d g e is t o b e
e r e c t e d . I n s t e a d , t h e y w o u l d start from c o n c r e t e m o r a l i s s u e s a c t u a l l y
in d i s p u t e a n d t h e n e x t e n d t h e i r m o r a l reflection a s far afield as is
n e c e s s a r y to r e a c h a g r e e m e n t . T h e y w o u l d n o t w a n t to learn a b o u t
K a n t i a n c o n s t r u c t i v i s m , reflective e q u i l i b r i u m , a n d t h e c o n c e p t i o n of
t h e p e r s o n u n t i l t h e y h a d first g r a s p e d t h e political c o n t e n t of Rawls's
c r i t e r i o n of justice, h o w it is to govern social i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d g u i d e
t h e i r a s s e s s m e n t a n d reform. O t h e r m a t t e r s are i m p o r t a n t only insofar
a s t h e y affect t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of this criterion o r its justification
a g a i n s t c o m p e t i n g criteria t h a t are a c t u a l l y p u t f o r w a r d in g o o d faith.
T h i s difference in a p p r o a c h h a s political r e l e v a n c e . C u r r e n t l y , m o r a l
a n d political p h i l o s o p h e r s a r e c o n t r i b u t i n g to t h e g e n e r a l c o m p l a ­
c e n c y a b o u t m o r a l i t y in v a r i o u s w a y s . S o m e of t h e s e c o n t r i b u t i o n s are
s c a r c e l y a v o i d a b l e . T h e r e h a v e always b e e n p h i l o s o p h e r s w h o c a t e r to
t h e i n d i v i d u a l a n d collective self-concern of t h e i r a u d i e n c e s , t h e r e b y
4
t u r n i n g s o m e into e a g e r c o n v e r t s a n d o t h e r s i n t o m o r a l c y n i c s . W h a t
w e c a n avoid is p r e s e n t i n g t h e i m a g e of a c o m m u n i t y of e x p e r t s totally
a n d h o p e l e s s l y d i v i d e d o n even t h e m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n s . T h i s
i m a g e m a k e s it far too e a s y for politicians, professionals, a n d p e o p l e in
g e n e r a l t o cast m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a s i d e in s i t u a t i o n s w h e r e a t t e n d ­
i n g to t h e m is liable to c a u s e discomfort. F o c u s i n g t h e ethical d e b a t e o n
c o n c r e t e i s s u e s of practical r e l e v a n c e w o u l d alleviate this p r o b l e m in
t w o w a y s : m o r a l d e b a t e s are h a r d e r to i g n o r e w h e n t h e i r p o i n t is to
c o m e to terms with malnutrition, homelessness, a n d oppression than
w h e n t h e y e x h a u s t t h e m s e l v e s in s p e c u l a t i o n s a b o u t ideal observers,
s e c o n d a r y qualities, a n d t h e f o u n d a t i o n s of i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o m p a r i ­
s o n s ; a n d d i s a g r e e m e n t a b o u t c o n c r e t e m o r a l i s s u e s is generally n a r -
*Our l i m e h a s p e r h a p s m o r e than its share of t h e s e b e c a u s e of the p o p u l a r n o t i o n (a
vulgar version of Rawls's idea of reflective equilibrium I that morality is w h a t e v e r fits best
with "our" reactions a n d i n t u i t i o n s — e q u a t e d , in a c o m m o n e x p r e s s i o n , w i t h the moral
facts. W h e n moraJists from all c a m p s s e e it a s their task to d e m o n s t r a t e that their
respective theories c a n "account for o u r moral experience," w e n e e d not be surprised, at
the h e i g h t of what is often called the rne-generahon, to find p h i l o s o p h e r s proliferating all
sorts of h i g h - s o u n d i n g p h r a s e s (and p u r p o r t e d justifications] for individual a n d c o l l e c ­
tive self-concern: a g e n t - c e n t e r e d prerogatives, a robust z o n e of moral indifference, a
cutoff for h e r o i s m , a n d t h e like. Justifications for s u c h n o t i o n s generally e m p h a s i z e h o w
very i m p o r t a n t it is to u s — i n d e e d , a matter of integrity—to be faithful to o u r d e e p
projects a n d constitutive c o m m i t m e n t s . There is praise for lovality to family, f i i e n d s , a n d
c o m m u n i t y a n d ridicule for abstract universalistic moraJism s u p p o s e d l y p r o d u c i n g
moral s a i n t s a n d d o - g o o d e r s w h o are intolerable as friends a n d lovers. It is transparent
e n o u g h that this diversion of the agent's moral c o n c e r n from t h o s e m o r e distant to t h o s e
a r o u n d h i m a n d to h i m s e l f will, in a w o r l d of radical inequalities, benefit the m o r e
advantaged p e r s o n s a n d g r o u p s at the e x p e n s e of the l e s s advantaged. It s h i e l d s u s from
moral c l a i m s invoking the e x t r e m e misery of distant others Is this the point of s u c h
m a n e u v e r s ? A n d if not, w h y hasn't their authors' (quite u n e x c e p t i o n a b l e ) c o n c e r n for the
value of d e e p p r o j e c t s a n d c o m m u n i t y alerted t h e m to the fact that s o m a n y h u m a n
beings, c o n s u m e d by a lifelong yet often short-lived daily struggle against h u n g e r a n d
d i s e a s e , are i n n o p o s i t i o n t o enjoy m e m b e r s h i p in a h a r m o n i o u s c o m m u n i t y o r to lead a
life of integrity by forming a n d h o n o r i n g d e e p projects a n d constitutive c o m m i t m e n t s ?
6 Introduction
rower, even a m o n g p h i l o s o p h e r s , t h a n d i s a g r e e m e n t a b o u t abstract,
"foundational'' q u e s t i o n s .
At stake in t h e a t t e m p t t o m a k e Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice m o r e
c o n c r e t e , t h e n , is its m o r a l value by t h e lights of h i s o w n t h e o r y , tf this
t h e o r y c a n m a k e n o c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e practical t a s k s of facilitating
a g r e e m e n t a n d alleviating injustice, t h e n it e n d s u p s e l f - c o n d e m n e d .
For in Rawls's view, the_truth of a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e c o n s i s t s in its
ability t o a p p e a l a n d motivate. Going a little further, o n e m i g h t s a y that
t h e p o i n t of political p h i l o s o p h y is n o t merely t o s h o w t h a t c e r t a i n
principles are true, b u t to m a k e t h e m t r u e by m o t i v a t i n g t h e s t r u g g l e for
their g r a d u a l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n .
Also at stake is t h e very m e a n i n g of Rawls's t h e o i y . An a r r a n g e m e n t of
c o n c e p t s a n d ideas m a y look meaningful if it is well o r g a n i z e d s o that
e a c h of its various e l e m e n t s c a n b e e x p l a i n e d a n d m o t i v a t e d in t e r m s of
the others, b u t s u c h a n a r r a n g e m e n t is n o t a t h e o i y if it is n o t p i n n e d
d o w n t o its subject m a t t e r . It is n o t meaningful as a w h o l e if it d o e s n o t
have significant implications statable o u t s i d e t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e t h e ­
ory itself. If the goal is t o facilitate a g r e e m e n t o n a c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e
"a public basis in t h e light of w h i c h citizens c a n justify to o n e a n o t h e r
their c o m m o n i n s t i t u t i o n s " (KCMT 5 6 1 ) — t h e n it m u s t b e m a d e clear
what this criterion m e a n s , t h a t is, h o w it w o u l d a s s e s s p a r t i c u l a r in­
stitutional s c h e m e s . Rawls c a n plausibly reply that it is n o t his role a s a
p h i l o s o p h e r to d e c i d e w h e t h e r , say, t h e difference p r i n c i p l e is satisfied
in t h e United States. Such a n investigation m u s t surely d r a w u p o n t h e
expertise of e c o n o m i s t s , a m o n g o t h e r s . Yet it is part of Rawls's task to
s h o w h o w experts in o t h e r fields s h o u l d go a b o u t settling s u c h m a t t e r s .
Rawls m u s t s h a r p e n t h e relevant q u e s t i o n s t o clarify w h a t sort of
empirical d a t a (and t h e like) a r e n e e d e d from o t h e r d i s c i p l i n e s a n d
w h a t a n s w e r s given d a t a w o u l d entail. Similarly, in r e g a r d to h i s ideal
well-ordered society, Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice n e e d n o t specify in
detail w h a t social institutions are required, b u t it m u s t state c l e a r l y — i n
t e r m s c o m p r e h e n s i b l e t o jurists, e c o n o m i s t s , a n d political s c i e n t i s t s —
what is required of such institutions. T h e b e a u t y a n d p o w e r of Rawls's
c o n c e p t i o n are w a s t e d insofar a s t h e y c a n n o t b e i m p o r t e d i n t o t h e
political a r e n a .
5
Although Rawls s e e m s to a c c e p t this d e m a n d i n p r i n c i p l e , i n p r a c ­
tice h e h a s fallen far s h o r t of m e e t i n g it, a n d t h e g a p is i n c r e a s i n g . Let
m e h e r e confine myself to a single e x a m p l e , o n e of several p o i n t s
extensively d i s c u s s e d in Part Two. T h r o u g h t h e first p r i n c i p l e of justice,
Rawls r e q u i r e s t h a t social institutions p r o t e c t t h e f r e e d o m a n d i n t e g -

AP ,iCa
m*lEr^ :
» °!i ! °T ° ° '
C Pti n f U S , i C e n e e d s c
g u i d e s of e n q u i r y a n d e r t a i n

fhere s ™TZ 1 ° ' ^ s i n g evidence to govern its*application. O t h e r w i s e ,

Stt^iTTtr^ f l , g de erm inin w h e t h
^ Btel Principles are satisfied, a n d for
o n a r o n c e n t o n nft^
partKul
Z a n- °effec,ive a g situations. A g r e e m e n t
s^r^cs^ss!^ ~«
i n s t i t u t i o n s r
« particular
 Introduction 7

rjty pf t h e p e r s o n . H o w d o w e j u d g e w h e t h e r this requirement is m e t ?

M u s t w e look at infant mortality r a t e s a n d t h e i n c i d e n c e of violent
c r i m e s ? Is it relevant w h e t h e r s o m e a m o n g t h e p o o r a r e m a l n o u r i s h e d
or starving? Rawls d o e s n o t say. His s i l e n c e facilitates a c o n s e n s u s of
s o r t s : m a n y c a n e n d o r s e t h e a b s t r a c t r e q u i r e m e n t , i n t e r p r e t i n g it
b r o a d l y o r n a r r o w l y a c c o r d i n g to t a s t e . But this is t h e w r o n g s o r t of
c o n s e n s u s — o r , r a t h e r , n o c o n s e n s u s at all. T o p r o v i d e a s h a r e d b a s i s
for a g r e e m e n t o n social i n s t i t u t i o n s , Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e m u s t
i n c l u d e a n s w e r s t o q u e s t i o n s of t h i s sort, a n d obviously, t h e relevant
specifications m u s t b e p r o v i d e d in t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o r e of t h e c o n ­
c e p t i o n itself. N o jurist o r social t h e o r i s t c a n a n s w e r s u c h q u e s t i o n s for
us.
T h e specification of Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice is a p a r a d i g m a t -
ically i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y e n t e r p r i s e . P h i l o s o p h e r s c a n n o t s i m p l y d e v e l o p
s u c h a c o n c e p t i o n u p to a c e r t a i n p o i n t a n d t h e n invite social t h e o r i s t s
a n d jurists to "take over." T h e i d e a s a n d t e r m i n o l o g i e s of t h e v a r i o u s
d i s c i p l i n e s m u s t e n g a g e w i t h o n e a n o t h e r . It m u s t b e a s s u r e d , for
e x a m p l e , t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r e c o n o m i c m e a s u r e , s t a t e d in t e r m s t h a t
e c o n o m i s t s a r e familiar w i t h a n d c a n w o r k with, really e x p r e s s e s ,
closely e n o u g h , t h e a s s e s s m e n t i n t e n d e d in t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g p h i l o ­
s o p h i c a l c r i t e r i o n of justice. Specification p r o c e e d s from a n a r e a t h a t is
p u r e l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l to a n a r e a t h a t is p u r e l y n o n p h i l o s o p h i c a l , b u t
a l o n g t h e way, it p a s s e s t h r o u g h a n a r e a t h a t is g e n u i n e l y i n t e r d i s c i ­
p l i n a r y — a n a r e a that, I think, Rawls h a s for t h e m o s t part failed to
reach. In p r o p o s i n g a specification of Rawls's criterion (in Part Two), I
v e n t u r e i n t o this i n t e r m e d i a t e area. Against t h e s t a n d a r d s a n d t e r m i ­
nologies of o t h e r d i s c i p l i n e s , this effort is b o u n d to a p p e a r s o m e w h a t
a m a t e u r i s h — e x c u s a b l y so, I h o p e , given t h a t it is m e r e l y a first s k e t c h
of h o w t o achieve g r e a t e r p r e c i s i o n , a n invitation for c o o p e r a t i o n a n d
n o t a n a t t e m p t to go it a l o n e .
I h a v e a r g u e d t h a t Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n m u s t b e specified to m a k e
clear w h a t h i s c r i t e r i o n of justice means, h o w it is to b e u s e d to a s s e s s
t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of a p a r t i c u l a r social s y s t e m a n d to g u i d e t h e i r reform.
Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice m u s t also b e d e v e l o p e d in t w o f u r t h e r 1

d i m e n s i o n s to m a k e it sufficiently c o n c r e t e . O n e task is to clarify t h e t-

d o m a i n of this c o n c e p t i o n . Rawls offers it for t h e a s s e s s m e n t of t h e
i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e of a society t h a t is (as h e variously p u t s it) "self-
c o n t a i n e d , " " m o r e o r less self-sufficient," o r "a c l o s e d s y s t e m isolated
from o t h e r s o c i e t i e s " (TJ 457, 4, 8). "At s o m e level t h e r e m u s t exist a
c l o s e d b a c k g r o u n d s y s t e m , a n d it is this s u b j e c t for w h i c h w e w a n t a
t h e o r y . We a r e b e t t e r p r e p a r e d to take u p this p r o b l e m , " h e f u r t h e r
s u g g e s t s , "for a s o c i e t y (illustrated b y n a t i o n s ) — If w e a r e successful in
t h e c a s e of a society, w e c a n try to e x t e n d a n d to a d j u s t o u r initial
t h e o r y a s f u r t h e r i n q u i r y r e q u i r e s " (BSS 70 n . 8; cf. TJ 8). In t h e m o d e r n
w o r l d t h e r e a r e n o self-contained n a t i o n a l societies, a c l o s e d b a c k ­
g r o u n d s y s t e m exists only at t h e global level. T h e q u e s t i o n , therefore, is
8 Introduction

w h e t h e r Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n , if it a p p l i e s at all, a p p l i e s to o p e n national

societies (as Rawls s e e m s to prefer) or to t h e c l o s e d social s y s t e m ot
h u m a n i t y at large (as I m a i n t a i n in Part Three).
T h e o t h e r additional task is to s k e t c h h o w t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o w a r d
juster social institutions is to b e b r o u g h t a b o u t . T h e u l t i m a t e political
i m p o r t of a c o n c e p t i o n of justice c o n s i s t s in s h o w i n g t h a t p e r s o n s
o u g h t to d o c e r t a i n t h i n g s . Like specification, t h i s task is essentially
interdisciplinary. It m u s t d r a w u p o n t h e k n o w l e d g e of h i s t o r i a n s a n d
social scientists a n d u p o n t h e practical e x p e r i e n c e of j u r i s t s a n d politi­
cians to d e t e r m i n e w h i c h institutional reforms a r e feasible, w h i c h
policies w o u l d b e effe^ve* a n d h o w s u c h reforms a n d policies might
b e initiated. But it also, to a significant e x t e n t , calls for p h i l o s o p h i c a l
reflection. A c o n c e p t i o n of justice m a y affect w h a t w e o u g h t to d o in at
least t h r e e ways: w e o u g h t t o h e l p reform existing social i n s t i t u t i o n s so
as to r e n d e r t h e m m o r e just; w e o u g h t to mitigate a n d alleviate the
plight of t h o s e d e p r i v e d a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e d by existing u n j u s t institu­
tions; a n d w e o u g h t to a c c e p t certain c o n s t r a i n t s u p o n o u r c o n d u c t
a n d policies t h a t anticipate t h e ideal of just g r o u n d lilies t o w a r d w h i c h
we are striving. Philosophical reflection is r e q u i r e d to resolve (1) c o n ­
flicts of moral c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w i t h i n a n d a c r o s s t h e s e t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s ;
(2) c o m p e t i t i o n s a m o n g t h e s e m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o
scarce r e s o u r c e s of time, m o n e y , a n d energy; a n d (3) conflicts a n d
c o m p e t i t i o n s a m o n g s u c h c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of justice a n d o t h e r c o n s i d ­
erations. T h e p r o b l e m of i m p l e m e n t a t i o n is a d d r e s s e d — a l b e i t n e i t h e r
systematically n o r at l e n g t h — i n Parts T w o a n d Three.
I have m e n t i o n e d t w o k i n d s of a b s t r a c t n e s s in Rawls t h a t I w a n t to
avoid: abstract p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e o r i z i n g (e.g., a b o u t K a n t i a n c o n s t r u c ­
tivism) a n d abstract m o r a l r e q u i r e m e n t s t h a t are too v a g u e to settle t h e
m o r e interesting political c o n t r o v e r s i e s a b o u t i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n j u s t i c e s .
T h e s e m u s t be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a n o t h e r k i n d of a b s t r a c t n e s s , e m ­
b o d i e d in Rawls's focus o n b a s i c social i n s t i t u t i o n s , w h i c h is of g r e a t
fertility a n d i m p o r t a n c e . To u n d e r s t a n d this a b s t r a c t n e s s , begin w i t h
the ultimate, c o n c r e t e q u e s t i o n of e t h i c s — H o w o u g h t I t o live?—
central to w h i c h is t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w I o u g h t to c o n d u c t myself
t o w a r d o t h e r s . For u s t h e q u e s t i o n arises in t h e c o n t e x t of a pervasive
s t r u c t u r e of g r o u n d r u l e s p u r p o r t i n g to r e g u l a t e h u m a n i n t e r a c t i o n s .
We find ourselves a s p a r t i c i p a n t s in a n o n g o i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e .
This preexisting s c h e m e of g r o u n d r u l e s j s of crucial i m p o r t a n c e i n at
least t w o w a y s . First, t h e relevant g r o u n d r u l e s a r e at least p a r t l y
constitutive. T h e y d e t e r m i n e w h o w e are (mother, juror, d o c t o r , d e l e ­
gate, convict, c a n d i d a t e , p r i n c e T o n j r i e s t ) andTwnat o u r a c t i o n s m e a n
(buy or sell, c o m m a n d or p r o m i s e , vote or veto, m a n y o r d i v o r e e , a p p l y
or appeal) in t h e n e t w o r k of h u m a n i n t e r a c t i o n . W i t h o u t an u n d e r ­
s t a n d i n g of t h e g r o u n d rules w e w o u l d lack t h e very t e r m s i n w h i c h t o
reflect upon o u r c o n d u c t . Second, t h e evolution of t h e s e g r o u n d r u l e s
h a s m a d e our social w o r l d highly c o m p l e x a n d i n t e r d e p e n d e n t . T h e
 Introduction 9

effects of m y c o n d u c t r e v e r b e r a t e t h r o u g h o u t t h e w o r l d , i n t e r m i n g l i n g
w i t h t h e effects of t h e c o n d u c t of billions of o t h e r h u m a n b e i n g s (as
i l l u s t r a t e d by m a r k e t t r a n s a c t i o n s ) . T h u s , m a n y m o r a l l y salient features
of t h e s i t u a t i o n s of h u m a n b e i n g s ( p e r s i s t e n t starvation in n o r t h e a s t e r n
Brazil, civil w a r in El Salvador, f a m i n e in India) a r i s e from t h e c o n ­
f l u e n c e of t h e often veiy r e m o t e effects of t h e c o n d u c t of vast n u m b e r s
of h u m a n b e i n g s . W e as i n d i v i d u a l s h a v e n o h o p e of c o p i n g w i t h s u c h
c o m p l e x i t y a n d i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e if w e take t h e existing g r o u n d r u l e s
for g r a n t e d a n d m e r e l y ask " H o w s h o u l d 1 a c t ? " o r " W h a t s h o u l d I d o
differently?" W e c a n c o p e only by a t t e n d i n g t o t h i s all-pervasive
s c h e m e of g r o u n d r u l e s w h i c h s h a p e s t h e w a y p e r s o n s act a n d c o -
d e t e r m i n e s h o w t h e i r a c t i o n s , t o g e t h e r , affect t h e lives of o t h e r s .
H e r e , t h e n , is t h e fruitful a b s t r a c t i o n in Rawls's a p p r o a c h . In o r d e r t o
c o p e a d e q u a t e l y w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w to live, o n e m u s t , at least in
t h e m o d e r n w o r l d , a b s t r a c t from this q u e s t i o n a n d reflect u p o n t h e
b a s i c g r o u n d r u l e s t h a t s h a p e us, u p o n t h e social c o n t e x t in w h i c h w e
all act. S u c h reflection c a n n o t p r o c e e d p i e c e m e a l . W e c a n n o t just
reflect s e p a r a t e l y u p o n t h e e t h i c s of e a c h role a n d office, b e c a u s e t o d o
s o w o u l d take for g r a n t e d t h e existing differentiation i n t o roles a n d
offices, w o u l d b l i n d u s to t h e joint effects of h o w t h e s e roles a n d offices
are c o n c e i v e d . N o r c a n w e a t t e n d to i n s t i t u t i o n s o n e b y o n e (marriage,
p r o p e r t y , t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e , t h e market), b e c a u s e t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s , t o o ,
i n t e r p e n e t r a t e in t h e i r effects. T h e p r o b l e m is a n a l o g o u s to t h a t of
s e e k i n g t o o p t i m i z e s o m e p r o c e s s of p r o d u c t i o n . Even if it is t r u e t h a t
e a c h p a r t of t h e p r o c e s s is d e s i g n e d in t h e b e s t p o s s i b l e way, given t h e
w a y t h e o t h e r p a r t s a r e d e s i g n e d , it m a y still b e p o s s i b l e to i m p r o v e t h e
e n t i r e p r o c e s s greatly b y r e d e s i g n i n g all p a r t s t o g e t h e r o r (more i m p o r ­
tant) b y a l t e r i n g its very s t r u c t u r e ( i n c l u d i n g its division i n t o p a r t s ) . W e
m u s t , t h e n , reflect u p o n social i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d t h e roles a n d offices
t h e y involve a s o n e scheme, against t h e b a c k g r o u n d of feasible a l t e r n a ­
tive s c h e m e s . T h i s reflection is highly a b s t r a c t , b u t w i t h o u t it w e c a n n o t
e v e n b e g i n to u n d e r s t a n d w h a t w e are d o i n g to o t h e r s , h o w w e a r e
involved in t h e i r lives, a n d w h a t c o n c r e t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w e m i g h t
h a v e t o w a r d t h e m . As I see it, Rawls's w o r k is i m p o r t a n t for a c h i e v i n g
this a b s t r a c t i o n , y e t w e a k in m a k i n g it relevant to t h e c o n c r e t e political
i s s u e s before u s . T h e a b s t r a c t i o n is crucial, b u t it m u s t b e b r o u g h t b a c k
d o w n to earth.
T h i s f o c u s o n t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e , c o m b i n e d w i t h t h e priority c o n ­
c e r n for t h e least a d v a n t a g e d , m a k e s Rawls a r a d i c a l t h i n k e r . M y r e ­
m a r k s a b o u t h i s (increasing) c o n s e r v a t i s m a r e t h u s m e a n t in a relative
s e n s e . It s e e m s t h a t in w o r k i n g o u t h i s t w o c e n t r a l i d e a s (as I h a v e
called t h e m ) , Rawls h a s b e e n resisting t h e i r p r o g r e s s i v e p o w e r every
s t e p of t h e w a y . T o s o m e e x t e n t h e h a s d o n e t h i s b y leaving h i s c o n c l u ­
sions abstract a n d vague w h e r e further development w o u l d have m a d e
t h e m m o r e c o n t r o v e r s i a l a n d critical of t h e s t a t u s q u o . A n d w h e r e h e
d i d a r g u e t o w a r d s o m e w h a t m o r e definite c o n c l u s i o n s , h i s a r g u m e n t s
10 Introduction

seem bent—bent on ensuring that these conclusions would be as

b l a n d , traditional, a n d m a i n s t r e a m A m e r i c a n a s p o s s i b l e .
While Rawls is t h e n b o t h a radical a n d a conservative, I will t i y t o b e
faithful t o t h e radical core of h i s c o n c e p t i o n , c o u n t e r i n g t h e m a n y ( a n d
individually often minor) conservative s t i p u l a t i o n s t h a t t h r e a t e n t o
o b s c u r e t h e great progressive p o t e n t i a l of h i s p r i n c i p a l i d e a s . T h u s it is
n o t essential t o m y goal h e r e t h a t Rawls s h o u l d fully a g r e e w i t h m y
c o n c l u s i o n s . Of c o u r s e , insofar a s I try t o e x p l i c a t e a n d d e f e n d h i s
position, especially in Part O n e , it m a t t e r s t h a t I s h o u l d d o s o correctly,
that w h a t I reject a s m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s really a r e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s .
But insofar a s I m a k e his criterion of justice m o r e c o n c r e t e , m y o v e r r i d ­
ing c o n c e r n is to develop t h e t w o c e n t r a l i d e a s i n a p l a u s i b l e w a y . I
w o u l d certainly be p l e a s e d a n d e n c o u r a g e d if Rawls w e r e t o find s o m e
of t h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s attractive, a n d I w o u l d r e t h i n k m y c o n c l u s i o n s if
h e gave r e a s o n s t o reject t h e m , b u t t h e s e a r e m y a t t i t u d e s t o t h e
6
r e s p o n s e s of a n y r e a d e r . My d e e p e s t allegiance h e r e is n o t to Rawls
b u t to his foremost ideas. T h e s e ideas have a life a n d p o w e r i n d e p e n ­
d e n t of Rawls, w h i c h is t e s t i m o n y , surely, t o t h e g r e a t n e s s of b o t h .
Rawls's m o s t i m p o r t a n t conservative s t i p u l a t i o n is t h a t h i s f o c u s o n
major social i n s t i t u t i o n s is t o e x c l u d e t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e .
Rawls follows t r a d i t i o n in treating n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s a s m o r a l w a t e r ­
s h e d s . Only w i t h i n a n a t i o n a l territory a n d t h e p o p u l a t i o n it d e f i n e s
does h e view t h e focus o n t h e least a d v a n t a g e d a s a p p r o p r i a t e . He
thereby c i r c u m v e n t s a crucial m o r a l question, w h i c h h i s t h e o r y o u g h t
to answer, n a m e l y w h e t h e r t h e institutionalization of n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s
really h a s t h i s magical m o r a l force of shielding u s from (or r e d u c i n g t h e
force of) t h e m o r a l c l a i m s of "foreigners." T h e p r a c t i c a l i m p o r t a n c e of
this q u e s t i o n is e n o r m o u s , s e e i n g t h a t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e n a t i o n -
state is a crucial c o n t r i b u t o r to t h e c u r r e n t i n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o d u c t i o n of
e x t r e m e d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d inequalities.
Rawls's c o n s e r v a t i s m is exemplified also in h i s specification of t h e
7
m a x i m i n i d e a a n d i n his r e m a r k s a b o u t i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . T h e m o s t
i m p o r t a n t e x a m p l e h e r e is h o w Rawls lets h i s lexical p r i o r i t y of t h e
basic liberties (the first principle of justice) u n d e r m i n e h i s p r i o r i t y
c o n c e r n for t h e least advantaged. T h i s p r o b l e m arises e v e n a p a r t from
t h e s t u n n i n g lack of interest in b a s i c social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s t h a t is
reflected in Rawls's d i s c u s s i o n s of t h e lexical priority. As it s t a n d s , t h e
lexical priority of t h e basic liberties will s u p p o r t t w o of Rawls's c o n c l u -

"Still, it would b e of s o m e historical interest if one could get Rawls t o be more specific
about h own 0wews, if only m response to the specifications proposed by others
rr' ",
ls

as^eH ^ ™lh » ^ in detail. As for the

S O m e o f t h e s e m a e

e m i h t m e t h e
no.abredU?ZnnfT ^ °" S " " ° ^ ^ ™™P^
o mcall b e r t ^ f s ? T H f " " q 6
« ° " ™ s t maintain the fair value of the
16 18 i n s

^enlnrirfi . °PP° ™*y °ne might also point out

o f r t u

0 f h t o S e C o n d
someTimesrathTrs^ ? T^" ™ ° Principle-common in TJ and
6 Y W r d e d l e T J ? & & 7 2 2 6 2 7 9 300 s
late Stings ° *' ' ' ' < > * > - < ™ ^sent from the
 Introduction 11

s i o n s : t h e fulfillment of its p a r t i c i p a n t s ' b a s i c liberties s h o u l d b e t h e

p r i m a r y c r i t e r i o n for identifying t h e least a d v a n t a g e d u n d e r s o m e in­
s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e , a n d e n h a n c i n g t h e b a s i c liberties of t h e least a d v a n ­
t a g e d s h o u l d b e t h e m o s t u r g e n t i m p e r a t i v e g u i d i n g t h e reform of a n
i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e . But Rawls d r a w s t h e further c o n c l u s i o n t h a t
r e f o r m s involving a n e n h a n c e m e n t of b a s i c liberties are always t h e m o s t
u r g e n t , e v e n w h e n t h e y involve a n e x p a n s i o n of t h e b a s i c liberties of t h e
m o r e a d v a n t a g e d ( w h o s e b a s i c liberties are a l r e a d y m o r e c o m p l e t e o r
b e t t e r p r o t e c t e d ) at t h e e x p e n s e of a d v a n c e m e n t s in t h e s o c i o e c o n o m i c
p o s i t i o n of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d . As I d e m o n s t r a t e in s o m e detail
(§11.3.1, cf. §11.2.1), this c o n c l u s i o n is a clear violation of t h e m a x i m i n
idea,.
M a k i n g Rawls's c e n t r a l i d e a s m o r e c o n c r e t e in a w a y that c o r r e c t s for
h i s conservative t e n d e n c y , I h o p e to leave t h e r e a d e r at t h e e n d w i t h
r e a s o n a b l y clear t h e s e s a b o u t w h e r e o u r w o r l d is n o w as far as j u s t i c e is
c o n c e r n e d , h o w w e a r e m o r a l l y related to existing injustices, a n d w h a t
a just i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e a n d p r o g r e s s t o w a r d it m i g h t look like.
T h e s e c o n c l u s i o n s s t a n d o p p o s e d to t h e s m u g c o n s e n s u s t h a t t r u l y
grievous i n j u s t i c e s exist only in t h e p a s t o r in d i s t a n t l a n d s a n d s o n e e d
n o t c o n c e r n u s h e r e a n d n o w . I c o n c l u d e t h a t w e are a d v a n t a g e d
p a r t i c i p a n t s in a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e t h a t p r o d u c e s e x t r e m e p o v e r t y
o n a m a s s i v e s c a l e so t h a t m a n y p e r s o n s a r e b o r n w i t h n o realistic
p r o s p e c t s of a life w i t h o u t h u n g e r , m a l n u t r i t i o n , a n d o p p r e s s i o n . T h e
s c h e m e is i m p o s e d u p o n t h e s e , its m o s t d i s a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s —
a n d i m p o s e d n o t b y fate o r n a t u r e b u t b y o t h e r , m o r e a d v a n t a g e d
p a r t i c i p a n t s , o u r s e l v e s i n c l u d e d . C u r r e n t injustices a r e n o less s e v e r e
t h a n t h o s e suffered by earlier d i s a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p s , a n d o u r r e s p o n ­
sibility for t h e s e i n j u s t i c e s is n o less t h a n t h a t of earlier m o r e a d v a n ­
t a g e d g r o u p s . But b e c a u s e of t h e vastly g r e a t e r differentiation a n d
c o m p l e x i t y of t h e prevailing i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e , t h e injustice a n d o u r
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for it a r e b o t h m u c h m o r e o p a q u e .
Clearly, t h e p l i g h t of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d is d u e t o social realities. It
is n o t n a t u r a l , for m o s t of t h e m , like m o s t of us, are perfectly c a p a b l e of
l e a d i n g h e a l t h y a n d successful lives if given a c h a n c e t o e s c a p e from
t h e i r p r i s o n of p o v e r t y . But t h e n w e a r e n o t like s l a v e h o l d e r s , w h o
e m b o d y a n d live o u t t h e injustice of slavery in t h e v i o l e n c e a n d c r u e l t y
t h e y visit u p o n t h e i r slaves. W e l e a d o r d i n a r y , civilized lives, a n d n o t h ­
ing w e d o s e e m s to have a m a j o r o r even m i n o r negative i m p a c t u p o n
t h e lives of t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e d . A n d so, paradoxically, t h e relevant social
realities t a k e o n t h e a p p e a r a n c e of a n o n y m i t y — s e e m t o be p r o d u c e d
a n d r e p r o d u c e d w i t h o u t a t r a c e of h u m a n a g e n c y .
Rawls's focus o n b a s i c social i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d t h e i r effects m a k e s it
p o s s i b l e t o clarify h o w injustice c a n b e s y s t e m i c , c a n exist w i t h o u t
b e i n g t r a c e a b l e to a n y manifestly u n j u s t a c t i o n s b y i n d i v i d u a l s o r
g r o u p s . O u r c a u s a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e suffering of t h e p o o r is ex­
t r e m e l y i n d i r e c t a n d i n t e r m i x e d w i t h t h e c a u s a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s of o t h -
12 Introduction

ers. It is quite infeasible for u s t o adjust o u r c o n d u c t s o as to avoid s u c h

effects. A n d h e r e again, Rawls's i n s t i t u t i o n a l a p p r o a c h is c r u c i a l for
s h o w i n g t h e alternative to s u c h a n (infeasible) a d j u s t m e n t of o u r c o n ­
d u c t . We m u s t initiate i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s t o w a r d a s c h e m e that,
h o w e v e r differentiated a n d c o m p l e x , d o e s n o t t e n d t o e n g e n d e r t h e
severe poverty a n d o p p r e s s i o n so typical of o u r c u r r e n t w o r l d . T h o s e
p r e s e n t l y m o s t d i s a d v a n t a g e d have virtually n o m e a n s for initiating
s u c h reforms. We d o . And o u r responsibility vis-a-vis existing i n j u s t i c e s
hinges u p o n o u r ability to initiate a n d s u p p o r t i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s .
T h e u l t i m a t e goal of s u c h reforms is a fully j u s t global i n s t i t u t i o n a l
s c h e m e , d e n n e d , p e r h a p s , b y reference t o t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s . O u r
n^porisibility, however, in n o w a y d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r s u c h a fully
just s c h e m e is practicable or realistically a t t a i n a b l e . Yes, Rawls's c r i t e ­
rion c a n b e u s e d to design a b l u e p r i n t of ideal i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t w o u l d
b e perfectly just. But m u c h m o r e i m p o r t a n t for n o w is its role in t h e
comparative a s s e s s m e n t of alternative feasible i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s .
P e r h a p s w e will never r e a c h a s c h e m e w h o s e w o r s t social p o s i t i o n is
optimal. But w e d o n ' t n e e d t h e a s s u r a n c e t h a t s u c h a s c h e m e is r e a c h ­
able in o r d e r to r e c o g n i z e t h a t w e o u g h t to s u p p o r t i n s t i t u t i o n a l re­
forms t h a t improve t h e w o r s t social position, j u s t as o n e d o e s n o t n e e d
t h e a s s u r a n c e t h a t o n e c a n r e a c h perfection for u n d e r t a k i n g to b e c o m e
a better h u m a n being.
P A R T O N E

DEFENDING
T H E MAIN IDEAS
C H A P T E R 1

Nozick and the Focus

on the Basic Structure

1. T h e P r o b l e m o f J u s t i c e

It is J o h n Rawls's a m b i t i o n t o p r e s e n t a c o n c e p t i o n of justice for t h e

b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d social s y s t e m . To get a n intuitive i d e a
of w h a t t h i s m e a n s , I b r i n g in Robert Nozick's w o r k , i n c l u d i n g h i s
r e a d i n g a n d criticism of Rawls. I a m especially i n t e r e s t e d in Nozick's
claim t h a t Rawls's a p p r o a c h begs i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y
a g a i n s t historical e n t i t l e m e n t t h e o r i e s of distributive justice, in w h i c h
o w n e r s h i p rights a r e d e n n e d recursively a n d o p e r a t e as s i d e c o n ­
straints.
1.1. W e c a n quickly get to t h e c o r e of Nozick's a t t a c k o n Rawls b y
a c c e p t i n g a c h a l l e n g e h e raises (ASU 167n, 204-5) w h i c h Rawls h a s n o t
t a k e n u p , t h e c h a l l e n g e to e x a m i n e t h e plausibility of c o m p e t i n g c o n ­
c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e in a surveyable, small-scale c o n t e x t . To a c c o m m o ­
d a t e Rawls, a n d w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e to Nozick, let u s i m a g i n e a c l o s e d
a n d s e l f - c o n t a i n e d g r o u p of p e r s o n s , p e r h a p s s h a r i n g a small i s o l a t e d
island, a collectivity t h a t is r e p r o d u c i n g itself over t i m e , w i t h c o n t e m ­
p o r a r i e s w i d e l y s c a t t e r e d in age. F o r n o w , w e c a n m a k e t h e simplifying
a s s u m p t i o n t h a t a n y social o r d e r w e c o n s i d e r for this g r o u p w o u l d b e
u n d e r s t o o d a n d g e n e r a l l y c o m p l i e d w i t h . To k e e p m a t t e r s even m o r e
s i m p l e , let u s leave a s i d e m o s t of t h e b a s i c features of t h e social o r d e r
1
a n d f o c u s o n t h e d e t a i l s of t h e g r o u p ' s i n s t i t u t i o n of private p r o p e r t y .
In t a k i n g for g r a n t e d t h a t this primitive, a g r a r i a n e c o n o m y p r o m i n e n t l y
involves t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n in s o m e form, w e p r e s u p p o s e a c o m m i t m e n t

•We c a n t h e n largely rely, for the m o m e n t , o n Rawls's difference principle in its

s i m p l e s t f o r m — c o v e r i n g o n l y the single g o o d , i n c o m e — t o bring out w h a t is distinctive
a b o u t h i s full criterion of justice, w h i c h is merely a m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d m a x i m i n criterion,
a d d r e s s i n g a w i d e r range of social g o o d s w i t h a priority ordering a m o n g t h e m .

15
16 T h e P r o b l e m of Justice, 1.1

Rawls a n d Nozick s h a r e a n d c a n c o n c e n t r a t e i m m e d i a t e l y o n w h a t is
controversial b e t w e e n t h e m .
We c a n further eliminate t h e m o r e a b s t r u s e p a t t e r n e d p r i n c i p l e s
Nozick e n t e r t a i n s — t h a t p r o p e r t y s h o u l d b e d i s t r i b u t e d a c c o r d i n g to
p e r s o n s ' m o r a l merit, usefulness to society, n e e d , intelligence, r a c e , or
s o m e m i x t u r e or c o m b i n a t i o n of these, o r s o as to m a t c h s o m e a n o n y ­
m o u s profile. Against this u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l b a c k g r o u n d , let u s c o n s i d e r
s o m e i m p o r t a n t p a r a m e t e r s of t h e definition of p r o p e r t y r i g h t s , e s p e ­
cially w h a t k i n d of i t e m s are o w n a b l e , h o w o n e c o m e s t o o w n s u c h
items, a n d w h a t rights o n e h a s w h e n o n e o w n s t h e m . Let m e give a t h i n
sketch of t h e e c o n o m i c o r d e r Nozick w o u l d envision for o u r i s l a n d ,
followed b y a n equally thin c o u n t e r s k e t c h m o r e Rawlsian in spirit.
Nozick defines t h e set of o w n a b l e s q u i t e widely, i n c l u d i n g e v e n
p e r s o n s w i t h i n its s c o p e : "I believe t h a t . . . a free s y s t e m will a l l o w [a
p e r s o n ] to sell himself i n t o slavery" (ASU 331). He allows slavery b e c a u s e
h e is convinced, c o n t r a r y to t h e A m e r i c a n D e c l a r a t i o n of I n d e p e n ­
2
d e n c e , t h a t all rights s h o u l d b e alienable. Still, a p e r s o n is a n o w n a b l e
of a special kind, in that s h e is initially self-owned w h e n s h e c o m e s of
age (ASU 289, 331, 38f). That h e r p a r e n t s or t h e i r o w n e r s o w n e d all t h e
ingredients to h e r " p r o d u c t i o n " d o e s not, in this one case, entail t h a t
they o w n t h e p r o d u c t . P e r s o n s c a n b e c o m e slaves o n l y b y a l i e n a t i n g
themselves.
C o n c e r n i n g control of the island's pivotal n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e — l a n d —
Nozick advocates t h e s e m a i n rules: All l a n d is subject to a c q u i s i t i o n b y
t h e first c o m e r , w h o t h e r e b y gains full, e x c l u s i o n a r y c o n t r o l over it,
i n c l u d i n g t h e right t o transfer any or all of h i s rights a s o w n e r to s o m e
o t h e r person(s) of h i s choice. A legitimate l a n d h o l d i n g is t h e n d e f i n e d
recursively as o n e t h a t arose from a valid first a c q u i s i t i o n t h r o u g h a n y
n u m b e r of valid transfers.
S o m e o n e w i t h Rawlsian leanings might p r o p o s e t h e following alter­
native g r o u n d rules. T h e r e is to b e n o i n s t i t u t i o n of slavery; p e r s o n s
c a n n o t alienate themselves or c o m e to b e o w n e d in a n y w a y . All l a n d is
subject to a p p r o p r i a t i o n by t h e first comer, w h o t h e r e b y g a i n s full,
exclusionary control over it. As o w n e r , h e is free to r e l i n q u i s h o w n e r ­
s h i p over (a portion) of his l a n d at a n y time ( t h r o u g h e x c h a n g e , gift, o r
bequest), b u t h e controls t h e a s s i g n m e n t of only 80 p e r c e n t of t h e l a n d
h e relinquishes. T h e r e m a i n i n g 20 p e r c e n t is a s s i g n e d ( p e r h a p s via
s o m e lottery m e c h a n i s m ) t o y o u n g p e r s o n s from l a n d l e s s families or,
s h o u l d t h e r e b e n o l a n d l e s s families, t o y o u n g p e r s o n s from families
w i t h the lowest l a n d h o l d i n g s p e r c a p i t a . T h u s , a legitimate l a n d h o l d i n g
is again defined recursively as o n e that a r o s e from a valid first a c q u i s i ­
tion t h r o u g h any n u m b e r of applications of t h e c h a n g e - o f - o w n e r s h i p
rules. O u r Rawlsian prefers t h e s e g r o u n d r u l e s t o Nozick's, b e c a u s e
they can b e e x p e c t e d to e n g e n d e r less, a n d l e s s severe, poverty.

hiSt riCaUy m re in this

xS^S^SIS^ ^ " ° ° **** <*>
 T h e P r o b l e m of J u s t i c e , 1.2 17

1.2. I p u r s u e t h i s d i s p u t e to t h e next h i g h e r level i n §3, e x a m i n i n g

h o w Rawls a n d Nozick m i g h t d i s a g r e e a b o u t w h a t s o r t s of c o n s i d e r ­
a t i o n s s h o u l d resolve t h e lower-level d i s p u t e a b o u t a just social o r d e r
for o u r i s l a n d , b u t first w e m u s t c h a r a c t e r i z e p r e c i s e l y w h a t t h e d i s p u t e
is a b o u t . In p a r t i c u l a r , w e m u s t k e e p s h a r p l y distinct, as Nozick d o e s
not, our subject, how the ground rules of a social system ought to be
assessed/designed, from t h e (secondary) s u b j e c t of h o w a c t o r s (individ­
uals, a s s o c i a t i o n s , t h e g o v e r n m e n t ) m a y a n d s h o u l d act w i t h i n a n
o n g o i n g s c h e m e w h o s e t e r m s are t a k e n as fixed. T h e f o r m e r of t h e s e
s u b j e c t s , justice, is c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e m o r a l a s s e s s m e n t a n d justifica­
tion of social i n s t i t u t i o n s ; t h e latter, morality, w i t h t h e a s s e s s m e n t of
conduct a n d character.
Both Rawls a n d Nozick are essentially c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e first s u b ­
ject, b u t Nozick e x p e n d s m u c h effort a t t a c k i n g a view that is n o t
Rawls's. While Rawls seeks to c o n s i d e r g r o u n d r u l e s from a h i g h e r level,
Nozick often c a s t s t h e i r d i s p u t e a s o n e a b o u t w h i c h g r o u n d r u l e s it is
p e r m i s s i b l e to infringe u n d e r w h a t c i r c u m s t a n c e s . T h o u g h h i s argu­
m e n t s in t h i s vein a r e n o t relevant to Rawls's project, t h e y are likely to
h a v e a significant r h e t o r i c a l effect u p o n t h e u n w a r y r e a d e r . Let m e give
three prominent examples.
First, Nozick f r e q u e n t l y c o n j u r e s u p t h e h o r r o r of redistribution, the
i d e a t h a t s o m e a u t h o r i t y (the g o v e r n m e n t , say) will c o m e along, w h e n ­
ever it p l e a s e s , to take a w a y p a r t of w h a t y o u o w n in o r d e r to d e v o t e it t o
s o m e p u r p o s e it d e e m s w o r t h y . But o u r Rawlsian's p r o p o s a l regarding
l a n d o w n e r s h i p is n o t r e d i s t r i b u t i v e in t h i s s e n s e . It e n v i s i o n s n o m e c h ­
a n i s m t h a t m a k e s a d h o c c o r r e c t i o n s a n d i m p r o v e m e n t s in t h e d i s ­
t r i b u t i o n of l a n d t h a t h a s e m e r g e d in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e r u l e s of
first a c q u i s i t i o n a n d c h a n g e of o w n e r s h i p . Rather, it e n v i s i o n s a p a r ­
t i c u l a r content for t h e s e rules, w h i c h d e t e r m i n e h o w ( p a t t e r n s of) l a n d -
h o l d i n g s arise in t h e first place. No p r o p e r t y is t a k e n from s o m e o n e a n d
given t o a n o t h e r . A l a n d o w n e r c o n t r o l s h i s e n t i r e p r o p e r t y u p t o t h e
m o m e n t w h e n h e r e l i n q u i s h e s it; n o l a n d is t a k e n a w a y from h i m . His
d e s i g n a t e d a s s i g n e e receives 80 p e r c e n t of t h e l a n d in q u e s t i o n ; n o l a n d
is t a k e n a w a y from h e r either, b e c a u s e s h e n e v e r o w n e d t h e full p l o t to
b e g i n w i t h . N o w o n e m a y t h i n k t h a t w h a t is t a k e n a w a y is t h e l a n d ­
o w n e r ' s p o w e r to d i s p o s e of all h i s p r o p e r t y a s h e d e e m s fit. But n o
s u c h p o w e r exists ( a n d t h u s c o u l d b e t a k e n away) u n d e r t h e Rawlsian's
p r a c t i c e . All l a n d is h e l d , from t h e very b e g i n n i n g , o n t h e p u b l i c u n d e r ­
s t a n d i n g of t h e c h a n g e - o f - o w n e r s h i p r u l e s . No o n e n e e d h o l d l a n d o n
3
these terms, b u t those w h o d o are b o u n d by t h e m .
S e c o n d , Nozick often c o m p l a i n s t h a t Rawls b e g s t h e q u e s t i o n a g a i n s t
all entitlement t h e o r i e s of distributive j u s t i c e (e.g., ASU 199, 2 0 3 - 4 , 207,

3
T h i s constraint is structurally a n a l o g o u s to limitations that figure in Nozick's o w n
s c h e m e : "My property rights in m y knife a l l o w m e to leave it w h e r e I will, but not in y o u r
c h e s t " (ASU 171). "Each o w n e r ' s title to his h o l d i n g i n c l u d e s the historical s h a d o w of t h e
Lockean p r o v i s o o n appropriation" (ASU 1801. Again, n o o n e n e e d o w n things o n t h e s e
t e r m s , b u t t h o s e w h o d o are b o u n d by t h e m .
18 T h e P r o b l e m of Justice, 1.2
215) Straightforwardly u n d e r s t o o d , this c o m p l a i n t is false. T h e e c o ­
n o m i c s t r u c t u r e o u r Rawlsian is p r o p o s i n g also revolves a r o u n d a
n o t i o n of e n t i t l e m e n t . It, too, features a recursive definition of legiti­
m a t e l a n d h o l d i n g s , involving r u l e s of first a c q u i s i t i o n a n d c h a n g e of
o w n e r s h i p . R e l i n q u i s h e d e n t i t l e m e n t s are t r a n s f o r m e d , in a c c o r d a n c e
w i t h t h e c h a n g e - o f - o w n e r s h i p rules, i n t o n e w e n t i t l e m e n t s of t h e
c h o s e n assignee a n d of s o m e o t h e r person(s). A n d again, a s in Nozick,
t h e p r o p o s a l s t i p u l a t e s t h a t existing e n t i t l e m e n t s m a y n o t b e infringed
4
for t h e sake of, for e x a m p l e , d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
Third, Nozick offers r e a s o n s for conceiving of rights a s side con­
straints (ASU 28-34), in c o n t r a s t to a c o n c e p t i o n of rights a s goals w h i c h
w o u l d u r g e a g e n t s t o act so as t o m a x i m i z e t h e w e i g h t e d s u m of r i g h t s
fulfillment overall. O n t h e latter view, o n e s h o u l d , d e s p i t e a r i g h t of
i n n o c e n t s n o t t o b e killed, kill i n n o c e n t s w h e n d o i n g s o s e c u r e s a
greater gain i n t e r m s of rights (for e x a m p l e , saves m o r e i n n o c e n t s from
b e i n g killed) e l s e w h e r e . But t h e s i d e - c o n s t r a i n t c o n c e p t i o n of r i g h t s ,
w h i c h Rawls c a n a n d d o e s a c c e p t , again fails t o a d v a n c e Nozick's c a s e
for a p a r t i c u l a r specification of p r o p e r t y rights (ASU 172-73). It i m p l i e s
t h a t if we e n d u p a c c e p t i n g t h e p r o p e r t y rights Nozick p r o p o s e s , t h e n
n o l a n d c a n b e t a k e n by t h e l a n d l e s s (or given t h e m b y s o m e official
authority) w i t h o u t t h e c o n s e n t of its o w n e r . But this i m p l i c a t i o n , a g a i n ,
is irrelevant t o o u r subject, n a m e l y , w h a t side c o n s t r a i n t s s h o u l d b e
r e c o g n i z e d or, m o r e specifically, h o w p r o p e r t y rights a r e t o b e specified
to begin w i t h . C h o o s i n g t h e p r a c t i c e p r o p o s e d b y o u r Rawlsian d o e s
n o t m e a n t h a t t h e rights of l a n d o w n e r s are violated for t h e sake of
fulfilling t h e right to a n initial plot of l a n d . R a t h e r it m e a n s t h a t t h e
conflict b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o purported rights is resolved b y r e c o g n i z i n g
t h e latter a n d c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g a n a d j u s t e d version of
t h e former. T h e p r o p o s a l is not t h a t t h e Nozickian p r o p e r t y rights of t h e
l a n d o w n e r s s h o u l d b e violated b u t t h a t s u c h rights s h o u l d n o t exist.
O u r Rawlsian finds insufficient t h e r e a s o n s s u p p o r t i n g a right to r e a s ­
sign all o n e ' s land, a n d so rejects a b initio t h e e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s
5
Nozick favors.
4
Vet Nozick's complaint may also h a v e another s e n s e , that Rawls is begging the q u e s ­
tion against the claim that "historical-entitlement principles are fundamental" (ASU 202).
Here, the point is not that Rawls is b i a s e d against all w a y s of specifying property rights as
historically recursive but rather that w e are to identify the correct specification of
property rights without any reasons or, at any rate, w i t h o u t the kind of r e a s o n s Rawls
d e e m s relevant. This issue will be central in § § 3 - 4 .
^Analogues to t h e s e three points c a n be m a d e about an income-tax-funded welfare
s c h e m e . There is no redistribution u n d e r the historical entitlement rules of s u c h a
s c h e m e , b e c a u s e u n d e r these rules p e r s o n s are entitled only to their net i n c o m e ( w h i c h
a l o n e is distributed to them in the first place) I n c o m e taxes w o u l d represent part of v o u r
property, w h i c h a be.ng taken away from y o u , only if y o u w e r e entitled to y o u r g r o s s
income, which, u n d e r the s c h e m e , y o u are not. T h o u g h the tax portion . n W s t K
physically in y o u r possession, it is (when due) n o longer y o u r s but rather b e S s to the
 T h e P r o b l e m of J u s t i c e , 1.3 19

1.3. I n r e s p o n s e to Nozick's affirmation of a p a r t i c u l a r specification

of rights, Rawls w o u l d n o t offer r e m a r k s o n a different subject, c l a i m i n g
t h a t t h e s e N o z i c k i a n rights ( a n d w h a t e v e r e n t i t l e m e n t s t h e y give rise to)
s h o u l d s o m e t i m e s b e o v e r r i d d e n b y o t h e r m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s (cf. BSS
65). I n s t e a d , h e w o u l d a d d u c e r e a s o n s o n a h i g h e r level against a c c e p t ­
i n g Nozick's specification of p r o p e r t y r i g h t s in t h e first p l a c e . It m a y
h e l p t o fix t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o levels terminologically b y
c o n t r a s t i n g t h e rights specified a s p a r t of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e w i t h
t h e values a p p e a l e d to in t h e c o m p a r a t i v e m o r a l a s s e s s m e n t of a l t e r n a ­
6
tive i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s . Values m a y conflict a n d t h e n r e q u i r e t r a d e ­
offs a n d sacrifices. But w h a t e v e r liberties a n d rights (side c o n s t r a i n t s )
a r e specified by t h e c h o s e n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e are d e s i g n e d t o b e
c o m p a t i b l e w i t h o n e a n o t h e r from t h e start. T h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r to
violate s o m e o n e ' s right in o r d e r to fulfill t h e rights of o t h e r s s h o u l d in
7
principle never arise.
It is likely, for e x a m p l e , t h a t Nozick w o u l d value b o t h f r e e d o m of
m o v e m e n t a n d t h e c h a n c e of e x c l u s i o n a r y c o n t r o l over l a n d . It is n o t
p o s s i b l e for b o t h v a l u e s to b e fully i n c o r p o r a t e d into o n e i n s t i t u t i o n a l
s c h e m e , h o w e v e r . A m o n g t h e v a r i o u s possibilities of sacrifice a n d c o m ­
p r o m i s e , Nozick favors a s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h p e r s o n s h a v e full exclu­
s i o n a r y c o n t r o l over w h a t e v e r l a n d t h e y o w n , as well as a c o r r e s p o n d ­
ingly l i m i t e d right t o f r e e d o m of m o v e m e n t . T h o u g h t h e value of free­
d o m of m o v e m e n t is sacrificed in p a r t , t h e l i m i t e d right t o f r e e d o m of
m o v e m e n t t h a t e m e r g e s from t h e trade-off is n o t s u b j e c t to violation for
8
t h e s a k e of o t h e r r i g h t s . Similarly, t h e Rawlsian's s c h e m e , t h o u g h it
6
N o z i c k ' s failure to appreciate this d i s t i n c t i o n c o n f u s e s not o n l y h i s l o n g d i s c u s s i o n of
Rawls but a l s o his d e v e l o p m e n t of h i s o w n theory. T h u s , c o n s i d e r h i s v i e w (ASU c h a p . 4)
that s o m e b o r d e r s may b e c r o s s e d (i.e., s o m e rights m a y be violated) w i t h o u t c o n s e n t ,
p r o v i d e d that c o m p e n s a t i o n is paid. Offhand this v i e w m u s t s e e m i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e . If I
a m at liberty to d o X w i t h o u t y o u r c o n s e n t provided I p a y y o u c o m p e n s a t i o n , t h e n y o u
have no right that I refrain from d o i n g so, a n d h e n c e m y d o i n g it c r o s s e s n o border at all.
But the mistake is c o m p r e h e n s i b l e , b e c a u s e Nozick, operating o n a single level, h a s n o
intelligible alternative. What a m I p a v i n g y o u c o m p e n s a t i o n for if n o right violation
(border crossing) is involved in m y action?
T h e difficulty d i s a p p e a r s if w e u n d e r s t a n d Nozick's p r o p o s a l as resolving, o n the
h i g h e r level, a c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n values. S h o u l d there be a right not to have X d o n e to
o n e w i t h o u t o n e ' s c o n s e n t or a liberty to d o X to o t h e r s w i t h o u t their c o n s e n t ? Given
s t r o n g r e a s o n s in favor of e a c h , o n e might, rejecting both, b e d r a w n to a c o m p r o m i s e of
the sort N o z i c k p r o p o s e s . Let there b e a liberty t o - d o - X - w i t h - c o n s e n t - o r - s i d e - p a y m e n t ,
a n d a right n o t - t o - h a v e - X - d o n e - t o - o n e - w i t h o u t - c o n s e n t - a n d - w i t h o u t - s i d e - p a y m e n t . In
this c o m p r o m i s e , t h e s i d e p a y m e n t c o m p e n s a t e s not for violation of a right (it enters into
h o w the right is formulated in the first placel but for abridgment of a value, the value of
controlling w h e t h e r o t h e r s d o X to oneself. One d o e s not get s u c h control, but t h e
institutionalized s i d e p a y m e n t t e n d s to make l e s s u n p l e a s a n t a n d l e s s frequent the
o c c a s i o n s o n w h i c h X is d o n e to o n e w i t h o u t o n e ' s c o n s e n t .
7
B u t s u c h conflicts will, of course, arise in practice. Even the m o s t rational legal
structure c a n n o t fully anticipate all p o s s i b l e conflict s c e n a r i o s or p r e e m p t all p o s s i b l e
d i s p u t e s a b o u t its o w n interpretation.
8
A value, e v e n w h e r e it is abridged, might still be partly realized, t h r o u g h c o n s e n t . In
Nozick's s c h e m e , p e r s o n s c a n b u y or e x c h a n g e t r e s p a s s rights; in the reverse s c h e m e ,
l a n d o w n e r s c a n b u y their neighbors' p r o m i s e not to trespass. Still, Coase's t h e o r e m
n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , t h e c h o i c e of s c h e m e will make a n e n o r m o u s difference in h u m a n
20 T h e P r o b l e m of Justice, 1.4.1

c o m p r o m i s e s c e r t a i n values, features ( m o r e limited) p r o p e r t y rights

t h a t m a y n o t b e violated for t h e sake of o t h e r rights. Neither s c h e m e is
o r involves a "utilitarianism of rights," w h o s e r u l e s r e q u i r e o r p e r m i t
t h a t p e r s o n s violate t h e rights of o t h e r s w h e n e v e r d o i n g s o p r o d u c e s a
net gain for r i g h t s fulfillment overall (cf. ASU 28). A n d both s c h e m e s
c o u l d b e justified t h r o u g h a balancing of values, d e t e r m i n i n g w h i c h
institutional s t r u c t u r e ( i n c l u d i n g a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t e q u a l
p a c k a g e of r e c o g n i z e d rights a n d liberties) y i e l d s t h e b e s t lives for
9
individuals.
1.4. Still leaving a s i d e t h e m o r a l s u b s t a n c e of Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of
justice, let m e n o w e x p o u n d s o m e w h a t m o r e p r e c i s e l y its s u b j e c t , t h e
basic s t r u c t u r e of a self-contained social s y s t e m . My e x p o s i t i o n of t h e
t w o key n o t i o n s involved d e p a r t s from Rawls's o w n in t w o m i n o r
respects.
1.4.1.1 prefer t o s p e a k of t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of a social system, r a t h e r
t h a n , a s Rawls, of a society. He explicates t h i s n o t i o n a s follows: "Let u s
a s s u m e , t o fix ideas, t h a t a society is a m o r e o r less self-sufficient
association of p e r s o n s w h o i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s t o o n e a n o t h e r r e c o g n i z e
certain r u l e s of c o n d u c t a s b i n d i n g a n d w h o for t h e m o s t p a r t a c t i n
a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e m . S u p p o s e f u r t h e r t h a t t h e s e r u l e s specify a s y s ­
t e m of c o o p e r a t i o n d e s i g n e d t o a d v a n c e t h e g o o d of t h o s e t a k i n g p a r t i n
1 0
i t . . . . [A] society is a cooperative v e n t u r e for m u t u a l a d v a n t a g e " (TJ 4 ) .
T h i s explication s e e m s n a r r o w , for t h e r e a r e s u r e l y m a n y h i s t o r i c a l
societies (standardly so-called) w h o s e r u l e s fail e i t h e r to b e d e s i g n e d
for m u t u a l a d v a n t a g e o r t o b e r e c o g n i z e d a s b i n d i n g b y all p a r t i c i p a n t s .
For e x a m p l e , t h e r u l e s m a y b e d e s i g n e d for t h e a d v a n t a g e of a minority,
and compliance by the remaining participants m a y be d u e to coercion
11
o r religious s u p e r s t i t i o n . N o w Rawls is free, of c o u r s e , t o e x c l u d e s u c h
c a s e s from h i s inquiry, leaving o p e n w h e t h e r a n d h o w s u c h social
s y s t e m s c a n b e a s s e s s e d a s m o r e o r less just. B u t a s h i s f r e q u e n t u s e of
slavery a s a n e x a m p l e of a social i n s t i t u t i o n m a k e s clear, t h i s is n o t h i s
i n t e n t i o n . Seeing t h a t Rawls is u n c l e a r a b o u t t h e s c o p e of his inquiry in

terms, a s c a n b e s e e n b y comparing, e.g„ t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e landless poor u n d e r t h e s e

t w o alternative s c h e m e s .
^ h i s statement fits w i t h what Nozick says w h e n h e is clear about t h e distinction
b e t w e e n the t w o levels. In d i s c u s s i n g h o w his principles of appropriation a n d rectifica­
tion s h o u l d b e formulated, h e remarks about t h e latter (which governs a d j u s t m e n t s of
h o l d i n g s in light of past infractions of his acquisition or transfer principles), "Whatever
difficulties (the entitlement theorist] h a s in applying the principle of rectification t o
p e r s o n s w h o d i d n o t t h e m s e l v e s violate t h e first t w o principles are difficulties in b a l a n c
ing the conflicting considerations so a s correctly to formulate t h e c o m p l e x princiole o f
rectification itself; h e will n o t violate moral side constraints b y applying t h e nrinrinle"
ASU 173, cf. 1 4 6 , 1 8 0 - 8 1 ) . My point is that s u c h balancing of c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s T q u S d
t h r o u g h o u t - . n the formulation of all s i d e constraints or other institutional f e a n ^ s
« l think Rawls is here defining what a society is. Were he S f f « S L
about what a society ought to be, I w o u l d not need t o objectTo This p t s s f g e P

" T h i s problem is first n o t e d bv Wolff tIR 77 7C u ;„ ,i ' t-"»s&age.

P
32,150n. ,thoughBeit tal<esS^
d ^ ^ ^ S ^ .
5 2 Z

be mutuary advantageous (rather than be

 T h e P r o b l e m of J u s t i c e , 1.4.2 21

t h i s r e s p e c t , I a m s t a r t i n g o u t w i t h t h e c o n c e p t of a (self-sufficient)
social s y s t e m , w h i c h is b r o a d e r t h a n Rawls's official n o t i o n of a society.
C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , I a m also b r o a d e n i n g his e x p r e s s i o n "social c o o p e r a ­
t i o n " to a l l o w t h a t t h e e c o n o m i c i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h i n a social s y s t e m
m a y b e largely coercive r a t h e r t h a n g e n u i n e l y c o o p e r a t i v e a n d t h a t t h e
m o s t i m p o r t a n t social i n t e r a c t i o n s m a y t a k e p l a c e o u t s i d e t h e e c o ­
1 2
n o m i c s p h e r e . My initial focus, t h e n , is o n a c o m p r e h e n s i v e a n d
r e a s o n a b l y s e l f - c o n t a i n e d s y s t e m of social i n t e r a c t i o n . I a m n o t d e n y ­
i n g t h e possibility t h a t t h e r e a r e s o m e s u c h s y s t e m s to w h i c h Rawls's
c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is n o t p l a u s i b l y a p p l i c a b l e , b u t w e d o b e s t t o
confront t h i s possibility later (§23), w h e n h i s c o n c e p t i o n is before u s in
d e v e l o p e d form.
1.4.2. W h a t , t h e n , is t h e basic structure of a self-sufficient social
s y s t e m ? Rawls leaves t h i s n o t i o n n o t m e r e l y v a g u e b u t also a m b i g u o u s .
Let m e e x p l a i n b y e l a b o r a t i n g o n e of its t w o s e n s e s in Rawls, h o w I
u n d e r s t a n d t h e t e r m basic structure. I will t h e n d e f e n d m y c h o i c e b y
c o n t r a s t i n g it to t h e o t h e r s e n s e in w h i c h Rawls u s e s t h e t e r m .
In A Theory of Justice t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of a social s y s t e m is d e n n e d
a s "the w a y in w h i c h t h e m a j o r social i n s t i t u t i o n s d i s t r i b u t e f u n d a m e n ­
tal r i g h t s a n d d u t i e s a n d d e t e r m i n e t h e division of a d v a n t a g e s from
social c o o p e r a t i o n " (TJ 7). Social i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e a s p e c i e s of social
p r a c t i c e s a n d t h u s a r e in s o m e w a y s a n a l o g o u s t o g a m e s a n d rituals (TJ
55; cf. TCR 175 n. 1; JF 164 n. 2). So t h e t e r m institution is u s e d h e r e in a
s e n s e t h a t — a l l o w i n g t h e ( r e d u n d a n t ) a d d i t i o n of " s o c i a l " — c o n t r a s t s
w i t h its o t h e r s e n s e of o r g a n i z a t i o n o r c o r p o r a t i o n (as in " i n s t i t u t i o n of
h i g h e r learning"). F o r this latter s e n s e of institution, Rawls u s e s t h e
term association.
Not every collective activity, h o w e v e r regular, c o n s t i t u t e s a social
p r a c t i c e . It is further r e q u i r e d t h a t t h e relevant r u l e s b e g e n e r a l l y
k n o w n a n d u n d e r s t o o d b y t h o s e p a r t i c i p a t i n g in t h e activity. A p r a c t i c e
involves a s y s t e m of r u l e s a n d p r o c e d u r e s t h a t "defines offices a n d
p o s i t i o n s w i t h t h e i r rights a n d d u t i e s , p o w e r s a n d i m m u n i t i e s , a n d t h e
like" (TJ 55). T h i s s y s t e m m a y i n c l u d e w a y s of d e a l i n g w i t h rule viola­
t i o n s — f o r e x a m p l e , p r o c e d u r e s for d e t e r m i n i n g violations, a list of
a d m i s s i b l e e x c u s e s , p e n a l t i e s , a n d s o forth. Moreover, s o m e of t h e r u l e s
g o v e r n i n g t h e activity m u s t b e constitutive rules, w h i c h stipulate roles
a n d m o v e s t h a t c o u l d n o t exist ( u n d e r t h e i r relevant d e s c r i p t i o n s )
13
o u t s i d e of t h e activity in q u e s t i o n (goalkeeper, t o c h e c k m a t e , e t c . ) . A
l 2
C p . Hoffe, PG 3 2 6 - 2 8 .
" R a w l s s l a t e s this s e c o n d r e q u i r e m e n t and t h e n illustrates it w i t h baseball terminol­
o g y a s follows: "The rules of practices are logically prior to particular c a s e s Given a n y
rule w h i c h specifies a form of a c t i o n (a move), a particular a c t i o n w h i c h w o u l d be taken a s
falling u n d e r this rule given that there is the practice w o u l d not b e described as that sort
of a c t i o n u n l e s s there w a s t h e practice. In the c a s e of a c t i o n s specified by practices it is
logically i m p o s s i b l e to perform t h e m o u t s i d e the stage-setting provided by t h o s e p r a c ­
tices, for u n l e s s there is t h e practice, a n d u n l e s s the requisite properties are fulfilled,
w h a t e v e r o n e d o e s , w h a t e v e r m o v e m e n t s o n e makes, will fail to c o u n t as a form of a c t i o n
w h i c h t h e practice specifies" (TCR 189). I have w e a k e n e d this c o n d i t i o n by a s s u m i n g that
22 T h e P r o b l e m of Justice, 1.4.2

g a m e , for e x a m p l e , m a y involve v a r i o u s r o l e s (batter, u m p i r e ) , w i t h e a c h

role envisaging v a r i o u s g a m e - d e p e n d e n t m o v e s t h a t o c c u p a n t s of this
role m a y o r m u s t m a k e in c e r t a i n c o n t e x t s .
T h e r e s e e m s t o b e n o very clear w a y of d e n n i n g social i n s t i t u t i o n s
w i t h i n t h e d o m a i n of social p r a c t i c e s . If g a m e s a n d rituals a r e n o t
n o r m a l l y t h o u g h t of a s i n s t i t u t i o n s , it is p r e s u m a b l y b e c a u s e t h e y are,
at least i n m o d e m W e s t e r n c u l t u r e , m a r g i n a l t o t h e o n g o i n g c o m p e t i ­
tion over c o n t r o l of c o n d u c t a n d r e s o u r c e s . T h o u g h p e r s o n s ' b e h a v i o r
w i t h i n a g a m e o r ritual m a y b e subject t o m o r a l critique, s u c h p r a c t i c e s
t h e m s e l v e s are m u c h less so, a s s u m i n g t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n c a n easily b e
1 4
d e c l i n e d , risks are limited, a n d s o o n . I n s t i t u t i o n s , by c o n t r a s t , d o call
for m o r a l a s s e s s m e n t . For t h i s subject Rawls r e s e r v e s t h e t e r m justice
a s "the first virtue of social i n s t i t u t i o n s " (TJ 3) or, p e r h a p s b e t t e r — t o
b y p a s s t h e s i d e i s s u e of h o w to i n d i v i d u a t e i n s t i t u t i o n s — a s t h e first
1 5
virtue of i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s .
Given this n o t i o n of t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e , Rawls's p r o j e c t is t o d e v e l o p
a c o n c e p t i o n of justice (or t h e c e n t r a l p a r t thereof) t h a t a s s e s s e s t h e
most important i n s t i t u t i o n a l features of a n y self-contained (TJ 457) o r
all-inclusive social s y s t e m (BSS IV). T h e s e e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e s of a c l o s e d
s y s t e m ' s i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e — " t h e political c o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e legally
r e c o g n i z e d forms of p r o p e r t y , . . . t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e e c o n o m y , a n d
t h e n a t u r e of t h e family" (BSS 47), w h o s e effects a r e " p r o f o u n d a n d
pervasive, a n d p r e s e n t from b i r t h " (TJ 96)—Rawls refers t o a s its b a s i c
s t r u c t u r e (TJ §2, BSS). I will also say t h a t t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e c o n s i s t s of
t h e , largely constitutive, g r o u n d rules t h a t s h a p e a society, o r of t h e
terms oj'social interaction t h a t significantly involve o r a t least affect all
its p a r t i c i p a n t s . T h e s e g r o u n d r u l e s define t h e society's c e n t r a l p r o ­
c e d u r e s , b o d i e s , a n d offices, a n d t h e y regulate t h e a s s i g n m e n t of b e n e ­
fits a n d b u r d e n s (rights a n d d u t i e s , p o w e r s a n d i m m u n i t i e s , g o o d s a n d
services) t o p a r t i c i p a n t s in g e n e r a l a n d t o t h e o c c u p a n t s of special
roles.
In b r o a d outline, t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e c o n s i s t s of a society's b a s i c
m o d e of e c o n o m i c organization; t h e p r o c e d u r e s for m a k i n g social

only some rules of the practice n e e d have this character (there might b e a rule in baseball
that forbids players to bite or kick others). T h i s point is relevant t o Rawls's subject of a
social system's basic structure. S o m e of the c o n d u c t rules in s u c h a system m a y m e r e l y
restate natural duties, w h i c h p e r s o n s have toward o n e another irrespective o f a n v
practices they may jointly participate in—criminal-law prohibitions against crueltv (TJ
1141 or against harming the innocent ITJ 109), for e x a m p l e
" C o m p a r e t h e distinction Rawls makes in another context b e t w e e n "a practice i n
which there is n o option w h e t h e r to e n g a g e in it or not, a n d o n e must plav" a n d "a
prachce m w h i c h there ,s s u c h an option, and o n e m a y decline the invitation" t m 242; ci.

c o ^ S ^ ^begmn^ . T h g h o u t ,

tar actions or of peLns I d o no.tale'up afallr UF S S ^ T l " " * ^

 T h e P r o b l e m of J u s t i c e , 1.4.2 33

c h o i c e s t h r o u g h t h e c o n d u c t of, or i n t e r a c t i o n s a m o n g , i n d i v i d u a l s a n d
16
groups, a n d limitations u p o n s u c h choices; the more important prac­
tices g o v e r n i n g civil ( n o n e c o n o m i c a n d nonpolitical) i n t e r a c t i o n s , s u c h
a s t h e family o r t h e e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m ; a n d t h e p r o c e d u r e s for i n t e r ­
p r e t i n g a n d enforcing t h e r u l e s of t h e s c h e m e . T h e first category in­
c l u d e s a specification of w h a t k i n d of i t e m s c a n b e o w n e d a n d b y
w h o m , h o w o w n e r s h i p is g a i n e d a n d lost, b u t n o t t h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i ­
z a t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r e c o n o m i c a s s o c i a t i o n s s u c h as firms o r u n i o n s ,
w h i c h o n l y s o m e p a r t i c i p a n t s are involved in. Similarly, t h e last c a t e ­
gory m i g h t i n c l u d e a specification of t h e w a y s a n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s in
w h i c h infractions of social r u l e s are to b e p r o t e s t e d , d e t e r m i n e d , p u n ­
i s h e d , d e t e r r e d , o r p r e e m p t e d b u t n o t t h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e
j u d i c i a r y o r t h e full details of c r i m i n a l trial p r o c e d u r e s . A m o n g t h e
i n s t i t u t i o n a l f e a t u r e s t h a t , w h e r e t h e y exist, are p a r t of t h e basic s t r u c ­
t u r e a r e t h e u s e of m o n e y , "competitive m a r k e t s , private p r o p e r t y in t h e
m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n , a n d t h e m o n o g a m o u s family" (TJ 7), r u l e s g o v e r n ­
ing t h e u s e of force, slavery (TJ 248), t h e division of p o w e r s , p a r l i a m e n ­
tary d e m o c r a c y , judicial review, a t a x - f u n d e d welfare s y s t e m , a n d c o m ­
17
pulsory primary education.
T h i s n o t i o n of a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e , a n e l a b o r a t i o n of t h e a c c o u n t in A
Theory of Justice, conflicts w i t h a n a r r o w e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e t e r m
w h i c h d o m i n a t e s Rawls's d i s c u s s i o n in " T h e Basic S t r u c t u r e as S u b ­
ject." T h e r e t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e is defined in t e r m s of " a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l
division of labor b e t w e e n t h e basic s t r u c t u r e a n d t h e r u l e s a p p l y i n g
directly t o i n d i v i d u a l s a n d a s s o c i a t i o n s " (BSS 55). " T h e role of t h e
i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t b e l o n g t o t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e is t o s e c u r e just back­
g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n s a g a i n s t w h i c h t h e a c t i o n s of individuals a n d a s s o ­
c i a t i o n s t a k e p l a c e " (BSS 53). By this n a r r o w c o n s t r u a l , Rawls's e x a m ­
p l e s of private p r o p e r t y in t h e m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n a n d t h e m o n o g a ­
m o u s family w o u l d n o t b e i n c l u d e d , b e c a u s e it is n o t t h e i r role, e v e n
ideally, to p r e s e r v e just b a c k g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n s . T h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of a
d e v e l o p e d society m i g h t t h e n i n c l u d e little m o r e t h a n its welfare a n d
s c h o o l s y s t e m s , a n d s o m e historical societies, o r g a n i z e d a r o u n d r u l e s
t h a t a p p l y directly t o i n d i v i d u a l s a n d a s s o c i a t i o n s , w o u l d lack a b a s i c
structure altogether.
I n w h a t follows, I w o r k w i t h t h e first, w i d e r s e n s e of t h e t e r m basic
structure. In a way, t h i s c h o i c e reflects n o d i s a g r e e m e n t w i t h Rawls,
b e c a u s e it leaves u n d i s p u t e d h i s reasons for t h i n k i n g t h a t s p e c i a l
m e c h a n i s m s a r e n e e d e d to p r e s e r v e a fair d i s t r i b u t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g
p o w e r a m o n g t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s in a social s y s t e m . I also believe, h o w -

1 6
H e r e a b a s i c structure m a y allow for c h o i c e s t h r o u g h w h i c h features of itself are
changed.
1 7
T h e n o t i o n of t h e basic structure, like m a n y o t h e r important c o n c e p t s , retains a
certain v a g u e n e s s , w h i c h it w o u l d b e futile to try to r e m o v e c o m p l e t e l y . The n o t i o n m a y
surely b e significant a n d p e n e t r a t i n g e v e n w i t h o u t a s h a r p line b e t w e e n practices that are
a n d t h o s e that are not part of the basic structure.
24 T h e P r o b l e m of Justice, 1.4.2

ever, t h a t Rawls's n a r r o w i n g of t h e n o t i o n w a s a s t r a t e g i c m i s t a k e ,
b e c a u s e h e w a s t h e r e b y a c c e p t i n g t h e w a y Nozick w a n t s to s t r u c t u r e
t h e c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n t h e i r t w o a p p r o a c h e s . W h a t 1 h a v e in m i n d c a n
b e c o m e c l e a r only gradually, as I d e v e l o p t h e c o n t r a s t in a w a y that
differs from Nozick's a n d Rawls's p r e s e n t a t i o n s . But o n e q u i c k w a y of
sketching m y w o r r y is this: O n t h e n a r r o w u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e t e r m ,
Rawls's e n t e r p r i s e — t o d e v e l o p a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e t h a t p r o v i d e s a
criterion for t h e m o r a l a s s e s s m e n t of alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s —
either b e g s t h e q u e s t i o n by a s s u m i n g t h a t social s y s t e m s o u g h t t o have
a basic s t r u c t u r e o r h a s n o t h i n g t o s a y a b o u t social s y s t e m s t h a t lack a
basic s t r u c t u r e . T h e latter, m o r e c h a r i t a b l e v e r d i c t w o u l d render
Rawls's a p p r o a c h p a r o c h i a l , as h e h i m s e l f s e e m s to c o n c e d e w h e n h e
suggests t h a t (only?) w h e n w e o p t for a s o c i a l - c o n t r a c t d o c t r i n e a n d
(only?) " o n c e w e t h i n k of t h e p a r t i e s to a social c o n t r a c t a s free a n d
equal (and rational) m o r a l p e r s o n s [are t h e r e ] s t r o n g r e a s o n s for taking
t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e as t h e p r i m a r y s u b j e c t " (BSS 48). " T h e l i b e r t a r i a n
d o c t r i n e . . . h a s n o p l a c e for a s p e c i a l t h e o r y of j u s t i c e for t h e b a s i c
s t r u c t u r e " (BSS 52). T h i s p a r o c h i a l c h a r a c t e r of Rawls's a p p r o a c h is
close to w h a t Nozick is s u g g e s t i n g . T h e c o n s t r u c t of t h e original p o s i ­
tion at b e s t p r o v i d e s a s u i t a b l e s t a n d p o i n t for r a n k i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l
s c h e m e s t h a t a r e o r g a n i z e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h (what Nozick calls)
patterned p r i n c i p l e s . It is u n s u i t a b l e for a fair a s s e s s m e n t of t h e liber­
tarian i n s t i t u t i o n s Nozick favors (ASU 198-204).
O n t h e w i d e n o t i o n of b a s i c s t r u c t u r e w h i c h I a m p r e s u p p o s i n g , any
c o m p r e h e n s i v e social s y s t e m h a s a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e a n d t h u s falls w i t h i n
18
t h e p u r v i e w of Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . T h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of
Nozick's m i n i m a l state, for e x a m p l e , c o n s i s t s of c e r t a i n p r o h i b i t i o n s
against force a n d fraud, c e r t a i n r u l e s of a c q u i s i t i o n , transfer, a n d r e c ­
tification of h o l d i n g s , a n d s o m e b a s i c m e c h a n i s m s of a d j u d i c a t i o n a n d
19
e n f o r c e m e n t . Rawls a n d Nozick c a n t h e n b e s e e n t o b e o p e r a t i n g

,8
T h i s wide notion is not fully displaced in Rawls's later work. It still appears, for
example, at BSS 55, where he varies the expression with "institutional form" and "social
structure," suggesting that every social s y s t e m has such a core of basic institutions.
"Nozick discusses some other basic structures in which the same rules and prohibi­
tions are combined with different methods of adjudication and enforcement—involving
an ufrraminimal government, protection agencies, and individuals (respectively) As we
shall see, Rawls's conception of justice is applicable even to the last of these Nozick's
state of nature can be understood as a basic structure, provided the rules and practices
he postulates for it are sufficiently known and honored to enable reasonably settled
expectations about how persons will interact. T h u s it is false, I think, that "anarchist
theoryrftenable undercuts the w h o l e subject of political philosophy" (ASU 4 l - 7 t teas if
one allows that Rawls's question is in political philosophy. A n a r c W s s o p p o s e nsntu
..onal s c h e m e s involving governmental authorities and coercion, but this not onnosl
tion to institutions as such. In fact, anarchist t h e o r i s t * Km.v,ii , I , ^ opposi-
m M r o o s a ) s
of practices, procedures, rules, a n c f n Z n t h a t Z „ ^ ? J ^ P P
social system^ T h e s e are anareWs. basT sSictu^s(irTmvtiH ^
Nevertheless, some intercourse is cleany n T - S t e a ared
° ^
i n s t l , u t I o n s w
' I n ­
justice c o u l d be a s s e s s e d ( p a r a d i g m a t i c X T h V ^ t t ? ? civUizati ns
^
Rawls contends that even S ^ S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ° »-
6 a C h p e r S O n s c o n d u c t l s m
by certain natural duties (cf Chap n 1 7 2 w a l l y constrained
 T h e P r o b l e m of Justice, 1.5 25

w i t h i n t h e s a m e a r e n a of possibilities, offering c o m p e t i n g a p p r o a c h e s
2 0
t o t h e s a m e subject, t h e justice of i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s .
1.5. O n c e t h i s focus o n a social s y s t e m ' s b a s i c s t r u c t u r e h a s b e e n
fully u n d e r s t o o d , it h a s a s t r o n g claim to p r i m a c y w i t h i n m o r a l reflec­
t i o n q u i t e a p a r t from w h e t h e r o n e believes in social c o n t r a c t s o r free
a n d e q u a l m o r a l p e r s o n h o o d . T h e reason is t h a t w e c a n n o t , c o n c e p ­
tually o r causally, e v a l u a t e w h a t w e a r e d o i n g t o o t h e r s w i t h o u t u n d e r ­
s t a n d i n g t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e g r o u n d r u l e s t h a t give m e a n i n g to o u r
a c t i o n s a n d o m i s s i o n s a n d d e t e r m i n e t h e i r (often r e m o t e ) repercus­
s i o n s . N o r c a n w e s i m p l y take t h e s e g r o u n d r u l e s for g r a n t e d . To s o m e
e x t e n t t h e c h o i c e of g r o u n d rules, t h e w a y w e s t r u c t u r e h u m a n i n t e r a c ­
tion, is u p to u s collectively, a n d t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of this c h o i c e are of
t h e g r e a t e s t m o r a l significance. C o n f r o n t e d w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w
o n e o u g h t to c o n d u c t oneself w i t h i n a social context, therefore, o n e
c a n n o t s i m p l y follow t h e prevailing social i n s t i t u t i o n s b u t m u s t e x a m ­
i n e t h e s e from a m o r a l p o i n t of view. W h e r e t h e y are just, t h e y s h o u l d
be c o m p l i e d with a n d s u p p o r t e d . Where they are unjust, one s h o u l d
s e e h o w o n e m i g h t c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e i r reform a n d p e r h a p s h e l p miti­
g a t e s o m e of t h e i r c o n s e q u e n c e s . A n d w h e r e (just) i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e
lacking a l t o g e t h e r , t h e task is to h e l p b r i n g t h e m a b o u t .
T h i s crucial c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n t w o m o r a l subjects, d e a l i n g respec­
tively w i t h i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d w i t h c o n d u c t , is n o t t h e c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n
m a c r o - a n d m i c r o c o n t e x t s , t h o u g h m a n y h a v e followed Nozick (ASU
167n, 2 0 4 - 5 ) in s u p p o s i n g o t h e r w i s e . U n d e r s t o o d generally, Rawls's
c r i t e r i o n of justice is a p p l i c a b l e , in t h e limit, to t h e d e s i g n of g r o u n d
r u l e s r e g u l a t i n g t h e c o o p e r a t i o n of t w o p e r s o n s s t r a n d e d t o g e t h e r o n
a n isolated i s l a n d o r t o t h e a s s e s s m e n t of g r o u n d r u l e s t h a t m a y h a v e
e m e r g e d b e t w e e n t h e m . If it is i n a p p l i c a b l e t o h o w p a r e n t s s h o u l d
allocate r e s o u r c e s to t h e e d u c a t i o n of t h e i r c h i l d r e n , h o w t e a c h e r s
s h o u l d g r a d e t h e i r p u p i l s , or h o w firms s h o u l d r e m u n e r a t e t h e i r e m ­
p l o y e e s , t h e reason is n o t that t h e s e a r e small-scale i s s u e s b u t t h a t t h e y
raise q u e s t i o n s a b o u t c o n d u c t w i t h i n i n s t i t u t i o n s r a t h e r t h a n a b o u t
i n s t i t u t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s . Rawls's criterion is also i n a p p l i c a b l e to t h e
d e s i g n a n d a s s e s s m e n t of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of a s s o c i a t i o n s
( s u c h a s firms) a n d s u b s y s t e m s ( s u c h as n a t i o n a l e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m s ) ,
n o m a t t e r h o w large t h e s e m a y b e . T h i s m u s t b e s o o n p a i n of i n c o n s i s ­
t e n c y , a s t h e r e is every r e a s o n t o believe t h a t t h e global c r i t e r i o n a n d
t h e local criteria a r e n o t cosatisfiable. T h e e n t i r e s e l f - c o n t a i n e d social
s y s t e m c a n b e o r g a n i z e d so as to o p t i m i z e t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n it t e n d s t o
g e n e r a t e , o r e a c h p a r t of t h i s social s y s t e m m i g h t b e o r g a n i z e d s o a s to
o p t i m i z e t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n w i t h i n t h a t part, b u t w e c a n n o t h a v e it b o t h
w a y s , b e c a u s e t h e t w o r e q u i r e m e n t s w o u l d i n p r a c t i c e conflict w i t h
each other.
2 0
T h o u g h basic structure is s o m e w h a t m o r e restrictive than institutional scheme in
regard to i n s t i t u t i o n s i n c l u d e d , this difference will not matter in w h a t follows. I will
generally prefer institutional scheme, b e c a u s e it is m o r e descriptive a n d not peculiar to
Rawls.
26 T h e P r o b l e m of J u s t i c e , 1.6
T h e crucial p o i n t , t h e n , is t h a t Rawls f o c u s e s o n t h e f u n d a m e n t a l
"rules of t h e g a m e " a n d n o t o n w h a t m o v e s p l a y e r s a r e m o r a l l y free or
c o n s t r a i n e d t o m a k e w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r g a m e in p r o g r e s s . T o stay w i t h
t h e m e t a p h o r for a m o m e n t , t h e q u e s t i o n is n o t w h e t h e r in a n o n g o i n g
p o k e r g a m e t h o s e w h o h a v e w o n a great d e a l s h o u l d n ' t (be m a d e to)
give s o m e of t h e i r w i n n i n g s to t h o s e w h o h a v e lost n e a r l y all t h e y h a d .
T h e q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r w e o u g h t n o t r a t h e r p l a y s o m e o t h e r g a m e
t h a t d o e s n o t , t i m e a n d again, p r o d u c e d e s t i t u t e l o s e r s . T h i s q u e s t i o n
m a y s e e m silly in t h e c o n t e x t of g a m e s t h a t p e r s o n s c a n join a n d q u i t at
will, b u t it is of c o n s i d e r a b l e u r g e n c y in r e g a r d to t h e f r a m e w o r k of
basic social i n s t i t u t i o n s , w h o s e p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e b o r n i n t o it a n d s h a p e d
b y it, c a n n o t quit at will, a n d a r e s u b j e c t t o violent c o e r c i o n w h e n t h e y
try to i g n o r e its r u l e s .
1.6. T h e c o m m o n m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of Rawls's p r o j e c t h a s v a r i o u s
s o u r c e s . F r e q u e n t l y h i s t e r m institution is a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a s p e c i a l
21
k i n d of actor, s u c h a s a g o v e r n m e n t o r o t h e r a u t h o r i t y . T h i s a s s o c i a ­
tion is s o m e w h a t e n c o u r a g e d b y h i s n a r r o w u s e of t h e t e r m b a s i c
structure in " T h e Basic S t r u c t u r e as Subject." T h e c a s e of o u r s i m p l e
island e c o n o m y (or even that of t h e p o k e r g a m e ) m a y h e l p s h o w h o w
Rawls's q u e s t i o n c a n arise e v e n i n very small-scale social s y s t e m s
w h o s e relevant p r a c t i c e s c o u l d q u i t e conceivably w o r k w i t h o u t a n y
a u t h o r i t i e s or officials.
T h e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g is p e r h a p s f u r t h e r e n c o u r a g e d b y a reluc­
t a n c e t o a c c e p t t h a t social i n s t i t u t i o n s or b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s c a n exist (be
quantified over) a n d c a n h a v e m o r a l p r o p e r t i e s . But I d o n ' t believe
Rawls's a p p r o a c h , p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d , h a s s u c h i m p l i c a t i o n s . In d e ­
veloping a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e (in h i s sense), o n e is n o t c o m m i t t e d t o
thinking of social i n s t i t u t i o n s a s t h i n g s t h a t , like p e r s o n s , a r e responsi­
ble for c e r t a i n m o r a l l y salient a s p e c t s of reality. (In fact, t h i n k i n g t h i s
w a y invites t h e m i s t a k e n a s s u m p t i o n t h a t insofar as i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e
responsible, p e r s o n s are not.) Rather, o n e c a n allow t h a t talk a b o u t
social i n s t i t u t i o n s m a y b e s h o r t h a n d for ( m u c h m o r e c o m p l e x ) talk
a b o u t e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d m o d e s of i n t e r a c t i o n p r e v a l e n t in s o m e social
s y s t e m a n d , c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , t h a t a c r i t i q u e of s o m e institution as
u n j u s t c a n b e c a s h e d o u t a s a critique of c o n d u c t as w r o n g (namely, t h e
c o n d u c t of t h o s e w h o i n a u g u r a t e d , p e r p e t u a t e , or are in a p o s i t i o n to
reform t h e m o d e of i n t e r a c t i o n in question).
Even w i t h s u c h reducibility, t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n justice a n d
morality is significant a n d fruitful. T h i s m a y b e overlooked i f — p e r h a p s
led o n by t h e fact t h a t t h e adjectivesjusf a n d unjust c a n also a p p l y t o
(individual a n d collective) a g e n t s a n d t h e i r c o n d u c t — o n e c o n c e i v e s
t h e reducibility simplistically, that is, t h i n k s of institutional injustice a s
s p l y the aggregate of m a n y h o m o l o g o u s i n t e r p e r s o n a l "injustices"
i m
 T h e P r o b l e m of J u s t i c e , 1.6 27

c o m m i t t e d b y (individual or collective) a g e n t s . I have a l r e a d y s u g g e s t e d

h o w this view is m i s l e a d i n g . T h e social injustice blacks h a v e suffered a s
victims of t h e institution of slavery d o e s n o t c o n s i s t of a m u l t i t u d e of
w r o n g s c o m m i t t e d against t h e m by t h e i r ("unjust") s l a v e h o l d e r s . W e
c a n n o t c o m b a t this injustice by stealing a n d p r o t e c t i n g slaves o r
t h r o u g h a t t e m p t s to reform s l a v e h o l d e r s ( p e r h a p s b y u r g i n g t h e m to
r e l e a s e t h e i r slaves o r at least to give t h e m b e t t e r t r e a t m e n t ) . W e m u s t
reform institutions. O n l y w h e n t h e relevant legal a n d political s y s t e m
c e a s e s t o r e c o g n i z e p r o p e r t y rights in p e r s o n s is t h e social injustice
o v e r c o m e . Likewise, w h e n Rawls c l a i m s t h a t e c o n o m i c inequalities
prevailing i n d e v e l o p e d W e s t e r n societies a r e u n j u s t (TJ 226, 279), h e is
n o t e n v i s a g i n g t h a t — t h a n k s t o a c h a n g e of h e a r t a m o n g t h e rich o r t o
i n t e r v e n t i o n s by t h i r d p a r t i e s — w e a l t h is to b e t r a n s f e r r e d or r e d i s t r i b ­
u t e d t o t h e p o o r . Rather, t h e p o i n t is t o c h a n g e t h e e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u ­
t i o n s t h a t g o v e r n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of resources (and give rise to e x c e s ­
sive inequalities) in t h e first p l a c e .
C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , t h e responsibility for s u c h u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d
t h e task of r e f o r m i n g t h e m a r e n o t c o n f i n e d to s l a v e h o l d e r s or t o t h e
r i c h b u t r a t h e r fall u p o n all p a r t i c i p a n t s in t h e social s y s t e m ( t h o u g h
p e r h a p s i n p r o p o r t i o n to t h e benefits a n d a d v a n t a g e s t h e y enjoy u n d e r
t h e u n j u s t s c h e m e a n d surely in p r o p o r t i o n to t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s t h e y
h a v e of s u p p o r t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform). Spelled o u t in this way, t h e
focus o n a social s y s t e m ' s b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s r e p r e s e n t s a w a y of a d ­
d r e s s i n g ( a n d t h u s a s s u m e s ) a s p e c i a l t y p e of m o r a l responsibility, t h e
joint r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s in a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e
h a v e for its j u s t i c e .
N o w o n e m i g h t t h i n k that, s o u n d e r s t o o d , t h e subject of justice will
largely p r e e m p t t h e subject of morality. O n c e t h e g r o u n d r u l e s a r e
given, i n d i v i d u a l s a n d g r o u p s o u g h t s i m p l y t o a b i d e b y t h e m , at least s o
l o n g a s t h e s e g r o u n d r u l e s a r e just; it is o n l y w h e n g r o u n d r u l e s a r e
u n j u s t , o r p a r t l y lacking, t h a t morality c o m e s i n t o play. But this view,
s o m e w h a t e n c o u r a g e d b y Rawls's earlier baseball a n a l o g y (TCR), is a
s u b s t a n t i a l o v e r s t a t e m e n t . Even w h e n a j u s t a n d c o m p l e t e s c h e m e of
g r o u n d r u l e s exists, it d o e s n o t s u p e r s e d e morality. I n s t i t u t i o n a l
g r o u n d r u l e s p r i n c i p a l l y govern e x t e r n a l c o n d u c t (generating d u t i e s of
2 2
j u s t i c e in Kant's s e n s e ) a n d t h u s largely leave a s i d e o u r i n n e r lives.
Morality (or ethics) a d d r e s s e s q u e s t i o n s of c h a r a c t e r , m a x i m s , virtues,
i n t e n t i o n s , s e n t i m e n t s , a n d t h e like, w h i c h w o u l d b e i m p o r t a n t even (or
r a t h e r , especially) in a perfectly just w o r l d . Next, a just i n s t i t u t i o n a l
s c h e m e p r o v i d e s o n l y a g e n e r a l f r a m e w o r k for i n t e r a c t i o n . Morality is
relevant t o h o w w e a c t w i t h i n t h e c o n s i d e r a b l e l e e w a y left b y s u c h a
framework. Not e v e r y t h i n g t h e g r o u n d r u l e s p e r m i t is of e q u a l m o r a l
quality. Finally, m o r a l i t y s u p p l i e s i n d e p e n d e n t reasons for a c t i o n
w h i c h m a y conflict w i t h just g r o u n d r u l e s in s p e c i a l c a s e s . Even p a r -

zz
See Kant, KPW 1 3 2 - 3 3 .
28 T h e Relevance of P a t t e r n s , 2.1

t i c i p a n t s in a (nearly) just i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e m a y in s p e c i a l c i r c u m ­
stances have moral reasons not to comply with particular obligations
23
t h a t p r o p e r l y a r o s e w i t h i n it (cf. §9.5).

Z. T h e R e l e v a n c e o f P a t t e r n s

2 . 1 . Let u s begin t h e d i s c u s s i o n of p o s s i b l e criteria for a s s e s s i n g

feasible b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s b y asking w h a t r e l e v a n c e p a t t e r n s m i g h t h a v e
for o u r subject. T h i s inquiry s h o u l d f u r t h e r i l l u m i n a t e o u r d i s t i n c t i o n
b e t w e e n t w o t y p e s of m o r a l a s s e s s m e n t , as well as t h e c h a r a c t e r of
Rawls's p r o j e c t a n d of Nozick's m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of it.
With a n eye to e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s especially, Nozick p o s t u l a t e s a
f u n d a m e n t a l division b e t w e e n patterned a n d unpatterned p r i n c i p l e s of
distributive justice (ASU 155-60). He favors u n p a t t e r n e d p r i n c i p l e s ,
w h i c h specify p r o c e d u r e s t h r o u g h w h i c h h o l d i n g s c a n b e a c q u i r e d
(initially or from others) a n d t h e n , so to speak, let t h e c h i p s fall w h e r e
t h e y m a y . P a t t e r n e d p r i n c i p l e s , b y c o n t r a s t , involve t h e i d e a t h a t s o m e
d i s t r i b u t i o n s of i n c o m e or w e a l t h are b e t t e r t h a n o t h e r s — f o r e x a m p l e ,
t h a t h o l d i n g s (at a n y m o m e n t o r over time) s h o u l d b e r o u g h l y e q u a l ,
s h o u l d reflect h o w h a r d p e o p l e work, or s h o u l d b e above a c e r t a i n
t h r e s h o l d . Nozick o p p o s e s p a t t e r n e d p r i n c i p l e s , b e c a u s e t h e y r e q u i r e
m e d d l i n g in c o n s e n s u a l e c o n o m i c i n t e r a c t i o n s ("between c o n s e n t i n g
adults") w h e n e v e r t h e s e i n t e r a c t i o n s w o u l d o t h e r w i s e u p s e t t h e fa­
vored p a t t e r n . T h e y l e a d t o " h e a d - o n c l a s h e s . . . [with] m o r a l s i d e
c o n s t r a i n t s o n h o w individuals m a y b e t r e a t e d " (ASU 173; cf. t h e tale of
Wilt C h a m b e r l a i n , ASU 161-64). A n d h e s e e s Rawls as p r e p o s s e s s e d in
favor of p a t t e r n e d p r i n c i p l e s , "for p e o p l e m e e t i n g t o g e t h e r b e h i n d a veil
of i g n o r a n c e to d e c i d e w h o g e t s w h a t , k n o w i n g n o t h i n g a b o u t a n y
special e n t i t l e m e n t s p e o p l e m a y have, will treat a n y t h i n g to b e d i s ­
t r i b u t e d a s m a n n a from h e a v e n " (ASU 199; b u t cf. TJ 88).
T h e mistake h e r e is t h a t t h e p a r t i e s in t h e original p o s i t i o n a r e t o
d e c i d e not w h o gets w h a t b u t r a t h e r w h i c h criterion will govern t h e
c h o i c e of e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t regulate w h o gets w h a t . A c c o r d i n g
to Rawls, s u c h a criterion s h o u l d b e sensitive t o w h a t sorts of p a t t e r n s
various alternative e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s t e n d to g e n e r a t e . Nozick fails t o
a p p r e c i a t e that any p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e might b e d e e m e d relevant in
t w o different w a y s . O n e might p r o p o s e its i n c o r p o r a t i o n i n t o t h e
g r o u n d rules, as a r e q u i r e m e n t u p o n t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s (officials) t o w o r k
for i m p r o v e m e n t s in t h e prevailing distribution of h o l d i n g s b y a d j u s t ­
ing t h e i r o w n e c o n o m i c activities a n d by interfering w i t h t h o s e of

" F o r examples of how such intrapersonal conflicts may arise even in a basically just
socery, see Femberg, RI i - 2 4 . Rawls once had the ambition of extending; n s contrac-
2 0

tanan conception "to the choice of more or less an entire ethical system includTng
pnnctp es for all the virtues" (TJ 17, cf. 109,130; BSS II), to be titled "rightn'ssasSness"
 T h e Relevance of P a t t e r n s , 2.2 29

o t h e r s . S u c h a p r o p o s a l conflicts w i t h t h e p a r t i c u l a r g r o u n d r u l e s
Nozick a d v o c a t e s a n d m o r e generally w i t h t h e i d e a t h a t e c o n o m i c
g r o u n d r u l e s s h o u l d b e p r o c e d u r a l . Alternatively, t h e p a t t e r n prefer­
e n c e m a y b e b r o u g h t to b e a r u p o n t h e a s s e s s m e n t ( a n d design) of
g r o u n d r u l e s . W h a t is p r o p o s e d in this c a s e is that w e b e g u i d e d in
r a n k i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s by t h e p a t t e r n of h o l d i n g s e a c h t e n d s to
p r o d u c e . S u c h a p r o p o s a l d o e s n o t conflict w i t h t h e i d e a of p r o c e d u r a l
g r o u n d r u l e s . W h e t h e r it s u p p o r t s t h e p a r t i c u l a r g r o u n d r u l e s Nozick
a d v o c a t e s d e p e n d s o n w h a t p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e is p r o p o s e d a n d o n
e m p i r i c a l d a t a a b o u t t h e p a t t e r n s of h o l d i n g s t h a t v a r i o u s alternative
i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s (Nozick's i n c l u d e d ) t e n d to g e n e r a t e .
Rawls's difference p r i n c i p l e m i g h t i n d e e d b e d e s c r i b e d a s "pat­
t e r n e d . ' ' It d o e s involve t h e i d e a t h a t s o m e p a t t e r n s a r e b e t t e r t h a n
o t h e r s . But it is a p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e in t h e s e c o n d s e n s e . Rawls e m ­
p l o y s it a s a c r i t e r i o n for t h e a s s e s s m e n t ( a n d design) of g r o u n d r u l e s .
He d o e s n o t w a n t it to b e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e c o n t e n t of t h o s e r u l e s
t h e m s e l v e s . In fact, like Nozick, h e w a n t s t h e e c o n o m i c g r o u n d r u l e s to
b e p r o c e d u r a l . If t h e y a r e just, t h a t is, t e n d to g e n e r a t e a b e t t e r p a t t e r n
of h o l d i n g s t h a n a n y feasible alternative i n s t i t u t i o n s w o u l d , t h e n t h e r e
is n o n e e d for official i n t e r f e r e n c e a n d p a r t i c i p a n t s n e e d n o t w o r r y
a b o u t t h e i m p a c t of t h e i r e c o n o m i c activities u p o n t h e overall p a t t e r n
of i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h (cf. TJ 8 7 - 8 8 ; BSS 54). So t h e difference p r i n c i p l e
d o e s n o t select a p a t t e r n as s u c h ; it selects a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e o n
t h e b a s i s of t h e p a t t e r n it t e n d s to p r o d u c e . H e n c e f l u c t u a t i o n s in t h e
p a t t e r n a just e c o n o m i c s c h e m e g e n e r a t e s a r e n o t r e a s o n s for interfer­
ing ( t h r o u g h r e d i s t r i b u t i o n s ) w i t h t h e w o r k i n g s of t h i s s c h e m e .
Moreover, in m a k i n g this selection, t h e difference p r i n c i p l e f u n c t i o n s
r a t h e r differently from t h e o t h e r " p a t t e r n e d " p r i n c i p l e s t h a t Nozick
l u m p s t o g e t h e r w i t h it. F r o m e x a m i n i n g a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e w i t h t h e
p a t t e r n of h o l d i n g s it t e n d s t o p r o d u c e , o n e c a n tell h o w close it c o m e s
to e q u a l i t y o r to h o l d i n g s b e i n g p r o p o r t i o n a l t o IQ o r m o r a l w o r t h . Yet
o n e c a n n o t tell w h e t h e r it satisfies t h e difference p r i n c i p l e or e v e n
w h e t h e r it d o e s well o r poorly. T h i s a s s e s s m e n t essentially d e p e n d s
u p o n w h a t o t h e r s c h e m e s are feasible a n d w h a t p a t t e r n s t h e y w o u l d
t e n d t o g e n e r a t e . W h a t e c o n o m i c s c h e m e is preferred a n d w h a t sort of
p a t t e r n t h e p r e f e r r e d s c h e m e t e n d s to p r o d u c e d e p e n d u p o n t h e full
r a n g e of feasible i n s t i t u t i o n a l alternatives. T h i s p o i n t u n d e r s c o r e s t h e
c o n c l u s i o n of t h e p r e v i o u s p a r a g r a p h : Rawls is n o t c o m m i t t e d to s o m e
p a t t e r n . He s e e k s to b e c o m m i t t e d , like Nozick, to a p a r t i c u l a r institu­
tional s c h e m e a n d t o t h e a c c e p t a n c e of w h a t e v e r p a r t i c u l a r d i s t r i b u ­
t i o n s t h i s s c h e m e m a y g e n e r a t e over t i m e . But h e w a n t s t o b a s e t h i s
c o m m i t m e n t u p o n a n e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e p a t t e r n s t h a t v a r i o u s a l t e r n a ­
tive s c h e m e s t e n d t o p r o d u c e . He h o l d s t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d b e
a s s e s s e d o r c h o s e n via t h e i r p a t t e r n s .
2Jt. If w e a s s e s s social i n s t i t u t i o n s via t h e p a t t e r n s t h e y t e n d t o
produce, w e m u s t ultimately compare entire basic structures, because
30 T h e Relevance of P a t t e r n s , 2.3

t h e best w a y of setting o n e p a r a m e t e r of t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e m a y n o t be
i n d e p e n d e n t of h o w its o t h e r p a r a m e t e r s will h a v e b e e n set. T h e value
of c e r t a i n rights a p e r s o n h a s u n d e r o n e i n s t i t u t i o n , for e x a m p l e , m a y
d e p e n d o n w h e t h e r h e h a s c e r t a i n o t h e r r i g h t s c o n f e r r e d b y a n o t h e r . It
w o u l d also b e i m p l a u s i b l e , in c o m p a r i n g alternative s c h e m e s , to p r o ­
c e e d p i e c e m e a l t h r o u g h t h e v a r i o u s k i n d s of g o o d s w h o s e d i s t r i b u t i o n
is p r e s u m e d t o m a t t e r . If t w o g o o d s — i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h , for e x a m ­
p l e — a r e u n e q u a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d , it will often b e relevant w h e t h e r t h e
s a m e p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e d i s a d v a n t a g e d u n d e r b o t h d i s t r i b u t i o n s . While
t h e r e is p l e n t y of r o o m for a b s t r a c t i o n s a n d simplifications of v a r i o u s
kinds, t h e u l t i m a t e i d e a m u s t t h e n b e to c o m p a r e e n t i r e b a s i c s t r u c ­
t u r e s by reference to t h e master pattern e a c h t e n d s to p r o d u c e . H e r e a
m a s t e r p a t t e r n c o n t a i n s i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e overall v a l u e s o m e in­
stitutional s c h e m e h a s for e a c h of its p a r t i c i p a n t s .
2 . 3 . T h a t i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s c a n e n g e n d e r p a t t e r n s is a n i d e a
Nozick himself a p p e a l s to i n t h e c o n t e x t of h i s d i s c u s s i o n of invisible-
h a n d e x p l a n a t i o n s , w h i c h explain " s o m e overall p a t t e r n o r d e s i g n " a s
t h e u n i n t e n d e d r e s u l t of t h e u n c o o r d i n a t e d activities of p e r s o n s c o e x ­
isting w i t h i n a c e r t a i n e n v i r o n m e n t (ASU 18). Let m e s h o w h o w t h e i d e a
of p a t t e r n e d p r i n c i p l e s in Rawls's s e n s e c a n b e p r e s e n t e d a s a n e x t e n ­
sion of t h i s p o i n t of Nozick's.
A h o m i c i d e r a t e is a s i m p l e e x a m p l e of a p a t t e r n t h a t e m e r g e s a s t h e
b y - p r o d u c t of t h e u n c o o r d i n a t e d activities of m a n y i n d i v i d u a l s . It is n o t
i n t e n d e d o r b r o u g h t a b o u t b y a n y o n e . S u c h r a t e s a n d t h e w a y t h e y vary
from c o u n t r y to c o u n t r y c a n n o t b e e x p l a i n e d b y r e f e r e n c e to t h e m o ­
tives a n d beliefs of i n d i v i d u a l a g e n t s , t h o u g h t h e s e a r e c r u c i a l t o t h e
e x p l a n a t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r h o m i c i d e s . T h e social p h e n o m e n o n of h o m i ­
cide calls t h e n for e x p l a n a t i o n o n t w o d i s t i n c t levels: for m a c r o e x p l a n a -
tions of its rates of i n c i d e n c e a n d for m i c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s of p a r t i c u l a r
i n s t a n c e s . N e i t h e r t y p e of e x p l a n a t i o n c a n fully p r e e m p t t h e o t h e r .
Individuals' m o t i v e s c a n n o t a c c o u n t for statistical p a t t e r n s , a n d t h e
e x p l a n a t i o n of a statistical p a t t e r n d o e s n o t a c c o u n t for w h y t h e p h e ­
24
n o m e n o n w a s m a n i f e s t e d i n these i n s t a n c e s r a t h e r t h a n in o t h e r s .
N o w s u p p o s e , for t h e sake of t h e a r g u m e n t , it b e c a m e k n o w n t h a t
s t r i c t n e s s of h a n d g u n legislation is o n e m a i n factor in t h e t r u e m a c -
r o e x p l a n a t i o n of h o m i c i d e . (Assume it explains s o m e sizable p a r t of
n a t i o n a l differentials in h o m i c i d e rates, a n d d o n ' t w o r r y a b o u t w h e t h e r
s u c h legislation is i m p o r t a n t e n o u g h t o b e p a r t of t h e basic s t r u c t u r e ) It
w o u l d t h e n b e t r u e t h a t if w e have m o r a l r e a s o n to prefer a l o w e r over a
h i g h e r h o m i c i d e rate, t h e n w e have m o r a l r e a s o n to s u p p o r t s t r i c t e r

" N o z i c k offers this refutation of methodological individualism- "Tfth »>;« B I , , U , P

re
filters out (destroys) all non-P Q>, then the MDlanattorTof n « a filter that
Q
pattern P) will refer t o this filter For each S b O 5 l"* * ^
explanation w h y it is P, h o w it came tn he P Jjh« . • m a y
1 Particular01
b e a

w h y all Q s a r e ^ w i l T h e T e ^^'X^^^^^ ^^
.hough t h e s e a r e a l l t h e ^ t h e r e ^ r e Z ^
 T h e Relevance of P a t t e r n s , 2.4 31
r a t h e r t h a n laxer h a n d g u n legislation. O n c e w e c o m e to u n d e r s t a n d
w h a t r o u g h p a t t e r n s various alternative s e t s of r u l e s w o u l d e n g e n d e r ,
w e c a n b r i n g o u r m o r a l v a l u a t i o n s of t h e s e p a t t e r n s to b e a r u p o n o u r
m o r a l a s s e s s m e n t of alternative sets of r u l e s . For e x a m p l e , w e c a n u s e
o u r n e w k n o w l e d g e t o c o n s t r u c t a m o r a l c r i t i q u e of existing h a n d g u n
legislation. S u c h a c r i t i q u e w o u l d b e d e p e n d e n t u p o n a p a r t i c u l a r
m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e h o m i c i d e r a t e (involving r e f e r e n c e to institu­
t i o n a l factors), just a s t h e c o n d e m n a t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r killing is d e p e n ­
d e n t u p o n a p a r t i c u l a r m i c r o e x p l a n a t i o n (involving t h e killer's a c t i o n s
a n d i n t e n t i o n s ) . Nozick's o w n d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n m i c r o - a n d m a c -
r o e x p l a n a t i o n s c a n t h e n serve a s a b r i d g e . It c a n facilitate a p p r e c i a t i o n
of t h e parallel d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t w o s u b j e c t s of m o r a l reflection:
i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s , w h i c h c a n b e m o r e o r less just o r unjust, a n d
c o n d u c t , w h i c h m a y b e right o r w r o n g in d e g r e e s . And it c a n m a k e clear
h o w p a t t e r n s m a y play a valid role in the former t y p e of a s s e s s m e n t s .
Let m e a d d t w o clarifications. First, t h e s e t w o t y p e s of a s s e s s m e n t ,
just like Nozick's t w o t y p e s of e x p l a n a t i o n , d o n o t p r e e m p t e a c h o t h e r .
F a u l t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l factors for a h i g h m u r d e r rate n e e d n o t at all
e x o n e r a t e t h e c r i m i n a l s , n o r is d e n o u n c i n g all m u r d e r s a n d m u r d e r e r s
25
t a n t a m o u n t to c o n d o n i n g laxity of g u n c o n t r o l . And faulting institu­
tional factors c a n a g a i n b e t a k e n a s s h o r t h a n d for a s c r i b i n g a r e s p o n ­
sibility t h a t all c i t i z e n s s h a r e . Even t h o u g h e a c h a n d every m u r d e r e r is
fully a c c o u n t a b l e for h i s act, t h e citizens in a d e m o c r a c y m a y also b e a r
a n a d d i t i o n a l collective responsibility for s o m e fraction of all h o m i c i d e s
if t h e s e a r e a t t r i b u t a b l e to t h e lack of a d e q u a t e h a n d g u n legislation, for
26
e x a m p l e , o r to a n u n j u s t d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o l i c e p r o t e c t i o n .
S e c o n d , I h a v e so far m e r e l y tried to s h o w how, in a Rawlsian view, t h e
m o r a l v a l u a t i o n of p a t t e r n s e n t e r s — v i a i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t w h a t p a t ­
terns alternative institutional s c h e m e s t e n d to e n g e n d e r — i n t o the
m o r a l d e b a t e a b o u t t h e a s s e s s m e n t of s u c h s c h e m e s . It is a s e p a r a t e
q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r s u c h c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , o n c e t h e y h a v e e n t e r e d , will b e
w e i g h t y e n o u g h to affect o u r a s s e s s m e n t s — t h a t is, in t h e c a s e at h a n d ,
w h e t h e r t h e y c a n o v e r t u r n t h e belief in a p e r s o n ' s right to o w n firearms
o r in a majority's right to set risk levels for t h e p o p u l a t i o n at large.
2 . 4 . Let u s e x t e n d t h e s e t h o u g h t s to e c o n o m i c i s s u e s , to w h i c h
Nozick's d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n p a t t e r n e d a n d u n p a t t e r n e d p r i n c i p l e s is
chiefly a d d r e s s e d . I b e g i n by s k e t c h i n g a n a r g u m e n t t h a t c o u l d h a v e
m o t i v a t e d t h e s u p p o r t e r s of t h e N e w Deal. S u p p o s e t h e y believed t h a t
(1) t h e r e is m o r a l r e a s o n to prefer a p a t t e r n of h o l d i n g s w i t h less r a t h e r

" N o z i c k explicitly a c c e p t s the related p o i n t that t w o p e r s o n s c a n e a c h b e fully r e s p o n ­

sible for a single m u r d e r (ASU 130).
2 6
H e r e a n d in the s e q u e l I a s s u m e that it w o u l d be objectively w r o n g not to d o w h a t o n e
c a n easily d o t o w a r d the reform of unjust features of a n institutional s c h e m e for w h i c h
o n e s h a r e s a collective responsibility. I d o not m e a n , however, to p r e j u d g e the q u e s t i o n
w h e t h e r a n d to w h a t e x t e n t o n e is b l a m e w o r t h y for not b e i n g aware of this responsibility
or for b e i n g aware but ignoring it. T h e s e i s s u e s I leave a s i d e b e c a u s e t h e y w o u l d lead u s
t o o far b e y o n d m y m a i n t o p i c : the moral a s s e s s m e n t of social institutions.
32 T h e Relevance of P a t t e r n s , 2.4

t h a n m o r e severe p o v e r t y a n d a l s o (2) t h e r e a r e feasible alternative

e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s (besides t h e laissez-faire s c h e m e prevailing in t h e
1920s) t h a t w o u l d t e n d t o e n g e n d e r less severe poverty. A s s u m e s u c h
N e w Dealers f u r t h e r believed t h a t t h e m o r a l r e a s o n r e s u l t i n g from (1)
a n d (2) is n o t n e u t r a l i z e d b y o t h e r m o r a l r e a s o n s favoring t h e existing
s c h e m e over alternatives e n g e n d e r i n g less severe poverty. T h e y w o u l d
t h e n c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e prevailing s c h e m e is u n j u s t a g a i n s t t h e back­
g r o u n d of s u p e r i o r alternatives. W h a t d o e s t h i s c o n c l u s i o n m e a n for
individuals? In p a r t i c u l a r , d o e s it entail t h a t t h e p o o r h a v e a right t o a
c e r t a i n m i n i m u m i n c o m e , w i t h c o r r e s p o n d i n g obligations o n t h e p a r t
of o t h e r s ?
Asserting s u c h a right in this c o n t e x t c o u l d b e triply m i s l e a d i n g . First,
as a m a t t e r of terminology, rights a r e b e s t specified by r e f e r e n c e t o a n
institutional s c h e m e . U n d e r t h e s c h e m e prevailing in t h e 1920s n o right
to a m i n i m u m i n c o m e existed. S e c o n d , t h e f o r m u l a t i o n m a y s u g g e s t
t h a t u n d e r a just alternative s c h e m e p e r s o n s w o u l d h a v e a right t o a
certain m i n i m u m i n c o m e . But t h i s n e e d n o t b e s o . T h e just s c h e m e
w o u l d b e o n e that, s o m e h o w or other, t e n d s t o e n g e n d e r less severe
poverty. It m a y n o t i n c l u d e t h e right in q u e s t i o n i f — h o w e v e r unlikely
u n d e r m o d e r n c o n d i t i o n s — t h i s right is infeasible o r if t h e r e a r e m o r e
effective alternatives for p r e v e n t i n g severe poverty. Is t h e p o i n t , t h e n ,
t h a t t h e p o o r h a v e a moral right t o a c e r t a i n m i n i m a l i n c o m e ? In a
s e n s e , y e s . But third, t h e "right to" f o r m u l a t i o n s u g g e s t s t h a t w h a t is at
i s s u e is a positive m o r a l right t h a t w o u l d give t h e p o o r a claim, against
all of h u m a n k i n d , t o b e h e l p e d i n t h e i r n e e d . B u t n o s u c h c l a i m is at
i s s u e . I a p p e a l t o a negative m o r a l right, a claim t h e p o o r h a d against
A m e r i c a n citizens, specifically, w h o w e r e c o l l a b o r a t i n g in t h e i m p o s i ­
t i o n of a n u n j u s t e c o n o m i c s c h e m e t h a t t e n d e d t o p r o d u c e m o r e
severe poverty t h a n is morally justifiable. T o b e s u r e , A m e r i c a n s p r e ­
s u m a b l y h a d t o do s o m e t h i n g ("positive") t o w a r d i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform
in o r d e r to avoid violation of t h e negative m o r a l right i n q u e s t i o n . But in
t h e context of p r a c t i c e s , it d o e s n o t follow t h a t t h e i r d u t y to act is
therefore a positive o n e . T h e negative d u t y n o t t o a b u s e just p r a c t i c e s
m a y d e m a n d positive action, a s w h e n o n e m u s t act t o k e e p a p r o m i s e
o r c o n t r a c t o n e h a s m a d e . Similarly, t h e negative d u t y n o t t o collabo­
r a t e in t h e i m p o s i t i o n of u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s m a y also d e m a n d positive
a c t i o n s (with t h e s o m e t i m e s possible alternative of w i t h d r a w i n g al­
27
t o g e t h e r from p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e u n j u s t s c h e m e ) .
All this suggests h o w o u r Rawlsian c a n begin to s u p p o r t t h e a l t e r n a ­
tive specification of l a n d o w n e r s h i p rights against Nozick's. I left t h e i r
W h i l e h i s conception of justice, I think, strongly suggests it R a w U Hr> „ .
2 7
i i 00

edge such a negative right and duty but merely

promote ,ust institutes (TJ 115, 334), which he classifies as posi,^ ira) Thta teav^s
v c , I J JUt
him unable to expla n whv one's r p ^ n n n c i h i i i t , , r„„ .u • . ^"°'" "- tnis leaves
f S y S , e m to
greater when one^s a panicTpantTnTa S m T h i s d T ^ ° * ^
negative duty, postulatetogether w M i
weight than positive ones" (TJ 1 1 4 ^
the•SZl^lT?™™
o r d l n
*P " e

a r y view that negahve duties have more

, a i e d t h e
 T h e Relevance of P a t t e r n s , 2.5 33

d i s p u t e in a standoff, s h o w i n g h o w n e i t h e r p r o t a g o n i s t c o u l d r e a s o n ­
ably take his specification of p r o p e r t y rights for g r a n t e d a n d t h e n
a c c u s e t h e o p p o n e n t of a d v o c a t i n g a s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h t h e c o r r e c t
p r o p e r t y rights w o u l d b e r o u t i n e l y violated. W e n o w have a c o n s i d e r ­
a t i o n t h a t m i g h t b r e a k t h e standoff. As Nozick u n d e r s t a n d s , h i s set of
r u l e s w o u l d e n g e n d e r a certain r o u g h p a t t e r n of h o l d i n g s , r e a s o n a b l y
stable over t i m e : "Heavy s t r a n d s of p a t t e r n s will r u n t h r o u g h it; signifi­
c a n t p o r t i o n s of t h e v a r i a n c e in h o l d i n g s will b e a c c o u n t e d for b y
p a t t e r n - v a r i a b l e s " (ASU 157). N o w it is q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t u n d e r h i s
libertarian g r o u n d r u l e s o u r i s l a n d e c o n o m y w o u l d t e n d t o b e d o m i ­
n a t e d b y t w o o r t h r e e large family e s t a t e s w h e r e t h e r e m a i n i n g l a n d l e s s
28
p o p u l a t i o n w o u l d s p e n d t h e i r lives as l a b o r e r s or s e r f s . T h e Rawls­
i a n ' s s c h e m e , by c o n t r a s t , w o u l d k e e p l a n d w i d e l y d i s t r i b u t e d a n d
w o u l d t h u s e n s u r e t h a t t h o s e w h o d o e n d u p l a n d l e s s c a n at least
c h o o s e a m o n g m a n y c o m p e t i n g e m p l o y e r s a n d sellers of a g r i c u l t u r a l
p r o d u c e . In s h o r t , t h e available e v i d e n c e from h i s t o r y a n d social t h e o r y
m a y s u g g e s t that Nozick's s c h e m e w o u l d h a v e feudalistic features a n d
t h a t t h e Rawlsian's s c h e m e w o u l d t e n d to e n g e n d e r a c o m p e t i t i v e
m a r k e t e c o n o m y in w h i c h t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n s , especially, w o u l d b e
m u c h s u p e r i o r to t h a t of serf.
2 . 5 . I h a v e said t h a t Rawls's t o p i c — m o r a l reflection u p o n b a s i c
i n s t i t u t i o n s — i s c r u c i a l for g a i n i n g a m o r a l o r i e n t a t i o n , for u n d e r s t a n d ­
ing w h a t w e are d o i n g to o t h e r s . Social i n s t i t u t i o n s play a large role in
d e t e r m i n i n g b o t h t h e m e a n i n g a n d t h e effects of o u r c o n d u c t . T h e
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of t h e last few p a g e s b r i n g o u t t w o f u r t h e r r e a s o n s w h y
t h i s t o p i c is s o i m p o r t a n t .
First, i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e a c e n t r a l factor in d e t e r m i n i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s
prevailing in s o m e social s y s t e m . This is easily a p p r e c i a t e d t h r o u g h
c o m p a r a t i v e s t u d i e s of n a t i o n a l societies t h a t differ in social institu­
t i o n s (for e x a m p l e , form of g o v e r n m e n t , legal s y s t e m , o r g a n i z a t i o n of
military a n d p o l i c e forces, e d u c a t i o n a l facilities, s y s t e m of l a n d t e n u r e ,
specification of p r o p e r t y rights, o r tax s t r u c t u r e ) . S u c h i n s t i t u t i o n a l
factors c o n d i t i o n t h e c o n d u c t of t h e various a c t o r s — c i t i z e n s , officials,
a s s o c i a t i o n s , a n d g o v e r n m e n t s — b y s h a p i n g t h e i r values a n d o p t i o n s
a n d b y fixing t h e i r "pay-off matrix," t h a t is, t h e s c h e d u l e of incentives
a n d d i s i n c e n t i v e s t h e y confront. In this w a y t h e y d e t e r m i n e (in a r o u g h
statistical way) m o r a l l y significant aggregate features of t h e social sys­
t e m , s u c h a s t h e level a n d d i s t r i b u t i o n of b a s i c f r e e d o m s , o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,
political influence, h e a l t h care, e d u c a t i o n , w o r k satisfaction, self-re­
s p e c t , c u l t u r e , poverty, crime, life e x p e c t a n c y , infant mortality, c h i l d
a b u s e , s u i c i d e , a n d s o forth. T h e p a t t e r n so e n g e n d e r e d a l r e a d y reflects
t h e fact t h a t s o m e p e r s o n s try, w i t h i n t h e i r m e a n s , to h e l p alleviate
c o n d i t i o n s t h e y c o n s i d e r objectionable. While s u c h efforts m a y cer­
tainly m a k e a g r e a t difference, it d o e s n o t s e e m r e a s o n a b l e o r realistic

2 8
C o m p a r e h e r e Nozick's e n d o r s e m e n t of "private t o w n s " (ASU 270n, cf. 322-23).
34 T h e Relevance of P a t t e r n s , 2.5

t o e x p e c t t h a t t h e y c o u l d m u l t i p l y t o t h e p o i n t w h e r e t h e y w o u l d fully
offset s t r o n g c o u n t e r v a i l i n g t e n d e n c i e s e n d e m i c t o a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l
s c h e m e . In a n y case, o n e s h o u l d e x p l o r e t h e a l t e r n a t i v e strategy that
g o e s b e y o n d s u c h r e m e d i a l t r a n s a c t i o n s d e m a n d e d o r e n c o u r a g e d by
morality, a i m i n g for a n e w i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e t h a t w o u l d t e n d to
engender a more acceptable pattern land t h u s w o u l d r e d u c e the need
for r e m e d i a l t r a n s a c t i o n s ) . S u c h a t t e m p t s at i n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e w o u l d
s e e m t o h o l d o u t t h e greatest h o p e t h a t o u r c o m b i n e d m o r a l efforts will
a c c u m u l a t e i n t o lasting p r o g r e s s . C o n c e n t r a t i n g exclusively o n private
a t t e m p t s t o i m p r o v e a prevailing p a t t e r n , o n e c a n at b e s t h o p e t h a t
c o n t i n u i n g efforts will m a i n t a i n t h e social s y s t e m s o m e w h a t a b o v e its
e q u i l i b r i u m p o i n t ( w h e r e it w o u l d b e if e v e r y o n e a c t e d self-interest-
edly). By c o n t r a s t , institutional c h a n g e , as exemplified b y t h e abolition
of slavery o r b y t h e N e w Deal, c a n m o v e this e q u i l i b r i u m p o i n t itself,
t h e r e b y also b r i n g i n g further i n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms w i t h i n r e a c h . Moral
efforts are likely t o b e of e n d u r i n g historical significance o n l y w h e n
t h e y c a n b e c o m e c u m u l a t i v e in t h i s way.
T h i s first n e w r e a s o n m a y s u g g e s t t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m is b e i n g
r e c o m m e n d e d for its effectiveness a l o n e , t h a t it is m e r e l y a different
( a n d better) w a y of d o i n g s o m e t h i n g m o r a l b y m a k i n g t h e w o r l d a little
b e t t e r . But t h i s c o n c l u s i o n m i s s e s a crucial p o i n t c o n c e r n i n g t h e
g r o u n d of t h e d u t y t o take a n i n t e r e s t in i n s t i t u t i o n a l m a t t e r s . An
a r g u m e n t f o u n d e d o n morality w o u l d seek t o s h o w t h a t p e r s o n s i n
g e n e r a l have positive claims against o n e a n o t h e r — f o r e x a m p l e , t o b e
r e s c u e d , fed, o r d e f e n d e d . S u c h a n a r g u m e n t w o u l d g o a g a i n s t t h e
grain of t h e Anglo-American m o r a l a n d legal t r a d i t i o n , i n w h i c h it is
often d e n i e d t h a t p e r s o n s h a v e d u t i e s t o p r o t e c t a n d aid o t h e r p e r s o n s
in d i s t r e s s : it's a g o o d t h i n g t o h e l p t h o s e w h o m i g h t o t h e r w i s e d r o w n
o r starve o r b e m u r d e r e d , b u t it i s n ' t very w r o n g n o t to, especially if t h e
trouble, e x p e n s e , o r risks involved a r e n ' t negligible. I a m n o t challeng­
ing this view h e r e . T h e m o r a l responsibility I a m s p e a k i n g of is f o u n d e d
o n justice a n d involves p e r s o n s ' negative claim n o t t o b e m a d e victims
of u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s .
T h i s t h o u g h t i n d i c a t e s t h e s e c o n d n e w r e a s o n for t h e i m p o r t a n c e of
Rawls's topic, t h a t (advantaged) p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a n institutional s c h e m e
s h a r e a responsibility for t h e justice of t h e s c h e m e . If t h e s c h e m e is
unjust, o n e m a y b e i m p l i c a t e d with o t h e r s in a collective w r o n g w h o s e
victims h a v e u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s i m p o s e d u p o n t h e m . Since, a s a m o r a l
p e r s o n , o n e w a n t s to avoid being involved in s u c h w r o n g s , o n e h a s
r e a s o n t o reflect u p o n t h e justice of social i n s t i t u t i o n s
S u c h reflection is especially needful b e c a u s e injustices m a y n o t b e
obvious. T h e c o n n e c t i o n of excessive deprivations a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s
t o t h e institutional s c h e m e p r o d u c i n g t h e m m a y b e o p a q u e T h e in­
justice of a n institutional s c h e m e t e n d s to b e m o s t manifest w h e n t h e
radical m e q u a l m e s it p r o d u c e s are clearly " o n t h e b o o k s " a r e for
inCOrP
SS£ beTaSt r<t ° ^ ^ ° ^ ' Must £ l n t C d e

t e n d s to be least obvious w h e n t h e radical inequalities it p r o d u c e s a r e

 T h e Relevance of P a t t e r n s , 2 . 5 35

n e i t h e r explicitly n o r e v e n implicitly called for b y t h e prevailing g r o u n d

r u l e s b u t h a v e merely, a s a n e m p i r i c a l m a t t e r , c o m e a b o u t p u r s u a n t t o
them.
T h u s t h e injustice of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of slavery (as it existed in t h e
U n i t e d States) is c o m p a r a t i v e l y obvious. Not o n l y w e r e s o m e forced to
live in a h i g h l y d e h u m a n i z i n g c o n d i t i o n , b u t this c o n d i t i o n of slavery
w a s "official," explicitly i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e A m e r i c a n political a n d
legal s y s t e m (in voting rights, fugitive slave laws, a n d so forth). B e c a u s e
of its d i s t i n c t l y i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r s y s t e m i c c h a r a c t e r , it is a l s o especially
evident that the moral problem concerned not slaveholders alone but
e v e n t h o s e A m e r i c a n c i t i z e n s w h o n e i t h e r o w n e d slaves n o r benefited
from slavery. T h e s e w e r e n o t u n c o n c e r n e d b y s t a n d e r s , a s t h e i r S w e d ­
i s h c o n t e m p o r a r i e s m a y h a v e b e e n — m e r e l y a w a r e of e n s l a v e m e n t a n d
in a p o s i t i o n t o d o at least a little bit a b o u t it. Rather, t h e y s h a r e d a
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for t h e injustice; t h e y h a d a negative d u t y to s t o p c o o p e r ­
a t i n g in its i m p o s i t i o n , for e x a m p l e , by h e l p i n g to e n d slavery t h r o u g h
29
institutional reforms.
T h e o t h e r e n d of t h i s s p e c t r u m c a n b e exemplified, o n c e again, b y t h e
laissez-faire i n s t i t u t i o n s p r e c e d i n g t h e N e w Deal. S u p p o s e t h e s e e n g e n ­
d e r e d severe d i s a d v a n t a g e s — i n t e r m s of n u t r i t i o n , e d u c a t i o n , h e a l t h
care, etc.—for t h o s e b o m into t h e l o w e r classes, w h o s e plight w a s t h e
s y s t e m a t i c c o r r e l a t e of a n u n c o n s t r a i n e d m a r k e t s c h e m e in w h i c h t h e
i n c o m e of m a n y h o u s e h o l d s w a s d e t e r m i n e d solely by t h e vagaries of
s u p p l y a n d d e m a n d for t h e k i n d s of l a b o r t h e i r m e m b e r s c o u l d sell.
Unlike slavery, this s c h e m e did n o t (explicitly or implicitly) call for
excessive d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s . Yet it d i d in fact c o n s i s t e n t l y
e n g e n d e r t h e m . It is o n t h e basis of this fact, a n d against t h e b a c k g r o u n d
of at least o n e a c c e s s i b l e alternative s c h e m e t h a t w o u l d n o t t e n d to
p r o d u c e similarly r a d i c a l inequalities, t h a t o n e c a n reject t h e relevant
e c o n o m i c s c h e m e a s u n j u s t a n d c o n c l u d e t h a t m a n y p e r s o n s at t h e
t i m e w e r e i m p o v e r i s h e d (rather t h a n m e r e l y poor), w e r e starved ( r a t h e r
t h a n m e r e l y starving). A n d this c o n c l u s i o n in t u r n s u p p o r t s t h e j u d g ­
m e n t t h a t t h e a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s in this s c h e m e , insofar as t h e y
p e r p e t u a t e d it (or e v e n r e s i s t e d its reform), s h a r e d a responsibility for its
injustice. T h e y h a d a negative d u t y n o t t o c o l l a b o r a t e in t h e i m p o s i t i o n
of u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s , w h i c h in p r a c t i c a l t e r m s m e a n s t h a t t h e y o u g h t to
h a v e p l a n n e d a n d p r o m o t e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform.
It is p o s s i b l e t h a t in o u r c o m p l e x a n d functionally highly differenti-

2 9
I n s u c h clear c a s e s it is also m o s t obvious that reforms c a n n o t b e b l o c k e d by t h e
a r g u m e n t that a liberation of slaves w o u l d violate the e n t i t l e m e n t s of their p r e s e n t
o w n e r s a n d is therefore e x c l u d e d by moral s i d e constraints. Perhaps e n t i t l e m e n t s that
arose p u r s u a n t to legally valid but unjust rules s h o u l d not be simply disregarded. T h e
u n j u s t rules w e r e not u n i q u e l y the slaveholders' responsibility, a n d s o there m a y be
r e a s o n s w h y c i t i z e n s at large s h o u l d c o m p e n s a t e slaveholders for their l o s s . There is n o
reason, h o w e v e r , w h y the slaveholders s h o u l d have the o p t i o n to retain their slaves in
preference to appropriate c o m p e n s a t i o n . N o o n e c a n have a claim that unjust institu­
t i o n s s h o u l d exist or c o n t i n u e , a n d the slaves land their progeny) have a c o n t i n u i n g
negative c l a i m not to b e forced to e n d u r e u n j u s t c o n d i t i o n s .
36 T h e C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m of Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n , 3.

a t e d w o r l d , injustices of this s o r t a r e q u i t e p r o m i n e n t , e s p e c i a l l y if I am
right (in Part Three) to e x t e n d t h e Rawlsian p r o j e c t t o t h e global basic
s t r u c t u r e . It is n o t easy to c o n v i n c e oneself t h a t o u r c u r r e n t global
order, a s s e s s e d from a Rawlsian p e r s p e c t i v e , is m o d e r a t e l y just despite
t h e w i d e s p r e a d a n d e x t r e m e d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s it en­
g e n d e r s . Even if w e limit o u r vision to o u r o w n a d v a n c e d Western
society, it is h a r d l y o b v i o u s that t h e b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s w e p a r t i c i p a t e in
are just or nearly just. In a n y c a s e , a s o m e w h a t u n o b v i o u s b u t massive
t h r e a t t o t h e m o r a l quality of o u r lives is t h e d a n g e r t h a t w e will have
lived as a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s in u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s , c o l l a b o r a t i n g in
30
their p e r p e t u a t i o n a n d benefiting from t h e i r i n j u s t i c e .

3. T h e C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m of Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n of J u s t i c e

3.1. If h i s g r o u n d r u l e s d i d really t e n d to e n g e n d e r a d e g e n e r a t e form

of feudalism, Nozick m i g h t well regret it. But h e w o u l d n o t r e c o n s i d e r
h i s c o m m i t m e n t to libertarian g r o u n d r u l e s . W h y n o t ? We h a v e s e e n
t h a t Nozick's i n s i s t e n c e o n (property) rights c o n c e i v e d a s s i d e c o n ­
straints, w i t h t h e correlative r e j e c t i o n of r e d i s t r i b u t i v e i n t e r f e r e n c e s ,
c a n n o t b e a g o o d r e a s o n , b e c a u s e Nozick's antifeudalist p r e f e r e n c e c a n
still b e relevant t o t h e q u e s t i o n of w h a t r i g h t s (or i n s t i t u t i o n s generally)
t h e r e s h o u l d b e in t h e first p l a c e . W h e n b r o u g h t to b e a r u p o n this
q u e s t i o n , t h e p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e cannot collide w i t h p r o p e r t y rights, for
t h e c h o i c e of a s c h e m e of s u c h r i g h t s is still at i s s u e . C a n w e a t t r i b u t e t o
Nozick a n o t h e r r a t i o n a l e t h a t w o u l d e x p l a i n h i s indifference t o t h e
k i n d of e m p i r i c a l a r g u m e n t o u r R a w l s i a n p r o p o s e s ?
At t i m e s Nozick s e e m s q u i t e u n w i l l i n g t o e n t e r t a i n a n y d e e p e r ra­
tionale or justification for h i s view, insisting i n s t e a d t h a t "historical-
e n t i t l e m e n t p r i n c i p l e s are f u n d a m e n t a l " (ASU 202). T h e s u g g e s t i o n is
t h a t it is n o t g o o d e n o u g h for Rawls's criterion t o favor p r o c e d u r a l
g r o u n d r u l e s ( s u c h as a specification of p r o p e r t y rights a s historically
recursive). T h e p r o b l e m Nozick s e e s is t h a t Rawls w o u l d h a v e d e r i v e d
t h e s e g r o u n d r u l e s from higher-level c o n s i d e r a t i o n s : "Rawls' c o n s t r u c ­
t i o n will yield a p p r o x i m a t i o n s of [the precisely correct principles) at
b e s t ; it will produce the wrong sorts of reasons for them" (ASU 202, m y
e m p h a s i s , cf. 2 0 3 - 4 , 215). But w h a t is Nozick's alternative? Are w e t o
take it as just plain obvious t h a t t h e rights he p r o p o s e s e x p r e s s " t h e
precisely correct principles"? And w h a t if s o m e alternative specifica­
tion of rights ( p e r h a p s that of o u r Rawlsian) is r e c o m m e n d e d a s o b ­
vious as well? T h e d e b a t e m i g h t b e c o m e r a t h e r dull
But p e r h a p s Rawls a n d Nozick are n o t so far a p a r t . Rawls, t o o ,

conviction, n a m e l y ,
h W S W e l e a d 1 a s s u m e
this conviction is not self-verifving can be s u h W ^ H f ! , '
e x a m i n a t i
well b e untenable. Still. 1 cWt^^nretend t h ^ ' t h T™* ™ < and may
P , h e c o n s , d e r a
sufficient to u n d e r m i n e t »°ns a d d u c e d s o far are
 T h e C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m of Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n , 3.2 37
believes t h a t w e h a v e c e r t a i n m o r a l fixed p o i n t s , o n all levels of g e n e r ­
ality, w h i c h a n y c o n c e p t i o n of justice m u s t by a n d large a c c o m m o d a t e .
T h u s , a l t h o u g h all r i g h t s m u s t b e derivable from t h e relevant h i g h e r -
level c o n s i d e r a t i o n s (those reflected in t h e original p o s i t i o n I, t h e failure
of s u c h a derivation w o u l d in m a n y c a s e s b e m o r e likely to m a k e u s
doubtful a b o u t Rawls's c o n s t r u c t of t h e original p o s i t i o n t h a n a b o u t t h e
right in q u e s t i o n . So Rawls w o u l d agree that s o m e rights a r e f u n d a m e n ­
tal in t h e s e n s e t h a t w e w o u l d reject a n y c o n c e p t i o n of justice that d i d
n o t — u n d e r m o d e r n c o n d i t i o n s a n y w a y — f i r m l y entail t h e s e rights.
But h e w o u l d not, of c o u r s e , agree t h a t Nozick's favorite p r o p e r t y rights
are f u n d a m e n t a l .
Nozick, too, c o u l d p r o v i d e s o m e rationale for his a c c o u n t of rights, o r
s o I s u g g e s t . J u s t as Rawls agrees w i t h Nozick t h a t g r o u n d r u l e s s h o u l d
b e p r o c e d u r a l , Nozick c a n agree w i t h Rawls t h a t t h e e n d o r s e m e n t of a
p a r t i c u l a r set of g r o u n d r u l e s c a n be justified, or at least motivated, by
a p p e a l t o a ( m a s t e r - I p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e . In o n e s e n s e this point is
trivial. Nozick c a n say t h a t h e prefers t h e institutional s c h e m e u n d e r
w h i c h c e r t a i n rights a n d liberties are d i s t r i b u t e d in exactly t h e w a y
p r o v i d e d for b y t h e g r o u n d r u l e s h e favors. W h a t I a m suggesting,
however, is a m o r e i n t e r e s t i n g s c e n a r i o in w h i c h Nozick w o u l d offer a n
i n d e p e n d e n t n o t i o n of p e r s o n a l freedom, for e x a m p l e , a n d w o u l d t h e n
p r o c e e d t o a r g u e t h a t t h e g r o u n d r u l e s h e favors w o u l d p r o d u c e a n
o p t i m a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m so c o n c e i v e d . This s c e n a r i o
m i g h t t h e n get s o m e d e b a t e going by p u t t i n g Nozick i n t o conflict w i t h
Rawls over w h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s h o u l d be d e e m e d relevant, a n d how
relevant, to t h e m o r a l a s s e s s m e n t of alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s . Nozick
w o u l d a c c e p t t h e invitation to justify' his favored g r o u n d r u l e s t h r o u g h
a " p a t t e r n e d " c r i t e r i o n of distributive justice t h a t involves w h a t I earlier
called a s y s t e m a t i c b a l a n c i n g of values. For p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s , w e c a n
a n a l y z e e a c h s u c h p a t t e r n e d criterion by asking t h r e e m a i n q u e s t i o n s
a b o u t it:

Who is a participant, a unit of moral concern, or where should we look for

information?
What goods and 01s are morally significant and what is their comparative
significance, or what information must we look for and how does this
information determine a participant's position (intrapersonal balancing/
aggregation)?
How should one rank the distributions of positions that alternative institu­
tional schemes might generate among their participants (interpersonal
balancing/aggregation)?

A n s w e r s t o t h e first t w o q u e s t i o n s d e t e r m i n e w h a t information is
n e e d e d for t h e c o m p a r a t i v e a s s e s s m e n t of institutional s c h e m e s . An­
s w e r s to t h e last t w o q u e s t i o n s d e t e r m i n e h o w t h a t information is to b e
e v a l u a t e d s o a s to arrive at this a s s e s s m e n t . T a k e n together, t h e t h r e e
answers constitute a pattern preference.
3 . 2 . Let u s t r y t o l o c a t e Nozick's view a n d its c o n t r a s t to Rawls w i t h i n
38 T h e C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m of Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n , 3.2

t h e framework of t h i s analysis. It is clear, 1 think, t h a t t h e y d o not

seriously differ in r e s p e c t to t h e w h o - q u e s t i o n . Nozick is s o m e w h a t
m o r e o p e n t o t h e c l a i m s of a n i m a l s (ASU 35-42), b u t in e s s e n c e they
s h a r e t h e c o m m i t m e n t to h u m a n i s m a n d i n d i v i d u a l i s m . F o r b o t h of
t h e m , t h e a p p r o p r i a t e u n i t s of m o r a l c o n c e r n are i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n
persons.
We c a n also say, at least w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of this a n a l y s i s , t h a t it
is n o t helpful t o c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e d i s p u t e b e t w e e n Rawls a n d Nozick as
b e i n g centrally a b o u t t h e relative m o r a l i m p o r t a n c e of f r e e d o m a n d
equality. F r e e d o m a n d equality figure in t h e a n s w e r s to different q u e s ­
t i o n s — w h a t a n d h o w , r e s p e c t i v e l y — a n d therefore d o n o t c o m p e t e .
Yes, Nozick is willing to tolerate even e x t r e m e i n e q u a l i t i e s i n h o l d i n g s ,
w h e n t h e s e a r e p r o d u c e d by h i s libertarian g r o u n d r u l e s . But this is
not, I think, b e c a u s e h e c a r e s so little a b o u t equality, b u t b e c a u s e h e
d o e s n o t view h o l d i n g s as a significant a s p e c t of t h a t p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m
w h o s e d i s t r i b u t i o n m a t t e r s for t h e d e s i g n of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e .
With r e g a r d to t h e a s p e c t s of individual f r e e d o m h e d o e s r e c o g n i z e ,
Nozick is, as w e will see, at least a s egalitarian as Rawls. A n d Rawls, tor
h i s part, is n o less c o m m i t t e d to f r e e d o m t h a n Nozick is. Not o n l y d o e s
h e give lexical priority to certain b a s i c liberties; h e e v e n w a n t s to
formulate h i s s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e of justice s o t h a t b o t h p r i n c i p l e s to­
g e t h e r are t a n t a m o u n t to t h e r e q u i r e m e n t "to m a x i m i z e t h e w o r t h t o
t h e least a d v a n t a g e d of t h e c o m p l e t e s c h e m e of e q u a l liberty s h a r e d b y
all" (TJ 205; cf. BSS 41).
T h e s u b s t a n t i v e divergence b e t w e e n Rawls a n d Nozick m u s t t h e n
c o n c e r n t h e w h a t - q u e s t i o n , reflecting differences a b o u t t h e m e a n i n g of
p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m a n d t h e relative m o r a l significance of v a r i o u s a s p e c t s
thereof. Here I s e e as t h e crucial difference t h e i r conflicting views a b o u t
t h e m o r a l relevance of t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n e s t a b l i s h e d a n d e n g e n ­
d e r e d p a t t e r n features. By engendered p a t t e r n features I m e a n o n e s
that, like i n c o m e differentials in a free-market s y s t e m , are n o t directly
called for in t h e relevant r u l e s a n d p r o c e d u r e s b u t m e r e l y foreseeably
c o m e a b o u t t h r o u g h t h e m . T h e y are a s u b s e t of t h e larger class of social
p h e n o m e n a a n institutional s c h e m e e n g e n d e r s (this class m a y also
i n c l u d e its b i r t h rate, h o m i c i d e rate, d e g r e e of political a p a t h y , a n d s o
on). In assigning c a u s a l responsibility for s u c h p h e n o m e n a to (particu­
lar) social i n s t i t u t i o n s o n e will often have to rely o n c o m p l e x a n d
s o m e w h a t speculative e m p i r i c a l generalizations, w h i c h m u s t also d e a l
w i t h s u c h b a c k g r o u n d factors as c u l t u r e a n d n a t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t
G o o d s a n d ills are established w h e n t h e y are directly called for i n t h e
(written or unwritten) rules a n d p r o c e d u r e s of t h e social s y s t e m , even if
t h e y are n o t specifically assigned to p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n s o r n a t u r a l
0 1 1 L e § a l e X C l U S i n f t h e o r e s t 2 0
D o ^ i . t ^ ^ ° ° P° P ^ e n t from
political p a r h c p a u o n *s an established inequality. By c o n t r a s t t h e
rfghtS t 0 PO itiCal
deredlur 111131 m

d e r e d rf t h e m m r n i u m - m c o m e
' P o t i iso nd e f i n e d
requirement
Jun^lTlngen-
s o t h a t it fs i n
 T h e C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m of Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n , 3 . 2 39
31
p r i n c i p l e p o s s i b l e t h a t all s h o u l d m e e t i t . By e s t a b l i s h i n g c e r t a i n
d i s a d v a n t a g e s , a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e m a y e n g e n d e r further b u r d e n s , a s
w h e n g e n d e r - s e n s i t i v e i n h e r i t a n c e laws have r e s u l t e d in a n inferior
e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n for w o m e n .
Nozick gives c o n s i d e r a b l e m o r a l significance to this d i s t i n c t i o n . I
3 2
take h i m to h o l d t h a t in d e s i g n i n g a n ideal i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e , w e
s h o u l d b e p r i m a r i l y o r even exclusively c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e d i s t r i b u ­
tion of e s t a b l i s h e d g o o d s a n d ills a n d , m o r e particularly, w i t h t h e
d i s t r i b u t i o n of e s t a b l i s h e d f r e e d o m . We n e e d n o t b e c o n c e r n e d (or w e
n e e d b e m u c h less c o n c e r n e d ) w i t h t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of e n g e n d e r e d
g o o d s a n d ills. T h e r e is a great difference, morally, b e t w e e n a s c h e m e
u n d e r w h i c h s o m e are a s s i g n e d inferior p r o p e r t y rights a n d a s c h e m e
u n d e r w h i c h s o m e c o m e to h a v e inferior p r o p e r t y rights p u r s u a n t t o
p r o c e d u r a l g r o u n d r u l e s t h a t d o n o t call for this inequality.
Rawls, b y c o n t r a s t , m a i n t a i n s t h a t w e s h o u l d a s s e s s feasible s c h e m e s
of e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s in light of t h e overall p a t t e r n s e a c h w o u l d
t e n d to g e n e r a t e (and s h o u l d d e s i g n a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e accordingly).
E c o n o m i c g r o u n d r u l e s a n d entire basic s t r u c t u r e s are to b e j u d g e d by
t h e i r effects. But not b y t h e i r effects a l o n e . T o s o m e e x t e n t m o r a l l y
significant g o o d s a n d ills are directly called for by prevailing institu­
tions, are p a r t of t h e s c h e m e r a t h e r t h a n effects of it. Rawls t a k e s
benefits a n d b u r d e n s of b o t h k i n d s to b e o n a p a r . It m a k e s n o differ­
e n c e to t h e a s s e s s m e n t of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e w h e t h e r given d e ­
privations forseeably existing u n d e r it are e s t a b l i s h e d or e n g e n d e r e d .
Either way, t h e i r i n c i d e n c e w o u l d be, in a b r o a d s e n s e , a c o n s e q u e n c e
of (the c h o i c e of) a p a r t i c u l a r institutional s c h e m e . Let u s call a criterion
of j u s t i c e broadly consequentialist if a n d only if it a s s e s s e s i n s t i t u t i o n a l
s c h e m e s exclusively o n t h e basis of t h e i r c o n s e q u e n c e s , b r o a d l y c o n ­
ceived, t h a t is, if it takes e q u a l a c c o u n t of g o o d s a n d ills e s t a b l i s h e d a n d
3 3
of e q u i v a l e n t g o o d s a n d ills e n g e n d e r e d by s u c h s c h e m e s .
S u c h a b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t a p p r o a c h involves t w o s u b s i d i a r y
t o p i c s . O n e m u s t settle o n specific g o o d s a n d ills w h o s e d i s t r i b u t i o n is

3,
A d m i t t e d I y , t h e r e are borderline cases, as w h e n t h o s e earning less t h a n the m e a n
i n c o m e are e x c l u d e d . It is just barely possible that all have the s a m e i n c o m e , and s o the
e x c l u s i o n m i g h t (implausibly) s e e m to c o u n t as e n g e n d e r e d . D e s p i t e s u c h problematic
possibilities, I h o p e the d i s t i n c t i o n is clear e n o u g h in realistic scenarios a n d for the role it
will play in w h a t follows.
3 a
I n contrast to Rawls, Nozick s h o w s little interest in h o w to rank institutional s c h e m e s
that are l e s s t h a n just by h i s standards. I a s s u m e h e w o u l d say that in a s s e s s i n g s u c h a
s c h e m e w e m u s t normally b e m u c h m o r e sensitive to the restrictions o n f r e e d o m it calls
for than to restrictions o n f r e e d o m it effects.
3 3
T h e justice of a n institutional s c h e m e is, in S e n s phrase, "given by the g o o d n e s s of its
c o n s e q u e n t states of affairs" (WAF 175). Calling Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n broadly c o n s e q u e n ­
tialist is s o m e w h a t at o d d s w i t h current u s a g e in p h i l o s o p h y , w h i c h , strongly influenced
by Rawls himself, w o u l d e n c o u r a g e u s to characterize Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n as d e o n t o l o g i ­
cal. My a t t e m p t at revision is motivated by t h e idea, to be d e v e l o p e d later in this section,
that w e s h o u l d reserve the t e r m s deontological and consequentialist for a d e e p e r a n d
m o r e i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n t h a n the o n e Rawls e m p h a s i z e s .
40 T h e C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m of Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n , 3 . 3 . 1 . 2
1 4
to b e i n c o r p o r a t e d into t h e M a s t e r P a t t e r n a n d o n a w a y of weighting
a n d aggregating i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t s u c h g o o d s a n d ills (for p u r p o s e s of
ranking p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s via t h e i r m a s t e r p a t t e r n s ) And
t h e r e n e e d s t o b e a b r o a d l y e m p i r i c a l i n q u i r y , involving social theory
a n d c o m p a r a t i v e historical investigations, a i m e d at e s t i m a t i n g what
m a s t e r p a t t e r n s v a r i o u s feasible b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s w o u l d t e n d to pro­
duce.
3 . 3 . Calling Rawls a c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t r e q u i r e s clarification of his
relation t o utilitarian c o n c e p t i o n s of justice w h i c h h e s o forcefully
attacks.
3 . 3 . 1 . T h i s task c a n c o n v e n i e n t l y b e b e g u n b y e x a m i n i n g h o w his
c o n t r a c t a r i a n c o n c e p t i o n in A Theory of Justice differs from t h e util­
35
itarian view h e h a d s k e t c h e d e a r l i e r . T h i s e s s a y e m p l o y s o u r division
of subjects in a s o m e w h a t different w a y . Rawls e n v i s i o n s a social sys­
t e m w h o s e i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e t o b e justified o n u t i l i t a r i a n g r o u n d s but
w h o s e p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e to c o m p l y w i t h t h e s e (optimal) p r a c t i c e s irre­
spective of utilitarian c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Let m e d i s c u s s a c e n t r a l weak­
n e s s in Rawls's earlier i n d i r e c t u t i l i t a r i a n i s m a n d h o w it is o v e r c o m e in
h i s later c o n c e p t i o n .
3 . 3 . 1 . 1 . A utilitarian a s s e s s m e n t of social p r a c t i c e s p o s e s t h e n o t o ­
r i o u s p r o b l e m of e x p l a i n i n g w h y a n actor, a n d officials i n p a r t i c u l a r ,
s h o u l d feel c o n s t r a i n e d t o h o n o r a r u l e of a p r a c t i c e e v e n t h o u g h
violating it in this case w o u l d clearly b e b e t t e r in t e r m s of a g g r e g a t e
utility. Yes, t h e g o i n g p r a c t i c e is t h e b e s t p o s s i b l e o n e , a n d it w o u l d b e
w o r s e if a c t o r s i n g e n e r a l h a d s u c h d i s c r e t i o n , b u t if o n l y utility ul­
timately m a t t e r s , w h y s h o u l d o n e n o t m a x i m i z e utility j u s t t h i s o n c e ?
F u r t h e r utilitarian c o n s i d e r a t i o n s will n o t h e l p , n o r d o e s it s e e m p o s s i ­
ble t o resolve t h e s u b s t a n t i v e p r o b l e m b y a p p e a l to t h e m e a n i n g of
36
c o n c e p t s ("rule," "practice," "authority," e t c . ) . W h a t o n e w o u l d h a v e
t o claim is t h a t utility is s o m e h o w a n i n a p p r o p r i a t e value to a p p e a l to in
justifying o n e ' s c o n d u c t i n s u c h a c a s e . T h i s c l a i m raises n e w q u e s ­
t i o n s : w h a t o t h e r values are relevant, a n d w h y a r e n ' t t h e y relevant also
t o t h e a s s e s s m e n t of p r a c t i c e s ? But t h e c e n t r a l p r o b l e m is to e x p l a i n
h o w utility c a n s i m u l t a n e o u s l y b e valuable (so t h a t in d e s i g n i n g p r a c ­
tices w e s h o u l d b e g u i d e d b y it) a n d n o t valuable (so t h a t w e s h o u l d
i g n o r e it in d e c i s i o n s a b o u t c o m p l i a n c e w i t h a practice).
3.3.1.2. T h i s p r o b l e m c o u l d b e solved if a suitable s u b s t i t u t e w e r e
p r o v i d e d for utility a s t h e value u p o n w h i c h t h e a s s e s s m e n t of social
i n s t i t u t i o n s is t o t u r n . W h a t is valuable a b o u t t h e provisions a n d effects

h e d t h a t u t i l i t a r i a
e s s T ™ ^ . ' " view when he wrote this
 T h e C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m of Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n , 3.3.1.3 41

of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s h o u l d b e d e n n e d in s u c h a w a y t h a t individ­
u a l s cannot affect it (except, of c o u r s e , t h r o u g h t h e i r role in i n s t i t u t i o n a l
c h a n g e ) . T h i s , I think, is t h e i d e a of t h e l a t e r Rawls. He a t t e m p t s t o
define h i s M a s t e r P a t t e r n (via w h i c h basic s t r u c t u r e s a r e to b e a s s e s s e d )
in t e r m s of features t h a t p e r s o n s c a n n o t affect b y t h e i r c o n d u c t w i t h i n
t h e p r a c t i c e s of a n o n g o i n g social s y s t e m . P e r s o n a l efforts, t h o u g h t h e y
c a n mitigate (or aggravate) t h e effects of injustice, c a n n o t r e d u c e (or
i n c r e a s e ) t h e i n j u s t i c e itself, c a n n o t alter t h e fact t h a t s o m e institu­
tional s c h e m e u n j u s t l y fails to establish c e r t a i n rights o r t e n d s to
e n g e n d e r certain inequalities.
3 . 3 . 1 . 3 . T h i s s t r a t e g y is s t r e n g t h e n e d by c o n c e i v i n g t h e M a s t e r Pat­
t e r n s o t h a t p e r f e c t i o n is p o s s i b l e . U n d e r a utilitarian criterion, t h e b e s t
b a s i c s t r u c t u r e will b e t h e o n e t h a t t e n d s to p r o d u c e t h e m o s t utility.
But even t h i s o p t i m a l s t r u c t u r e still leaves indefinite r o o m for f u r t h e r
i m p r o v e m e n t ; t h e r e is n o limit to h o w m u c h utility t h e r e m i g h t b e . Even
u n d e r perfectly just i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h e q u e s t i o n c a n therefore a r i s e
w h e t h e r o n e s h o u l d violate t h e g r o u n d r u l e s for t h e s a k e of a n e t
i n c r e a s e in utility. In Rawls's later c o n c e p t i o n , by c o n t r a s t , t h e values
u n d e r l y i n g t h e a s s e s s m e n t of b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s c a n b e invoked t o justify
violating t h e r u l e s of existing i n s t i t u t i o n s o n l y w h e n s u c h violation
c o m e s in r e s p o n s e to s o m e injustice.
S u p p o s e , for e x a m p l e , t h a t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of slavery in s o m e social
s y s t e m is u n j u s t b e c a u s e t h e p o s i t i o n of slaves is m u c h w o r s e t h a n a n y
p o s i t i o n m u s t u n a v o i d a b l y b e ( m o d u l o t h e prevailing n a t u r a l environ­
m e n t a n d level of e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t ) . S u p p o s e that, u n d e r s u c h
c o n d i t i o n s , a citizen w e r e to h e l p a slave e s c a p e from h e r m a s t e r . S u c h
a n a c t i o n w o u l d n o t m a k e t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e slaveholding society a n y
m o r e j u s t (even t h e e s c a p e e is still legally unfree, m a y b e r e c a p t u r e d ,
etc.), b u t it m a y still b e justifiable t o b r e a k t h e r u l e s in this w a y s o a s t o
s h i e l d o n e slave from unjustifiable h a r m s s h e w o u l d o t h e r w i s e suffer.
So far, Rawls's later c o n c e p t i o n agrees w i t h h i s earlier o n e . It differs in
that, w h e n t h e existing b a s i c s t r u c t u r e is fully justifiable (in t h a t t h e
w o r s t p o s i t i o n it t e n d s to p r o d u c e is s u p e r i o r t o t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n s
feasible a l t e r n a t i v e s c h e m e s w o u l d t e n d t o p r o d u c e ) , t h e n t h e r e are n o
unjustifiable b u r d e n s of t h e relevant k i n d to s h i e l d o t h e r s from. T h e
values u n d e r l y i n g Rawls's criterion of justice a r e fully a c c o m m o d a t e d ,
"exhausted," c a n n o t (logically) b e satisfied to a n even g r e a t e r d e g r e e ,
a n d h e n c e c a n n o t justify a n y violation of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t t h e y also
justify.37 Rawls's l a t e r criterion of justice is satiable?* T h i s quality is
often o v e r l o o k e d ; r e a d e r s take this criterion ( a n d especially t h e differ-
37
I t m a y still b e a morally g o o d thing, of c o u r s e , to h e l p t h o s e w o r s e off than oneself. But
this a s s e s s m e n t n o w involves a separate v a l u e — e n s h r i n e d , perhaps, in a principle of
m o r a l i t y — w h i c h c a n p l a u s i b l y b e s u b o r d i n a t e d to the values in terms of w h i c h the basic
structure is justified (so that" the c o n c e r n to h e l p others is a n insufficient reason for
violating t h e t e r m s of just practices). Moral r e a s o n s b a s e d o n utility, by contrast, c a n n o t
be s o s u b o r d i n a t e d ; all that c a n matter are the quantities involved.
3 8
T h e t e r m satiable is b o r r o w e d from Raz (MF 2 3 5 - 4 4 ) .
42 T h e C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m of Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n , 3.3.2

e n c e principle) to r e q u i r e t h a t t h e least a d v a n t a g e d s h o u l d b e as well-

off as p o s s i b l e . T h i s r e a d i n g is m i s t a k e n . O n l y t h e basic structure inso­
far as it generates inequalities is r e q u i r e d t o o p t i m i z e t h e position ot
t h o s e least a d v a n t a g e d by t h o s e i n e q u a l i t i e s (cf. §§14.1, 14.3).
3.3.1.4. T h r o u g h t h e s e revisions Rawls arrives at v a l u e s for t h e as­
s e s s m e n t of i n s t i t u t i o n s that c a n n o t c o m e i n t o conflict w i t h themselves
in the w a y t h e earlier value of utility c o u l d . T h i s is t h e first s t e p toward
realizing a n a i m that, I believe, Rawls h a d earlier failed t o achieve,
namely, to s k e t c h a n overall m o r a l c o n c e p t i o n t h a t is (in w h a t for Rawls
is t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t s e n s e of this w o r d ) deontological. J u s t institu­
t i o n s confer rights t h a t give p e r s o n s " a n inviolability f o u n d e d o n justice
t h a t even t h e welfare of society a s a w h o l e c a n n o t o v e r r i d e " (TJ 3). In his
s e c o n d a t t e m p t Rawls h a s s u c c e e d e d in t a k i n g a b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n ­
tialist a p p r o a c h to t h e c h o i c e of social i n s t i t u t i o n s ( a n d n a t u r a l duties)
t h a t is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a strictly d e o n t o l o g i c a l a s s e s s m e n t of a c t o r s
p a r t i c i p a t i n g in t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s ( b o u n d b y t h e s e n a t u r a l d u t i e s ) . T h e
entire c o n c e p t i o n is a s u c c e s s f u l v e r s i o n of indirect consequential­
i s m — s u c c e s s f u l in t h a t t h e b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t justification of
t h e g r o u n d r u l e s d o e s n o t c o r r u p t t h e strictly d e o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s
t h e s e g r o u n d r u l e s a r e t o h a v e for (individual a n d collective) a c t o r s .
H e n c e n o t h i n g is lost if this justification is fully p u b l i c . T h e w i l l i n g n e s s
of a c t o r s t o give p r e c e d e n c e t o t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l g r o u n d r u l e s over t h e
p u r s u i t of a n y social o r i n d i v i d u a l g o a l s is s u s t a i n e d r a t h e r t h a n s u b ­
verted b y t h e i r full u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e d e e p e r c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t c o n ­
s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t unify a n d s u p p o r t t h o s e g r o u n d r u l e s .
3 . 3 . 2 . T h e r e a r e t w o f u r t h e r i m p o r t a n t d e p a r t u r e s from h i s e a r l i e r
v i e w — t h e s e explicitly e m p h a s i z e d in A Theory of Justice—that move
h i s criterion of justice itself in a recognizably d e o n t o l o g i c a l d i r e c t i o n .
Rawls defines a d e o n t o l o g i c a l (or non-teleological) c o n c e p t i o n a s o n e
"that e i t h e r d o e s n o t specify t h e g o o d i n d e p e n d e n t l y from t h e right, or
d o e s n o t i n t e r p r e t t h e right as m a x i m i z i n g t h e g o o d . . . . J u s t i c e as
fairness is a d e o n t o l o g i c a l t h e o r y i n t h e s e c o n d w a y " (TJ 30, cf. 24). He
t h e n e m p h a s i z e s t w o w a y s i n w h i c h h i s criterion of justice, u n l i k e t h e
utilitarian o n e , d o e s n o t i n t e r p r e t t h e right as m a x i m i z i n g t h e g o o d .
First, i n u s i n g a s i m p l e function for aggregating t h e g o o d of different
p e r s o n s ( s u m r a n k i n g or averaging), t h e utilitarian criterion is i n s e n s i ­
tive to h o w g o o d s a n d ills a r e d i s t r i b u t e d . I n s t i t u t i o n s g e n e r a t i n g t h e
m o s t e x t r e m e inequalities in utility are r e q u i r e d b v justice, s o l o n g a s
t h e greater welfare of s o m e o u t w e i g h s t h e g r e a t e r suffering of o t h e r s a s
c o m p a r e d t o m o r e egalitarian alternative s c h e m e s (TJ §5) Against t h i s
criterion Rawls seeks t o p r e s e n t a distribution-sensitive c r i t e r i o n o n
w h i c h an institutional s c h e m e m a y p e r m i t inequalities only insofar a s
d o i n g so raises t h e w o r s t position as against t h o s e u n d e r all feasible
m o r e e g a h t a n a n alternative s c h e m e s . This modification b y itself is
C XS m
^i°X^^ Tf ° ^ l o g i c a l oySs's
f ) U S t i C e

hghts. If the distribution of g o o d s is also c o u n t e d as a good, p e r h a p s a

 T h e C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m of Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n , 3.4 43

h i g h e r o r d e r o n e , a n d t h e t h e o r y d i r e c t s u s to p r o d u c e t h e m o s t g o o d
( i n c l u d i n g t h e g o o d of d i s t r i b u t i o n a m o n g others), w e n o l o n g e r have a
teleological view in t h e classical s e n s e . T h e p r o b l e m of d i s t r i b u t i o n falls
u n d e r t h e c o n c e p t of right as o n e intuitively u n d e r s t a n d s it, a n d s o t h e
t h e o r y lacks a n i n d e p e n d e n t definition of t h e g o o d " (TJ 25, cf. 210-11).
But t h e n , s u c h a b r o a d definition w o u l d also classify a s d e o n t o l o g i c a l a
q u a s i - u t i l i t a r i a n c r i t e r i o n t h a t gives n o w e i g h t to t h e well-being of t h e
worst-off 5 p e r c e n t , say.
S e c o n d , Rawls a r g u e s t h a t a utilitarian criterion relies o n a n i n a p ­
p r o p r i a t e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d as h a p p i n e s s or t h e satisfaction of
rational d e s i r e . T h i s w a y t h e j u s t i c e of i n s t i t u t i o n s c o m e s to d e p e n d
excessively u p o n t h e d e s i r e s t h a t h a p p e n to b e d o m i n a n t at t h e t i m e
39
(TJ 4 4 7 - 5 1 ) . Moreover, certain g o o d s (such as basic rights a n d liber­
ties) are m u c h m o r e valuable t h a n their c o n t r i b u t i o n to a p e r s o n ' s
utility m a y s u g g e s t (TJ 207). To a c c o m m o d a t e t h e s e p o i n t s , Rawls p o s ­
t u l a t e s a " t h i n t h e o r y of t h e good," e m b o d i e d in h i s c o n c e p t i o n of
social p r i m a r y g o o d s (TJ §60). Only this thin, objective n o t i o n of t h e
g o o d is a p p e a l e d to in t h e a s s e s s m e n t of feasible alternative b a s i c
s t r u c t u r e s . Rawls t a k e s this d e p a r t u r e as a f u r t h e r r e a s o n for t h i n k i n g
t h a t his c o n c e p t i o n is d e o n t o l o g i c a l in t h a t it "does n o t i n t e r p r e t t h e
right as m a x i m i z i n g t h e g o o d . . . . (Here I s u p p o s e w i t h u t i l i t a r i a n i s m
t h a t t h e g o o d is d e n n e d a s t h e satisfaction of r a t i o n a l desire.)" (TJ 30, cf.
396). Yet again, this definition s e e m s excessively b r o a d ; it w o u l d classify
as d e o n t o l o g i c a l a c r i t e r i o n r e q u i r i n g that i n s t i t u t i o n s m a x i m i z e g r o s s
national p r o d u c t .
3 . 4 . T o s u m u p , by defining t h e right as " m a x i m i n n i n g t h e t h i n
g o o d " — t h a t is, a s d e m a n d i n g t h a t inequalities b e a r r a n g e d so as t o
o p t i m i z e t h e w o r s t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h a r e of social p r i m a r y g o o d s —
Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice reflects a b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t a p ­
p r o a c h . Feasible alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s a r e to b e a s s e s s e d by
r e f e r e n c e to t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of social p r i m a r y g o o d s e a c h of t h e m
t e n d s to p r o d u c e , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e extent to w h i c h this d i s t r i b u t i o n is
e s t a b l i s h e d o r e n g e n d e r e d . (Obviously t h e effects of social i n s t i t u t i o n s
m u s t b e d e s c r i b e d in a r o u g h , statistical way, involving g e n e r a l t e n d e n ­
cies, p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s , a n d t h e like.) Moreover, Rawls's c o n ­
s t r u c t i o n p r e c l u d e s a n y spillover of t h e values informing t h e a s s e s s ­
m e n t of i n s t i t u t i o n s t o t h e subject of c o n d u c t a s s e s s m e n t . In this w a y
t h e g r o u n d r u l e s justified t h r o u g h his criterion of justice c a n be m o r ­
ally d e t e r m i n a t i v e , a n d h i s e n t i r e c o n s t r u c t i o n is in this s e n s e d e o n -
3 9
H e r e utilitarians might reasonably reply that t h e y d o not take existing desires for
granted but treat d e s i r e s as a d e p e n d e n t variable that, as far as possible, is to b e adjusted
for the sake of t h e greatest h a p p i n e s s . T h e c h o i c e of an institutional s c h e m e will impor­
tantly involve a t t e n t i o n to w h a t sort of d e s i r e s various alternative s c h e m e s w o u l d t e n d to
e n g e n d e r in p e o p l e . Utilitarians prefer, o t h e r things equal, institutions that generate
easily satisfiable d e s i r e s w h o s e pursuit will p r o d u c e intrapersonal a n d social harmony,
thereby in turn s u p p o r t i n g t h o s e institutions. In this r e s p e c t utilitarians n e e d not differ
from w h a t Rawls s a y s about his o w n c o n c e p t i o n (TJ §9 a n d c h a p . 8).
44 T h e C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m of Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n , 3.5

tological. Finally, t h e p a r a m e t e r s of Rawls's b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t

a p p r o a c h a r e s e t s o a s t o y i e l d a c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e t h a t itself h a s a
d e o n t o l o g i c a l flavor, i n t w o r e s p e c t s : Its p r e e m i n e n t c o n c e r n for t h e
w o r s t p o s i t i o n e n s u r e s t h a t t h e n e e d s a n d vital i n t e r e s t s of e v e n smaU
m i n o r i t i e s c a n n o t b e o u t b a l a n c e d b y t h e g r e a t e r g o o d of t h e m a n y . And
b y i n c o r p o r a t i n g a t h i n a c c o u n t of t h e good, Rawls's c r i t e r i o n partially
d i s c o n n e c t s t h e a s s e s s m e n t of social i n s t i t u t i o n s from w h a t e v e r d e ­
sires a n d c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e g o o d m a y b e e m p i r i c a l l y p r e v a l e n t (be­
40
c a u s e of n a t u r a l o r social f a c t o r s ) .
3 . 5 . I h a v e s a i d t h a t o n e i m p o r t a n t difference b e t w e e n Rawls a n d
Nozick i s t h a t Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n is b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t , a n d
Nozick's is n o t . Let m e n o w try t o i n c o r p o r a t e t h i s c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n
t h e m into a more complex framework that extends t h e deontological/
c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t d i s t i n c t i o n from c o n c e p t i o n s of m o r a l i t y t o c o n c e p ­
t i o n s of j u s t i c e .
A d e o n t o l o g i c a l m o r a l i t y typically gives c o n s i d e r a b l e w e i g h t to t w o
d i s t i n c t i o n s : b e t w e e n w h a t p e r s o n s d o a n d w h a t t h e y m e r e l y let h a p ­
p e n ; a n d w i t h i n t h e d o m a i n of w h a t t h e y d o , b e t w e e n w h a t t h e y intend
a n d w h a t t h e y m e r e l y foresee (or s h o u l d foresee). T h e p o i n t of b o t h
d i s t i n c t i o n s is t h a t s o m e X is m o r a l l y m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n s o m e Y. But
t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s m a y b e d r a w n in v a r i o u s w a y s . T h e difference in m o r a l
i m p o r t a n c e m a y o b t a i n always o r o n l y s o m e t i m e s . A n d Y m a y b e
w e i g h t e d less heavily t h a n X o r m a y b e r e l e g a t e d t o t h e s t a t u s of a tie
b r e a k e r (X h a s lexicographical priority), o r i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t Y m a y b e
d i s r e g a r d e d altogether. T h e r e a r e t h e n at least 2 X 3 = 6 w a y s i n w h i c h
e a c h d i s t i n c t i o n m i g h t b e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o a c o n c e p t i o n of m o r a l i t y .
T o m a k e c l e a r w h a t is d e m a n d e d of s u c h a c o n c e p t i o n for it t o c o u n t a s
deontological, w e m u s t t h e n specify n o t m e r e l y t h a t it m u s t r e c o g n i z e
t h e t w o differentials i n m o r a l i m p o r t a n c e b u t also h o w p r o m i n e n t
t h e s e t w o differentials m u s t m i n i m a l l y b e . I p r o p o s e that a c o n c e p t i o n
of morality is d e o n t o l o g i c a l if a n d o n l y if it h o l d s both that (a) a n y h a r m
a n a g e n t d o e s is always m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n a n y h a r m t h a t a g e n t
m e r e l y lets h a p p e n (so t h a t t h e latter c a n figure at m o s t as a tie b r e a k e r
in t h e a s s e s s m e n t of c o n d u c t ) , a n d t h a t (b) h a r m a n a g e n t i n t e n d s a n d
d o e s , s o m e t i m e s at least, h a s m o r e w e i g h t t h a n equivalent h a r m t h e
a g e n t d o e s b u t m e r e l y foresees (or s h o u l d foresee). T o b e fully c o n s e ­
quentialist, a c o n c e p t i o n of morality m u s t d e n y b o t h (a) a n d (b). S u c h
41
c o n c e p t i o n s will typically n o t r e c o g n i z e t h e t w o differentials at a l l .
« A s my objections suggest, it is probably futile to look for a s h a r p d e m a r c a t i o n of t h e
extension of deontological m this last s e n s e . It is e n o u g h that criteria of justice m a y b e
more o r less d e o n t o ogical in this sense, d e p e n d i n g o n how t h e y define the g o o d a n d o n
h o w they are sensitive to its distribution. Rawls's criterion d o e s n o t m e r e l y satistV t h e
m i n i m u m c o n d i t i o n s for being deontological (in h i s excessively broa™aense) ftls a s I
w o u l d put tt, m u c h more significantly deontological than ^ ^ S S ^
cntena (requiring, respectively, t h e maximization of gross i L o n d ^ K ^ a ^ t h t
maximization of utility for the best-off 95 percent) national p r o d u c t a n d m e

t h e y
P ^ b ^ ^ S ^ ^ ^ T ^ ^ i n t e n d
y a n d w
' h a t m e r e l f o r e s e e

paruy Because the same c o n d u c t can b e reported and i n t e n d e d u n d e r different d e s c r i p -

 T h e C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m of Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n , 3.5.1.2 45

In analogy, a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is d e o n t o l o g i c a l if a n d only if it
h o l d s both t h a t (A) a n y benefits a n d b u r d e n s a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e
b r i n g s a b o u t a r e a l w a y s m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n a n y g o o d s a n d ills it
m e r e l y lets h a p p e n (so t h a t t h e latter c a n figure at m o s t as a tie b r e a k e r
in t h e a s s e s s m e n t of institutions), a n d t h a t (B) w i t h i n t h e d o m a i n of
w h a t a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e b r i n g s a b o u t , benefits a n d b u r d e n s it
e s t a b l i s h e s have, s o m e t i m e s at least, m o r e w e i g h t t h a n equivalent b e n ­
efits a n d b u r d e n s it foreseeably e n g e n d e r s . A c o n c e p t i o n of justice is
fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t o n l y if it d e n i e s b o t h (A) a n d (B). Again, s u c h
c o n c e p t i o n s will typically n o t r e c o g n i z e t h e t w o differentials at all.
3 . 5 . 1 . 1 . Let m e s k e t c h h o w Nozick's views c a n b e motivated, in p a r t ,
by a t t r i b u t i n g t o h i m t h e t w o d e o n t o l o g i c a l c o m m i t m e n t s . H u m a n life
is e x p o s e d to a w i d e r a n g e of n a t u r a l c o n t i n g e n c i e s , s u c h a s g e n e t i c
h a n d i c a p s , illnesses, a c c i d e n t s , a n d o t h e r m i s f o r t u n e s n o t socially in­
d u c e d . S u c h c o n t i n g e n c i e s restrict o u r o p t i o n s . T h u s it m a y s e e m t h a t
in e v a l u a t i n g t h e p r o s p e c t s for p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m u n d e r s o m e institu­
tional s c h e m e , o n e m u s t take into a c c o u n t to w h a t e x t e n t s u c h restric­
t i o n s a r e m i t i g a t e d t h r o u g h this s c h e m e . Nozick, however, d i s p u t e s t h e
r e l e v a n c e of t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n . O n e r a t i o n a l e for his o p p o s i t i o n is
p r o v i d e d b y (A): a b s t r a c t i n g from n a t u r a l r e s t r i c t i o n s o n freedom, w e
s h o u l d a s s e s s i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s by reference to t h e " i n s t i t u t i o n a l "
f r e e d o m e a c h t e n d s to g e n e r a t e . T h u s Nozick thinks t h a t w h e n a n
i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e r e q u i r e s t h e h e a l t h y to s u p p o r t t h e h a n d i c a p p e d ,
it i n t r o d u c e s (rather t h a n mitigates) a n inequality. It restricts t h e free­
d o m of t h e f o r m e r a n d confers benefits u p o n t h e latter. A s c h e m e t h a t
r e q u i r e s n o s u c h s u p p o r t , by c o n t r a s t , involves n o morally significant
inequality, b e c a u s e t h e special h a r d s h i p s suffered by t h e h a n d i c a p p e d
a r e n a t u r a l r e s t r i c t i o n s o n t h e i r f r e e d o m a n d h e n c e d o n o t c o u n t in t h e
a s s e s s m e n t of i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s . T h e intuitive idea is t h a t w e o u g h t
n o t conflate t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e is just b e ­
t w e e n its p a r t i c i p a n t s w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r t h e w o r l d at large (the
i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e i n c l u d e d ) is just b e t w e e n t h o s e s a m e p e r s o n s .
3 . 5 . 1 . 2 . Nozick's libertarian s c h e m e i m p o s e s s e r v i t u d e u p o n slaves
a n d e x c l u d e s p e r s o n s from things, s u c h as l a n d , h e l d b y n o n c o n s e n t -
ing o w n e r s . U n d e r it t h e f r e e d o m of large s e g m e n t s of t h e p o p u l a t i o n is
42
likely t o b e v e r y severely r e s t r i c t e d . But Nozick s h o w s n o i n t e r e s t in a n
e m p i r i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n of t h i s i s s u e , a n d a s t r o n g version of (B) p r o v i d e s
o n e r a t i o n a l e for t h i s r e l u c t a n c e . In a s s e s s i n g a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e
b y r e f e r e n c e t o t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of benefits a n d b u r d e n s it p r o d u c e s , w e
should care m u c h m o r e about established than about engendered
benefits a n d b u r d e n s . W e s h o u l d c o n c e n t r a t e o n t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s o n
p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m t h a t t h e s c h e m e directly calls for a n d b e m u c h less
c o n c e r n e d w i t h r e s t r i c t i o n s t h a t ( d e p e n d i n g o n h o w p e o p l e interact)

tions. I n e e d not w o r r y a b o u t this difficulty here, s i n c e m y task is to clarify the a n a l o g o u s

d i s t i n c t i o n s in t h e d o m a i n of justice.
4 2
S u c h a r g u m e n t s have b e e n a d v a n c e d , for e x a m p l e , by G. A. C o h e n , CFP. See also
Cohen's m o r e g e n e r a l critique of Nozick in RNWC.
46 T h e C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m of Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n , 3.5.2.1

m a y o r m a y n o t b e i m p o s e d u n d e r t h e s c h e m e ( t h o u g h t h e y predict­
ably will be). I n t h e libertarian s c h e m e it is i n t e n d e d o n l y t h a t p e r s o n s
s h o u l d have t h e f r e e d o m t o a l i e n a t e t h e i r r i g h t s o v e r l a n d a n d even over
t h e m s e l v e s a n d also t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d b e i n s t i t u t i o n a l m e c h a n i s m s
enforcing w h a t e v e r p a r t i c u l a r e n t i t l e m e n t s m a y c o m e a b o u t t h r o u g h
s u c h transactions. But the g r o u n d rules d o not "intend" a n y particular
e n t i t l e m e n t s so g e n e r a t e d . T h e y d o n o t p r e s c r i b e t h a t s o m e s h o u l d be
slaves or b e l a n d l e s s , n o r d o t h e y p r e s c r i b e a n y p a r t i c u l a r distribu­
tional feature of t h e p a t t e r n of h o l d i n g s t h e y e n g e n d e r . Even t h o u g h it
m a y b e a statistical c e r t a i n t y t h a t t h e s c h e m e p r o d u c e s ( w i d e s p r e a d )
slavery or a (large) l a n d l e s s class, t h e r u l e s d o n o t m a n d a t e t h a t (many
or) a n y o n e at all s h o u l d o c c u p y t h e s e social p o s i t i o n s . T h e r e s t r i c t i o n s
o n t h e freedom of s u c h p e r s o n s , h o w e v e r severe, c o m m o n , a n d pre­
dictable, a r e m e r e l y a n i n c i d e n t a l c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e libertarian
s c h e m e . H e n c e , Nozick c o u l d c o n c l u d e by a p p e a l t o a s t r o n g v e r s i o n of
(B) t h a t t h e s e restrictions a r e m o r a l l y insignificant for t h e a s s e s s m e n t of
h i s s c h e m e , at least in t h i s c a s e , w h e r e t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s t h e s c h e m e d o e s
4 3
directly p r e s c r i b e a r e t h e c o r r e c t o n e s .
3.5J2.1. Rawls s h a r e s w i t h Nozick t h e c o m m i t m e n t t o (A). H e c o n ­
fines h i s a t t e n t i o n t o t h e benefits a n d b u r d e n s of social i n t e r a c t i o n (e.g.,
TJ 4 - 5 ) . His c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e g o v e r n s t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of social p r i ­
m a r y g o o d s a l o n e , r a t h e r t h a n t h e joint p a t t e r n e m e r g i n g w h e n t h e
d i s t r i b u t i o n of social p r i m a r y g o o d s is s u p e r i m p o s e d u p o n t h a t of
n a t u r a l g o o d s a n d ills. I n a p p l y i n g t h i s criterion, " w e a r e n o t r e q u i r e d
t o e x a m i n e citizens' p s y c h o l o g i c a l a t t i t u d e s n o r t h e i r c o m p a r a t i v e lev­
els of w e l l - b e i n g " (SUPG 163). C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , h i s c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s
a r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h c i t i z e n s ' social p o s i t i o n s , o r shares, a n d n o t w i t h
t h e i r overall situations, o r standard of living (in S e n ' s sense). T h e y c a r e
a b o u t t h e l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d , n o t a b o u t t h e least well. S o m e r e a d e r s ,
overlooking t h i s p o i n t , h a v e s u p p o s e d t h a t t h e p a r t i e s a r e c o n c e r n e d
w i t h all factors affecting t h e lives of t h o s e t h e y represent, w h i c h h a s
given rise t o m a n y m i s t a k e n c o u n t e r e x a m p l e s , a b o u t h o w i n s t i t u t i o n s
m u s t b e d e s i g n e d so a s t o o p t i m i z e t h e quality of life of t h o s e m o s t sick,
4 4
feeble, ugly, o r r e t a r d e d . Yes, t h e a c c o u n t of social p r i m a r y g o o d s is
m e a n t to reflect a c o n c e p t i o n of h u m a n n e e d s (RAM 643; WOS 15; FG
554; SUPG 172-73). But t h e s e are t h e standard n e e d s of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s
in a given social s y s t e m . T h r o u g h o u t , Rawls leaves aside differences
a m o n g p e r s o n s t h a t affect h o w useful a given b u n d l e of social g o o d s

« I a d d this proviso b e c a u s e Nozick, having said nothing about the comparative a s s e s s -

liable k that the is,inctio
^£Z?^SSSS^ !° T " ^
be irrelevant. He may believe, for example, that a n inequality in initial shares nf riehts i s
equally un)ust irrespective of w h e t h e r the inequality is 1 Mt»hli«h»,i
S
>
a m t O C r a C y
or e n g e n d e r e d (eg., through market t ^ ! n C n £ S £ ^ £ ^ '
n S
i ^ e T S r S wherC°o c casional ly re-
T o
more likelv that o n e is amoni t h l i l ! ? f ° e sure, natural h a n d i c a p s m a k e it
determined ^Z^ZV^Z^tT" ^ "^ ^ "
 T h e C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m of Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n , 3.5.2.2 47

will b e t o e a c h . In t h e i r c o m m i t m e n t to (A) Rawls a n d Nozick s t a n d

t o g e t h e r a g a i n s t s u c h fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n s of justice as
45
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m o r t h e capabilities a p p r o a c h r e c e n t l y set forth b y S e n .
3 . 5 . 2 . 2 . Yet Rawls d e n i e s (B). His criterion of justice r a n k s b a s i c
s t r u c t u r e s o n t h e b a s i s of i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e overall p a t t e r n of social
p r i m a r y g o o d s t h e y t e n d to g e n e r a t e . Rawls explicitly d e v e l o p s h i s
c o n c e p t i o n in c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t t e r m s : "The b a s i c s t r u c t u r e is t o b e
a r r a n g e d t o m a x i m i z e t h e w o r t h to t h e least a d v a n t a g e d of t h e c o m ­
p l e t e s c h e m e of e q u a l liberty s h a r e d by all" (TJ 205), for e x a m p l e , a n d
" t h e p a r t i e s . . . strive for as h i g h a n a b s o l u t e s c o r e as p o s s i b l e " (TJ
4 6
144) His c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e is u l t i m a t e l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e institu­
tional f r e e d o m p e r s o n s actually enjoy, a n d h e evaluates t h e foreseeable
d i s t r i b u t i o n of s u c h f r e e d o m w i t h o u t asking t o w h a t e x t e n t it is e s t a b ­
l i s h e d o r e n g e n d e r e d b y social i n s t i t u t i o n s . Rawls, therefore, p a y s
m u c h m o r e a t t e n t i o n t h a n Nozick d o e s to t h e effects of institutional
s c h e m e s . I s e e t h i s a s a c e n t r a l d i v e r g e n c e b e t w e e n t h e m : Nozick's
c o n c e p t i o n of justice is d e o n t o l o g i c a l in m y s e n s e , w h e r e a s Rawls's,
b e c a u s e of its r e j e c t i o n of (B), is b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t . But t h e n ,
b e c a u s e of its c o m m i t m e n t to (A), Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice is n o t
fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t . Let m e call c o n c e p t i o n s of justice t h a t are c o m ­
m i t t e d t o (A) b u t n o t t o (B) a n d likewise c o n c e p t i o n s of m o r a l i t y c o m ­
m i t t e d t o (a) b u t n o t t o (b) semiconsequentialist c o n c e p t i o n s . This t e r m
s h o u l d n o t give rise to confusion, at least if it is t r u e t h a t n o significant
m o r a l c o n c e p t i o n i n s t a n t i a t e s t h e inverse c o m b i n a t i o n : a c o m m i t m e n t
47
t o (B) b u t n o t t o (A), t o (b) b u t n o t to (a).
^ A c o n c e p t i o n of justice c o m m i t t e d to (A) i p s o facto e m p l o y s an objective criterion for
interpersonal c o m p a r i s o n s , w h e r e a s the criterion e m p l o y e d by fully consequentialist
c o n c e p t i o n s m a y b e either subjective, as w i t h utilitarianism, or objective, as in Sen (EW,
SL, WAF). Sen's c o n c e p t i o n is fully consequentialist (in m y s e n s e ! b e c a u s e it evaluates a
person's b u n d l e of benefits a n d b u r d e n s in light of particular features of this p e r s o n
(notably capabilities, disabilities, a n d special n e e d s ) . It is objective, b e c a u s e n o a c c o u n t is
taken of particular interests or preferences. See Scanlon, PU 6 5 6 - 5 8 , a n d SC 1 9 7 - 2 0 1 , for
this subjective/objective d i s t i n c t i o n .
'"'On t h e o t h e r h a n d , Rawls also says that "the c o n c e p t i o n defined by t h e s e principles
is not that of m a x i m i z i n g anything" (TJ 211), but h e is here speaking i n rejection of the
narrower idea that social institutions s h o u l d be d e s i g n e d s o as to "maximize the s u m of
intrinsic value or the net b a l a n c e of the satisfaction of interests" (ibid.) in a distribution-
insensitive w a y . Rawls b e l i e v e s that in d e v e l o p e d societies certain established benefits
and b u r d e n s are of p a r a m o u n t i m p o r t a n c e . Yet h e gives t h e s e n o special w e i g h t from the
start but rather a r g u e s for this result. T h e priority of t h e first principle is d e f e n d e d by
d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e special i m p o r t a n c e of certain g o o d s for citizens a n d is t h u s not b a s e d
o n t h e idea that e s t a b l i s h e d g o o d s are m o r e important a s such (TJ §26, §33). That this is s o
is confirmed b y h i s first p r i n c i p l e of justice, w h i c h is c o n c e r n e d with o n l y some estab­
l i s h e d g o o d s (certain basic rights a n d liberties) a n d also with e n g e n d e r e d inequalities in
the w e l l - p r o t e c t e d n e s s of t h e s e rights a n d liberties a n d in the worth of the basic political
liberties. 1 d i s c u s s t h e s e m a t t e r s further in Chapter 3.
4 7
B y p r o p o s i n g a n a l o g o u s tripartite typifications for c o n c e p t i o n s of justice a n d c o n ­
c e p t i o n s of morality, I don't m e a n to suggest that r e a s o n s for preferring a s e m i c o n s e ­
quentialist c o n c e p t i o n of justice, say, have a n a l o g u e s in t h e d o m a i n of c o n c e p t i o n s of
morality. It i s perfectly c o n c e i v a b l e that t h e m o s t reasonable c o m b i n a t i o n will consist of a
s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of justice c o u p l e d with a fully consequentialist or
d e o n t o l o g i c a l morality.
48 Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.1

4. Nozick's D e o n t o l o g i c a l Alternative

4 . 1 . Let m e d e v e l o p t h e s u g g e s t e d justificatory b a c k g r o u n d for

Nozick's views a little f u r t h e r b y l o o k i n g m o r e closely at w h a t h e could
say in s u p p o r t of h i s O r w e l l i a n c o n c l u s i o n t h a t if w e a r e firmly com­
m i t t e d to f r e e d o m , w e m u s t e n d o r s e g r o u n d r u l e s t h a t r e c o g n i z e a n d
48
enforce s l a v e r y .
For Nozick, slavery involves total a n d u n l i m i t e d p e r p e t u a l unfree-
d o m . Slaves h a v e n o c o n t r o l over t h e i r o w n lives, a n d a r e legitimately
subject to every conceivable form of s a d i s t i c o r s e x u a l p e r v e r s i o n — m a y
49
b e w o r k e d t o d e a t h , e a t e n alive, t o r t u r e d , a n d s o f o r t h . Evidently,
Nozick d o e s n o t t h i n k t h a t t h i s sort of u n f r e e d o m disqualifies t h e
g r o u n d rules h e p r o p o s e s . Nor w o u l d h e b e t a k e n a b a c k , I s u p p o s e , if
h i s t o r i a n s a n d social t h e o r i s t s p r e d i c t e d t h a t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e
of o u r Rawlsian w o u l d p r o d u c e a w o r l d of m a n y m o r e o p t i o n s t o
c h o o s e a n d lives to lead, t h a t u n d e r Nozick's c o n s t i t u t i o n a slave e c o n ­
o m y w o u l d e m e r g e o n o u r i s l a n d a n d few p e r s o n s , b e i n g n e i t h e r slaves
n o r slaveholders, w o u l d h a v e t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d i n c e n t i v e s to
c o m m e n c e novel v e n t u r e s — t o t r a d e , c o m p o s e , invent, e x p l o r e , r h y m e ,
r e s e a r c h , a n d p e r f o r m . Against o b j e c t i o n s of t h e s e k i n d s , N o z i c k c a n
a p p e a l t o a s t r o n g v e r s i o n of (B): t h e g r o u n d r u l e s h e is a d v o c a t i n g d o
n o t call for slavery; t h e y d o n o t p r e s c r i b e t h a t a n y p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n s or
g r o u p s o r p r o p o r t i o n of t h e p o p u l a t i o n s h o u l d b e slaves; t h e y d o n ' t
even m a n d a t e t h a t t h e r e b e a n y slaves at all; a n d therefore, s i n c e t h e
b u r d e n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h slavery, t h o u g h p r e d i c t a b l e a n d officially e n ­
forced, are entirely e n g e n d e r e d , t h e c o s t s of its r e c o g n i t i o n a r e m o r a l l y
insignificant i n c o m p a r i s o n t o t h e g a i n s . For t h e benefits slavery c o n ­
fers a r e e s t a b l i s h e d : Every p e r s o n is a s s i g n e d t h e liberty of selling
himself i n t o slavery if h e s o c h o o s e s . A n d e v e r y o n e (so l o n g as h e h a s
n o t s o l d himself) h a s a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o o w n slaves, b y a c q u i r i n g a n

•">Cf. ASU 331. C o n c e r n i n g t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w g r o u n d rules s h o u l d he d e s i g n e d , 1 s e e

n o e v i d e n c e that Nozick r e c o g n i z e s any values b e y o n d freedom. It is true, h e "feel[s] m o r e
comfortable" w i t h a capitalist s y s t e m , b e c a u s e t h e circulation of a s s e t s w i t h i n it is
"largely reasonable a n d intelligible" a n d correlated with persons' s u c c e s s in "serving
others a n d w i n n i n g t h e m as c u s t o m e r s " IASU159). But I think h e w o u l d e n d o r s e t h e s a m e
entitlement structure e v e n if p e o p l e u n d e r it m a d e transfers i n less appealing w a y s If so,
t h e p o i n t h a s n o w e i g h t against freedom considerations. Elsewhere Nozick a p p e a l s to t h e
"familiar social considerations favoring private property," but h e adds i m m e d i a t e l y ,
"These c o n s i d e r a t i o n s enter a Lockean theory to support t h e claim that a p p r o p r i a t i o n of
pnvate property satisfies t h e intent b e h i n d t h e e n o u g h a n d as g o o d left over' proviso, not
as a utihlanan justification of property" IASU 177; cf. Locke, STG §41). T h o s e for w h o m
h e r e is n o l a n d left to appropriate are allegedly c o m p e n s a t e d b y the s u p e r i o r options
they have u n d e r Nozick's s c h e m e . Acceptable property s c h e m e s m u s t s a f e f v t h i s c o n d i -
t.on, but Nozick w o u l d d e n y that, b e y o n d this threshold, suchTcheme^^ t h m l
acceptable t h e b e t t e r they satisfy it (i.e., the better t h e worst o p t i o n set theTengen^erT
••This is s o b e c a u s e N o z i c k — i n contrast in i «r.ir„ a I Y<1 • i y
e n
s e n a e
'/-
 Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.1 49

existing slave from h e r p r e s e n t o w n e r or a self-owned p e r s o n from

herself. I n light of t h e s e t w o o p t i o n s , slavery, a s envisaged b y Nozick,
s h o u l d clearly b e r e c o g n i z e d in "a free system."
O n e m a y q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r having t h e s e t w o o p t i o n s really c o n ­
s t i t u t e s a benefit. Is n o t t h e first o p t i o n r a t h e r a liability, given that t h e
d e c i s i o n t o sell oneself m a y well t u r n out t o h a v e b e e n a dreadful
m i s t a k e ? N o z i c k w o u l d s a y that t h e possibility—even p r o b a b i l i t y — o f
m i s t a k e s d o e s n o t c o u n t against slavery, b e c a u s e , w h e n s h e w a s still
self-owned, t h e slave h a d t h e liberty to sell herself into s o m e m o r e
limited form of d e p e n d e n c e , or n o t to sell herself at all. It w o u l d b e
p a t e r n a l i s m p u r e a n d s i m p l e to s e c o n d - g u e s s or disallow s u c h
c h o i c e s . Even if s o m e slaves, or even all, w o u l d have h a d m o r e f r e e d o m
a n d a b e t t e r life if t h e y h a d n o t sold t h e m s e l v e s , w e c a n n o t c o u n t this
differential a g a i n s t Nozick's i n s t i t u t i o n of slavery. T h e loss of f r e e d o m
suffered by a slave d o e s n o t c o u n t , b e c a u s e it c a m e a b o u t p u r s u a n t t o
50
free c h o i c e ( w h e t h e r r a t i o n a l or o t h e r w i s e ) .
But t h e r e a r e n o n p a t e r n a l i s t i c a r g u m e n t s as well. To invoke a c o m ­
m o n p l a c e from g a m e t h e o r y , t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of slavery will create t h e
very e m e r g e n c y s i t u a t i o n s in w h i c h selling oneself c o u l d b e rational.
C o n s i d e r a sick p e r s o n w h o h a s m a n a g e d to r e a c h a d o c t o r b u t is t o o
p o o r or w e a k t o m a k e it to t h e n e x t p h y s i c i a n alive. T h e doctor, w h o c a n
easily c u r e h e r , is in a p o s i t i o n to exact a n y p r i c e . He c a n d e m a n d all
t h i n g s s h e o w n s . If slavery is r e c o g n i z e d , t h e p a t i e n t ' s situation is m u c h
w o r s e , a s h e m a y d e m a n d her in a d d i t i o n . In t h i s case, t h e p a t i e n t h a s
n o r e a s o n t o b e grateful t h a t s h e h a d t h e liberty to sell herself: T h e n e e d
s l
to u s e t h i s o p t i o n a r o s e o n l y b e c a u s e s h e h a d it in t h e first p l a c e .

5 0
T h i s reply a l s o e x p l a i n s w h y t h e "Lockean proviso" d o e s not protect slaves against
mistreatment. T h o u g h p e r s o n s are o w e d c o m p e n s a t i o n (by whom?) insofar as their
o p t i o n s are inferior to the s t a n d a r d state-of-nature o p t i o n s IASU 178-79n), their o p t i o n s
are v a l u e d e x ante. C o m p a r e the situation of a n u n i n s u r e d rider w i t h o u t h e l m e t w h o is
badly hurt in a s e l f - c a u s e d m o t o r c y c l e a c c i d e n t ; s h e h a s n o right to c o m p e n s a t i o n e v e n if
her o p t i o n s n o w are m u c h l e s s valuable than the standard state-of-nature o p t i o n s . It w a s
h e r o w n free c h o i c e to ride w i t h o u t h e l m e t a n d i n s u r a n c e (and a c h o i c e that it w o u l d
have b e e n w r o n g to deprive h e r of).
51
M e d i c a l expertise, not b e i n g a natural resource, d o e s not fall u n d e r Nozick's "Lock­
e a n proviso" (cf. ASU 181, the c a s e s of the m e d i c a l researcher a n d the surgeon). T h e
following trialogue is t h e n a realistic scenario within Nozick's libertarian society. A police
officer c o m e s u p o n a c o u p l e struggling w i t h e a c h other, the m a n evidently trying to rape
the w o m a n .
W o m a n : Please, sir, p l e a s e h e l p m e .
Officer [to man): Hey, y o u , let h e r go at o n c e !
Man: Don't get involved.
Officer: I m u s t . You are violating this w o m a n ' s right not to be assaulted.
Man: N o , I'm n o t . S h e is m y slave. Here are the papers, s i g n e d b y herself.
W o m a n : But I w a s c o e r c e d i n t o signing. He said h e w o u l d not treat m y father if I refused
to sign.
Officer: That's n o t c o e r c i o n b u t at m o s t d u r e s s . H e w a s at liberty not to treat y o u r father
or to ask c o m p e n s a t i o n for treating h i m .
W o m a n : But m y father is d e a d !
Man: T h e c o n t r a c t s a y s o n l y that I w o u l d try to save him, a n d I did.
50 Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.2

Moreover, t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of slavery p r o v i d e s i n c e n t i v e s for would-be

slaveholders t o try to entrap a n o t h e r in a s i t u a t i o n t h a t m a k e s it rational
t o sell herself. O n e c a n l u r e h e r i n t o a l i f e - t h r e a t e n i n g s i t u a t i o n and
t h e n offer t o r e s c u e h e r , o n e c a n p a y o t h e r s to b o y c o t t h e r a n d then
52
offer t o save h e r from starvation, a n d s o f o r t h . All t h e s e examples
s h o w h o w it m a y b e q u i t e a b u r d e n to b e t o o free (by h a v i n g t h e liberty
t o sell oneself).
H e r e it d o e s n o t h e l p m u c h t o insist (cf. ASU 331) t h a t if s o m e o n e
finds it d a n g e r o u s t o h a v e t h e o p t i o n t o sell herself, t h e n s h e c a n e n t e r a
c o n t r a c t d i s a b l i n g this o p t i o n , t h a t is, give a w a y t h i s liberty. (Could her
p u r s u e r b u y t h i s c o n t r a c t from t h o s e w i t h w h o m it w a s m a d e , and
w h e n h e h a s h e r in a d e s p e r a t e s i t u a t i o n , quickly r e s t o r e h e r liberty to
sell herself b y releasing h e r from t h e p r o m i s e ? ) O n e m a y d o u b t that
s u c h c o n t r a c t s c o u l d b e p e r m i s s i b l e in a l i b e r t a r i a n s o c i e t y . If they
w e r e , c o u l d n ' t y o u a n d y o u r friend m a k e a s i m i l a r c o n t r a c t , p r o m i s i n g
e a c h o t h e r t h a t n e i t h e r of y o u will ever sell y o u r h o u s e , t h e r e b y p r o t e c t ­
ing y o u r s e l v e s against p o t e n t i a l c r e d i t o r s ? B u t e v e n if s u c h c o n t r a c t s
w e r e r e c o g n i z e d , t h e y w o u l d n o t h e l p i n all c a s e s . For e x a m p l e , a
slaveholder w o u l d find it easy to m a k e t h e c h i l d r e n of h i s slaves his
p r o p e r t y : W h e n s u c h a c h i l d c o m e s of age (before s h e c a n m a k e any
disabling c o n t r a c t s ) , h e c a n t h r e a t e n to m i s t r e a t h e r p a r e n t s if s h e will
n o t give herself over a s h i s slave. He also h a s every o p p o r t u n i t y t o
d e t e r m i n e h e r u p b r i n g i n g , to m o l d h e r abilities, d e s i r e s , a n d a m b i t i o n s
so that s h e will a c c e p t slavery r a t h e r t h a n b e c h a s e d a w a y from t h e only
p l a c e s h e k n o w s . T h e c h i l d r e n of slaves, at t h e very least, a r e likely to b e
m u c h b e t t e r off w i t h o u t t h e o p t i o n of selling t h e m s e l v e s , b u t d o e s
having t h e o p t i o n r e d u c e t h e i r freedom (as Nozick c o n c e i v e s t h i s n o ­
tion)?
4 . 2 . Let u s s t e p b a c k from t h e e x c h a n g e at t h i s point, t o e x a m i n e
m o r e generally w h a t sort of a c o n c e p t i o n of distributive justice Nozick
m i g h t h a v e p r e s e n t e d h a d h e c a r e d t o s y s t e m a t i z e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s like
t h e foregoing i n t o a justificatory b a c k g r o u n d for h i s view a n a l o g o u s to
t h e o n e Rawls d e v e l o p s . In a d d i t i o n t o t h e i r differing views a b o u t t h e
m o r a l relevance of t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n e s t a b l i s h e d a n d e n g e n ­
d e r e d p a t t e r n features, t h e r e is a s e c o n d i m p o r t a n t difference w i t h i n
t h e w h a t - c o m p o n e n t . This difference c o n c e r n s t h e o p t i o n s p a c e in
t e r m s of w h i c h a p e r s o n ' s freedom is d e s c r i b e d . For Rawls, t h i s o p t i o n

Officer Uo Woman): I'm sorry, ma'am, but I c a n n o t help y o u

Man: But y o u c a n h e l p m e in forcing her to fulfill her contractual obligations S h e h a s
already scratched m e . See if y o u c a n tie her h a n d s """gallons. &ne n a s
W nS
X T '!Z Tr (T^ S b S scre
*™f°r help as she is being raped )
s o ^ h S ^ ^
P - v i s o . We may
t h a t s h e c o u l d h a v e
the s u m m e r . She h a s c o m e h o w e v ^ £ i t , g r o w n food d u r i n g
S e l U n g t 0 o l s for w h i c h s h B
n o w cannot, s u d d e n l y tad a ^ c u s t o m e d ^ '
 Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.2 51

s p a c e is largely s t r u c t u r e d by social i n s t i t u t i o n s . His b a s i c liberties

cover s u c h c o n v e n t i o n a l o p t i o n s a s voting, m a r r y i n g , w o r s h i p i n g , mak­
ing a s p e e c h , h a v i n g a c c e s s to t h e m e d i a , a n d so o n . T h i s e m p h a s i s is
closely a s s o c i a t e d w i t h h i s i n s i s t e n c e o n t h e constitutive a s p e c t of
social p r a c t i c e s .
Nozick, t h o u g h h e t o o views t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of freedom as r e g u l a t e d
by social i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h i n k s of f r e e d o m itself a s a n o n c o n v e n t i o n a l
g o o d . T h e o p t i o n s of t h e v a r i o u s individuals are l o c a t e d w i t h i n a preex­
isting s p a c e . T h e y are, i n t h e first i n s t a n c e , o p t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t to
c h u n k s of s p a c e - t i m e , p h y s i c a l objects, a n d p e r s o n s . T h e r e are, in
a d d i t i o n , s e c o n d - o r d e r o p t i o n s , t h a t is, o p t i o n s to m a k e certain
c h a n g e s i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of first-order o p t i o n s (for e x a m p l e , gaining
a n o p t i o n o r d e p r i v i n g another of one), as well a s t h i r d - o r d e r o p t i o n s ,
a n d s o o n u p . While g r o u n d r u l e s b r i n g into b e i n g n e w k i n d s of rela­
tions b e t w e e n p e r s o n s a n d o p t i o n s — p e r s o n s c a n n o w h a v e o p t i o n s
legitimately, c a n b e e n t i t l e d to t h e m — t h e y d o n o t alter t h e s p a c e of
possible o p t i o n s o r t h e p o s s i b l e o p t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s . Therefore, seeing
t h a t a given u n i v e r s e of s p a c e - t i m e , objects, a n d p e r s o n s fixes t h e s p a c e
of p o s s i b l e o p t i o n s , Nozick t e n d s t o t h i n k of f r e e d o m as a c o n s t a n t - s u m
g o o d . F o r Rawls, b y c o n t r a s t , t h e s p a c e of possible o p t i o n s is a function
of e x i s t i n g s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . I n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms will c h a n g e t h e
s h a p e a n d s t r u c t u r e of this s p a c e , m a k e it larger or smaller o r (when
53
t h e y are significant) i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e a l t o g e t h e r .
T h i s b r i n g s u s to t h e t h i r d c o m p o n e n t , t h e h o w - q u e s t i o n , w h i c h
c o n c e r n s t h e d e m a n d s Nozick m a k e s o n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of e s t a b l i s h e d
freedom. He s t r o n g l y e m p h a s i z e s a formal c o n s t r a i n t , namely, t h a t a set
of g r o u n d r u l e s s h o u l d restrict p e r s o n s ' (legitimate) o p t i o n s s o as to
achieve a c o m p l e t e o r d e r i n g of claims, or interpersonal consistency.
This d e m a n d is b r o u g h t o u t e s p e c i a l l y in h i s a r g u m e n t s (ASU 28-35) for
s e e i n g r i g h t s a s s i d e c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t — b y m e a n s of a b o u n d a r y , line, or
h y p e r - p l a n e (ASU 57)—define a m o r a l s p a c e for e a c h individual (there­
54
by r e s t r i c t i n g t h e o p t i o n s of o t h e r s ) .
In a d d i t i o n , Nozick s e e m s c o m m i t t e d to t h r e e s u b s t a n t i v e c o n ­
straints. First, p e r s o n s ' o p t i o n s p a c e s s h o u l d b e not only m u t u a l l y
exclusive b u t a l s o e x h a u s t i v e . P e r s o n ' s o p t i o n s m a y be r e s t r i c t e d only
insofar a s is n e c e s s a r y for i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o n s i s t e n c y . T h e rights a n d
liberties of t h e v a r i o u s i n d i v i d u a l s t o g e t h e r m u s t "fill t h e s p a c e " (ASU

53
N o z i c k w o u l d r e c o g n i z e , of course, that the set of o w n a b l e objects of value m a y
fluctuate, that the total of w e a l t h p r o d u c e d m a y be affected by the c h o i c e of g r o u n d rules.
But h e w o u l d d e n y , I think, that this c h o i c e c o u l d affect the s h a p e and structure of the
s p a c e of p o s s i b l e o p t i o n s . T h i s idea of a fixed s p a c e is compatible with carving the s p a c e
u p in very c o m p l i c a t e d w a y s , as w h e n p e r s o n s have partial control over s o m e thing, e.g.,
over s o m e a s p e c t o r t i m e s l i c e of it, or t h r o u g h voting rights or veto p o w e r s .
5 4
S u c h imaginative reflection a b o u t freedom in spatial m e t a p h o r s is p r o m i n e n t before
Nozick, e.g., in H o b b e s , Locke, a n d Kant. It a l s o appears in Rawls's reference to liberties a s
"a framework of legally p r o t e c t e d paths" IBLP 40). For an illuminating w a y of e x t e n d i n g
the m e t a p h o r in t e r m s of railway lines, s w i t c h e s , a n d l o c o m o t i v e s , s e e Feinberg, ILS.
52 Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.2

238); f r e e d o m m u s t n o t b e w a s t e d . T h i s ephaustiveness c o n s t r a i n t pro­

vides a straightforward r a t i o n a l e for o n e of Nozick's views, h i s (' non-
paternalistic ") rejection of i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s . S u p p o s e s o m e p e r s o n , P,
inalienably h a d s o m e right, R. T h e n n o o n e c o u l d legitimately have the
h i g h e r - o r d e r o p t i o n of divesting P of R; s o m e bit of f r e e d o m w o u l d go to
w a s t e . T h i s i d e a m a y m o t i v a t e Nozick's o p p o s i t i o n to d e e p r i g h t s (for
e x a m p l e , t h e right t o h o l d p r o p e r t y ) t h a t define t h e p e r m a n e n t frame­
w o r k w i t h i n w h i c h superficial r i g h t s (for e x a m p l e , to t h i s piece of
property) arise a n d l a p s e . All r i g h t s are o n a p a r . For e a c h right o r liberty
t h e r e is a d e e p e r right or liberty t o c h a n g e its o w n e r s h i p , a n d s o on, ad
infinitum.
Insofar as t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of l e g i t i m a t e o p t i o n s is t h e r e s u l t of the
exercise of h i g h e r - o r d e r o p t i o n s , it is e n g e n d e r e d a n d h e n c e of little
m o r a l significance, if a n y . T h e u n i v e r s a l alienability of r i g h t s a n d liber­
ties, as r e q u i r e d b y t h e e x h a u s t i v e n e s s c o n s t r a i n t , t h e r e f o r e r e d u c e s
t h e m o r a l l y i m p o r t a n t p a r t of Nozick's view to t h e key q u e s t i o n of the
initial d i s t r i b u t i o n of o p t i o n s a n d r e s t r i c t i o n s (on all levels). T h i s q u e s ­
tion c a n b e f o r m u l a t e d from t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of e i t h e r t h e s u b j e c t s or
t h e objects of rights. W h a t are t h e initial rights a n d liberties of t h e
various p e r s o n s , w h i c h s p r i n g i n t o e x i s t e n c e at t h e m o m e n t of social
b i r t h (but are t h e n i m m e d i a t e l y salable a n d t h u s i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y o n a
p a r w i t h t h e n e w p e r s o n ' s infinitely m a l l e a b l e holdings) or w h a t are t h e
initial rights a n d liberties relating t o e a c h p i e c e of t h e u n i v e r s e ( c h u n k
of s p a c e - t i m e , p h y s i c a l object, o r p e r s o n ) ?
Second, t h e r e m u s t b e n o i n e q u a l i t i e s in e s t a b l i s h e d f r e e d o m . While
p e r s o n s ' liberties m a y have t h e s a m e object (all c a n b e at liberty to
a p p r o p r i a t e this thing, for example), t h i s is n o t p o s s i b l e for r i g h t s s u c h
a s p r o p e r t y rights. But p e r s o n s c a n a n d s h o u l d h a v e s y m m e t r i c a l
rights, as w h e n e a c h h a s certain rights w i t h r e g a r d to his own b o d y . We
m a y call this t h e equality or t h e majcimin c o n s t r a i n t . Given t h e c o n ­
s t a n t - s u m n a t u r e of Nozick's good, t h e s e t w o f o r m u l a t i o n s d o n ' t differ
i n r e s p e c t t o t h e d e s i g n of ideal g r o u n d r u l e s . T h e y d o differ in h o w
t h e y r a n k l e s s - t h a n - i d e a l g r o u n d rules, b u t w e d o not h a v e Nozick's
views o n this t o p i c . Let m e n o t e t h a t Nozick offers n o c o m m e n t o n , or
rationale for, h i s egalitarian c o m m i t m e n t — a s o m e w h a t a m u s i n g lack,
given his c o m p l a i n t s a b o u t a d e a r t h of valid a r g u m e n t s for e q u a l i t y
(ASU 223, 233). W h y s h o u l d n ' t s o m e p e o p l e start out a s slaves; w h y
s h o u l d n ' t s o m e b e able to a c q u i r e m o r e p r o p e r t y t h a n o t h e r s t h r o u g h
t h e s a m e acts; a n d w h y s h o u l d n ' t m e n n e e d t h e c o n s e n t of a female
relative to transfer p r o p e r t y ? P r o p o n e n t s of s u c h inequalities c o u l d tell
Nozick (in analogy to w h a t h e tells u s at ASU 239-41) t h a t h i s h a n g - u p
w i t h certain equal rights is t h e historical p r o d u c t of envy, w h i c h h a s
rankled away for g e n e r a t i o n s in t h o s e b o r n less excellent
T h i r d as far as o p t i o n s (on all levels) w i t h r e s p e c t t o p e r s o n s a n d
t h e i r a c u o n s are c o n c e r n e d , p e r s o n s s h o u l d h a v e initial rights t o t h e
6 8 l n P r e f e r e n c e t o g
nfS to *\ sy™ietric al options
relating to others. L e t s call this t h e relatedness constraint
 Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.3 53

4 . 3 . My q u i c k s k e t c h of a justificatory b a c k g r o u n d for Nozick's views

w a s m e a n t to b r i n g o u t t h e a b s e n c e of d r a m a t i c s t r u c t u r a l d i s p a r i t y in
h o w h e a n d Rawls a p p r o a c h political p h i l o s o p h y . T h e d i s a g r e e m e n t is
o n e in s u b s t a n c e . Yet it m a y look s t r u c t u r a l (ASU 2031 b e c a u s e Rawls
a n d Nozick h a v e w o r k e d o u t different halves of t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n s .
Rawls h a s c o n c e n t r a t e d o n t h e h i g h e r level of a b s t r a c t i o n , o n s u p p o r t ­
ing a c r i t e r i o n for a s s e s s i n g alternative sets of g r o u n d rules. T h i s crite­
rion h a s t h e form of a p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e . Basic s t r u c t u r e s are to b e
r a n k e d b y t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of social p r i m a r y g o o d s e a c h t e n d s to p r o ­
d u c e . Nozick, by c o n t r a s t , h a s d e v e l o p e d a set of g r o u n d rules, s h o w i n g
t h e i r i n n e r c o h e r e n c e a n d t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s for t h e social s y s t e m a s a
w h o l e . T h e s e g r o u n d r u l e s a r e p u r e l y p r o c e d u r a l , t h a t is, d o not re­
quire the participants to orient their c o n d u c t toward any particular
p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e . It is clear t h a t Rawls, d e s p i t e h i s p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e
on t h e h i g h e r level, c a n a n d d o e s favor p r o c e d u r a l g r o u n d r u l e s . And it
is clear t h a t a r g u m e n t s N o z i c k might give for h i s c h o i c e of g r o u n d rules
c o u l d b e c o n s t r u e d as a p a t t e r n preference, t h o u g h Nozick m a y n o t
w i s h t o r e s t a t e t h e m in t h i s w a y .
To b r i n g o u t t h i s last p o i n t s o m e w h a t dramatically, let u s imagine, as
a vivid i m a g e e q u i v a l e n t to m y c o n j e c t u r e d justificatory b a c k g r o u n d for
55
Nozick's views, a Nozickian a n a l o g u e to t h e original p o s i t i o n . As in
Rawls's o w n c o n s t r u c t i o n , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of p e r s o n s w o u l d b e asked
to c h o o s e a c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e for t h e d e s i g n a n d a s s e s s m e n t of basic
social i n s t i t u t i o n s . T h e y w o u l d m e e t b e h i n d s o m e veil of i g n o r a n c e so
that t h e y k n o w n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e i r "clients'" p a r t i c u l a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .
In r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e i r c l i e n t s ' interests, s u c h parties w o u l d again be
e x t r e m e l y risk-averse. But, in c o n t r a s t to Rawls's c o n s t r u c t i o n , t h e s e
parties w o u l d b e given to k n o w that t h e i r clients c a r e (almost) exclu­
sively a b o u t t h e i r p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m insofar as it is directly called for by
an i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e a n d c a r e m u c h less, if at all, a b o u t f u r t h e r w a y s
in w h i c h (the c h o i c e of) a n institutional s c h e m e might p r e d i c t a b l y
affect t h e i r i n s t i t i t u t i o n a l f r e e d o m . E a c h d e l i b e r a t o r w o u l d a s s u m e t h a t
h e r client w a n t s as large as possible a s h a r e of e s t a b l i s h e d f r e e d o m so
conceived. ( B e c a u s e of t h e c o n s t a n t - s u m c h a r a c t e r of t h e relevant
good, w e n e e d n o t w o r r y w h e t h e r s h a r e s w o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d in
relative o r a b s o l u t e terms.) In a n initial s i t u a t i o n s o d e s c r i b e d , t h e
p a r t i e s w o u l d t h e n c h o o s e a criterion t h a t r a n k s e a c h b a s i c s t r u c t u r e
56
by t h e w o r s t s h a r e of e s t a b l i s h e d f r e e d o m .

" A s Rawls says, "The contractarian m e t h o d is a useful way of studying ethical theories
and of setting forth their u n d e r l y i n g a s s u m p t i o n s " (TJ 16). "We m a y conjecture that for
each traditional c o n c e p t i o n of justice there exists an interpretation of the initial situation
in w h i c h its p r i n c i p l e s are the preferred solution" (TJ 121).
S6
R a w I s h a s n o w s e t t l e d o n v i e w i n g the parties a n d the citizens they represent as
distinct (SUPG 165, BLP 1 9 - 2 1 ) , w h e r e a s in TJ the prospective participants t h e m s e l v e s
were generally p i c t u r e d as e n t e r i n g the original position. In a sense, "it makes n o
difference either w a y " (KCMT 525), but I follow Rawls's later style by distinguishing
b e t w e e n the parties a n d their c l i e n t s (my term) b e c a u s e d o i n g s o makes it easier to k e e p
separate t w o s e t s of "psychological" a s s u m p t i o n s . As w e will see, Rawls's picture of t h e
54 Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.4.1

4.4. T h e rationale I have s k e t c h e d for Nozick's views d o e s not solve

his p r o b l e m s , of c o u r s e , b u t it h i g h l i g h t s t h e m . T h e s e p r o b l e m s are of
t h r e e m a i n k i n d s : h o w p l a u s i b l e are t h e key v a l u e s u n d e r l y i n g Nozick s
g r o u n d rules w h i c h c a n b e identified b y a n a l y z i n g t h e i r p o t e n t i a l ra­
tionale, h o w clear are t h e s e b a c k g r o u n d values, a n d are t h e y sufficient
to derive t h e views Nozick h a s p u t forth? T h o u g h I c a n n o t d i s c u s s these
q u e s t i o n s in detail, let m e offer a few c o m m e n t s o n e a c h .
4 . 4 . 1 . U n d e r t h e first h e a d i n g , let m e briefly s u g g e s t t w o internal
r e a s o n s for d e p a r t i n g from Nozick's d e o n t o l o g i c a l c o m m i t m e n t in the
direction of a b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t alternative (cf. §10.4.1). T h e first
r e a s o n arises from Nozick's a d v e r t i s e m e n t (in ASU pt. 3) of h i s p r o p o s e d
social system as a "framework for Utopia," f e a t u r i n g "a w i d e a n d diverse
r a n g e of c o m m u n i t i e s w h i c h p e o p l e c a n e n t e r if t h e y are a d m i t t e d ,
leave if t h e y w i s h to, s h a p e a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r w i s h e s ; a s o c i e t y i n w h i c h
Utopian e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n c a n b e tried, different styles of life c a n be
lived, a n d alternative visions of t h e g o o d c a n b e individually o r jointly
p u r s u e d " (ASU 307). T h e m e r i t s of s u c h a free f r a m e w o r k a r e t o b e an
i n d e p e n d e n t s o u r c e of s u p p o r t for t h e m i n i m a l s t a t e w i t h its p a r t i c u l a r
e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s (ASU 333). T h e y c a n l e n d s u c h s u p p o r t , however,
only if it is empirically t r u e t h a t Nozick's g r o u n d r u l e s w o u l d i n d e e d
e n g e n d e r s u c h a framework. I h a v e a l r e a d y s u g g e s t e d r e a s o n s for be­
lieving t h a t Nozick's rights w o u l d l e a d i n s t e a d to a feudal s y s t e m (with
slavery) offering a very n a r r o w r a n g e of diverse c o m m u n i t i e s a n d o p ­
p o r t u n i t i e s for e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n . S h o u l d this b e so, t h e n t h e m e r i t s of
Nozick's f r a m e w o r k for Utopia w o u l d f u r n i s h i n d e p e n d e n t r e a s o n s
against h i s libertarian i n s t i t u t i o n s . Nozick r u s h e s to assert t h a t h i s are
" t h e precisely c o r r e c t p r i n c i p l e s " (ASU 202) w i t h o u t e x a m i n i n g this
possibility, a n d h e c a n d o so by heavily d i s c o u n t i n g t h e e n g e n d e r e d
effects of h i s s c h e m e . But t h i s defense h a s t w o d r a w b a c k s . If b a d d a t a
d o n ' t c o u n t for m u c h , g o o d d a t a c a n ' t c o u n t for m u c h either. T h u s ,
e v e n if h i s libertarian i n s t i t u t i o n s d i d t e n d t o e n g e n d e r his f r a m e w o r k
for Utopia, t h a t t h e y d i d so c o u l d n o t b e m u c h of a r e a s o n in t h e i r favor.
Moreover, it a p p e a r s from Nozick's lyrical celebration of t h e frame-
work-for-utopia idea, t h a t h e himself m i g h t b e quite u n c o m f o r t a b l e
w i t h a b a n d o n i n g t h i s ideal so easily for d r a b feudalism, if t h a t is w h a t
h i s favorite g r o u n d r u l e s w o u l d likely p r o d u c e . After all, it is p o s s i b l e
that a modified s c h e m e of i n s t i t u t i o n s w o u l d i n fact t e n d to e n g e n d e r
a n d s u s t a i n s o m e t h i n g like t h e social ideal h e envisions.
J u s t as Nozick is n o t sensitive to w h a t sort of social w o r l d h i s g r o u n d
rules w o u l d t e n d t o e n g e n d e r given full c o m p l i a n c e , h e a l s o p a y s n o
a t t e n t i o n to w h e t h e r t h e r e w o u l d be c o m p l i a n c e . A s e c o n d r e a s o n for
moving in a b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t direction is t h e n t h a t Nozick's
disregard for e n g e n d e rther e d p h e n o m e n a l e a d s h i m to ignore t h e e m p i r i -
hlSt T^ W S l i b e r t a r i a n
g ™ n d r u l e s w o u l d w o r k as
i n t e n d e d or c o u l d even s u s t a i n themselves. T h e y m i g h t t e n d to en-
economics) is quite
^^^SiSI^^^'Sg^
prospective participants whom the parties represent.
 Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.4.1 55

g e n d e r a g o o d d e a l of n o n c o m p l i a n c e , as c o m p a r e d to m a n y differently
o r g a n i z e d social s y s t e m s — r a m p a n t c o r r u p t i o n a m o n g minimal-gov­
e r n m e n t officials, f r e q u e n t private f e u d s a n d civil w a r s , a n d a high
c r i m e r a t e ( b o m , p e r h a p s , of t h e d e s p e r a t i o n of large n u m b e r s of
people). It is p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of t h e m i n i m a l s t a t e c o n ­
stitute o n l y a m i n i m a l i m p r o v e m e n t over t h e Lockean state of n a t u r e .
Nozick i g n o r e s s u c h possibilities; a n d , again, h e c a n d o so by heavily
d i s c o u n t i n g t h e e n g e n d e r e d effects of his s c h e m e . But h e t h e r e b y risks
e n d o r s i n g a s o c i e t y w h o s e m e m b e r s enjoy less p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m (as
Nozick h i m s e l f defines it) t h a n t h e m e m b e r s of differently o r g a n i z e d
societies t h a t h e c o n d e m n s a s u n j u s t . T h e s e d a n g e r s of ignoring h o w
t h e c h o i c e of g r o u n d r u l e s affects c o m p l i a n c e is a further r e a s o n
against d e s i g n i n g a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e by looking only at w h a t t h e
"rules of t h e g a m e " call for, r a t h e r t h a n also at h o w t h e y w o u l d actually
work in p r a c t i c e .
T h e s e t w o i n t e r n a l o b j e c t i o n s t o Nozick b r i n g o u t a n i m p o r t a n t
point. My p r o j e c t i n g a p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e a n d especially an a n a l o g u e to
the original p o s i t i o n b e h i n d Nozick's views m a y well have l o o k e d like
begging t h e q u e s t i o n in favor of b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t criteria of
justice: "Once w e look at i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s from t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of
their p r o s p e c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t s , t h e d i s c o u n t i n g of e n g e n d e r e d benefits
a n d b u r d e n s d o e s i n d e e d c o m e to look silly. F a c e d w i t h s o m e given
p r o s p e c t of b e i n g e x c l u d e d from e d u c a t i o n , o n e will, of c o u r s e , n o t c a r e
w h e t h e r t h i s is d u e to a n official p r o h i b i t i o n (based o n g e n d e r or
descent) o r a c o n d i t i o n a l effect of t h e rules (based on e n g e n d e r e d
p a r e n t a l poverty, say). But w h a t this fact s h o w s is n o t that d e o n t o l o g i ­
cal c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e a r e u n t e n a b l e b u t t h a t t h e c o n t r a c t a r i a n
p e r s p e c t i v e b e g s t h e q u e s t i o n against t h e m . " I c a n n o w r e s p o n d that
a d o p t i n g t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of p r o s p e c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t s is n o t a n arbitrary
move. Nozick h i m s e l f a p p e a l s to this p e r s p e c t i v e in p a r t 3 of Anarchy,
State, and Utopia, a n d it is u n c l e a r w h a t else o n e c a n plausibly a p p e a l
to if o n e c a r e s at all t o give a justification of the g r o u n d rules o n e favors.
C o n s i d e r h o w t h e s e c o n d d e o n t o l o g i c a l c o m m i t m e n t loses its p l a u ­
sibility o n c e it g e t s t r a n s f e r r e d from t h e d o m a i n of c o n c e p t i o n s of
morality to t h a t of c o n c e p t i o n s of justice. W h e n w e are a s s e s s i n g t h e
c o n d u c t of t h o s e w h o s h a p e d t h e e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m in q u e s t i o n , it m a y
well m a t t e r t o u s w h e t h e r t h e y i n t e n d e d that t h e s c h e m e s h o u l d
effectively e x c l u d e s o m e p r o p o r t i o n of all c h i l d r e n (as they m u s t have if
t h e e x c l u s i o n is g e n d e r - b a s e d ) . It is p l a u s i b l e to a s s e s s their c o n d u c t b y
m o r e t h a n its c o n s e q u e n c e s . But it is n o t plausible, I suggest, to a s s e s s
the relevant e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m itself b y m o r e t h a n its c o n s e q u e n c e s .
O n c e it is k n o w n effectively t o e x c l u d e s o m e given p r o p o r t i o n of all
children, t h e n t h e d e s i r e t o h a v e a c c e s s to a n e d u c a t i o n , w h i c h p o t e n ­
tial p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e p r e s u m e d t o have, c o u n t s equally against b o t h
5 7
schemes.
S7
T h i s is not t o d e n y that there m a v be other reasons for preferring o n e of the two
s c h e m e s . In o n e of the t w o c a s e s , the e x c l u s i o n m a y c o m e o n top of m a n y o t h e r
56 Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.4.1

T h i s line of t h o u g h t e x p o s e s Rawls's s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m to an
attack from t h e o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n . If p r o s p e c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t s d o not
c a r e w h e t h e r given benefits a n d b u r d e n s a r e e s t a b l i s h e d or engen­
d e r e d , w h y s h o u l d t h e y c a r e w h e t h e r given differences i n welfare are
d u e t o n a t u r a l o r i n s t i t u t i o n a l factors? F a c e d w i t h s o m e given prospect
of b e i n g less well e d u c a t e d t h a n o t h e r s , w h y s h o u l d o n e c a r e w h e t h e r i t
is b e c a u s e of social factors (official p r o h i b i t i o n s o r h i g h t u i t i o n fees) o r a
n a t u r a l h a n d i c a p (blindness, say) t h a t is n o t e v e n e d o u t t h r o u g h social
i n s t i t u t i o n s ? Rawls m a k e s w h a t a p p e a r s to b e a n a r b i t r a r y stipulation
b y giving h i s p a r t i e s to k n o w t h a t t h e i r c l i e n t s c a r e exclusively about
t h e i r s h a r e of social p r i m a r y g o o d s . So h o w c a n I p r o t e s t if Nozick were
t o m a k e a n equally arbitrary s t i p u l a t i o n , n a m e l y , t h a t h i s p a r t i e s are
given t o k n o w t h a t t h e i r c l i e n t s c a r e exclusively a b o u t t h e i r established
s h a r e of p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m ?
My a n s w e r h a s t w o p a r t s , w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d t o t w o w a y s i n w h i c h it
m a y b e i m p l a u s i b l e t o t r u n c a t e t h e a c c o u n t of t h e i n d i v i d u a l g o o d —
from a fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t (goods a n d ills, or welfare) t o a s e m i c o n s e ­
quentialist (benefits a n d b u r d e n s ) t o a d e o n t o l o g i c a l o n e (established
benefits a n d b u r d e n s ) . S u c h t r u n c a t i o n s m a y b e s e e n a s irrational
b e c a u s e all m a y e n d u p intuitively w o r s e off if c e r t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n is
d i s r e g a r d e d , o r t h e y m a y b e s e e n a s unfair b e c a u s e of t h e i r distribu­
tional i m p l i c a t i o n s . I will d i s c u s s b o t h o b j e c t i o n s a s t h e y a p p l y t o the
two truncations.
Rawls's d i s r e g a r d of n a t u r a l i n e q u a l i t i e s d o e s n o t e x p o s e h i m t o the
c h a r g e of irrationality, b e c a u s e , t h o u g h h e i g n o r e s i n t e r p e r s o n a l dif­
ferentials i n n e e d s , h e d o e s n o t i g n o r e h u m a n n e e d s as s u c h . O n t h e
contrary, h i s a c c o u n t of social p r i m a r y g o o d s is specifically d e s i g n e d to
reflect o p t i m a l l y t h e m o r e vital standard n e e d s of h u m a n b e i n g s , o r so,
58
at least, h e c l a i m s . Nozick's d i s r e g a r d of e n g e n d e r e d p a t t e r n features
d o e s e x p o s e h i m t o t h e c h a r g e of irrationality, b e c a u s e everyone's
d e s i r e t o enjoy a f r a m e w o r k for Utopia a n d a h i g h level of c o m p l i a n c e
m a y b e b e t t e r fulfilled u n d e r c o m p e t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s .
It c o u l d b e s a i d t h a t Rawls's a t t e m p t t o s e c u r e a n a c c e p t a b l e s h a r e of
social p r i m a r y g o o d s for every p a r t i c i p a n t t r e a t s s o m e p a r t i c i p a n t s ,
namely, t h o s e w h o suffer s p e c i a l n a t u r a l h a n d i c a p s , unfairly. Rawls c a n
r e p l y (with Nozick's approval) t h a t it is n o t t h e role of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l
s c h e m e to e v e n t h i n g s o u t in t h e interest of t h e overall justice of t h e
h u m a n u n i v e r s e (the institutional s c h e m e i n c l u d e d ) . W h a t p e r s o n s
m a y r e a s o n a b l y d e m a n d of a n institutional s c h e m e is o n l y t h a t it
s h o u l d situate t h e m fairly as participants vis-a-vis t h e o t h e r s Society's
r e s p o n s e to t h e b l i n d objector w o u l d t h e n b e that, by h y p o t h e s i s , t h e
a m o u n t of r e s o u r c e s d e v o t e d to h i s e d u c a t i o n r e p r e s e n t s a s h a r e t h a t

disadvantages a n d therefore b e less tolerable, o r the financially b a s e d e x c l u s i o n m a y

prov.de valuable m c e n t i v e s to parents to work harder. A l S S 2 S t 7

"1 wilt examine this claim critically in Chapters 3 a n d 4.

 Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.4.2 57

w o u l d b e fair for a n o r m a l , s i g h t e d p a r t i c i p a n t . His n a t u r a l h a n d i c a p ,

t h o u g h n o fault of h i s o w n , is in n o w a y a c o n s e q u e n c e of social
i n s t i t u t i o n s (or a n y o t h e r social factors, for t h a t m a t t e r ) . Therefore t h e
claim for a d d i t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s h e a d d r e s s e s to h i s fellow p a r t i c i p a n t s
can a p p e a l o n l y t o morality, n o t to j u s t i c e . T h e Rawlsian p a r t i e s ' selec­
tive c o n c e r n w i t h s h a r e s of benefits a n d b u r d e n s , h o w e v e r unintuitive
59
psychologically, at least h a s a philosophical rationale.
But t h e s a m e is n o t t r u e of Nozick's further t r u n c a t i o n of t h e g o o d to
s h a r e s of e s t a b l i s h e d benefits a n d b u r d e n s . T h e p e r s o n e x c l u d e d from
e d u c a t i o n b e c a u s e of p a r e n t a l poverty is n o t h a n d i c a p p e d b u t d i s a d ­
v a n t a g e d . In h e r c a s e t h e i n e q u a l i t y is a c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e (choice of)
institutional s c h e m e . S h e is t r e a t e d w o r s e t h a n o t h e r s by the scheme.
She c a n t h e n d e m a n d t h a t t h e inequality b e justified to h e r — p e r h a p s
t h r o u g h s o m e b a l a n c i n g of v a l u e s m o d e l e d in a c o n t r a c t a r i a n situation.
Her claim m a y b e o u t w e i g h e d , b u t it c a n n o t be d i s c o u n t e d .
4.4J2. U n d e r t h e h e a d i n g of clarity, a pervasive p r o b l e m for any
a t t e m p t to give a p r e c i s e justificatory b a c k g r o u n d suitable for liber­
tarian views d e r i v e s from t h e fact t h a t t h e objects of rights a n d liberties
can b e d e s c r i b e d in m a n y different w a y s . To illustrate, let u s ask h o w
abstract t h e f o r m u l a t i o n of rights m a y b e for p u r p o s e s of t h e equality
c o n s t r a i n t . T a k e t h e s i m p l e s t c a s e of t w o subjects a n d o n e thing. T h e
e x h a u s t i v e n e s s c o n s t r a i n t entails t h a t t h e t h i n g m u s t be u s a b l e a n d
o w n a b l e . T h e e q u a l i t y c o n s t r a i n t entails t h a t initially n e i t h e r subject
o w n s a n d b o t h m a y u s e t h e t h i n g . H o w t h e n c a n it c o m e to be o w n e d ?
The s t a n d a r d s o l u t i o n is, of c o u r s e , t h a t b o t h subjects have a s e c o n d -
o r d e r liberty t o h e l p t h e m s e l v e s , t h r o u g h "first a p p r o p r i a t i o n , ' ' to a n
e x c l u s i o n a r y p r o p e r t y right i n t h e t h i n g (which e x t i n g u i s h e s t h e o t h e r ' s
liberty t o u s e it). H o w c a n t h i s s i m p l e s y m m e t r i c a l s o l u t i o n c o p e w i t h
the r e a l - w o r l d fact t h a t s u b j e c t s c o m e into being at different times? In
a p p r o p r i a t i n g s o m e t h i n g , d o e s Senior d o so p u r s u a n t to a liberty to
a p p r o p r i a t e t h i s t h i n g o r p u r s u a n t to a b r o a d e r liberty to a p p r o p r i a t e
u n o w n e d t h i n g s i n g e n e r a l ? If t h e former, t h e equality c o n s t r a i n t w o u l d
require t h a t t h e arrival of a n e w subject e x t i n g u i s h all p r o p e r t y rights,
so t h a t for every t h i n g , t h e n e w p e r s o n h a s a n equal initial liberty to u s e
a n d a p p r o p r i a t e it. If t h e latter, t h e equality c o n s t r a i n t is satisfied even
if t h e r e is n o t h i n g left u n o w n e d u p o n w h i c h J u n i o r c o u l d exercise
liberties t o u s e a n d a p p r o p r i a t e .
Both t h e s e f o r m u l a t i o n s a r e i m p l a u s i b l e e x t r e m e s of c o n c i s e n e s s
a n d a b s t r a c t i o n , a n d t h i s implausibility motivates t h e s e a r c h for a n
i n t e r m e d i a t e s o l u t i o n . F o r e x a m p l e , J u n i o r m u s t h a v e a n initial liberty
to a p p r o p r i a t e stuff t h a t is equivalent to t h e stuff Senior h a d t h e initial
liberty t o a p p r o p r i a t e ; S e n i o r m u s t leave " e n o u g h , a n d as g o o d " for
J u n i o r (Locke, STG §33, cf. §27). But libertarians typically w a n t to justify
/ • W h e t h e r this rationale c a n u n d e r m i n e the idea that e a c h feasible basic structure
s h o u l d b e a s s e s s e d via the worst quality of life that w o u l d exist u n d e r it is another matter,
^ e r , I d e v e l o p R a w l s i a n r e s p o n s e s t o this a n d o t h e r fully consequential.s views m
various c o n t e x t s , i n c l u d i n g t h e e s p e c i a l l y t r o u b l e s o m e c a s e of m e d i c a l n e e d s l§10.4 . w ,
§§14-16).
S8 Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.4.3

a w o r l d in w h i c h everything is o w n e d a n d in w h i c h n e w s u b j e c t s (some
of t h e m o w n i n g n o t h i n g ) will find n o u s e for t h e i r initial liberty to
a p p r o p r i a t e . So t h e y favor a n o t h e r i n t e r m e d i a t e f o r m u l a t i o n of the
equality c o n s t r a i n t . J u n i o r m u s t have initial e s t a b l i s h e d r i g h t s and
liberties t h a t a r e at least equivalent t o t h e initial e s t a b l i s h e d r i g h t s a n d
liberties of Senior.
But o p t i n g for o n e of t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e s o l u t i o n s d o e s n o t r e m o v e the
unclarity, given t h e v a g u e n e s s of t h e n o t i o n of e q u i v a l e n c e . A relaxed
n o t i o n of e q u i v a l e n c e c a n m a k e t h e e q u a l i t y c o n s t r a i n t very weak
i n d e e d , as w h e n t h e liberty to seek e m p l o y m e n t in a c a p i t a l i s t e c o n o m y
is offered as a s u b s t i t u t e for earlier p e r s o n s ' liberties to a p p r o p r i a t e
large t r a c t s of l a n d (Locke, STG §37; Nozick ASU 175-82). A d e m a n d i n g
n o t i o n of e q u i v a l e n c e c a n yield q u i t e r a d i c a l c o n c l u s i o n s , a s in t h e case
of Bruce A c k e r m a n ' s t h e o r y of justice (SJLS), w h i c h also differs from
Nozick's in its a c k n o w l e d g m e n t of g o o d s o t h e r t h a n f r e e d o m .
4 . 4 . 3 . Besides clarification, t h e p r o p o s e d justificatory b a c k g r o u n d
n e e d s c o n s i d e r a b l e specification before it c a n single o u t a n y p a r t i c u l a r
g r o u n d rules ( s u c h as t h e o n e s Nozick p r o p o s e s ) . Very different
s c h e m e s satisfy all t h e c o n s t r a i n t s s o far i m p o s e d u p o n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n
of e s t a b l i s h e d freedom. A s c h e m e m i g h t , for e x a m p l e , define a m o r e
l i m i t e d s e c o n d - o r d e r liberty of a p p r o p r i a t i o n . T h e a p p r o p r i a t i o n of a
p i e c e of l a n d w o u l d leave intact c e r t a i n liberties of t r e s p a s s , a n d (some
of) t h e rights it confers w o u l d b e l i m i t e d t o t h e a p p r o p r i a t o r (that is,
w o u l d b e n o n t r a n s f e r a b l e by him, as u n d e r t h e Rawlsian's change-of-
l a n d o w n e r s h i p rules). Alternatively, p e r s o n s m i g h t h a v e a n initial lib­
erty to gain o w n e r s h i p of a plot of l a n d for t h e next p l a n t i n g s e a s o n by
organizing s o m e o p e n a n d fair b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e d u r e t h r o u g h w h i c h
s u c h p l o t s are d i s t r i b u t e d . M o r e radical still, p e r s o n s m i g h t h a v e a n
initial liberty t o u s e a n d c o n s u m e everything, t o g e t h e r w i t h a s e c o n d -
o r d e r right n o t to b e d e p r i v e d of this liberty w i t h o u t t h e i r c o n s e n t . In
this a n a r c h i s t w o r l d , p e o p l e w o u l d "own" w h a t t h e y s w a l l o w a n d
m a y b e w h a t they w e a r b u t w o u l d s h a r e everything else w h e n a s k e d to.
Private p r o p e r t y , in p l o t s of l a n d for e x a m p l e , w o u l d b e p o s s i b l e in
p r i n c i p l e (as m a n d a t e d b y t h e exhaustiveness constraint) t h r o u g h
u n a n i m o u s c o n s e n t , b u t it w o u l d be extremely unlikely a n d a l s o h i g h l y
60
u n s t a b l e b e c a u s e of t h e a p p e a r a n c e of n e w p e r s o n s .
U n d e r all t h r e e p r o p o s a l s t h e liberty of u n i l a t e r a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n is
defined as m o r e limited, s o t h a t it w o u l d give rise t o l e s s extensive, less

^ h i s instability raises the cute question whether the exhaustiveness constraint re-
qunjs that plot fu ures be ownable today (in which case the instability would not exist as
alleged). In Noz.ck s scheme plot futures are ownable today. A property owner by first
appropnanon owns all future stages of the object as well. But' is it reasonable to make this
t w T Z " °NH ^ °fg T U n d m l 6 S ? T o d o s o w o u l d b e » the case of the
scheme d.scussed m the text because those in the present generation, by giving up
hbert.es meanmgless to them, could constrain the liberties of future generations. If
ZT£ "HT C 0 1 N S E N T S 1 I N A « < * should now own Manhattan-in W ^
N o z i

great-granddaughter will, m , have the right to exclude everyone elsefrommeLand.

2 0 8 0
 Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.5 59

exclusionary, o r less e n d u r i n g p r o p e r t y rights. S u c h a modification

s e e m s attractive if t h e r e is r e a s o n to prefer a m o r e egalitarian distribu­
tion of e n g e n d e r e d f r e e d o m . Given Nozick's e n d o r s e m e n t of equality in
the d i s t r i b u t i o n of e s t a b l i s h e d freedom, it s e e m s t h a t this p r e f e r e n c e
s h o u l d exist at l e a s t as a s e c o n d a r y p r i n c i p l e (tie breaker). But t h e m a i n
point of s k e t c h i n g t h e s e alternative possibilities w a s to s h o w t h a t —
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h m y c o n j e c t u r e d c o n s t r a i n t s , h o w e v e r clarified—there
are indefinitely m a n y a n d very different w a y s of specifying t h e initial
package of rights a n d liberties to b e a s s i g n e d to t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s in
61
libertarian i n s t i t u t i o n s .
4.5. Before c o n c l u d i n g t h i s section, I m u s t briefly a d d r e s s a n objec­
tion. It m a y b e s a i d t h a t Nozick, i n s t e a d of a c c e p t i n g a justificatory
b a c k g r o u n d involving a p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e , c a n b r i n g in a structurally
different justificatory b a c k g r o u n d t h a t a p p e a l s to historical facts.
W h e r e a s for Rawls t h e j u s t i c e of a basic s t r u c t u r e h i n g e s o n a forward-
looking (broadly c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t ) a s s e s s m e n t of it a n d its feasible
alternatives, Nozick a s s e r t s t h a t its justice c a n n o t b e a s s e s s e d apart
from i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t h o w t h i s s c h e m e c a m e a b o u t . F o r h i m , t h e
justification of p a r t i c u l a r social i n s t i t u t i o n s is historically recursive just
like t h e justification of a p a r t i c u l a r d i s t r i b u t i o n of h o l d i n g s . T h u s ,
institutional c h a n g e s (for e x a m p l e , from a b a r t e r to a m o n e y e c o n o m y
or from p r o t e c t i v e a g e n c i e s t o t h e m i n i m a l g o v e r n m e n t ) are legitimate
only if t h e y a c t u a l l y c a m e a b o u t t h r o u g h legitimate p r o c e s s e s (for
e x a m p l e , t h r o u g h a n i n v i s i b l e - h a n d p r o c e s s or t h r o u g h a m a n d a t o r y
a t t e m p t t o s a f e g u a r d m o r a l rights t h a t w o u l d o t h e r w i s e have b e e n
violated). He m i g h t t h e n reject c o m p e t i n g g r o u n d r u l e s m o r e Rawlsian
in spirit b e c a u s e t h e y c o u l d n o t (or n o t plausibly) have c o m e a b o u t
t h r o u g h a s e q u e n c e of legitimate t r a n s i t i o n s from a n original state of
n a t u r e c o n s t r a i n e d o n l y b y Nozickian rights (cf. ASU 280-90).
T h i s a p p e a l t o h i s t o r y c a n m o v e b u t it c a n n o t fill t h e g a p in Nozick's
a c c o u n t . His favorite i n s t i t u t i o n s , even w i t h t h e i r historically recursive
justification, still h a n g in m i d a i r so l o n g as it h a s n o t b e e n s h o w n w h i c h
62
g r o u n d r u l e s w e r e valid at t h e very b e g i n n i n g . I n s t e a d of challenging
" N o z i c k o n c e e n t e r t a i n s s h a p i n g "the p r e c i s e c o n t o u r of the b u n d l e of property
rights'— a s p e c i a l c a s e — w i t h a n e y e to the m o s t efficient internalization of externalities
'ASU 280). We s h o u l d c h o o s e property rights s o that productive e x c h a n g e s are e n c o u r ­
aged at l o w t r a n s a c t i o n c o s t s . I n a s m u c h as productive e x c h a n g e s are o n e s that make
both s i d e s subjectively better off, this proposal c o m e s perilously c l o s e to a utilitanan
criterion for assessing' institutions. Moreover, it w o u l d s e e m to favor a specification of
property rights that t e n d s to e n g e n d e r m o r e egalitarian patterns of holdings. For p r o d u c ­
tive e x c h a n g e s of t h e relevant kind actually to occur, t h e parties w i t h o u t right must have
the f u n d s t o b u y off (part of) t h e rights of the o p p o s i t e party, a n d this consideration
supports a s s i g n i n g t h e right to t h e generally p o o r e r party. (Consider the c h o i c e b e t w e e n
a purported right to p o l l u t e and a p u r p o r t e d right to veto pollution in o n e s area. The
latter o p t i o n is s u p e r i o r for p u r p o s e s of internalizing externalities if it is m o r e likely that
industrialists h a v e t h e f u n d s to b u y p o l l u t i o n e n t i t l e m e n t s from their neighbors t h a n that
residents have t h e f u n d s to b u y p o l l u t i o n limitations from industnalists.)
" T h e r e is c o n s i d e r a b l e unclariry e v e n about w h a t h e takes t h e s e original g r o u n d rules
to b e in t h e e c o n o m i c s p h e r e . M o s t often it s e e m s that t h e s e are his p n n c i p l e s ot
60 Nozick's D e o n t o l o g i c a l Alternative, 4.5

his p r o p o s e d g r o u n d rules, o n e w o u l d n o w challenge h i s p r o p o s e d

original g r o u n d r u l e s , i n c l u d i n g r u l e s for t h e i r valid revision. T h e core
idea of s u c h a negative strategy is c l e a r e n o u g h , a n d I will confine
myself t o a few brief i l l u s t r a t i o n s . C o n c e r n i n g t h e original g r o u n d rules,
h o w c a n w e settle, for e x a m p l e , w h e t h e r t h e w o r l d w a s originally
u n o w n e d o r o w n e d collectively? C a n w e d e c i d e o n p h i l o s o p h i c a l
g r o u n d s a n d , if so, w h i c h ? O r c a n w e d e c i d e b y a p p e a l t o h i s t o r y a n d , if
so, h o w ? C o n c e r n i n g r u l e s for t h e valid revision of t h e original g r o u n d
rules, b o t h Nozick a n d Locke s u g g e s t t h a t s u c h r e v i s i o n s m u s t be
m u t u a l l y beneficial. (Must e v e r y o n e u n d e r t h e n e w s c h e m e b e b e t t e r off
t h a n anyone w a s u n d e r t h e o l d o n e ? H o w c o u l d it b e s h o w n t h a t they
w e r e ? Or is s o m e w e a k e r c o n d i t i o n sufficient; a n d w h i c h m i g h t this
be?) Both e m p h a s i z e t h a t p r i v a t e a p p r o p r i a t i o n of s o m e plot of l a n d o n
t h e t e r m s they p r o p o s e will t e n d t o i m p r o v e t h e s h a r e s of all ( i n c l u d i n g
t h o s e w h o will n o t o w n l a n d ) a s a g a i n s t a s t a t e w i t h o u t p r i v a t e l a n d -
6 3
o w n e r s h i p . But t h e s a m e c o u l d b e said, w i t h g r e a t e r plausibility
p e r h a p s , a b o u t m a n y o t h e r revised s e t s of g r o u n d r u l e s t h a t w o u l d
p e r m i t less extensive, less e x c l u s i o n a r y , o r less p e r m a n e n t p r i v a t e a p ­
p r o p r i a t i o n t h a n t h e i r s d o . Again, h o w d o w e d e c i d e a m o n g v a r i o u s
s u c h revisions? O n p h i l o s o p h i c a l g r o u n d s ? O r b y a p p e a l t o h i s t o r i c a l
facts a b o u t h o w p r o p e r t y rights a n d o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n s a c t u a l l y
e m e r g e d ? A n d w h a t if t h e y e m e r g e d differently i n Egypt, G r e e c e , Rome,
etc.?
T h o s e w h o w a n t t o a s s e r t t h a t t h e r e is one o b v i o u s s e t of (original)
g r o u n d r u l e s will h a v e t o d e f e n d "obvious" a n s w e r s t o t h e s e a n d m a n y
o t h e r s u c h q u e s t i o n s . T h e Rawlsian, favoring w h a t I h a v e c a l l e d a
b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t a s s e s s m e n t of social i n s t i t u t i o n s , c a n m a i n ­
tain t h e g r o u n d o n t h e h i g h e r level b y m e r e l y b l o c k i n g s u c h a s s e r t i o n s .
P e r h a p s t h e b e s t w a y t o s u c c e e d at t h i s negative t a s k is t o confront t h e
v a r i o u s proffered d e s c r i p t i o n s of s u p p o s e d l y o b v i o u s o r n a t u r a l in­
s t i t u t i o n s w i t h o n e a n o t h e r , t o m a k e c l e a r h o w h o p e l e s s is t h e p r o j e c t
of legitimating o n e p a r t i c u l a r set of (original) g r o u n d r u l e s as m o r a l l y
fundamental. And so long as n o s u c h s c h e m e h a s been so legitimated,

acquisition, transfer, a n d rectification of h o l d i n g s . But if s o , t h e n there w o u l d b e n o

reason for Nozick to try to "rebut t h e claim t h a t . . . n o natural right t o private p r o p e r t y c a n
arise b y a Lockean p r o c e s s " IASU 1771. This right w o u l d n ' t n e e d to arise, b e c a u s e it w o u l d
exist a b initio. I don't think this p a s s a g e is just a slip o n Nozick's part. Rather, I b e l i e v e (in
elaboration o f n. 6) that Nozick takes t h e institution of private property to have arisen,
b e c a u s e h e w a n t s to reaffirm t h e Lockean proviso but c a n m a k e s e n s e of it o n l y as s o m e
kind of c o m p e n s a t i o n requirement. If property rights h a d existed at t h e very b e g i n n i n g ,
t h e n t h e Lockean proviso w o u l d s e e m to h i m t o have n o rationale. Nozick c a n s o l v e this
s u p p o s e d problem by a s s u m i n g , w i t h Locke, that t h e institution of private property
developed in a a world
aUOrthat originally b e l o n g e d t o h u m a n k i n d in c o m m o n . If so, t h e n t h e
^Z°K^ J 6
l " 6 n S U 0r eneSa st hh aa tr et h e e m e r 8 e ™ e of this institution m a k e s n o o n e
t o eveI
ZS? ^ * r ^ ' " ! >' °f (S Bd initial freedom that is n o w o r s e t h a n t h e
TM
F?WolffTa«en7nn?h T 6 1
l e
~ s s
™ d e l i n g ofd Nozick conflicts i t h B.
w91
P
' ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ "° riginally
~ °<See M S1 0 1
"
 Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.5 61

n o t h i n g h a s b e e n s h o w n t o p r e e m p t o r c o n s t r a i n Rawls's p a t t e r n pref­
e r e n c e (as a p p l i e d to t h e r a n k i n g of s u c h s c h e m e s ) .
I n d e p e n d e n t l y a n d in a d d i t i o n , t h e r e are r e a s o n s against a c c e p t i n g
t h e very i d e a t h a t t h e justification of e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d have
to fit t h e h i s t o r i c a l l y r e c u r s i v e m o l d . T h e p r o b l e m is t h a t s u c h a c o n ­
c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is h i g h l y inflexible a n d u n a d a p t a b l e t o t h e e n o r m o u s
r a n g e of social a n d e n v i r o n m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n s to w h i c h h u m a n b e i n g s
have b e e n a n d m i g h t b e — s o m e t i m e , s o m e w h e r e — e x p o s e d . Rights
that s e e m o b v i o u s w i t h i n a small-scale social s y s t e m m a y m a k e a large-
scale o n e e n t i r e l y u n m a n a g e a b l e . A specification of p r o p e r t y rights t h a t
is p l a u s i b l e for a n a g r i c u l t u r a l society may, in a h u n t i n g society, lead to
extinction from s t a r v a t i o n . Variations in technology, c u l t u r e , a n d p o p u ­
lation d e n s i t y define a n e n o r m o u s s p a c e of possibilities. Reflecting o n
this p o i n t d r a i n s a w a y y e t m o r e of w h a t e v e r plausibility Nozick's c o n ­
c e p t i o n m a y h a v e . T h e original g r o u n d r u l e s h e p r o p o s e s d o n ' t look so
b a d in t h e s t a t e of n a t u r e Locke d e s c r i b e s , in w h i c h vast t r a c t s of fertile
l a n d a r e available t o b e b r o u g h t u n d e r cultivation a n d t h e Rawlsian's
c h a n g e - o f - l a n d o w n e r s h i p r u l e s (besides b e i n g pointless) w o u l d far ex­
c e e d existing a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c a p a c i t i e s . Of c o u r s e , I c o u l d d e s c r i b e
a n o t h e r s t a t e of n a t u r e in w h i c h t h i n g s w o u l d b e o t h e r w i s e , but even
waiving this objection, w h y s h o u l d w e n o w have to justify o u r institu­
tions by r e f e r e n c e to s o m e base-line s c h e m e t h a t w o u l d h a v e b e e n
plausible at t h e b e g i n n i n g s of h u m a n history? And if w e do, w h y is
Nozick's a r g u m e n t a justification for t h e m i n i m a l state r a t h e r t h a n t h e
r e d u c t i o a d a b s u r d u m of h i s specification of original rights?
A t h e o r y e n v i s i o n i n g a historically recursive a s s e s s m e n t of institu­
tional s c h e m e s vastly o v e r b u r d e n s u s w i t h morally significant c o n s i d e r ­
a t i o n s . O n e m u s t n o t m e r e l y d e s i g n a s c h e m e suitable for a p a r t i c u l a r
social s y s t e m at a p a r t i c u l a r t i m e in history. In d e s i g n i n g s u c h a s c h e m e
o n e m u s t a l s o b e c o n c e r n e d t h a t t h i s s c h e m e c a n plausibly have c o m e
a b o u t t h r o u g h a s e q u e n c e of legitimate institutional c h a n g e s from t h e
original s c h e m e , t h a t t h e original a n d all i n t e r m e d i a t e s c h e m e s b e
suitable t o t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e social c o n d i t i o n s , t h a t all o t h e r s c h e m e s t h a t
might p l a u s i b l y h a v e legitimately e m e r g e d (or m i g h t yet so emerge)
from t h e original s c h e m e also b e suitable u n d e r all sorts of social a n d
n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n s , a n d t h a t n o alternative specification of t h e original
s c h e m e s h o u l d g e n e r a t e a t r e e of accessible s c h e m e s t h a t s e e m s m o r e
a c c e p t a b l e o n t h e w h o l e t h a n t h e tree g e n e r a t e d by Nozick's o w n
original s c h e m e . Given t h e s e fantastic complexities, o n e m a y c o m e t o
a p p r e c i a t e w h y Nozick is t e m p t e d — e v e n at t h e e x p e n s e of d e c o u p l i n g
t h e t h i r d p a r t of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, w h i c h h o l d s o u t t h e p r o m ­
ise of a " f r a m e w o r k for U t o p i a " — b y t h e q u i c k e r r o u t e of d e c l a r i n g his
specification of original rights " f u n d a m e n t a l " b y insisting t h a t his a r e
"the p r e c i s e l y c o r r e c t p r i n c i p l e s " (ASU 202). If t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s ( p e r h a p s
t h r o u g h s o m e p l a u s i b l e s e q u e n c e of legitimate i n s t i t u t i o n a l changes)
lead to m a s s i v e slavery, s e r f d o m , starvation, o r n o n c o m p l i a n c e , t h e n
62 Nozick's Deontological Alternative, 4.6

t h e r e is p e r h a p s r e a s o n t o violate s o m e rights h e r e a n d t h e r e — " t o avoid

c a t a s t r o p h i c m o r a l h o r r o r " (ASU 3 0 n ) — b u t c e r t a i n l y n o t r e a s o n to
change one's m i n d about the principles themselves.
4.6. Rawls i n A Theory of Justice also a i m s for a t h e o r y that is
applicable to social s y s t e m s u n d e r very different social a n d natural
c o n d i t i o n s . But h e w a n t s t o a s s e s s t h e justice of a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e by
h o w it w o r k s n o w , w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o its h i s t o r y . T h r o u g h h i s broadly
c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t m o d e of a s s e s s m e n t , Rawls g a i n s a g o o d d e a l of se­
curity against s h o c k i n g s u r p r i s e s , for i n s t a n c e , t h a t t h e m o s t r e p u g n a n t
s c h e m e s c a n b e just a n d t h e m o s t beneficial o n e s u n j u s t o n a c c o u n t of
their genesis. E m p l o y i n g a t h i n n o t i o n of t h e h u m a n g o o d , R a w l s m a k e s
t h e justice of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e t u r n o n h o w its least a d v a n t a g e d
fare in c o m p a r i s o n to t h e least a d v a n t a g e d u n d e r feasible alternative
basic s t r u c t u r e s .
Rawls's p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e w o u l d entail a l o w r a n k i n g for Nozick's
g r o u n d r u l e s . If Nozick p r o t e s t s t h a t h i s g r o u n d r u l e s a r e s o m e h o w
n a t u r a l or obvious, h e is unlikely to prevail. T h e r e are j u s t t o o m a n y
p r e t e n d e r s t o t h e s e a t t r i b u t e s , a n d o n l y if t h e r e w e r e s o m e conver­
g e n c e u p o n o n e set of g r o u n d r u l e s m i g h t t h e s e b e u s e d t o t e s t (and
reject) t h e Rawlsian criterion. A b s e n t s u c h c o n v e r g e n c e , it s e e m s m o r e
p r o m i s i n g for Nozick to e x t e n d h i s c o n c e p t i o n t o t h e h i g h e r level s o as
to p r e v e n t Rawls from m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t g r o u n d b y default. D o i n g so, I
have suggested, w o u l d l e a d h i m t o d e f e n d a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e t h a t
in its b a l a n c i n g of values, is s t r u c t u r a l l y similar to Rawls's o w n . T h i s
balancing, however, w o u l d n o t b e b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t , b e c a u s e
Nozick in c o n s t r u c t i n g h i s M a s t e r P a t t e r n w o u l d give m u c h less w e i g h t
to t h e benefits a n d b u r d e n s t h a t a r e t h e effects of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l
s c h e m e t h a n to equivalent benefits a n d b u r d e n s it calls for.
This c h a p t e r h a s d o n e little t o d e f e n d t h e p a r t i c u l a r criterion Rawls
p r o p o s e s for a s s e s s i n g alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s . My m a i n c o n c e r n
w a s t o m a k e p l a u s i b l e t h e very i d e a of s u c h a criterion, t h e i d e a of
t h i n k i n g a b o u t i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s in t e r m s of d i s t r i b u t i o n a l pat­
t e r n s . I h a v e also tried to gain s o m e initial credibility for t h e s e m i c o n s e ­
quentialist a p p r o a c h to t h e subject of t h e basic s t r u c t u r e . S u c h a n
a p p r o a c h is c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of benefits a n d b u r d e n s
a n institutional s c h e m e t e n d s to p r o d u c e , irrespective of t h e e x t e n t to
w h i c h it e s t a b l i s h e s o r e n g e n d e r s t h e m .
C H A P T E R 2

Sandel and the

Conception of the Person

5- N a t u r a l E n d o w m e n t s

M i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of Rawls's t r e a t m e n t of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s
have b e e n s o r o u t i n e t h a t a clear ( t h o u g h s o m e w h a t critical) defense of
it s e e m s useful for t h i s r e a s o n a l o n e . My d i s c u s s i o n of n a t u r a l e n d o w ­
m e n t s serves t w o a d d i t i o n a l p u r p o s e s as well, it allows m e to clarify a
further i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t of Rawls's focus o n t h e basic s t r u c t u r e , a n d it
c o n s t i t u t e s a s m a l l - s c a l e p r e l u d e to t h e d i s c u s s i o n of Rawls's infamous
c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n , w h i c h , s u p p o r t i n g t h e a c c o u n t of social
p r i m a r y g o o d s a n d t h e m a x i m i n idea, plays a crucial role in his c o n c e p ­
tion of social j u s t i c e .
5 . 1 . T h e severe c r i t i c i s m s of Rawls's t r e a t m e n t of n a t u r a l e n d o w ­
m e n t s c e n t e r a r o u n d t h e m i s t a k e n i d e a t h a t t h e difference principle, as
d e f e n d e d in A Theory of Justice, p e r m i t s or even r e q u i r e s t h a t p e r s o n s
b e u s e d a s m e a n s for t h e benefit of o t h e r s . This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n thrives
o n Rawls's c l a i m t h a t h i s is "a c o n c e p t i o n of justice t h a t nullifies t h e
a c c i d e n t s of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t ' ' (TJ 15). It is confirmed by his adver­
t i s e m e n t of t h e difference p r i n c i p l e as a n a g r e e m e n t to regard t h e
d i s t r i b u t i o n of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s as a " c o m m o n , " "collective," or
"social a s s e t t o b e u s e d for t h e c o m m o n a d v a n t a g e " (TJ 101,179,107).
And it finds f u r t h e r s u p p o r t w h e n Rawls a n n o u n c e s t h a t " n o o n e
deserves h i s p l a c e in t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of native e n d o w m e n t s " (TJ 104, cf
§48), t h a t s u c h e n d o w m e n t s a r e "arbitrary from a m o r a l p o i n t of view"
<TJ 312, cf. 72, 75, 102). T h e s e p h r a s e s m a y easily mislead, a n d t h e n
inspire h o r r o r in r i g h t e o u s h e a r t s . Let u s further develop Rawls's con­
c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e s o a s to p r o v i d e t h e context in w h i c h t h e s e p h r a s e s
c a n b e c o r r e c t l y u n d e r s t o o d a n d t h e i r defensibility e x a m i n e d . I begin
t h e first t a s k b y p e e l i n g a w a y t h r e e layers of p o t e n t i a l m i s u n d e r s t a n d ­
ing.
63
64 Natural E n d o w m e n t s , 5.1.1

5 . 1 . 1 . It h a s b e e n s u p p o s e d t h a t c o n t r o l over o n e ' s n a t u r a l e n d o w ­
m e n t s is itself u p for c o n s i d e r a t i o n , t h a t Rawls is e x a m i n i n g t h e n a t u r a l
d i s t r i b u t i o n of s p e c i a l gifts a n d h a n d i c a p s a g a i n s t t h e b a c k g r o u n d of
other, p e r h a p s m o r e d e s i r a b l e alternative p a t t e r n s . O n t h i s s u p p o s i ­
tion, t h e c o n s i s t e n t p r o p o s a l s for Rawls t o m a k e w o u l d involve involun­
tary o r g a n t r a n s p l a n t s (Nozick, ASU 206-7), c o o w n e r s h i p b y o t h e r s of
e x c e p t i o n a l n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s (giving t h e m a right t o d e c i d e h o w
1
t h e s e s h o u l d b e e m p l o y e d ) , o r at t h e very least a " h e a d tax" (ASU 229n)
to b e i m p o s e d u p o n t h e b e t t e r e n d o w e d . T h e s u p p o s i t i o n , h o w e v e r , is
m i s t a k e n : "Greater n a t u r a l t a l e n t s a r e n o t a collective a s s e t in t h e s e n s e
t h a t society s h o u l d c o m p e l t h o s e w h o h a v e t h e m to p u t t h e m to w o r k
for t h e less favored" (RMC 145). "We h a v e a right to o u r n a t u r a l abilities"
(BSS 65). This m u c h is e n s h r i n e d i n Rawls's first p r i n c i p l e .
W e s h o u l d recall h e r e t h a t Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice is only
s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t . Natural p r i m a r y g o o d s , s u c h a s " h e a l t h a n d
vigor, intelligence a n d i m a g i n a t i o n " (TJ 62), fall o u t s i d e t h e m a s t e r
p a t t e r n s b y w h i c h feasible alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s are a s s e s s e d .
" T h e n a t u r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n is n e i t h e r just n o r u n j u s t " (TJ 102). Rawls is
C o n c e r n e d only w i t h t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of social p r i m a r y g o o d s , w h i c h is
/ r e g u l a t e d b y t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e . All a n d only i n e q u a l i t i e s in this dis­
t r i b u t i o n r e q u i r e justification: "A h y p o t h e t i c a l initial a r r a n g e m e n t in
w h i c h all t h e social p r i m a r y g o o d s are equally d i s t r i b u t e d . . . p r o v i d e s a
b e n c h m a r k for j u d g i n g i m p r o v e m e n t s " (TJ 62). H e n c e t h e r e is n o rea­
s o n , n o t even a reason o v e r r i d d e n b y o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , w h y t h e u s e
of p e r s o n s ' e n d o w m e n t s s h o u l d b e d e c i d e d collectively, o r n a t u r a l
inequalities b e offset b y social o n e s .
T h e fact of n a t u r a l inequalities m a y p r o v i d e a n o t h e r sort of r e a s o n for
d e p a r t i n g from a n e q u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of social p r i m a r y g o o d s . P e r h a p s
all s h a r e s c o u l d b e larger if special rewards w e r e offered for t h e d e ­
v e l o p m e n t a n d exercise of special t a l e n t s . In this case, h o w e v e r , t h e
resulting social inequalities w o u l d b e justified b y r e f e r e n c e t o t h e
preferred d i s t r i b u t i o n of social p r i m a r y g o o d s t h e y m a k e p o s s i b l e ( a n d
not by reference to a preferred d i s t r i b u t i o n of welfare o r of p r i m a r y
g o o d s overall). I n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t n a t u r a l i n e q u a l i t i e s — t h o u g h it p l a y s
n o n o r m a t i v e role w i t h i n Rawls's criterion of justice, d o e s n o t figure in
t h e M a s t e r P a t t e r n — i s still n e e d e d in a n e m p i r i c a l role. It c o d e t e r -
m i n e s h o w this criterion c a n b e satisfied.
T h e r e is t h e n n o d i s a g r e e m e n t a b o u t w h e t h e r t h e b e t t e r e n d o w e d
s h o u l d have a n d c o n t r o l t h e i r s u p e r i o r n a t u r a l gifts. Rawls d o e s n o t

•Sandel has it that Rawls's text is not merely i n c o n s i s t e n t with but is s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y

arguing against the view "that I have certain privileged c l a i m s with r e s o e c t t o [my
3 b U n d l e
mem' U J ^ r f I ^> ?L ° f rights a n
y° n e e l
y have with respect to
s e m a

coToaStot?h«. h i ' ^ 2 8 9
K~ , '- °2 n t W s
«'readin Rawls
°" ° u ^ g that every
w l d e

ZEEZ^lSZZSS! ^ 3 a S y
° U d
° " ^'^howyo/en^owments
 Natural E n d o w m e n t s , 5.1.2 65

q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e y s h o u l d . T h e o n l y c o n t r o v e r s y is over w h a t advan­
tages t h e y a r e t o b e offered for d e v e l o p i n g a n d exercising t h e i r special
endowments.
5.1.2. T h e s e c o n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n c e m o r e involves t h e distinc­
tion of m o r a l s u b j e c t s : t h e a s s e s s m e n t of i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d t h e a s s e s s ­
m e n t of c o n d u c t . H o w w e feel a b o u t a p r e f e r e n c e for s o m e p a t t e r n s
over o t h e r s d e p e n d s u p o n t h e role it is a s s i g n e d in m o r a l a r g u m e n t .
Appeal t o t h e s a m e p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e m a y s e e m perfectly sensible a n d
also q u i t e o u t r a g e o u s , d e p e n d i n g o n w h e t h e r it is m e a n t to justify the
ranking of o n e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e above a n o t h e r or the infringement
of rights u n d e r s o m e ( r e a s o n a b l y just) existing institutional s c h e m e .
T h e s e c o n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o n s i s t s in a s s u m i n g that Rawls's valua­
tion of i n c o m e p a t t e r n s , w h i c h reflect t h e n a t u r a l distribution of e n ­
d o w m e n t s , is t o b e a p p l i e d w i t h i n a n o n g o i n g e c o n o m i c s c h e m e w h o s e
t e r m s are t a k e n for g r a n t e d . Rawls is viewed as s u g g e s t i n g that w e
s h o u l d try to factor o u t t h e p a r t of a p e r s o n ' s h o l d i n g s that is d u e to
natural e n d o w m e n t s , a n d t h e r e f o r e u n d e s e r v e d , as a fit c a n d i d a t e for
r e d i s t r i b u t i o n . Against this p o s i t i o n Nozick c a n q u i t e convincingly ar­
g u e t h a t s o m e t h i n g m a y b e legitimately o n e ' s o w n even t h o u g h w h a t
o n e u s e d t o o b t a i n it ( a n d w h a t o n e u s e d to o b t a i n that, etc.) are not
"deserved, all the way down.. .. S o m e of t h e t h i n g s h e u s e s h e just m a y
have, n o t illegitimately" (ASU 225).
Taking n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s to b e a m o n g t h e s e things o n e just has,
Nozick s k e t c h e s t h i s a r g u m e n t :

1- P e o p l e a r e e n t i t l e d t o t h e i r n a t u r a l a s s e t s .
2. If p e o p l e a r e e n t i t l e d t o s o m e t h i n g , t h e y a r e e n t i t l e d t o w h a t e v e r f l o w s
f r o m it (via s p e c i f i e d t y p e s o f p r o c e s s e s ) .
3. P e o p l e ' s h o l d i n g s flow f r o m t h e i r n a t u r a l a s s e t s . T h e r e f o r e ,
4. P e o p l e a r e e n t i t l e d t o t h e i r h o l d i n g s .
5 If p e o p l e a r e e n t i t l e d t o s o m e t h i n g , t h e n t h e y o u g h t t o h a v e it ( a n d t h i s
o v e r r i d e s a n y p r e s u m p t i o n of equality there m a y b e about h o l d i n g s ) .
(ASU 2 2 5 - 2 6 )

This a r g u m e n t is e n t i r e l y u n e x c e p t i o n a b l e . O n l y it leaves o p e n w h a t
those "specified t y p e s of p r o c e s s e s " s h o u l d b e via w h i c h h o l d i n g s flow
from n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s . A n d it is precisely this issue, a n d t h i s issue
alone, t h a t Rawls's reflections a b o u t n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s are m e a n t to
a d d r e s s . T h e r e is n o q u e s t i o n t h a t p e r s o n s a r e e n t i t l e d to w h a t e v e r
they a c q u i r e u n d e r j u s t p r o c e s s e s , n o m a t t e r w h a t role their e n d o w ­
m e n t s m a y h a v e p l a y e d i n t h i s a c q u i s i t i o n (cf. TJ 103). W h a t Rawls
d i s p u t e s is t h a t p e r s o n s , in virtue of t h e i r e n d o w m e n t s , are entitled to
o r d e s e r v e any particular specification of these processes (cf. TJ 104)—
s o m e t h i n g Nozick w o u l d d i s p u t e j u s t as vigorously. O n c e again, t h e
valuation of t h e relevant p a t t e r n features ( i n c o m e differentials reflect­
ing diverse n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s ) is m e a n t to influence t h e a s s e s s m e n t
of institutions. It is n o t i n t e n d e d t o i n s p i r e rectificatory interference
66 Natural E n d o w m e n t s , 5.2

w i t h t h e h o l d i n g s t h a t have a r i s e n u n d e r s o m e e x i s t i n g institutional
scheme.
5.2. T h e s e t w o m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s out of t h e w a y , w e c a n begin
delineating t h e m a i n i s s u e : H o w a r e e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s to be de­
signed a n d a s s e s s e d (the relevant "types of p r o c e s s e s " to b e specified)?
W h a t is t h e m e a n i n g a n d plausibility of Rawls's v i e w t h a t institutional
s c h e m e s s h o u l d regulate differentials in t h e s o c i a l r e w a r d s for develop­
ing a n d exercising n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s s o as t o o p t i m i z e t h e worst
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h a r e of social p r i m a r y g o o d s ?
Let m e give a c r u d e illustration of Rawls's p o s i t i o n , b a s e d , o n c e again,
u p o n his difference p r i n c i p l e in its s i m p l e s t f o r m ( w h e r e it g o v e r n s only
income) as a p p l i e d to t h e e c o n o m y of a small s e l f - c o n t a i n e d society. To
further simplify m a t t e r s , I a s s u m e t h a t t h e r e a r e o n l y t w o levels of
e n d o w m e n t : e i g h t e e n specially gifted p e r s o n s ("the e x c e p t i o n a l s " ) , ca­
p a b l e of w o r k i n g in t h e c o m p l e x job, a n d fifty-four n o r m a l l y e n d o w e d
p e r s o n s ("the normals"), w h o c a n w o r k only in t h e s i m p l e j o b . I con­
sider four alternative e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s , u n d e r w h i c h t h e i n c o m e for
o n e h o u r of w o r k in t h e c o m p l e x job is t h e m a r k e t p r i c e of s u c h labor
m i n u s , respectively, 0, 40, 50, a n d 60 p e r c e n t . T h e i n c o m e for o n e hour
of w o r k in t h e s i m p l e job is t h e m a r k e t p r i c e of s u c h l a b o r p l u s some
p e r c e n t a g e , w h i c h is c h o s e n so that t h e total flow of s u p p l e m e n t a r y
i n c o m e (that is, of "negative" i n c o m e t a x e s in t h e s i m p l e job) exactly
b a l a n c e s t h e total flow of taxes r a i s e d in t h e c o m p l e x j o b . S u p p o s e
empirical s t u d i e s s h o w t h e p a t t e r n s t h a t t h e f o u r a l t e r n a t i v e s c h e m e s
w o u l d e n g e n d e r to be roughly as s h o w n in T a b l e 1 (stating i n each
2
c o l u m n t h e d a t a for t h e c o m p l e x job first).
For each s c h e m e , t h e first value in r o w [A] is e x o g e n o u s . All other
values are calculated, e x c e p t for t h o s e in r o w s [B], [F], a n d (H). T h e s e are
stipulated m accordance with three straightforward empirical assump­
tions a b o u t variations across s c h e m e s . First, as r e g a r d s [F], average
W g f o r e a c h
° ™ ™ group u n d e r each scheme are s u c h that groups
higher n e t i n c o m e rates [D] have m o r e leisure [F] a n d e a r n m o r e
i n c o m e [G). Second, as r e g a r d s [H], a n i n c r e a s i n g p r o p o r t i o n of the
exceptionals prefer t o w o r k in t h e s i m p l e j o b a s t h e r a t i o b e t w e e n the
C O m e r 3 t e S [ E 1 d e c r e a s e
r h ? d ^ « »from S to S ). T h i r d , a s r e g a r d s [B], 4 e
1 g r S i n C m e s i s
olv S n xi " °f ° " ^ l i v e l y related to the labor sup-
p i i C e
relatTve J L H 6
° ^ a f u n c t i o n of t h e f l a b o r i n e a c h

%
S r a t h e r T 6? " ^01 S C h
« tendencies c o m b i n e to make T h e s e t h r e

Although t « J P I *?™
^ t h e difference p r i n c i p l e . r e f e r r e d

Although tax rates are h i g h e s t u n d e r S , t h e least a d v a n t a g e d u n d e r S 6 5

figu^a^^ P"ce vectors fixed, assuming that all dollar

S S S C h e m e s S e e G i b b a r d
problem. The i n c Z ^ l h . ' e - «J, for a discussion of this
P
S GED t h i s
workings of (what RTwlsTalLMnef™nT K [° ^ ^ a t i o n may exemplify the
S ) h e t r a n s f e
distribution branch m ^ J r branch (TJ 276-77) and the second part of the
t 1 I
, e R a W S S s u e s
expenditure tax may be DR^fw™. "° ' ' 8 S " ° n that "a proportional
m c o m e tax <TJ 2 7 8 ) 1 c n o s e i n c o m e t a X
schemes because they afford a™J™r " -
mey aftord a more famU.ar and perspicuous illustration.
 Natural E n d o w m e n t s , 5.3 67

Table 1. Alternative e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s a n d the difference principle

S,

[A I Tax rate 0% 0% -40% 44% -50% 60% -60% 64%

IB] Gross i n c o m e rate p e r 110.00 13.00 82.00 16.00 90.00 15.00 96.00 14.40
hour 1$)
!C]Tax per h o u r [$), [A]X[B] 0.00 0.00 -32.80 +7.04 -45.00 + 9.00 -57.60 + 9.22
!D!Net i n c o m e rate p e r 110.00 13.00 49.20 23.04 45.00 24.00 38.40 23.62
hour 1 $ ) , IBJ+IC)
(E) Net i n c o m e rate ratio, 8.46 2.14 1.88 1.63
from ID]
IF) Average working h o u r s 20 60 26.4 41.0 28 40 32.4 40.5
per week
IG] Average net i n c o m e p e r 2,200.00 780.00 1,298.88 944.64 1,260.00 960.00 1,244.16 956.45
week l$),[D)x[F]
(HINumber of workers 18 54 18 54 16 56 12 60
(1) Total working h o u r s p e r 360 3,240 475.2 2,214 448 2,240 388.8 2,430
week, [F]x[H]
(J) Labor s u p p l y ratio, 0.111 0.215 0.200 0 160
from [I)
IK] Total tax bill p e r w e e k IS) +/- 0 +/- 15,586.56 + / - 20,160.00 + / - 22 ,394.88
(A]x|B)X(IJ

are n e v e r t h e l e s s b e t t e r off (have a h i g h e r net i n c o m e rate [Dj—work

less [F] a n d e a r n m o r e [G]) t h a n t h e least a d v a n t a g e d u n d e r a n y of t h e
3
alternative s c h e m e s .
5.3. While it is q u i t e c l e a r t h a t t h e Rawlsian criterion w o u l d entail a
preference for S Rawls m a k e s it difficult to u n d e r s t a n d w h a t this
s>

preference m e a n s . C o n s i d e r his formulations in explication of t h e dif­

ference p r i n c i p l e : " T h o s e w h o h a v e b e e n favored b y n a t u r e . . . m a y gain
from t h e i r g o o d f o r t u n e o n l y o n t e r m s that improve t h e situation of
t h o s e w h o h a v e lost o u t " (TJ 101); " t h e m o r e fortunate are to benefit
only in w a y s t h a t h e l p t h o s e w h o have lost o u t " (TJ 179); "no o n e gains
or loses from h i s a r b i t r a r y p l a c e in t h e distribution of n a t u r a l assets . .

3
A s the e x a m p l e m a k e s clear, Sandel g o e s w r o n g in believing that the s c h e m e ranked
highest by Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n "nullifies the effect of t h e s e differences lin natural for­
tune]" (LU 69). In S t h o s e w o r k i n g in the c o m p l e x job have considerably more i n c o m e
5

and m o r e leisure t h a n their fellows working in the s i m p l e job. Moreover, they prefer their
c o m p l e x job (unavailable to the normals), as is w i t n e s s e d by the fact that they c o u l d
switch at any time. There is n o q u e s t i o n that they h a v e — o n top of their better e n d o w ­
ment, w h i c h is irrelevant for R a w l s — a better social position than the normals. It may
s e e m that a w e a k e r c l a i m is true. A just s c h e m e is s u c h that some of the exceptionals just
barely prefer t h e c o m p l e x job; s o m e of t h e m (in S ) w o u l d s w i t c h into the s i m p l e job if the
5

net i n c o m e rate ratio w e r e reduced a little bit further. But o n e m u s t be careful with s u c h
statements. Rawls's criterion c o m p a r e s long-term s c h e m e s (existing "in perpetuity," as it
were). So t h e table d o e s n o t illustrate h o w actual persons, having convex indifference
curves b e t w e e n i n c o m e a n d leisure w h i c h reflect decreasing marginal utility for both
g o o d s , w o u l d a d j u s t their e c o n o m i c behavior to tax-rate fluctuations. Rather, the as­
s u m p t i o n is that p e r s o n s h a v e g r o w n u p in "their" s c h e m e , that their preferences a n d
indifference c u r v e s (etc.) have b e e n s h a p e d by it. There is n o guarantee that p e r s o n s in S 5

w o u l d adjust to short-term c h a n g e s in i n c o m e tax rates as s h o w n m the table.

68 Natural E n d o w m e n t s , 5.3

w i t h o u t giving or receiving c o m p e n s a t i n g a d v a n t a g e s in r e t u r n . . . . In
justice as fairness m e n agree to s h a r e o n e a n o t h e r ' s fate" (TJ 102).These
formulations invite t h e t h i r d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . G r a n t e d , it might be
said, S is so organized t h a t n o t h i n g is t a k e n a w a y from t h e excep­
5

tionals or r e d i s t r i b u t e d . It's all d o n e a u t o m a t i c a l l y a n d o n a schedule

a n n o u n c e d in a d v a n c e . But t h e q u e s t i o n r e m a i n s : W h y s h o u l d the
exceptionals o w e t h e n o r m a l s any c o m p e n s a t i n g a d v a n t a g e s ? In return
for w h a t ? Yes, t h e e x c e p t i o n a l s a r e free to w o r k in t h e s i m p l e job, and
they have to p a y only if t h e y c h o o s e to e x e r c i s e t h e i r s u p e r i o r endow­
m e n t s , b u t by w h a t right m a y t h i s c o n d i t i o n b e i m p o s e d u p o n them?
Why s h o u l d t h e y b e f o r b i d d e n to e x e r c i s e t h e i r s u p e r i o r e n d o w m e n t s
without h e l p i n g t h e n o r m a l s ? How is this w a y of u s i n g p e o p l e (or their
talents or t h e i r work) for t h e benefit of o t h e r s m a d e a c c e p t a b l e by the
fact that it's built into t h e rules of t h e g a m e , r a t h e r t h a n i m p o s e d by
officials in a n a d h o c m a n n e r ?
This line of criticism is beautifully c a p t u r e d in Nozick's i m a g e of the
exceptionals b e i n g harnessed to serve o t h e r s , " a n d h a r n e s s i n g ' is an
a p p r o p r i a t e t e r m — a s it w o u l d b e for a h o r s e h a r n e s s e d to a wagon
w h i c h d o e s n ' t have t o m o v e ever, b u t if it d o e s , it m u s t d r a w t h e wagon
along" (ASU 229n). W h a t Nozick w a n t s to c o n c l u d e is t h a t Rawls's
c o n c e p t i o n of justice, b y favoring i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s u n d e r which
t h e exceptionals are h a r n e s s e d , e n c o u r a g e s t h e u s e of s o m e p e r s o n s as
m e a n s for t h e benefit of o t h e r s .
W h e n p e r s o n s are h a r n e s s e d , however, o n l y t h e i r work and efforts
are i m m e d i a t e l y u s e d . Nozick's p a t h t o h i s c o n c l u s i o n r e q u i r e s then
two further s t e p s : t o u s e p e r s o n s ' w o r k a n d efforts is t o u s e t h e i r natural
e n d o w m e n t s , a n d to u s e t h e i r n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s is to u s e them.
Nozick explicitly asserts t h e s e c o n d of t h e s e s t e p s : ' W h y w e , thick with
particular traits, s h o u l d b e c h e e r e d t h a t (only) t h e t h u s p u r i f i e d m e n
w i t h i n u s are n o t regarded as m e a n s is . . . u n c l e a r " (ASU 228). And
N Z C S
3 ° ! ^ ' P o i n t - i n s i s t i n g t h a t u s i n g t h e s p e c i a l gifts of the
6 S t r g t h f 3 h o r s e l a s m e a
u S th * T ° ™ * n o t t a n t a m o u n t to so
u s i n g t h e exceptionals themselves (the h o r s e i t s e / f j - i n d e e d s e e m s to
aTim nn{ 5. T 1C
S6COnd
WBIght
d i s t i n c t i o n . Still, Nozick r 3 t h e r 1 0 0 s u b t l e a

Sm?n t h ^ I f P ' * i t w e r e e n o u g h , a n d S a n d e l follows

P re en n
e a s

U2J 77 f S « * ™ half a r g u m e n t albeit i n g r e a t e r detail

7K>' R
e s a

hameTs"ed 'J?S V * ° ? * w h e n p e r s o n s are W b e S O o b v i o u s t h a t

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
U a b l e t 0 d G f e n d t h e i r
ouuhlfR a w l s ^ K i n c l u s i o n by pointing
8 t h e m
tat^^i^^/P "* t r o u b l e of a r g u i n g for the
eventfTheTdortm * W
* *
Ughtt0
c o m

ave
™n-asset formulations,
oint control over the
d e v ^ m S i S e ^
that « S S d S S m S ^
1r ° ° " ° w*m e n t s , e n t a i l at least U r e n d
reexercised mavbeu s e daS
means for the cZmon
° g° -
*I 1°"*
C
* m
<
they see it, Rawls is a r g u i n g this way:
m o n o d A s
 Natural E n d o w m e n t s , 5.4 69

ID N a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s m a y b e r e g a r d e d a s a c o m m o n a s s e t .
(2) H e n c e , t h e t a l e n t s a n d a b i l i t i e s o f (or " r e s i d i n g in") t h e e x c e p t i o n a l s
m a y be u s e d as m e a n s .
(3) H e n c e , t h e w o r k a n d e f f o r t s of t h e e x c e p t i o n a l s m a y b e u s e d a s m e a n s ,
or h a r n e s s e d .
4
(4) H e n c e , a n i n c o m e tax s c h e m e like S m a y b e i n s t i t u t e d .
s

If Rawls w e r e really a r g u i n g in this way, t h e n Nozick a n d Sandel w o u l d

i n d e e d n e e d t o s h o w o n l y h o w (1) or (2) p r e s u p p o s e s that persons m a y
be u s e d as m e a n s .
Their r e a d i n g , h o w e v e r , is m i s t a k e n ; Rawls m a k e s n o s u c h a r g u m e n t
and d o e s n o t e n d o r s e a n y of p r o p o s i t i o n s (l)-(3). My d i s c u s s i o n will
c o n c e n t r a t e o n (3), for b y s h o w i n g that, d e s p i t e a p p e a r a n c e s , Rawls is
not invoking (3) in a n y relevant s e n s e , I c a n d e s t r o y t h e o r d i n a r y ra­
tionale for a t t r i b u t i n g (1) a n d (2) to h i m . At the e n d I will look again at
Rawls's c o m m o n - a s s e t f o r m u l a t i o n s to s h o w h o w t h e Nozick-Sandel
reading of t h e m g o e s w r o n g a n d h o w t h e y s h o u l d i n s t e a d b e u n d e r ­
stood.
5.4. T h e s e c o n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g viewed Rawls as e n c o u r a g i n g
officials to t a k e a w a y s o m e of p e o p l e ' s e a r n i n g s a n d p a s s t h e m along to
the less f o r t u n a t e . I s a i d in r e s p o n s e t h a t Rawls is d i s c u s s i n g t h e
scheme u n d e r w h i c h e a r n i n g s arise in t h e first place. He a d d r e s s e s
himself t o t h e d e e p e s t b a s i s of e c o n o m i c e n t i t l e m e n t s a n d t h u s c a n n o t
be criticized in a w a y t h a t a l r e a d y takes s o m e e n t i t l e m e n t - p r o d u c i n g
p r o c e s s e s for g r a n t e d . To s a y t h a t w i t h Rawls in c h a r g e p e o p l e get less
t h a n t h e y are e n t i t l e d t o b e g s t h e q u e s t i o n Rawls is raising, by a s s u m i n g
w e a l r e a d y k n o w w h a t p e o p l e are e n t i t l e d to.
T h e t h i r d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g is similar to t h e s e c o n d in t h a t it again
reflects t h e failure t o u n d e r s t a n d Rawls's focus o n t h e basic s t r u c t u r e .
The c h a r g e is t h a t u n d e r t h e s c h e m e Rawls favors, S , p e o p l e are s

entitled to less t h a n t h e y o u g h t to have. This objection can be embel­

lished b y a d d i n g t h a t p e o p l e o u g h t to have w h a t flows from t h e i r w o r k
a n d efforts, b u t it still b e g s t h e q u e s t i o n , this t i m e by a s s u m i n g w e
already k n o w w h a t flows from p e o p l e ' s w o r k a n d efforts a n d that this is
what they o u g h t to have.
But is n o t R a w l s h i m s e l f saying t h a t t h e exceptionals, if t h e y w a n t to
exercise t h e i r s p e c i a l t a l e n t s , m u s t " h e l p " t h e n o r m a l s , m u s t "improve
their s i t u a t i o n " a n d "give t h e m c o m p e n s a t i n g a d v a n t a g e s " ? A n d d o e s
this r e q u i r e m e n t n o t p r e s u p p o s e t h a t w e do k n o w w h a t flows from
their w o r k a n d efforts, n a m e l y , t h e i r e n t i t l e m e n t s u n d e r S plus w h a t ­ s

ever " h e l p " w a s d i v e r t e d t o t h o s e in t h e s i m p l e job?

In t w o of t h e t h r e e p a s s a g e s q u o t e d at t h e b e g i n n i n g of §5.3, Rawls
formulates m o r e carefully, s a y i n g t h a t t h e m o r e f o r t u n a t e m a y gain
4
F o r Nozick, this a r g u m e n t s h o w s h o w l o w e v e n the m o s t able defenders ° f i n c o m e
toes m u s t sink, wherlas Sandel w o u l d p e r h a p s b e willing to enterta.n other arguments
in s u p p o r t of s u c h taxes, at least w i t h i n local c o m m u n i t i e s .
70 Natural E n d o w m e n t s , 5.5

only on terms t h a t improve, m a y benefit o n l y in ways t h a t help those

w h o have lost o u t . T h e s e f o r m u l a t i o n s s u g g e s t a n a l t e r n a t i v e reading,
w h i c h alone m a k e s t h e m meaningful a s a p a r a p h r a s e of t h e difference
principle. O n this reading, t h e implicit r e f e r e n c e of s u c h comparative
expressions as "gain," "improve," " h e l p , " "giving c o m p e n s a t i n g advan­
tages" is not to t h e (smaller) s h a r e t h e n o r m a l s w o u l d h a v e if the
exceptionals d i d less w o r k in t h e c o m p l e x job. I n s t e a d , t h e implicit
reference is to t h e (smaller) s h a r e of t h e n o r m a l s as it would exist under
alternative schemes. It's n o t that t h e p r e f e r r e d e c o n o m i c scheme is
rigged s o t h a t t h o s e in t h e c o m p l e x j o b c a n n o t b u t h e l p t h o s e in the
simple job. Rather, Rawls's criterion of j u s t i c e is s u c h t h a t its selection
of a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e will (maximally) h e l p — t h a t is, improve—the
lowest social position. T h u s S is preferred over S b e c a u s e t h e ("inter- s K

schemic") gain in the c o m p l e x j o b is a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a compensating

gain i n t h e l o w e r job. (The "in r e t u r n " is m e a n i n g f u l if w e a p p r o a c h S 5

from Rawls's e q u a l - i n c o m e b e n c h m a r k . )
This r e a d i n g makes t h e s e n t e n c e s at i s s u e c o n t i n u o u s w i t h h o w we
m u s t c o n s t r u e t h e principle they are i n t e n d e d t o e x p l i c a t e . T h e differ­
e n c e p n n c i p l e assesses institutional s c h e m e s w i t h a n eye to the in­
equalities e a c h t e n d s to p r o d u c e , w h i c h a r e t o b e "to~the greatest
benefit of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d " (TJ 302). Rawls d o e s n o t m e a n to
e n d o r s e t h e s c h e m e in w h i c h benefits a r e largest, w i t h benefits defined
m a w a y internal t o e a c h s c h e m e . If t h i s w e r e h i s p o i n t , t h e n h e would
nave t o prefer S , u n d e r w h i c h t h e i n c o m e s u p p l e m e n t in t h e simple
6

job is highest b o t h in relative a n d in a b s o l u t e t e r m s (64 p e r c e n t or $922

p e r h o u r or $22,394.88 in total, as c o m p a r e d t o 60 p e r c e n t o r $9.00 per
r $ 2 1 6 i n t o t a l
srhJL° J °f " n ° e r S ). B u t Rawls i n t e n d s t o favor the 5
U n , C h t h S e i n t h e s i m l e b
so h T ^ t f ° P J ° h a v e t h e largest s h a r e , and
h M m m i n d a
" „ ™ ' C 1 n o t i o n of benefit across schemes. At issue
nCretepersons!

a^rhern. H ? I abstract t °
derive from o t h e r s ' a c t i o n s within
IZnZ^Z " r e p r e s e n t a t i v e " ) g r o u p s derive ( o r

f n e S c h e m e r a t h
mav s a v t h a t ° ° * r «™n a n o t h e r . In t h i s s e n s e we
m a y say that workers m b o t h jobs benefit from t h e s e l e c t i o n of S rather s

^tok^L^^?- ° f g r
f P i n g
' P° R a w l s
* i n c r e a s e d b y two s i n t

p o L feMh " g S U C h c o m
P a r i s o n s across s c h e m e s , h e presup-
groupswould existu n d e r different sche ies In
SnTSCtXsr
fo™somelZ^ ° lT PP S n i S d e a r l
y f a l s e
' for h a d
6
"
S really b e e n in
d b e W r k i i n a d i f f e
Rawls ^ S £ ^ ™ ° "S ™ t job.* Since
S 6 e m t h a t h i s c o m p a r i S
must involve g ^ u T ^ ^ t ^ " ^ °nS G S a m e s c h e
however, is not n m h i 2 ^ J ™ . The presupposition,
b G C a u s e h e i s
with t h e g r o o ^ T a T i " > u p ™nce™e6 only RSWlS

not care t L S t e x t e n t f h ^ " d e r e a c h s c h e m e a n d does a d v m u

what extent t h e i r m e m b e r s h i p s w o u l d o v e r l a p . W h a t is t o be
*Or a t t o ^ d i f f e r e m p m o n s W Q u l d w b e e n ^ ^ R p ^ p
 N a t u r a l E n d o w m e n t s , 5.6 71

optimized t h r o u g h t h e c h o i c e of a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e is n e v e r t h e
position of t h e p r e s e n t l y p o o r e s t p e r s o n s (as if o n e c o u l d k e e p track of
concrete i n d i v i d u a l s a c r o s s h y p o t h e t i c a l s c h e m e s ) but always the
smallest s h a r e , t h a t is, in t h e s i m p l e s t case, t h e floor of t h e i n c o m e
hierarchy.
Second, Rawls m o v e s freely back a n d forth b e t w e e n (what I call) t h e
/nfraschemic a n d / n f e r s c h e m i c s e n s e s of s u c h t e r m s as benefit a n d
advantage. T h a t i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t i e s m u s t be to t h e a d v a n t a g e of
the least a d v a n t a g e d , for e x a m p l e , m e a n s that t h e s c h e m e m u s t be
c h o s e n so t h a t t h o s e i n t r a s c h e m i c a l l v m o s t d i s a d v a n t a g e d will enjoy
an / n f e r s c h e m i c a d v a n t a g e over t h o s e Uhtraschemically) m o s t disad­
vantaged u n d e r feasible alternative s c h e m e s . Likewise, h i s criterion
selects t h e s c h e m e t h a t benefits m o s t t h o s e w h o m it benefits least
(Rawls u s e s b o t h e x p r e s s i o n s ) . T h e s h a r e of this g r o u p is inferior to t h e
shares of all o t h e r (existing) g r o u p s a n d yet s u p e r i o r to t h e (hypotheti­
cal! w o r s t s h a r e u n d e r a n y feasible alternative s c h e m e .
5.6. T h e i n t e r s c h e m i c c o n s t r u a l of t h e c o m p a r a t i v e t e r m s ("greatest,"
"gain," " i m p r o v e , " etc.) dissolves t h e a c c u s a t i o n t h a t Rawls himself
explicitly favors a s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h s o m e a r e h a r n e s s e d for t h e
benefit of o t h e r s . Rawls is n o t r u n n i n g afoul of his o w n insistence that
p e r s o n s m u s t n o t b e r e g a r d e d a s m e a n s (TJ 1831.1 c a n t h e n c o n t i n u e in
his behalf t h e s t r a t e g y I h a v e e m b a r k e d u p o n in §4.5 (cf. §4.6)—the
strategy of b l o c k i n g a n y a s s e r t i o n of a n obvious e c o n o m i c s c h e m e or of
6
conditions t h a t e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s m u s t obviously satisfy.

6
C o n s i d e r h e r e t h e c o m p l a i n t that u n d e r s c h e m e s Rawls w o u l d favor people's ac­
tivities will have positive a n d negative externalities (on a c c o u n t of the tax system). Such a
s c h e m e will allow that I c a n act to benefit myself in w a y s that m a k e y o u w o r s e off or las in
S ) that y o u c a n n o t d o certain things w i t h o u t benefiting m e . But w h y s h o u l d this be
5

inadmissible? After all, this m u c h is true of every market s c h e m e w e know. My i n c o m e

may b e v e i y significantly affected by others' e c o n o m i c activities that don't involve m e at
all- It w o u l d be r i d i c u l o u s to say that thev are h a r n e s s e d to m e just b e c a u s e I benefit las a
shareholder, perhaps) every t i m e t h e v buv a n e w car ("They don't have to b u y a n e w car
ever, but if they d o , t h e y m u s t g e n e r a t e s o m e gain for me"). Another external attack might
charge that u n d e r w h a t Rawls c o n s i d e r s a just e c o n o m i c s c h e m e persons w o u l d not be
receiving their marginal p r o d u c t s . (This idea s e e m s to m e already disqualified o n e c o ­
nomic g r o u n d s . T h e r e is n o g u a r a n t e e that if factor inputs are multiplied, e a c h with its
marginal p r o d u c t , a n d t h e results are a d d e d , the s u m will equal total production.) But a
person's marginal c o n t r i b u t i o n d e p e n d s in various w a y s u p o n contextual factors that
cannot reasonably b e attributed to this p e r s o n icf. TJ 308). Moreover, is it really obvious
that t h o s e w h o c a n n o t contribute Ithe aged, o r p h a n e d , h a n d i c a p p e d , etc.) ought to be
receiving their marginal p r o d u c t , i.e., nothing? D o thev not also have s o m e claim o n the
material w o r l d that is a m a i n s o u r c e of e c o n o m i c values? Only a morally appealing notion
of what "flows from'' a p e r s o n ' s work or efforts c o u l d overturn or constrain the Rawlsian
Pattern preference.
Finally, Nozick s u g g e s t s that t h e appropriate w a y of settling o n an e c o n o m i c s c h e m e is
through an u n c o n s t r a i n e d collective bargaining s e s s i o n b e t w e e n the exceptionals las a
team) a n d the n o r m a l s (ASU 193-95). In s u c h a s e s s i o n the exceptionals w o u l d b e fools to
agree to S . T h e y c o u l d m a k e a c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l u n d e r w h i c h the s i m p l e |ob is taxed s o a s
s

to fund a n i n c o m e s u p p l e m e n t for the c o m p l e x job. T h e bargaining w o u l d ^tycomwge

toward a m i l d p r o p o s a l of this form (rather than S„J because, Nozick tells us, the normals
have m o r e to lose, vis-a-vis S , from a b r e a k d o w n of social cooperation. But o n c e again
0
72 Natural E n d o w m e n t s , 5.7

Let m e a d d t h a t t h e i n t r a s c h e m i c c o n s t r u a J s u g g e s t e d b y t h e har­
n e s s i n g image is u n s o u n d even i n strictly e c o n o m i c t e r m s , b e c a u s e tax
rates have a n i m p a c t o n g r o s s i n c o m e s . C o n s i d e r t h e c o m p l a i n t against
S o r against c u r r e n t l y existing s c h e m e s t h a t w h a t i s p a i d i n i n c o m e tax
s

a n d s p e n t o n t h e n e e d s of o t h e r s r e p r e s e n t s (unjustly) redistributed
i n c o m e . In k e e p i n g c u r r e n t g r o s s i n c o m e s fixed, t h i s c o m p l a i n t pre­
s u p p o s e s t h e very i n c o m e t a x s c h e m e it r e j e c t s . If t h e c h a l l e n g e d tax
really d i d n o t exist, t h e n g r o s s i n c o m e s ( a n d a v e r a g e w o r k i n g hours) in
all jobs w o u l d b e different. Gross i n c o m e s r e p r e s e n t n o t t h e market
price of o u r labor simpliciter b u t t h e m a r k e t p r i c e of o u r l a b o r within
some particular institutional s c h e m e .
To b e c o h e r e n t , t h e c o m p l a i n t m u s t t h e n b e f o r m u l a t e d in inter-
s c h e m i c t e r m s . But, s o f o r m u l a t e d , it h a s c o n s i d e r a b l y less intuitive
a p p e a l . Critics m a y a d v o c a t e t h e i r favorite a l t e r n a t i v e economic
s c h e m e a n d p o i n t o u t t h a t relative t o it, a s c h e m e favored by the
7
difference p r i n c i p l e w o u l d b e u s i n g o r e x p l o i t i n g t h e b e t t e r endowed.
But t h i s c o m p l a i n t r e d u c e s to t h e c o m m o n p l a c e t h a t s o m e schemes
are b e t t e r for s o m e g r o u p s a n d o t h e r s for o t h e r s . Relative t o S , S raises 0 5

t h e p r o s p e c t s of t h e n o r m a l s w h i l e l o w e r i n g t h o s e of t h e exceptionals.
But t h i s c o m p l a i n t p r e s u p p o s e s , a n d h e n c e c a n n o t s u p p o r t , a prefer­
e n c e of S over S , for it i s equally t r u e t h a t , relative t o S , S raises the
0 5 5 0

p r o s p e c t s of t h e e x c e p t i o n a l s w h i l e l o w e r i n g t h o s e of t h e n o r m a l s . It is
unlikely t h a t t h e r e is a feasible s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h n o g r o u p would
lose relative t o any feasible alternative s c h e m e , a n d if t h e r e w e r e s u c h a
s c h e m e (weakly P a r e t o - s u p e r i o r t o all alternatives) t h e n Rawls's crite-
n o n w o u l d favor it i n a n y c a s e .
5.7. W i t h t h e t h r e e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s clarified, t h e r e is n o basis left
tor believing Rawls h a s a n y n e e d for p r o p o s i t i o n (3), t h a t t h e w o r k and
efforts of s o m e m a y b e u s e d a s m e a n s for t h e benefit of o t h e r s . T h u s he
a S 0 n l a S S e W h a t t n e N
^ ° ^ , ° ? ° z i c k - S a n d e l r e a d i n g t a k e s h i m to
a t e v e h
2 . f ; W t a s s o m e e n t i t l e m e n t o r c l a i m o n t h e totality of
3 8 3 P 0 l ) ( A S U2 2 8 ,
m a v s t r ^ n ^e ° " > t h e l e a s t advantaged
Z7s^TJ«,T°T u °
t
™ " (LLJ 70). A n d if h e h a s no
h 6 n
f t

h e
h e f

3 1 8
o r

0n
t

e e d n o t
D T r i i ? ^ b e a t p a i n s t o s h o w that
by regardung t h e distribution of n a t u r a l t a l e n t s a s a c o m m o n a s s e t . .

^ » " g - the right m e t h o d for b

c p e r a t i o n sh
justice have to yield the W ? ° ° u ' d a discussion about
ested groups? (Rawls has a lover! footnnt* ^ f ^ . « » S e S S i o n a m o n u n e £ u a l

h o w t h i s i s
iTJ 134 n. 101.) Nozick can 3 " implausible e v e n in microcases
exceptionals, but he therebv is h U T P 8 S would be foolish on the part of the a
f
c c e t l n
5
g o n l y t h a t t h e w
sense) to talk about justiceatatfT°£ u" y ° u l d be fools (in Nozick s
l 6 X a C l t h e b e s t t e r m s t h e v c a n l m
Melian dialogue). He does not^showth^ ° &
m a t b l s utl
u s e d as means. * )ust or that under S the exceptionals are s

7
S o Nozick (ASU 228-29) • "In a f™>
eo les tale
themselves. Is it the extraction of™?n T**' Z P n t s benefit others, and not only
S U p p O S e d l
treating p * , ^ assets a s T c o l T e c S ^ u r e e ' ' ^ *** *
n a t U r a ] °'
 N a t u r a l E n d o w m e n t s a n d Desert, 6.1 73

not persons b u t o n l y 'their' attributes are b e i n g u s e d as m e a n s to

8
others' w e l l - b e i n g " (LIJ 78; cf. ASU 228).

6. N a t u r a l E n d o w m e n t s a n d D e s e r t

6 . 1 . Rawls c l a i m s t h a t h i s c o n c e p t i o n of justice nullifies t h e acci­

d e n t s of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t . T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t e n d o w m e n t s are
to be e q u a l i z e d o r t h a t a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e m u s t not offer g r e a t e r
r e w a r d s to t h o s e b e t t e r e n d o w e d . T h e p o i n t is t h a t t h e b e t t e r e n d o w e d
have n o s p e c i a l c l a i m s u p o n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e criterion of social
justice. T h i s p o i n t h a s t w o i m p o r t a n t corollaries: w h e n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e
t e r m s of e c o n o m i c c o o p e r a t i o n are n e g o t i a t e d (for e x a m p l e , in t h e
original p o s i t i o n ) , it is m o r a l l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e for e n d o w m e n t s to be a
9
factor in t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s ' b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n ; a n d n a t u r a l e n d o w ­
m e n t s d o n o t reflect a n i n t r i n s i c m o r a l w o r t h that w o u l d set b o u n d s o n
the t e r m s a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e m a y offer for t h e i r d e v e l o p m e n t a n d
exercise. T h i s s e c o n d corollary will b e c e n t r a l to t h e p r e s e n t section.
Given t h e c o n s t r a i n t u p o n its c o n s t r u c t i o n , Rawls arrives at a crite­
rion of ( e c o n o m i c ) j u s t i c e t h a t d o e s n o t m e n t i o n n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s .
It ranks e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s solely w i t h regard to t h e i n c o m e distribu­
tion (specifically, t h e l o w e s t i n c o m e s ) t h e v t e n d to p r o d u c e . H o w the
d e v e l o p m e n t a n d e x e r c i s e of e n d o w m e n t s s h o u l d b e r e w a r d e d is a
s e c o n d a r y i s s u e , t o b e s e t t l e d b y reference to this criterion (and e m p i r i ­
cal facts). E n d o w m e n t s p l a y n o role in specifying w h a t a n e c o n o m i c
s c h e m e is s u p p o s e d t o achieve, t h o u g h t h e v d o of c o u r s e play a role in
h o w it c a n b e s t a c h i e v e t h i s .
T h u s , in t h e c o r r e c t r e a d i n g of t h e c o m m o n - a s s e t formulations,
Rawls's p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e r e q u i r e s t h a t e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s b e s u c h
that t h e i n e q u a l i t i e s t h e y g e n e r a t e t e n d to m a x i m i z e , interschemically,
the m i n i m u m s h a r e . T h i s p r e f e r e n c e leaves w i d e o p e n t h e kind a n d
extent of i n e q u a l i t i e s t h e favored s c h e m e w o u l d allow. In particular,
the r e w a r d s t h i s s c h e m e offers to p e r s o n s w i t h special gifts d e p e n d s o n
h o w useful a n d h o w w i d e s p r e a d t h e s e are a n d also o n h o w t h e de­
v e l o p m e n t a n d e x e r c i s e of t h e s e gifts w o u l d b e affected by alternative
1 0
r e w a r d s c h e d u l e s . By t h u s a d j u s t i n g t h e (choice of) e c o n o m i c s c h e m e

*Nor n e e d Rawls a c c e p t Sandel's invitation to g o over to the c o m m u n i t a r i a n c a m p "by

questioning the s e n s e in w h i c h t h o s e w h o share in my' assets are properly d e s c n b e d as
o t h e r s ' . . . . if the difference p r i n c i p l e is to avoid u s i n g s o m e as m e a n s to others e n d s , it
can o n l y b e p o s s i b l e u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h e r e t h e subject of p o s s e s s i o n is a w e rather
than a n T , w h i c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s i m p l y in r u m t h e e x i s t e n c e of a c o m m u n i t y in the
constitutive s e n s e " ( L U 7 9 - 8 0 ) . , . . . .
^ h i s corollary is explicit in a parallel p a s s a g e : "The idea of the original position u to s e
UP a fair p r o c e d u r e s o that a n y p r i n c i p l e s agreed to will b e just. S o m e h o w w e must
nullify the effects of s p e c i f i c c o n t i n g e n c i e s " (TJ 136). Compare the final paragraph of n 6.
'"For e x a m p l e , if t h e r e w e r e a feasible s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h almost all the e x c e p t o n a l s
w o u l d greatly e n j o y the c o m p l e x job a n d w o u l d c h o o s e to work in it even t h o u g h it pays
74 Natural E n d o w m e n t s a n d Desert, 6.1

to t h e distribution of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s l a n d of h u m a n dispositions),
one regards a s a c o m m o n asset this distribution, n o t t h e particular
e n d o w m e n t s t h e m s e l v e s o r w h a t flows from t h e i r e x e r c i s e within some
e c o n o m i c s c h e m e . O n e might say that this fact of differential endow­
m e n t s is u s e d a s a m e a n s .
Stated i n t h e abstract, t h e d i s t i n c t i o n 1 p r o p o s e h e r e m a y seem to
have a n air of sophistry, so let m e offer a n i l l u s t r a t i o n of its significance.
A travel c o m p a n y o p e r a t i n g w i t h r u n - d o w n a c c o m m o d a t i o n s , unsafe
flights, h i d d e n charges, a n d t h e like m a y b e s a i d t o u s e t h e n e e d s and
desires of its c u s t o m e r s as m e a n s for its o w n e n r i c h m e n t . T h i s u s e may
well be, as Nozick a n d Sandel w o u l d insist, t a n t a m o u n t to u s i n g these
c u s t o m e r s t h e m s e l v e s m e r e l y as m e a n s . By c o n t r a s t , c o n s i d e r a travel
c o m p a n y that c h a r g e s different p r i c e s for i d e n t i c a l services provided at
different times of t h e y e a r (off-peak, h i g h s e a s o n , etc.), s o a s to equalize
d e m a n d . In this c a s e it is t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of c u s t o m e r interests and
desires, t h e fact t h a t c u s t o m e r s a r e different i n v a r i o u s relevant re­
spects, that is u s e d as a m e a n s . T h o u g h t h e e n d m o t i v a t i n g the policy
m a y b e t h e s a m e i n b o t h c a s e s ( m a x i m i z a t i o n of profit, say), it seems
clear that only t h e first policy c a n r e a s o n a b l y b e s a i d t o u s e customers
as m e a n s . This distinction c o n c e r n i n g (the c h o i c e of) policies h a s an
analogue, I believe, as regards (the c h o i c e of) social i n s t i t u t i o n s . Here
Rawls s suggestion is a n a l o g o u s to t h e s e c o n d k i n d of policy. By adjust­
ing t h e t e r m s offered for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d e x e r c i s e of e n d o w m e n t s ,
institutions m a k e this fact serve t h e Rawlsian i m p e r a t i v e of justice, that
social inequalities m u s t b e t o t h e greatest benefit of t h o s e m o s t disad­
vantaged by t h e m .
!S a d n i S c o n f i r m e d
,m™ ^ u t by looking o n c e m o r e at t h e sentences
N o z i c k S a
encpM , - " d e l r e a d i n g s o heavily relies: " T h e differ-
n > l e r e s e n t s i n
S£Zn nf t Pf , ' efect, a n a g r e e m e n t t o r e g a r d t h e dis-

inTtotrS
d l S t n b u t i o n w h a
"the rwn 1 * e v e r it t u r n s o u t t o b e " (TJ 101) and
a r e e
K ^ v a l e n t , a s I have r e m a r k e d , t o a n u n d e r t a k -
^ e Z J ^ r f ° f m t u r a
collective asset so l a b i l i t i e s a s a

have l o s ^ ^ m VTKZ? ^ ^ °^ *^ t h a t h e l p

of n a t u r a l e n r i o i J ; u
P g e s confirm t h a t it is t h e distribution a s s a

l b C regarded a sa c o m m o o r c o l l e C t i V e
l e t » N o ^ T o T "° "
W h a t R a w l s i s S 3
afterQuoting t h " 1 ^ 1 ^ ^ W
4 g n e 0 r m e r
™ * Passage, s p e a k s of " t r e a t i n g p e o p l e s natural
3 < h i S c h e m e
woutd'have " h k h ™ n e t ^n™™f" * w o u l d be preferred
ob u n d e r S
b Te ac ba lue s Je both jobs
contrary, is based o n t h T s ^ m e n^n^'l
U
S i m p l e

d e r a
>
f e a s i b l e
- ' °" T
exceptionals prefer the c o m n W ^ K • , " " s c h e m e s s o m e of the
mini 1 1 1 reWardS ntHiS a S S U m p t i n 55
' " " S u c h fo'r^u^S
P TJ
™" S ™ * ^ ' ° °'
u s e d for the c o m m o n b e n e f i t ^ ' ? h ^ f ?1" ^ " ' " g s - Rawls d e s c r i b e s w h a t i s to be h

n u r a l d l s , n b u t i
'' a<uralcontingencies'MWOSi7 = 1 ^ o n o f abUities" (RMC145; HAM647),
d l f f e r e n c e s ( K C M T 5 5 1 a w i s s o i n
correctly noted, for e x a m p l e in Martin RrTt^ " » « P ' *
 N a t u r a l E n d o w m e n t s a n d Desert, 6.1 75

assets a s a collective r e s o u r c e " (ASU 228-9). Sandel, after q u o t i n g b o t h ,

p a r a p h r a s e s t h e m b y s a y i n g t h a t Rawls "regardls] p e o p l e ' s n a t u r a l
12
assets as c o m m o n p r o p e r t y " (LLJ 7 8 ) .
With this p o i n t c l e a r e d u p , a n u m b e r of further issues raised by
Nozick a n d S a n d e l t u r n o u t t o b e irrelevant. T h u s Sandel, again d r a w ­
ing u p o n Nozick, s p e n d s a g o o d d e a l of effort (LLJ 96-103) o n t h e
question w h e t h e r , if e n d o w m e n t s d o n o t b e l o n g to t h o s e w h o "have"
them, it follows t h a t t h e y b e l o n g to society or h u m a n k i n d at large, or
w h e t h e r t h e y m i g h t b e l o n g t o n o o n e at all? This q u e s t i o n r e a p p e a r s in
his later d i s c u s s i o n of affirmative a c t i o n (LLJ 135-47), w h e r e h e writes:
"The a r b i t r a r i n e s s of a n individual's a s s e t s a r g u e s only against t h e
proposition t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l o w n s t h e m or h a s a privileged claim to
their benefits, n o t in favor of t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t s o m e p a r t i c u l a r
society o w n s t h e m o r h a s a privileged claim w i t h r e s p e c t to t h e m . And
unless t h i s s e c o n d p r o p o s i t i o n c a n b e established, t h e r e w o u l d s e e m
no g r o u n d s for favoring a utilitarian d i s p e n s a t i o n of s u c h a s s e t s a n d
e n d o w m e n t s r a t h e r t h a n j u s t letting t h e m lie w h e r e t h e y fall" (LLJ 141).
Rawls, far from s e e k i n g t o e s t a b l i s h t h e s e c o n d , h a s n o r e a s o n to d e n y
the first p r o p o s i t i o n . W i t h i n t h e o p t i o n s p a c e available in a just social
system, p e r s o n s s h o u l d h a v e t h e right to d e v e l o p o r n o t to develop, to
exercise or n o t t o exercise, t h e i r e n d o w m e n t s as t h e y w i s h a n d s h o u l d
he entitled to t h e full benefits offered for t h e i r efforts in this regard. T h e
question Rawls a n d R o n a l d Dworkin are raising is w h e t h e r having
greater e n d o w m e n t s s h o u l d entitle p e r s o n s to a n y t h i n g else, s u c h as a
higher i n c o m e , p r e f e r e n t i a l t r e a t m e n t b y university a d m i s s i o n b o a r d s ,
a n d so forth.
In S a n d e l ' s c a s e , t h e m i s r e a d i n g is all t h e m o r e p u z z l i n g in view of his
exemplarily c l e a r g r a s p of t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l issue. He writes: "In o r d e r
for m e t o d e s e r v e t h e benefits a s s o c i a t e d w i t h m y ' s u p e r i o r intel-

andel
tn vvhich° R f
t h e third o c c u r r e n c e of the expression, a s e n t e n c e
d o e s
d o

i n
e s n o t a u o t e

differen . d e e d s u g g e s t t h e c o m m o n - p r o p e r t y view: "By a c c e p t i n g the

C P n n C p l e f t h e l e s s
used f o r t h ' ' f°rtunate] v i e w the greater abilities as a social asset to be
c o m m o n
nor Sanri l advantage" (TJ 107). This careless phrasing, cited by neither Nozick
w o u l d
senten c o u n t in favor of their reading, at least if there weren't'the two parallel
e S t n e r e w e r e a n v
ndowrn ^, o t h e r i n d i c a t i o n s that Rawls regards people's natural
n S S c o m m o n
writing N ' t' property."' Still, it m u s t be n o t e d that b y the time of Sandel's
Z S 6 3 1 0
cause R °| 'h ' " t e r p r ' ' " h a d b e c o m e w i d e s p r e a d , presumably in large part be-
S n e v e r
cornmet explicitly r e p u d i a t e d it. Even s o sympathetic and knowledgeable a
1 0 t 0 r a S c a r u n
an u f f ^ ° writes: "As Rawls says, t h e terms of this principle are equivalent
rectly .^"S to regard natural abilities as a c o m m o n asset" (RTJ 203)—after ror-
n S R a w , s s
^gard d ? R s t a t e m e n t that t h e distribution of natural abilities i s to b e s o
e } 1 9 9 )
ijw t n . - T h e c o m m o n - a s s e t formulations are n o t o n l y infelicitous, t h u s invit-
I S U n C , e r S t a n d i n g 1 h a v e d i s c u s s e d T h
°roadlv " e y are also undistinctive in that t h e y fit any
C O n s e ( u e n u a s ,
justice ^ 'i criterion for a s s e s s i n g basic structures. Even c o n c e p t i o n s of
0 n C e r n e d W t b t h e n c o m e
"ourish^ ' ' °f t h e better e n d o w e d or general h a p p i n e s s or the
f a F t S a n d s c i e n c e s for
"tents ° < e x a m p l e , w o u l d treat the distribution of e n d o w -
38 a c o m m o n a s s e
exercis f t b y d e m a n d i n g that institutions affecting the d e v e l o p m e n t and
6 n a t u r a l
criteric- e n d o w m e n t s b e d e s i g n e d s o as optimally to satisfy the c h o s e n
76 Natural E n d o w m e n t s a n d Desert, 6.2

ligence, say, it is n e c e s s a r y b o t h t h a t I p o s s e s s m y intelligence (in some

non-arbitrary s e n s e of p o s s e s s i o n ) , a n d t h a t I h a v e a right (in a strong,
pre-institutional s e n s e of right) t h a t society v a l u e intelligence rather
t h a n s o m e t h i n g else. But o n Rawls' a c c o u n t , n e i t h e r c o n d i t i o n holds
(LLJ 77). Here Sandel u n d e r s t a n d s t h a t i n o r d e r t o d e n y t h e conjunc­
13
tion, o n e d o e s n o t need t o d e n y m o r e t h a n t h e s e c o n d c o n d i t i o n . How
d o e s h e get t h e idea t h a t Rawls, w h o s e a i m i s t o a r g u e "from widely
a c c e p t e d b u t w e a k p r e m i s e s " (TJ 18), unnecessarily invokes t h e shock­
ing c o m m o n - p r o p e r t y claim? O n e m i g h t b e t e m p t e d t o think that
Sandel, so close a r e a d e r of Rawls, falls for Nozick's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n only
b e c a u s e it fits s o wonderfully into his overall a t t a c k o n Rawls's (or "the
liberal") c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n (to b e d i s c u s s e d i n §§8-9)-
6.2. While this m a y b e so, it w o u l d b e unfair t o c l a i m t h a t Sandel is
taking a few s e n t e n c e s o u t of c o n t e x t a n d t h e n u s i n g t h e m to support a
perverse c o n s t r u a l of Rawls's position. T h i s is c l o s e r t o w h a t Nozick
does, brilliantly. Sandel m a n a g e s t o c o n n e c t t h e s e m i s r e a d i n g s in a
systematic w a y a n d e n d s u p w i t h a r e a s o n a b l y c o h e r e n t a c c o u n t of
large p o r t i o n s of Rawls's text, a s w e c a n s e e in a d i s c u s s i o n of t h e third
quotation of m y o p e n i n g set (§5.1), t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t " n o o n e deserves
his place in t h e distribution of native e n d o w m e n t s " (TJ 104), that such
e n d o w m e n t s a r e "arbitrary from a m o r a l p o i n t of v i e w " (TJ 312). To
m a k e things m o r e vivid, let u s personify t h e d o u b t R a w l s is addressing
in t h e s e p h r a s e s . S u p p o s e a n exceptionally gifted p e r s o n , Genius, has
l o d g e d t h i s c o m p l a i n t against t h e difference p r i n c i p l e : "Perhaps it
w o u l d b e nice, o t h e r t h i n g s equal, t o a r r a n g e a s c h e m e of economic
institutions s o that t h e inequalities it p r o d u c e s t e n d t o o p t i m i z e the
smallest representative s h a r e . But o t h e r t h i n g s a r e n o t e q u a l . I a m a lot
m o r e t a l e n t e d t h a n most, a n d I d e s e r v e t h e s e t a l e n t s t o g e t h e r w i t h the
greater i n c o m e t h a t flows from t h e m . It is n o t right t h a t t h e possibility
of (mtraschemically) benefiting from o n e ' s e n d o w m e n t s s h o u l d be in­
c o r p o r a t e d into t h e e c o n o m i c s c h e m e o n l y insofar a s s u c h incorpora­
tion (mterschemically) e n h a n c e s t h e s m a l l e s t s h a r e . "
to c o p e w i t h this complaint, it w o u l d b e e n o u g h t o c h a l l e n g e Ge­
n i u s s p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t s o m e t h i n g - n a t u r a l l y , a s it w e r e — " f l ° v *
from h e r talents. 1 Rawls m a k e s this r e s p o n s e , a s S a n d e l appreciates-
S m l uTri"'!! a n o
G e n i u s ' s a r g u m e n t as well,t n e r l i n k i n

6 e &
nTSl^f ^ ^™ h e r t a l e n t s S
K w h e t h e r h e n e e d s to or o R a w

n h u n s e l f w i t h a
S^drt^Kf s t i n g e r c o m m i t m e n t . T o e x p l a i n what
C O m m i t o
cSstniP^h e n t t o be, let m e c o n j e c t u r e h o w h e would
spondTngto: ^ K a u a A b y G e n i m t h a t
* e n t e r t a i n i n g a n d re- R a w l s

i S n 1
P^^Hn^X^ ' C O m n
t h i s c l e a r
- There are t w o equally clear parallel
musTpresuppose ihat Z ^ ^° d a k n 8
"The difference p i W "
l i k e

has some prior title o7c am? L u ^ 7 ° f a S S e , S t Q

°w h
yi c h t h e c m m u n i t a s a w h
 N a t u r a l E n d o w m e n t s a n d Desert, 6.2 77

(a) I h a v e e n d o w m e n t s .
(b) O n e d e s e r v e s w h a t e v e r e n d o w m e n t s o n e h a s ; w h i c h i s t o s a v : it i s
p r o p e r t h a t o n e h a v e t h e m , it w o u l d b e w r o n g for o n e t o b e d e p r i v e d o f
them, a n d s o forth.
(c) I d e s e r v e m y e n d o w m e n t s [ f r o m (a) a n d (b)J.
(d) H e n c e , I d e s e r v e t h e g o o d s t h a t flow f r o m t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d e x ­
ercise of m y e n d o w m e n t s .

Sandel a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t Rawls d e n i e s t h e t r a n s i t i o n from (c) to (d),

and that t h i s d e n i a l is e n o u g h t o t u r n a w a y t h e c o m p l a i n t . Still, Sandel
finds h i m d i s p u t i n g (c) a s well, r e p e a t e d l y d e n y i n g t h a t " t h e p e r s o n
with g r e a t e r n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s d e s e r v e s t h o s e a s s e t s " (TJ 103). Be­
cause h e d e n i e s (c), Rawls is c o m m i t t e d to d e n y i n g e i t h e r (a) o r (b),
because t h e s e t o g e t h e r i m p l y (c). But h o w c o u l d Rawls possibly d e n y
either, if b o t h s e e m s o p l a u s i b l e ? T h e i n g e n i o u s a n s w e r Sandel at­
tributes to Rawls is t h a t (a) a n d (b) a r e b o t h true, b u t that t h e y d o not
employ t h e s a m e s e n s e of "to h a v e " a n d therefore d o not i m p l y (c);
"Rawls' a r g u m e n t from a r b i t r a r i n e s s u n d e r m i n e s d e s e r t not directly,
by claiming I c a n n o t deserve w h a t is arbitrarily given, b u t indirectly, by
showing that I c a n n o t possess w h a t is arbitrarily given, t h a t is, that T,
qua subject of p o s s e s s i o n , c a n n o t p o s s e s s it in t h e u n d i s t a n c e d , con­
stitutive s e n s e n e c e s s a r y to p r o v i d e a d e s e r t b a s e " (LLJ 85). This a n s w e r
powerfully s u p p o r t s S a n d e l ' s chief t h e s i s a b o u t Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of
the p e r s o n , c o n d e n s e d i n t o t h e refrain: "On Rawls' c o n c e p t i o n , t h e
characteristics I p o s s e s s d o n o t attach to t h e self b u t are only related to
the self, s t a n d i n g a l w a y s a t a c e r t a i n d i s t a n c e . T h i s is w h a t m a k e s t h e m
attributes r a t h e r t h a n c o n s t i t u e n t s of m y p e r s o n ; t h e y are mine r a t h e r
than m e , t h i n g s I have r a t h e r t h a n a m " (LLJ 85).
This i m p r e s s i v e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of Rawls's t r e a t m e n t of d e s e r t goes
w r o n g b y m i s c o n s t r u i n g t h e s e n s e in w h i c h Rawls is s p e a k i n g of d e s e r t .
According t o Rawls, for o n e t o d e s e r v e s o m e t h i n g entails t h a t it is
p r o p e r t h a t o n e h a v e it. But it m e a n s m o r e . Desert, for Rawls, is moral
deservingness, a reflection of o n e ' s m o r a l w o r t h in virtue of w h i c h a l o n e
one c a n Deserve a n y t h i n g . T h i s m a y n o t b e t h e o r d i n a r y s e n s e of t h e
term. Rawls s u g g e s t s a s m u c h w h e n h e occasionally s p e a k s m o r e fully
of moral d e s e r t a n d , o n c e , w h e n h e h a s t h e b r o a d e r s e n s e in m i n d , talks
of p e o p l e b e i n g " d e s e r v i n g i n t h e o r d i n a r y s e n s e " (TJ 74). Still, t h e r e can
14
be n o d o u b t t h a t t h e s t r o n g e r , n a r r o w e r n o t i o n is t h e o n e h e is u s i n g .
It follows t h a t m a n y t h i n g s d e s e r v e d in t h e o r d i n a r y s e n s e are not
Deserved in R a w l s ' s . You m a y h a v e w o r k e d all y o u r life o n y o u r a u t o ­
b i o g r a p h y a n d t h u s d e s e r v e t h e National Book Award, b u t y o u w o u l d
still n o t Deserve it i n Rawls's s e n s e , u n l e s s y o u r efforts s o m e h o w testi­
fied to y o u r s u p e r i o r moral w o r t h .
. "For e x a m p l e , Rawls writes, "there is a t e n d e n c y for c o m m o n s e n s e to s u p p o s e . t h a t
"icome a n d w e a l t h , a n d t h e g o o d t h i n g s generally, s h o u l d b e distributed accordtng to
moral desert. Justice is h a p p i n e s s a c c o r d i n g to virtue" (TJ 3101.
78 Natural E n d o w m e n t s a n d Desert, 6.3

6.3. With this n a r r o w e r s e n s e of Desert in m i n d , w e c a n also under­

s t a n d Rawls's claim t h a t t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s is
morally arbitrary. Rawls is n o t s a y i n g t h a t t h e r e is n o m o r a l reason to
leave e n d o w m e n t s w h e r e w e find t h e m — o f c o u r s e t h e r e is—but that
differences i n e n d o w m e n t s d o n o t , w i t h i n t h e c o n c e p t i o n of social
justice, signify differences in m o r a l w o r t h . T h i s c l a i m d o e s n o t presup­
p o s e t h a t native e n d o w m e n t s a r e a m a t t e r of l u c k o r f o r t u n e . Even if
p e o p l e h a d to have w o r k e d very h a r d t o b e b r i g h t o r a t h l e t i c , t h e s e traits
w o u l d still b e arbitrary from a m o r a l p o i n t of view. T h o s e w h o don t
care to b e c o m e bright o r athletic t h r o u g h h a r d w o r k a r e n o t therefore
to b e c o n s i d e r e d morally inferior (as far a s o u r s h a r e d p u b l i c concep­
tion of justice is c o n c e r n e d ) . So in Rawls's t e r m i n o l o g y t h e two locu­
tions express t h e s a m e d i s t i n c t i o n : s o m e t h i n g w e h a v e is morally arbi­
trary just in c a s e o u r having it is n o t D e s e r v e d .
Given this distinction, t h e r e are t w o different w a y s in w h i c h a prac­
tice or a set of n a t u r a l rights a n d d u t i e s m a y specify s o m e t h i n g as a
p e r s o n ' s d u e . If s o m e t h i n g is d u e y o u in t h e w i d e r s e n s e , t h e n you
o u g h t to have it, it is right t h a t y o u h a v e it, a n d it w o u l d b e w r o n g for
y o u to b e deprived of it. I h a v e b e e n e x p r e s s i n g t h i s s e n s e of " d u e " by
s p e a k i n g — w i t h Nozick—of y o u r b e i n g entitled t o s o m e t h i n g . One
might stretch this t e r m by i n c l u d i n g u n d e r t h e label of entitlements
also u n d e s i r a b l e things t h a t are d u e y o u , s u c h a s a d e b i t o r a punish­
m e n t . In this s t r e t c h e d s e n s e , being e n t i t l e d to s o m e t h i n g d o e s not
entail t h a t y o u have a choice w h e t h e r to receive it o r n o t . You m a y or
m a y not have s u c h a choice.
Something is d u e y o u in t h e n a r r o w s e n s e o n l y if y o u a r e e n t i t l e d to it
in virtue o f y o u r m o r a l Deservingness, t h a t is, in v i r t u e of a m o r a l quality
of yourself o r a m o r a l quality of s o m e t h i n g y o u h a v e d o n e . Y o u r d u e in
this s e n s e p r e s u p p o s e s Desert (moral Deservingness) o n y o u r part. »
w o u l d n o t b e u n n a t u r a l to s p e a k of d e s e r t i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h most of
y o u r e n t i t l e m e n t s (salary, a w a r d s , vacations) a n d in o t h e r c o n t e x t s as
well (good luck, ill-behaved children, a n a c c i d e n t ) , b u t w e m u s t stick to
the n a r r o w n o t i o n b e c a u s e it is t h e o n e Rawls is u s i n g .
Keeping this n o t i o n of Desert in m i n d , let m e give a c o u n t e r s k e t c h of
m e a r g u m e n t by Genius t h a t Rawls is e n t e r t a i n i n g a n d r e s p o n d i n g to:

(a) 1 have endowments.

IB) One Deserves whatever endowments one has, which is to say, one's
endowments reflect ones moral worth, are a sign of moral Deserving-
endowment
mi ISIT? ^ l
s f'rom (a) and (B)>.
t h e g d s t n a t flow
e x e r S 7ot my endowments.
exercise f ° °° the development and

"ke?ch Let m T n ntht ^ P^ intS

jKita^Z -r, °
D

t
1 0

°
t h e c o n
™ of t h e p r e v i o u s a r g u m e n t
a b U t
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e com­
c l

t h i s

plaint Rawls seeks t o block. T o begin w i t h , s i n c e (C) is s t r o n g e r t h a n (c),

 N a t u r a l E n d o w m e n t s a n d Desert, 6.3 79

the last s t e p of t h e r e a s o n i n g h a s b e c o m e m u c h m o r e plausible. If

Genius is m o r a l l y m o r e w o r t h y t h a n o t h e r s less well e n d o w e d , t h e n
one m a y b e t e m p t e d t o b e l i e v e — a s Rawls t h i n k s c o m m o n s e n s e is
t e m p t e d (n. 1 4 ) — t h a t s h e s h o u l d h a v e a h i g h e r i n c o m e too. A n d t h u s
my c o u n t e r s k e t c h m a k e s m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i b l e w h y Rawls s h o u l d
have s e e n t h e n e e d t o c o m p l e m e n t h i s d e n i a l of t h e last s t e p by
denying its s t a r t i n g p o i n t a s well.
Next, Rawls's d e n i a l of (C) is fully c o n s i s t e n t w i t h (a), (b), a n d (c), w i t h
what, o n m y r e a d i n g , Rawls s i m p l y takes for g r a n t e d : p e r s o n s have t h e i r
natural e n d o w m e n t s i n a thick, constitutive s e n s e a n d a r e fully entitled
to (exercise c o n t r o l over) t h e m . T h e r e is n o q u e s t i o n that Genius's
talents m u s t n o t b e d e s t r o y e d o r t a m p e r e d w i t h o r taxed a n d that s h e
1 5
must n o t b e c o e r c e d to d e v e l o p or exercise t h e m . T h e denial of (C)
gives n o s u p p o r t t o S a n d e l ' s v i e w t h a t Rawls thinks of e n d o w m e n t s as
only t e n u o u s l y c o n n e c t e d t o t h e i r "repository'' or "guardian'' (LLJ 97),
so that "it m a t t e r s little h o w s o m e c a m e to reside in y o u a n d o t h e r s in
me" (LLJ 74).
Finally, t h e p r e m i s e Rawls c h a l l e n g e s is (B), claiming that it is n o
moral d i s t i n c t i o n t o b e gifted, t h a t t h e b e t t e r e n d o w e d are not for this
reason m o r e w o r t h y , m o r a l l y : "Surely a p e r s o n ' s m o r a l w o r t h d o e s not
vary a c c o r d i n g t o h o w m a n y offer similar skills, o r h a p p e n to w a n t w h a t
he can p r o d u c e . N o o n e s u p p o s e s t h a t w h e n s o m e o n e ' s abilities are
less in d e m a n d o r h a v e d e t e r i o r a t e d (as in t h e c a s e of singers) h i s m o r a l
deservingness u n d e r g o e s a s i m i l a r shift" (TJ 311). It s e e m s q u i t e likely
that Nozick a n d S a n d e l , h a d t h e y a p p r e c i a t e d h i s p o i n t , w o u l d have
agreed w i t h Rawls. Nozick, at a n y rate, is c o n s t r a i n e d to agree, for
u n d e r h i s o w n s c h e m e r e w a r d s a r e d e t e r m i n e d by existing m a r k e t
d e m a n d , a n d s o G e n i u s w o u l d b e u n a b l e t o e a r n r e w a r d s for exercising
her t a l e n t s if p e o p l e w e r e e i t h e r u n a b l e o r unwilling t o p a y h e r for s u c h
exercise. So N o z i c k a n d Rawls a r e h e r e in full a g r e e m e n t . While G e n i u s
has every right t o e a r n a n y s p e c i a l r e w a r d s for t h e exercise of h e r
talents t h a t m a y b e offered u n d e r t h e p r e f e r r e d s c h e m e (and is surely
fully e n t i t l e d t o w h a t e v e r r e w a r d s s h e m a y h a v e so earned), s h e h a s n o
claim t h a t t h e r e b e a s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h s u c h r e w a r d s are offered, let
alone r e w a r d s of a n y p a r t i c u l a r k i n d or m a g n i t u d e . Of c o u r s e , Rawls
a n d Nozick d i s a g r e e a b o u t w h a t e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s are just. T h e y
merely agree t h a t t h e a n s w e r t o this q u e s t i o n is n o t c o n s t r a i n e d by
claims of m o r a l w o r t h b a s e d o n n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s . Sandel, o n t n e
other h a n d , believes t h a t t h i s a n s w e r is c o n s t r a i n e d by s o m e claims or
moral w o r t h a n d D e s e r t . I d i s c u s s his view in c a s e s w h e r e s u c h claims
have a m o r e p l a u s i b l e b a s i s t h a n n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s ($7.3), b u t nrsi,
let u s b r i n g t h e w h o l e t o p i c of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s t o a c o n c l u s i o n .
l 5
T n e is o n e p a s s a g e 1 m u s t d i s c o u n t a s a slip: "No o n e deserves 1 J ^ t e r r»tural
r e

< * P * % . . . . But it d o e f n o t follow that o n e s h o u l d eliminate t h e f f ' s t m c t w n s . Th ere >s

another w a y to deal w i t h t h e m " (TJ 102). Nozick rightly
a r e n ' t a n o t h e r w a y to d e a l w i t h t h e m ? Kawls h a s corrected the s h p in the u e r m
translation (TG 122).
80 Natural E n d o w m e n t s a n d D e s e r t , 6.4

6.4. Rawls h o l d s t h a t e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s s h o u l d b e ranked on

broadly c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t g r o u n d s , specifically, a c c o r d i n g t o t h e worst
social position e a c h t e n d s t o p r o d u c e . W h e t h e r a n d t o w h a t extent the
favored e c o n o m i c g r o u n d r u l e s w o u l d l e a d t o differentials i n income
(etc.) b a s e d on differentials i n n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s is left open by
Rawls, t o b e settled t h r o u g h t h e difference p r i n c i p l e i n light of empiri­
cal c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s a p p r o a c h i s s u b j e c t t o t w o m a i n s o r t s of attack on
behalf of t h e b e t t e r e n d o w e d : o n e i n s i s t s t h a t t h e p r a c t i c e s a n d pro­
cesses t h a t are t o r e g u l a t e e c o n o m i c i n t e r a c t i o n s h o u l d b e c h o s e n in a
w a y t h a t reflects t h e superior bargaining position of t h e better en­
d o w e d ; t h e o t h e r m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e b e t t e r e n d o w e d , i n virtue of their
g r e a t e r moral Deservingness, o u g h t t o r e c e i v e s p e c i a l r e w a r d s (of a
certain relative o r a b s o l u t e m a g n i t u d e ) for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d ex­
ercise of their e n d o w m e n t s . T h e s e a t t a c k s m a y b e u s e d t o assert that
t h e r e are morally obvious p r o c e s s e s ( w h i c h a r e t o b e c h o s e n regardless
of t h e p a t t e r n t h e y w o u l d yield) o r t h a t t h e c h o s e n e c o n o m i c scheme or
t h e distribution it w o u l d p r o d u c e m u s t satisfy c e r t a i n moral con­
straints.
I have d i s c u s s e d h o w Rawls c a n b l o c k t h e s e a t t a c k s . H e c a n resist the
assertion of morally obvious p r a c t i c e s a n d p r o c e s s e s a n d reject the
claim t h a t p e r s o n s Deserve t h e i r n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s . N e i t h e r of these
a e t e n s e s relies o n a n y p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e self, let a l o n e on the
a s s e r t i o n s Sandel a t t r i b u t e s t o R a w l s - t h a t " t h e v a r i o u s n a t u r a l assets
1 1 3 0 1
^ • T * b o m m a y b e said t o ' b e l o n g ' t o m e i n t h e weak,
of n w r f I 8 6 " 5 6 t h 3
a c c i d e n t a l l y w i t h i n m e , b u t t h i s sense
t t h e y reside

rthtT^?h P
° r p o s s e s s i o n
a n r i o t e s t a b l i s h t h a t I h a v e a n y special c

S £ ^ rT?ut0 ™y Privileged c l a i m t o t h e fruits of

t h 6 S e 3 S s e t s o r

I n t h 1 a U
™ ! ! ' , ' * n u a t e d s e n s e of p o s s e s s i o n , I a m n o t really the
h e
a S t S r ^ l ^ ° a r d
P°smory of t h e a s s o r t e d assets and i a n r re

a
rfSZS^S ^ - P bout R a w l s ' s treatment
< L U 8 2 ) T h e d i s u t e

UX U n
a £ T L ^ t h T T J ™ ° ' P ° l a m i n a t i o n , t o h a v e nothing
a b U t h i s
These defrn * c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n . °
n^J^SZ^ t o , e
^
reason w h y a just eco-
, n
t h 6 r e i s n o m o r a l

oSS5fc^„" l l 1 T
» g e n e r a t e s s h o u l d reflect d i s t r i b u t i o n

It £ ta«£££ to n n f ^ ° ~ in o n e w a y o r a n o t h e r o r not at all.

d s

t h 3 t t W s result
that d o e s Tt °™
n d e f e n d s a n y p a t t e r n preference
, 0 n n a t U r a l e n d o
p a i t i X Ye t h e ' ,, ^ e n t s , not m e r e l y Rawls's in
the n J ^ c S i S f " ^ S i g n i f i c a n t . I n t h e abstract, t h 6 r e f 0 r e

e p i m i 2 e d i n t h e
higWy plausible a n d 0r o ' t 1, ! 1° difference p r i n c i p l e , is t

^ l ^ ^ S T -
c o n c e d e s , "If s o m e h o w t h e ^ N o z i c k

distribution s o m Z L T realized t h a t p u r s u i n g an equal 1 1W a s

Uld ead
might o c c T ^ e D elr total pie t h a n otherwise i t 0 a s m a l l e r

W e l 1 t o a n
w h i c h raised t h e siz* rrf . K T u n e q u a l distribution
< A S U 1 9 8 c l 2 3 1 1B u t tf
have argued, t £ ^ £ ^ T i b ^ ' ' ' ' S 1
e p , e l s n t c a
have a n y moral b e a r m ^ n r , ^ ™ ° t (justifiably)
r e a r i n g o n o u r p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e i n m a t t e r s of justice,
 Desert, 7.1 81

then Nozick c o u l d b e p e r s u a d e d t o a c c e p t w h a t e v e r e c o n o m i c p r o c e s s
does best b y t h e difference p r i n c i p l e . A m o n g p a t t e r n p r e f e r e n c e s t h a t
do not m e n t i o n n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s Rawls's criterion m i g h t well w i n
out almost b y default.

7. D e s e r t

7.1. G r o u n d r u l e s r e g u l a t e t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of benefits a n d b u r d e n s
among i n d i v i d u a l s a n d a s s o c i a t i o n s o n t h e basis of various p r e d i c a t e s
that are t r u e of t h e m o r of t h e i r c o n d u c t . I will say that g r o u n d r u l e s are
moralized insofar a s t h e p r e d i c a t e s t h e y invoke are p r e d i c a t e s of m o r a l
evaluation. T h u s , w h e n g r o u n d r u l e s classify certain k i n d s of c o n d u c t
as right o r w r o n g o r c e r t a i n k i n d s of p e r s o n s or a s s o c i a t i o n s as morally
better o r w o r s e , t h e n a n y benefits or b u r d e n s a t t a c h e d to s u c h p r e d i ­
cates are (positive o r negative) s a n c t i o n s that, w h e n correctly applied,
are Deserved b y t h e i r r e c i p i e n t s . Conversely, g r o u n d rules are un-
moralized insofar a s t h e p r e d i c a t e s t h e y invoke are n o n m o r a l . Any
benefits o r b u r d e n s a t t a c h e d t o s u c h predicates—(dis)incentives, for
e x a m p l e — a r e v i e w e d a s m e r e l y d e s e r v e d , n o t Deserved. In s u c h c a s e s
16
the moral quality of p e r s o n s o r t h e i r c o n d u c t is n o t at i s s u e .
Let m e give a s i m p l e illustration of t h e distinction. Take, in o u r
culture, a l a w t h a t i m p o s e s s o m e tax o n interest i n c o m e . This law is
partly u n m o r a l i z e d . T h e r e is n o t h i n g morally u n w o r t h y a b o u t e a r n i n g
interest, a n d s o t h e t a x is n o t a p u n i s h m e n t . In this t h e tax is akin to t h e
interest itself, w h i c h also is m e r e l y e a r n e d , n o t Deserved. Investing
one's m o n e y for i n t e r e s t is n o b e t t e r o r w o r s e , morally, t h a n s p e n d i n g it
or keeping it u n d e r o n e ' s pillow. Yet s u p p o s e t h e law m a k e s it a n
offense to e v a d e t h e tax. It w o u l d t h e n , in this respect, b e m o r a l i z e d . It
is w r o n g t o e a r n i n t e r e s t w i t h o u t p a y i n g t h e tax, a n d a n y fine for d o i n g
so is a p u n i s h m e n t .
This d i s t i n c t i o n m a k e s Rawls's task h a r d e r t h a n it m a y initially a p ­
pear. He is offering u s t h e original p o s i t i o n t o g e t h e r w i t h a r g u m e n t s
about h o w p a r t i e s s o s i t u a t e d w o u l d go a b o u t regulating h u m a n inter­
action. H e r e Rawls s e e k s t o s h o w t h a t t h e y w o u l d a d o p t a p a r t i c u l a r set
1 7
of n a t u r a l rights a n d d u t i e s a n d a criterion of justice for t h e assess-
" T h e d i s t i n c t i o n d r a w n h e r e is p u r e l v descriptive. So i leave o p e n what moral or
nonmoral p r e d i c a t e s m a y b e i m p o r t a n t in or m a y b e incorporated into the g r o u n d m e s
°f a given society. M o r e o v e r t h e d i s t i n c t i o n is not entirely sharp. A parking ticket m a y (in
our culture) b e a b o r d e r l i n e c a s e , in that it c a n b e v i e w e d as a Deserved p u m s h m e n for
"aving d o n e s o m e t h i n g w r o n g or also a s a m e r e disincentive morally o n a par with a
parkingfee. . . .
9 3 5 1
"Rawls p r e s e n t s h i s a c c o u n t of natural d u t i e s in TJ § § 1 8 , J ' . " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ' ^
hold b e t w e e n p e r s o n s irrespective of their institutional relationships, (TJ U5l a n a
t o s s c t o
"Klude the d u t i e s n o t t o b e cruel, not to harm or injure the innocent, h ° ^ ^
t '
h
f l p t h o s e in n e e d , a n d to c o n t r i b u t e to t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of just m s t t t u t i o n , (TJ 1 0 a
" 4 - 1 5 , 3 3 4 , 3 3 7 - 3 9 ) . It i s s o m e t i m e s overlooked that the a c c o u n t of natural d u t . e s a s ^ s o
* o s e n through t h e original p o s i t i o n (TJ 1 1 6 , 3 3 4 , 3 3 8 t . T h u s , like the c n t e n o n of justice, .t
82 Desert, 7.2

m e n t of institutional g r o u n d rules. H e t h e n invites u s t o check these

natural duties a n d some
basic s t r u c t u r e s t h a t m i g h t plausibly satisfy
his criterion of justice u n d e r s t i p u l a t e d e m p i r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s against
o u r c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s . Is w h a t Rawlsian i n s t i t u t i o n s w o u l d specify
as a p e r s o n ' s d u e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h w h a t w e intuitively believe o n e ought
to have o r receive? Yet a n affirmative a n s w e r t o t h i s q u e s t i o n is not
e n o u g h , for n o t only m u s t a p e r s o n ' s d u e b y Rawls's lights m a t c h what
w e intuitively think is d u e , b u t t h e t w o s e n s e s of due m u s t match as
well. Even if w h a t p e r s o n s a r e e n t i t l e d to, p u r s u a n t t o Rawls's natural
d u t i e s a n d u n d e r Rawlsian g r o u n d r u l e s , is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h what we
think p e r s o n s s h o u l d b e entitled t o , t h e r e m a y still b e disagreement
a b o u t w h i c h of t h e s e e n t i t l e m e n t s s h o u l d involve D e s e r t . A n d even this
is n o t all. We m u s t also b e satisfied t h a t Rawls is right a b o u t which
Deserts a n d m e r e e n t i t l e m e n t s a r e n a t u r a l a n d w h i c h institutional, that
is, w h i c h arise b e t w e e n p e r s o n s g e n e r a l l y (even in t h e absence of
s h a r e d institutions) a n d w h i c h arise only a m o n g p a r t i c i p a n t s in an
o n g o i n g practice o r institutional s c h e m e .
T h e s e t w o crosscutting d i s t i n c t i o n s ( m o r a l i z e d / u n m o r a l i z e d and
natural/institutional) yield four categories of e n t i t l e m e n t s , namely,
benefits a n d b u r d e n s t h a t p e r s o n s (a) D e s e r v e a c c o r d i n g t o a natural
taw (such a s a p u n i s h m e n t for cruelty); (b) Deserve u n d e r t h e terms of
a n institutional s c h e m e (such a s a fine o r a jail s e n t e n c e ) ; (c) a r e entitled
t o a c c o r d i n g t o a n a t u r a l l a w b u t d o n o t D e s e r v e ( m i n i m a l r e s p e c t and
nonviolence,
U
p e r h a p s ) ; o r (d) a r e e n t i t l e d t o u n d e r t h e t e r m s of an
,?rvl tf b u t d
™ > (salaries, t a x e s , g o o d s and o n o t D e s e

rriS P
D
a i d
; s 'a v ' c h Rawls refers t o a s legitimate expectations
o r e t c ) w h i

«.m*hi, k
a U S G
f n o t h i n
g a b o u t e n t i t l e m e n t s of t h e first kind, pre-
t Z Z « l f
a r e
P s e d e d , o n c e r e a s o n a b l y j u s t institu-
t h 8 6 s u e r

S e n t l t l e l e n t s o f
° n r i n " t h e s e c o n d k i n d . Still, h e c a n s a y that,
D e s e , e d
civUTw JL 7 P u n i s h m e n t is m e t e d o u t i n a c c o r d a n c e with a
t
m g u n i s h e
uTJZ'Jtr* P d c a n always b e v i e w e d a s also the

institutinnpl A , " t h l s s e n s e
t h e m o r a l force of all P a r t o f

d 6 r i V e S from o u r n a t
7 T w T h a v ^ K m , e S
^ duties.
com Z?ZnTthZffT
P
lS

d l f f e r e n c e
S
° U g h
ve^ion t t 0
Genius's re)eCt
of)
tion of iusttrVTho w Principle b y d e n y i n g t h a t a concep­
tion T h l ^ T n a t U r
e n d o w m e n t s a s a moral distinc-
a l

haveoSe^^ d refleCt t h e i r m o r a l
give t h e ' m o r e D e ? m °Valid d a i m s t o w o r t h a n d t h u s might
Ueme sTSnri ^ t h a t a n economic
vein Rawls deS m i l P ™ ^ m i g h t leave u n m e t . In this
m a t a m a n
deserves t h e s u p e r i o r c h a r a c t e r that
icaT preS " " v v T r f ™ n m ! i *«««* rather t h a n u p o n s u c h metaphy«-
a
r C
P
S i d e , d
ud

t h e a t u r a l I a w
consistentvvith Rawls's recent^ F " - tradition. T h e a c c o u n t i s the"
W S q U C S t te f ra m o r a l c o n c e t i o n , h a t
Political not metaphysical" uVpm^OC) ° P
 Desert, 7.3 83

enables h i m to m a k e t h e effort t o cultivate his abilities . . . for h i s

character d e p e n d s i n large p a r t u p o n f o r t u n a t e family a n d social cir­
18
c u m s t a n c e s for w h i c h h e c a n c l a i m n o c r e d i t " (TJ 104). T h e r e a s o n
Rawls gives h e r e for t h e d e n i a l is n o t a g o o d o n e . It suggests that h e
requires Desert itself t o b e D e s e r v e d "all t h e w a y d o w n " (cf. Nozick, ASU
225), with t h e r e s u l t t h a t t h e r e is n o Desert at all. Rawls c o u n t e r a c t s this
impression b y i n s i s t i n g t h a t e n t i t l e m e n t s arising u n d e r t h e criminal
law d o involve D e s e r t (TJ 3 1 4 - 1 5 ) . But t h e n Sandel c a n ask with s o m e
plausibility h o w a c r i m i n a l c a n Deserve h e r inferior c h a r a c t e r if it
d e p e n d s in large p a r t u p o n u n f o r t u n a t e family a n d social c i r c u m ­
stances (LLJ 9 1 - 9 2 ) . T h e r e a s o n Rawls gives w o u l d t h e n suggest t h a t
the e c o n o m i c a n d p e n a l s y s t e m s are, pace Rawls, o p p o s i t e s of e a c h
other—two u n m o r a l i z e d s y s t e m s of incentives a n d disincentives (re­
spectively), w h i c h a r e d e s i g n e d t o s t e e r c o n d u c t in t h e interest of
maximizing e c o n o m i c efficiency a n d t h e effectiveness of g r o u n d rules
generally.
Even if t h e r e a s o n Rawls gives is n o t a g o o d o n e , h i s c o n t e n t i o n itself
seems p l a u s i b l e e n o u g h (at least if D e s e r t is u n d e r s t o o d in his n a r r o w
sense). P e r s o n s w h o p u t s c a n t effort into t h e i r careers, p e r h a p s b e c a u s e
they care little for m a t e r i a l w e a l t h or prefer to c o n c e n t r a t e their e n e r ­
gies u p o n o t h e r p r o j e c t s , a r e n o t for this r e a s o n morally less w o r t h y . Of
course, h i g h e r i n c o m e s will g e n e r a l l y b e e a r n e d by t h o s e w h o m a k e
special efforts to d e v e l o p a n d exercise abilities for w h i c h greater re­
wards are offered. B u t t h e s e h i g h e r i n c o m e s are m e r e l y e a r n e d , n o t
Deserved, b e c a u s e s u c h efforts at self-improvement are n o t c o n s i d e r e d
(within o u r p u b l i c c o n c e p t i o n of justice) a form of moral excellence.
That they a r e n o t is o n e r e a s o n p e r s o n s w h o m a k e special efforts to
develop a n d e x e r c i s e u n r e w a r d e d abilities have n o valid g r o u n d s for
complaint. T h a t s o m e h a v e t r a i n e d t h e m s e l v e s to juggle six balls or to
recite the Iliad i m p l i e s n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e i r (moral) Deservingness.
7.3. But t h e o b j e c t i o n m a y b e r e n e w e d o n e last t i m e . Even if Rawls is
"ght t h u s far, s u r e l y t h e r e a r e some forms of m o r a l excellence. Clearly,
some p e r s o n s a r e m o r a l l y b e t t e r h u m a n b e i n g s t h a n o t h e r s , a n d m i g h t
not these p e r s o n s r a i s e a valid c o m p l a i n t against a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e
that is just b y Rawls's c r i t e r i o n , if t h e i r i n c o m e s u n d e r this s c h e m e d o
not reflect t h e i r s u p e r i o r m o r a l c h a r a c t e r ? Let m e sketch s u c h a c o m ­
plaint.

A
*) Courtney has a superior moral character.
,B
*> One Deserves whatever moral character one has, which is to say, one s
moral character reflects one's moral worth, is a sign of moral Deserv­
ingness.
(C*) Courtney Deserves her superior moral character.
(D
*) Courtney is entitled to greater economic rewards.

mini " 3 1 2
' W h 6 r e t h e
^ " S ^ 5 5 t o m a k e e f f o r t i s a S C r f b e d l
° S U p e r i 0 r e n d W
° '
84 Desert, 7.4

In this case, at last, Rawls's first line of d e f e n s e is s u r e l y overwhelmed,

for h e c a n n o t d e n y (C*). T h a t (as Rawls insists) c r i m i n a l s Deserve pun­
i s h m e n t implies t h a t t h e y a r e m o r a l l y l e s s w o r t h y o n a c c o u n t of their
a c t i o n s (and i n t e n t i o n s ) . So surely it is p o s s i b l e t h a t C o u r t n e y is morally
more w o r t h y o n a c c o u n t of her a c t i o n s ( a n d i n t e n t i o n s ) , at least more
w o r t h y t h a n t h e criminals.
Rawls is right t o e m p h a s i z e t h a t "the c o n c e p t of m o r a l w o r t h does
not provide a first p r i n c i p l e of d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e . . . b e c a u s e it cannot
b e i n t r o d u c e d u n t i l after t h e p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e a n d of n a t u r a l duty
a n d obligation" (TJ 312). N e v e r t h e l e s s , s u r e l y w e c o u l d settle on the
n a t u r a l d u t i e s a n d t h e civil a n d political a s p e c t s of a j u s t basic struc­
t u r e first, u s e t h e s e r e s u l t s t o define t h e i d e a of m o r a l l y ( m o r e or less)
w o r t h y citizens a n d h u m a n b e i n g s , a n d t h e n c h o o s e a n economic
s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h (insofar a s is feasible) i n c o m e reflects moral
w o r t h . I n t h i s c a s e t h e e c o n o m i c a n d p e n a l s y s t e m s w o u l d o n c e again
b e o p p o s i t e s of e a c h other, b u t t h e y w o u l d b o t h b e moralized, two
s y s t e m s of (respectively) positive a n d n e g a t i v e s a n c t i o n s that play a
s e c o n d a r y role i n t h e r e i n f o r c e m e n t of d u t i e s a n d g r o u n d rules inde­
p e n d e n t l y defined.
In t h e face of t h i s c o m p l a i n t , Rawls is t h r o w n b a c k u p o n h i s second
line of defense, w h i c h d e n i e s t h e s t e p s f r o m (C) t o (D), a n d from (CI to
(D*): Even p e r s o n s w h o a r e g e n u i n e l y D e s e r v i n g o u g h t n o t therefore to
b e entitled t o larger s h a r e s of social p r i m a r y g o o d s . A b a s i c structure
u n d e r w h i c h s o m e g o o d o r b a d d e e d s g o u n r e q u i t e d i s n o t unjust for
this reason. T h o u g h Rawls is clearly c o m m i t t e d t o t h i s view, h e does
not seek t o s u p p o r t its intuitive plausibility. B u t I t h i n k it w o u l d not be
too h a r d t o d o s o . It m a y b e e n o u g h t o i m a g i n e a s o c i a l s y s t e m i n which
cash p r i z e s a r e p a i d t o t h o s e w h o d o n o t b r e a k a n y l a w s for five years or
in w h i c h all m o r a l w r o n g s (lies, for e x a m p l e ) i n c u r fines, t o s e e t h a t this
is n o t w h a t w e w o u l d t h i n k justice r e q u i r e s .
7.4. This s e c o n d line of d e f e n s e also s h i e l d s R a w l s ' s belief t h a t the
distribution of i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h s h o u l d b e r e g u l a t e d , b y a n d large, by
u n m o r a l i z e d g r o u n d r u l e s . Again w e m u s t rely o n c o n j e c t u r e a s to how
h e w o u l d s u p p o r t this belief. T h e n a t u r a l d u t i e s a n d t h e civil and
political g r o u n d rules of a just b a s i c s t r u c t u r e i m p o s e s i m p l e , "binary
c o n s t r a i n t s o n t ph ei nr s o n s ' c o n d u c t . No m o r a l d i s t i n c t i o n s a r e m a d e (by
tr t h e

f
V a s t

rt h
a

e g
r e

r
n

e a
a
of p e r m i s s i b l e c o n d u c t . Participants
t e s t
s o l e nn ° m o r a l e x c e l l e n c e a s m e a s u r e d on
S C a l e b U t a r e m e r e l
sne^Zt " . y ^ j o i n e d t o refrain f r o m certain
C m l v i n
Ses t « „!T?- n ^ P g w i t h t h e s e n a t u r a l d u t i e s a n d social prac-
ude n£rT , °
m
e

X
S n

m
C

l
1t

e
t

S
h e n
* t i c feats of m o r a l forti-
a r e s o
re uire f a n t a

pmsible a n r i ^ s i g n e d t h a t c o m p l i a n c e is quite
0 1 b e
K^uS^?!! ^ fr° "y y p ' e x
P e c t e d m a o r d i n a r e r s o n

posu^Sl,£ ! T h
°n
18
H t t l e
for i n s t i t u t i o n i z i n g any ° r n o reas

STo The^T S U C
™ g n t even subvert t h e stand­h

ing of the rules by drverting a t t e n t i o n a w a y from t h e m o r a l r e a s o n s for

S a n c t i o n s
 Desert, 7 . 5 85

honoring t h e m , m i g h t i m p e d e t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of a s e n s e of justice.
Punishments will of c o u r s e b e n e e d e d , a n d s o m e of t h e s e m a y take t h e
form of fines. Still, t h e s e will b e rare, a n d organizing t h e entire e c o ­
nomic r e w a r d s y s t e m a r o u n d t h e m w o u l d entail that m o s t p e r s o n s
would receive ( a n d Deserve) t h e e q u a l m a x i m u m i n c o m e of a law-
abiding citizen. Against s u c h a s c h e m e Rawls c a n plausibly ask: W h y
not " u n m o r a l i z e " e c o n o m i c benefits s o a s t o allow i n c o m e differentials
(among l a w - a b i d i n g citizens) insofar a s t h e s e benefit everyone? T h u s
collective rationality m a k e s it p l a u s i b l e to prefer a n e c o n o m i c s c h e m e
under w h i c h i n c o m e is g e n e r a l l y c o n c e i v e d as m e r e l y e a r n e d , n o t
Deserved.
Nozick w o u l d w h o l e h e a r t e d l y agree w i t h t h i s c o n c l u s i o n . E c o n o m i c
sanctions a t t a c h e d t o (moralized) g r o u n d r u l e s s h o u l d n o t play a c e n ­
19
tral role in t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h .
7.5. O n e c a n n o t tell w h e t h e r S a n d e l w o u l d agree, b e c a u s e h e h a s n o t
yet p r e s e n t e d h i s o w n c o n c e p t i o n of justice. Still, let m e briefly trace
where his c r i t i c i s m s of Rawls g o w r o n g . As w e have s e e n , Sandel fails t o
appreciate t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n Desert a n d desert, t h e stronger a n d
weaker n o t i o n s . T h i s m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g l e a d s h i m t o c o n s t r u e Rawls's
distinction b e t w e e n D e s e r t a n d legitimate e x p e c t a t i o n s a s o n e b e t w e e n
preinstitutional a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l e n t i t l e m e n t s . But even correcting for
such terminological differences, S a n d e l is w r o n g to claim that Rawls
makes "a d r a m a t i c d e p a r t u r e from t r a d i t i o n a l c o n c e p t i o n s " in p r e s e n t ­
ing "a t h e o r y of j u s t i c e . . . r u l i n g o u t d e s e r t altogether" (LLJ 8 6 ) . " T h e
Principles of j u s t i c e d o n o t m e n t i o n m o r a l desert, b e c a u s e , strictly
speaking, n o o n e c a n b e s a i d t o d e s e r v e a n y t h i n g o n Rawls' view,
people have no intrinsic worth, n o w o r t h t h a t is intrinsic in t h e s e n s e
fhat it is t h e i r s p r i o r t o o r i n d e p e n d e n t of o r apart from w h a t just
institutions a t t r i b u t e t o t h e m " (LLJ 8 8 ) .
This d i a g n o s i s is false b e c a u s e Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of justice i n c o r p o ­
rates a n o t i o n of D e s e r t c o n n e c t e d t o t h e m o r a l i z e d p a r t of a just basic
structure (the g r o u n d r u l e s insofar a s t h e y a d m i t of violation). So t h e r e
is an institutional n o t i o n of D e s e r t t h a t c o n t r a s t s w i t h t h e (institutional)
notion of l e g i t i m a t e e x p e c t a t i o n s . T h e r e is a p r e i n s t i t u t i o n a l notion of
Desert as well. Violations of n a t u r a l d u t i e s — c r u e l t y o r injury of a n
"mocent, for e x a m p l e — d o d e t r a c t from a p e r s o n ' s m o r a l w o r t h o r
Deservingness ( a n d will e x p o s e t h a t p e r s o n t o p u n i s h m e n t within, a n d
m
a y b e also a p a r t from, a n y i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e ) .
Perhaps S a n d e l w o u l d t h i n k t h i s t o o t h i n a n o t i o n of preinstitutional
Desert. He a p p e a l s t o t h e classical i d e a of t h e virtues, defining various
'Perhaps c o r r e l a t e d ) d i m e n s i o n s of m o r a l excellence. M a y b e his idea is
that p e r s o n s s h o u l d b e t r e a t e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e i r scores i n t h e s e
dimensions o r i n overall m o r a l excellence, b u t h o w is this idea t o b e

" C o m p e n s a t i o n for "bonder c r o s s i n g s " is o w e d u n d e r unmoralized g r o u n d rules. It is

not wrong to c r o s s a n d p a y . S e e C h a p . 1, n. 6; a n d Nozick, ASU, chap. 4.
86 T h e "Deontological" Self, 8.1

i n c o r p o r a t e d into t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of a social s y s t e m ? Would Sandel

prefer a society in w h i c h , say, t h e right t o r u l e is r e s e r v e d for the most
virtuous? This sort of traditional c o n c e p t i o n r a i s e s familiar problems,
s u c h as h o w w e r e a c h a g r e e m e n t o n a s p e c i f i c a t i o n of t h e virtues and
2 0
o n p r o c e d u r e s for selecting t h o s e w h o excel in t h e m .
I c o n c l u d e t h a t Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n c a n a n d d o e s incorporate the
distinctions b e t w e e n n a t u r a l a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d b e t w e e n moralized
a n d u n m o r a l i z e d g r o u n d r u l e s . H e n c e h e h a s b o t h a preinstitutional
a n d a n institutional n o t i o n of D e s e r t — w h i c h n o t i o n s , moreover, are
even s t r o n g e r t h a n Sandel's (and t h u s m o r e s p a r i n g l y invoked). Sandel
is t h e n m i s t a k e n in claiming t h a t Rawls d i s p e n s e s w i t h Desert, and so
t h e r e is n o r e a s o n to s a d d l e Rawls w i t h t h e r e a s o n S a n d e l predictably
provides for this s u p p o s e d d e n i a l : "No o n e c a n b e s a i d to deserve
a n y t h i n g (in t h e strong, p r e - i n s t i t u t i o n a l s e n s e ) , b e c a u s e n o one can be
said to p o s s e s s a n y t h i n g (in t h e s t r o n g , c o n s t i t u t i v e s e n s e ) " (LLJ 92f).K
is n o t t r u e t h a t Rawls is p r e s e n t i n g "a t h e o r y of j u s t i c e w i t h o u t desert
a n d a n o t i o n of t h e self as essentially d i s p o s s e s s e d , o r b a r r e n of constit­
u e n t traits" (LLJ 92). Let u s , n e v e r t h e l e s s , i n v e s t i g a t e t h e s e c o n d con­
junct of this claim as well.

8. T h e " D e o n t o l o g i c a l " Self

8 . 1 . So far I h a v e s h o w n h o w , o n c e h i s N o z i c k i a n misre^lmg^
" c o m m o n asset," " m o r a l arbitrariness," a n d " d e s e r t are i ' R a W s s

large p a r t s of Sandel's attack dissolve. T h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t s o i ^ ^ d

u r
a r g u m e n t are q u i t e m a i n s t r e a m a n d h a r d l y w a r r a n t t h e ^ P , nt o o r n e
d e v
hostility t h e y h a v e evoked. P e r s o n s s h o u l d c o n t r o l t h e ^ p e o n s a C

a n d exercise of t h e i r o w n n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s w i t h i n t h e o p ^ ial s o C

available i n a j u s t social system. T h e a s s e s s m e n t a n d d e s i g n j b a s e f

i n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d n o t b e influenced b y t h e i d e a of bargamin& p 0

o n k n o w l e d g e of differential e n d o w m e n t s o r b y t h e i d e a t h a t t ° ^ j ] y o r a

have o r develop o r exercise g r e a t e r e n d o w m e n t s a r e t h e r e f o r e ,^

m o r e w o r t h y . Moreover, i n s t i t u t i o n s r e g u l a t i n g t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n ^ ^
c o m e a n d w e a l t h s h o u l d b e c o n c e i v e d a s u n m o r a l i z e d , t h a t is, ^ j o r a

n o t b e d e s i g n e d t o achieve a c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n i n c o m e a n
Z0 n
B u t perhaps Sandel w a s merely m i s e x p r e s s i n g h i s o b j e c t i o n . P e r h a p s ^L[ duties
> a
want the parties in the original p o s i t i o n t o s u p p l e m e n t their a c c o u n t ° V ^ i e d & c e V

w i t h an a c c o u n t of natural virtues. S u c h additional m o r a l n o t i o n s , t h o u g h c o ' a v e u s

preinstitutional, w o u l d still b e o n e s w e construct rather t h a n find. T h e y w o u ) iyc e d e n t

"inhabitants of a world w i t h o u t telos,... u n c o n s t r a i n e d b y a n o r d e r of v a l u e a n e

given . . . the author of t h e only moral m e a n i n g s there are" ( L U 1 7 7 ) . Against this, h,<
^ ^
insist o n a truly natural telos, part of the fabric of t h e universe, t h r o u g h ^ ;!L der. o r

discern t h e natural order of h u m a n affairs a n d the p l a c e e a c h of u s o c c u p i e s m t m

But then Sandel also s e e m s to w a n t a community-relative telos, intersubjecti ^ e j r

than objective, that is constitutive of h o w the c o m m u n i t y m e m b e r s c o n c e i v e ^

identity. At least h e s u g g e s t s a s m u c h b y d e n y i n g that "we c a n n o t k n o w o n e a n o
our e n d s , well e n o u g h t o govern by the c o m m o n g o o d a l o n e " ( U J 183).
 T h e "Deontological" Self, 8.2 87

worth. Since n e i t h e r t h e s e c o m m o n p l a c e views n o r a n y c o n c l u s i o n s

anyone h a s n o n f a l l a c i o u s l y d r a w n from t h e m have even mildly exciting
implications for o u r s e l f - c o n c e p t i o n a s p e r s o n s , Sandel's m o s t i m p o r ­
tant s o u r c e of e v i d e n c e for a t t r i b u t i n g t o Rawls a p a r t i c u l a r n o t i o n of
the self is entirely u n p r o d u c t i v e .
Still, Rawls is offering a n explicit c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n , a n d w e
should therefore s e e w h e t h e r S a n d e l a c c e p t s Rawls's s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d ­
ing on this p o i n t o r p r e s e n t s p l a u s i b l e r e a s o n s t o d e p a r t from it. This
undertaking p r e s e n t s a n e w task, n a m e l y , t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e idea of a
"deontological" self, w h i c h S a n d e l c l a i m s t o h a v e discovered in Rawls's
conception of j u s t i c e .
8.2. Sandel d e s c r i b e s h o w h e h a s d i s c o v e r e d t h i s i d e a a s follows:
"The original p o s i t i o n is t h e f u l c r u m of t h e justificatory p r o c e s s in that
it is t h e device t h r o u g h w h i c h all justification m u s t p a s s . . . . [W]hat
issues at o n e e n d i n a t h e o r y of j u s t i c e m u s t issue at t h e o t h e r in a
theory of t h e p e r s o n , o r m o r e p r e c i s e l y , a t h e o r y of t h e m o r a l subject.
Looking from o n e d i r e c t i o n t h r o u g h t h e l e n s of t h e original position w e
see t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s of justice; looking from t h e o t h e r direction w e
see a reflection of o u r s e l v e s " (LLJ 4 7 - 4 8 ) . Sandel's central discovery is
that for Rawls t h e self, o r subject, is p r i o r t o its e n d s . Sandel links this
priority w i t h five f u r t h e r p r i o r i t i e s : of t h e right over t h e good, of justice
over o t h e r v a l u e s , of t h e c o n t r a c t over t h e p r i n c i p l e s it g e n e r a t e s , of
plurality over u n i t y , a n d of p r i n c i p l e s of justice over t h e choice of
2 1
conceptions of t h e g o o d .
Sandel's g e n e r a l i d e a is t h a t "deontological" liberals, b y asserting
certain m o r a l p r i o r i t i e s , m u s t p r e s u p p o s e c e r t a i n other, n o n m o r a l pri­
orities that h e w i s h e s t o e x p o s e a s e m b a r r a s s i n g . To his credit, Sandel is
clear t h r o u g h o u t t h a t Rawls d o e s n o t himself assert t h e n o n m o r a l
priorities S a n d e l a s c r i b e s t o h i m . T h u s h e r e c o g n i z e s , for example, t h a t
Rawls's p h r a s e " t h e self is p r i o r t o t h e e n d s w h i c h are affirmed by it" (TJ
560) asserts a m o r a l p r i o r i t y ( p e r s o n s a r e t o c o n s t r a i n t h e i r p u r s u i t of
ends by p r i n c i p l e s of r i g h t a n d justice) a n d t h a t h e , Sandel, m u s t show
that Rawls implicitly p r e s u p p o s e s a n o n m o r a l priority of t h e self over
"s ends (LLI19-20).
Much less clear, h o w e v e r , a r e S a n d e l ' s a t t e m p t s t o d e m o n s t r a t e
Rawls's s u p p o s e d i m p l i c i t p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . O n e p r o b l e m is t h a t h e
never states w i t h a n y p r e c i s i o n w h a t h e m e a n s w h e n h e speaks of
priority in a n o n m o r a l s e n s e . H e r e t h e adjectives h e e m p l o y s t o refer t o
the d e e p e r a n d r e v e a l i n g n o n m o r a l priorities h e claims t o have dis­
covered in Rawls a r e of little h e l p . S a n d e l a l t e r n a t e s b e t w e e n founda-
Jonal," " m e t a e t h i c a l , " a n d " e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l , " of w h i c h t h e latter is b y
wr t h e m o s t f r e q u e n t , for e x a m p l e : " T h e i n d e p e n d e n c e of t h e s e l f . . . is

2,
f t remains u n c l e a r w h y a n d h o w , a c c o r d i n g to Sandel, t h e s e ^ " ^ T s s e X T ^
D w s e g
° 'hey resemble o r s u g g e s t o r i m p l y e a c h other? Sandel's standard % ? * * « ™ ™ e

connection is in v a g u e sentences of t h e form "As X is prior to Y. s o V * p n o r t o W T h e

k t h e r priorities are s o l i k e n e d t o t h e first at L U 7, 2 0 , 1 2 0 , 1 3 3 , 1 5 7 , respectively.
88 T h e "Deontological" Self, 8.2

above all a n e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c l a i m " (LLJ 182, cf. 12, 20) a n d "this is the
epistemological priority t h a t d e o n t o l o g i c a l e t h i c s c a r r i e s over into a
2 2
m o r a l priority" (LLJ 156) a n d s o o n .
Often, n o n m o r a l p r i o r i t y is e x p l a i n e d a s s o m e k i n d of independence:
X is p r i o r t o Y if X (or t h e n o t i o n of X) is i n d e p e n d e n t of, o r derived
i n d e p e n d e n t l y from, Y (the n o t i o n of Y). As I u n d e r s t a n d Sandel, such
i n d e p e n d e n c e o b t a i n s if n o c h a n g e in ( t h e n o t i o n of) Y m a k e s a differ­
e n c e t o ( t h e n o t i o n of) X, if t h e l a t t e r c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d w i t h o u t any
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e former. Using t h e w o r d " p r i o r i t y " i n this way is
p u z z l i n g b e c a u s e S a n d e l is n o t c o n c e r n e d t h a t t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e be
unilateral ( a n d w e r e it m u t u a l , X a n d Y w o u l d b e p r i o r t o e a c h other, an
o d d possibility). T h u s h e a s s e r t s t h a t for Rawls j u s t i c e is "prior in the
s e n s e of i n d e p e n d e n t l y d e r i v e d " (LLJ 16). B u t o n e w o u l d t h i n k that the
priority of justice over o t h e r v a l u e s ( b e n e v o l e n c e etc.) r e q u i r e s n o t only
that it s h o u l d b e i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e m b u t a l s o t h a t they s h o u l d not be
i n d e p e n d e n t of it. Sandel d o e s n o t w o r r y w h e t h e r t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e is
2 3
mutual.
But even t h i s s t r a n g e n o t i o n of priority a s i n d e p e n d e n c e m i g h t work
t o Sandel's a d v a n t a g e . A m o r a l c o n c e p t i o n d e r i v i n g t h e right indepen­
dently of t h e g o o d m u s t specify it, h e a s s u m e s , w i t h o u t a p p e a l to what
w e k n o w a b o u t h u m a n n e e d s a n d e n d s — o n t h e b a s i s of t h e bare
n o t i o n o f a self ( p e r h a p s c h a r a c t e r i z e d solely b y r a t i o n a l i t y a n d agency)
It s u c h a m o r a l c o n c e p t i o n also r e q u i r e s a c t o r s t o give p r i m a c y to
c o n s t r a i n t s of t h e right (including just g r o u n d rules), t h e n , Sandel
r e a s o n s , it is at least implicitly c o m m i t t e d t o t h e p r e e m i n e n c e of this
bare n o t i o n of t h e self. This t h o u g h t e s t a b l i s h e s t h e s o u g h t connection
o e t w e e n a deontological m o r a l c o n c e p t i o n a n d a " d e o n t o l o g i c a l " self
H e c o n c l u
' d e s : "If t h e c l a i m for t h e p r i m a c y of j u s t i c e is to
t h e i s t o b e r i
"° r i
C
' ' J
P ° r t o t h e g o o d i n t h e i n t e r l o c k i n g moral
S 6 n S e S w e n a v e
u d i s t i n g u i s h e d , t h e n s o m e version of
n m a c o f
mf«£ , P y t h e subject m u s t s u c c e e d a s well. This
l

m u c h s e e m s clear (LLJ 7).

2
We m a y leave aside w h e t h e r t h i s d i a g n o s i s is t r u e of K a n t * a n d , if so,

1 8 u b i u i t u s
five^oriSvv^u'fn M°iTf <l ° ^ t h e text a n d p r e d i c a t e d of t h e other
P S 2 3 5 3 m 1 3 3 1 5 6 ) S a n d e l
u s e p ^ S S " f nr^ ' / ' '
i n ' - A»
t r e c o g n i z e s , Rawls always
n
r a n o r i , T h
logical, m e u e X c a J a n d / i - f ° / P y " « f u r t h r n o n m o r a l nonon(s) ofepistemo- e
, , , U , 1
arfintroduceSnSStoS^t W " ? ™ P P < ^ d l y implicit i n Bawls,
t h e r e f o r e
t h e s e notions ' < Sandel's responsibility to clarify this n o t i o n or

S a n 1 y S t h a t f o r K a n t
i n S ^ n S ^ X ^ ? "'he right i s prior to the g o o d

mutual i n d e p e n d ^ c e
He d o e s ™ * * " 2 e x c l u d i n g t h e possibility of
d y C O n v e r e e

, h a tf o r K a n t d R a w e
d o e s not , ™ » s « " n o t i o n of t h e g o o d
f
with a s o m e w h a " " " " ™ ^ P ™ ^ ° of t h e right. Tlhis i s n o t t o d e n y u w
sustained (oTZm ™ d ° * P *>**
F o r K
££Z a n a s s e r t i o n c o u l d be f b e B n
Tuch
naturemclinations)te«c^don vwK ^ • h a p p i n e s s (the satisfaction of P S V V e l l ,
^
a n d only insofar » ttttr^^? * ^ *™» a t t a i n m e n t of ends <*» permissible
"Karn surely asserts t t e mnr»7 ' d i s p o s i t i o n to a c t from duty). H e p e r e o n 8 v , r t u e

f t h e v e r
Kant, c o n c e p L i ^ K ^ P ™ " ^ ° ° * e g o o d . By claiming that
o n g n t reltes u p o n a n o t i o n of h u m a n n e e d s (TJ 338, WOS 19), Rawls
 T h e "Deontological" Self, 8.3 89

whether s u c h a " p r i m a c y of t h e s u b j e c t " w o u l d b e an e m b a r r a s s m e n t .

Sandel is c e r t a i n l y w r o n g to c l a i m (LLJ 18) t h a t " t h e right is derived
independently from t h e g o o d " by Rawls, w h o explicitly asserts t h e
opposite: "It s h o u l d b e n o t e d t h a t d e o n t o l o g i c a l theories a r e defined as
non-teleological o n e s , n o t a s views t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e r i g h t n e s s of
institutions a n d a c t s i n d e p e n d e n t l y from t h e i r c o n s e q u e n c e s . All ethi­
cal doctrines w o r t h o u r a t t e n t i o n t a k e c o n s e q u e n c e s i n t o a c c o u n t in
judging r i g h t n e s s . O n e w h i c h d i d n o t w o u l d simply b e irrational,
crazy" (TJ 30). So R a w l s e n d o r s e s n o i n d e p e n d e n c e of justice o r t h e
right from t h e g o o d . His c r i t e r i o n of justice i n c o r p o r a t e s a n a c c o u n t of
social p r i m a r y g o o d s t h a t reflects a n o t i o n of t h e m o r a l subject as a
being with c e r t a i n n e e d s a n d i n t e r e s t s (cf. WOS 15). We m u s t c o n c l u d e ,
then, that S a n d e l fails i n h i s first a t t e m p t t o s a d d l e Rawls with a
conception of t h e self a s b a r r e n a n d d i s e n c u m b e r e d .
8.3. In a f u r t h e r a t t e m p t t o reveal Rawls's c o m m i t m e n t to t h e priority
of the self, S a n d e l a t t r i b u t e s t o Rawls t h e view "that I c a n never fully b e
constituted b y m y a t t r i b u t e s , t h a t t h e r e m u s t always b e s o m e attributes
I have r a t h e r t h a n a m . O t h e r w i s e , just any c h a n g e in m y situation,
however slight, w o u l d c h a n g e t h e p e r s o n l a m " (LLJ 20). Sandel freely
admits that "this a c c o u n t is n o t offered b y Rawls himself . . (but] a
reasonable r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e p e r p l e x i t i e s h e seeks to a d d r e s s " (LLJ
20). We a r e n o t t o l d w h e r e Rawls a d d r e s s e s s u c h perplexities, b u t t h e
view a t t r i b u t e d t o h i m is s o far h a r m l e s s e n o u g h .
Later Sandel s t r e n g t h e n s h i s c l a i m (LLJ 54-59): Rawls is really c o m ­
mitted to t h e view t h a t all of a p e r s o n ' s a t t r i b u t e s s t a n d o u t s i d e t h e self.
As evidence, h e cites t w o p a s s a g e s from s e c t i o n 22 of A Theory of
Justice, w h e r e Rawls s a v s t h a t t h e p a r t i e s in t h e original position are to
"try to a d v a n c e t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d as best t h e y c a n " (TJ 128).
This does n o t m e a n , R a w l s a d d s , t h a t e a c h p e r s o n ' s c o n c e p t i o n of t h e
good is a s s u m e d to b e egoistic. T h e ( u n k n o w n ) i n t e r e s t s t h e parties a r e
to p r o m o t e " a r e n o t a s s u m e d to b e i n t e r e s t s in t h e self," t h o u g h they
^ "as t h e y m u s t a l w a y s b e , i n t e r e s t s of a s e l f (TJ 127, 129). Here,
Sandel exclaims, " w e find t h e key t o Rawls' c o n c e p t i o n of t h e subject,
• t h e n o t i o n of t h e self a s a s u b j e c t of p o s s e s s i o n To say t h a t I
Possess a c e r t a i n trait o r d e s i r e o r a m b i t i o n is to say t h a t . . I a m
distanced from it in a c e r t a i n w a y — t h a t it is mine r a t h e r t h a n m e (LLJ
55
>- But in t h e p a s s a g e s S a n d e l q u o t e s ( a n d elsewhere) Rawls says
nothing at all a b o u t p o s s e s s i o n , let a l o n e a b o u t p o s s e s s i o n m t h e
attenuated" a s o p p o s e d t o t h e " u n d i s t a n c e d , constitutive s e n s e I U J
82-85). He m e r e l y s a y s t h a t i n t e r e s t s a r e always t h e interests oj a sett.
Whereas p o s s e s s i o n m a y s o m e t i m e s f u n c t i o n as "a d i s t a n c i n g n o t i o n
<LU 54), it is far from c l e a r t h a t " o f m u s t always function in this way.
Talk about t h e i n t e r e s t s of a self o r o f Michael Sandel h a r d l y excludes

^ d e n i e d , h o w e v e r , Kant's c o m m i t m e n t to t h e •epistemological" priority, t h e other half

* Sandel's reading of Kant. Rawls m a y w e l l b e mistaken o n thtf poutt, but Sandel n
n e n o t
h i n g at all t o s h o w that h e i s
90 T h e "Deontological" Self, 8.4

t h e possibility t h a t s o m e of t h e s e m i g h t b e w h a t S a n d e l calls constitu­

25
tive i n t e r e s t s .
8.4. Sandel d r a w s f u r t h e r c o n c l u s i o n s . S i n c e for R a w l s " t h e identity
of t h e agent is b a r r e n of c o n s t i t u e n t traits s o t h a t n o a i m o r desire can
b e essential to it" (LLJ 164), a Rawlsian self is i n c a p a b l e of genuine
choice a n d c a n only w e i g h d e s i r e s a g a i n s t o n e a n o t h e r in t h e way of a
h e d o n i s t : "The g o o d is n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n t h e i n d i s c r i m i n a t e satisfac­
tion of arbitrarily-given p r e f e r e n c e s , r e g a r d l e s s of w o r t h " (LLJ 168).
Readers m i g h t think, S a n d e l foresees, " t h a t Rawls c o u l d e s c a p e this
a p p a r e n t collapse of t h i s a c c o u n t of a g e n c y " (LLJ 163) b y suggesting
that p e r s o n s m i g h t have s e c o n d - o r d e r d e s i r e s . T h i s is i n d e e d possible,
in t h e s e n s e that s o m e of t h e a g e n t ' s d e s i r e s m a y b e d e s i r e s about
desires. But s i n c e all d e s i r e s a r e equally o u t s i d e t h e self, second-order
desires w o u l d b e n o m o r e essentially c o n n e c t e d t o t h e self t h a n first-
o r d e r d e s i r e s are. H e n c e t h e y c o u l d n o t b e a u t h o r i t a t i v e b u t would
simply b e w e i g h e d in "a slightly m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d e s t i m a t e of the
relative i n t e n s i t y of p r e - e x i s t i n g d e s i r e s , first- a n d s e c o n d - o r d e r desires
i n c l u d e d " (LLJ 164).
It is only o n t h e s e c o n d to last p a g e of his b o o k t h a t S a n d e l informs us
of w h a t s h o u l d h a v e dissolved all t h i s u n r e a l s p e c u l a t i o n ; h e quotes
Rawls's " c o n c e s s i o n " t h a t "citizens in t h e i r p e r s o n a l affairs, o r within
t h e internal life of a s s o c i a t i o n s , . . . m a y have a t t a c h m e n t s a n d loves that
t h e y believe t h e y w o u l d not, o r c o u l d not, s t a n d a p a r t from; a n d they
might r e g a r d it a s u n t h i n k a b l e for t h e m t o v i e w t h e m s e l v e s without
f v ™ ^^ous and philosophical convictions a n d commitments"
IKCMT 5 4 5 ) U n f o r t u n a t e l y , Rawls's explicit s t a t e m e n t s t o t h i s effect
w e r e n o t n o t i c e d in t i m e t o mitigate t h e p o w e r f u l i m p r e s s i o n evoked in
Sandel by h i s r e a d i n g of " o f a n d t h u s to b l o c k h i s e l a b o r a t e tale of the
e m p t y self a n d t h e " i m p o v e r i s h e d t h e o r y of t h e g o o d " (LLJ 165).
in restricting his r e m a r k s to "citizens in t h e i r p e r s o n a l affairs, or
su
tior'^sein^Pnt !? ^ 0 0 S a n d e
' S
** o n
Pfartherhere. Since in Rawls's concep-
e s t e

quii^et idem^B U n e n c u m b e r e
SXdlhm
" and barren of attributes, any two selves are
selves"On^X^Tll ™ o n
* <° distinguish our variouso u r b o d i e

subject and e^erv mn, . K^

, 6 C t a
S

n
U b

indiv
j e
' c
y individual human being is a moral
t e v e ,

an rh ;Mureo^ w7 r * *dual human being" (LU 52) This is yet

o e

bounds of the lllZa

, n V,' 8 to Sandel, for Rawls must assume 'that the

0
a c c o

1
r d i n

i n d i v ^ u a T h ^ ^ X ^ ^ correspond to the bodily bounds between

801. Sandel su^ ts?n1 R>
es 1 °' a l m >S n e v e r
defended by Rawls, only assumed' (UJ
h a V B e e n b
po«ibu£ o w h o embr * " ^ » «terhad tawte allowed for the
m r e 3 f a m U y 0 r
less ("a pluraCof r e W e s ^ t h ° community or c l a s s or nation ") or
& i n d M d
individuatedI w,!^ , » * human being") than a physically
r e S , m g t 8 6 6 S a n d e l w o r k h i
of justice i X u o c i ^ ^ , ? , , ' u ,° 8 W h
«« * of i criterion
should p e r i ^ p r a t o S ^ e a ^ ^ „ r ^ ^ - S ' ' M
e n t i t i e s I n d o i n s o H O W E V E R

d i n t r a s u b
6 2 - 6 3 . . as such talk w o f f i S J < f " i « * i v e conceptions of the self ILU
reasons of claritl amo2 . 5 ? , contest Rawls's point that for r a h e r t h a n

reco
subject that of an individual h u m a n b ^ n g ^ gn^ as the basic notion of a
a n a
as K d c T s I n ^ K n ^ T t h a ? ^ \ f f ges as a concession because Rawls hopes, sa

Williams. 1 s h o w j nnext s e r t . ^ h
t h e _ P some objections made by Bernard c l e a r U

n V e r t h a t R a w l
™ n in TJ is an integi^ par, ° ; ^ '
o f n * h here merely reiterating what
h
 T h e "Deontological" Self, 8.5 91

within t h e i n t e r n a l life of a s s o c i a t i o n s " (KCMT 545), Rawls c r e a t e s t h e

impression t h a t S a n d e l is right at least in t h e very limited s e n s e t h a t in
"public life . . . n o loyalty o r allegiance c o u l d b e similarly essential to o u r
sense of w h o w e a r e . . . , n o d e v o t i o n t o city o r n a t i o n , to p a r t y o r c a u s e ,
could possibly r u n d e e p e n o u g h t o b e defining" (LLJ 182, cf. 179). Yet
consider h o w Rawls c o n t i n u e s after t h e q u o t e d s e n t e n c e a b o u t o u r
nonpublic a t t a c h m e n t s a n d loves: "But n o n e of this n e e d affect t h e
conception of t h e p e r s o n c o n n e c t e d w i t h society's p u b l i c c o n c e p t i o n
of justice a n d its i d e a l of social c o o p e r a t i o n " (KCMT 545). This is a
statement a b o u t h o w citizens a r e t o b e c o n c e i v e d a n d t r e a t e d in politi­
cal contexts, from t h e p o i n t of view, a s it w e r e , of t h e basic s t r u c t u r e of a
well-ordered society. S u c h a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s t a n d s a p a r t from all m o r e
particular political c o m m i t m e n t s a n d also views citizens as d e t a c h e d
from w h a t e v e r s u c h c o m m i t m e n t s t h e y m a y have. T h u s a p e r s o n ' s
deepest loyalties, c o m m i t m e n t s , a n d s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g s d o n o t affect
his status as p a r t i c i p a n t in t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e — h i s basic rights a n d
27
duties a n d s o f o r t h . A n d t h i s s t a t e m e n t is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h citizens'
having d e e p s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g s a n d c o n v i c t i o n s even of a political
son. Citizens m a y u n d e r s t a n d t h e m s e l v e s as political feminists o r m a y
have strong c o n v i c t i o n s a b o u t t h e c o m m o n g o o d . To be sure, all s u c h
constitutive c o m m i t m e n t s a r e s u b j e c t to a categorical s e n s e of justice
(to be d i s c u s s e d in §9), a n d s o m e political a n d nonpolitical convictions
will be e x c l u d e d b y R a w l s ' s c o n c e p t i o n of justice fully spelled out. But
many of t h e political c o n v i c t i o n s m o s t d e e p l y h e l d t o d a y c a n b e equally
deeply h e l d in a w e l l - o r d e r e d R a w l s i a n society. T h e s t a n d a r d issues
concerning t e c h n o l o g i e s a n d t h e e n v i r o n m e n t ; b u d g e t allocations to
education, h e a l t h c a r e , s c i e n c e , a n d t h e arts; t h e school c u r r i c u l u m ;
special taxes o n t o b a c c o o r g a s o l i n e ; s p e e d limits; etc. are h a r d l y fully
settled by Rawls's c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e . T h e s e m u s t b e d e c i d e d t h r o u g h
28
the political p r o c e s s a s m a t t e r s of p u r e p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e . Given their
categorical s e n s e of j u s t i c e , p e r s o n s will have a sufficient m o r a l motive
to comply w i t h e v e n t h o s e o u t c o m e s of this p r o c e s s t h a t go against
their deeply h e l d c o n v i c t i o n s . T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n that t h e y have n o
such convictions, t h a t t h e y w o n ' t d e e p l y identify w i t h s o m e political
cause a n d c o n t i n u e t h e a t t e m p t to c o n v i n c e o t h e r s of its m e r i t s .
8-5. Two f u r t h e r a s p e c t s of S a n d e l ' s r e a d i n g m a y b e w o r t h examin-

f"'When citizens convert from o n e religion t o another, or n o longer affirm an^estab-

£ h e d religious faith, t h e y d o n o t c e a s e to be, for q u e s t i o n s of political ,ustice, the s a m e
Persons they w e r e before T h e r e is n o l o s s of w h a t w e m a y call their public ' d e n h ^ t h e i r
a S 3 m a t t e r o f b a s i c l a w I n
fi? \ - S^evai, t h e y still have t h e same bas.c. rights and
* J * t h e y o w n t h e s a m e p r o p e r t y a n d c a n m a k e the s a m e claims as before ^ P M f 4 1 K
^ of course, w a s w r i t t e n after, a n d partly in r e s p o n s e to, Sandel, but it .s anticipated at
«3 and also, I believe, fully c o n s i s t e n t w i t h KCMT. nmredural
b e
iu2°. , <S U r e
* y s t " » ' ^ e political p r o c e s s is a c a s e of ™ P ^ , K £
R a w l s s a

^ t i c e (TJ 2 2 9 ) - i e a r l true i n that legislation c a n be m o r e or less ,ust by^theflights ot

c y
1 0
J » cnterion f 0 . ij u s t i c e ^ , important d ^
m> t h " ^ " ' ^ ^
i s c r i t e r i o e a v e s m a n y
t h i s e s a
° P " P ^ t h e political p r o c e s s is a n i n s t a n c e <*f™$°™*^£^
* » « n e d so that t h e l a w will, w i t h i n t h e c o n s t r a i n t s of justice, reflect c . h z e n s desu-es and
f Terences. See §13.5 h e r e i n ; a n d a l s o G u t m a n n , LE 1 7 3 - 8 3 .
92 The "Deontological" Self, 8.5
ing. Sandel believes Rawls begs the question against communitaria-
nism by describing the parties in the original position as mutually
disinterested, that is, as seeking to promote their own client's (un­
known) conception of the good regardless of how this affects the lives of
others. As Sandel understands (LLJ 42), the assumption of mutual
disinterest does not mean that persons in real life are mutually disin­
terested. Rawls merely wants the basic structure of society to be ar­
ranged in accordance with a criterion that can be justified on the basis
of undemanding, commonly shared assumptions. In reference to this
ambition, Sandel correctly points to the relativity involved in calling
such assumptions weak (LU 45-46). The assumption of mutual disin­
terest indeed demands little of those who see the primary function of
social institutions as providing a framework within which people can
choose and lead their own lives, safely, effectively, and with a minimum
of restrictions and interferences. But it demands a great deal of those
who, like Sandel, want the entire social system, not merely associations,
to be a community in a strong sense. Such a community presupposes a
set of defining values and loyalties that is "constitutive of the shared
self-understandings of the participants and embodied in their institu­
tional arrangements, not simply an attribute of certain of the partici­
pants plans of life" (LLJ 173). So why shouldn't the parties be informed
mat their clients have an overriding desire to live in this sort of a
comprehensive community?
But this suggestion is still incomplete. Somehow the parties must be
given or be enabled to derive the content of those "shared self-under­
standings that are to play a constitutive role both in shaping the
community s institutions and in the identities of its members. Once
18 m c o r o r a t e d
AT! P into the original position, however, it is
Tr^I. ?Tthan " 3 S m a
y ^ would be pulled into the m i n o i i t o f

Zn^lT b e
P e r s u a d e d
by it to support institutional change
b a s i c s t r u c t u r e
ar^^rnt i ° t KC m U

P
n i t a
that would best embody
r i a n

C U l a r V 3 l U e S that t o b e
e C S fact f h ^ «™ constitutive. It is this
t h e f e 18 n 0 t e v e n a remote
S r r l p . ? chance that we might
3 S p e c f f i c V i s i o n o f t h e
b a r i c .nshmt good and to arrange our
m
aTtem2HS a t 3 C C O r d a n c e
™»h it-that makes the Sandelian d e m a n d i
dSS^^ST'l " g - ^wls's vision of a vweU-or-
It can ann t o 1
M Including community values) is widespread.
0 n C O m m U n i t a r i a n s a n d
l i S S f c S S ^ aCC
rn «*» *> all communitarians
not^mZttL T ° W h 3 t f
admittedly second best, a rt h e m i s

U t S r S ^ " " frameworkwithin which communi-

1 1 1

n^^SSS^T 5 - fr^ework, Sandel's corn-

n V C W i t H i n S U c h a

shift the bi^TZ^Te\nn !h ^ T * * ° """A

S t r e n g t h W U l d

values and self-unTerTtandmgs ^ ' i ™ ° ' ^ f S a n d e l S

Essentially the reply can be

s a m e the mUder proposal-first m a d e t o
 T h e "Deontological" Self, 8.6 93

rejected by S a n d e l (LLJ 1 1 - 1 2 ) , b u t l a t e r r e s u r r e c t e d in a different guise

(LLJ 4 4 - 4 6 ) — t h a t t h e p a r t i e s s h o u l d b e e n d o w e d with b e n e v o l e n c e o r
love of h u m a n k i n d , t h a t is, t h e d e s i r e t h a t o t h e r s s h o u l d b e successful
in the p r o m o t i o n of t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d a s well. As Sandel
notes only m u c h l a t e r (LLJ 171), Rawls h a s a n o t h e r plausible reply t o
this suggestion a s well, n a m e l y , t h a t it w o u l d m a k e n o difference. T h e
veil of i g n o r a n c e a l r e a d y e n s u r e s t h a t t h e p a r t i e s c a n n o t safeguard a n d
promote t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r o w n c l i e n t s w i t h o u t p r o m o t i n g t h o s e of
all others as well. All p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e virtually r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e delib­
erations of every c o n t r a c t o r .
8.6. This r e s p o n s e S a n d e l a g a i n finds revealing: "Even in t h e face of
so noble a virtue a s t h e love of m a n k i n d , t h e p r i m a c y of justice prevails,
although t h e love t h a t r e m a i n s is of a n o d d l y judicial spirit" (LLJ 171).
This remark i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of a n o t h e r pervasive s t r a n d of Sandel's
reaction to Rawls's w o r k , t h e c o m p l a i n t t h a t justice is a r e m e d i a l virtue,
a virtue "not a b s o l u t e l y , a s t r u t h is t o t h e o r i e s , b u t only conditionally, a s
physical c o u r a g e is t o a w a r z o n e " (LLJ 31, cf. 168-72), a n d w o u l d it not
be nice to d o w i t h o u t c o u r a g e a n d e n j o y p e a c e a n d tranquility instead.
This t h e m e is p l a y e d r e p e a t e d l y . T h e r e is t h e h e a r t r e n d i n g story a b o u t
an ideal family s i t u a t i o n g o v e r n e d b y s p o n t a n e o u s affection, w h i c h
deteriorates t o t h e p o i n t w h e r e " p a r e n t s a n d c h i l d r e n . . . dutifully it
sullenly a b i d e b y t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s " (LLJ 33). Similarly d i s t u r b i n g is t h e
imagined close friend w h o "insists o n calculating a n d p a y i n g his p r e ­
cise s h a r e of everv c o m m o n e x p e n d i t u r e " a n d is extremely r e l u c t a n t t o
accept any "favor o r h o s p i t a l i t y " (LLJ 35). Finally, "intimate o r s o h d a n s -
tic associations" w o u l d a l s o s e e m t o get a l o n g well w i t h o u t too great a n
emphasis o n j u s t i c e (LLJ 30). . . .
But t h e n Rawls h a s p r a i s e d j u s t i c e a s t h e first virtue of social institu­
tions (TJ 3) a n d n o t a s t h e m o s t n o b l e p e r s o n a l virtue o r h u m a n senti­
ment. He is c o n c e r n e d w i t h s u c h i s s u e s a s t h e organization ot m e
economy, of g o v e r n m e n t a n d political participation, a n d ot t h e legal
UI
and penal s y s t e m s . S u c h i s s u e s a r e n o t m a d e obsolete ty„^ "*
stances of b e n e v o l e n c e , o r fraternity, o r of e n l a r g e d affections ( L U u>,
for the s e n t i m e n t s of b e n e v o l e n c e a n d love c a n hardly, o n a large scaie,
Peivade h u m a n i n t e r a c t i o n s s o t h o r o u g h l y as t o r e n d e r s h a r e d i n s u i u
Sons u n n e c e s s a r y . F o r o n e t h i n g , e v e n if e v e r y o n e g e n u i n e l y s e e K s i u
realize t h e c o m m o n g o o d , p e o p l e a r e likely t o disagree a b o u t w h a t h a s
>s concretely.** H e n c e p r a c t i c e s a n d p r o c e d u r e s of s e t t l e m e n t are n o t
dispensable e v e n i n a w o r l d of s a i n t l y altruists, t h o u g h t h e y m a y o e
among close f r i e n d s o r w i t h i n a family. e n t i r e s
f S U C
Now Sandel m i g h t w e l l a c c e p t t h e i n d i s p e n s a b i h t y ° ^ ™ * ^
procedures; h i s d e m a n d might t h e n b e that J ^ J ^ ^ J
benevolence o r fraternity s h o u l d d i s p l a c e justice a s t h e foremost virtue

20™ . m i r 17B n 71, w h o cites

"T1>» point is d u e , I believe, t o Kant. S e e a l s o Larmore, PMC 175 n.
Michael Taylor, CAL 2 6 - 3 2 .
94 Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n of t h e P e r s o n , 9.1

of social institutions. But this i d e a is s u r e l y very different from, and

m u c h m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d t h a n , t h e i d e a t h a t p e a c e a n d tranquility
s h o u l d displace p h y s i c a l c o u r a g e as a v i r t u e of persons a n d t h u s can­
not b e i l l u m i n a t e d b y this vague a n a l o g y . O n e w a n t s s o m e sketch, at
least, of Sandel's favored b e n e v o l e n t o r fraternal e c o n o m y , penal sys­
tem, or political p r o c e s s , t o g e t h e r w i t h s o m e a s s u r a n c e that these
w o u l d n o t give rise to t h e p a t h o l o g i e s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of p r e v i o u s (philo­
sophical a n d political) a t t e m p t s t o c o n s t r u c t s u c h i n s t i t u t i o n s . Sandel
fails to a d d r e s s t h e s e issues.

9. R a w l s ' s C o n c e p t i o n of t h e P e r s o n

9 . 1 . Having f o u n d n o t e n a b l e g r o u n d s for S a n d e l ' s v i e w t h a t Rawls is

implicitly c o m m i t t e d to a c o n c e p t i o n of c i t i z e n s as mean-spirited
"strangers" (LLJ 183) a n d b a r r e n selves, let u s e x a m i n e w h a t Rawls
himself h a s t o say a b o u t h i s c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n a n d its role
w i t h i n h i s c o n c e p t i o n of justice.
Rawls is centrally c o n c e r n e d i n t h i s a n d o t h e r m a t t e r s t o argue from
w e a k p r e m i s e s . T h i s a m b i t i o n c o u n s e l s , first of all, a g a i n s t relying on
too thick or rich a c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n . If a h i g h l y specific concep­
tion of t h e p e r s o n is involved in c o n s t r u c t i n g h i s c r i t e r i o n of justice,
t h e n this criterion is liable t o b e r e j e c t e d b y t h o s e w h o find t h i s specific
c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n u n a p p e a l i n g . Rawls h i m s e l f h a s q u i t e effec­
tively u s e d t h i s strategy a g a i n s t u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . By p o s t u l a t i n g a shared
h i g h e s t - o r d e r p r e f e r e n c e function, u t i l i t a r i a n s p r e s u p p o s e t h a t there is
only o n e rational g o o d for h u m a n b e i n g s (SUPG 1 7 3 - 8 3 ) . T h e y assume
that, if d o i n g s p o r t s in o n e ' s s p a r e t i m e m a k e s p e r s o n s h a p p i e r than
reading, t h e n p e r s o n s o u g h t t o (be e d u c a t e d to) p r e f e r s p o r t s over
reading. Moreover, b y d e m a n d i n g t h a t this (subjective) g o o d b e max­
imized, utilitarians view p e r s o n s as m e r e c o n t a i n e r s for this g o o d . In
w h o m utility o c c u r s a n d h o w it is d i s t r i b u t e d a r e m o r a l l y immaterial
(RAM 645). T h e utilitarian criterion c a n r e a s o n a b l y b e r e j e c t e d by any­
o n e w h o d o e s n o t s h a r e , a n d d o e s n o t w a n t t o live u n d e r institutions
that reflect, t h i s view of p e r s o n s as l o c a t i o n s for t h e o c c u r r e n c e of
valuable subjective s t a t e s .
But t h e n it is n o t clear that a t h i n o r a b s t r a c t c o n c e p t i o n of the
p e r s o n c a n avoid s u c h p r o b l e m s . T o s e e w h y , s u p p o s e s o m e o n e has
p r o p o s e d a n e l a b o r a t e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n , r i c h w i t h s t i p u l a t e d
features (such as n e e d s a n d interests) A t h r o u g h F A s s u m e also that
various criticisms are d i r e c t e d against this c o n c e p t i o n , challenging
teatures D, E, F a s empirically i n a c c u r a t e o r m o r a l l y u n c o n v i n c i n g . In
r e s p o n s e t o s u c h criticisms, o n e m i g h t t r y t o r e t r e a t t o c o m m o n
g r o u n d , by retracting t h e assertion of f e a t u r e s D, E, F a n d a r g u i n g from
a mm or abstract c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n d e f i n e d b y t h e u n c o n t r o v e r -
s.at teatures A, B, C. But is o n e n o w relying o n w e a k e r p r e m i s e s ?
 Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n of t h e Person, 9.1 95

With r e g a r d t o s t r i c t l y d e d u c t i v e a r g u m e n t s in logic, m a t h e m a t i c s ,
and geometry, t h e a n s w e r w o u l d b e affirmative. But in practical r e a s o n ­
ing, w h e n d e c i s i o n s m u s t b e m a d e "in light o f given p r e m i s e s , m a t t e r s
are o t h e r w i s e . H e r e c o n c l u s i o n s m a y b e u p s e t b y t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of
additional p r e m i s e s . C o n s i d e r , for e x a m p l e , t h e c a s e of a criminal trial,
where t h e j u r o r s a r e a s k e d t o d e c i d e b e t w e e n conviction a n d acquittal
on the b a s i s of v a r i o u s facts a s s e r t e d d u r i n g t h e trial. In this sort of
situation, n o n e u t r a l i t y c a n b e h a d b y s i m p l y d i s c o u n t i n g alleged facts
that are c o n t r o v e r s i a l a m o n g t h e j u r o r s . For s u p p o s e that s o m e alleged
facts favoring t h e d e f e n d a n t a r e d i s p u t e d a n d that t h e jurors m u s t
either i n c l u d e t h e s e a l l e g e d facts a m o n g t h e i r p r e m i s e s a n d acquit o r
exclude t h e m a n d c o n v i c t . In t h i s c a s e , t h e latter c o u r s e c a n n o t b e said
to be n e u t r a l b e t w e e n t h e m o r to rely o n w e a k e r p r e m i s e s , b e c a u s e t h e
former c o u r s e i m p l i c i t l y a l s o invokes a d i s p u t e d p r e m i s e , namely, that
30
no further facts favoring t h e d e f e n d a n t have b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d .
Essentially t h e s a m e p o i n t c a n b e m a d e a b o u t t h e q u e s t to attain
31
some m e a s u r e of p r o c e d u r a l n e u t r a l i t y . T h u s , a c c e p t a n c e of Rawls's
criterion of j u s t i c e m a y h i n g e o n w h e t h e r w e a c c e p t a n d i n c o r p o r a t e
into the original p o s i t i o n t h e richer o r t h e t h i n n e r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e
person. In c h o o s i n g t h e t h i n n e r c o n c e p t i o n , w e d o not get a clearly
more n e u t r a l a r g u m e n t o r o n e b a s e d u p o n unequivocally w e a k e r
premises, b e c a u s e w e a r e m a k i n g t h e s t r o n g a n d controversial a s s u m p ­
tion that A, B, C a r e t h e only f e a t u r e s of p e r s o n s relevant to a political
32
conception of j u s t i c e . W e t h e r e b y s n u b all t h o s e w h o believe that
persons' g e n e r a l b e n e v o l e n c e , say, o r g e n e r a l n o n b e n e v o l e n c e s h o u l d
be i n c l u d e d a m o n g t h e p r e m i s e s . G e n u i n e p r o c e d u r a l neutrality
would b e a c h i e v e d n o t b y l e a v i n g controversial p r e m i s e s aside b u t — a t
best—only b y s h o w i n g t h a t a c o n c l u s i o n follows irrespective of h o w
these a s s e r t i o n s a r e t r e a t e d , t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t g o e s t h r o u g h n o m a t t e r
whether D, say, is a s s e r t e d , d e n i e d , o r left o p e n . Unfortunately, o n e will
rarely b e a b l e t o s h o w t h i s . N o r is it p r o m i s i n g to seek t h e c o n c e p t i o n of
33
justice t h a t i n c o r p o r a t e s the most neutral c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n .
Many t e n a b l e c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e will b e u n d o m i n a t e d a n d h e n c e
^ c o m m e n s u r a b l e in t h i s r e g a r d .

^Similarly, t h e neutral g r o u n d a m o n g a n atheist, an agnostic, a n d a believer^is decid­

edly not a g n o s t i c i s m . Rattier, neutral g r o u n d a m o n g t h e s e three i n c l u d e s whatever
w
° u i be r e a s o n a b l e t o a c c e p t
Q any t h e three perspectives. from of s l
3 1
Met e d u r a l neutrality" m i g h t b e m o r e precise, b e c a u s e Rawls•' J ^J°"
a p r o c
e n e d
' ? "ot w i t h t h e neutrality of r u l e ! a n d p r o c e d u r e s but w i t h n e u ral w a y s ' ^ W ^ *
« « * rules a n d p r o c e d u r e s For t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n neutrality f™^™*
neutrality of p r o c e d u r e , s e e Raz, M F 1 1 4 - 1 5 ( w h o falsely ascribes to R a w l s *
outcome view [MF 117-24]); a n d Larmore, PMC 4 2 - 4 7 . Rawls's o w n ^ f n o n o t h e
i s s u e ( P R I ^ g u e s that in d i s p u t e s about the ,us^,ce ot
G V | f o I l o v v s w h o
eu
^ e d institutions o n e s h o u l d b e w i l l i n g t o retreat w i t h others to « «J """Xta,
f"*nd (PMC
What
5 0 - 6 8 ) . I a m n o t q u e s t i o n i n g Larmore's a c c o u n t of w h y o n e s h o u I d d o t h *
gmlna e x t e n t - o n l y h i s s u g g e s t i o n of w h a t it w o u l d m e a n t o retreat t o neutra.
is
5? p o i m
' a s I h a v e s a i d , is d u e t o Sandel (LLJ 45-46).
"f- Larmore, PMC 68.
96 Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n of t h e P e r s o n , 9.2

9.2. Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n c o m p r i s e s w h a t e v e r empirical

a n d (especially) n o r m a t i v e claims a b o u t h u m a n b e i n g s a r e implicit in
various features of t h e original p o s i t i o n — f o r e x a m p l e , t h e publicity
c o n d i t i o n o n a d o p t a b l e criteria of justice, t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the origi­
1
n a l position "so t h a t it is a s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h t h e m a x i r n i n r u l e applies'
(TJ 155), t h e rationality of t h e p a r t i e s , a n d t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of those the
parties r e p r e s e n t (including t h e a c c o u n t of social p r i m a r y goods). The
m o s t i m p o r t a n t c h a l l e n g e s to Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n con­
c e r n t h e last of t h e s e features.
Rawls s t i p u l a t e s t h a t t h e p a r t i e s in t h e original p o s i t i o n "know
t h a t they prefer m o r e r a t h e r t h a n l e s s p r i m a r y g o o d s . . . . [These] are
things w h i c h it is s u p p o s e d a r a t i o n a l m a n w a n t s w h a t e v e r else he
wants With m o r e of t h e s e g o o d s m e n c a n g e n e r a l l y b e assured of
g r e a t e r s u c c e s s in c a r r y i n g o u t t h e i r i n t e n t i o n s a n d i n a d v a n c i n g their
e n d s , w h a t e v e r t h e s e e n d s m a y b e " (TJ 93, 92). While t h e c h o i c e of this
a c c o u n t (for t h e p u r p o s e of i n t e r p e r s o n a l a n d i n t e r s c h e m i c compari­
sons) m a y b e " f o u n d e d o n t h e facts of p s y c h o l o g y " (FG 538), it is surely
n o t d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e s e facts a n d t h u s reflects s o m e b r o a d l y moral
attitudes t o w a r d t h e s e g o o d s a n d t o w a r d t h e r o l e t h e y s h o u l d play in a
successful h u m a n life. T h o s e w h o find r e a s o n t o d i s a g r e e significantly
with Rawls's a c c o u n t of social p r i m a r y g o o d s a n d t o diverge from the
a t t i t u d e s it e x p r e s s e s m a y r e a s o n a b l y reject h i s c o n c e p t i o n of justice
( a t l e a s t if t h e y c a n p o i n t t o a n o t h e r s h a r a b l e b a s i s for a g r e e m e n t ) .
This p o i n t is p a r t i c u l a r l y obvious i n r e g a r d to t h e p r i o r i t y Rawls gives
in t h i s a c c o u n t t o c e r t a i n b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties. O n e set of t h e s e fall
u n d e r t h e g e n e r a l h e a d i n g of f r e e d o m of t h o u g h t a n d c o n s c i e n c e (TJ
S33). N o w if t h e p a r t i e s w e r e d e l i b e r a t i n g i n b e h a l f of p e r s o n s w h o care
primarily a b o u t utility (one's o w n o r t h a t of o t h e r s ) , t h e y m i g h t not
w a n t t h e rights a n d liberties of t h i s set t o b e very e x t e n s i v e . T h e s u p ­
p r e s s i o n of c e r t a i n beliefs a n d p r a c t i c e s m a y w e l l r a i s e e a c h position,
Sfr^iT^ G
l 0 W G S t ( i n t e r
s c h e m i c a l l y a s e v a l u a t e d i n t e r m s of util-
f r u s t r a t i o n s
S i? J r e s u l t i n g from a b r i d g m e n t s of t h e relevant rights
andI h b e r h e s are o u t w e i g h e d b y satisfactions g a i n e d d i r e c t l y (from
n P P u l a r o c t r i n e s
S!? " ° / s u p p r e s s e d ) o r t h r o u g h i n t e r m e d i a t e so-
B u t n R a w l s s a c c
Sl^r!H ^ . 0 N 1 C
- °
F A C T 0 R S
° u n t t h e p a r t i e s deliberate
m U S t 3 S S U m e t h a t t h e m a h
rTn^nnhi ,^ y y ^ e m o r a l , religious, or
£S£ t 6 r e S t *, " I * * * P ^
j e o p a r d y u n l e s s there C a n n o t u t i n

n t e ^ K S T ? ' US• V ^ rm ral ° o s eed opmr i n c i p l e s t h a t s e c u r e the m U S t c h

coZeVL\Z° °° ^
d o n o t k n o w , of A
«tT^l^Z TT hm
° ° A c t i o n s . . [ a n d obligations r m r a l

L^ot^\ifV }
TlTe ° f
^ e s a s h a v i n g s u c h obligations, t h e m s

t ^ c ^ • • - h e y cannot

i n t e r e V s ^ h i n g e s u p o n constitutive
U s t t h e s o r t S a n d
denying ThnnJh ' e l t h i n k s Rawls is
nying. T h o u g h h e can concede t h a t s o m e p e r s o n s m a y organize
 Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n of t h e Person, 9.3 97

their lives a r o u n d t h e i d e a of m a x i m i z i n g utility, Rawls must insist that

persons " m a y h a v e a t t a c h m e n t s a n d loves t h a t t h e y believe they w o u l d
not, or c o u l d n o t , s t a n d a p a r t from; a n d t h e y m i g h t regard it as u n t h i n k ­
able for t h e m to view t h e m s e l v e s w i t h o u t c e r t a i n religious a n d philo­
sophical c o n v i c t i o n s a n d c o m m i t m e n t s " (KCMT 545). W h o e v e r is con­
vinced that this is not, o r o u g h t n o t to b e , a significant feature of h u m a n
personality c a n r e a s o n a b l y reject t h e i m p o r t a n c e Rawls a t t a c h e s to
freedom of t h o u g h t a n d c o n s c i e n c e .
9.3. But Rawls d o e s n o t m e r e l y i n f o r m t h e p a r t i e s that their clients
have constitutive i n t e r e s t s ; h e a l s o gives t h e m to know, m o r e specifi­
cally, w h a t t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t of t h e s e i n t e r e s t s are. T h e p a r t i e s repre­
sent moral p e r s o n s , " c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y t w o m o r a l p o w e r s . . . t h e c a p a c ­
ity for a n effective s e n s e of j u s t i c e . . . [and] t h e capacity to form, to
revise, a n d r a t i o n a l l y to p u r s u e a c o n c e p t i o n of t h e good. C o r r e s p o n d ­
ing to t h e m o r a l p o w e r s , m o r a l p e r s o n s are said to be m o v e d by two
highest-order i n t e r e s t s t o r e a l i z e a n d exercise t h e s e p o w e r s . By calling
these i n t e r e s t s ' h i g h e s t - o r d e r ' i n t e r e s t s , I m e a n t h a t . . [they] are
supremely regulative a s w e l l a s effective. This implies that, w h e n e v e r
circumstances a r e r e l e v a n t to t h e i r fulfillment, t h e s e interests govern
34
deliberation a n d C o n d u c t " (KCMT 5 2 5 ) .
Clearly t h e s e a r e v e r y s u b s t a n t i a l s t i p u l a t i o n s . A brief reflection o n
the actual p e r s o n s w e k n o w is likely to p r e s s u p o n u s t h e question of
how relevant Rawls's c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e c a n b e t o o u r w o r l d if it has
been a d o p t e d in behalf of m o r a l p e r s o n s so conceived. If Rawls aims for
a comparative a s s e s s m e n t of b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s by h o w suitable each
would be for p e r s o n s h a v i n g t h e t w o h i g h e s t - o r d e r interests, a n d if
these i n t e r e s t s a r e a n d will b e q u i t e r a r e in a c t u a l fact, t h e n Rawls's
criterion, a n d t h e r a n k i n g of feasible b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s b a s e d u p o n it,
would s e e m t o b e d i s c r e d i t e d .
Let m e c o n s i d e r t w o p o s s i b l e responses to s u c h d o u b t s . Rawls c o u l d
say that p e r s o n s b o m i n t o a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d society governed by his
cnterion of j u s t i c e w o u l d b e m o r e likely to b e c o m e moral p e r s o n s .
Perhaps so, b u t t h e r e w o u l d r e m a i n a significant n u m b e r of p e r s o n s in
w
h o m t h e " h i g h e s t - o r d e r " i n t e r e s t s w o u l d n o t b e s u p r e m e l y regula­
tive. Moreover, u t i l i t a r i a n s c o u l d e q u a l l v well a r g u e t h a t p e r s o n s b o m
jnto a self-contained s o c i e t y g o v e r n e d by t h e p r i n c i p l e of utility w o u l d
°e more likely to c o m e t o h a v e a h i g h e s t - o r d e r preference function.
Rawls c o u l d a l s o s a y t h a t h i s c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n is to serve only

J'Ravvls's talk of h i g h e s t - o r d e r interests m a y mislead by suggesting a H j f ™*

^ o n d - o r d e r d e s i r e s , w h i c h are d e s i r e s about desires a n d n e e d no be r e g u l a b v v * h
* Pect to first-order d e s i r e s . H i g h e s t - o r d e r interests are n o t about but
^ P e c t to other interests. Rawls a l s o s t i p u l a t e s that moral persons• a » . r e p « s e n t e d by h e
P^hes, have "a h i g h e r - o r d e r interest in p r o t e c t i n g a n d advancing their c o n c e p h o n ot the
6°oa (KCMT 5251
hemHH
R a W l s s t U 1 c l a i l
" *°™ advantage, a s s u m i n g that our considered J^gnen^
£ T n o w w o u l d g o a g a i n s t a h i g h e s t - o r d e r preference function while supporting
the idea/ of moral p e r s o n a l i t y (as h e d e f i n e s it).
98 Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n of t h e P e r s o n , 9 . 3

for developing a political c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e : " W i t h i n different con­

texts w e c a n a s s u m e diverse p o i n t s of view t o w a r d o u r p e r s o n without
c o n t r a d i c t i o n s o long a s t h e s e p o i n t s of v i e w c o h e r e t o g e t h e r when
c i r c u m s t a n c e s r e q u i r e " (KCMT 5 4 5 ; cf. JFPM 2 3 2 n . 1 5 ) . But the co­
h e r e n c e c o n d i t i o n s h a r p l y limits t h e u s e f u l n e s s of t h i s strategy as a
r e s p o n s e to t h e difficulty. F o r c o n s i d e r a g a i n t h e possibility of a util­
itarian m a k i n g t h e s a m e r e s p o n s e t o Rawls's c r i t i c i s m s . Rawls would
probably c o u n t e r this by s h o w i n g h o w c o n c e i v i n g of p e r s o n s as having
a h i g h e s t - o r d e r p r e f e r e n c e f u n c t i o n c a n n o t n e a t l y b e c o n f i n e d to politi­
cal p h i l o s o p h y b u t w o u l d also affect t h e w a y p e r s o n s in t h e envisaged
utilitarian society w o u l d view t h e m s e l v e s o u t s i d e t h e political realm,
especially if t h e operative c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e a n d t h e r e a s o n s for it
are r e q u i r e d t o b e p u b l i c (the p u b l i c i t y c o n d i t i o n , [cf. TJ 1 3 3 , 182]).
P e r s o n s ' c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e i r p u b l i c a n d p r i v a t e roles m u s t "cohere
together." T h e a n a l o g o u s c o u n t e r w o u l d , I believe, d e f e a t t h e response
in Rawls's behalf a s well. If c i t i z e n s — e v e n i n Rawls's m o s t favored
s o c i e t y — w o u l d frequently set a s i d e t h e i r ( s u p p o s e d l y ) "highest-order"
interests for t h e sake of o t h e r i n t e r e s t s a n d c o m m i t m e n t s , t h e n Rawls's
ranking of basic s t r u c t u r e s is b a s e d u p o n a n e m p i r i c a l l y false assump­
tion. Therefore, if t h e t w o h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s really a r e "supremely
regulative a s well as effective" (KCMT 5 2 5 ) , t h e n t h e d e s i r e to h o n o r just
institutions m u s t c o n s t r a i n a n d (in c a s e of conflict) o v e r r i d e even our
most constitutive private loyalties, c o m m i t m e n t s , a n d a t t a c h m e n t s ,
w h e t h e r p e r s o n a l , religious, o r e t h i c a l . T h e c o n c e p t i o n p e r s o n s are to
have of t h e i r p u b l i c role c o n s t r a i n s h o w t h e y c a n c o n c e i v e of them­
selves from o t h e r p o i n t s of view.
T h e two r e s p o n s e s I h a v e c o n s i d e r e d d o little t o d e f e n d t h e stipula­
tion of t h e t w o h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s o r t o m i t i g a t e t h e conclusion
t h a t this s t i p u l a t i o n m a k e s Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n very de­
m a n d i n g . I n a d d i t i o n , it s e e m s t h a t Rawls d o e s n o t e v e n n e e d t o affirm
tnis m o d e l of m o r a l p e r s o n a l i t y i n o r d e r t o d e r i v e h i s c r i t e r i o n of social
justice; in A Theory of Justice t h e t w o m o r a l p o w e r s a r e i n t r o d u c e d
onty n e a r t h e e n d (in very rcriterion u d i m e n t a r y form [TJ 5 0 5 , 5 6 1 ] ) , l o n g after the
ST!!? I™!! * T 6 d t h 6 i r i « c e i n its final s t a t e m e n t (TJ o f u s

a l s m a t h e n
Z " ' 1
' ™ * ™ y s e e m t o e n d o r s e far t o o controversial a
1 P e r S n t h e r e b m a k i n h i s
sTvXK! K, , ° ' y S c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e exces-
I n S t e 3 d f b a s i t h e a c c o u n t
u o o n 2Ur- ° "S «f s ° « a l p r i m a r y goods
should?Z1T^T? ,
~ K C
* * ; JFPM 2 2 4 n 2 ) , h e
M T 5 2 5 2 6 ; S U P G

r i m a
m e S n S ^ f f P ^ g o o d s a s t h e relevant a l l - p u r p o s e
e ^ Smocrat^ V""**the P ™ P e r s o n s in mod- i n t e r e s t s a n d l a

EeddSST T i ' r a r e i n f a c t l i k e l
y t o h a v e s u c h a m o r e b r o a d l y

d
P ^ s v 5 h h ^etWK b 6 e
P « b l e w i t h a l l o w i n g t h a t some n c o m a

nTb^a^^T ° J,BnCe S
h i h e s t
- ° r d e r i n t e r e s t s w h i l e o t h e r , will have
SwnTSS^ ^ " « o n s of t h e s o c i a l system
t t o m p l y m g p e r h a p s o n p r u d e n t i a l g r o u n d s ) o r will c a r e very little for
b a S i C i n s t i t
 Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n of t h e Person, 9.4.1 99
38
the capacity r a t i o n a l l y t o revise t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . By
relying o n a m o r e n e u t r a l c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n , this a r g u m e n t
would have h a d w i d e r a p p e a l . So w h y d o e s Rawls insist o n t h e t w o
highest-order i n t e r e s t s i n s t e a d ?
9.4. If t h e r e is a g o o d a n s w e r , t h e n it m u s t b e that Rawls c o n s i d e r s
the more d e m a n d i n g s t i p u l a t i o n n e c e s s a r y for a n o t h e r p u r p o s e (other
than establishing a p r e f e r e n c e in t h e original p o s i t i o n for h i s criterion).
But what p u r p o s e ? T h e s i m p l e s t e x p l a n a t i o n is t h a t Rawls w a s carried
away by K a n t i a n p r e d i l e c t i o n s . T h e conviction, even p a t h o s , in his
endorsement of t h e first h i g h e s t - o r d e r interest i s certainly n o t u n r e ­
lated to his s t r o n g a t t r a c t i o n t o K a n t : "The s e n s e of justice . . . reveals
what t h e p e r s o n is, a n d t o c o m p r o m i s e it is n o t t o achieve for t h e self
free reign b u t t o give w a y t o t h e c o n t i n g e n c i e s a n d a c c i d e n t s of the
world" (TJ 575). H e a d d s t h a t b y a c t i n g from a s e n s e of justice, w e
express " o u r n a t u r e a s m o r a l p e r s o n s " (TJ 574). T h i s appeal, however,
cannot b e t o a u n i v e r s a l " w e " b u t o n l v t o t h o s e w h o will s h a r e t h e
37
Kantian a s p i r a t i o n t o t h e free reign of t h e self. T h a t Rawls's most
favored society i s d e s i g n e d for K a n t i a n spirits will for them surely
count in its favor b u t is b o u n d t o a l i e n a t e o t h e r s w h o are less t h a n
enthusiastic a b o u t t h e i d e a l of free r e i g n for t h e self. Rawls's appeal t o
Kant does n o t p r o v i d e t h e k i n d of b r o a d l y b a s e d a n d powerful argu­
ment that s o d e m a n d i n g a s t i p u l a t i o n r e q u i r e s . Is t h e r e a n o t h e r w a y ot
providing s u c h a n a r g u m e n t ?
3-4.1. Let m e b e g i n w i t h t h e s t i p u l a t e d interest in a s e n s e ot justice.
There is s u r e l y s o m e t h i n g m o r a l l y d i s t u r b i n g a b o u t a n institutional
scheme that, relying o n s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d motivations, wouldI w o r k w i m
38 t h l s 1 S W
equal effectiveness i n a n a t i o n of intelligent d e v i l s . But is £ ™-
enough t o s t i p u l a t e a highest-order i n t e r e s t ? T h e r e is, I trunK, a n
even m o r e b r o a d l y b a s e d a n d c o m p e l l i n g a r g u m e n t for moral c r a z e "
ship. Rawls w a n t s t o s h o w n o t m e r e l y that h i s criterion o )ust.ce
indicates a m o r a l l y p l a u s i b l e w a y of o r g a n i z i n g social m t e r a c t i o n u u
also that a social s y s t e m satisfying t h i s criterion w o u l d b e w e l l - o m e r e a ,
s t a
*hich for h i m r e q u i r e s stability. T h a t a social s y s t e m is ™\™
a s p e c t t o its c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i c e . . . m e a n s t h a t . . . u s m e !

a * l n TJ, this c a p a c i t y i s n o t i n c l u d e d w i t h i n t h e s e c o n d K T T ' s - ' s u P G 165 n'

Apparently Rawls o w e s t h e i d e a of i n c l u d i n g it to B u c h a n a n IKCM1: • ^ ^ o f

«• who bases Rawls's s o c i a l p r i m a r y g o o d s o n t h e interest to n f f l W 3 g 9 )

u c h a n
w j c a l reusability t o w a r d o n e ' s o w n c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e g o o d < B ^ ' ,
* * a p s foremost a m o n g t h e p r o b l e m s w i t h t h i s i d e a is that ^ ^ " i t n X p o r t a n c e
J« rational p e r s o n s h a v e this i n t e r e s t but also that its relat.ve strength a n d i m p
^ very great. B u c h a n a n d e f e n d s o n l y t h e former. . t h ew o r d n a U i r e

can s e e that R a w l s is a w a r e of t h i s limitation b y apprecwiimg; u dual i n d j v i

ta
be u n d e r s t o o d n e i t h e r e m p i r i c a l l y n o r teleologtcally *" not a g o o d
i s

Pereon s character: About " t h o s e w h o find that b e i n g d i s p o s e d to.art ju y s e n s e o f

g»*em . . . o n e c a n o n l y say: t h e i r n a t u r e i s their misfortune (TJ 576).

lushce e x p r e S S e s t h e n a t u r e o f o n l y s o m e , n o t all h u m a n beimgs.
rne image i s from Kant's e s s a y "Perpetual Peace ( K P W i i * ™ -
100 Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n of t h e P e r s o n , 9.4.2

acquire . . . a sufficiently s t r o n g a n d effective s e n s e of justice, one that

usually o v e r c o m e s t h e t e m p t a t i o n s a n d s t r e s s e s of social life'' (RAM
634). This is a c o n s i d e r a b l y s t r o n g e r r e q u i r e m e n t t h a n t h a t of equt-
librium, w h i c h is satisfied even if "individuals c o m p l y w i t h t h e institu­
tional s c h e m e solely as a m e a n s to t h e i r s e p a r a t e c o n c e r n s . . . from self-
or g r o u p - i n t e r e s t e d m o t i v e s " (TJ 455).
Here, t h e n , is a partial r a t i o n a l e for Rawls's d e c i s i o n t o invoke strong­
er p r e m i s e s . If w e believe t h a t h u m a n b e i n g s a r e i n d e e d capable of a
regulative a n d effective s e n s e of j u s t i c e a n d if w e c a r e s t r o n g l y that our
criterion of justice a n d t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s it favors s h o u l d h a v e a tendency
t o w a r d stability (that is, t o w a r d e n g e n d e r i n g s u c h a s u p p o r t i n g sense
of justice), t h e n it is r e a s o n a b l e t o s t i p u l a t e t h a t " o t h e r t h i n g s equal, the
p e r s o n s in t h e original p o s i t i o n will a d o p t t h e m o r e stable s c h e m e of
39
p r i n c i p l e s " (TJ 455). N o w o n e m a y well t h i n k t h a t t h e m o r e intuitive
w a y of e m b e d d i n g t h e c o n c e r n for stability w o u l d b e given by the
s t i p u l a t i o n t h a t t h e p a r t i e s ' clients v a l u e a n effective s e n s e of justice in
one another, r a t h e r t h a n e a c h only in h i m - o r h e r s e l f a s t h e first highest-
o r d e r interest s u g g e s t s . In a l a t e r essay, Rawls d o e s i n d e e d explain the
p a r t i e s ' p r e f e r e n c e for a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e t h a t e n g e n d e r s a n ef­
fective s e n s e of justice b y e m p h a s i z i n g h o w p e r s o n s living u n d e r stable
i n s t i t u t i o n s will b e m o r e successful in a d v a n c i n g t h e i r determinate
c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e g o o d , w h a t e v e r t h e s e m a y b e (BLP 3 1 - 3 2 ) . T h e r e is, I
believe, n o s e r i o u s t e n s i o n b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o a c c o u n t s of t h e parties
reasoning, b e c a u s e b e h i n d t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e t h e t w o stipulations
a r e equivalent. Still, t h e s e c o n d a c c o u n t (in BLP, p u b l i s h e d after KCMT)
m a y have t h e a d v a n t a g e of m a k i n g m o r e p e r s p i c u o u s h o w t h e parties'
rational d e l i b e r a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t o u r own m o r a l r e f l e c t i o n s .
9.4.3. W h y t h e n s h o u l d t h e p a r t i e s h a v e so decisive a p r e f e r e n c e for
stability over o t h e r forms of social e q u i l i b r i u m ? I s u g g e s t t h a t stability
e n a b l e s a g o o d t h a t is o t h e r w i s e u n a t t a i n a b l e . Stability m a k e s certain
features of t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e i m m u n e t o t h e shifting d i s t r i b u t i o n of
b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r w i t h i n t h e social s y s t e m in q u e s t i o n . T o s e e w h a t is at
stake, c o n s i d e r t h a t a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e m u s t c o p e w i t h t h e as­
s u r a n c e problem.™ P e r s o n s ' p r u d e n t i a l a n d m o r a l r e a s o n s for accept­
ing t h e i r fair s h a r e of t h e b u r d e n s of social c o o p e r a t i o n a r e u n d e r ­
m i n e d w h e n t h e r e are n o a s s u r a n c e s t h a t o t h e r s a r e c o m p l y i n g a s well.
This p r o b l e m c a n generally b e solved t h r o u g h m e c h a n i s m s for detect­
ing a n d penalizing n o n c o m p l i a n c e (TJ 270,240). T h e r e is, h o w e v e r , also
a d e e p e r v e r s i o n of t h e a s s u r a n c e p r o b l e m . H e r e t h e r e l e v a n t s u s p i c i o n
is n o t t h a t o t h e r s m a y b e shirking t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s u n d e r the
s c h e m e but t h a t m a j o r g r o u p s m a y b e s e e k i n g t h r o u g h t h e i r legitimate
political a n d e c o n o m i c p o w e r to shift t h e t e r m s of t h e institutional

c o n c o n s o f
e a ^ r i n ^ / *Z° ?P" ("stice have equally s t r o n g t e n d e n c i e s toward
S m
m^?h^
w?L-
nST n ^ J ° P

s a n c t i o n s and (dis)incentives
r e h e n e t h a t relies
<™
or![stability (a s e n s e of justice)
- T r m p r o b l e m is clearly stated in "Perpetual P e a c e ' (Kant, KPW 121n).
 R a w l s ' s C o n c e p t i o n of t h e Person, 9.4.3 101

scheme itself i n t h e i r favor. T h i s s u s p i c i o n t e n d s t o d i s p o s e o t h e r

groups to use their l e g i t i m a t e p o w e r in similar w a y s s o as to block any
advances by t h o s e w h o m t h e y s u s p e c t a n d , if possible, to w e a k e n their
position as well. As t h e situated a s s u r a n c e p r o b l e m t h r e a t e n s pervasive
noncompliance w i t h e x i s t i n g g r o u n d rules, so t h e fundamental as­
surance p r o b l e m t h r e a t e n s pervasive a n d u n r e s t r a i n e d c o m p e t i t i o n
over what the g r o u n d r u l e s will b e .
While, o n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e f u n d a m e n t a l a s s u r a n c e p r o b l e m c a n n o t
be solved t h r o u g h i n s t i t u t i o n a l m e c h a n i s m s , it may, o n the o t h e r h a n d ,
seem m u c h less t h r e a t e n i n g . S u p p o s e t h a t e a c h m a j o r g r o u p a c c e p t s
the going s c h e m e o n l y p r u d e n t i a l l y , a s t h e b e s t it c a n for n o w exact
from the others, a n d t h a t t h e r e a r e significant shifts in the distribution
of bargaining p o w e r a m o n g t h e s e g r o u p s o r in t h e i r values a n d inter­
ests. Even then, a b r e a k d o w n of o r d e r is less likely t h a n a n a d a p t a t i o n of
the scheme t o t h e a l t e r e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Even while t h e going s c h e m e
would u n d e r g o s u b s t a n t i a l c h a n g e s , o r d e r w o u l d b e preserved through
an underlying modus vivendi (cf. JFPM 247; IOC), a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h the
going terms of i n t e r a c t i o n will t e n d t o reflect a dynamic bargaining
equilibrium. T h e c o n t i n u i t y a c h i e v a b l e t h r o u g h s u c h a m o d u s vivendi
is quite weak, h o w e v e r , a s t h e g o i n g t e r m s are liable t o c h a n g e without
limit. In fact, it is p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e its t e r m s a r e flexible that a m o d u s
wendi c a n e n d u r e over t i m e . As t h e b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r o r t h e values a n d
interests of t h e v a r i o u s g r o u p s c h a n g e , t h e institutional distribution of
benefits a n d b u r d e n s is a d j u s t e d s o t h a t t h e s c h e m e c o n t i n u e s t o b e
rationally a c c e p t a b l e t o all. T h u s , w h e n a g r o u p ' s p o w e r h a s increased,
so that it n o w h a s m o r e t o g a i n a n d less t o lose from a (partial) break­
down of orderly r e l a t i o n s , it will p r u d e n t l y p r e s s for m o r e favorable
terms. And o t h e r g r o u p s will p r u d e n t l y a c c e d e t o its d e m a n d -
weakened g r o u p s b e i n g o b l i g e d to a c c e p t less favorable terms b e c a u s e
°f their i n c r e a s e d v u l n e r a b i l i t y o r d e c r e a s e d t h r e a t advantage.
9
-4-3- It is i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t w h i l e t h e c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g
^ ° " P s is effectively c o n s t r a i n e d at e a c h m o m e n t b y t h e going t e r m s ot
^ scheme, t h e r e a r e n o r e s t r a i n t s o n t h e t e r m s themselves. T h e r e are
no limits o n h o w w e a k o r s t r o n g a g r o u p m a y b e c o m e t h r o u g h shifts in
e
2 distribution of p o w e r a s reflected i n a n d c o m p o u n d e d by shirts in
m
e terms of t h e m o d u s v i v e n d i . A n d t h i s a b s e n c e of limits indicates t n e
"^son for insisting o n a s e n s e of justice. T h e features characterizing a
J»t basic s t r u c t u r e c a n b e p r e s e r v e d o n l y if e a c h major g r o u p within
m e
social s y s t e m will s u p p o r t t h e m even w h e n it is i n a position to
exact n e w t e r m s m o r e favorable t o itself. A truly e n d u r i n g just scheme
P*supposes a w i d e s p r e a d a n d d e e p m o r a l allegiance t o its basic
«*n», so that e a c h of at least t h e influential social g r o u p s can b e rehea
h o n o r t h e m e v e n w h e n t h e y significantly conflict with its moral or
JJWous convictions o r w i t h its political o r e c o n o m i c ™erests O r i y in
w
f y c a n all b e a s s u r e d t h a t t h e t e r m s of t h e s c h e m e will not.be
Justly s h i f t e d j n s t t h t h a t n o t b e forced into a d e c h n
t h
102 Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n of t h e P e r s o n , 9.4.4

ing spiral of fading power and deteriorating terms of participation.

Such assurance, in turn, radically reduces the temptation to seek un­
justly to shift the scheme's terms in one's favor (cf. §19.2 and §20.4).
9.4.4. Rawls has, then, a crucially important reason for favoring a
basic structure that has a strong tendency to engender a normally
overriding moral allegiance to itself. T h e stipulation of thefirsthighest-
order interest can be justified through the preference for a social
41
system whose basic ground rules are "taken off the political agenda,"
are not themselves objects of the political and economic competition
they are to regulate. T h e realization of this preference requires persons
who, despite a wide diversity of conflicting values and interests, share
an area of value overlap (cf. TJ 387-88), who have an overriding alle­
42
giance to this "kernel of political morality" and to its institutionaliza­
tion, and who know all this about one another. T h e aspiration toward
such a social system with such persons is partly a matter of collective
rationality, but it is also moral in three distinct respects. First, each
social group will consider it morally important to protect its values and
way of life, and for many such groups stability is the only feasible or at
least the most reliable way of ensuring that its conception of the good
will survive, will be available to be known, reaffirmed, and continued by
whoever may choose to do so. S e c o n d , individuals and associations
may also recognize other groups as having a valid claim that their
values and form of life should remain accessible within the social
system, and ensuring stability is then the best way of discharging this
collective responsibility vis-a-vis other groups in general. Here stability
is a way of assuring that we, as members of one group, will never be
forced to choose between the security of our own conception of the
good and the moral claims of others to live in accordance with theirs,
tnird, a kernel of political morality would also engender greater social
P e a c e and harmony than has been displayed by any of the large so-
aeties w e are familiar with from history, and such peace and harmony
are of moral value for their own sake
stinuLIS'Tr Sg d Rawls can give in defense of his
s u e s t e

stipulation of the first highest-order interest has this schematic form:

s p r e a d , s t r o n g a n d effective s e n s e of j u s t i c e
b a S l C S t m C t u r e , h a t t e n d s 1 0 r o d u c e i n S
SJr^' 6 firSt h , h e
P "
m AnH tt! / g s t - ° r d e r interest
oftsKS e
r K ° uf
h S
S h

, t a b
U l
° °P6 e k l d e v e l
implement a conception
a n d

accepSeto * ° P » e t o a s i c structures with this t e n d e n c y and

b

a c c e p t a b l e t o p e r s o n s w h o h a v e t h e first h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t .

8 S U 8 g e s , i n g t h i s h r a s e a n d i d e a , l o c 1 4 n 2 2 1
^ . T S m S K S T p -
f j U S i C e a n d
far — s i n g c o n d u c (and ° ' ^
 Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n of t h e Person, 9 . 4 . 6 103

9.4.5. The p r e f e r e n c e for stability m a y also furnish t h e m o s t broadly

based and m o s t c o m p e l l i n g a r g u m e n t for stipulating t h e s e c o n d high­
est-order interest i n r e a l i z i n g a n d exercising t h e capacity to form, to
revise, a n d rationally t o p u r s u e a c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . Social institu­
tions u n d e r w h i c h t h i s i n t e r e s t is w i d e s p r e a d w o u l d e n g e n d e r a strong
and lasting allegiance to a k e r n e l of political morality t h a t allows a w i d e
range of diverse a n d e v e n m u t u a l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e c o n c e p t i o n s of the
good. For c o n t r a s t , c o n s i d e r a social s y s t e m in w h i c h p e r s o n s are
primarily m o t i v a t e d b y t h e i r i n t e r e s t in p r o t e c t i n g a n d advancing their
own particular c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . In s u c h a system t h e s h a r e d
political morality is liable t o c h a n g e in r e s p o n s e to shifts in t h e relative
strength of t h e g r o u p s s u p p o r t i n g t h e various c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e good.
There is little c o n c e r n t o p r e s e r v e s p a c e for values a n d ideals currently
out of favor. H e n c e t h e a d h e r e n t s of e a c h g r o u p m u s t fear that, s h o u l d
their n u m b e r s d e c l i n e t e m p o r a r i l y , t h e r e w o u l d b e p r e s s u r e s o n the
basic structure t o c h a n g e s o a s t o m a k e a r e s u r g e n c e of their values less
likely or even i m p o s s i b l e . T h i s fear in t u r n t e n d s to p r o d u c e in each
group a strong d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o m a i n t a i n a n d increase its strength.
The fear a n d d e t e r m i n a t i o n t e n d t o u n d e r m i n e t h e g r o u p s ' moral
allegiance to t h e existing social i n s t i t u t i o n s . This p r o b l e m is avoided
when the s e c o n d h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t is w i d e s p r e a d . In that case,
many p e r s o n s will w a n t t h e social s y s t e m to b e o p e n to, a n d even to
foster, a w i d e diversity of v a l u e s a n d projects, so as t o provide a rich
background a g a i n s t w h i c h p e r s o n s c a n form a n d c h a n g e their o w n
conceptions of t h e g o o d . A n d t h e a d h e r e n t s of e a c h particular w a y of
"fe will t h e n b e a s s u r e d t h a t a n o p e n n e s s for, a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of,
their particular c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d will b e preserved by others,
even if their o w n s t r e n g t h s h o u l d d w i n d l e .
1-
Both h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s , t h e n , p l a y a n i m p o r t a n t role in p r e y e "
the inevitable c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n rival values a n d interests from
broadening i n t o a c o m p e t i t i o n over t h e t e r m s of t h e basic s t r u c t u r e
itself. This role i n d i c a t e s a n i m p o r t a n t r e a s o n w h y p e r s o n s living to­
gether u n d e r a s h a r e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s h o u l d — f o r t h e sake ot
heir particular c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d , w h a t e v e r it may b e — w a n t
these h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s i n o n e a n o t h e r . This p r u d e n t i a l reason,
"•ewforced o n c e a g a i n b y t h e t h r e e m o r a l r e a s o n s , s h o u l d lead us to
want our c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e a n d t h e b a s i c structure(s) it favors to
Render t h e s e h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s a n d to b e a p p r o p n a t e tor per­
sons having them. T h e original p o s i t i o n is to b e d e s i g n e d accordingly
9
-4.6. If Rawls w a n t s t o make a c o n v i n c i n g case for his stipulation ot
^ two highest-order i n t e r e s t s , then h e must p r e s e n t a rationale ot this
Wh Se
Zs ° a
PP e a l i s
i n d e p e n d e n t of a n y p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t i o n s of the
§°°d. Rawls fails t o s u p p l y s u c h a r a t i o n a l e in A Theory <tf-^j£*
**n years later, h e s k e t c h e s o n e b y saying that t h e parties^seek to
Render t h e highest-order i n t e r e s t s as means to protect a n d ad
104 Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n of t h e P e r s o n , 9.5

v a n c e t h e d e t e r m i n a t e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d of t h o s e t h e y represent
(BLP 27, 29-32). But i m m e d i a t e l y t h e r e a f t e r h e g o e s right back to a
highly p a r t i s a n K a n t i a n r a t i o n a l e : " T h e role a n d e x e r c i s e of [the moral]
p o w e r s (in t h e a p p r o p r i a t e i n s t a n c e s ) is a c o n d i t i o n of g o o d . . . . [Cit­
izens'] j u s t a n d h o n o r a b l e ( a n d fully a u t o n o m o u s ) c o n d u c t renders
t h e m , a s Kant w o u l d say, w o r t h y of h a p p i n e s s ; i t m a k e s their accom­
p l i s h m e n t s w h o l l y a d m i r a b l e a n d t h e i r p i e a s u r e s c o m p l e t e l y good
(BLP 49).«
9.4.7. T h e s t i p u l a t i o n of t h e h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s will of course
affect h o w t h e c o n t e n t of t h e favored c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is argued for
w i t h i n t h e c o n s t r a i n t s of t h e original p o s i t i o n . T h e a r g u m e n t will reflect
t h e t h i n k i n g of p e r s o n s w h o v a l u e t h e i r s h a r e d c a t e g o r i c a l allegiance to
a lasting k e r n e l of political m o r a l i t y a n d t h e i r s h a r e d i n t e r e s t in pre­
serving t h e s p a c e for a w i d e r a n g e of d i v e r s e c o n c e p t i o n s of the good.
T h e s e p e r s o n s a r e n o t w e , b u t t h e m e m b e r s of t h e w e l l - o r d e r e d society
c o r r e l a t e d w i t h Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . B u t t h e a r g u m e n t still
t o u c h e s u s insofar as w e , u p o n reflection, w o u l d a s p i r e t o s u c h a social
s y s t e m , w o u l d w a n t t o s e e o u r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d a n d w a y of life
b e t t e r p r o t e c t e d , w o u l d w a n t t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t satisfy
t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s of justice, a n d w o u l d w a n t t o b e a n d live among
p e r s o n s w h o , h o w e v e r different i n o t h e r w a y s , s h a r e a categorical
c o m m i t m e n t t o m a i n t a i n t h e j u s t i c e of t h e i r s h a r e d b a s i c institutions.
Some p e o p l e h e r e a n d n o w m a y s e e n e i t h e r r a t i o n a l n o r m o r a l reasons
tor finding t h i s a s p i r a t i o n p l a u s i b l e a n d will, p e r h a p s r e a s o n a b l y , reject
Rawls s c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n , a l t h o u g h t h e y m i g h t h a v e a c c e p t e d a
m o r e n e u t r a l o n e sufficient for d e r i v i n g h i s c r i t e r i o n of justice. But
losing t h e m c a n n o t b e h e l p e d , b e c a u s e a m o r e n e u t r a l c o n c e p t i o n of
m e p e r s o n w o u l d n o t s u p p o r t t h e a m b i t i o n for a s t a b l e , h a r m o n i o u s ,
a n d e n d u n n g l y j u s t social s y s t e m .
9 . 5 . Let m e c o n c l u d e w i t h s o m e r e m a r k s o n h o w Rawls's insistence
o n a s u p r e m e l y regulative a n d effective s e n s e of j u s t i c e m i g h t c o m e to
t e r m s w i t h t h e d o u b t s first voiced b y B e r n a r d W i l l i a m s i n "Persons,
Character, 0
a n d Morality."*. T h e w o r r y i s t h a t o n c e w e r e s e r v e a special
SSlIm. / s
" p r
!* e

S
m

1
a

c
f o

c
r m
° r a l m o t i v a t i o n s w e will n o t b e able to
e
to r T r « . h ^ ^ s t r u c t u r a l i m p o r t a n c e t h a t c a n attach
to o u r o t h e r c o n s h t u t i v e c o m m i t m e n t s (Williams, ML 2). T h u s Williams

n , k
M ^ ¥ u S p ? c 1 S T . ! ! ^ ° ' ^ ^ i o n s , °f' f r R a W S S G a l s t

U m o r e
Kantian (or Aristotelian) r n r T . ' - } s u g g e s t s that rather t h a n a p p e a l t o a narrowly
P l n
u p o n a m r e M m nemril ^ J ° ° « < f t
s h o u l d b a s e his stipulations h e 0 o d U f e R a w l s

C O m m d e
th^goocTa«ualtSd^h^ T ^ ° " " ° ™ n a t o r of t h e c o n c e p t i o n s of
I a n , S O c i e , v a a
the l e x t , n o ^ 1 K ^ ? ? I < &™ t i m e . As s h o u l d b e c l e a r from
f a , l s resoIve
Groups m u s t fear hat a T n l i n <° t h e f u n d a m e n t a l a s s u r a n c e problem-
mw may induce a shift in ,nis comm0
'^^^.^S^S^^^Jt ^
their values. 1 h a ^ a ^ u e d for ™ ? P ° " itteass u p p o r t i v e of (or e v e n hostile to
s b a s e d u
by inVokin ve a
rationale that a p p ^ a l s T ^ value oPf,^^", «' u

m d
security of any coYua^ * ^ o t ^ ' * for t h e long-term 3 8 a

- F i r s . pubHshed i n i 9 7 6 ,> n d £ ^ j n ^ ^
 Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n of t h e Person, 9.5 105

thinks we o u g h t "to a l l o w m o r e r o o m t h a n K a n t i a n i s m c a n allow for t h e

importance of i n d i v i d u a l c h a r a c t e r a n d p e r s o n a l relations in m o r a l
experience" (ML 5). F o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s mitigate this c o n c e r n as ad­
dressed to Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n . First, w h a t is to take motivational p r e c e ­
dence over o u r d e e p loyalities, a t t a c h m e n t s , or g r o u n d projects is a
political, r a t h e r t h a n a g e n e r a l a n d c o m p r e h e n s i v e morality (cf. IOC 3 -
4TWhat Rawls s t i p u l a t e s is a n a l l e g i a n c e o n l y to t h e criterion of justice,
to the basic s t r u c t u r e i n s o f a r a s it is justified by this criterion, a n d to
legislative, judicial, a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e c i s i o n s insofar as they are
rendered p u r s u a n t t o justified p r o c e d u r e s a n d a c c o r d in c o n t e n t with
the criterion of j u s t i c e .
Second, t h e political m o r a l i t y is specifically conceived so as to be
compatible with, a n d p r o t e c t i v e of, a w i d e range of diverse a n d often
mutually i n c o m p a t i b l e religions, p e r s o n a l values, a n d ethical doctrines
(of the more g e n e r a l a n d c o m p r e h e n s i v e kind).
These two c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s h o w t h a t t h e o c c a s i o n s o n w h i c h the
sense of justice w o u l d c o m e i n t o conflict w i t h o t h e r constitutive c o m ­
mitments are likely to b e r a r e , at least i n c o m p a r i s o n to alternative, n o n -
Rawlsian basic s t r u c t u r e s . T h i s fact is w e l c o m e , b e c a u s e a regulative
and effective s e n s e of j u s t i c e , t h o u g h it m u s t b e determinative, n e e d not
be our s u p r e m e o r p r e e m i n e n t c o m m i t m e n t . It n e e d not be ranked
45
above c o m m i t m e n t s t h a t d o n o t conflict w i t h i t .
Third, Rawls's t h e o r y is a n e x e r c i s e in ideal theory. So even if it w e r e
true that p e r s o n s a s t h e y n o w a r e h a v e s o m e constitutive c o m m i t m e n t s
that may conflict w i t h a n a l l e g i a n c e t o a just institutional s c h e m e , it
46
would not follow t h a t s u c h conflicts w o u l d o c c u r u n d e r that s c h e m e .
The reason, as Williams h i m s e l f p o i n t s o u t , is t h a t a p e r s o n ' s constitu­
tive c o m m i t m e n t s a r e "in g o o d p a r t . . . f o r m e d within, a n d formed by,
dispositions w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e a c o m m i t m e n t to morality" (ML 12)—in
thJS case to t h e political m o r a l i t y Rawls is p r o p o s i n g . This consider­
ation shows h o w o n e n e e d n o t d e n y e i t h e r t h e crucial role of constitu­
t e c o m m i t m e n t s i n a w o r t h w h i l e h u m a n life or t h e fundamental
"nportance of s u c h c o m m i t m e n t s o n c e t h e y have b e e n formed. Both
these points a r e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e h o p e t h a t in t h e context ot a n

* « one accepts this p o i n t , a s Rawls s e e m s t o d o (IOC 17), then o n e m i g i t consider

^ n g Rawls's talk of t h e t w o h i g h e s t - o r d e r interests. A preeminent .nteres m o n e s
a t i n for e x a e
W f ° ' ™ P ' ' P ° s e s n o p r o b l e m s o l o n g as a confl.ct b e t w e e n . t a n d the
m , 6 r e S t t o d e v e l e s s e n s e f
o n W 5, °P exereiie ° " ° Justicejs . m p o s s bte lor at teas.
atT St
V
0rder
p o s s i b l e ) . T h u s o n e m a y prefer t o speak of a defrmmawe
remote!
rrther than
"i ~, ^ ^ e r e s t
call it "regulative in the political d o m a i n « ^ t h e r

^ P r e m e l y regulative." T h i s p r o p o s a l a l s o avoids t h e misleading a s s o c . a n o n of h.gnest

1
^rn^ s e c o n d - o r d e r " (see n. 3 4 abovel. . from f f h t
:
*££T d o n o
c o m m i t m e n t that t
^' c o n s i d e r t h e s t r a i n s o f m 1
d

P e h a v i n t 0
' g m o v e from a favored p o s i t i o n in a n unjust s o c i e t y t o a ess^avo
SH ' i n this . , o ^ f s to ask w h a t stra n s ansefrom, * e onjo g
j u s t s o c i e r y R a t h e r

^"^thesocieryone^puttingto SSbis test...-T^^^^rK

^ of hypothetical transition from u n j u s t s o c i e t i e s is irrelevant RAM 653)
A c t i n g the last f e w l i n e s of TJ 176 (cf. TG 2 0 2 - 3 ) . See also Shue, BJ 607.
 106 Rawls's C o n c e p t i o n of t h e P e r s o n , 9.5

o n g o i n g just b a s i c s t r u c t u r e , p e r s o n s w o u l d t e n d e i t h e r n o t to form
certain c o m m i t m e n t s or to u n d e r s t a n d t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i v e commit­
m e n t s as limited from t h e start s o t h a t t h e possibility of s u c h conflicts is
largely e x c l u d e d . Given w i d e s p r e a d m o r a l a l l e g i a n c e to a just regime,
p e r s o n s might, for e x a m p l e , b e u n w i l l i n g to form a f r i e n d s h i p with a
n o t o r i o u s tax c h e a t or m i g h t refuse t o u n d e r s t a n d s u c h a friendship as
obligating t h e m t o h e l p cover u p t h e i r friend's f r a u d u l e n t activities.
It m a y n e v e r t h e l e s s h a p p e n , of c o u r s e , t h a t a d e e p a n d long-standing
c o m m i t m e n t c o m e s i n t o conflict w i t h political m o r a l i t y . S u c h conflicts
w o u l d b e m u c h m o r e difficult t h a n Williams's c a s e (ML 1 7 - 1 8 ) , in
w h i c h s o m e o n e , u n a b l e to r e s c u e b o t h of t w o e n d a n g e r e d persons,
gives p r e c e d e n c e t o t h e o n e w h o is h i s wife. It w o u l d b e a case where
t h e a g e n t ' s loyalty to his wife w o u l d r e q u i r e h i m to violate just rules, to
b r e a k a law, to bribe a j u d g e , or s u c h like. It is n o t o b v i o u s that one
s h o u l d w a n t to b e a p e r s o n w h o w o u l d , e v e n i n a perfectly j u s t society,
d o s u c h t h i n g s if o n e ' s wife t u r n e d o u t to b e in t h e Mafia, say. I feel that
at this p o i n t Williams overstates t h e significance of c o n s t i t u t i v e com­
m i t m e n t s w h e n h e writes (about t h e r e s c u e case): "It m i g h t have been
h o p e d by s o m e (for i n s t a n c e , by h i s wife) t h a t h i s m o t i v a t i n g thought,
fully spelled out, w o u l d b e t h e t h o u g h t t h a t it w a s h i s wife, not that it
w a s h i s wife a n d t h a t in s i t u a t i o n s of this k i n d it is p e r m i s s i b l e to save
o n e ' s wife," as t h e latter r e a s o n i n g " p r o v i d e s t h e a g e n t w i t h one
J
| ! ? ^ k t o o j n a n y " (ML 1 8 ) . But t h e s e c o n d t h o u g h t is n o t o u t of place
in~Tne c o n t e x t s relevant h e r e , for e x a m p l e , t h e Mafia c a s e . Even if s h e is
o n e s wife, o n e m a y still ask w h e t h e r it is right t o violate a just practice
tor h e r sake. This m u c h s e e m s perfectly c o m p a t i b l e w i t h having a
character.
Fourth, t h e s e n s e of justice n e e d n o t b e d e t e r m i n a t i v e for all persons
all t h e t i m e . " T h e r e can c o m e a p o i n t at w h i c h it is q u i t e u n r e a s o n a b l e
tor a m a n t o give u p , in t h e n a m e of t h e i m p a r t i a l g o o d o r d e r i n g of the
w o r l d of moral a g e n t s , s o m e t h i n g w h i c h is a c o n d i t i o n of h i s having any
interest m b e i n g a r o u n d in t h a t w o r l d at all" (ML 1 4 ) I n d e e d , s u c h a
C m e V e t n e n e e d n o t s a 1 t h
E ° ° y- i n k ' t h a t h e is justified i n
6 11 U P b U t a t m o s t i n
Sh? a r^u ' ' Williams's p h r a s e , t h a t "some
s UJations i e b e y o n d justifications" (ML 1 8 ) . Moreover, t h e possibility of
q U U e c o m a t i b l
nf ™ i" !f P e w i t h t h e feasibility a n d desirability
C i e t y i n W h i c h m o s t
haveT^ f° ' P e r s o n s m o s t of t h e t i m e will
S 6 n S e f j U S t i c e s o t h a t
basfr ? °
t h e e n d u r i n g j u s t i c e of the
1 8
not bC ? ? ^ s u r e d . S u c h a s s u r a n c e is u n d e r m i n e d
m a n i f e s t l
3 '
P n S S U c h a s W i l l i
reH*£n • ™r\ T ° a m s d e s c r i b e s b u t b y powerful
r e C O n o m i c
S l S m n S > '° g ^ P s struggling t o shift t h e a c c e p t e d
political morality ,n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s or val-
PART T W O

DEVELOPING RAWLS'S
CRITERION O F J U S T I C E
C H A P T E R 3

The First Principle

of Justice

10. T h e G e n e r a l P a r a m e t e r s

Rawls p r o p o s e s a c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e t h a t r a n k s feasible alternative

basic structures b y t h e m i n i m u m r e p r e s e n t a t i v e lifetime s h a r e of social
primary goods e a c h of t h e m t e n d s t o g e n e r a t e . In this section, I analyze
this proposal i n t o eight m a i n e l e m e n t s , w h i c h m a y b e g r o u p e d into o u r
familiar three c o m p o n e n t s , t h e w h o - , w h a t - , a n d h o w - q u e s t i o n s of §3.1.
J ^ e I discuss s o m e of t h e s e e l e m e n t s e l s e w h e r e (as indicated in
Table 2), the p r e s e n t s e c t i o n is i n t e n d e d o n l y t o i n t r o d u c e t h e m briefly
m
one place. T h e r e m a i n d e r of Part T w o focuses o n t h e core of the
what-component, t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n of Rawls's semiconsequentialist ac­
count of the i n d i v i d u a l g o o d , w h i c h is t o inform all interpersonal a n d
Werschemic c o m p a r i s o n s i n m a t t e r s of social justice.

^j^Tbe main e l e m e n t s of Rawls's criterion of justice

m 1 0 2
° Humanism S -
1 0 3
„, Individualism § „ .,
c
m
* S e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m vs. d e o n t o l o g y S J W . l . §3.5.22, §4.4.1
i f n u c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m vs. full c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m S10.4.A ! $ • > ^ »
freedom, social primary g o o d s §10.5, §9.4, §§H
st s h a r e s
How r? e t
! m e e
* P°
Maxtmin §10 •»
^ _ _ ^ e p r e s e n t a t i v e groups ^

10-1. Let begin with t h e key element within the h o w - c o m p j e n ^ ,

m e

c o m m i t m e n t t o t h e m a x i m i n idea. In analogy to the biblical

109
110 T h e General P a r a m e t e r s , 10.1

idea of m o r a l i t y — "Whatever y o u h a v e d o n e t o o n e of t h e least of these

m y b r e t h r e n , t h a t y o u h a v e d o n e t o m e " ( M a t t h e w 25:40)—the ranking
of feasible alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s is to d e p e n d u p o n t h e worst
social p o s i t i o n e a c h of t h e m t e n d s t o p r o d u c e . All i n f o r m a t i o n about
b e t t e r p o s i t i o n s is left a s i d e as irrelevant. T h u s Rawls invites u s to think
of " t h e two p r i n c i p l e s a s t h e m a x i m i n s o l u t i o n t o t h e p r o b l e m of social
j u s t i c e — [T]he t w o p r i n c i p l e s a r e t h o s e a p e r s o n w o u l d c h o o s e for the
d e s i g n of a society in w h i c h h i s e n e m y is to a s s i g n h i m h i s place
[T]hat t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e w o u l d b e c h o s e n if t h e p a r t i e s were
forced to p r o t e c t t h e m s e l v e s a g a i n s t s u c h a c o n t i n g e n c y explains the
s e n s e i n w h i c h t h i s c o n c e p t i o n is t h e m a x i m i n s o l u t i o n " (TJ 152-53). As
t h e s e r e m a r k s i n d i c a t e , Rawls's a r g u m e n t from t h e original position is
divisible i n t o t w o s t e p s . T h e first of t h e s e links t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of the
original p o s i t i o n w i t h t h e p a r t i e s ' e m p l o y m e n t of t h e m a x i m i n rule,
a n d t h e s e c o n d p r e s e n t s t h e c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e h e p r o p o s e s as "the
m a x i m i n s o l u t i o n to t h e p r o b l e m of social j u s t i c e . " After s o m e brief
c o m m e n t s a b o u t t h e first s t e p , I c o n c e n t r a t e o n t h e d i s c u s s i o n of the
s e c o n d , w h i c h b r i n g s in t h e o t h e r e l e m e n t s of h i s c r i t e r i o n of justice.
1
Rawls's u s e of t h e m a x i m i n i d e a h a s p r o v o k e d a flood of criticism
T h e s e a p p e a r q u i t e d e v a s t a t i n g if o n e t a k e s literally Rawls's professed,
aim "to c h a r a c t e r i z e [the initial] s i t u a t i o n s o t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e s that
w o u l d b e c h o s e n , w h a t e v e r t h e y t u r n o u t to b e , a r e a c c e p t a b l e from a
m o r a l p o i n t of v i e w . . . . T h u s j u s t i c e a s fairness is a b l e to u s e t h e idea of
p u r e p r o c e d u r a l justice from t h e b e g i n n i n g " (TJ 120). T h i s statement
s e e m s t o i n d i c a t e t h a t Rawls's e n t i r e a r g u m e n t w o u l d c o l l a p s e if the
p a r t i e s ' e m p l o y m e n t of t h e m a x i m i n r u l e w e r e r e f u t e d . In t h e same
section, however, Rawls s u g g e s t s t h e o p p o s i t e p i c t u r e a s well. "The
p r o c e d u r e of c o n t r a c t t h e o r i e s p r o v i d e s , t h e n , a g e n e r a l analytic
m e t h o d for t h e c o m p a r a t i v e s t u d y of c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e . O n e tries
to set o u t t h e different c o n d i t i o n s e m b o d i e d in t h e c o n t r a c t u a l situa­
tion i n w h i c h their p r i n c i p l e s w o u l d b e c h o s e n . In t h i s w a y o n e formu­
lates t h e various u n d e r l y i n g a s s u m p t i o n s o n w h i c h t h e s e c o n c e p t i o n s
s e e m to d e p e n d " (TJ 121-22). Here, Rawls s u g g e s t s t h a t o n e b e g i n s with
a p a r t i c u l a r criterion of j u s t i c e a n d t h e n c o n s t r u c t s o n e ' s initial situa­
tion accordingly: "We w a n t to define t h e original p o s i t i o n s o t h a t w e get
t h e d e s i r e d s o l u t i o n " (TJ 141); "the original p o s i t i o n h a s b e e n defined
s o t h a t it is a s i t u a t i o n in w h i c h t h e m a x i m i n r u l e a p p l i e s " (TJ 155).
Each of t h e s e t w o p i c t u r e s is o v e r d r a w n a n d at o d d s w i t h Rawls's
m e t h o d of reflective e q u i l i b r i u m . Of t h e original p o s i t i o n a n d h i s max­
imin c n t e n o n , n e i t h e r is c o n c e i v e d p r i o r to a n d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of the
other. T h e p o i n t is r a t h e r to fit t h e m closely i n t o e a c h o t h e r while
arguing for t h e specification of e a c h o n i n d e p e n d e n t g r o u n d s a s far as

XeS
lO-UH^HT^nTTF ' 1 8 6 6
' S e n C C S W c h a D S 9 a
* ; Pettit, TJ 3 1 2 - 1 4 ; Naget, Wn d 9

provides s^Jriil; f?UN ~ 2 5 0 5 1 ; M

" " g r a v e , MULT; a n d Harsanyi, CMP. Rawls
provides s o m e d e f e n s e s a n d elaborations in R M C a n d RAM
 T h e G e n e r a l Parameters, 10.1 111

possible (cf. TJ 20). H e n c e R a w l s ' s failure t o establish a tight c o n n e c t i o n

between his original p o s i t i o n a n d h i s favored criterion w o u l d n o t d e ­
stroy his case for t h e latter. H e c o u l d still try t o r e d e s c r i b e t h e original
position in a w a y t h a t p r e s e r v e s t h e plausibility of this "expository
device" (TJ 21) w h i l e a l s o r e d e e m i n g h i s claim that t h e parties w o u l d
employ t h e m a x i m i n r u l e ( a n d c h o o s e h i s favored criterion). Rawls's
argument w o u l d b e d e f e a t e d o n l y if every d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e initial
situation that c o u l d y i e l d h i s p r e f e r r e d c r i t e r i o n w e r e morally i m p l a u s ­
ible.
But let u s n o t r u s h t o s p e c u l a t e a b o u t h o w t h e original position
might best b e r e d e s c r i b e d . F o r it is far from clear t h a t s u c h revision is
needed. It is Rawls's c l a i m t h a t a " c o n s t e l l a t i o n of w e a k e r a n d m o r e
basic conditions o n t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , e a c h w i t h its a p p r o p r i a t e
pedigree o r justification . . . , w h e n o n e c o n s i d e r s t h e i r c o m b i n e d force,
would lead r e a s o n a b l e p e o p l e t o c h o o s e a s if t h e y w e r e highly risk-
2
averse" (RAM 649). Rawls h a s given at least six g r o u n d s for this claim,
but his critics h a v e a l m o s t exclusively c o n c e n t r a t e d o n only t w o of
these: that t h e r e is r e a s o n , b e h i n d t h e veil of ignorance, for sharply
discounting p r o b a b i l i t y e s t i m a t e s (TJ 154) a n d t h a t c h o o s i n g in accor­
dance with t h e m a x i m i n r u l e e n s u r e s a n a c c e p t a b l e m i n i m u m position
above which t h e r e is little t o g a i n a n d b e l o w w h i c h t h e r e is m u c h to
3
lose (TJ 154-55). Let m e briefly r e c a p i t u l a t e t h e r e m a i n i n g four rea­
sons.
Third, "the p a r t i e s w a n t t h e i r d e c i s i o n t o a p p e a r well f o u n d e d t o
others" (TJ 173). W h a t is m e a n t , I s u p p o s e , is that t h e parties s h o u l d
choose in t h e spirit of a t r u s t e e investing m o n e y for a w a r d . This
attitude is i n d e e d a p p r o p r i a t e b e c a u s e in s h a p i n g basic institutions t h e
Parties (and we) a r e d e t e r m i n i n g t h e v a r i o u s social positions that per­
4
sons will b e b o r n i n t o , w i t h o u t c h o i c e . Fourth, t h e b e n c h m a r k ot

J take the original p o s i t i o n to i n c o r p o r a t e t h e following six features-. (II the conception

« « * parties a s m u t u a l l y d i s i n t e r e s t e d a n d rational in t h e narrow s e n s e of decuaon
e c o n
™ ( e g . , TJ 1 4 4 - 4 5 ) ; (2) t h e characterization of those thtpartes
^ s e n t as individuals,
C 0 Ception
a n d e q u a l moral p e r s o n s w i t h t w o h . g h e s t frle -«^*£*£
S^ v . of1
P
o f t h e

^
g o o d (KCMT 5 2 5 - 2 6 ) ; (3) t h e restriction o n
parties'
« f f ^ * 3 e
staMe
m
Tty
i g n o r a n c e ( 4 ) ( h e fonnu]ation o f t h e

o n
a criterion for a s s e s s i n g t h e b a s i c structure of a .wlf-contamed s o c
y « « n existing in t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f justice (TJ §§2, 22); (5) t h e tot of >*e™S
to the parties (TJ §21); a n d (6) t h e formal constraints of the r i g h t - g e n e r a l i t y ,
u b l i c i ,
'Haurf?' P y , ordering, a n d finality (TJ §23). annronoriate
Rawls cues Fellner, PP l o 4 , a s s h o w i n g that t h e s e « n * ^ f ^ , ^4 ^C^n 2

spltaLP,fi6S h e S
t o c h o
^ a c c o r d a n c e with the maximin m ' \ ^ « *
e c o n d
o s e
Z t o F

^ S , c o n d i t i o n i n t o t w o , t h o u g h t h e p o i n t m u s t b e that the potential g a m

r e a t , v e t 0
'CW ' ,
6
»he p o t e n t i a l l o s s e s . „ ; w l i t v toward the c

peSf here Rawls's remarks that t h e parties have a r e s p o n s i b ^ t y tovvarc^

CexL^e™1 . 26) a n d a l s o t h e p a s s a g e about the= P ^ ^ d ( B L P 2 1
, t h a
n e r a t i o n ( T J h s D
» i « « l, dn e^r a t i o n " 2MM>. for w h i c h I s e e n o o t h e r rationale. It * J ^ . erse, r i s l c a V

CS 1 s
S
re
^ e parties t o k n o w that t h o s e they Pf** r
O S
uire

h o s e they
re
n ^7
42^™ - W e t h e parties w e r e g i v e n to k n o w t h a t o n to^^^^
p
" » e n t are e n t r e p r e n e u r s o r g a m b l e r s b y t e m p e r a m e n t . Even w i t h this s n p
112 T h e G e n e r a l P a r a m e t e r s , 10.2

equality, t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e c o n c e r n for t h e l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d , appropri­

ately e x p r e s s e s t h e political c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n , o u r aspiration
for a society of free a n d e q u a l c i t i z e n s (RMC 1 4 4 - 4 5 ) . Fifth, a maximin
criterion is m u c h e a s i e r t o apply, for it is c o n c e r n e d o n l y w i t h t h e worst
s h a r e . It is especially s u i t a b l e as a p u b l i c c r i t e r i o n b e c a u s e one can
m o r e easily u n d e r s t a n d it a n d c h e c k w h e t h e r it is satisfied (TJ 517; RMC
5
143-44).
Finally, t h e p a r t i e s ' c h o i c e is to b e a b i n d i n g a g r e e m e n t t h a t persons
s h o u l d b e able t o k e e p w i t h o u t t o o m u c h difficulty. W h e n Rawls's
m a x i m i n c r i t e r i o n is satisfied, t h e " s t r a i n s of c o m m i t m e n t " are rela­
tively w e a k b e c a u s e e v e r y o n e will benefit from e x i s t i n g inequalities
vis-a-vis t h e b e n c h m a r k of equality, a n d t h e w o r s t s h a r e , in particular,
will n o t b e w o r s e t h a n n e c e s s a r y s o a s to a l l o w o t h e r s h a r e s to be
h i g h e r t h a n t h e y c o u l d o t h e r w i s e b e . T h a t e v e n t h e w o r s t social posi­
t i o n will b e r e a s o n a b l y a c c e p t a b l e ( c o m p a r e d t o t h e w o r s t social posi­
t i o n u n d e r a n y alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e favored b y o t h e r criteria) is of
s o m e m o m e n t b e c a u s e " t h e p a r t i e s m u s t d e c l i n e all risks e a c h possible
o u t c o m e of w h i c h t h e y c a n n o t a g r e e i n g o o d faith t o a c c e p t " (RAM 653).
Moreover, w e a k s t r a i n s of c o m m i t m e n t a r e a n e c e s s a r y p r e r e q u i s i t e for
t h e crucially i m p o r t a n t g o o d of stability (TJ 1 7 5 - 7 8 , 4 9 8 - 9 9 ; RMC 144).
In v i e w of t h e s e a d d i t i o n a l positive r e a s o n s ( a n d t h e d e f e n s e s devel­
o p e d in §6.4) let m e t h e n a s s u m e t h a t t h e c a s e for m a x i m i n is still
p l a u s i b l e a n d c o n c e n t r a t e o n t h e s e c o n d s t e p : "If t h e original position
h a s b e e n d e s c r i b e d s o t h a t it is r a t i o n a l for t h e p a r t i e s t o a d o p t the
conservative a t t i t u d e e x p r e s s e d b y [ t h e m a x i m i n ) r u l e , a conclusive
a r g u m e n t c a n i n d e e d b e c o n s t r u c t e d for t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s " (TJ 153).
T h e r e a r e m a n y different w a y s in w h i c h a m a x i m i n c r i t e r i o n might be
specified, however, d e p e n d i n g o n h o w o n e s e t s v a r i o u s f u r t h e r param­
e t e r s . In t h i s s e c t i o n a n d t h e n e x t I will p r e s e n t a n d p a r t l y d i s c u s s these
f u r t h e r e l e m e n t s of Rawls's p a r t i c u l a r m a x i m i n c r i t e r i o n . T h e discus­
s i o n will suggest v a r i o u s w a y s of revising t h e M a s t e r P a t t e r n u p o n
w h i c h t h e m a x i m i n r a n k i n g of feasible alternative b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s is to
be based.
l O A . Rawls is c o m m i t t e d t o h u m a n i s m a n d t h u s d e n i e s t h a t a con­
c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e s h o u l d i n c l u d e a n i m a l s a s well: " T h o s e w h o c a n give
j u s h c e a r e o w e d j u s t i c e " (TJ 510).« Rawls s e e m s a l s o t o d e n y that

d a V e reaS n t 0 C h o o s e
JhM l C . K ° conservatively, for t h e y w o u l d t h e n w a n t t o preclude
y r e p r e e m b e b o m i n t o
^ f , t , ^ a social p o s i t i o n in w h i c h g a m b l i n g and
m e a n S U t o f , h e
mheritanr^' K t ^ f ' ° q ^ t i o n A trustee w h o lost her wards
WmTnov!ZTJ* by
* !n,mg ,hat
1 # 1 n k c o m m o
y ° P « o n c o n t r a c t c a n h a r d l y justify t h i s gamble to d i t

risk t a W ^ |?L T
u s e s h e k n e w that h e w a s going to S h e b ] e d b e M

-ForRaw£ i ^ t o j ™ o n e of Rawls's parties w h o s e c l i e n t is b o r n i n t o slavery

C ndUi n
m e m .s e t TJ1133KC^LT-iJta!^ ° °""^ ^
P e R O n a l i , y T h e riSk 1 0
"
 T h e G e n e r a l P a r a m e t e r s , 10.3.2 113

animals have m o r a l r i g h t s ( t h a t w e o w e t h e m morality), for h e says that

we have "duties of c o m p a s s i o n a n d h u m a n i t y in their case" (TJ 512, m y
7
emphasis). While t h i s s e c o n d t e n e t is c o n t r o v e r s i a l , t h e first is m o r e
secure. Animals w o u l d b e suffering a n i n j u s t i c e if t h e y w e r e excessively
disadvantaged p a r t i c i p a n t s in s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s o r u n r e a s o n a b l y ex­
cluded from s u c h i n s t i t u t i o n s a l t o g e t h e r . But n e i t h e r is t h e case. Ani­
mals cannot p a r t i c i p a t e i n b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s b e c a u s e they c a n n o t
understand political d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , legal rights, m a r k e t s , money,
marriage, a n d t h e like. If w e s h o u l d n e v e r t h e l e s s take t h e m into ac­
count in t h e d e s i g n of o u r s o c i a l w o r l d , w e a r e b o u n d b y a collective
duty of morality.
10.3. Rawls t a k e s t h e r e l e v a n t p a r t i c i p a n t s in social institutions,
represented by t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e original position, to b e individual
persons.
10.3.1. One a l t e r n a t i v e s t i p u l a t i o n is t h a t t h e u l t i m a t e u n i t s of moral
concern include g r o u p s , a n d i n h i s first s t a t e m e n t of his c o n c e p t i o n of
justice Rawls d i d i n d e e d s t i p u l a t e t h a t t h e p a r t i e s also r e p r e s e n t "na­
tions, provinces, b u s i n e s s firms, c h u r c h e s , t e a m s , a n d s o o n " (JR 245, cf.
24
8-49).» He h a s s i n c e c o m e t o t h e v i e w t h a t o n e s h o u l d not postulate
groups with r e p r e s e n t a b l e i n t e r e s t s over a n d above t h o s e of its m e m ­
bers: "For r e a s o n s of clarity a m o n g o t h e r s . . . w e w a n t to a c c o u n t for t h e
social values, for t h e i n t r i n s i c g o o d of institutional, c o m m u n i t y , a n d
associative activities, b y a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e that in its theoretical
basis is individualistic" (TJ 264). A further, decisive r e a s o n s u p p o r t i n g
™» change is t h a t t h e i n c l u s i o n of " s u p r a p e r s o n a l " u n i t s w o u l d b e
incompatible w i t h R a w l s ' s i n s i s t e n c e o n t h e p r i m a c y of (the subject of)
"J; basic s t r u c t u r e . If w e a r e t o b e g i n m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y with t h e
Section u p o n o u r m o s t b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h e n w e c a n hardly take tor
fatted that t h e s e a r e t o r e g u l a t e t h e i n t e r a c t i o n s a m o n g business
and c h u r c h e s . W h a t k i n d s of a s s o c i a t i o n s exist is itself a function
d e s 9
JJ* » g n of b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s . , ,
10.3.2. In r o u g h l y t h e o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n goes t h e d e m a n d tor m e
dmjssion of " s u b p e r s o n a l " u n i t s . S a n d e l ' s i d e a of "a plurality of selves
3 S i n l e
IT § < ^ d i v i d u a l h u m a n b e i n g " (LLJ 63) c a n h a r d l y be useful
d e s j n
g a n d a s s e s s m e n t of i n s t i t u t i o n s , b u t o n e might c o n s i d e r
m
* slices of i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n b e i n g s . T h i s i d e a raises various q u e s -

SXft? h e a d s of families" (TJ 128). T h i s idea plays a very

C o n c l
to^rote in 1
"«X ^ i ° n that t h e parties c a r e for m e m b e r s of ^ t u r e g e n e r a ^ ^ J
that e a c h h o u s e h o l d , regardless o f size, h a s only o n e r e p r e s e n t ^
^ P o s i t i o n . ) Rawls w a n t e d that c o n c l u s i o n ^ p u r p o s e s of an a c c o u n ^ J
h p f h a s s i n c e w i t h d r a w n this a c c o u n t (BSS70> o i ' d M d u a l i s
n e t i o n s H e
? - t i c

, W he h also a b a n d o n e d talk of h e a d s of families in favor of cleanly m d m a

a s
114 T h e General P a r a m e t e r s , 10.4.2.1

tions: h o w "thick" s h o u l d t h e slices b e , a n d s h o u l d p e r s o n s b e sliced

individually (by age) o r t o g e t h e r o n c e r t a i n fixed d a t e s ? T h e problems of
i n c o r p o r a t i n g t h i s i d e a i n t o t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of a modem
society are evident, b u t m o r e d a m a g i n g is t h e p r o b l e m that these
h u m a n slices w o u l d t h e m s e l v e s w a n t t o b e t a k e n into account as
c o m p l e t e p e r s o n s , w o u l d w a n t to b e able to save for a n d b o r r o w against
future i n c o m e , a n d t h e like.
10.4. T h e r e a r e t w o m a i n a l t e r n a t i v e s t o t h e semiconsequentialist
e l e m e n t of Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e .
10.4.1. Rawls d e p a r t s from d e o n t o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s of justice by
h o l d i n g t h a t equivalent benefits a n d b u r d e n s s h o u l d b e weighted
equally, regardless of w h e t h e r t h e y a r e e s t a b l i s h e d o r e n g e n d e r e d by
social i n s t i t u t i o n s . In t h e c o m p a r a t i v e a s s e s s m e n t of b a s i c structures
t h e perspective of its p o t e n t i a l p a r t i c i p a n t s is decisive, o r s o a broadly
consequentialist approach maintains.
10.4.2. W i t h i n s u c h a n a p p r o a c h , t h e a l t e r n a t i v e t o s e m i c o n s e q u e n -
tialism is full c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m , w h i c h h o l d s t h a t a c o n c e p t i o n of
justice m u s t p a y a t t e n t i o n n o t o n l y t o t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of social goods
b u t also to differences in p e r s o n s ' p h y s i c a l a n d m e n t a l constitutions.
W e s h o u l d c o n s i d e r s h a r e s n o t in t h e a b s t r a c t b u t in relation t o the
p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n s w h o s e s h a r e s t h e y a r e . T h i s k i n d of objection to
Rawls c a n b e specified in t w o w a y s , p o i n t i n g t o w a r d t w o roughly
o p p o s i t e k i n d s of fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n s of justice.
10.4.2.1. O n e m i g h t a r g u e t h a t relevant p o s i t i o n s s h o u l d b e defined
a s i n c l u d i n g capabilities, n e e d s , g o o d looks, t a s t e s , preferences, or
desires, so that n a t u r a l differences are compensated for. T h o s e whose
lives a r e w o r s e b e c a u s e of t h e i r inferior p h y s i c a l o r m e n t a l constitution
s h o u l d , o t h e r things equal, h a v e a s u p e r i o r s h a r e of b e n e f i t s a n d bur­
d e n s ; i n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d o p t i m i z e t h e w o r s t q u a l i t y of life (or standard
of living, in Sen's p h r a s e ) . T h e a p p r o p r i a t e c r i t e r i o n for a s s e s s i n g social
i n s t i t u t i o n s m i g h t t h e n b e e i t h e r m a x i m i n u t i l i t a r i a n i s m o r s o m e mea­
s u r e c o m b i n i n g social a n d n a t u r a l p r i m a r y g o o d s . In r e s p o n s e to this
objection, Rawls h a s s t r e s s e d t h e n e e d for " w o r k a b l e criteria for inter­
p e r s o n a l c o m p a r i s o n s w h i c h c a n b e publicly a n d , if p o s s i b l e , easily
a p p l i e d " (SUPG 169). He h a s also p o i n t e d o u t t h a t h e c o n c e i v e s persons,
in virtue of t h e i r s e c o n d m o r a l power, as free to c h o o s e a n d as responsi­
ble for t h e i r o w n final e n d s a n d p r e f e r e n c e s . T h e y c a n b e e x p e c t e d to
have ' a d j u s t e d t h e i r likes a n d dislikes over t h e c o u r s e of t h e i r lives to
10
t h e i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h t h e y c o u l d r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t " (SUPG 169). But
t h e s e r e m a r k s a d d r e s s only t h e easier c a s e s , b y p a s s i n g t h e difficult
q u e s t i o n of h o w to c o p e w i t h t h o s e m a n i f e s t a n d objective interper­
s o n a l differences in n e e d s for a n d c a p a c i t i e s to t a k e a d v a n t a g e of social
p n m a r y g o o d s for w h i c h p e r s o n s a r e n o t t h e m s e l v e s r e s p o n s i b l e a n d
to w h i c h they c a n adjust t h e m s e l v e s o n l y w i t h g r e a t difficulty, if at all.
,0
Cf. also Scanlon, SC 1 8 5 - 9 0 .
 T h e G e n e r a l P a r a m e t e r s , 10.4.2.2 115

The serious p r o b l e m for R a w l s i s t h e c o n t e n t i o n t h a t for p u r p o s e s of

identifying t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n , s p e c i a l gifts a n d n a t u r a l h a n d i c a p s (spe­
11
cial disabilities o r n e e d s ) s h o u l d b e t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t . This idea is
perhaps most c o m p e l l i n g in c a s e s s u c h as b l i n d n e s s or special medical
needs, which Rawls leaves a s i d e (e.g., KCMT 546; SUPG 168). But it p o s e s
a general challenge t o h i s a s s u m p t i o n t h a t for p u r p o s e s of assessing
basic structures, t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s ' p o s i t i o n s s h o u l d b e defined solely in
terms of benefits a n d b u r d e n s of social i n t e r a c t i o n .
104.2.2. On t h e o t h e r h a n d , o n e m i g h t a r g u e that positions s h o u l d
be defined so that n a t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s a r e corrected for. W h e n a basic
structure generates u n e q u a l s h a r e s of social p r i m a r y goods, these give
rise to questions of j u s t i c e o n l y i n s o f a r as t h e y c a n n o t b e explained by
12
reference to differences i n e n d o w m e n t s (or m o t i v a t i o n ) . On this view,
the least advantaged a r e t h o s e w h o s e s h a r e s fall farthest short of t h e
shares of others similarly m o t i v a t e d a n d e n d o w e d . T h e r e a r e two p r o b ­
lems with this view. Defining t h e b e n c h m a r k of equality a s a state in
which persons' s h a r e s of social p r i m a r y g o o d s m a t c h t h e i r natural
endowments implicitly p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t g r e a t e r e n d o w m e n t s should
entitle persons t o l a r g e r s h a r e s ; t h i s is t h e k i n d of claim w h o s e merits
were questioned i n § 6 . 2 - 4 . M o r e o v e r , t h e institutional s c h e m e s favored
b
y the p r o p o s e d c r i t e r i o n w o u l d b e likely t o e n g e n d e r considerable
strains of c o m m i t m e n t , a s n a t u r a l h a n d i c a p s a n d social disadvantages
would powerfully aggravate e a c h o t h e r . T h o s e w i t h a weak physical
^ d mental c o n s t i t u t i o n w o u l d i n a d d i t i o n h a v e t h e smallest m i n i m u m
share of social p r i m a r y g o o d s . . \
me second c h a l l e n g e is p e r h a p s n o t s o s e r i o u s , b u t it h e l p s m e bring v

°W how Rawls's s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m is a plausible intermediate

Point between t w o fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t e x t r e m e s . To illustrate, let m e
jfetch how t h e difference p r i n c i p l e i n its s i m p l e s t form (symbolizing
tawls's maximin c r i t e r i o n ) w o u l d e v a l u a t e a n i n c o m e distribution
a b a c k g r o u n d of d i v e r s e n a t u r a l a t t r i b u t e s . On Rawls's proposal,
Positions a r e a s s e s s e d s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y i n t e r m s of i n c o m e alone_
he rejects, o n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e i d e a of defining t h e m in t e r m s ot
< f come + n a t u r a l a t t r i b u t e s > - i n w h i c h c a s e equality of i n c o m e for
8 1 1
PWJons working e q u a l l y h a r d w o u l d r e q u i r e special l " ^ ™ * \
2> «w 5 e 0 u l d i i y m o r e gifted (whose greater
d i s a d v a n t a g e t h e n a t u r a

J J f B n o t r e w a r d e d ) vis-a-vis t h e n a t u r a l l y h a n d i c a p p e d . A n d h e
on t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e i d e a of defining positions i n t e r m s ot
^ c o m e relative t o n a t u r a l a t t r i b u t e s > - i n w h i c h case equality ot

C n t i c i s m
< s e e S e n . EW; a n d W A F 1 9 5 - 2 0 0 . Rawls has ^ ' ^ S ^ t l S
t h e l i s t t o i n c l u d e
* 2 f « h e r g o o d s , . . . e v e n certain m e n alst ^ u c h
u n m
nceof physical pain" ( P R I G 257). But s o far Rawls s e e m s ^ £ £ ^ k of p e a

XaJ. ^ consequentialist r i o n , t h o u g h h e h a s lately preferred to speaK c r i t e

u r a t h e r t h a n
As social primary g o o d s . .,, n i n t which,' n
d H f a
^ l ^ « « "
^ m o t i v a t i o n , t h i s v i e w articulates a p l a u s . b l e t f
1
hlCfe," - § 1 7
' ' 2 c a n
b e a c c o m m o d a t e d t h r o u g h the difference p n n o p l e ,
e l s
included a m o n g the social primary goods.
116 T h e G e n e r a l P a r a m e t e r s , 10.5.1

i n c o m e for p e r s o n s w o r k i n g e q u a l l y h a r d w o u l d r e q u i r e special justifi­

cation b e c a u s e it w o u l d d i s a d v a n t a g e t h e n a t u r a l l y h a n d i c a p p e d (to
w h o m o t h e r h u m a n g o o d s are less a c c e s s i b l e ) vis-a-vis t h e naturally
gifted. On Rawls's p r o p o s a l , justification is r e q u i r e d insofar as institu­
t i o n s g e n e r a t e unequal i n c o m e s for p e r s o n s w o r k i n g equally hard; the
d i s a d v a n t a g e d a r e t h o s e w i t h t h e l o w e s t i n c o m e s , regardless of their
specific n a t u r a l capabilities o r n e e d s .
10.5. In Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e , all i n t r a - a n d interschemic
c o m p a r i s o n s a r e to b e m a d e i n t e r m s of s h a r e s of social primary
g o o d s — c e r t a i n b a s i c liberties a n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s , i n c o m e a n d wealth,
p o w e r s a n d prerogatives of offices, a n d t h e social b a s e s of self-respect
(TJ 62, 92). Rawls h o l d s t h a t t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e original position have
r e a s o n t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h o s e t h e y r e p r e s e n t p r e f e r m o r e of these
g o o d s t o less (TJ 9 3 , 1 4 2 - 4 3 , 253, 260, 396, 4 3 3 - 3 4 ) . But h e changes his
m i n d a b o u t t h e i r b a s i s for t h i s c o n c l u s i o n . In A Theory of Justice the
a c c o u n t of social p r i m a r y g o o d s is s a i d (TJ 92) t o follow from the "thin
t h e o r y of t h e g o o d , " featuring t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n P r i n c i p l e a n d rational life
p l a n s (TJ §§60-65). Later, this a c c o u n t is l i n k e d t o t h e highest- and
h i g h e r - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s of free a n d e q u a l m o r a l p e r s o n s (KCMT 525-26).
In b o t h cases, t h e a r g u m e n t , t h o u g h s o m e w h a t sketchy, is clearly
r e l a t e d to t h e value of p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m .
1 0 . 5 . 1 . It m a y b e o b j e c t e d t h a t p e r s o n s u l t i m a t e l y c a r e not about
social p r i m a r y g o o d s but, for e x a m p l e , a b o u t h a p p i n e s s o r utility. Inter­
p e r s o n a l a n d i n t e r s c h e m i c c o m p a r i s o n s s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e b e m a d e in
t e r m s of t h e utility value of s h a r e s , a s c a l c u l a t e d b y m e a n s of general
f o r m u l a s (which, c o n s i s t e n t w i t h s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m , w o u l d leave
a s i d e i n t e r p e r s o n a l differences). Rawls c a n reject t h i s p r o p o s a l o n the
g r o u n d t h a t utility is just o n e e n d a m o n g o t h e r s . S o m e will a t t a c h great
i m p o r t a n c e t o it, w h i l e o t h e r s will c h e r i s h w i s d o m , love, o r art. The
d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e s e g o o d s is n o t directly r e g u l a t e d b y t h e b a s i c struc­
t u r e — a n d c o u l d n o t p l a u s i b l y b e at a n y r a t e — a n d s o t h e r e is n o need
to settle t h e i r relative i m p o r t a n c e . A c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e s h o u l d as far
as possible avoid taking a s t a n d o n s u c h differences a b o u t t h e g o o d life
It c a n d o so by d e s c r i b i n g s h a r e s in t e r m s of g o o d s t h a t overlap closely
w i t h t h e benefits a n d b u r d e n s t h a t a c t u a l l y g e t d i s t r i b u t e d in the
c o u r s e of social i n t e r a c t i o n as r e g u l a t e d b y t h e g r o u n d r u l e s (are "at the
disposition of society" [TJ 62]). F u r t h e r a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t w h a t the
value of t h e s e g o o d s c o n s i s t s in a r e to b e a v o i d e d b e c a u s e s u c h as­
s u m p t i o n s w o u l d n e e d l e s s l y m a k e t h e c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e more
controversial.
T h e s a m e g o e s for further a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t w h a t s u c h goods
s h o u l d best b e u s e d for. S h a r e s a r e t o b e d e s c r i b e d in very general
t e r m s . I n s t e a d of asking w h e t h e r p e o p l e travel a n d r e a d books, for
e x a m p l e it isC b e t tee r t o ask w h e t h e r t h e y h a v e t h e freedom t o travel a n d
whiif 0
i" °T s u f f i c i e n t t o
exercise this f r e e d o m . I n s t e a d of asking
w n e t n e r t h e y h a v e a c c e s s t o u n s p o i l e d n a t u r e , it is b e t t e r to ask
 T h e G e n e r a l Parameters, 10.6 117

whether they have l i b e r t i e s of political p a r t i c i p a t i o n t h a t allow t h e m a n

equal say about m a t t e r s of e n v i r o n m e n t a l quality. This way, Rawls's
conception of j u s t i c e r e s p e c t s p e r s o n s ' f r e e d o m in t h a t it "does not
look behind the u s e w h i c h p e r s o n s m a k e " (TJ 94; cf. SUPG 169-72) of t h e
general all-purpose m e a n s a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l . It takes t h e s e m e a n s t h e m ­
selves as f u n d a m e n t a l a n d d e f i n e s relevant p o s i t i o n s in t e r m s of t h e m .
10.5.2. But o n e m a y still c h a l l e n g e Rawls's a p p r o a c h at this point
without a b a n d o n i n g h i s r e s p e c t for f r e e d o m . Different institutional
schemes will e n g e n d e r different a t t i t u d e s a n d will t h u s affect the ways
in which p e r s o n s will u s e t h e i r f r e e d o m . P e r h a p s p e r s o n s w o u l d cher­
ish art and w o u l d s u p p o r t art t h r o u g h private a n d political efforts
under some i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s b u t n o t u n d e r o t h e r s . Rawls is com­
mitted to the view t h a t s u c h differences s h o u l d not play a role in
constructing a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . It s h o u l d n o t be p r e s u m e d a h e a d
of time that art o u g h t t o b e c h e r i s h e d .
10.5.3. Even if R a w l s w e r e r i g h t a b o u t h o w a n a c c o u n t of social
primary goods s h o u l d b e c o n s t r u c t e d , h e m i g h t still b e mistaken about
what particular g o o d s s h o u l d b e i n c l u d e d o r a b o u t h o w t h e y should be
weighted relative t o o n e a n o t h e r . I will d i s c u s s several s u c h issues in
Sll-12 and § § 1 5 - 1 7 .
10.5.4. Finally, R a w l s ' s w a y of b r i n g i n g t h e m a x i m i n idea to b e a r
"pon his a c c o u n t of s o c i a l p r i m a r y g o o d s m a y also s e e m problematic,
w even if the p a r t i e s e m p l o v t h e m a x i m i n rule a n d a s s u m e that t h e
Persons they r e p r e s e n t p r e f e r m o r e social p r i m a r y g o o d s t o less, it d o e s
notfollowthat t h e y w o u l d favor w h a t e v e r b a s i c s t r u c t u r e offers t h e best
share. It m u s t a l s o b e a s s u m e d t h a t Rawls's social primary
goods have n o significant n e g a t i v e externalities. Even while each per-
s
°n is better off w i t h m o r e r a t h e r t h a n less, it m a y still b e t r u e that e a c h
Jworseoffif all h a v e m o r e t h a n if all h a v e less. (Compare, even if each is
*** with a g u t h a n w i t h o u t o n e , it m a y still b e t r u e that each is ess
n

«e if all have g u n s t h a n if n o n e do.) I try to resolve this p r o b l e m i n §13.5

™ C h t 4 t h r o u g h a p a r t i c u l a r v i e w of t h e basic political liberties
a p e r

^ the political p r o c e s s .
10.6. Rawls m o d i f i e s t h e m a x i m i n i d e a b y stipulating that inter-
Jtemfc c o m p a r i s o n s are t o b e b a s e d u p o n representative shares, that
^ the first i n s t a n c e , u p o n t h e social p o s i t i o n of t h e least advantaged
£ * s e n t a t i v e g r o u p . O n e r e a s o n b e h i n d this stipulation seermrto, be
2* one c a n n o t r e a s o n a b l y e s t i m a t e for various feasible fema ve
5*«*» what the w o r s t i n d i v i d u a l s h a r e w o u l d be. It w o u l d b e quite
c
^ " l t to find t h i s share even w i t h i n a n actually existing s c h e m e . And
J" * one c o u l d find it, t h i s s h a r e w o u l d p r o b a b l y be a « * c t e d b y
^ . p e c u l i a r i t i e s - s u c h as its bad
"owner's" family b a c k g r o u n d
e
^ a b i l i t i e s , p e r s o n a l d i s p o s i t i o n s (for example, tc> l a a n e a j or
> >. and s o on~and t h u s w o u l d reveal little a b o u t the prevaflng
Structure the
(cf. TJ 96). F o r t h e s e r e a s o n s parties can m o r e
* * * * * * safeguard the i n t e r e s t s of t h o s e t h e y r e p r e s e n t by basing
118 T h e General P a r a m e t e r s , 10.7

t h e i r i n t e r s c h e m i c c o m p a r i s o n s u p o n s o m e larger least advantaged

1 3
g r o u p ( u n d e r e a c h s c h e m e ) . I find t h i s k i n d of r e a s o n i n g convincing
in r e g a r d to engendered (intra- o r i n t e r s c h e m i c ) i n e q u a l i t i e s in social
p r i m a r y g o o d s , s u c h a s i n e q u a l i t i e s i n i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h , in the fair
value of b a s i c political liberties, o r in t h e s e c u r i t y of o t h e r basic liberties.
T h e r e a s o n i n g is l e s s c o n v i n c i n g i n r e g a r d t o p a r t l y established inequal­
ities h o w e v e r . W h e n s o m e a r e explicitly e x c l u d e d from certain consti­
t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e s o r legally b a r r e d from c e r t a i n o p p o r t u n i t i e s , the
n u m b e r of p e r s o n s so d i s a d v a n t a g e d is m u c h l e s s relevant. But then we
c a n n o t treat e s t a b l i s h e d a n d e n g e n d e r e d i n e q u a l i t i e s differently—at
least if I a m right t o a r g u e (§§2.2,11.2.1) t h a t t h e c r i t e r i o n of justice must
c o n s i d e r t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of overall s h a r e s r a t h e r t h a n t h e separate
1 4
d i s t r i b u t i o n s of v a r i o u s g o o d s . H e r e t h e m o r e i m p o r t a n t consider­
a t i o n s s e e m t o p o i n t i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e g r o u p s , and the
countervailing c o n s i d e r a t i o n s c a n b e a c c o m m o d a t e d b y stipulating
that r e p r e s e n t a t i v e g r o u p s a r e r e a s o n a b l y s m a l l o r t h a t representative
s h a r e s a r e t h e g e o m e t r i c ( r a t h e r t h a n a r i t h m e t i c ) m e a n of t h e shares of
t h e m e m b e r s of t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e g r o u p .
10.7. Rawls specifies a social p o s i t i o n i n t e r m s of a lifetime share of
social p r i m a r y g o o d s : " T h e l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d a r e d e f i n e d as t h o s e who
have t h e lowest i n d e x of p r i m a r y g o o d s , w h e n t h e i r p r o s p e c t s are
viewed over a c o m p l e t e life. T h i s definition i m p l i e s t h a t social mobility
is n o t c o n s i d e r e d a p r i m a r y g o o d . I n d i v i d u a l s a c t u a l l y b o m into this
g r o u p h a v e s o m e likelihood of i m p r o v i n g t h e i r s i t u a t i o n a n d of belong­
ing to t h e m o r e favoured; b u t w h a t e v e r t h i s l i k e l i h o o d is, it is irrelevant,
s i n c e t h e least a d v a n t a g e d are, b y definition, t h o s e w h o a r e b o m into
a n d w h o r e m a i n in t h a t g r o u p t h r o u g h o u t t h e i r life" (SUPG 164). The
last s e n t e n c e , 1 suggest, c a n n o t b e t a k e n literally, b e c a u s e it w o u l d leave
u s w i t h a n e m p t y g r o u p if in s o m e social s y s t e m t h e likelihood of

3
> It s o m e t i m e s s o u n d s a s t h o u g h Rawls h a s m o r e p r i n c i p l e d r e a s o n s for focusing on
the least advantaged representative g r o u p rather t h a n p e r s o n (TJ 98)—similar to the
parties p n n c i p l e d reasons for f o c u s i n g o n s o c i a l primary g o o d s rather t h a n utility, if so, 1
d o nor s e e w h a t t h e y might b e (see e n d of §17.5). T h e n o t i o n of representative groups
raises t h e q u e s t i o n s h o w s u c h g r o u p s are to be d e n n e d a n d h o w t h e representative
p r o s p e c t s of e a c h g r o u p are to be d e t e r m i n e d o n t h e b a s i s of empirical data about their
m e m b e r s (cf. S c a n l o n RTJ193-94). T h e s e q u e s t i o n s , hardly t o u c h e d u p o n by Bawls, plav
a cruc a] role l n i
s e t t l n g h o w e g . Suppose, for
a l i t a r i a n h i s m a x i m i n c r i t e r i o n i s

t i y m t Q f i n d o u t w h a t , h e
U n ^ S I; T , § ^ c o m e of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d is in the
y a n d w h e
, I" t h e r it c o u l d b e raised by reforming e c o n o m i c institutions in
ual es 1 6 ,ne
.'T" ? i t i «hey g e n e r a t e . Here, it m a k e s a n e n o r m o u s difference
D ™ J o t a d Pv aUn l, ja, S0e nd « ™ P ^ d e f i n e d - w h e t h e r it c o m p r i s e s , say, 4 0 percent or 2
^T 3
' representative
r
a n d

m
w

e
h

, r
e

i
,
d e f i n e d a s t h e arithme-
c
h

m
e r

e
i t s

a n o f , h e
shares
H n i " ' ° fam° s h a r e s of its m e m b e r s (cf. § 1 7 . 5 ) .
uals" s o e r i *
m
!V»- T
l e a s t
he s p e a k s of "representative individ-
U b o t h W , A t

problem m ^ f h H° f ^ "
raarT.h*win ,
y

d , 8
* / P n c i p l e " (TJ
t n o u 1 0
8
t h u s r u n n i n g i n t o the further
' n of first-principle g o o d s is to s o m e e x t e n t e n g e n d e r e d - a s
S e C O n d ri
m,
8
n S u S M ,
m d w d u a l p e r s o n s w o u l d s e e m at least
h e S e m a t t e r e , h
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s against f o c u s i n g strictly u p o n
e

as strong as in theTase of i n c o m e a n d wealth.

 T h e G e n e r a l P a r a m e t e r s , 10.7 119

upward mobility w e r e 100 p e r c e n t . It w o u l d l e a d t o t h e a b s u r d conclu­

sion that a s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h t h e least a d v a n t a g e d earn $5.00 a n
hour all their lives is, o t h e r t h i n g s e q u a l , to b e preferred to a s c h e m e
under which everyone's n e t i n c o m e r a t e g r a d u a l l y increases with age,
say, from $4.50 t o $30.00. It is e v i d e n t , I t r u s t , t h a t t h e u p w a r d mobility
under the latter s c h e m e m u s t c o u n t i n its favor.
I suggest that Rawls m e a n s t o a d d r e s s t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r p e r s o n s '
1S
social positions a r e t o b e e v a l u a t e d ex post o r ex ante . Should w e care
about those w h o s e lifetime e x p e c t a t i o n o r p r o s p e c t for social primary
goods (a p r o b a b i l i t y - w e i g h t e d average) is w o r s t o r about t h o s e w h o
would actually h a v e t h e w o r s t s h a r e of social p r i m a r y goods over a
lifetime? Under a s c h e m e w i t h a lot of social mobility, representative
expected lifetime s h a r e s m a y n o t differ m u c h b e t w e e n those b o r n into
different classes. Yet actual lifetime s h a r e s m a y differ quite significantly,
so that those (from all c l a s s b a c k g r o u n d s ) w h o fail in their careers are
very badly off. U n d e r s u c h a s c h e m e , t h e w o r s t representative ex ante
position (prospective s h a r e s of t h o s e b o r n into t h e lowest class) would
°e much s u p e r i o r t o t h e w o r s t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ex post position (the
worst actual shares). I i n t e r p r e t Rawls's s t a t e m e n t a b o u t t h e irrelevance
16
of social mobility t o m e a n t h a t h e is o p t i n g for t h e ex post perspective.
The least a d v a n t a g e d a r e d e f i n e d a s t h o s e w h o w o u l d actually t u r n out
t 0 17
have the w o r s t s h a r e s of social p r i m a r y g o o d s over a complete life.
Another alternative t o t h e ex post p e r s p e c t i v e is the view that a
criterion of justice s h o u l d b e c o n c e r n e d n o t w i t h lifetime shares at all
b u t o n J
y with t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of initial s h a r e s o r starting positions (at
coming of age, say). T h e p r e f e r r e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e is t h e one that
generates the best m i n i m u m initial s h a r e . This view differs from t h e ex
We Perspective in t h a t it d i s r e g a r d s social mobility. It does not matter
r o r
the a s s e s s m e n t of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e to w h a t extent initial
•"equalities will t e n d to b e c o m p o u n d e d ( t h r o u g h centrifugal t e n d e n -
es
" » or to b e w a s h e d o u t . T h i s m a t t e r s very m u c h o n t h e ex ante
Perspective a n d m a t t e r s a t l e a s t s o m e w h a t o n t h e ex post perspective.

r
>4!, i s s i o n by an economist, see Kanbur, SL 5 9 - 6 9 .
b r
! e f d i s c u
. b u t f

belwt o f t e
n speaks of expectations, (life) prospects, and even starting positions, buu
JJ»these expressions are meant to emphasize that he is concerned notwrth he
5X£f S h a r e S 0 f
t e r e t e individuals b u t with representative
S C h e m e s w e
<^"™%%X
C h ^ , i n s i d e r in reflecting upon institutional
^ hencal. We ask from the standpoint of prospective participants.howthey wouid d
3gf«n» scheme. So my interpretation can account for ^wls's talk of prospects^
5 ™ S o f the actual shares we can expect to exist (e.g„ from ^?^ff£wy-
w ^ f P ° o n ) if this orthat scheme iTchosen, not of the expected shares (proD
sltj
^
*8E under s o m e given scheme. Let me add • ^ S ^ S i J U n - I
Kfenme shares must say something about i
P O S t
HtewL * o r e
P
a f l ( e )

SSSLK * e C a

m0re
s e o f
S° o d s s u c h a s i n c
° m e
- F O f
f T nn a d d r e s f t h i s
P
issue.
"The7Z*\ * c o m e s as a more evenflow?Rawls d o e s n ^ a d d w s m ^ ^
fp e r s o n s
1 1

"^becan ° moving from one representative group to another is

*Cnn P h a s only one actual lifetime share. Social
e r e o n

^° "i calculating persons' snares and in sorting them into representative gro p
U n i
120 T h e G e n e r a l P a r a m e t e r s , 10.7

Both alternative p r o p o s a l s c a n b e s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t by agreeing

w i t h Rawls t h a t e s t a b l i s h e d a n d e n g e n d e r e d i n e q u a l i t i e s (in expected
s h a r e s o r s t a r t i n g positions) s h o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d o n a par. Yet both
are s o m e w h a t d e o n t o l o g i c a l i n spirit, i n t h a t p e r s o n s themselves are
a s s i g n e d a m u c h larger r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for t h e i r s u c c e s s in life. Still,
n e i t h e r alternative g o e s to Nozickian e x t r e m e s , a n d t h a t in at least two
r e s p e c t s . First, u n d e r Nozick's l i b e r t a r i a n s c h e m e s o m e m a y (subject to
t h e Lockean proviso) start o u t i n d i r e p o v e r t y w i t h o u t any realistic
p r o s p e c t of ever i m p r o v i n g t h e i r c o n d i t i o n . Nozick is n o t concerned
w i t h s t a r t i n g p o s i t i o n s insofar as t h e y a r e e n g e n d e r e d , o r with pros­
p e c t s for social mobility. S e c o n d , u n d e r Nozick's s c h e m e p e r s o n s may
risk o r a l i e n a t e all t h e i r initial rights. T h e ex ante p e r s p e c t i v e , however,
will favor i n a l i e n a b l e rights w h e n t h i s i m p r o v e s p e r s o n s ' prospects.
Even t h e s t a r t i n g - p o s i t i o n view m a y well d o likewise o n t h e grounds
t h a t a n initial b u n d l e of a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s c a n b e i m p r o v e d u p o n by
t r a n s f o r m i n g s o m e of t h e rights it c o n t a i n s i n t o i n a l i e n a b l e ones. The
s e c o n d - o r d e r liberty t o risk o r a l i e n a t e o n e ' s b a s i c r i g h t s is n o t advan­
t a g e o u s , q u i t e a p a r t from p a t e r n a l i s t i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a b o u t the likeli­
h o o d of m i s t a k e s . It e n d a n g e r s a g e n t s b y p r o v i d i n g v a r i o u s n a s t y incen­
tives t o o t h e r s t o try t o bring t h e m u n d e r t h e i r c o n t r o l .
Still, t h e t w o alternative views, like Nozick's, p a y m u c h less attention
t h a n d o e s Rawls t o h o w p e r s o n s ' lives a c t u a l l y t u r n o u t u n d e r alterna­
tive s c h e m e s , w h e t h e r t h r o u g h t h e a g e n t ' s o w n failures a n d achieve­
m e n t s or t h r o u g h c o n t i n g e n t factors. Both m a y favor a s c h e m e under
w h i c h s o m e p e r s o n s end up very b a d l y off i n d e e d , w h i c h w o u l d be
justified t o s u c h p e r s o n s by p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t t h e y s t a r t e d o u t either
r e a s o n a b l y well off (starting p o s i t i o n ) o r w i t h r e a s o n a b l y g o o d pros­
p e c t s of s u c c e s s a s w i t n e s s e d b y all t h e o t h e r s from t h e i r b a c k g r o u n d
w h o " m a d e it" (ex ante).
T h e r e are t w o m a i n k i n d s of a r g u m e n t a g a i n s t t h e s e views. First,
c o n s i d e r i n g alternative i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s from t h e (risk-aversei
s t a n d p o i n t of a p r o s p e c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t , o n e c a n n o t p l a u s i b l y ignore
t h e possibility of e n d i n g u p very b a d l y off o r b e c o n c e r n e d with this
possibility only in p r o p o r t i o n to its likelihood. It is t h u s i m p l a u s i b l e for
t h e p a r t i e s to b e indifferent to h o w t h e i r c l i e n t s ' lives a c t u a l l y t u r n out.
Of c o u r s e , if t h e p a r t i e s d e l i b e r a t e d in a risk-neutral fashion, t h e ex ante
a n d ex p o s t p e r s p e c t i v e s w o u l d b e e q u i v a l e n t . But s i n c e t h e y are risk-
averse, they m u s t b e c o n c e r n e d to o p t i m i z e t h e w o r s t lifetime shares
r a t h e r t h a n t h e w o r s t e x p e c t e d lifetime s h a r e s , let a l o n e t h e worst
initial s h a r e s .
Second, t h e t w o alternative criteria of j u s t i c e w o u l d also b e risky in
that t h e y w o u l d largely give u p t h e f o u r t h a n d sixth a d v a n t a g e s Rawls
claims tor t h e m a x i m i n idea. T h e y m i g h t favor s c h e m e s t h a t e n g e n d e r
radical e c o n o m i c inequalities, w h i c h w o u l d f r u s t r a t e Rawls's aspira­
tion tor a s h a r e d n o t i o n of e q u a l c i t i z e n s h i p a n d w o u l d a l s o i n d u c e
e x t r e m e strains of c o m m i t m e n t a s p e r s o n s w h o s e p o s i t i o n h a d gravely
 T h e General Parameters, 10.7 121

deteriorated w o u l d b e s t r o n g l y t e m p t e d n o t to abide by t h e g r o u n d
rules when all t h e y c o u l d n o w e x p e c t i s a life of abject poverty. Such
schemes would b e less likely t o e n d u r e a n d unlikely t o e n g e n d e r a
widespread categorical s e n s e of j u s t i c e . T h e s e a r e i m p o r t a n t reasons
for describing t h e p a r t i e s s o t h a t t h e i r risk-averse c o n c e r n extends to
the entire lives of t h e i r c l i e n t s .
Yet one may t h i n k t h a t t h e R a w l s i a n ex post perspective is too con­
servative in favoring i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s t h a t prohibit almost all
forms of gambling a n d (voluntary) e c o n o m i c risk taking. In considering
any liberty to take risks, R a w l s ' s p a r t i e s p a y very little attention to t h o s e
who gamble a n d w i n , for t h e y will b e u n d e r r e p r e s e n t e d a m o n g t h e
least advantaged. T h e y f o c u s d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y u p o n t h o s e w h o gam­
ble and lose, w h o s e ex post p o s i t i o n is likely to be w o r s e t h a n t h e worst
position u n d e r t h e a l t e r n a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e w i t h o u t t h e liberty.
That these losers w a n t e d t o g a m b l e a n d w e r e free n o t t o is simply
ignored.
This objection m a y s e e m t o t a k e a n e x t r e m e view of what it would
mean to opt for t h e Rawlsian ex post p e r s p e c t i v e . It d o e s not m e a n that
wery lottery ticket p e r s o n s m i g h t p u r c h a s e m u s t be considered ex post
and that lotteries m u s t t h e r e f o r e b e p r o h i b i t e d . Rawls c a n say that
buying a lottery ticket d o e s n o t r e d u c e one's n e t i n c o m e but is o n e way
°f spending one's i n c o m e , like b u y i n g a movie ticket. T h e r e is n o reason
vv
hy consumption d e c i s i o n s of e i t h e r k i n d s h o u l d b e prohibited.
B
«t I think t h e o b j e c t i o n c a n b e s t a t e d in a plausible form. Take t h e
of a society i n w h i c h a c e r t a i n m i d d l i n g position is o p e n to
*eryone but m a y b e d e c l i n e d i n favor of a riskier career that offers a
J f w (ex ante) e x p e c t a t i o n b u t also involves s o m e d a n g e r of falling
^ovvfhe middling p o s i t i o n . H e r e t h e p o s i t i o n of t h o s e w h o are u n s u c -
««W in the risky c a r e e r c a n b e m e a s u r e d in t h r e e different ways: o n e
™W ascribe to t h e m t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h a r e of t h e middling posi-
Jon. which is t h e o p t i m a l n o - r i s k s h a r e a t t a i n a b l e a n t e c e d e n t to their
c h
2 ^ o i c e ; o n e m i g h t u s e t h e e x p e c t e d s h a r e of the risky career
« t h e i r ex ante p r o s p e c t before t h e i r c a r e e r t u r n s out o n e way or
^ e r but after it i s c h o s e n ; finally, t a k i n g t h e ex p o s t perspecfive, one
J * * ascribe t o t h e m t h e (poor) s h a r e t h e y actually h a d after having
0t h e risk c a
us?,! y r e e r . T h o s e o b j e c t i n g t o Rawls s view might say: Let
***e 0 n e Q f t h e in ^ s e s o that s u c h risky
t i y e s c a

e r s
** " e e d n o t b e p r o h i b i t e d W e s h o u l d h a v e faith that people can
gjwand t h a t t h e y b e c a m e p o o r a s a c o n s e q u e n c e of their o w n
t h a t
2?' ^ f o w e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n will therefore not tempt
e
* into n o n c o m p l i a n c e . " , i m i t s t o

^ objection is p l a u s i b l e i n p r i n c i p l e , I think, b u t there a r e « t o

f u s i b i l i t y fn a e . First, taking t h e ex ante P j J P f ^ J
s u c h C S S

2**lble w h e n t h e risk t a k i n g is n o t fully v o h m t ^ r f * ^ ^

if" *K <or n o t u n d e r s t o o d to be) g e n u i n e l y ^ f ^ X ^ .
"*» involved in t h e risky c a r e e r a r e n o t u n d e r s t o o d a n d a c c e p t e a
122 T h e Split i n t o T w o P r i n c i p l e s of J u s t i c e , 11.1.1

S e c o n d , taking t h e ex ante p e r s p e c t i v e is also i m p l a u s i b l e when the j

w o r s t ex post s h a r e of t h o s e w h o fail in t h e risky c a r e e r is very bad, so !
t h a t t h e e q u a l - c i t i z e n s h i p a n d s t r a i n s - o f - c o m m i t m e n t arguments j
clearly c o m e i n t o play. W h e r e radical d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d inequalities are
at stake, w e m u s t take t h e ex post p e r s p e c t i v e .
T h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s u g g e s t a n i n t e r m e d i a t e s o l u t i o n that makes ]

t h e c h o i c e of p e r s p e c t i v e d e p e n d in p a r t u p o n t h e severity of the i
p o t e n t i a l inequalities at i s s u e . Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is already I
!
c o m m i t t e d t o a suitable n o t i o n of significance t h r o u g h w h i c h this idea
c a n b e i n c o r p o r a t e d a n d m a d e m o r e c o n c r e t e — h i s lexical prioritiza­
tion of t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s (within t h e s p e c i a l c o n c e p t i o n of justice). My
c o n j e c t u r e , t h e n , is t h a t w h e n t h e lexical o r d e r i n g of t h e principles
a p p l i e s , first-principle g o o d s a n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s s h o u l d always be de­
n n e d m a n ex post fashion, w h i l e all o t h e r g o o d s s h o u l d b e defined in
a n ex ante fashion for c a s e s of v o l u n t a r y e x p o s u r e t o risk a n d in an ex
post fashion otherwise.™ 1 c o n s i d e r this c o n j e c t u r e a p l a u s i b l e working
h y p o t h e s i s t h a t m u s t r e d e e m itself b y fitting t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e remain­
ing e l e m e n t s of Rawls's criterion of j u s t i c e .

11. T h e Split into T w o P r i n c i p l e s of Justice

1 1 . 1 . 1 have a n a l y z e d into its m a i n e l e m e n t s Rawls's general concep­

t i o n of justice, w h i c h t r e a t s all social p r i m a r y g o o d s a s c o m m e n s u r a b l e .
"All social p r i m a r y g o o d s . . . a r e t o b e d i s t r i b u t e d e q u a l l y unless an
u n e q u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of a n y o r all of t h e s e g o o d s is t o t h e advantage of
t h e least favored" (TJ 303). Ultimately, h o w e v e r , Rawls w a n t s t o defend a
specification of t h e g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n t h a t d i v i d e s t h e s e g o o d s into
t w o categories, e a c h g o v e r n e d b y its o w n c r i t e r i o n . T h i s special concep­
t i o n of justice is to a p p l y u n d e r " r e a s o n a b l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s " (BLP
11); t h e g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n is to a p p l y u n d e r all o t h e r c o n d i t i o n s . The
i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h e special c o n c e p t i o n raises several f u r t h e r issues.
11.1.1. Although b o t h t h e g e n e r a l a n d t h e s p e c i a l c o n c e p t i o n s are
m a x i m i n criteria, it is, strictly s p e a k i n g , t h e d i s j u n c t i v e c o m b i n a t i o n of
g e n e r a l a n d special c o n c e p t i o n s that, a c c o r d i n g t o Rawls, constitutes
" t h e m a x i m i n s o l u t i o n to t h e p r o b l e m of social j u s t i c e " (TJ 152). It «
t h u s i m p o r t a n t h o w t h e d o m a i n s of t h e t w o c o n c e p t i o n s a r e delimited,
t h a t is, h o w "reasonably favorable c o n d i t i o n s " a r e d e f i n e d — a question
Rawls largely e v a d e s . T h i s t o p i c i n c l u d e s t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r two
c o n c e p t i o n s are really n e c e s s a r y o r w h e t h e r o n e of t h e m is superior
u n d e r all c o n d i t i o n s (cf. §12.8.4).
'"Even with this conjecture, the liberty t o take e x t r e m e risks or the a s s i g n m e n t of basic
rights through (involuntary) lottery c o u l d still be justified u n d e r verv extraordinary
n a m e l V W h e n t h e w o r s t a c , u a l l j f e m e
S E N ^ T 5
? ' ' » ^ a r e s ^ " 6 o u t c o m e s of risk
m t o a c c o u m ) a r e
. ^ . n o w o r s e than the worst s h a r e s w o u l d be u n d e r any
» h « FL.I?™ . , V e S
^ C h e m e T h i
c o n t i n u o u s with the justification Rawls enter­ s i s

tains for the institution of slavery (TJ 248).

 T h e Split i n t o T w o P r i n c i p l e s of Justice, 11.2.1 123

11.1J2. Conversely, s e e i n g t h e g r e a t diversity of possible conditions,

one may ask w h y t h e p a r t i e s s h o u l d n ' t a d o p t a large n u m b e r of c o n c e p ­
tions, each fine-tuned t o a specific set of social c o n d i t i o n s . I think Rawls
could plausibly resist t h i s i d e a , a r g u i n g t h a t t h e p a r t i e s have reason not
to want a long list of c o n c e p t i o n s . T o o c o m p l i c a t e d a n agreement is
likely to be m i s a p p l i e d i n p r a c t i c e e v e n b y c o n s c i e n t i o u s p e r s o n s a n d is
generally u n s u i t a b l e a s a p u b l i c c r i t e r i o n by w h i c h citizens c a n assess
their common i n s t i t u t i o n s . So t h e p a r t i e s m a y well prefer Rawls's p r o ­
posal of only t w o c o n c e p t i o n s — a n d t h i s n o t m e r e l y as an acceptable
approximation b u t a s t h e b e s t w a y of safeguarding the interests of
those they r e p r e s e n t u n d e r f o r e s e e a b l e w o r s t - c a s e scenarios.
112. Let u s c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r t h e s p e c i a l c o n c e p t i o n is, u n d e r rea­
sonably favorable c o n d i t i o n s , a p l a u s i b l e m a x i m i n criterion. It r e a d s as
follows (BLP 5):

FIBST PRINCIPLE: Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme
of equal basic liberties w h i c h is compatible with a similar scheme of
liberties for all.
SECOND PRINCIPLE: Social a n d economic inequalities are to satisfy two condi­
tions. First, they m u s t be attached to offices and positions open to all
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity [the opportunity princi­
ple); and second, they m u s t be to the greatest benefit of the least advan­
taged members of society [the difference principle].

Underlying this s p e c i a l c o n c e p t i o n is t h e i d e a that "the social structure

can be divided i n t o t w o m o r e o r less d i s t i n c t p a r t s , t h e first principle
a
PPlying to t h e o n e , t h e s e c o n d t o t h e o t h e r . T h e y distinguish between
s e
™ ^ P e c t s of t h e s o c i a l s y s t e m t h a t define a n d secure t h e equal
Gerties of c i t i z e n s h i p a n d t h o s e t h a t specify a n d establish social a n d
economic i n e q u a l i t i e s . . . . [T]he d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n fundamental
"ghts and liberties and e c o n o m i c a n d social benefits marks a differ­
ence among p r i m a r y s o c i a l g o o d s that o n e s h o u l d try to exploit, it
Jests an i m p o r t a n t d i v i s i o n in t h e social s y s t e m " (TJ 61,63). Assum-
"'gthat each b a s i c s t r u c t u r e c a n b e s o a n a l y z e d into two jointly ex-
^ s t i v e and n o n o v e r l a p p i n g p a r t s , Rawls p r o p o s e s that over a certain
2?e of c o n d i t i o n s t h e m a x i m i n c r i t e r i o n governing t h e assessment ot
b 3 S i c s t r u
X « u r e s s h o u l d c o n s i s t of t w o m a x i m i n criteria govem-
2 the a s s e s s m e n t s of t h e s e t w o p a r t s . T h i s way, e a c h basic structure
E*"ves one s c o r e b a s e d o n t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n it g e n e r a t e s in terms ot
« « c nghts a n d l i b e r t i e s a n d a n o t h e r s c o r e b a s e d o n t h e worst repre
s o c i
° e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n it g e n e r a t e s . Of c o u r s e R a w l m u s
J2J weights t o t h e s e tvvo s c o r e s s o a s to e n a b l e a " ^ " ^ r *
^ a t i v e basic s t r u c t u r e s . B u t e v e n before asking h o w t h e two scores
jo be aggregated, I c a n s t a t e t w o o b j e c t i o n s right away,
' ^ a w i t h t h e split i n t o two criteria, t h e distributions oTthe^two
J * * g o o d s a r e a s s e s s e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of « a c h o t h e r ^ m p o r t a n t
N a t i o n a b o u t e a c h b a s i c s t r u c t u r e is d i s r e g a r d e d . It c a n n o t c o m e
124 T h e Split i n t o T w o P r i n c i p l e s of J u s t i c e , 11.2.2

i n t o view w h e t h e r inequalities of t h e t w o k i n d s t e n d t o compensate or

aggravate o n e a n o t h e r , b u t this i n f o r m a t i o n i s i n d i s p e n s a b l e if the
q u e s t is for t h e m a x i m i n s o l u t i o n t o t h e p r o b l e m of social justice. To
clarify t h e o b j e c t i o n let m e s y m b o l i z e t h e e v a l u a t i o n of a social position
by a n o r d e r e d p a i r of n u m b e r s t h a t r e p r e s e n t t h e p o s i t i o n ' s first-
p r i n c i p l e s c o r e a n d s o c i o e c o n o m i c s c o r e , respectively. S u p p o s e basic
s t r u c t u r e O N E h a s t w o relevant g r o u p s w i t h s c o r e s < 8 0 , 7 0 > and
< 3 0 , 2 0 > , w h i l e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e T W O h a s t w o relevant g r o u p s with
s c o r e s < 8 0 , 2 0 > a n d < 3 0 , 7 0 > . W e m a y a s s u m e t h a t o t h e r things and
also t h e size of all four g r o u p s a r e e q u a l . I n t h i s case, t h e t w o basic
s t r u c t u r e s w o u l d b e r a n k e d a s e q u a l s b y Rawls's split criterion; both
p r i n c i p l e s of justice a r e equally well o r ill satisfied. But t h e parties
w o u l d obviously p r e f e r a criterion y i e l d i n g a p r e f e r e n c e for b a s i c struc­
t u r e T W O b e c a u s e b o t h relevant social p o s i t i o n s u n d e r T W O a r e clearly
s u p e r i o r to t h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n u n d e r O N E . 1 9

We s e e h e r e that t h e special c o n c e p t i o n — t h o u g h it i s i n o n e sense,

a s its n a m e is m e a n t t o suggest, a limiting c a s e of t h e g e n e r a l concep­
tion, i n w h i c h specific w e i g h t s a r e a t t a c h e d t o t h e v a r i o u s social pri­
m a r y g o o d s relative t o e a c h o t h e r — i s also m o r e t h a n j u s t a special case
of t h e general c o n c e p t i o n . T h e g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n w o u l d always yield
a p r e f e r e n c e for T W O over O N E , n o m a t t e r h o w t h e t w o scores are
w e i g h t e d (so l o n g a s n e i t h e r k i n d of social p r i m a r y g o o d s is disre­
g a r d e d entirely).
11.2.2. A related difficulty derives from Rawls's v i e w t h a t "as far as
possible t h e basic s t r u c t u r e s h o u l d b e a p p r a i s e d from t h e position of
equal citizenship T h e p r o b l e m s of a d j u d i c a t i n g a m o n g t h e funda­
m e n t a l liberties a r e settled b y reference t o it" (TJ 97). By contrast, a
m a x i m i n c r i t e r i o n w o u l d b e sensitive t o w h a t a l t e r n a t i v e specifications
of t h e b a s i c liberties w o u l d m e a n for t h e v a r i o u s s o c i o e c o n o m i c
classes, a n d surely t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e rich a n d t h e p o o r might be
o p p o s e d in regard to, say, h o w f r e e d o m of t h e p r e s s s h o u l d b e spec­
ified, h o w political s p e e c h s h o u l d b e r e g u l a t e d (cf. BLP 73-74), o r h o w
judicial p r o c e e d i n g s s h o u l d b e f i n a n c e d . W h a t is t h e p r e f e r e n c e of "the
2
representative equal citizen" in s u c h c a s e s ? "
This p r o b l e m is s o m e w h a t m i t i g a t e d b y Rawls's qualification that
differential effects of a set of equal b a s i c liberties " m a y b e left a s i d e . . . if
21
social a n d e c o n o m i c inequalities a r e just" (TJ 9 7 ) . T h i s suggests
r S P O n C W i , h , h ee m i r i c
J ^ ^ ^ i ! ! P a l claim that t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n s of t h e t w o kinds of
f a c t
F _ ' f , ^ a t e . This claim, however, i s historically doubtful (as in t h e case of
3 S m e t h i n 6 h e C u l d 3 S k
S K S ^ g r a n t e d ^ ^ ° ° ^
h e e n d i S C U S S e d i n H a r t R L P
Ha7 Rawlf » S . ^ ^ ' h i s elaborate response to
e U C a t e , h e n a t i o n o f {
re^nc^nthP^K £ '0 ^1 8 1
h e representative e q u a l citizen by
^ T ^ i M ^ T . ^r- " - interesls
This response m a k e s h i s i d e a r n o r e determi­
nate, but it d o e s not, t believe, resolve t h e difficulty
a U P O S E 3 n c o n
which Ln m^«ON^« RF
8 l ° n i i c a l l just s o c i e t y e n c o u n t e r s a n e m e r g e n c y in y

necessary. C a n w e s a y that basic liberties are equally restricted IF

everyone m a y avoid c o n s c r i p t i o n through making a large p a y m e n t ? I s u s p e c t s u c h a
 T h e Split i n t o T w o Principles of Justice, 11.3 125

(though it does n o t entail) t h a t t h e y m a y n o t b e left a s i d e w h e n social

and economic i n e q u a l i t i e s a r e n o t j u s t . But w h e n Rawls actually dis­
cusses the specification of b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties in the United
States, he does s o from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of equal citizenship (BLP), even
though he clearly believes t h a t t h e s e c o n d principle is not satisfied
(TJ279).
The problem h a s a n a n a l o g u e in t h e s o c i o e c o n o m i c s p h e r e . How are
we to compare i n c o m e s a c r o s s i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s if these have
different price v e c t o r s ? T h i s is e v i d e n t l y a n extremely complicated
22
problem, which I c a n n o t a d d r e s s in a n y d e t a i l . Still, t h e intuitive idea
must be to c o n s t r u c t s o m e s t a n d a r d b a s k e t of g o o d s a n d services a n d
then ask h o w m a n y s u c h b a s k e t s c o u l d b e b o u g h t with t h e lowest
representative i n c o m e u n d e r e a c h s c h e m e . T h e p r o b l e m is h o w to
construct this s t a n d a r d b a s k e t — f r o m t h e s t a n d p o i n t of "the equal
citizen" or from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d . In the former
case, we would b e g u i d e d b y w h a t p e r s o n s in general tend to c o n s u m e
in the two s c h e m e s . In t h e l a t t e r c a s e , w e w o u l d b e g u i d e d by what the
poor would t e n d t o c o n s u m e a n d m i g h t , therefore, weight the price of
basic foodstuffs m o r e heavily a n d t h a t of airline tickets less heavily, for
example. Once t h e q u e s t i o n h a s b e e n clearly stated, it is h a r d to see
how risk-averse c o n t r a c t o r s (or m a x i m i n p h i l o s o p h e r s ) can allow inter­
schemic income c o m p a r i s o n s t o b e m a d e from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of the
rcpresentative (average) c i t i z e n r a t h e r t h a n t h a t of t h e least advantaged,
'tod the same h o l d s , for a n a l o g o u s r e a s o n s , for i n t e r s c h e m i c com­
parisons of alternative s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of b a s i c rights a n d liberties.
11.3. For r e a s o n a b l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s Rawls p r o p o s e s a serial or
'eacographical ("lexical") o r d e r i n g of t h e t w o scores, s o that first-score
^erentials always o v e r r i d e s e c o n d - s c o r e differentials. The reason he
f es is that " t h e i n t e r e s t s of liberty . . . b e c o m e stronger as the conui-
o n s fo
J r the e x e r c i s e of t h e e q u a l f r e e d o m s are m o r e wily realized.
% ° n d some p o i n t it b e c o m e s a n d t h e n r e m a i n s irrational from t h e
^andpoint of t h e original p o s i t i o n t o a c k n o w l e d g e a lesser liberty_tor
foesake of r m a t e r i a l m e a n s a n d a m e n i t i e s of office" (TJ 542). The
g r e a t e

Parhes adopt t h e s p e c i a l r a t h e r t h a n t h e general c o n c e p t i o n for^sucn

c
°ndiuons b e c a u s e , o n t h e b a s i s of t h e i r limited knowledge, they find t
1
^ ° n a l to a s s u m e t h a t t h o s e t h e y r e p r e s e n t will, " n ^ " .
J * * take a n i n c o m m e n s u r a b l y g r e a t e r interest in basics r i g h t a n d
than i n all o t h e r s o c i a l p r i m a r y g o o d s . Rawls n e e d not daw
parties k n o w t h i s a s s u m p t i o n t o b e true, t h o u g h h e sometimes
to think t h a t h e m u s t (BLP 83 n. 87). It is e n o u g h that rt be h e
J« sensible o n e t o m a k e for t h e p a r t i e s w h o seek to safeguard the
^ ^ o n h o s e t h e y r e p r e s e n t u n d e r foreseeable worst-case see

ot b e a c c e p t a b l e o n l y if e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n s
275JS?
w e K
would ^ l b l y n o t based
f ""Unary i d e a s a b o u t w a r t i m e rationing, w h i c h are presumably
3 S o c i a l a n d
^Seer-w!* ' e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t i e s are unjust.
Aboard, DG, for a d i s c u s s i o n o f this p r o b l e m .
126 T h e Split i n t o T w o P r i n c i p l e s of J u s t i c e , 11.3.1

narios. P e r h a p s t h e p a r t i e s k n o w o n l y t h a t t h e i r c l i e n t s , given their two

h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s a s s t i p u l a t e d b y Rawls, will u n d e r reasonably
favorable c o n d i t i o n s a t t a c h v e r y g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e basic liberties
relative t o social a n d e c o n o m i c b e n e f i t s a n d b u r d e n s . If t h e dangers of
u n d e r e s t i m a t i n g t h i s i m p o r t a n c e a r e g r e a t e r t h a n t h o s e of overestimat­
ing it, it m a y well b e rational for t h e m to m a k e t h e a s s u m p t i o n of
infinite w e i g h t , especially w h e n this a s s u m p t i o n o b v i a t e s t h e need for
w e i g h t i n g a n d b a l a n c i n g diverse g o o d s a n d t h u s r e s u l t s in a criterion
t h a t is easier t o a p p l y a n d m o r e s u i t a b l e a s a p u b l i c criterion (all of
w h i c h t e n d s t o raise t h e w o r s t social p o s i t i o n ) .
Evidently, t h e serial o r d e r i n g h a s very c o n s i d e r a b l e advantages as a
simplifying device. It n e a t l y resolves c a s e s w h e r e t h e t w o principles are
n o t cosatisfiable. As Rawls u n d e r s t a n d s it, it a l s o g u i d e s o u r efforts
t o w a r d i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform: " W h e n w e c o m e t o n o n i d e a l theory, we do
n o t fall b a c k s t r a i g h t w a y u p o n t h e g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n of justice.
[T]he r a n k i n g of t h e p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e i n i d e a l t h e o r y reflects back
a n d g u i d e s t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s to n o n i d e a l situations. It
identifies w h i c h limitations n e e d t o b e d e a l t w i t h first" (TJ 303, cf. 2461
in t h a t it " r e q u i r e s u s to satisfy t h e first p r i n c i p l e in t h e o r d e r i n g before
w e c a n m o v e o n t o t h e s e c o n d , t h e s e c o n d b e f o r e w e c o n s i d e r the third,
a n d so on. A p r i n c i p l e d o e s n o t c o m e i n t o p l a y u n t i l t h o s e previous to it
are e i t h e r fully m e t or d o n o t a p p l y " (TJ 43, cf. 244). T h i s lexical priority,
however, also raises a n u m b e r of s e r i o u s difficulties for Rawls's claim to
b e p r e s e n t i n g t h e m a x i m i n criterion of social j u s t i c e .
1 1 . 3 . 1 . Let m e again r e p r e s e n t t h e e v a l u a t i o n of a social position by
a n o r d e r e d p a i r . S u p p o s e t h a t w h e n t h e first p r i n c i p l e is satisfied, the
first n u m b e r will b e 100 for all p o s i t i o n s . N o w t a k e a b a s i c structure
g e n e r a t i n g t w o p o s i t i o n s w i t h s c o r e s < 8 0 , 7 0 > a n d < 3 0 , 2 0 > . Here the
last q u o t a t i o n w o u l d suggest t h a t o n e n e e d n o t w o r r y a b o u t t h e sec­
o n d - p r i n c i p l e s c o r e of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d ( u n j u s t l y low, let u s sup­
pose), so long a s s o m e first-principle s c o r e s h a v e n o t r e a c h e d 100. By
contrast, a m a x i m i n criterion w o u l d d e m a n d t h a t political efforts and
social r e s o u r c e s be d e v o t e d to raising t h e s e c o n d - p r i n c i p l e s c o r e of the
least a d v a n t a g e d w h e n s u c h efforts d o n o t d e t r a c t from i m p r o v i n g their
first-pnnciple s c o r e . All p r i n c i p l e s s h o u l d a l w a y s b e "in p l a y " More
i m p o r t a n t , b o t h q u o t a t i o n s entail t h a t feasible i m p r o v e m e n t s in the
hrst-principle s c o r e of t h e m o r e a d v a n t a g e d (for e x a m p l e , l a r g e r press
freedoms for t h e S o u t h African whites) m u s t t a k e p r e c e d e n c e over
feasible i m p r o v e m e n t s in t h e s e c o n d - p r i n c i p l e s c o r e of t h e l e a s t advan­
c e d (for e x a m p l e , b e t t e r e d u c a t i o n for t h e S o u t h African blacks). But
the p a r t i e s m a x i m i n rule w o u l d l e a d t h e m t o prefer a c r i t e r i o n favoring
precisely t h e o p p o s i t e priority

1
JriSlK*
art priority
feaSiblB
™P""»nHW«s i n l h . i
e score of the
ftrBt pnncip e

P r e c e d e n c e over everything else. What is at i s s u e h e r e is a second-

 T h e Split i n t o T w o P r i n c i p l e s of Justice, 11.4 127

Rawls gets i n t o t h i s p r o b l e m , I believe, b e c a u s e h e d o e s not properly

distinguish two different r o l e s of t h e lexical priority. Initially h e takes it
to be a design priority. O u r u l t i m a t e goal, as envisioned by t h e special
conception, is t o satisfy t h e first p r i n c i p l e c o m p l e t e l y (which p r e s u p ­
poses the a c h i e v e m e n t of w h a t I call truly favorable conditions), n o
matter how its satisfaction m a y c o n s t r a i n t h e distribution of second-
principle scores. T h i s d e s i g n p r i o r i t y d o e s n o t clash with t h e preemi­
nent concern for t h e l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d . T h e r e a s o n is that a basic
structure u n d e r w h i c h t h e f i r s t - p r i n c i p l e g o o d s of s o m e o r all are
abridged ipso facto p r o d u c e s a w o r s t social position that is inferior to
the worst social p o s i t i o n u n d e r a n y b a s i c s t r u c t u r e that completely
2 4
satisfies the first p r i n c i p l e . F o r p u r p o s e s of d e s i g n i n g an ideal institu­
tional scheme, t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e s e c o n d principle are then sub­
25
ject to those of t h e first a n d i n v a l i d a t e d in c a s e s of inconsistency.
Without p r o p e r a r g u m e n t for t h e t r a n s i t i o n , Rawls also u n d e r s t a n d s
his lexical priority in t h e q u i t e different s e n s e of a n implementation
priority. For p u r p o s e s of r e f o r m i n g a less-than-just institutional
scheme u n d e r r e a s o n a b l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s , feasible reforms de­
manded by t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e m u s t give way to t h o s e d e m a n d e d by
*e first, w h e n d e m a n d s of t h e t w o k i n d s s t a n d in competition (on
account of scarce r e s o u r c e s ) . Given t h e p a r t i e s ' a s s u m p t i o n of a pre­
eminent interest i n f i r s t - p r i n c i p l e s c o r e s , t h i s move is unobjectionable
when the c o m p e t i t i o n is b e t w e e n i n t e r e s t s of t h e s a m e representative
S^up But in o t h e r c a s e s t h e p a r t i e s w o u l d clearly prefer a c n t e n o n in
^ c h (in the a l l o c a t i o n of s c a r c e r e s o u r c e s available for institutional
^orm) the priority c o n c e r n for t h e w o r s t representative share over-
"des the lexical p r i o r i t y of f i r s t - p r i n c i p l e over second-principle scores.
U-4. Before d i s c u s s i n g f u r t h e r difficulties, w e m u s t look m o r e
cl
°sely at Rawls's overall r a t i o n a l e for h i s t w o principles. Here it t u r n s
°W that t h e t w o p a r t s of t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e aren't so distinct after all.
l n e
goods falling u n d e r t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s are b o t h separated a n d
united by the different c o n t r i b u t i o n s t h e y m a k e to t h e same s u p r e m e
Jwe. Rawls m a r k s t h i s difference b y d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e t w e e n h e ^ r e e -
*»» Persons h a v e , t h a n k s t o t h e i r b a s i c rights a n d liberties (an e n u -
1 0 f W h i c h
S " ° b a p p e n d e d t o t h e first principle [TJ 61), a n d the
W o
£ of this freedom, a s e s t i m a t e d t h r o u g h second-principle scores.
r h
« interplay b e t w e e n t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s is envisaged as follows.

^ e d o m as equal liberty is t h e same for all; the question of ^ P ^ t i n g

for
a lesser than equal liberty does not arise. But the worth of liberty is not

Umw
*n5S^ ' P
° S U I 0 N
° F

"
C O

, T
U

J
R E

5
E

4
'
2 )
T H

T
A

O
T
« I S R A T

U N D E R REASONABLY
I O N A L
" F R O M
*? ^H r^N£NS 1nfiniie
S, d

^.^J^^ens.
P

^ "6 P ^ P l e
"•ttttSn*
U
^ H U S G O O D S RELATIVE TO SOCIAL A N D E C O N O M . C B E N E F I T • * £ D D T H A T

° P P ° r t "clos
NITY P R I N C I P L E , FOR E X A M P L E , I S C O N S T R U E D ^ M N N G FEASIBLE
*«5S -5 ,

n d
0 m e
A S
* T O
M A I N T A I N I N G FAIR EQUALITY OF O P P O R T U N . T Y
8ment OF B A S I C RIGHTS A N D LIBERTIES.
128 T h e Split i n t o T w o P r i n c i p l e s of J u s t i c e , 11.4

the same for everyone. Some have greater authority and wealth, and there­
fore greater means to achieve their aims. The lesser worth of liberty is,
however, compensated for, since the capacity of the less fortunate mem­
bers of society to achieve their aims would be even less were they not to
accept the existing inequalities whenever the difference principle is satis­
fied. . . . Taking the two principles together, the basic structure is to be
arranged to maximize the worth to the least advantaged of the complete
scheme of equal liberty shared by all. [TJ 204-5]

Rawls reaffirms this i d e a eleven y e a r s later:

The basic liberties are specified by institutional rights and duties that
entitle citizens to do certain things, if they wish, and that forbid others to
interfere. The basic liberties are a framework of legally protected paths and
opportunities. Of course, ignorance a n d poverty, a n d the lack of material
means generally, prevent people from exercising their rights and from
taking advantage of these openings. But rather than counting these and
similar obstacles as restricting a person's liberty, we count them as affect­
ing the worth of liberty, that is, the usefulness to persons of their liberties.
Now in justice as fairness, this usefulness is specified in terms of an index
of the primary goods regulated by the second principle of justice The
basic structure of society is arranged so that it maximizes the primary
goods available to the least advantaged to make use of the equal basic
liberties enjoyed by everyone. [BLP 40-41)

I believe Rawls's general idea is to c o n c e i v e w o r t h of f r e e d o m (what

ultimately matters) as a function of t h r e e c o m p o n e n t s : t h e public rec­
ognition of certain b a s i c f r e e d o m s (the p u b l i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g that it is
legitimate for m e to travel along c e r t a i n p a t h s ) ; t h e i r protection (the
m a i n t e n a n c e of t h e s e p a t h s a s s e c u r e h i g h w a y s ) ; a n d t h e m e a n s at
o n e ' s d i s p o s a l (my ability to o b t a i n f o o d a n d b o o t s , a c a r a n d gasoline,
w i t h o u t w h i c h I c o u l d n o t travel o n even t h e b e s t a n d safest highway).
Let u s say t h a t t h e first c o m p o n e n t d e t e r m i n e s (formal) legal freedom:
that t h e first t w o c o m p o n e n t s t o g e t h e r d e t e r m i n e effective legal free­
dom (Rawls: freedom); a n d t h a t all t h r e e c o m p o n e n t s t o g e t h e r deter­
26
m i n e worth of freedom or (as I also say) worthwhile freedom.
While t h e t h i r d c o m p o n e n t is r e l e g a t e d t o t h e s e c o n d principle.
Rawls s first p r i n c i p l e governs both of t h e o t h e r c o m p o n e n t s , reflecting
t h e realization t h a t basic rights a n d liberties p r o t e c t o u r f r e e d o m only
insofar as they are t h e m s e l v e s w e l l - p r o t e c t e d , t h a t is, u p h e l d a n d en-
t o r c e d / T h u s t h e first p r i n c i p l e r e q u i r e s n o t m e r e l y formal b u t effective
legal freedom: "It is t h e institution as r e a l i s e d . . . w h i c h is just or
u n i u s t (TJ 551 " W h e t h e r t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e g u a r a n t e e s e q u a l liberty of
c o n s c i e n c e , o r freedom of t h o u g h t , is s e t t l e d b y . . . h o w t h e y are
actually i n t e r p r e t e d a n d e n f o r c e d " (SUPG 163). U n f o r t u n a t e l y , Rawls
m a k e s n o a t t e m p t to say how this i s s u e is t o b e s e t t l e d . Take the

othTtS^^^^
 T h e Split i n t o T w o P r i n c i p l e s of Justice, 11.5 129

integrity of the p e r s o n , for e x a m p l e . S u p p o s e this is g u a r a n t e e d by laws

against homicide, r a p e , a s s a u l t , d r u n k driving, a n d s o o n . What else is
required for the integrity of t h e p e r s o n t o b e sufficiently well p r o t e c t e d ?
What if 60 p e r c e n t of all w o m e n a r e r a p e d , o r 4 p e r c e n t of all black m e n
murdered within t e n y e a r s of r e a c h i n g a g e sixteen? W h a t if 3 p e r c e n t ot
the population m e e t t h e i r d e a t h s i n c a r a c c i d e n t s ? Without a clue h o w
to answer s u c h q u e s t i o n s , w e c a n n o t tell w h e t h e r t h e first principle is
satisfied in a given social s y s t e m a n d h e n c e d o n o t k n o w w h a t political
priorities Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n w o u l d s e t for its institutional reform.
My conjecture i n §10.7 a c h i e v e s s o m e w h a t m o r e specificity, t h o u g h
perhaps at t h e p r i c e of i m p l a u s i b i l i t y . Effective legal freedom is evalu­
ated ex post. T h e d i s a d v a n t a g e d a r e t h o s e w h o s e basic rights a n d
liberties are actually ill p r o t e c t e d . It i s n o t e n o u g h t h a t certain crime
rates are sufficiently l o w overall. T h e y m u s t also b e sufficiently low
within the various p o p u l a t i o n c l u s t e r s . S u c h c l u s t e r s can b e defined
quite narrowly, s o l o n g a s i n t r a c l u s t e r r a t e s a n d intercluster inequali­
e a m
ties in rates a r e statistically significant. It m a y b e t h e case, for' ^ P ^ '
that poor, black, female, i n n e r - c i t y r e s i d e n t s , o n a c c o u n t ot t n e inci
dence of violent c r i m e s c o m m i t t e d a g a i n s t t h e m , d o not effectively nave
'he right to p e r s o n a l integrity, t h o u g h o n p a p e r t h i s right is ^anieea
to them as t o e v e r y o n e e l s e . T h i s violation of t h e first principle would
Ny place t h e s e w o m e n a m o n g t h e least a d v a n t a g e d
Now, surely, s o m e p e r s o n s o u t s i d e this c l u s t e r will suffer-voiem
chmes, a n d s o m e p e r s o n s w i t h i n t h i s c l u s t e r w o n ' t . But singiu g
^ persons w h o s e b a s i c r i g h t s a r e a c t u a l l y violated, ^ h e r ^ m ™ *
1 8 1
^ o s e basic rights a r e a c t u a l l y ill p r o t e c t e d , is ^ P * " * ^ ^ o n
d e
Pwposal t h e identification of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d heavily P ™
chance factors t h a t h a v e little t o d o w i t h t h e prevailing basic stru -
*Jich may result in a h i g h l y h e t e r o g e n e o u s a n d u n r e p r e s e n tehvete
advantaged g r o u p . T h e p r o p o s a l also d i s r e g a r d s the'fact ma•
whose basic r i g h t s a r e ill p r o t e c t e d live in fear even if they never in
su
ffer a violation of t h e i r r i g h t s . , j titu- n s

„ His c r i t e r i o n of Justice, Rawls says, ultimately

°ns "to m a x i m i z e t h e w o r t h t o t h e least a d v a n t a g e ^ ^ J ^
s
c W of e q u a l liberty s h a r e d b y all" (TJ 204-5). This requi
Presupposes s o m e t h i n g like t h e following rationale.

Ial
Given their limited general knowledge, the parties find-^^^^
assume that those they represent have a piwsroujem :i ^ ^.^
worth of their freedom, in being in the best social posu ^ i p l e

exercise, or take advantage of whatever freedom m . b g e v a J u

squires them to have. Hence they want individual snai

a
ted in terms of worthwhile freedom.

^ " h w h i l e freedom, as w e have seen, is a ^ f ^ S i g ^

**Ws.Ravvi - s p e c i a l c o n c e p t i o n , h o w e v e r , a t t a c h e s a w e n t *
s s g ^
* * * to effective legal freedom, gives lexical priority t o t n e
130 T h e Split i n t o T w o P r i n c i p l e s of J u s t i c e , 11.5.1

c o m p o n e n t s over t h e t h i r d . T o m a k e p l a u s i b l e t h a t t h e parties would

a c c e p t this priority of f r e e d o m o v e r its w o r t h ( w h i c h s t a n d s behind the
lexical priority of t h e first over t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e ) , Rawls m u s t invoke
a further p r e m i s e , r o u g h l y as follows:

(b) The parties find it rational to assume that it is (something very close to)
a necessary prerequisite to being in a position to enjoy, exercise, and
take advantage of one's first-principle freedom that one should have
certain publicly recognized and effectively enforced basic rights and
liberties that institutionally protect such enjoyment. There is no
worthwhile freedom without effective legal freedom.

To b e sure, w h e n o n e d o e s h a v e s u c h b a s i c r i g h t s , o n e ' s enjoyment of

t h e f r e e d o m t h e y p r o t e c t m a y still d e p e n d o n social a n d economic
factors. T h e extent t o w h i c h o n e is in a p o s i t i o n t o enjoy t h e freedom to
o w n p r o p e r t y , t o exercise f r e e d o m of m o v e m e n t , o r t o take advantage of
t h e freedom t o have o n e ' s o p i n i o n s p u b l i s h e d , for e x a m p l e , is a func­
t i o n of o n e ' s w e a l t h a n d i n c o m e . Still, if o n e d o e s n o t have t h e relevant
basic rights at all, t h e n enjoying t h e correlative f r e e d o m s is altogether
o u t of t h e q u e s t i o n . T h i s c o n j e c t u r e d p r e m i s e (b) w o u l d explain the
p a r t i e s ' overriding c o n c e r n w i t h effective legal f r e e d o m . T h a t Rawls
m u s t rely o n a n a r g u m e n t of this s o r t r a i s e s t h r e e f u r t h e r difficulties for
his position.
11.5.1. Let u s begin w i t h t h e s i m p l e c a s e of a single a s p e c t of freedom
for w h i c h t h e first p r i n c i p l e r e q u i r e s effective i n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n in
form of a b a s i c right o r liberty, L. T h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h p e r s o n s actually
enjoy t h i s f r e e d o m d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r t h e y have L (effective legal
freedom) a n d o n t h e further m e a n s ( m o n e y , e d u c a t i o n , etc.) at their
disposal. N o w w h y s h o u l d having L b e i n c o m m e n s u r a b l y m o r e impor­
t a n t t h a n having t h o s e m e a n s — s o t h a t in n o n i d e a l c o n t e x t s establish­
ing t h e former always takes priority over i n c r e a s i n g t h e latter? The
a n s w e r I h a v e s u g g e s t e d Rawls m u s t give is t h a t h a v i n g L is a prerequi­
site w i t h o u t w h i c h t h e m e a n s for t h e e n j o y m e n t c o m e t o n a u g h t . There
a r e t w o w a y s of r e a d i n g this claim, b o t h p r o b l e m a t i c . W e c a n take the
p r e r e q u i s i t e t o b e c o n c e p t u a l , t h a t is, to h o l d t h a t it is logically impossi­
ble to enjoy o r exercise a basic right o r liberty t h a t o n e d o e s n o t have. In
this c a s e w e w o u l d h a v e to r e a d (a) as a s s e r t i n g t h a t t h e p a r t i e s care
a b o u t f r e e d o m only insofar a s it is e n j o y e d a s a matter of right. But if we
r e a d this way, (a) is i m p l a u s i b l e . W h y s h o u l d p e r s o n s w h o in virtue of
their s o c i o e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n d o in fact enjoy s o m e a s p e c t of t h e i r first-
principle f r e e d o m b e c o n s i d e r e d unfree in t h e relevant r e s p e c t just
a hat they
! K «»r
f L
e
'° n y i s n
J o t t h e o b e c t o f a r
» effectively e n f o r c e d legal
n g n t ? Why s h o u l d f r e e d o m of m o v e m e n t o r f r e e d o m from arbitrary
arrest, say, have value only insofar as t h e y a r e e n j o y e d a s rights? Alter­
natively, w e c a n r e a d (a) a s allowing t h a t t h e p a r t i e s c a r e e v e n about
^ e e d o m t h a t n o t e n j o y e d a s a m a t t e r of right. In t h i s c a s e , w e w o u l d
l s

take t h e p r e r e q u i s i t e t o b e causa], to h o l d t h a t if s o m e a s p e c t of one's

 The Split into Two Principles of Justice, 11.5.3 131

freedom is not publicly recognized and institutionally protected, then

one will not, as a matter of fact, enjoy it. In this construal, (b) is
implausible. It is not historically true, for example, that freedom from
arbitrary arrest, or freedom of movement, is enjoyed only in societies in
which a legal right to these aspects of freedom is publicly recognized
and effectively enforced. Either way, the lexical priority of the interest
in L over the interest in the means for enjoying the aspect of freedom
that L protects jars with the idea of maximizing the worthwhile first-
principle freedom of the least advantaged.
11.5.2. This conclusion can be further supported. Just as an aspect
of freedom may be enjoyable in some degree even though it isn't legally
protected, it may also be in s o m e degree unenjoyable even though it is
so protected. A basic right or liberty L, though listed in the constitution,
may not in fact be effectively enforced, for certain sectors of society
perhaps, so that some find it very difficult to enjoy or exercise L even
27
though they have the money, education, etc., to do s o . Now if having L
were an all-or-nothing affair, t h e n it might be plausible to assign it the
preeminence Rawls postulates over the means for enjoying the correla­
tive freedom. But if the transition from not having L to having L lies
somewhere on a continuum, t h e n the priority is no longer plausible, for
1
j * transition may then be a small step indeed (no matter where the
toe is drawn). Thus, it was at some time during the 1960s, perhaps, that
Macks in the United States began to have certain rights they had tor-
"wdy had only on paper. In such a case it seems implausible to assume
«at the decisive incremental increase in their effective legal freedom
should have made a greater contribution to their worthwhile freedom
than any increase in their m e a n s of enjoyment could have done.
»-5.3. Let us suppose, contrary to the preceding two objections,
m
at without L (effective legal freedom) the means for enjoying tne
^ l a t i v e aspect of freedom are generally of little or no value, so that it
plausible to assign lexical priority to the demand for the former over
J* demand for the latter. Even this supposition would not be enough
JWS needs to show not merely that for each basic liberty, L, having L is
eacaUy m o r e i n s for the enjoyment ot
m p o r t a n t t h a n h a v i n g t h e m e a

2 ^ d o m L protects. He m u s t also show that having L is lencaUy

£»? ""Portant than the m e a n s for the enjoyment of any tot-p^pta
J**** ( F the fact that each daughter is younger than her mother
r o r n

d
<*s not follow that all daughters are younger than all motheraJ To
W h a t i s a t s e s u s e s o m e r o U P
SLSf £ L b u
^ < PP°
t n o t
* hTfreSom
w 2
W o u l
K. It may t h e n be false that their worthwhile.freedom
d gain i n c o m m e n s u r a b l y more through their acquisition of K (as

B ^ i s holds f i a bul ne d e r c e r t a i n h a l f w a y favorable c o n d i t i o n s » J j f g ^ S ^ S

U s , i that
^^J b
-
P ^ d e d t h e l o s s in t e r m s of bas.c G e r t i e s left unre » ^
l^Z^ y "the greater p r o t e c t i o n " or "the larger s e c u n t y o i the ba ^
first-pnnciple f°*"™%led effective
tt6d
'**§13n rf < ^ ° < I T J 2 3 1 2 3 3 s h a t t h e w o r e t

T h , S
kfcl W r t s t a t e m e n t s h o w s that h e w o u l d grant that what I have call
• " ^ o m is a matter of d e g r e e .
132 T h e Split i n t o T w o P r i n c i p l e s of J u s t i c e , 11.6.1

a n effectively e n f o r c e d right) t h a n t h r o u g h a significant increase in their

m e a n s for enjoying L. It is q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t a g r e a t e r gain in the
w o r t h w h i l e f r e e d o m of t h e p o o r w o u l d r e s u l t from a n improvement in
t h e i r i n c o m e a n d e d u c a t i o n (enabling t h e m b e t t e r t o t a k e advantage of
t h e i r existing b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties) t h a n from a d d i t i o n a l legal rights
(whose effect o n t h e i r w o r t h w h i l e f r e e d o m m a y b e r a t h e r slight so long
as they remain p o o r a n d uneducated).
11.6. T h e p r e c e d i n g t h r e e o b j e c t i o n s h a v e a s s u m e d (that the parties
accept) t h e exclusive c o n c e r n for m a x i m i z i n g t h e w o r t h of freedom as
Rawls u n d e r s t a n d s f r e e d o m . Before e x a m i n i n g t h a t a s s u m p t i o n , let us
look m o r e closely at t h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Rawls e x p l a i n s w h a t aspects of
f r e e d o m h e is especially c o n c e r n e d w i t h b y specifying that the first
p r i n c i p l e r e q u i r e s t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n of a fully a d e q u a t e pack­
age of b a s i c civil a n d political r i g h t s a n d l i b e r t i e s t h a t covers t h e follow­
ing four categories (outlined at TJ 61 a n d refined in BLP 5 et passim):

(A) The basic political liberties, which are said to be connected with the
capacity for a sense of justice (BLP 471. These include the basic right to
vote and be eligible for public office as well as basic rights to political
speech and assembly (freedom of thought). Rawls includes here as a
first-principle requirement that institutions must maintain the fair
value of the basic political liberties, though this requirement is left
rather vague (BLP 42).
(B) The basic rights and liberties protecting freedom of conscience, said to
be connected to the capacity for a conception of the good (BLP 47).
These include, in particular, rights to freedom of association as well as
basic religious liberties (BLP 56-57).

T h e r e m a i n i n g t w o categories c o n t a i n " s u p p o r t i n g " (BLP 50) basic

liberties, n e c e s s a r y to t h e a d e q u a t e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d full exercise of
both moral powers:

(C) The basic rights and liberties protecting the freedom and integrity of
the person. These are violated "by slavery and serfdom, a n d by the
denial of freedom of movement and occupation" (BLP 50). Thev further
include the right to be free "from psychological oppression arid physi­
cal assault'' (RAM 640) and also "the right to hold and to have the
exclusive use of persona] property"—though this latter without cer­
tain (capitalist) "rights of acquisition a n d bequest, as well as the right to
own means of production and natural resources" and without certain
(socialist) rights "to participate in the control of means of production
and natural resources, which are to be socially owned" (BLP 121.
iu) The basic rights and liberties associated with the rule of law, including
protections against arbitrary arrest and seizure.

11.6.1. T h e objection t o this a c c o u n t c a n b e f o r m u l a t e d b y charging

Rawls with, alternatively, a t r u n c a t e d c o n c e p t i o n of f u n d a m e n t a l free­
d o m o r an overblown view of its i m p o r t a n c e . C o n s i d e r , t o b e g i n with
t n e hrst formulation, a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e e n g e n d e r i n g a s u b s t a n t i a l inci-
 T h e Split i n t o T w o P r i n c i p l e s of Justice, 11.6.1 133

dence of severe a n d u n r e l i e v e d p o v e r t y . T h e p o o r u n d e r this s c h e m e

are in many obvious w a y s u n f r e e o n a c c o u n t of their poverty. The
existing ground r u l e s p r o v i d e n o legal p a t h o n w h i c h they can obtain
more than part of w h a t t h e y n e e d . T h e y a n d their families m a y be
unfree to p u r c h a s e a n u t r i t i o u s a n d healthful diet, sufficient clothing
and heating fuel for t h e w i n t e r , n e e d e d m e d i c a l care a n d medications,
adecent education, a n d s o f o r t h . W h e r e d o e s Rawls's account take note
of this sort of u n f r e e d o m ? G r a n t e d , Rawls w a n t s his conception of
freedom to b e c o n f i n e d t o its m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l aspects, b u t is it not
fundamental w h e n social c o n d i t i o n s leave o n e w i t h o u t access to suffi­
cient food a n d h e a t i n g fuel w h i l e t h e r e is p l e n t y of it a r o u n d ? Rawls
may reply that t h e f u n d a m e n t a l a s p e c t s of freedom are identified
through the t w o h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s in t h e development a n d ex­
ercise of the two m o r a l p o w e r s , a n d t h a t p e r s o n s w h o are very p o o r in a
democracy are m u c h b e t t e r a b l e t o satisfy these interests t h a n persons
iiving under a d i c t a t o r s h i p b e c a u s e t h e v a r e still able to engage in the
activities p r o t e c t e d b y t h e b a s i c civil a n d political rights a n d liberties.
Even if you a n d y o u r family freeze t h r o u g h t h e w i n t e r and m u s t feed
yourselves o n d o g food, y o u c a n still a t t e n d political meetings a n d
j*%ious c e r e m o n i e s . But p e r h a p s s u c h a reply w o u l d t e n d to cast
doubt on Rawls's a c c o u n t of t h e t w o h i g h e s t - o r d e r interests rather t h a n
vindicate his list of first-principle g o o d s .
In its second f o r m u l a t i o n , t h e o b j e c t i o n a c c e p t s Rawls's conception
°f fundamental f r e e d o m a s it is a n d t h e n rejects t h e claim that the
worth of freedom (so d e f i n e d ) is all t h a t ultimately matters to prospec-
°ve participants in social i n s t i t u t i o n s . P e r s o n s have s o m e basic social
^ e c o n o m i c n e e d s . F o r e m o s t a m o n g t h e s e are t h e n e e d s for a certain
""nhnurn access t o food, c l o t h i n g , shelter, care, culture, a n d educa-
°on S u g o o d s a r e of m u c h g r e a t e r u r g e n c y a n d importance than
c h
o m d
, derived b y v i e w i n g t h e m m e r e l y a s m e a n s for fulfilling a more
J^ntneed t o s e c u r e t h e w o r t h of o n e ' s f u n d a m e n t a l freedoms. Rawls
*** not do j u s t i c e t o t h i s p r o b l e m b v a d d r e s s i n g t h e p o s s ^ l ™
e
J> basic liberties m a y p r o v e t o b e m e r e l y formal" (BLP 40). This
Posing of t h e i s s u e a l r e a d y p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t t h e i m p o r t a n c e of social
economic e s s e n t i a l s lies i n t h e i r f u n c t i o n as m e a n s to the enjoy-
^ t o f f u n d a m e n t a l (civil a n d political) freedoms. If the account ot

2 643;
2
WOS
g ° ° d s is t o r e f l e c i a p l a u s i b l e n o t i o n of h u m a n needs
FG 15; 554;
SUPG 172-73), t h e n it cannot d e n y the
^ d a m e n t a l role b a s i c s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s actually p ay m a
J j j n hfe. But i n s i s t e n c e o n t h e p r e e m i n e n c e of t h e baste, cwland
Pineal) t00d
2T>
rights a n d l i b e r t i e s c o n s t i t u t e s just s u c h a demal.To xllus rate

goods
a s
P * * ° f a m a x i m i n criterion, t h e a c c o u n t
t p r o v i d e a p l a u s i b l e m e a s u r e °f P « J » J * ^
m u s

n
S£ i Ch6mes
SS - S c h e
a n d compare m e

N
t h e social positions <*
o w
s u p p o s e b a s i c r i g h t s a r e u n e q u a l (in> a n m t r a or
^ c h e m i c c o m p a r i s o n ) . F o r s u c h c a s e s , Rawls's crrtenon,
134 T h e Package of Basic Rights a n d Liberties, 12

c e r n e d w i t h t h e w o r t h of f r e e d o m , w o u l d a l w a y s c o u n t the social
p o s i t i o n w i t h t h e l e s s e r b a s i c rights a s w o r s e . Of t w o g r o u p s with scores
< 9 0 , 1 0 0 > a n d < 1 0 0 , 2 0 > , t h e f o r m e r w o u l d b e v i e w e d as the less
a d v a n t a g e d . T h u s h i s c o n c e p t i o n w o u l d e n t a i l , for e x a m p l e , that (afflu­
ent) p e r s o n s w h o s e b a s i c rights t o f r e e d o m of political s p e e c h or as­
s e m b l y a r e (even slightly) r e s t r i c t e d i p s o facto h a v e a w o r s e share than
o t h e r s w h o , t h o u g h free from t h i s r e s t r i c t i o n , a r e m a l n o u r i s h e d and
h o m e l e s s . But t h i s r a n k i n g is intuitively i m p l a u s i b l e . O n e would be
r e l u c t a n t t o e m p l o y Rawls's a c c o u n t of social p r i m a r y g o o d s , with its
heavy e m p h a s i s o n civil a n d political f r e e d o m s , a s a g u i d e for choosing
"a society in w h i c h h i s e n e m y is to a s s i g n h i m h i s p l a c e . " O n e would be
r e l u c t a n t t o u s e t h i s a c c o u n t e v e n if o n e w e r e p e r s u a d e d t h a t persons
have h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s i n d e v e l o p i n g a n d e x e r c i s i n g their two
m o r a l p o w e r s . It is n o t c r e d i b l e t h a t in t h e U n i t e d States today the
lowest p r o s p e c t s for d e v e l o p i n g a n d e x e r c i s i n g t h e t w o m o r a l powers
w o u l d b e r a i s e d m o r e b y o v e r t u r n i n g t h e " p r o f o u n d l y d i s m a y i n g " (BLP
74-79) p r e c e d e n t of Buckley v. Valeo (in w h i c h t h e S u p r e m e Court
d e c l a r e d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v a r i o u s c o n g r e s s i o n a l l i m i t s o n election ex­
p e n d i t u r e s ) t h a n by i m p r o v e m e n t s in t h e diet, s h e l t e r , o r education of
28
the poorest citizens.

12. T h e P a c k a g e o f B a s i c R i g h t s a n d L i b e r t i e s

T h e p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n h a s r a i s e d v a r i o u s d o u b t s a b o u t Rawls s pre
s e n t a t i o n of " t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s a s t h e m a x i m i n s o l u t i o n to t h e p
r e s o n s e
l e m of social j u s t i c e " (TJ 152). I n o w d i s c u s s s o m e p o s s i b l e P h i m

Rawls's behalf, i n c l u d i n g p r o p o s a l s for r e v i s i o n s t h a t w o u l d h e l p ^

o s s i b U l t y
c o p e w i t h t h e difficulties. H e r e I d o n ' t a d d r e s s t h e P ° h o s

radical r e d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e original p o s i t i o n w i t h a r e t r a c t i o n , p e r ap>

of t h e m a x i m i n idea. Instead, I d i s c u s s f o u r m a i n s t r a t e g i e s for m
Rawls's p r o p o s a l attractive t o t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e original position
described. All four strategies h a v e a t least s o m e b a s i s i n Rawls s tex
2 S
O n e c o u l d r e s p o n d to t h i s criticism w i t h a n empirical claim, that t h e P ' ^ ' j ^ g n s ,
p o o r will not b e effectively a d d r e s s e d by t h e political p r o c e s s u n l e s s a n d until al e n c e

whatever their s o c i o e c o n o m i c position, h a v e a roughly e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y t o in ^

the o u t c o m e of political d e c i s i o n s . Buckley s t a n d s i n t h e w a y of p r e c i s e l y s
equalization of political influence. But this r e s p o n s e is n o t available to Rawls• His ^
m e n t for t h e priority of the basic liberties is b a s e d o n their intrinsic rather tnan 5
s r o
instrumental importance. His claim is that "the interests o f liberty . . . b e c o m e ' " £ , d o n

the c o n d i t i o n s for t h e exercise of t h e equal freedoms are m o r e fully realized. ^

s o m e point it b e c o m e s a n d t h e n remains irrational from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of t h e o " * ^
1
position to acknowledge a lesser liberty for t h e sake of greater material m ^ " * t n e
b l e 1
amenities of office" ITJ 542). Moreover, t h e s u g g e s t e d empirical c l a i m is u n a v a i l a u s

case of o t h e r infringements of t h e first principle. Removing a restriction o n religi ^

freedom, for example, will n o t improve t h e situation of t h o s e w h o s e p r o s p e c s ^
a
developing a n d exercising their t w o moral p o w e r s are b l o c k e d by severe P ^V^ . oav

removal w o u l d nevertheless, o n Rawls's a c c o u n t , have priority o v e r relieving their p

erty.
 T h e P a c k a g e of Basic Rights a n d Liberties, 12.1 135

Before I begin, let m e n o t e t h a t m o s t of t h e p r o b l e m s I have sketched

involve the a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s (serially ordered) to situa­
tions of injustice, t h a t is, t o s o c i a l s y s t e m s in w h i c h b o t h principles—
(§§11.3.1, 11.5.1-3)—or at l e a s t t h e second—(§11.2.1)—are n o t satis­
fied. And even t h e r e m a i n i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s — t h o u g h also relevant to the
ideal-theoretical q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e fully satisfying
Rawls's two p r i n c i p l e s w o u l d i n d e e d o p t i m i z e t h e worst share (as
intuitively a s s e s s e d i n t e r m s of social p r i m a r y g o o d s ) — b e c o m e m u c h
more pressing w h e n , b e c a u s e of v i o l a t i o n s of t h e s e c o n d principle,
social and e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t i e s a r e very great (§11.2.2) or basic social
and economic n e e d s a r e n o t m e t (§11.6.1). Rawls's p r o p o s a l w o u l d be a
great deal more p l a u s i b l e , t h o u g h also m u c h less interesting, if it did
not presume to p r o v i d e g u i d a n c e for t h e reform of unjust institutional
schemes.
W.l. One might in large p a r t s i m p l y d e n y t h e s e difficulties by assert­
ing a weaker version of t h e e m p i r i c a l claim s k e t c h e d in note 28. The
parties run n o risk b y a d o p t i n g t h e serial o r d e r i n g because efforts
toward satisfying t h e first p r i n c i p l e d o n o t , as a n empirical matter,
compete with efforts t o w a r d satisfying t h e s e c o n d . This assertion is
doubly implausible. It w o u l d s e e m q u i t e possible that the establish­
ment or s t r e n g t h e n i n g of s o m e b a s i c liberty for all participants or for
some group(s) c a n w o r s e n t h e w o r s t social position. One can readily
raagine or cite from h i s t o r y s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h major e c o n o m i c re­
forms toward t h e e r a d i c a t i o n of m a l n u t r i t i o n , illiteracy, a n d homeless-
ness and a fairer d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h generally are im­
peded or blocked by t h e m o r e affluent (whose interests w o u l d be
adversely affected b y t h e p r o j e c t e d reform) t h r o u g h their concerted use
ft the media a n d t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s a s g u a r a n t e e d by basic rights a n d
p i t i e s . Even a p a r t from t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n , it is quite conceivable that
™ establishment a n d s t r e n g t h e n i n g a n d t h e n t h e m a i n t e n a n c e a n d
effects p r o t e c t i o n of b a s i c liberties c a n divert political efforts a n d
res
ources from t h e t a s k of r e d u c i n g social a n d e c o n o m i c a e ­
rations. An effective s y s t e m of e q u a l b a s i c liberties is not cost free but
f
or p a r l i a m e n t s , a j u d i c i a r y , a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , police forces, a n d
mu
<J more. It s e e m s c l e a r t h a t t h e effective i m p r o v e m e n t of these
^ a n i s m s w o u l d g e n e r a l l y d e m a n d a different allocation of efforts
resources t h a n w o u l d b e r e q u i r e d t o i m p r o v e nutrition a n d basic
Ration for t h e p o o r , say. Given t h e s e eventualities, t h e parties m u s t

6 r t h e S 3 t l
m
^ b Sa s i c
t h a t t

s o c i a l
h e s e r i a J

a n d e c
°
o
r d e r i n

n o m i c
g ™ yi . A n d if t h e y take tthesen neeee id sasas
6
n e e
e n d a n g 6 r

3 8 t h e
no^f y ^ e s o m e of Rawls's b a s i c liberties, then t h e y w o u W
r a n k i n t h e m
W g ^wer o n t h e b a s i s of u n c e r t a i n empirical as
"rophons.za
B ent
"«2i? T i s
a n a l o g o u s t o o n e Rawls e , h e i r t oe ds h mo w that the> parties w o u l d not
t h i s c a sgives
^ ? o f ^
S 0 f s o c
e
, P r
P i n c i l e

f <" would lead ^ ° rttn?thTs

' a l interests a n d t h e y w o u l d b e authorizing its restnction it tm
136 T h e Package of Basic Rights a n d Liberties, 12.2

12.2. T h e failure of t h i s e m p i r i c a l l y b a s e d d e n i a l s u g g e s t s the first

strategy: restrict t h e serial o r d e r i n g t o i d e a l t h e o r y , t h a t is, jettison the
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n priority of t h e first p r i n c i p l e w h i l e reaffirming its de­
sign priority. I n d e e d , Rawls says o n c e t h a t " t h e p r i n c i p l e s a n d their
lexical o r d e r w e r e n o t a c k n o w l e d g e d w i t h [ n o n i d e a l ] situations in
m i n d a n d s o it is p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e y n o l o n g e r h o l d " (TJ 245). Consider
also h o w Rawls rejects t h e i d e a t h a t t h e first p r i n c i p l e should be
a m e n d e d b y t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t all p a r t i c i p a n t s m u s t h a v e a certain
a b s o l u t e m i n i m u m of social a n d e c o n o m i c benefits ( e n s u r i n g that their
b a s i c social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s a r e m e t ) : ' W h a t e v e r t h e merits of this
suggestion, it is s u p e r f l u o u s in view of t h e difference p r i n c i p l e . For any
fraction of t h e i n d e x of p r i m a r y g o o d s e n j o y e d b y t h e least advantaged
c a n a l r e a d y b e r e g a r d e d in t h i s m a n n e r " (BLP 44). Clearly, this argu­
m e n t c a n b e r e a s s u r i n g only in r e g a r d t o t h e d e s i g n p r i o r i t y of the first
principle.
But t h e s e p a s s a g e s are d r o w n e d o u t b y c o u n t e r v a i l i n g evidence. That
t h e p a r t i e s a d o p t a priority r u l e g o v e r n i n g w h a t c o n d i t i o n s justify
u n e q u a l basic liberties (TJ §37, §39, 302) s h o w s t h a t t h e y d o deliberate
30
a b o u t n o n i d e a l s i t u a t i o n s as w e l l . Moreover, Rawls d o e s n o t merely
seek t o c o n s t r u c t t h e ideal of a perfectly j u s t w e l l - o r d e r e d society and
t h e n h a v e u s u s e i n t u i t i o n a n d i n s t r u m e n t a l r a t i o n a l i t y for muddling
t h r o u g h t o w a r d this ideal. He r e i t e r a t e s a g a i n a n d a g a i n t h a t his con­
c e p t i o n of justice is to g u i d e t h e c o u r s e of social c h a n g e (TJ 520,263) and
t h a t a crucial feature e n a b l i n g it t o d o this is t h e serial o r d e r i n g of the
t w o p r i n c i p l e s (TJ 43, 244, 246, 303; BLP 11 et p a s s i m ) . Of c o u r s e , Rawls
m a y still c h o o s e to limit h i s a m b i t i o n s , b u t t h i s l i m i t a t i o n w o u l d consti­
t u t e a devastating loss of practical political r e l e v a n c e for h i s theory.
N o w it c a n h a r d l y b e k e p t s e c r e t from t h e p a r t i e s t h a t t h e serial
o r d e r i n g of t h e two p r i n c i p l e s is t o b e relevant t o d e t e r m i n i n g which
injustices " n e e d t o b e dealt w i t h first" (TJ 303). If it w e r e , t h e n the
original p o s i t i o n w o u l d b e of n o u s e in justifying fo us (in o u r nonideal
social w o r l d ) t h a t w e s h o u l d give p r e c e d e n c e t o t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of
Rawls's first p r i n c i p l e . T h u s Rawls m u s t s h o w t h a t t h e p a r t i e s would
find t h e serial o r d e r i n g c o n v i n c i n g o n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t it is to be
a p p l i e d i n n o n i d e a l c o n t e x t s a s well. T h e serial o r d e r i n g m u s t lead to a
plausible ranking of less-than-just r e g i m e s a n d t o p l a u s i b l e political
priorities for c a s e s in w h i c h t h e p r i n c i p l e s a r e n o t satisfied (with plau­
sibility b o t h times u n d e r s t o o d by reference t o t h e p a r t i e s ' c o n c e r n for
t h e worst ex post lifetime s h a r e s ) . « A n d t h i s is i n fact a crucial test

Sati sfaction
W ^ ' m tfS^SV"*, , °f c
° " r * e , » w e have s e e n , a utilitarian may try to
K a n t a ^ e ™ r ?T eS° ^ f

h
, h a t w h e n r o
P P y carried o u t t h e computatton e r l

UomTZLrTZuT rZ 6
l i m i t a ( i o n s
^ least u n d e r reasonably favorable cond.-
,^u
>

w L L l ^ P a r t i e s
P ^ u a d e d of this, t h e y m i g h t as vveU
w e r e

^ ^ d S l K ^ T S , r a
'« h t w a
y ^ a d o p t i n g the p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l liberty' (TJ 207).

t h e l n t^ration of n
!a
i n d i C a e s h o w R a
w l s g o e s w r o n g w h e n h e rejects a s superfluous
.ncorporat.on of a soma) m t n i m u m i n t o the first principle. S u c h an additional
 T h e P a c k a g e of Basic Rights a n d Liberties, 12.3 137

because the serial o r d e r i n g is of c o m p a r a t i v e l y m i n o r significance in

the (moreover r a t h e r t h e o r e t i c a l ) event t h a t all principles or all b u t o n e
are fully satisfied.
12.3. If the difficulties c o n f r o n t i n g t h e serial o r d e r i n g of t h e t w o
principles c a n n o t b e p l a u s i b l y d e n i e d o r evaded, w e a r e r e d u c e d to
finding ways of c o p i n g w i t h t h e m . In t w o m i n o r c a s e s there are rela­
tively straightforward s o l u t i o n s . T h e p r o b l e m set forth in §11.2.2 can be
resolved through a m i n o r m o d i f i c a t i o n . W h e n conflicting specifications
of the basic liberties w o u l d b e p r e f e r a b l e from t h e points of view of
different socioeconomic c l a s s e s , s o t h a t t h e p o s i t i o n of the representa­
tive equal citizen i s ill d e f i n e d a n d c a n n o t a d j u d i c a t e h o w the basic
liberties should b e m a d e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h o n e a n o t h e r , t h e n this ad­
judication s h o u l d b e u n d e r t a k e n from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of t h e lowest
socioeconomic class.
The problems n o t e d i n §11.2.1 a n d §11.3.1 c a n likewise b e resolved
through a modification. R a t h e r t h a n v i e w i n g a n y citizen as occupying
two social p o s i t i o n s ( o n e w i t h i n e a c h of t h e t w o p a r t s of t h e basic
structure), we c a n r e g a r d e a c h c i t i z e n a s having just o n e overall share,
jvfoch is defined b y r e f e r e n c e t o both p r i n c i p l e s of justice. Here t h e
'east advantaged a r e s i n g l e d o u t b y first identifying those with t h e
worst first-principle s c o r e s . S h o u l d t h i s g r o u p i n c l u d e everyone o r n o
°ne or be otherwise t o o l a r g e o r t o o small t o qualify as a representative
SNup in Rawls's s e n s e , t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e is b r o u g h t in as a second-
j y criterion. O n c e t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e g r o u p of t h e least advantaged has
Unidentified i n this w a y , its m e m b e r s ' first-principle scores a n d their
^ond-principle s c o r e s c a n b e a g g r e g a t e d so as to d e t e r m i n e t h e worst
32
"Pvsentative s h a r e (cf. § 1 7 . 5 ) . T h e task of institutional reform is then
10
raise this w o r s t social p o s i t i o n if p o s s i b l e . H e r e improving the repre-
^ntative first-principle s c o r e of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d takes p n o n t y over
^proving their r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s e c o n d - p r i n c i p l e score, w h i c h in t u r n
e
^ s priority over i m p r o v i n g e v e n t h e representative first-principle
of more a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p s . T h u s , u n d e r s t o o d as implementa-
J * Priorities, t h e p r i o r i t y c o n c e r n for t h e least advantaged overrides
£ lexical priority of t h e first p r i n c i p l e , if t h e s e t w o priorities should
n n i d e a l c o n
m„H« ° t e x t s b e i n c o m p e t i t i o n for scarce resources^This
^ c a t i o n leaves i n t a c t t h e lexical design priority of t h e first over the

8 0 8
P r i o r i ^ " " ^ d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r h i s c o n c e p t i o n of fushce ass.gns * n V

™S??X , h e p o l i t i c a l t a s k o f m e e t i n
s b a s i c s o c i a l a n d e c

e
*rhis «i? 0
t a s k

C
o f
e x p a n d i n g effective legal freedom.
a n W o r k o n J
—tended to the
t h e i d e a f
* tef t P y * ° representative C i b l S case of
t h U t n i s 1
•wEE?• ' ° ^ e x t e n s i o n m a y b e s o m e w h a t WP*™* ™™ , dious, s o e

h^Jed me t0 ,. . §io.6). It w o u l d _be e v e s o t ^ ^ ^

ZSSaSy, q u a l i t i e s i n fire principle

t w o k i n d s of first-principle W ^ ' ^ S r Rawls's view

t r e a t t h e s e
g o o d s ( c f

* * i s m°T U S e t h e i d e a
of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e g r o u p s a c r o s s the b w f - « - o l i t y |TJ
w a n t s t o
*w,t ? evaluate i n e q u a l i t i e s in first-pnnc.ple g o o d s b y r e
a o r
' t h e w o r s t representative share.
138 T h e Package of Basic Rights a n d Liberties, 12.4

s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e . W e c a n n e v e r i m p r o v e o u r i d e a l of a perfectly just
b a s i c s t r u c t u r e b y allowing a b r i d g m e n t s of first-principle goods for the
sake of raising s e c o n d - p r i n c i p l e s c o r e s . Ideally, all participants must
have a fully a d e q u a t e p a c k a g e of b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties.
T h e s e modifications still leave t h e i m p o r t a n t w o r r y that the serial
o r d e r i n g m a y l e a d t o a misidentification of t h e least advantaged (by
being t o o c o n c e r n e d w i t h w h e t h e r p e r s o n s h a v e effective legal freedom
r a t h e r t h a n w i t h w h e t h e r t h e i r b a s i c social a n d e c o n o m i c needs are
met) o r m a y d e m a n d too m u c h a t t e n t i o n t o t h e establishment and
p r o t e c t i o n of t h e i r b a s i c liberties at t h e e x p e n s e of t h e i r basic social and
e c o n o m i c n e e d s (§§11.3.1 a n d 11.5.1-3). W e c a n u n d e r s t a n d the re­
m a i n i n g t h r e e strategies as a d d r e s s i n g t h i s w o r r y .
1 2 . 4 . T h e s e c o n d strategy c o n s i s t s i n p u n c t u r i n g , t o s o m e extent, the
s h a r p "distinction b e t w e e n f u n d a m e n t a l rights a n d liberties and eco­
n o m i c a n d social benefits" t h a t Rawls h a d i n t r o d u c e d "to exploit.. an
33
i m p o r t a n t division in t h e social s y s t e m " (TJ 6 3 ) . T h i s is done by
specifying t h e first p r i n c i p l e s o t h a t it forbids r a d i c a l social a n d eco­
34
n o m i c inequalities (avoidably involving e x t r e m e p o v e r t y ) . Here we can
d r a w u p o n a s o c i o e c o n o m i c p r o v i s i o n t h a t is a l r e a d y p a r t of the first
principle, namely, t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e fair value of the basic
political liberties b e p r o t e c t e d : " T h e w o r t h of t h e p o l i t i c a l liberties to all
citizens, w h a t e v e r t h e i r social o r e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n , m u s t b e approx­
imately equal, or at least sufficiently e q u a l , i n t h e s e n s e t h a t everyone
h a s a fair o p p o r t u n i t y t o h o l d p u b l i c office a n d t o i n f l u e n c e the out­
c o m e of political d e c i s i o n s " (BLP 42), o r s o m e w h a t less vague, "those
similarly e n d o w e d a n d m o t i v a t e d s h o u l d h a v e r o u g h l y the same

" R a w l s wants the differentiation into two principles t o reflect three distinct divides^
division in the social system, as thefirstprinciple governs its civil and political, the
second its social and economic aspects; a different order of importance, as the need for
first-principle goods is ranked lexically above the need for social and economic benefits:
and a distinction m kind, as thefirstprinciple requires certain specific protections while
the second merely demands that representative socioeconomic shares be related in
certain ways. It would be a remarkable coincidence indeed, if these three divides were to
coincide as perfectly as Rawls wants.
6 h a V U r g e d a s m
n , ™ ^ I"**? ! ideal-theory revision that certain socioeconomic
e l e V a t e <
th^nX , ? h S
V° t
(perhaps as 'welfarerights').But in idea!
h e
«™t Principle
a m e n d m e t
,nle« ^ " *s indeed superfluous for the reason Rawls gives (BLP 44
cotZnT ,'
selevTZ^rl
a
c * h , s

^ u
u
s e m i C O n s e t
r n for the sake of a fully consequential*'
U
u e n , i a J i s

P °o. "°t always recognized as such, is endorsed h3 re udiati

M , c h a e l m a n fi d
conselanvl-nH r " s * unacceptable that t h e parties "are extremel>
gW t h h e risk,hat t n e
v e t Tn^ " ' C1 socially
0miCgenerated basVcstructure will define
luT aZlZ?» °TT
n P° . but not especially conservative a s i t i o n s

C ^ m a n n mlu?h? ^ " " P ™ " ' * *vill be very expensive to overcome" ICWR 339
r a U O n a l fori
ri k ™ o d e r l , l ^ ' ndividuals in the original position to accept the
S

t urtZ 1
will T m P aPateM« in exchange for the certainty that their health
m C O m e r o s

ame,^^^lr ™ *™ < outrageous cost to society" I L E 127). Th

S
bu

a£Z£
fi
RawU !
f CUS s h a r e s e n t e r i n g h e r e has an entirely different
t h a t 1 a m

merXen?^?'
h£^V£TZ£££
° °" °
P*™VthB goods i s retained, and the
Priority of «he
a , , e m P t
o i s o c i a l

l
 T h e P a c k a g e of Basic Rights a n d Liberties, 12.5 133

chance of attaining p o s i t i o n s o f political a u t h o r i t y irrespective of their

economic a n d social c l a s s " (TJ 225). In A Theory of Justice Rawls takes
this requirement t o e n t a i l t h a t " t h e r e i s a m a x i m u m gain p e r m i t t e d to
the most favored o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t , even if t h e difference princi­
ple would allow it, t h e r e w o u l d b e u n j u s t effects o n t h e political system
and the like e x c l u d e d b y t h e p r i o r i t y of liberty" (TJ 81). "Disparities in
the distribution of p r o p e r t y a n d w e a l t h t h a t far e x c e e d w h a t is compat­
ible with political e q u a l i t y h a v e g e n e r a l l y b e e n t o l e r a t e d by t h e political
system" (TJ 226, cf. 225, 277, 279; BSS 6 5 - 6 6 ; PFE 5).
By incorporating a l i m i t a t i o n o n e c o n o m i c inequalities into his first
principle, Rawls c o u l d r e a s s u r e t h e p a r t i e s that by accepting t h e pro­
posed priority of t h e first o v e r t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e t h e y w o u l d not r u n
a serious risk t h a t m e e t i n g b a s i c social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s will in
nonideal contexts t a k e s e c o n d p l a c e t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of basic
liberties (which c o u l d h a r d l y b e e n j o y e d b y t h o s e w h o s e basic n e e d s
remain unmet). Rawls's l a t e s t w r i t i n g s s e e m t o close t h e d o o r o n this
strategy, however. T h e y e n v i s i o n t h a t t h e fair value of t h e basic political
liberties be p r o t e c t e d t h r o u g h t h e " p u b l i c financing of political cam­
paigns and election e x p e n d i t u r e s , v a r i o u s limits o n contributions and
other regulations" (BLP 73, cf. 4 2 - 4 3 ) . S i m u l t a n e o u s l y Rawls explicitly
rejects, as we h a v e s e e n , t h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n of a social m i n i m u m into the
™ Principle (BLP 44). T h e r e s u l t i n g n a r r o w interpretation of t h e first
Principle fails t o give t h e p a r t i e s a n y a s s u r a n c e that w h e n the differ­
ence principle is not satisfied, m e e t i n g basic social a n d economic
needs won't b e d e f e r r e d for t h e s a k e of (efforts toward) establishing
basic civil a n d political l i b e r t i e s .
. l * S . A third s t r a t e g y for a d d r e s s i n g t h e r e m a i n i n g problems ot & n
jw*es the proviso t h a t t h e serial o r d e r i n g applies only in "reasonably
*orabl c o n d i t i o n s " (BLP 11) Rawls w r i t e s t h a t t h e lexical priority ot
e

7; basic rights a n d l i b e r t i e s m a y n o t a p p l y " w h e n social conditions do

not allow the effective e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e s e rights" (TJ 152,542).* And

3 W l s
alW . h * ' £ " W " *
t h e serial ordering applies only w h e n social! condilions
J the e f f e c t i v e

a r e
es
n e f f 6 C t m a k i n
f ablishment Hberties: ' ' I n ' W X
o f t h e b a s i c rf h
e
t s a n d

,' 8 P a s
a s s u m p t i o n in the original e c i a l
p ^ J ™
a d
that t h e c o n d i t i o n s of their society, whatever they are, ™ < <
^ r e a l i z a tUii do n of t h e e q u a l liberties" (TJ 152). But h e ^ ^ " ^ e t S
Semin 7 T
m a k e
« ™ p l e t e l y o b s o l e t e t h e first priority rule attached to Je spe
C S f
h
° 3

n S
-
3 X 6 f a v
2 )
^
-Seed.Raw.s a d d s in t h e G e n n a n t r a n s l a h o n ^ » ^ t e s

*« most , ? ° ° r a b l e e n o u g h s o that t h e priority of the firs.• P ™ f £ »

^ K ^ ™ « n d s h o w s t h e w a y to a social state <n whichaM basic n
r e a l i 2 e c r ( T G
'W^r ™ > m y translation). Let m e , then, propose the s e d . s t m t
y/aVoraWeo r
^Cn, u 0 6e f f e
halfway favorable,
depending ° n . !™ are not w n e t h
a n e s t h a t

- C a t T , r a<
W*e vW
e lh ya te s t a b l i s h e d for all. Unfavorable c o n d . h o n s » « o n e s ^
""tditiZ, °
l f }
H a w l s l e a v e s
^ p l e t e l y vague how h ™
h^.^Sion
rf | h e
t ob e
S**rd d i s t i n g u i s h e d from unfavorable ones, i * , to the
S P e C i a l c o n
, c e p t i o n s are t o b e d e l i m i t e d (cf. t h e quoted add.t.o
140 T h e P a c k a g e of Basic Rights a n d Liberties, 12.5

h e c a n t h e n reject a s irrelevant a n y i m p l a u s i b l e i m p l i c a t i o n s his serial

ordering might have u n d e r unfavorable c o n d i t i o n s .
But t h e difficulties arise e v e n i n t r u l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s in which
t h e b a s i c liberties c a n b e effectively e s t a b l i s h e d for all. A social system
u n d e r t r u l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s is p r e s u m a b l y a d v a n c e d e n o u g h eco­
nomically to render feasible e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s u n d e r which the
m o s t u r g e n t n e e d s a r e m e t , b u t t h e feasibility of s u c h institutions
h a r d l y entails t h e i r e x i s t e n c e . T h o s e in t h e w o r s t s o c i o e c o n o m i c posi­
t i o n m a y in fact b e m a l n o u r i s h e d , illiterate, a n d d e s t i t u t e . It is not at all
clear w h y t h e p a r t i e s s h o u l d d e m a n d t h a t i n s u c h s i t u a t i o n s political
efforts a n d social r e s o u r c e s b e d e v o t e d to t h e effective establishment of
t h e basic liberties even t h o u g h t h e p o o r w o u l d largely b e u n a b l e to take
advantage of t h e m . H. L. A. Hart h a s r a i s e d t h i s p r o b l e m in a clear
36
f o r m . But in h i s r e s p o n s e t o Hart, Rawls m e r e l y reiterates without
c o m m e n t t h a t r e a s o n a b l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s i n c l u d e "circumstances
w h i c h , p r o v i d e d t h e political will exists, permit t h e effective establish­
m e n t a n d t h e full exercise of t h e s e l i b e r t i e s " (BLP 11, m y emphasis).
Given this definition, it is i n d e e d " e v i d e n t " (BLP 11) t h a t reasonably
favorable c o n d i t i o n s o b t a i n i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o d a y . T h e hypothesis
t h a t if t h e U n i t e d States h a d a j u s t e c o n o m y t h e n all c o u l d fully exercise
t h e i r basic liberties suffices t o trigger t h e serial o r d e r i n g , regardless of
t h e extent t o w h i c h t h e real existing p o o r c a n i n fact take advantage of
t h e i r b a s i c liberties.
Curiously, w h e n Rawls actually tries to s u b s t a n t i a t e t h e parties' be­
lief t h a t o n c e c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s o b t a i n t h e i n t e r e s t in t h e b a s i c liberties
n e
is p r e e m i n e n t a n d t h e s p e c i a l c o n c e p t i o n s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e apply.
suggests a quite different definition of " r e a s o n a b l y favorable condi­
tions." "As t h e general level of w e l l - b e i n g rises (as i n d i c a t e d by the
i n d e x of p r i m a r y g o o d s t h e less favored c a n expect) o n l y t h e less urgent
w a n t s r e m a i n t o b e m e t " (TJ 542). "Until t h e b a s i c w a n t s of individuals
c a n be fulfilled, t h e relative u r g e n c y of t h e i r i n t e r e s t in liberty c a n n o t be
firmly d e c i d e d in a d v a n c e . It will d e p e n d o n t h e c l a i m s of the least
favored a s s e e n from t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d legislative s t a g e s " (TJ 543).
D e s p i t e t h e "can be," it s e e m s t h a t Rawls is h e r e c o n c e r n e d with the
actually least a d v a n t a g e d , t h e r e b y s u g g e s t i n g a different i n t e r p l a y be­
t w e e n t h e general a n d special c o n c e p t i o n s t h a t is m u c h m o r e conge­
nial to t h e p a r t i e s ' m a x i m i n c o n c e r n . T h e s p e c i a l c o n c e p t i o n comes
i n t o play only w h e n t h o s e in t h e w o r s t actual s o c i o e c o n o m i c position
c a n exercise basic liberties, a n d t h u s a r e sufficiently well-off rationally
t o value s u c h liberties above f u r t h e r a d v a n c e s i n t h e i r m a t e r i a l weU-
n e m g . O h e r w i s e , t h e general c o n c e p t i o n a p p l i e s , d e m a n d i n g that ba­
sic social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s b e m e t s o a s t o g u i d e social p r o g r e s s to
t h e po.nt w h e r e t h e special c o n c e p t i o n c a n t a k e over. H a d Rawls

" H a n , RU» 249 n. 13.

 T h e P a c k a g e of Basic Rights a n d Liberties, 12.6 141

adopted this w a y of d e l i m i t i n g t h e d o m a i n s of t h e general a n d the

special conceptions, t h e s e r i a l o r d e r i n g in t h e latter w o u l d have been
much more plausible as p a r t of a m a x i m i n criterion, t h o u g h it w o u l d
then be quite u n c e r t a i n , r a t h e r t h a n " e v i d e n t . . . , that in o u r country
today reasonably favorable c o n d i t i o n s d o o b t a i n " (BLP 11). This uncer­
tainty in turn w o u l d o n c e a g a i n frustrate Rawls's h o p e that his theory
can provide definite p o l i t i c a l g u i d a n c e for institutional reform u n d e r
existing conditions.
12.6. Rawls h a s y e t a f o u r t h s t r a t e g y for d e a l i n g w i t h t h e remaining
problems, which involves a p a r t i t i o n i n g of h i s project. His m a i n goal for
now is to s h o w t h a t t h e p a r t i e s in t h e original p o s i t i o n w o u l d prefer his
proposal (with t h e serial o r d e r i n g ) o v e r " t h e first principles associated
with the traditional d o c t r i n e s of u t i l i t a r i a n i s m , w i t h perfectionism, or
with intuitionism" (BLP 6). By c o n c e n t r a t i n g u p o n this "initial aim" of
Justice as fairness (BLP 6 - 8 ) , Rawls leaves r o o m for his "doubt . . that
the principles of j u s t i c e (as I h a v e d e f i n e d t h e m ) will b e t h e preferred
conception on a n y t h i n g r e s e m b l i n g a c o m p l e t e list" (TJ 581). He there­
by retracts his c l a i m t o b e p r e s e n t i n g the m a x i m i n solution to the
Problem of social j u s t i c e .
°"e might t h i n k t h a t s u c h m o d e s t y is uncalled-for. Rawls could
easily vindicate h i s c l a i m t o b e p r e s e n t i n g t h e maximin solution by
abandoning t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s a n d p r o p o s i n g t h a t t h e general c o n c e p -
bon (or some even less s p e c i f i c m a x i m i n criterion) b e applied across
the board, irrespective of s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s . Yet b y leaving o p e n h o w the
!J*nous social p r i m a r y g o o d s a r e t o b e w e i g h t e d vis-a-vis one another,
m e
general c o n c e p t i o n gives v e r y little g u i d a n c e for its own application
thus avoids t h e difficulties a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e special conception
° 7 a
the price of i m p o s i n g significant risks of a n o t h e r sort. Seeking to
t

^ g u a r d the i n t e r e s t s of t h o s e t h e y r e p r e s e n t in a definite a n d clear­

- w a y , the p a r t i e s w o u l d prefer a d e t a i l e d a n d specific c n t e n o n ot
J f c e . But given t h e vast r a n g e of s u b t l y varying potential proposals ot
^ a p p r o p r i a t e specificity, it m u s t b e e x t r e m e l y difficult (if not impos-
to identify p r e c i s e l y the m o s t r a t i o n a l c h o i c e in t h e original
s
P? *on as d e s c r i b e d . It m a y t h e n b e r e a s o n a b l e to aim first for a
P^Posal that b e a t s t h e t r a d i t i o n a l criteria of justice, while deferring the
p w h e t h e r t h i s p r o p o s a l c a n itself b e s u r p a s s e d .
S t l o n

does Rawls a c h i e v e e v e n h i s "initial aim"? Relying on t h e max-

J ? ruJe the p a r t i e s w o u l d f o c u s o n t h e w o r s t social p o s i t i o r u n d e r
J * of the various a l t e r n a t i v e p r o p o s a l s . Yet a l t h o u g h Rawls discusses
'fength the w o r s t o u t c o m e s p o s s i b l e u n d e r « m i p e t a « ^ P ^ £
3 f j n J criteria, a s i m i l a r s c r u t i n y of h i s o w n criterion is J * u * ^
e x a m i n e d , for e x a m p l e , t h e possibility of a n u n d e r c ^ s of
e r s
W P ° n s living i n a s o c i e t y t h a t is econonncally advanced
to bring i n t o p l a y t h e serial o r d e r i n g of t h e t w o P ^ P ^ ™
0 1 , 8
^ n t e x t Rawls's c r i t e r i o n w o u l d d e m a n d t h a t political efforts a n a
142 T h e Package of Basic Rights a n d Liberties, 12.7

social r e s o u r c e s b e d e v o t e d t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a fully adequate

37
s c h e m e of b a s i c civil a n d political l i b e r t i e s . B u t p r o g r e s s in this direc­
tion w o u l d n o t s u b s t a n t i a l l y b e t t e r t h e p o s i t i o n of t h o s e in the under­
class, for w h o m i m p r o v e m e n t s in b a s i c liberties a r e of little worth. They
w o u l d h a v e t o w a t c h g a i n s i n t h e p o s i t i o n s of t h o s e already much
b e t t e r p l a c e d (who, u n l i k e t h e m s e l v e s , c a n t a k e a d v a n t a g e of increasing
b a s i c liberties), w h i l e b e i n g a w a r e t h a t t h e i r o w n b a s i c social and
e c o n o m i c n e e d s will take c e n t e r s t a g e o n l y after t h e first principle has
b e e n fully satisfied.
T h e likelihood of t h i s s c e n a r i o is n o t a s c e r t a i n a b l e a n d h e n c e irrele­
vant for t h e p a r t i e s , b u t let m e a d d a n y w a y t h a t t h e s c e n a r i o is by no
m e a n s far-fetched. Rawls a p p a r e n t l y believes t h a t it obtains in the
United States t o d a y . He says t h a t "for u s t h e p r i o r i t y of the basic
liberties is r e q u i r e d " (BLP 11) a n d i m p l i e s t h a t t h e first p r i n c i p l e is not
satisfied: "In o u r society p a r t of t h e political t a s k is to h e l p fashion
t h e political will" for t h e effective e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e b a s i c liberties
(BLP 11, cf. 75-79). Rawls d o e s n o t a t t e m p t t o give a n y t h i n g like an
e x h a u s t i v e s t a t e m e n t of w h a t r e m a i n s t o b e d o n e t o w a r d satisfying his
first p r i n c i p l e . But I a s s u m e h e w o u l d h a v e t o c o n c e d e that such
reforms are likely to d e m a n d a different a l l o c a t i o n of political efforts
a n d social r e s o u r c e s t h a n w o u l d b e d e m a n d e d for t h e attempt to
i m p r o v e t h e w o r s t s o c i o e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n ( o c c u p i e d , p e r h a p s , by wel­
fare r e c i p i e n t s , t h e u n e m p l o y e d , a n d t h o s e e v e n m o r e disadvantaged).
T h e w o r s t - c a s e s c e n a r i o for Rawls's c r i t e r i o n is very bleak—quite
significant d e a t h r a t e s in t h e u n d e r c l a s s from m a l n u t r i t i o n , trivial dis­
eases, o r lack of h e a t i n g fuels a r e n o t r u l e d o u t . T h e w o r s t - c a s e scenario
for t h e p r i n c i p l e of utility is very bleak a s w e l l — p o l i t i c a l o p p o n e n t s and
h a t e d m i n o r i t i e s m a y h a v e t o b e p e r s e c u t e d , e v e n e r a d i c a t e d , for the
sake of achieving a n d m a i n t a i n i n g a u t i l i t y - m a x i m i z i n g society. It is
3 8
possible that Rawls c o u l d still find w a y s of a c h i e v i n g h i s initial a i m
But t h i s a c h i e v e m e n t is sufficiently difficult a n d d o u b t f u l t o motivate
t h e a t t e m p t t o i m p r o v e u p o n Rawls's list of b a s i c liberties even now, m
t h e h o p e of achieving t h e initial a i m i n a c l e a r a n d c o n v i n c i n g manner.
12.7. This t h o u g h t favors a r e s u s c i t a t i o n of t h e s e c o n d strategy,
w i n c h a l o n e r e s c u e s w h a t Rawls clearly c o n s i d e r s h i g h l y desirable,
n a m e l y t h e practical political i m p o r t a n c e of h i s s p e c i a l conception,
h eP maty
im3Sn^W^ - '
Pte iS
" C r i t e r i o n
identifying t h e least advantaged, and f o r

t h e
, ^ t - p n n c l e score of this g r o u p h a s s u p r e m e priority. H e n c e ,
l p

U r C e S b e d e V O t e d t o m e e t i n b a s i c so
politic*
onlv f n s r f a r ^ l ° ^ « <=ial and e c o n o m i c need
^Zw^cTTm, RLP251 ^ 1 0 E
° X P a n d e f f e C U V e l 6 6 a J f r e e d m S d e m a n d

the^omS ofTot' ^ T ^ ' 6 t h a t tf h i s

of j u s t i c e is c o n s i s t e n t l y followed conception
mtataZr ^SLET£ take c e n t e r stage a n d reduced to the feas.ble be
nn P e
peZ-u^dT^ni.l £ K ' e
°/ u t U
* «i m i h
d e m a n d that c e r t a i n minorities t
be
heTwtt! b e . S S M e m b e r S
° f t h e
""derelass can die with the consolation tha
^ K i i S ! 6 m e P
° V e r 1 y
° f , h e s o r t
e x p e r i e n c e d will n o longer , h e v

.2 mX a l S e p e r e 6 C U t e d n
™ ° " » < * have n o a n a l o g o u s a s s u r a n c e . Would
 T h e P a c k a g e of Basic Rights a n d Liberties, 12.7 143

involving the design a n d implementation priorities of t h e first principle,

which is so m u c h m o r e d e f i n i t e in its d e m a n d s t h a n t h e general
conception. This s t r a t e g y p r e s e r v e s t h e j u d g m e n t t h a t t h e special con­
ception is widely a p p l i c a b l e t o d a y , r e q u i r i n g t h a t efforts a n d resources
be allocated to satisfying t h e first p r i n c i p l e even at t h e expense of
satisfying the s e c o n d . It s e e k s t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e plausibility of this
priority by i n c l u d i n g w i t h i n t h e first p r i n c i p l e t h e requirement that
basic social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s m u s t b e m e t .
This first-principle social m i n i m u m is b e s t justified, I believe, by
showing basic social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s to b e entailed by, or by
stipulating t h e m as o n a p a r w i t h , t h e h i g h e s t - o r d e r interests. Rawls
would presumably p r e f e r t h e f o r m e r k i n d of justification. One might
formulate the a m e n d m e n t a s g u a r a n t e e i n g t o everyone a b u n d l e of
social and e c o n o m i c b e n e f i t s t h a t is sufficient for normal persons
iwhose physical a n d m e n t a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s fall w i t h i n t h e normal range)
io develop a n d e x e r c i s e t h e i r t w o m o r a l p o w e r s a n d to b e "normally
active and fully c o o p e r a t i n g m e m b e r s of society over a complete life"
'SUPG 168; cf. BLP 85). T h i s f o r m u l a t i o n allows for variation in basic
social and e c o n o m i c n e e d s w i t h age. Infants a n d t h e aged need more
c
are, children m o r e e d u c a t i o n , a d o l e s c e n t s m o r e food, a n d so forth.
True to Rawls's s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m , t h e formulation is based o n o u r
standard n e e d s a s h u m a n p a r t i c i p a n t s in a given social system It
assumes that all p a r t i c i p a n t s h a v e t h e s a m e n e e d s over a complete lite
and thereby p r e s e r v e s t h e a d v a n t a g e for stability that I u s e d earlier to
explain why Rawls b a s e s h i s a c c o u n t of social p r i m a r y goods u p o n the
%ulation of common h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s r a t h e r t h a n u p o n the
V a n o u s
interests p e r s o n s h a v e i n virtue of t h e i r diverse needs, endow-
me
nts, preferences, o r c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e g o o d .
fhus, leaving a s i d e i n t e r p e r s o n a l differences in basic social a n a
g n o m i c n e e d s b e c o m e s m o r e p l a u s i b l e w h e n — a s in Raw s s worK
^ r e l e v a n t b u n d l e of s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c benefits is defined ab-
fractly in terms of social primary g o o d s s u c h as i n c o m e (rather t h a n m
of rice, linen, etc.). T h e first p r i n c i p l e w o u l d t h e n reqmre t h a t a n
^ t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s h o u l d , if feasible, g u a r a n t e e to every participant
^ficient s o c i o e c o n o m i c g o o d s for m e e t i n g t h e basic socud a n d eco-
1 needs of n o r m a l h u m a n p e r s o n participating in the: relevant
r^
a

a s t e r n . W h e n n o r m a l p e r s o n s differ, this m i n i m u m - t h e same

^ 7 * defined s o t h a t it suffices for t h e greater n e e d s (withinHflw
Jmal rangej.39 T refer t e c o n o m i c n e e d s , so defined,
o b a s i c s o c i a l
38
^standard basic socioeconomic needs within s o m e social system.

1 m u m
" «feL^ m u s t t h e n b e sufficient t o cover t h e greater ^ ^ " ^ c

^theZT*^ ^ n ' ^ e r m e t a b o l i c rates o r p r e g n a n c y (cf. Sen,™™ d m ^ w l s ' s

«*SZer C l Q t h i n
8 n e « t s of t h e tall, for e x a m p l e . In defending a n d
*hetC^UeDtialism ' h e r e 1 a m n
d i s p u t i n g Sen's point that w n o t
^
d a r d ) D a s i c n e
"^S ^ " d s are actually m e t , w e d o to rely ° n
* N u t r i t i o n , a n d illiteracy rather t h a n o n i n c o m e data (cf. Sen,
144 T h e Package of Basic Rights a n d Liberties, 12.8

W h a t t h e s e s t a n d a r d b a s i c s o c i o e c o n o m i c n e e d s a r e is in large part
straightforward. H u m a n b e i n g s n e e d f o o d a n d drink, clothing and
shelter, a s well a s s o m e i n t e r a c t i o n i n c l u d i n g e d u c a t i o n a n d care (for
40
e x a m p l e , in c h i l d h o o d a n d o l d a g e ) . H e n c e it is r a t i o n a l in their behalf
t o r e q u i r e of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e t h a t it a s s u r e its participants that
t h e y c a n m e e t t h e s e n e e d s . I n m o r e t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i e t i e s this require­
m e n t m i g h t b e s t b e satisfied t h r o u g h a s o l i d a r i s t i c family o r kinship
s t r u c t u r e c o u p l e d w i t h s o m e f o r m of o r g a n i z e d c h a r i t y . In modern
societies effective legal rights w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y b e necessary, but
t h e s e n e e d figure o n l y a s a last r e s o r t . Basic s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c needs
c a n b e m e t w i t h o u t a n e l a b o r a t e welfare s y s t e m o r g o v e r n m e n t "hand­
o u t s " — i f e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s m i n i m i z e u n e m p l o y m e n t , for exam­
ple, a n d i n c l u d e a d e q u a t e i n s u r a n c e p r o v i s i o n s for v a r i o u s contingen­
cies a n d r e t i r e m e n t .
T h e m o r e d e t a i l e d specification of s t a n d a r d b a s i c socioeconomic
n e e d s will t o s o m e e x t e n t d e p e n d u p o n a social s y s t e m ' s natural
e n v i r o n m e n t , c u l t u r e , a n d level of political a n d e c o n o m i c develop­
m e n t . T h u s h o w m u c h i n c o m e p e r s o n s r e q u i r e t o m e e t t h e i r standard
c l o t h i n g n e e d s w i t h i n s o m e social s y s t e m m a y d e p e n d o n t h i s system's
n a t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t (prevailing climate), o n p r i c e s , a n d also o n cut
tural factors if p e r s o n s m u s t b e in a p o s i t i o n t o a p p e a r in public
4 1
w i t h o u t s h a m e . Similarly, p e r s o n s will b e p r e s u m e d t o n e e d access to
e n o u g h of a n e d u c a t i o n to b e able t o u n d e r s t a n d a n d participate in
t h e i r society's political, legal, a n d e c o n o m i c s y s t e m s a n d associational
life. T o t h i s e x t e n t t h e m o r e d e t a i l e d s p e c i f i c a t i o n of s t a n d a r d basic
42
n e e d s m a y have t o b e left t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d legislative stages. It
s h o u l d b e clear in a n y c a s e t h a t u n d e r s o m e w h a t m o r e fortunate
c o n d i t i o n s t h e social m i n i m u m r e q u i r e d b y t h e first p r i n c i p l e w o u l d be
well b e l o w t h e m i n i m u m e n t a i l e d b y t h e s e c o n d , s o t h a t s t a n d a r d basic
s o c i o e c o n o m i c n e e d s , a n d first-principle r e q u i r e m e n t s generally, can
b e m e t w i t h o u t m u c h strain o n t h e e c o n o m i c s y s t e m .
12.8. T h e r e a r e further r e a s o n s i n favor of t h e a m e n d m e n t .

, r o a d 0 8 e n S U S n t h e D a s i c s t a t u s f e
intI^ft^ii / KH 6 L R ° ° t h ^ needs, both nationally and
S w l ^ H ^ i
n
n c o
dS U
o r
^ '"to thefirstprinciple (on the highest her of
r '
that a s o i ^ T h ^ " T
c o n s e n t ^ °°
t h e

f P P^icularly
n

Utical appropriate for a moral conception

^ ""ich an overlap^
e P i S
« l l a v w h ^ , .
m 0 t U r e w h e l h e r t h e s e
liftin*of the" veil n f ^ T CB
£ /
stages, defined through a gradyrf
< T J§ 3 1 Ka r e n t a n
t h e f t S w i Zt LT T unnecessary shuffle. For already beh.nd
comDarea^nmnoLf !! u " ° *"
a ,eS
« ^ they are given to assess and
d t h e w o r k

and h a T c u T t S r ^ v ^ ° v f ^ "'/ ° « a l ^ e m e x U in conditions X

h C

1
i n f

i t o b a s i c
o n n :

s t
t h e

c t u r
s

Rawls himself n t , ,h V"" ™ « ^ouTd satisfy requirements Z

*Z herTh«en™ nr , h ! " X P e d , e n
P ° P < ™ *° the next sta^e the question e d o e s n o t s t

ar/pl cationoTto™ ^ 1 ^ " a i . conception applies. Rather, h e definesthe domains of

churnstances o f ^ n i c r . h T C ^ t ,C0 n 8 n0t P° «° ' « ™ hypo**"^ ta t h e s i n i n e s o f

« * m posMM^forVhe na^«
P
™ ^ w h e t h e r t h e y obtain. SimUarly, it would
l
ne^Md^£ed fT«V°J 7 ^ifications of basic social and economic
acn designed for a particular natural-cultural-economic-political context
 T h e P a c k a g e of Basic Rights a n d Liberties, 12.8.3 145

12.8.1. For o n e t h i n g , it is n e c e s s a r y t o r o u n d o u t t h e package of first-

principle goods. T h u s R a w l s h o l d s t h a t "certain basic liberties are
indispensable i n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s o n c e o t h e r basic liberties are
guaranteed; t h u s f r e e d o m of t h o u g h t a n d freedom of association are
necessary to give effect t o l i b e r t y of c o n s c i e n c e a n d t h e political liber­
ties" (BLP 24). I u n d e r s t a n d h i m a s s a y i n g h e r e that t h e political liberties
(for example), t h o u g h legally c o m p l e t e l y g u a r a n t e e d a n d also effectively
protected, might still b e c l o s e t o m e a n i n g l e s s w i t h o u t t h e effective legal
freedom to associate a n d a s s e m b l e in p e a c e . O n e c a n defend t h e first-
principle social m i n i m u m a n a l o g o u s l y , as a n i n d i s p e n s a b l e institu­
tional condition n e c e s s a r y for m a k i n g m e a n i n g f u l t h e basic rights a n d
liberties associated w i t h t h e f r e e d o m a n d integrity of the person, the
basic political liberties, a n d t h e r u l e of law. W h e n p e r s o n s c a n n o t afford
food or shelter o r w h e n t h e y l a c k a c c e s s t o e d u c a t i o n o r basic care, they
can still have rights t o h o l d p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y or t o r u n for public office
'effective legal f r e e d o m ) b u t c a n h a r d l y b e g i n t o enjoy o r fully to exercise
these basic rights ( w o r t h w h i l e f r e e d o m ) . For t h e m t h e result may be
that the integrity of t h e i r p e r s o n is p r o t e c t e d against violence even
it collapses t h r o u g h d e p r i v a t i o n of food a n d shelter. For society at
iar
ge, it may b e t h a t a s e g m e n t of its p o p u l a t i o n c a n n o t (fully) partici­
pate in its legal s y s t e m , p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s , a n d associational life.
U.8JJ. The a m e n d m e n t is n e c e s s a r y , too, to m a k e t h e fair value of
the basic political liberties fully s e c u r e , t h u s preserving an important
of what Rawls h a d e a r l i e r d e e m e d n e c e s s a r y for this purpose,
namely, first-principle l i m i t a t i o n o n social a n d e c o n o m i c inequalities
a

,rj
8 l , 226,277). His l a t e r d i s c u s s i o n of t h e s a m e issue suggests that it is
enough "to k e e p political p a r t i e s i n d e p e n d e n t of large concentrations
01
Private e c o n o m i c a n d s o c i a l p o w e r in a private-property democracy,
^ of government c o n t r o l a n d b u r e a u c r a t i c p o w e r in a liberal socialist
" f n e " IBLP 4 2 - 4 3 ) , p e r h a p s b y m e a n s of t h e "public financing of
P°«hcal c a m p a i g n s a n d e l e c t i o n e x p e n d i t u r e s , various limits on con­
ations a n d o t h e r r e g u l a t i o n s " (BLP 73).« But s u c h m e a s u r e s cannot
6
s e c u r e for t h e y to h o l d public office
fair o r t u n i t

J £ to influence t h e o u t c o m e of political d e c i s i o n s " (BLP 42) unless

«" basic social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s a r e met.
JJA3. A f u r t h e r r e a s o n is t h a t t h e first p r i n c i p l e in its a m e n d e d form
s «
m a k e
plausible tto
« plausible o argue
r ^ , tthat
h * t tthe
h e oparties
arties w
a R would findthe special
o u l d find
Option convincing even on the understanding that it wifi guide
^tutional reform in situations of injustice. With *e amendment
"•*»• conception would come much closer to being the ma«m.n
Snln.; w o u i u c o m e IIIULU <^^~' — - .v, a features
LU ui« t r a n s i t i o n p r o o i e m . « m^^j
0 o— S ~ tt>xt
Z 'l ^T
c o^u n t for
1° ^t h e a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of t h e «m^a x i! m i?n idea.
" £ this
In In", contex
CoS nn

i r f e 1386 (albeit i n a n e w p r e f a c e t o h i s 1971 book) Rawlsval s p e ^ ^ o l i t S ^

a ^ ' ^ ^ q u a l i t i e s of w e a l t h i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e fatr
I f t h U s t
ZnMfSme accep-
«*»3m * e m e n t reflects h i s c o n s i d e r e d position, it w o u l d facl.ta
m y
Proposed a m e n d m e n t .
146 T h e Package o f Basic n i g h t s a n d Liberties, 12.8.6

t h e reduction in t h e s t r a i n s o f c o m m i t m e n t is p r o b a b l y most impor­

t a n t . T h o s e w h o , r e a s o n a b l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s notwithstanding,
c a n n o t m e e t t h e m o s t b a s i c social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s o f themselves
a n d t h e i r families w o n ' t b e a s k e d to s u p p o r t a p r o g r a m o f institutional
reform t h a t calls first a n d f o r e m o s t for t h e full e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a fully
a d e q u a t e s c h e m e o f b a s i c civil a n d political l i b e r t i e s . I n s t e a d , they are
a s s u r e d t h a t m e e t i n g s u c h n e e d s i s a t o p p r i o r i t y o f institutional re­
form, c o e q u a l w i t h t h e e x p a n s i o n of effective legal f r e e d o m . I n this way
t h e e n v i s i o n e d p a t h o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m c a n elicit t h e willing cooper­
ation o f t h o s e in t h e actually w o r s t social p o s i t i o n — s u r e l y desirable for
a c o n c e p t i o n o f justice t h a t p r o f e s s e s s u p r e m e c o n c e r n for the leas!
advantaged.
12.8.4. O n c e s t a n d a r d basic s o c i o e c o n o m i c n e e d s a r e s e c u r e d by the
first p r i n c i p l e , t h e p r e c i s e d e l i m i t a t i o n o f t h e d o m a i n s o f t h e general
a n d special c o n c e p t i o n s b e c o m e s m u c h l e s s i m p o r t a n t — a n d Rawls's
vague reference t o " r e a s o n a b l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s " t h u s m u c h less
unsatisfactory. U n d e r t h e p r o p o s e d a m e n d m e n t , efforts to establish
basic civil a n d political liberties c a n b e l i m i t e d for t h e s a k e o f social and
e c o n o m i c gains w h e n e v e r t h e l a t t e r a r e themselves r e q u i r e d by the first
p r i n c i p l e . A n d this m a y well b e a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e first principle
t h a t m a k e s t h e serial o r d e r i n g p l a u s i b l e e v e n for a large r a n g e o f dis-
t n C t n f a V r a b l e c o n d m o n s
h ^^, ° - T h i s r e a s o n favors t h e a m e n d m e n t over
t h e t h i r d strategy, w h i c h relies m u c h m o r e o n t h e g e n e r a l conception,
b e c a u s e t h e m o r e definite g u i d a n c e for i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform that the
special c o n c e p t i o n p r o v i d e s is n o w available for a w i d e r r a n g e o f less-
44
than-just basic structures.
1 2 . 8 . 5 . Admittedly, m u l t i p l y i n g t h e g u a r a n t e e s i n c l u d e d in the first
p r i n c i p l e risks w e a k e n i n g t h e r e q u i r e m e n t for t h e m o s t essential ones
m g W i t h i t h e first
^frt^Tf - " P r i n c i p l e " t h e i n d e t e r m i n a t e a n d un-
g i n d e d b a l a n c i n g p r o b l e m s w e h a d h o p e d t o avoid b y a suitably cir­
c u m s c r i b e d n o t i o n of priority" (BLP 10). B u t b e i n g in a p o s i t i o n to meet
n d e c o n o
sfie n a ™ c n e e d s is itself a f u n d a m e n t a l prerequi-
n h W h n e h u m a n l i f e a n d t h u s o n a
mosfesLX"^ ? ™.? n R a w l s s l i s t N o t
^
m e n fn r ^ 1 ° ° ' - to i n c l u d e t h e require-
& m i n i m u
u^ramonmf ^ m w i t h i n t h e first p r i n c i p l e is itself
n S k m g W h 3 t i s m o s t
1 T« T u
2 essential,
t O W a n d s a
would u n n p r r ; - ! ^ ' / ^ t i s f y m g t h e difference principle 8

y f 0 r t U a t e
r ^ o t o n o m i r u E d i t i o n s a l s o t e n d t o r a i s e t h e worst
t
a b V e t h 3 t S C i a l m i n i n
n ^ S S ^ S T S ? " ° ° ™ a n d t h i s tendency
ThZ™TneoZ t P ^ e d requirement " s u p e r f l u o u s "for ideal

not r e d u n d a n t , b e c a u s e o f Rawls's i n s i s t e n c e t h a t t h e serial

t h a t ^ S ^ D e
, m a d e
equivalent to the second by stipulating
a P y U n l e s s s,ar
are met and by specirvina th^l P "Jard basic socioeconomic needs
H^iesandstWiatd^ basic rights and
 T h e P a c k a g e of Basic Rights a n d Liberties, 12.9 147

ordering is to a p p l y in n o n i d e a l s i t u a t i o n s as well. T h e p r o p o s e d first-

principle r e q u i r e m e n t e n s u r e s t h a t w h e n u n m e t basic social or eco­
nomic needs c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n of t h e first principle, they cannot
like demands i s s u i n g from t h e s e c o n d principle) b e set aside or de­
ferred for the sake of fully e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e basic liberties. This as­
surance would l e a d t h e p a r t i e s a s Rawls d e s c r i b e s t h e m to prefer the
two principles s o a m e n d e d o v e r Rawls's later p r o p o s a l (in BLP), on
which the first p r i n c i p l e d o e s n o t c o n s t r a i n t h e distribution of social
and economic g o o d s at all. T h e a m e n d m e n t , therefore, strengthens
Rawls's claim to h a v e a c h i e v e d t h e "initial a i m " of his theory (which
claim was weakened, I believe, b y h i s d e l e t i o n of t h e limitation on social
and economic i n e q u a l i t i e s f r o m t h e first principle).
12.9. The first-principle g o o d s t h a t c o n s t i t u t e w h a t I would call a
fully adequate p a c k a g e c a n t h e n b e c a t e g o r i z e d as follows (cf. §11.6):

(A) basic p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s a n d l i b e r t i e s , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e g u a r a n t e e of t h e i r
fair value;
IB) basic rights a n d l i b e r t i e s p r o t e c t i n g f r e e d o m o f c o n s c i e n c e ;
(
C) basic rights a n d l i b e r t i e s p r o t e c t i n g t h e f r e e d o m a n d integrity of t h e
person, i n c l u d i n g rights t o a s o c i o e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n t h a t is suffient t o
meet t h e b a s i c s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s o f a n y n o r m a l h u m a n
participant i n t h e r e l e v a n t s o c i a l s y s t e m ;
'D> basic rights a n d l i b e r t i e s c o v e r e d b y t h e r u l e o f l a w .

All these must exist n o t m e r e l y o n p a p e r b u t effectively, in practice. A

J% adequate p a c k a g e is a p a c k a g e of b a s i c rights a n d liberties that are
^ complete (so t h a t all s t a n d a r d b a s i c n e e d s are covered) a n d well-
45
PWected (so t h a t t h e s e b a s i c n e e d s a r e actually s e c u r e d ) .
£
ven if R i p r o p o s a l , s o a m e n d e d , achieves t h e initial aim in a
a w s s

convincing way, it still faces a n u m b e r of p r o b l e m s . Among these are, in

^akened form, s o m e of t h e difficulties r a i s e d in t h e preceding sec ion,
a s u e s
IT} < I t i ° n s a b o u t w h i c h civil a n d political liberties to include
4
" « how to specify t h e m . * T h e s e p r o b l e m s c a n n o t be neatly resolved,
U a l
sife" r f P 8 ^ t h e n two-dimensional, its "area" « ^ e « ™ i n « l ^ » two
S U c n a c k a e

fiL?* ' h e s e r e p r e s e n t s its c o n t e n t , the c o m p l e t e n e s s of its

o f

S Iformat legal freedom). T h e o t h e r r e p r e s e n t s the security of the ^"J^J

h o W
S R ^ ' ^ e l l - p r o t e c t e d t h e / a r e . In the s e c o n d ^ e n s . o n o n e j e e d ^
* U » liT
S
P
b e r t y
d 0 C S
e , ^ notion
F a i l i n
n o
^sufficiently secure or weU-protecrtedJM
t r o v i d
of
hl g this, t h e first principle c o u l d , realisticaUy, ^^saB*ed an
8 311 a V a U a b l e s c i a l res t 0 b e d e V O t B d l U
^ o W T*"
^ J P * * forces (to i m p r o v e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e basic right to
° ™ °t HnteJtvT
phys.cahrff^
a ^ u e s t i o n s o f ^
3 8 b a s e d o r l a a
s e p a r a t e - b u t - e q u a l doctrine, a n d rf so, « * ^ ° ^ o l 4 y by

•he iSS^"?
8 a n d
"niversity a d m i s s i o n s be r u l e d o u t by the first P^^L first
R a w i s su ests? i b l p 79 80K
w-SK^ p r i n c i
p i e a s
«* - s
i t £ t o y

mZ^T™
^Se C r° m e r e °" t h a t m e d i
e a i p r o v i d e i s a n d o t h e r b u s i n e s s e s not be J « * ^ a B y
^ u n d s SUCh 35 r a C e
; S toviof a^y but
U 0 U S o r s o c i a
W f c J tato
% divisive" (BLP 44) to incorporate t h e , W ™
^mt^J c a B
«™«Principle, or do s o m e basic rights c o v e r e d ™* ™
t h e b y
c o s t s of
for a ftowite p r o t e c t i o n that might limit, in particular, the access
148 T h e Political P r o c e s s , 13.1

t h e r e is n o h o p e t h a t o n e m i g h t " d e r i v e " the m a x i m i n solution to the

p r o b l e m of social j u s t i c e from t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e original position,
given t h a t t h e p a r t i e s ' aversion t o risk favors v a r i o u s competing de­
siderata. T h e p r e f e r r e d c r i t e r i o n s h o u l d h a v e a c o n t e n t t h a t expresses
c o n c e r n for t h e least a d v a n t a g e d , s h o u l d e n g e n d e r stability w h e n satis­
fied, s h o u l d b e clear a n d s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d s o t h a t it c a n serve as a public
criterion, s h o u l d b e d e t e r m i n a t e s o a s t o m a k e definite d e m a n d s upon
existing social i n s t i t u t i o n s , a n d s o forth. T h e p r o b l e m s raised in §11
w e r e f o r m u l a t e d p r i m a r i l y b y a p p e a l t o t h e first c o n c e r n , b u t taking all
c o n c e r n s t o g e t h e r , t h e r e m a y b e n o s o l u t i o n t h a t is clearly superior to
t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s w i t h t h e a m e n d e d list of first-principle goods. In any
case, s e e i n g t h e c o m p l e x i t i e s involved, it m a y b e w e l l t o follow the
f o u r t h strategy. O n c e t h e initial a i m is a c h i e v e d , w e view this list "as a
s t a r t i n g p o i n t t h a t c a n b e i m p r o v e d b y f i n d i n g a s e c o n d list such that
t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e original p o s i t i o n w o u l d a g r e e t o t h e two principles
w i t h t h e s e c o n d list r a t h e r t h a n t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s w i t h t h e initial list
(BLP 7). W e w o u l d p r o c e e d a n a l o g o u s l y for all o t h e r difficulties and
i m p r o v e m e n t s — c o n c e r n i n g t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e , t h e priority rules,
t h e general c o n c e p t i o n , o r t h e d e l i m i t a t i o n of t h e d o m a i n s of the
general a n d special c o n c e p t i o n s .

13. T h e Political P r o c e s s

c o n P
1 3 . 1 . 1 h a v e b e e n a s s u m i n g t h a t Rawls t a k e s t h e s p e c i a l w h a t h e

t o consist of t w o (serially o r d e r e d ) m a x i m i n criteria, g o v e r n i n g

t h i n k s of a s t w o d i s t i n c t a n d jointly e x h a u s t i v e p a r t s o t ^
m
s t r u c t u r e . But o n t h e face of it, t h e first p r i n c i p l e is n o t a . n s t U u .
criterion. Unlike t h e difference p r i n c i p l e , w h i c h r e q u i r e s t h a far

t i o n s s h o u l d t e n d t o p r o d u c e social a n d e c o n o m i c inequalities
a s d o i n g s o w o u l d o p t i m i z e t h e s o c i o e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n ot a t e
t 0 e
advantaged, t h e first p r i n c i p l e r e q u i r e s t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e £ t n a t
4 7
a n e q u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of first-principle g o o d s . O n e m a y t h i n

poorer g r o u p s t o the court system? Here, o n e m i g h t a r g u e that i n t h e a b s e ° or c o S t

provisions p o o r p e r s o n s w o u l d t e n d to s h u n l a w s u i t s b e c a u s e of t h e profit i ^ ] gal e

financial risk involved. They w o u l d t h e n b e k n o w n to b e m u c h l e s s likely to Ae ma

redress, w h i c h in turn w o u l d make it m o r e likely for d e c i s i o n s affecting t h e m to ^ ^

f a i r
without d u e regard t o their rights. Rawls's a r g u m e n t for i n c o r p o r a t i n g t h e ^ ' . . ^ has
basic political liberties e m p h a s i z e s that t h e political p r o c e s s is a "public facility ^^
limited s p a c e " (BLP 431. But o n e c o u l d say t h e s a m e of t h e judicial p r o c e s s ^ ^ f g i r -
similar argument might b e m a d e , t h o u g h p e r h a p s w i t h l e s s plausibility, in favor
value guarantee for freedom of e x p r e s s i o n t h r o u g h t h e m a s s m e d i a . . i S

4 1 06
T h e first principle requires for e a c h p e r s o n a s c h e m e of e q u a l b a s i c K^* " f a i r 0

compatible w i t h a similar s c h e m e of liberties for all. T h i s f o r m u l a t i o n h a s a

mystery. If there are to b e packages of e q u a l basic liberties for all, w h y m u s t n ^
p e r s o n s package b e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a like ( a n d n o t a similar) p a c k a g e for everyo ^
as Rawls's earliest s t a t e m e n t s of the first principle (JF 166, JR 244) h a d d e m a n a e e

conjecture is that Rawls m e a n s t o rule out l e s s - t h a n - e q u a l p a c k a g e s w h i l e leaving

 T h e Political Process, 13.1 149

Rawls faces a further difficulty h e r e . W o u l d n ' t t h e parties prefer a

criterion that favors inferior p a c k a g e s of basic rights a n d liberties for
some when this i m p r o v e s t h e w o r s t p a c k a g e ?
Rawls barely t o u c h e s u p o n t h i s q u e s t i o n , b u t a n explanation sug­
gests itself. T h e first p r i n c i p l e r e q u i r e s t h a t a basic structure contain
full safeguards for t h e m o s t b a s i c n e e d s of n o r m a l h u m a n p e r s o n s (as
Rawls conceives of t h e m ) . N o w , a p a r t i c i p a n t ' s s t a n d a r d basic n e e d s —
unlike his preferences, w h i c h m i g h t a l w a y s b e b e t t e r satisfied by m e a n s
of indefinite i n c r e a s e s i n i n c o m e o r w e a l t h — c a n b e completely met.
Moreover, since t h e r e a r e n o i n h e r e n t conflicts b e t w e e n t h e s t a n d a r d
basic needs of a p l u r a l i t y of p a r t i c i p a n t s , truly favorable conditions
make it possible for all p a r t i c i p a n t s t o b e a s s u r e d t h a t they c a n meet
these needs. Rawls c a n t h e n c o n c l u d e t h a t a n ideal basic structure
would protect a fully a d e q u a t e p a c k a g e of basic rights a n d liberties for
every participant. His i n s i s t e n c e o n a n equal distribution of effective
legal freedom (or of f i r s t - p r i n c i p l e g o o d s ) is t h e n a corollary of the fact
that, under truly favorable c o n d i t i o n s , everyone's (by stipulation) equal
basic needs c a n b e fully m e t . H e r e m a x i m i n entails equality, because
when all first-principle s c o r e s c a n b e o p t i m a l (fully adequate), t h e n n o
""equal institutional d i s t r i b u t i o n of first-principle goods can be justi­
fied as optimizing t h e w o r s t s h a r e .
This explanation is c o n f i r m e d bv w h a t Rawls says about halfway
avorable conditions, w h i c h , t h o u g h " r e a s o n a b l y favorable," make it
"npossible for e v e r y o n e t o h a v e a fully a d e q u a t e package. He takes the
senal ordering of t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s t o entail a "priority rule" according
"which basic liberties c a n b e r e s t r i c t e d only for t h e sake of basic
Arties. There a r e t w o c a s e s : (a) t h e b a s i c rights a n d liberties m a y be
JJaty incomplete for all i n s o f a r a s t h i s i n c o m p l e t e n e s s (through the
*"er protection of t h e r e m a i n i n g b a s i c liberties) improves t h e stan-
J « package of b a s i c l i b e r t i e s overall, o r (b) t h e y m a y be unequal
J**ras s u c h i n e q u a l i t i e s i m p r o v e t h e w o r s t package of basic: hber-
D e s 4 8
Rawls's w i l l i n g n e s s t o a l l o w s u c h inequalities in the context ot

b u t
Tf^ equivalent o n e s . Here, o n e m i g h t think of a constitution conferring
e r e n t b u
52? ^0US < b i v a l e n t b a s i c rights a n d duties u p o n m e n
Z^T ™ d ) linguistic, e t h n i c , regional, o r religious
( n a
^^^S'Sy
Jtesgesting that, w h i l e r e c o g n i z e d basic rights a n d libert.es
^•Jnrpmtectton c a n hardly b e e x a c t l y equal for different g r o u p J h e f c S tprm « P
^ e t o ^ ° S similar P - t e c t ' a n e o u a /formallegal ^ ^ ^ g t u r e s
q
nl
U i r e P a k a e s t h a t

^feri
,
W

h
e

e
° y
'effective legal freedom). Both these c o ,
u e s
o v e r a 1 1

*rj oh, S qd t i o n I raise i n t h e text. . , , earlier i l s

^S„r « ™ ° ^ n c e ^ t h BLP 5 - 6 a n d m y t e r m * In a c c

«tenZ , T \ firsl
Principle h a d r e q u i r e d that basic n g h t s and h ° ™
t h e
, ^ e s D
t o

a n d t h e (a)-clause of t h e priority rule w a s then;J*rused to g u ^

^ !£de- ff 0 s^ d o m s s o as to. (ibid t h e ftlndamental f f g ^ .).
^DtertiL 8 t e ntom s i v e s yh s tAe mH a rot ,fR L[mutually
m o s t

P239
consistent)
4 4 h RaW h
basic i d h e j d e a

^ S ^ ™ (BLP
«• - ' - ^ lXadSuae scheme of
• W h S SmEl e"s 6 ' - O n h i s later a c c o u n t , t h e notion of a fuUy
4
^ .
t^ "
h J e s t

d e v e l o p e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o n the baauof the tw

, B L P 5 ) i s
^ ^
m t e r
e s t s , and . i | e of t h e priority rule n o longer play
s o t h e l a ) c a u
150 T h e Political P r o c e s s , 13.1

halfway favorable c o n d i t i o n s s h o w s t h a t t h e u n d e r l y i n g idea for assess­

ing t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n a l s o of f i r s t - p r i n c i p l e goods is max­
49
imin, a n d n o t e q u a l i t y .
It is o n l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o t r u l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s , Rawls asserts,
t h a t " t h e q u e s t i o n of c o m p e n s a t i n g for a l e s s e r t h a n e q u a l liberty does
50
n o t arise" (TJ 2 0 4 ) . T h e q u e s t i o n c a n a r i s e i n t h e real w o r l d , and here
Rawls's c o n c e r n is t o s h o w w h a t w o u l d h a v e t o b e t h e c a s e for institu­
t i o n s g e n e r a t i n g u n e q u a l b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties t o b e justified: There
m u s t b e n o feasible i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h everyone would
h a v e a fully a d e q u a t e p a c k a g e (that is, c o m p l e t e b a s i c rights and liber­
ties, sufficiently well-protected), a n d leaving s o m e f u n d a m e n t a l free-
dom(s) of s o m e g r o u p entirely u n r e c o g n i z e d m u s t o t h e r w i s e augment
(the p r o t e c t i o n of) o t h e r basic rights a n d liberties s o significantly that a
c o m p a r i s o n of feasible i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s w i t h a n e y e t o optimizing
t h e w o r s t p a c k a g e ( n o w a n d i n t h e future) favors t h e s c h e m e with
u n e q u a l b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties. I n m o d e r n d e v e l o p e d societies dur­
ing p e a c e t i m e , it w o u l d s e e m q u i t e difficult t o justify institutions
u n d e r w h i c h g r o u p s differ i n legal r i g h t s of c a t e g o r i e s (B)-(D). It is hard
t o s e e h o w restricting a n y of t h e s e m i g h t s u b s t a n t i a l l y a u g m e n t (the
p r o t e c t i o n of) o t h e r b a s i c rights a n d liberties i n w a y s t h a t w o u l d other­
5
wise b e impossible. * S o m e w h a t m o r e f o r m i d a b l e is J o h n Stuart Mill's
a r g u m e n t for u n e q u a l b a s i c political l i b e r t i e s if i t i s u n d e r s t o o d as
follows: s o m e p e r s o n s a r e t o h a v e inferior political liberties so that the
better e d u c a t e d m a y have a s u p e r i o r o p p o r t u n i t y t o influence the
o u t c o m e of political d e c i s i o n s ; this p r a c t i c e is justified b e c a u s e under

specifying t h e list of
basic rights a n d liberties. N o w both c l a u s e s t h e priority rule of
relevant o n l y to nonideal theory, w h e r e t h e y govern h o w , u n d e r halfway favorable
conditions, restrictions of basic rights a n d liberties c a n be justified a s "adjustments to
natursdlimitations a n d historical c o n t i n g e n c i e s " (TJ 246)
If this claim correct,is the (a)-clause, then
s h o u l d really c o n c e r n e d with the too, be
wont first-pnnciple score. Basic liberties m a y be equally restricted o n l y if those whose
P a C , 8 l e a S t w e U r o
S l ^u P ' e c t e d have m o r e effective legal f r e e d o m than would
L
8 e h t h e l 6 a s t W e
u ° T " P ^ e c t e d package u n d e r a s c h e m e of equal complete
fhe ufnt T8
P i. 8 S U r n s

h
n

e 3 )
t h a t
> * s h o u l d have o v e r l o o k e d this p o i n t
8 0 M
R a w

s
formulating
a r e
in
HlZ^Mh ™*^* * ° P P « a t e t h e parallel p o i n t in ideal theory irf-
restrictionnf h P
\ w t i m
y ^ is that Rawls m e r e l y permits uniform o r u n e q u ^
package Icf TIXTX* 7 * to« * necessary l i b e n i e S
o p t i m i s e the w h e n l h e s e

rnoSed L /ht a ? " to «ance require s u c h restrictions may well be W s relu

Taoed In,
wi^h h
vf a c d l , a , i n t n e f
a t n d e r h a U W
c o n d i t i o n s i n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d also bea v f a v o r a b l e

toZE*2TATU e
q U 3 t e P a G k a g efor n e c e s s a r y reforms t o w a r d a perfectly just institu­
T E ShSTand K^Lf if cert«n
V be m u c h harder to achieve
3 X 1 M A

rat^ate fi, ^, s b l £y We
W n
th.
^ c o g n i z e d (for s o m e ) . 1 s u g g e s t that
o w n o t

S S ^
f n o n " of
™y interpretation as t h e first principle a
™h ™assert ^ P a t Z°P « ,hel e s sworst
e r libertfirst-principle s c o r e .
timizin
.
pa^t and chuThL r ^ . ^ " y °* c h i l d r e n " (TJ 244). Though
rtfeZeTxpeSSr ^ ^ now, do not
'Arties they H
have unequal X & m d

1
reslSLrofSS
the mos. important sShT
S " " ^ disadvantaged by***"
s t a n d i n g of equal citizenship. t m d
b

t
6 C a

o l o s e
U S e

t h e i r
t h o s e

inequalitieT^S b t ^ , ; s e c t (TJ §§79,821. T h e g a i n s p r o d u c e d b y such

«1 t es will rarely be great e n o u g h to c o m p e n s a t e these g r o u p s for s u c h losses
o f s e l f r e
P
 T h e Political Process, 13.2 151

the alternative p r a c t i c e w i t h e q u a l b a s i c political liberties t h e political

process would t e n d t o b e s o ineffective o r s o liable t o abuse that t h e
worst package w o u l d b e e v e n w o r s e ( p e r h a p s t h e political p r o c e s s itself
52
would then b e u s e d t o r e s t r i c t b a s i c l i b e r t i e s ) . 1 will p r o c e e d with this
line of thought o n c e t h e r o l e of t h e political p r o c e s s h a s b e c o m e
somewhat clearer.
13JJ. The political p r o c e s s i s a p a r a d i g m i n s t a n c e of t h e idea of
53
procedural justice. T h i s is p r i m a r i l y a n idea for t h e nonviolent recon­
ciliation of conflicting c l a i m s a n d t h u s a n alternative t o (unmediated)
persuasion a n d c o m p r o m i s e . It p r e s u p p o s e s a p r o c e d u r e of reconcilia­
tion to which t h e r e l e v a n t c l a i m a n t s a r e sufficiently c o m m i t t e d to
accept what this p r o c e d u r e p r o d u c e s b y w a y of settlements, w h i c h
adjust their claims to a p o i n t of m u t u a l compatibility. Examples of s u c h
procedures are t h e t o s s of a c o i n , e m p l o y m e n t of a mutually agreeable
expert or arbitrator, c o u r t s , m a r k e t s (bidding), a n d t h e political process
'voting).
Such p r o c e d u r e s c o m e i n t h r e e ideal-typical varieties, w h i c h in prac­
tice are often i n t e r m i x e d . O v e r a c e r t a i n r a n g e of possible outcomes the
claimants disagree b u t a r e w i l l i n g t o a c c e p t w h a t e v e r o u t c o m e t h e
Procedure m a y p r o d u c e . T h i s i s t h e e l e m e n t of pure p r o c e d u r a l justice.
But while t h e y d i s a g r e e a b o u t t h e o u t c o m e t o b e preferred, t h e
claimants will often a g r e e t h a t c e r t a i n o u t c o m e s a r e unacceptable^
When they do, t h e y h a v e a s h a r e d (partial) criterion, i n d e p e n d e n t of
procedure, for t h e a c c e p t a b i l i t y of o u t c o m e s . T h e y can u s e this
jnterion to design, select, o r c o n s t r a i n t h e p r o c e d u r e in s u c h a way
™« mutually u n a c c e p t a b l e o u t c o m e s a r e , as far as possible, ruled out.
^°far as t h e p r o c e d u r e r e l i a b l y e x c l u d e s certain mutually unaccept­
able outcomes, it c o n t a i n s a n e l e m e n t of perfect p r o c e d u r a l Juajce-
b n
c h reliable e x c l u s i o n is s o m e t i m e s n o t achievable, typically oe-
J«se it is l t h a n o b v i o u s w h e t h e r s o m e o u t c o m e i n fact satisfies the
e s s

Shared criterion. A g r e e m e n t o n t h e criterion is t h e n t o s o m e extent

or
" * n a l . it ^c o e g x e n t s over w h e t h e r t h e c n t e n o n is
i s t s d i s a r e e m

^sfied. w h e r e t h i s is t h e c a s e , t h e c l a i m a n t s m a y still agree that t h e

P ^ e d u r e s h o u l d h a v e c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s t h a t will t e n d to make it more
W a t t h e o u t c o m e s p r o d u c e d will satisfy (or c o m e close to satisty-
the criterion i n q u e s t i o n . S u c h f e a t u r e s w o u l d e m b o d y t h e element
Effect p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e .

U
UOLC
0rtin
- 9 0 ; a n d TJ 2 3 2 - 3 3 . A m o r e topical variant ^ * ££#£5
Cri£ y S
2 8 3
t o
i u s t * y c o n t i n u e d inequality i n t h e ^ u J Spolitical
0
, h e w e a l t h s u e r i o r m e a n s f o r mUen g
C o n ^ * y P ^ £«ZetecZ political
r e x a m
S e e ^ P t e , "If t h e l e s s affluent a n d l e s s e d u c a t e d h ^ ^ w d corrupt,
andadn^T g o v e r n m e n t p e r s o n n e l w o u l d b e even more incompetent
a e )e sla
M v £ I ; S * t > o n a n d p o l i c i e s w o u l d b e l e s s just o n the w h o e j u s t i c e

'TJss-te a t a e n t d U f e r e
v a r i o u s w a y s from Rawls's discussion of procea ^
r K a n
W * h W C M T 523). In particular"I v i e w pure, perfect, d mpertec^P ^
c l e a r i
V""* V d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e kinds of procedures but as elem
c e d u r e s
are often c o m b i n e d .
152 T h e Political P r o c e s s , 13.2

As a n illustration, c o n s i d e r o u r i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e c r i m i n a l trial. This is

a c a s e of perfect p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e i n s o f a r a s t h e p r o c e d u r e firmly
e x c l u d e s o u t c o m e s t h a t a r e u n i v e r s a l l y a g r e e d to b e unacceptable (for
e x a m p l e , vicarious p u n i s h m e n t s o r t h e m a i m i n g of convicts). It is a case
of imperfect p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e i n s o f a r a s e v e r y o n e a g r e e s that defen­
d a n t s s h o u l d b e c o n v i c t e d o n l y if guilty a n d b e a c q u i t t e d otherwise.
A l t h o u g h t h i s a g r e e m e n t m a y b e m e r e l y n o m i n a l (so l o n g as there are
d i s a g r e e m e n t s a b o u t w h e t h e r s o m e d e f e n d a n t s a r e guilty o r not), it will
s u p p o r t a s h a r e d d e s i r e t o d e s i g n t h e p r o c e d u r e s o t h a t it is reasonably
likely t o p r o d u c e o u t c o m e s s e n s i t i v e t o t h e facts. It is a case of pure
p r o c e d u r a l justice, finally, i n s o f a r a s t h e r e is s o m e s l i p p a g e between
even t h e m o s t c o m p l e t e a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e e m p i r i c a l a n d legal facts of,
54
a n d t h e exact p u n i s h m e n t a p p r o p r i a t e in, a p a r t i c u l a r criminal case.
A m o n g t h e t h r e e e l e m e n t s , p u r e a n d p e r f e c t p r o c e d u r a l justice are
t h e m o s t clearly distinct. T h e o t h e r t w o d i s t i n c t i o n s a r e m o r e gradual.
Imperfect s h a d e s i n t o perfect p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e a s t h e reliability of
s o m e (feature of a) p r o c e d u r e — t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t it will exclude
certain u n a c c e p t a b l e o u t c o m e s — a p p r o a c h e s 1. It s h a d e s into pure
p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e a s t h e s p a c e of p o s s i b l e o u t c o m e s g r o w s too large or
t o o d e n s e for a n y o u t c o m e t o b e p r e c i s e l y c o n n e c t i b l e t o t h e agreed-
u p o n i n d e p e n d e n t criteria.
T h e r e is a n o t h e r w a y in w h i c h t h e b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n p u r e and
imperfect p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e is p r o b l e m a t i c . W i t h p u r e a n d perfect
p r o c e d u r a l justice, t h e r e c a n b e n o conflict b e t w e e n t h e s h a r e d com­
m i t m e n t t o t h e p r o c e d u r e a n d t h e s h a r e d c o m m i t m e n t t o a n indepen­
d e n t criterion for u n a c c e p t a b l e o u t c o m e s . I n t h e p u r e c a s e , t h e r e is no
s h a r e d c o m m i t m e n t t o a n i n d e p e n d e n t c r i t e r i o n , a n d i n t h e perfect
C t e n o n i s e i t h e
™L T f " r satisfied o r else t h e p r o c e d u r e w a s not
correctly foUowed ( t h o u g h w h i c h of t h e s e is t h e c a s e m a y still be
i m e r f e
o n n E ^ P « p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e , b y c o n t r a s t , such a
aeclaSd i ^ °
a
S S l b 6 i S P S s i b l e f o r e x a m
-Cent
" ° ' P ^ t h a t a g u i l t y p e r s o n is
therZLT° 1 1 , 6 1 8 3
M

C h i
t

e
h

V
e

e
c o n c l u
« o n of
i t s
p r o p e r l y c o n d u c t e d trial. If
U I s
cla^ho? t° P P ° e of reconciling conflicting
mtTare p e r S O n s m u s t
P * * s o u t c o m e even when a c c e

i l d o e s n o t
crheri™ f ^ t i s f
U r e 18imperfeCt y t h e r e l emUSt
v a n ttoigenera1
ndependent
-Sd S^4™ '* ' '^
havrr^etcentew'
nave t o b e e x c e p t e d . J u d g e s
a r
P ^ e d u r e itself may e

a n d j u r o r s a r e n o t t o t h i n k d u r i n g their
p a r t o f t h e

S s h m e
^ ^ m ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ of anyone found guilty shouldfitthe gravis
r e c o r d
specified, these factor* v^n ™?*lTJ ' character, and so on. However eiaooraiej.
6 1 6 t h e
fallible human j X 1 ™ K , ^ ' ™ " P^nishment-and that not onlyfora
knowledge and p e r f e r w d e ^ n H ? ' c T 1 W O U , d a s s e s s 3 1 1 relevant fac,ore

D w r i U n T R S W5
that these c o n s C S n s ™ rt^ ° ' ~™-^u\d c presumably find
precise length of time ?o tel^T with perfect precision le*. tl* the

1 8 robbere s h o u l d s e n d i n W i l l U
certain limits, the conWt D I I S E . I*"™ P ^ "
Humsnment is whatever the judge says it is.
 153

deliberations that t h e y c a n r e n d e r a n yT hverdict e Political

they Process,
please b e c a133.u s e their
verdict will define t h e c o r r e c t o u t c o m e . R a t h e r t h e y must try in good
faith and to the b e s t of t h e i r abilities t o deliver w h a t e v e r verdict accords
with the facts a n d t h e m e r i t s of t h e c a s e . It is only because they are
trusted to take this a t t i t u d e t h a t t h e p r o c e d u r e is believed to be reason­
ably reliable. And its reliability in t u r n s u p p o r t s t h e shared commit­
ment to the p r o c e d u r e , o n t h e b a s i s of w h i c h o u t s i d e r s are willing to
accept its o u t c o m e s w h a t e v e r t h e y m a y b e .
13.3. Some i n s t a n c e s of p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e are m u c h simpler, but the
political process involves t h e s a m e c o m p l e x i t i e s . T h e r e is a n i n d e p e n ­
dent criterion of j u s t i c e , a n d t h e political p r o c e s s therefore contains
elements of perfect a n d i m p e r f e c t p r o c e d u r a l justice as it satisfies this
criterion with c e r t a i n t y o r p r o b a b i l i t y . Insofar as o u t c o m e s are under-
determined by t h i s i n d e p e n d e n t criterion, t h e political process con­
tains an element of p u r e p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e . Within s o m e range, any
outcome will count a s c o r r e c t m e r e l y b y virtue of having b e e n pro­
duced in the p r o p e r w a y . In t h i s i n s t a n c e s u c h leeway is welcome, for it
allows more of a social s y s t e m ' s i n s t i t u t i o n a l features to be s h a p e d in
accordance w i t h collective p r e f e r e n c e s e m e r g i n g from political debate.
An ongoing political p r o c e s s is t h e n a s s e s s e d a n d , if n e e d be, re­
formed °y reference t o t w o r e q u i r e m e n t s : first, t h e equal basic political
Arties together w i t h t h e i r fair v a l u e m u s t b e fully recognized a n d
Protected, so t h a t all p a r t i c i p a n t s e q u a l l y have a g e n u i n e opportunity
for meaningful political p a r t i c i p a t i o n as d e m a n d e d by their first high­
est-order interest; s e c o n d , t h e political p r o c e s s m u s t b e reliable, that is,
m
jst result in legislation a n d p o l i c i e s t h a t are just (insofar as they are
su 55
°ject to an i n d e p e n d e n t c r i t e r i o n ) .
to theory, t h e s e t w o r e q u i r e m e n t s leave o p e n a vast range ot mstitu-
n
°nal options. Obviously, a t h o r o u g h a s s e s s m e n t of these options can-
J» be made in t h e a b s t r a c t . Rather, it m i g h t start from comparative
a n
^topical a l y s e s a n d b e f u r t h e r a d v a n c e d , p e r h a p s , by some social
^ e n r n e n t s . m v i e w of t h e g r e a t diversity of possibilities a n d our
ignorance in r e g a r d t o t h e m , it is s o m e w h a t regrettable tha

Jg*W
"*a*utre ,tj 222; 50),
*J» largely takes for g r a n t e d a political p r o c e s s resembling the m o d e .
representee
to t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d Great B r i t a i n - w i t h a

nl 222-23).
constituencies
BLP
(TJ
a multiparty

None of t h e s e t h r e e a s s u m p t i o n s is obvious. Concerning * e fin*

. ,
system, a n d single-member
first
role m i g h t b e r e s e r v e d for d i r e c t d e m o c r a c y , which w r t h m a
**°*toy s e t t l e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e m a y constitute a suitable

h reaui e t
*°t0 ">nients are clearly stated at TJ 1 9 7 - 9 8 and 221, ^ ^ r S e
"»i5£?
E^E^^Sd^W onal
t h
« the equal basic political liberties BLP

•"W*^
V S
*.SS? l i U 8 t i f i 6 d b v t h e
requirement for a reasonably
sidered view is that the basic political J * " " *
h i S con
^ n e e d for
found
ation in thefirsthighest-order interest (BLP 47) and the
31 b a s e s
of) self-respect (TJ 234).
154 T h e Political P r o c e s s , 13.3

m e c h a n i s m for resolving m a t t e r s of a f u n d a m e n t a l n a t u r e . Typically,

s u c h m a t t e r s arise infrequently, a r e clearly definable a n d not overly
p r e s s i n g , a n d t h e r e f o r e p e r m i t of e x t e n s i v e d e b a t e culminating in a
well-deliberated d e c i s i o n b y t h e e n t i r e p o p u l a t i o n . Referendums may
b e especially a p p r o p r i a t e for d e c i s i o n s a l t e r i n g o r reaffirming the
s c h e m e of indirect d e m o c r a c y t h r o u g h w h i c h " n o r m a l " decisions are
b e i n g m a d e , a n d t h e r e b y m a y e n s u r e a m o r e m e a n i n g f u l form of self-
government.
Against Rawls's s e c o n d a s s u m p t i o n , o n e m i g h t envision a demo­
cratic single-party s y s t e m w i t h a h i e r a r c h y of o r g a n s , t h e higher-level
o n e s b e i n g c o m p o s e d of d e l e g a t e s from t h e n e x t l o w e r level, who are
p e r h a p s b o u n d b y a n i m p e r a t i v e m a n d a t e . S u c h a political process
w o u l d s e e m c o m p a t i b l e w i t h Rawls's " p r i n c i p l e of (equal) participa­
t i o n " (TJ 221) a n d t h e fair v a l u e of t h e political liberties, at least if it is
a s s u r e d "(1) t h a t t h e r e is full i n t r a - p a r r y d e m o c r a c y , (2) that party
m e m b e r s h i p is o p e n , a n d (3) t h a t t h e p r i c e of p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the party
is n o t a g r e a t e r d e g r e e of activity t h a n t h e average p e r s o n c a n reason­
36
ably b e e x p e c t e d t o c o n t r i b u t e . " S u c h a d e m o c r a t i c single-parry sys­
t e m m i g h t d o b e t t e r in involving o r d i n a r y c i t i z e n s i n t h e formulation
a n d r e s o l u t i o n of c o n c r e t e political i s s u e s t h a n d o e s a multiparty
system u n d e r w h i c h t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of m o s t c i t i z e n s m a y tend to
d e g e n e r a t e into a n infrequent c h o i c e a m o n g t w o o r t h r e e preexisting
p a r t y platforms.
Finally, o n e c o u l d a r g u e against Rawls's t h i r d a s s u m p t i o n that a
wuiner-takes-all" electoral s y s t e m t e n d s t o o v e r r e p r e s e n t the larger
a n d m o r e e s t a b l i s h e d g r o u p s . U n d e r s u c h a s y s t e m , m i n o r i t y views that
are n o t c o n c e n t r a t e d in o n e o r a few territorial c o n s t i t u e n c i e s may be
effectively e x c l u d e d from t h e legislative d e b a t e , p e r h a p s abridging the
57
tair value of t h e political liberties of m e m b e r s of s u c h a m i n o r i t y . In
a n y case, it is u n c l e a r w h y s o m e s y s t e m s of p r o p o r t i o n a l representa­
tion s h o u l d n o t b e a c c e p t a b l e a s w e l l
My objective in briefly raising t h e s e i s s u e s is n o t t o a r g u e for or
y s emP
o m e p a r t i c u l a r m o d e l of a reat
iTht^r?-
J°.
against

T
v 3
Whi0hpersonsof
8 1 2 6 t h a t t h e r e i s a

will m a y reasonably disagree.

8
d e m o c r a t i c political p r o c e s s but
od d e a l of s p a c e for institutional
8°
JdeaiJlJl° K ° P° m i m r t a n
< * ^ Part T h r e e " w h e r e I s u p p o r t the
e

m e a l ot a global basic s t r u c t u r e t h a t w o u l d e m b o d y a c e r t a i n degree ot

56
M a c p h e r s o n , RWD Zl.
on
n o
" H e r e , clearly, o n e c a n n o t object thai a m e m b e r of a m i n o r i t y will * inning
w i n n i n g side a s often as other participants o r that a m i n o r i t y will n o t b e o n f io 0

s i d e in proportion to its relative size. T h e objection is rather that w h e n a m i n t n e

percent, say, is widely d i s p e r s e d s o that its c a n d i d a t e s l o s e in every electoral i ^ e l T

its m e m b e r s don't have a fair opportunity, t h r o u g h a r g u m e n t s p u t forwa " tbe 0

representatives, to influence t h e o u t c o m e of political d e c i s i o n s . T h i s m a y o r y a

n o t n i n a
a n abridgment of t h e fair value of their political liberties. R a w l s s a y s |. - n of D u n o

p e r s o n ' s c h a n c e s to influence political d e c i s i o n s m a y b e affected b y t h e d i s t

v i e w s a m o n g t h e other participants.
 T h e Political Process, 13.4 155

tolerance toward d i v e r s e n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s . It is likely that

there are meaningfully d e m o c r a t i c f o r m s of self-government that are
quite different from t h o s e A m e r i c a n s h a p p e n to b e a c c u s t o m e d to.
13.4. Another r e g r e t t a b l e o m i s s i o n is Rawls's c o m p l e t e silence on
the subject of federalism. T h i s o m i s s i o n , in c o n j u n c t i o n with his almost
exclusive c o n c e n t r a t i o n o n t h e e l e m e n t of imperfect procedural justice
in the political p r o c e s s , m a y s u g g e s t t h a t h e finds decentralized organs
58
of self-government s u p e r f l u o u s . Following R o u s s e a u a n d Mill, Rawls
views democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s a s c e n t e r i n g a r o u n d t h e ideal that per­
sons vote their c o n s c i e n c e r a t h e r t h a n t h e i r self-interest; everyone is
asked to make a moral, n o t a p r u d e n t i a l j u d g m e n t (TJ 357, 284, 2 3 0 -
59
31). When the task is t o f o r m u l a t e j u s t legislation (as defined by some
independent criterion), t h e n it m a y s e e m t h a t all issues, including local
ones, should b e d i s c u s s e d a n d d e c i d e d by all b e c a u s e "an ideally
conducted d i s c u s s i o n a m o n g m a n y p e r s o n s is m o r e likely to arrive at
the correct c o n c l u s i o n " (TJ 358).
In fact, however, o n e c a n still p r e f e r a d e c e n t r a l i z e d p r o c e d u r e for
making political d e c i s i o n s of m e r e l y local significance. This preference
need not be b a s e d o n t h e c l a i m t h a t s o m e o n e ' s ability to influence a
Political decision s h o u l d b e p r o p o r t i o n a l to h o w m u c h it affects one­
self. If persons a r e t o b e e x c l u d e d from political decisions of other
localities, the r e a s o n is n o t t h a t t h e y s t a n d to gain or to lose nothing
either way (that w o u l d m o r e likely b e a n asset) b u t rather that they are
Presumably in n o p o s i t i o n t o m a k e a n informed, responsible judgment.
!
™y cannot possibly k n o w e n o u g h a b o u t all t h e s e matters, n o r is it
e
«her practicable o r m o r a l l y a c c e p t a b l e t o delimit t h e g r o u p of those
w
hoare c o m p e t e n t o t h e r w i s e t h a n b y r o u g h geographical criteria.
The reasons for t h e p a r t i a l d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of political decision
making become s t r o n g e r o n c e w e qualify Rawls's characterizations o
™ political p r o c e s s a s a n i n s t a n c e of imperfect p r o c e d u r a l justice ( J
f> cf. §54). T h e r e a r e m a n y political i s s u e s t h a t d o not have a uniquely
°<*ect outcome. In t h e s e c o n t e x t s a n d r e s p e c t s t h e political process, is
case of p e p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e , a n d citizens c a n argue a n d vote on
U r

J*basis of t h e i r o w n i n t e r e s t s . I s s u e s of this kind are the stuff of day-

J % politics: H o w m u c h s h o u l d b e s p e n t o n maintaining the p u n t y
« public w a t e r s u p p l y , p u b l i c r e c r e a t i o n areas, or fire, ambulance,
^ l ^ a g e - c o U e c t i o n s e r ^ c e s ? H o w are o p e n i n g h o u r s hohdays, ;
m a n
i a g e contracts, b r o a d c a s t i n g , c o n s u m e r protection, a n d the scnooi

Rousseau, SC 153, 83, 149; a n d Mill, UOIX 2 1 5 - 1 8 , 2 7 7 - 7 9 . knowledge

^Z™* i D
* e
P° l i t i c a l
P r o c
^ Slf S S
e s s a r
well be e t o d e b a t 8

8 ldeal b u t
P*2^ < °™ cannot simply presuppose it in de signing m P
St
T 3 1 8 0 b e
° w n that t h e preferred kind of P
s h
S u ^ o n s . The o h t l c a l
t
P
t
£ 5 2 * *" Participants are fully a w a r e of their particular even
*«mthV h a v e a c e r t a
* > r o b u s t n e s s . It m u s t p r o d u c e acceptable
t h e ^ ^ ^ o h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s will n o t b e determinaUve for all.ts part P
^
156 T h e Political P r o c e s s , 13.5

c u r r i c u l u m t o b e r e g u l a t e d ? S h o u l d h i g h - r i s e b u i l d i n g s b e allowed or
c a r c o n g e s t i o n b e r e d u c e d i n s o m e p a r t i c u l a r a r e a a n d , if so, to what
e x t e n t a n d h o w ? S u c h q u e s t i o n s d o n ' t h a v e u n i q u e l y correct answers,
defined b y t h e d e c i s i o n a n ideally r e a s o n a b l e a n d well-informed legis­
lator w o u l d m a k e b e h i n d s o m e p a r t i a l veil of i g n o r a n c e (cf. TJ 196-98,
357). W h a t is i m p o r t a n t is m e r e l y t h a t t h e p e r s o n s affected have the
p o w e r to s h a p e t h e e n v i r o n m e n t t h a t s h a p e s t h e i r lives, t h a t they can,
w i t h i n b r o a d limits, a r r a n g e t h e i r m o r e i m m e d i a t e social world the way
t h e y w a n t it t o b e . A n d t h i s v a l u e obviously, favors local mechanisms of
political d e c i s i o n m a k i n g .
As t h e s e t h o u g h t s suggest, j u s t i c e p e r m i t s a n d p r o b a b l y favors feder­
alist i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t feature d e c e n t r a l i z e d legislative, executive, and
judicial o r g a n s . T h i s i d e a m i g h t b e c o m b i n e d w i t h Rawls's four-stage
s e q u e n c e (TJ §31). W h e r e a s a m o r e a b s t r a c t c r i t e r i o n of justice governs
t h e g r o u n d r u l e s of t h e s e l f - c o n t a i n e d social s y s t e m a s a whole, various
different specifications of this c r i t e r i o n m i g h t g o v e r n p r a c t i c e s whose
a u t h o r i t y is c o n f i n e d t o a p a r t i c u l a r r e g i o n a l division. T h u s the require­
m e n t of e q u a l basic political liberties c a n b e satisfied even while politi­
cal p r o c e s s e s are d e s i g n e d differently o n t h e v a r i o u s levels (global,
national, provincial, m u n i c i p a l ) a n d in t h e v a r i o u s (territorially defined!
divisions o n t h e s a m e level. In fact, w h y s h o u l d it n o t e v e n b e permissi­
ble t h a t in a representative d e m o c r a c y t h e d e l e g a t e s from t h e various
political subdivisions are e l e c t e d i n d i v e r s e w a y s , s o l o n g as rough
equality of political influence is p r e s e r v e d a m o n g p e r s o n s from dif­
ferent c o n s t i t u e n c i e s ? ^
Again, t h e s e t h o u g h t s are of s o m e r e l e v a n c e t o t h e a r g u m e n t of Part
Three for t h e y s h o w that a w e l l - o r d e r e d w o r l d c o m m u n i t y n e e d not be
a w o r l d state m t h e o r d i n a r y s e n s e of "state." Political d e c i s i o n making
o n t h e global p l a n e c a n b e c o n f i n e d t o i s s u e s t h a t a r e trulv transna­
tional in character, a n d s u c h i s s u e s c a n b e s e t t l e d t h r o u g h a demo-
h t
P ° " » | P r o c e s s t h a t t a k e s a c c o u n t of t h e different political
traditions of t h e v a r i o u s n a t i o n s .
13.5. T h e first p r i n c i p l e a t t e n d s only to s t a n d a r d b a s i c n e e d s , which

8
d i S e S ^ ^ " ^ ' C O n c
«P t i o n
<* i ^ i c e abstracts from natural interpersonal
uHS^^^^T" t h 3 ,t
P t h C . . " , system
a .r t, i c i
P * n t s in t h e relevant social
a u i e r e n c e s a n d t h u s p r e s u m e s that t h e participants in t h e relevant s o c i
a s a n d
" y e m have
^,
have
U^OO^II. I.V.1" S St

. "Herests over a c o m n l e t o „ i „ „ i „ „ « n n s ' shares : o r

s h a r e s

the s a m e n e e d s a n d interests over a c o m p l e t e lifetime. C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , p follow

e
are evaluated in t e r m s of the s a m e metric of social primary g o o d s . It . > iatioris var

however, that the specification of these g o o d s m u s t n o t b e s u b j e c t to r e g i o n . but n e s

T h i s thought m a y evoke the s a d m e m o r y of historical s e p a r a t e - b u t - e q u a l d o ^ be t 0

there are t w o important differences: the regional variations i n political s t r u c t u ^ ^ go n

e
b a s e d u p o n variations in regional preferences (by contrast, blacks d i d n o t g ent v e W

w h e t h e r they preferred their separate status), a n d t h e r e i s to b e full f r e e d o m o ^, ^ ( Q

across regional b o u n d a r i e s (by contrast, n o black c o u l d c h o o s e to h a v e t h e w ja- var

rights a n d opportunities instead). This i d e a c o u l d b e g e n e r a l i z e d . Slight regv ^ &

t i o n s in h o w o t h e r basic rights a n d liberties are s p e c i f i e d m a y b e p e r m i s s i b l e , ^ ^^e-
the resulting packages are roughly equivalent a n d fully a d e q u a t e e v e r y w h e r e . An
thing analogous might h o l d for o t h e r (e.g., e d u c a t i o n a l ) o p p o r t u n i t i e s a s well.
 The Political Process, 13.5 157

can be completely safeguarded through a definite and limited package

of effectively enforced basic rights and liberties. Hence, if the first
principle were the only independent criterion for judging political
decisions, then the political process of a just basic structure would
contain a large element of pure procedural justice. But Rawls proposes
that this remaining leeway should be further constricted through the
second principle. This proposal can be recommended to the parties
through the following rationale: if the design of the second part of the
basic structure were left entirely to the political process as a matter of
pure procedural justice, then a voting coalition including more affluent
classes could easily impose or perpetuate economic institutions under
which the poor would be much poorer than is unavoidable (though
61
their standard basic socioeconomic needs would still be met).
The least restrictive way of blocking this considerable danger in­
volves constraining the political process so that the interests of all
Participants are tied to those of any least advantaged group. This, I
tbink, is the general idea behind the second principle. It ensures that
decisions made through the political process are framed in a way that
Precludes bias against particular persons and groups. While the first
Principle requires definite and specific safeguards in the form of a
Package of enumerated basic rights and liberties, the opportunity pnn-
ci
ple requires nothing about what specific opportunities an institu­
tional scheme is to generate but constrains only the distribution of
su
ch opportunities, whatever they mav be. Similarly, the difference
Principle requires only of social and economic inequalities that they
must optimize the socioeconomic position of the least advantaged; no
such requirement is imposed upon any other features the social sys-
en
> may tend to produce. In this way, the choice of any institutional
Panares that affect socioeconomic positions roughly equally are, inso-
J«r as they are not preempted by the first or opportunity principles, ten
0
be governed by the political process as matters of pure procedural
These may include features that affect or constrain overall
g n o m i c activity (working hours, pollution, depletion of mineralI re-
°*ces), the proportion of the social product allocated to education
^health care, the provision of public goods, and birth rates.
a w , s c I e
J h e constraints added by the second principle make » * "
J » mo* acceptable to the parties. The principle requires more of an
y j u t a n a l scheme with regard to the worst socioeconomic position
" P ^ i t s , without detracting from what is significant about the basic

U i t e
^ ^ P ^ u a s i v e l y that this actually t e n d s to ^ ^ ^ ^ Z
s h a e d t h
Cmw P ~ " 8 h d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e s : "A voting
n 4 f o r m
* 2 £° b e c a u s e it will b e l e s s e x p e n s i v e to the top group to buy otl
K P h a n t o l e t f o r m ( A S U 2 7 5 1
B v S i " " i t i ^ l nrocess as matters of
N f e ' « r t a i n c h o i c e s are t o be g o v e r n e d by the
u s t i c e
choices p«J«g«
tohou^ ^ > ' I a l w a y s m e a n t o i n c l u d e t h e o p t i o n of delegating
^ o l d s , s c h o o l b o a r d s , a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , experts, a n d the liKe.
158 T h e Political P r o c e s s , 13.5
63
political l i b e r t i e s . O n e m i g h t h a v e t h o u g h t t h a t t h e s e additional con­
s t r a i n t s s h o u l d also p l a y a r o l e i n a s s e s s i n g a n e x i s t i n g political process
a n d in g u i d i n g its reform. After all, t h e s e c o n d r e q u i r e m e n t upon any
political p r o c e s s is t h a t it s h o u l d b e reliable, t h a t is, p r o d u c e legislation
a n d policies t h a t a r e just. H e r e t h e reliability of t h e political process
w i t h r e g a r d to t h e difference p r i n c i p l e is of s p e c i a l c o n c e r n . Often a
large variety of m u t u a l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e e c o n o m i c l a w s a n d policies can
w i t h s o m e plausibility b e d e f e n d e d a s d o i n g b e s t b y t h e difference
p r i n c i p l e b e c a u s e i n t h i s m a t t e r s o m u c h " d e p e n d s u p o n speculative
political a n d e c o n o m i c d o c t r i n e s a n d u p o n social t h e o r y generally" ITJ
199). Still, t h e r e is h o p e t h a t s u c h p o l i t i c a l r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s can be
c u r b e d t o s o m e e x t e n t s o a s t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e difference principle is at
least a p p r o x i m a t e l y satisfied. W h i l e t h e e q u a l b a s i c political liberties
r e q u i r e social a n d e c o n o m i c legislation t o b e c r e a t e d democratically
(rather t h a n b y a g r o u p of u p r i g h t e x p e r t s , say, t h o u g h legislators could
of c o u r s e c o n s u l t s u c h experts), t h e y a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a system ot
judicial review t h a t w o u l d filter o u t a t least t h e c l e a r e r c a s e s of legisla­
tion violating t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e .
Alluding t o " t h e h i s t o r y of s u c c e s s f u l c o n s t i t u t i o n s " (BLP 52), Rawls
o p p o s e s t h i s idea, h o w e v e r , w i t h h i s r e m a r k a b l e fiat t h a t "the second
p r i n c i p l e of justice . . . is n o t i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e constitution
64
(ibid.). This is r e m a r k a b l e b e c a u s e it w o u l d s e e m t o c o n t r a d i c t Ravvls s
official p o s i t i o n . T h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n of t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e would
clearly b e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a fully a d e q u a t e p a c k a g e of b a s i c political
liberties for all™ But if so, t h e n t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r it should be
63
T h i s general w a y of u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e p r e s e n t s Rawls as offering a
1
ISSE ?" t h e tension b e t w e e n what A m y G u t m a n n h a s called participatory and
( S 6
N L N H 7 1LE ' c h a p 7
ft^er e x p l o r e d in t h e next chapter. It ATOO ) m i d e a

8 W n S t t h e c h a r e t h a t h e
f u S a ^ e s fallaciously from t h e p r e m i s e that it s
w a n m o r e s e
ml, S t \ c ° n d - r i n c i p l e g o o d s rather t h a n l e s s t o t h e conclusion P

0 r e t 0 h m r e
t h a n Lss™§1o 5 .4 ) *° ™ ° s e c o n d - p r i n c i p l e g o o d s rather
1 1 f a C t h a t s o m e
n o ^ s t ? , ? ™ ^ *? ' " ^ ^ m e m s of t h e o p p o r t u n i t y principle do
u a r a n , e e s
d o n s ' n the ^» g - T h u s , a s Martin p o i n t s o u t m a n y state consutu-
e
"ciTrK r w , H S

<hlS
®>™T C a i m i n
t
^ P u b ' * e d u c a t i o n (RH112-13-
h

t h a t
e

R a w
t

l
0

s
a

c
e

be i n c o m o ^ t S , 2 ' ' « ™ n ° t a l l o w t h e s e c o n d principle to

S S i t ^ " C O
u
n S t U t i o n
' o f a
' w e l l - o r d e r e d s o c i e t y , b e c a u s e such u s t

l 6R r S t p r i n c i , e m a k i
Z * e Z l f n * u P ^ " S * e b a s i c political liberties le
lltishZdtZtnr?^^ n e i , h e r a
» ° * market socialist society r

3 6 b < 3 C a U S e c i t i z e n s
ends" c a n n t f oe e ^ T * ' ' ' ^ particular moral a n d personal
3Z4, Though ^essemSf, * ^ ^ ' <l h e
° " " » i n s t i t u t i o n s (RJES re uisite e c 0 c

W f t h t h e i r e m
CWITI I see n o ™ ! ™ t T * w P ™ a l views, 1 d i s p u t e their i n t e r p r e t *
nXdIZ literrvl „ / ] l i e b a s i c
P° ' A r t i e s s h o u l d h a v e t o be understood as
, i t i c a )

t e g , 8 t a h t m t h a t
unc^^nK^^^- Principle, That no such v i o i a t e s t h e s e c o n d

m 0 r e n o w
p m E t o S S have 1fi^ "T" «"« P ™ « P 0 b v i 0 u s ! e

S c h e m e ( B L P5
iotal S m ' m T o z i J ^ ! i ! f " > «'"er t h a n ' t h e m o s t extensive
3 q U a t

also c c ^ Z i b S olT . r t i e s . After all. s u c h a fully a d e q u a t e package « b a s , c l i b e

stiputaZ foe^mX ^ ° P o f i n a j o r i t y rule, by d 8 V i c e S , h a t l i m i l t h e s c e

" S * "><*** * *5 p e r c e n t m a j o r * ; o r
P
the cons^nt of S ^ S ^ ' S T ' J e g i S a t i v e c h a e

o rwo tegjslatrve bodies or o f two c o n s e c u t i v e p a r l i a m e n t s Icf. TJ 224, 229-

 T h e Political Process, 13.6 159

incorporated m u s t b e s e t t l e d b y r e f e r e n c e t o t h e t w o principles them­

selves. The s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e o u g h t t o b e p a r t of t h e constitution if a n d
only if this w o u l d t e n d t o i m p r o v e t h e w o r s t social position o n t h e
66
whole.
His opposition is f u r t h e r r e m a r k a b l e b e c a u s e Rawls himself suggests
that existing i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e n o t all t h a t successful, in that they don't
even remotely satisfy t h e difference p r i n c i p l e (TJ 87). And h o w c a n we
expect them to, s o l o n g a s t h i s p r i n c i p l e is n o t i n c o r p o r a t e d into the
public and official t e r m s of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e ? How are actual
legislators to u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h e y a r e t o frame their deliberations in
accordance w i t h t h e difference p r i n c i p l e , w h e n it is merely o n e among
many incompatible i d e a s d e b a t e d b y t h e a c a d e m i c s of t h e well-or­
dered society? I w o u l d t h i n k , t h e n , c o n t r a r y to Rawls, that if the second
principle is a r e q u i r e m e n t of j u s t i c e a t all, if it is part of that kernel of
political morality t h a t is t o solve t h e f u n d a m e n t a l a s s u r a n c e problem
by lasting t h r o u g h a n d c o n s t r a i n i n g all institutional changes, then it
must be e n s h r i n e d in t h e legal o r d e r i n a w a y that reflects its perma­
nent and f o u n d a t i o n a l s t a t u s . It m u s t n o t b e merely a n idea that
legislators m a y o r m a y n o t find attractive a n d m a y u s e o n occasion as a
Preamble to a p a c k a g e of s o c i a l o r e c o n o m i c legislation.
13.6. When it c o m e s t o n o n i d e a l c o n t e x t s , t h e s e c o n d principle once
again gets s h o r t shrift, t h i s t i m e , h o w e v e r , for systematic reasons. The
question h e r e is w h e t h e r a n d o n w h a t g r o u n d s equal basic political
Jherties may b e r e s t r i c t e d for t h e s a k e of e n s u r i n g juster legislation,
"ecall the t w o r e q u i r e m e n t s a political p r o c e s s m u s t satisfy. First, the
Procedure s h o u l d b e s u c h t h a t all p a r t i c i p a n t s have basic political
Gerties that a r e e q u a l l y c o m p l e t e a n d w e l l - p r o t e c t e d a n d w h o s e fair
U e
™ is m a i n t a i n e d s o t h a t all h a v e "a fair o p p o r t u n i t y to hold public
m c e
, and to i n f l u e n c e t h e o u t c o m e of political decisions ( B U ' w .
"Kofar as t h e political p r o c e s s is a n i n s t a n c e of p u r e procedural jus-
Ce
? ' r e q u i r e m e n t is u n o p p o s e d . I n t h e r e m a i n i n g "impure area,
b°wever, w h e r e a n i n d e p e n d e n t c r i t e r i o n exists for judging outcome*
™*e political p r o c e s s , a s e c o n d r e q u i r e m e n t c o m e s into play, m e
Pob-hcal p r o c e s s s h o u l d b e d e s i g n e d s o a s t o b e maximally reliable
Kawls c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h i s s e c o n d r e q u i r e m e n t as o n e for a p r o c e d u r e
nc
^ e o u t c o m e s a r e m o s t "likely t o a c c o r d w i t h t h e P " f J £
JJce" ( J leg). T T i i d e s over a n i m p o r t a n t p o m t B a a c
h i s f o r m u l a t i o n s

Pjcal l i b e r t i e s s that resmchon wJl

b e ( o n { h e g r o u n d

to juster legislation) o n l y if s u c h legislation constitute > a n im

^ v e m e n t b y t h e lights of the first p r i n c i p l e (cf. TJ 229). ^ s h o w s tha
^ e c o n d r e q u i r e m e n t really c o n s i s t s of t w o p a r t s : a
JJW satisfy t h e first p r i n c i p l e , w h i c h is o n a p a r with a n d h u s m g m
3 5
margins o v e r r i d e t h e first r e q u i r e m e n t for t h e basic polecat
e n
i ^ P o i n t is n o t u n d e r m i n e d b y t h e c o m m o n p l a c e , true ° " f l ' S C c o r S 0

•*3h m
« m b e
P i n
' s c o u l d b
consistently p r o d u c e o p u m e e r f e c t c o u l d

V matters e v e n w h e r e p e r f e c t i o n is o u t of reach.
160 T h e Political P r o c e s s , 13.6
67
liberties a n d t h e i r fair v a l u e ; a n d a r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t o u t p u t satisfy the
s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e , w h i c h r a n k s lexically b e l o w b o t h first-principle re­
q u i r e m e n t s a n d t h u s c a n i n f l u e n c e t h e d e s i g n of t h e political process
o n l y w i t h i n w h a t e v e r l e e w a y t h e y m a y leave. Not e v e n t h e slightest
r e s t r i c t i o n of b a s i c political liberties o r of t h e i r fair value is justifiable
w h e n t h e b e t t e r legislation it w o u l d l e a d t o m e r e l y r e d u c e s unjust
social a n d e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t i e s , h o w e v e r significantly.
Rawls m u s t s h o w t h a t t h e risk-averse p a r t i e s , w i t h their decision
rule, w o u l d find this r e s u l t a c c e p t a b l e . T h i s t a s k h i g h l i g h t s once again
t h e crucial i m p o r t a n c e of m y p r o p o s e d a m e n d m e n t of t h e first princi­
ple. T h e p a r t i e s m u s t a s s u m e t h a t t h e p o o r m a y find it very difficult to
p e r s u a d e a majority t o s u p p o r t s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s required
by t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e . Rawls h o l d s t h a t r e s t r i c t i o n s of basic political
liberties for t h e s a k e of satisfying t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e a r e nevertheless
strictly r u l e d o u t ( u n d e r r e a s o n a b l y favorable c o n d i t i o n s ) . T h e parties
w o u l d certainly find t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t u n a c c e p t a b l e u n l e s s they are
a s s u r e d that restrictions of b a s i c political liberties m a y b e justifiable
w h e n t h e y are n e c e s s a r y to m e e t s t a n d a r d b a s i c s o c i o e c o n o m i c needs.
H e n c e t h e p a r t i e s have y e t a n o t h e r r e a s o n t o w a n t a c l e a r a n d straight­
forward social m i n i m u m t o b e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e first principle
w h e r e it will play a p r i m a r y r o l e i n d e t e r m i n i n g h o w t h e political
p r o c e s s is to b e a d j u s t e d t o n a t u r a l l i m i t a t i o n s a n d historical con­
tingencies.

U n e q u a l basic political liberties s u c h a s Mill h a d p r o p o s e d m a y be justifiable in this

w a y w h e n t h e inequalities w o u l d make o t h e r basic rights a n d liberties significantly more
c o m p l e t e or m o r e secure (cf. TJ §37). Put in m y terms, M i l l s claim (as Rawls reconstructs
? m r f W . h ^f-
u n d e
L e x i s t i n g halfway favorable c o n d i t i o n s , w e o u g h t to accept a
Z7£ to the first requirement in order to avoid a larger shortfall in
u n e c u a l v o t i n
SSr^SitT T.^ 6
" ? *° a c c e
P l
l 6 rights b e c a u s e the l o s s in terms of
leSnn£ th
e
e r t l e S

p r o l e
3 n

c t ,
d t h 6 l r f a i r v a l u e i s
o u t w t i g h e d by t h e gain, through juster
SnT'™J^ , °P o f ) o t h e r
first-principle g o o d s It is c l a i m e d that, given
S S S S • p u r a l v o t i n g e n h a n c e s t h e
p a c k a
§ e
° f b a s i c righ,s
 CHAPTER 4

The Second Principle

of Justice

14. Rawls's O p p o r t u n i t y P r i n c i p l e

14.1. The s e c o n d principle is a m o n g the features of his conception

that Rawls has t e n d e d to d e e m p h a s i z e in recent years. He now believes,
as we have seen, that t h e s e c o n d principle of justice is to be excluded
from the written c o n s t i t u t i o n of a well-ordered society (BLP 52). More
gently, he has e v e n d e c l a r e d t h e difference principle all but dispens­
able: "The primary a i m of justice as fairness is achieved once it is: clear
"W" the parties w o u l d prefer average utilitarianism constrained by nis
to** and opportunity p r i n c i p l e s over average utilitarianism uncon-
f P F E
fained 4). In this area, unsurprisingly, w e have nothing like tne
bailed elucidations Rawls h a s s i n c e provided in support of his hrst
f^ciple and t h u s m u s t rely m o r e extensively o n his account in A
^ory of Justice. There are s o m e significant revisions, "^ever ine
amount of social primary g o o d s is n o w said to be based on the concep-
of the person as characterized by the two highest-order m t e r e s ^
Jvvewill s e e i n e doubly ambiguous account ot m e
a m o m e n t ( t h

J * * x t Principle in A Theory of Justice receives some clanncahon.m

course of w h i c h Rawls all but d e l e t e s what w a s arguably the most
Portant s e c o n d - p r i n c i p l e g o o d : opportunities.
The second principle (of The special conception) impose j t w o w
u p o n the s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c inequalities.an
2 * * "V g e n ^ a t e : t h e opportunity principle and the d # r e n c e
P r
^ p / e . These are serially o r d e r e d s o that the former ranks lex.caty

f i
In TJ a n , d F G b c o n t r a s t ; t h e a c C 0 u n t was more s f " ' ™ l e , . PFE 3,
r f
y
^ t h e o r y and t h e x h i n t h o f t h e g o o d w i t h the Anstotehan Pnnc.p
" " ^ Rawls d i s c u s s e s t h i s shift?.

161
162 Rawls's O p p o r t u n i t y Principle, 14.2

above t h e latter, just a s t h e first p r i n c i p l e r a n k s lexically above the

s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e a s a w h o l e . Before d i s c u s s i n g t h e s e requirements in
m o r e detail, I m u s t settle t w o p r e l i m i n a r y m a t t e r s . O n e of these con­
c e r n s t h e role " t h e social b a s e s of self-respect'' p l a y in t h e metric of
s e c o n d - p r i n c i p l e g o o d s in t e r m s of w h i c h s o c i o e c o n o m i c positions are
t o b e evaluated. T h e o t h e r p r e l i m i n a r y m a t t e r c o n c e r n s t h e ways in
which institutional inequalities might b e generated.
14.3. T h e difference p r i n c i p l e g o v e r n s t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of what 1 call
index goods—powers a n d p r e r o g a t i v e s of offices a n d positions of re­
sponsibility; i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h ; a n d t h e s o c i a l b a s e s of self-respect. It
r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e g e n e r a t e i n e q u a l i t i e s in i n d e x goods if
a n d insofar a s t h e s e o p t i m i z e t h e social p o s i t i o n of t h e least advan­
t a g e d (or, as I have also said, t h e w o r s t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e share). Here the
i n c l u s i o n of t h e t h i r d i n d e x g o o d , t h e social b a s e s of self-respect, is
p u z z l i n g . T h i s g o o d " h a s a c e n t r a l p l a c e " (TJ 62), i s "very important" (TJ
S p e r h a s t h e m o s t
"^'fi P i m p o r t a n t p r i m a r y g o o d " (TJ 440), is even
defined a s [the] m o s t i m p o r t a n t p r i m a r y g o o d " (TJ 604 [index]). If it
really is s o i m p o r t a n t , t h e n w h y d o e s it c o m e i n o n l y o n t h e lowest
priority level, as a n i n d e x g o o d w h o s e d i s t r i b u t i o n is t o b e governed by
2
t h e difference p r i n c i p l e ?
Rawls's i d e a s e e m s t o b e t h a t self-respect i s d u e t o various factors
(has v a r i o u s "bases"), s o m e of w h i c h a r e m u c h m o r e i m p o r t a n t than
o t h e r s . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t social b a s i s of self-respect is (or in a just
society o u g h t t o be) t h e e q u a l b a s i c liberties, a n d Rawls a p p e a l s exten-
0 l f r e s p e c t i n s u
nr? - K ^ ! : P P o r t of h i s first p r i n c i p l e a n d its lexical
H e e v e n h e s t h a t
i t °P social i n s t i t u t i o n s , merely by
™3r^rT P * ^ ' a r e i m m u n e t o c o m p l a i n t s invoking self-
1 1 1 6

Z7nTJ I v ° - 3 8 1 5 f rs e l f
^ a j u s t s o c i e t y is n o t t h e n one's e s t e e m

rilhtTLn ^ X
y t h e p
» e d d i s t r i b u t i o n of fundamental u b H c l a f f i m

eSnnrnl? ^ T ^ ' ' , " ' [ W e e l i m i n a t e t h e significance of relative s e e k ] t o

e c o n o m i c a n d social a d v a n t a g e s a s s u p p o r t s for m e n ' s self-confidence

esteS ( ^ S 46K3 ° * * * * 6 F
^ I N T H E S O C I A L B A S C S
° F

ha
e a u a l bas^lirT^^ Mly
1

3,16
68 , h a t6 V e n a
™ s t r u c t u r e u n d e r w h i c h the
SidesTt I n ? P T O t e c t e d m
^ « * e n t h e e c o n o m i c in-
SPIC. fotheT S e V G r e
' f a U t o s u p
P° the self-respect of, and
r t

Raw,s t o sav
"ex^sii: sTz ^ T~ ' ^ e
d v a t o r a s

the parties wmSd.ro • I i m p l a u s i b l e t o (assume l t m a y t h e n b e

n e parties w o u l d ) r e q u i r e that i n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d b e d e s i g n e d so that

MichaelmTnicvim 3 4 5 ^ ' '° » s e s of self-respect is also noted in

S 8 n 0 t n o f t h e s o c i a l b

sectors of'sodetwl^j non*™™!^ this end by ensuring that "the various m i g h t

U p s
a c h i e v e

( T J
the context of feudal or cas\e s X ^ £ ° '' 5 l ~ a n idea he explicitly rejects in 5 4

5 4 7 1H e m i h t m o r e
once essential needs are met thlr \ « plausibly have argued that
n f o r e c
away as associational ties and N L « ? ° ° n o m i c status can be made to fade
and personal pro,ects come to assume greater importance.
 163
R a w l s ' s O p p o r t u n i t y Principle, 14.2

Index position optimum

oi least overall
advantaged in /
absolute terms I
optimum
all index goods apart from
self-respect
economic bases
ot self-respect

other index goods

> inequality

equality < R e l a t i v e i n d e x H«»

Graph,. Optimum i n d e x i n e q u a l i t y a c c o r d i n g t o t h e difference principle, with and

without residual ( e c o n o m i c l b a s e s ot self-respect

the social a n d e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t i e s t h e y ^'X^toVp^l

the worst s o c i o e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n . T h e p o o r might excusa y
socioeconomic p o s i t i o n t h a t , t h o u g h s o m e w h a t worse
terms, is (in relative t e r m s ) s o m e w h a t less inferior. - po- d u a l c o m

Rawls h a n d l e s t h i s p r o b l e m b y r e c o g n i z i n g that a i ^ , 4

ram of self-respect m a y h a v e t o b e i n c l u d e d a m o n g nt a c c o u

n n c u
Adding this i n d e x g o o d e n a b l e s t h e difference P ^ rior t l i n f e

of abridgments of s e l f - r e s p e c t t h a t a r e d u e t o a signn
share of other i n d e x g o o d s (see G r a p h 1). necessary in- tf

Rawls's halfhearted offer t h a t "theoretically w e c difference

v e e ( y
dude self-respect
u d e self-respect ii n t h e p r i m a
nthe pnmaiy u ^ . „ r y g o o d s " g ° ^ \ a n c e he i m p o r t
g
Principle (TJ 546) d o e s n o t t h e n d e t r a c t from
Pnnaple (TJ 546) d o e s n o t t h e n d e t r a c t from t h e great impu..~~ t h e ^ e a « _ ^ . for s e l f

J" e w h—e r •e a• t t a c h• e s t o self-respect.

if. "e a s—-mps
H that tuh ev need
s u m e s that _ for. „sett- v p r v

^pect ( a s it i s s o c i a l l y b a s e d ) w o u l d b e met, at least in very

m s o f a r

y part, t h r o u g h t h o s e i n s t i t u t i o n a l features in virtue of w h i c h a bas c

^ c t u r e satisfies t h e first a n d o p p o r t u n i t y principles. V i n d ^ a t m g this
O p t i o n will b e o n e c e n t r a l g o a l i n m y a t t e m p t t o specri>'the
Pportunity c o n s t r a i n t t h a t i s t o b e i m p o s e d u p o n the difference p n n
g " . I will try t o i n t e r p r e t t h e o p p o r t u n i t y principle so that Us satisfac
t o g e t h e r w i t h t h a t of t h e first p r i n c i p l e , w o u l d e n s u r e that t h e
" J * bases of self-respect a r e , a s Rawls envisions, f
Cl
^ f ™ £ *
K -aJt tbases
i s s a lof
l sself-respect
ector, ^ a^r e ,.a sM» y o c c a ^ f ^ ^ ^ Q

•«« across all s e c t o r s of s o c i e t y . M y occasional a p p e a l s w - -

- - — „ the opportunity P ^ ^ ' ^
i n the t o
course of i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e o p p o r t u n i t y principle refer, then, not
J
*» residual c o m p o n e n t i n c l u d e d a m o n g t h e i n d e x goods but to the
l0 Uld h a v e b e e n m r e
^n'^\T ° n^cuKowereS
c l e a r e r h a d R a w l s s p 0 k e n

C> ba8e8 o f
l**2S^ , *tf-«*pect, one's relative status in P^uchon £ ^
f
° ° f f i c e s a n d
P° » of responsibility) and consumpnonjm
s i o n s
^
cto bases o f
*5L2n£ ' « e l f
- r e s
P e c t 3 1 8 0 i n c l u d e e d u c a , , o n a n
'
164 Rawls's O p p o r t u n i t y Principle, 14.3

full social b a s e s of self-respect t h a t a l s o figure s o prominently in

Rawls's a r g u m e n t for t h e p r i o r i t y of t h e e q u a l b a s i c liberties.
1 4 . 3 . C o m i n g t o t h e s e c o n d p r e l i m i n a r y , i n s t i t u t i o n s m a y generate
inequalities in v a r i o u s w a y s . P e r p e n d i c u l a r t o m y earlier distinction
b e t w e e n e s t a b l i s h e d a n d e n g e n d e r e d i n e q u a l i t i e s , w e m u s t now dis­
t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n t h e various k i n d s of n o n i n s t i t u t i o n a l facts to which
t h e inequalities p r o d u c e d b y a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e m a y be related
W h a t facts a b o u t p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s e x p l a i n t h e lifetime share each
c o m e s t o have u n d e r t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e t h e y participate in? If
s h a r e s a r e u n e q u a l , t h e n t h e r e m u s t b e s u c h facts. T h e s e facts are not
t h e m s e l v e s p a r t of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e a n d a r e therefore irrelevant
t o its a s s e s s m e n t . W h a t is relevant is w h i c h k i n d s of facts an institu­
tional s c h e m e allows t o p l a y a c a u s a l role i n d e t e r m i n i n g shares and
h o w significant a n i m p a c t it allows e a c h k i n d of fact t o have. Here Rawls
w a n t s t o d i s t i n g u i s h a m o n g " t h r e e m a i n k i n d s of c o n t i n g e n c i e s " (WOS
11): n a t u r a l c o n t i n g e n c i e s , social c o n t i n g e n c i e s , a n d " s u c h chance
c o n t i n g e n c i e s as a c c i d e n t a n d g o o d f o r t u n e " (TJ 7 2 ) .
In first explicating t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e , Rawls p u t s a g o o d deal of
weight u p o n t h e distinction b e t w e e n n a t u r a l a n d social contingencies
Luck is a l m o s t entirely i g n o r e d , t h o u g h i n e q u a l i t i e s arising through
c h a n c e a r e implicitly g r o u p e d t o g e t h e r w i t h t h o s e a r i s i n g from natural
contingencies.
T h e n a t u r a l / s o c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n is p r o b l e m a t i c in v a r i o u s ways, and
Rawls d o e s n o t d r a w it precisely. C o n c e r n i n g i n e q u a l i t i e s related to
differentials i n n a t u r a l t a l e n t — h i s p a r a d i g m e x a m p l e for natural con­
t i n g e n c i e s — R a w l s s u g g e s t s t h a t insofar a s s o c i o e c o n o m i c inequalities
a r e t a l e n t - i n d u c e d , t h e y c a n b e e x p l a i n e d b y r e f e r e n c e t o t w o factors:
t h e n a t u r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of t a l e n t s a n d t h e p r e v a i l i n g institutional
s c h e m e . This suggestion, however, is t o o s i m p l e T h e r e is a t h i r d factor,
namely, h o w valuable t h e various n a t u r a l t a l e n t s a r e c o n s i d e r e d to be
in t h e relevant social system. T o s o m e e x t e n t t h i s t h i r d factor will itself
b e d e t e r m i n e d by t h e prevailing i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e . T o s o m e extent it
will also b e d u e t o e x o g e n o u s d e t e r m i n a n t s , s u c h a s t h e systems
ltur
IH ,f! e n v i r o n m e n t , c u l t u r e , a n d level of d e v e l o p m e n t . In any case,
t h i s t h i r d factor e n s u r e s that even so-called natural c o n t i n g e n c i e s (the
d i s t r i b u t e of valuable talents) will have a c o n s i d e r a b l e social compo-
nent.
r a m a t X a m l e Q f t h
HP« » .° P ^ a r e r a c e - a n d g e n d e r - i n d u c e d inequali-
A T h S O r y J sti
W ™ . 'r °f " <*- m s o m e actual societies a p e r
6 S O C i a l 1
hv hif^ T °T P ^ ^ g o o d s a r e very c o n s i d e r a b l y affected
d 6 S C e n t o r s k i n c o l o r
™ i . ^ ' ' N e a r l y , s u c h inequalities
are related to n a t u r a l c o n t i n g e n c i e s , i n Rawls's s e n s e . Yet, u p o n reflec-
t o h a v e m
S a5 ^ ° r e in c o m m o n w i t h i n e q u a l i t i e s related to
n C , e a S e e m l i f i e d
^ S * u . . ' * P ° y t h e social c l a s s of o n e ' s parents.
X Say t h a t t h e lack f a t a l e n t is a natU
hh aa nn dd ilccaapo faonr di 7that
h fT*** °
t h e n a t u r a l diversity of t a l e n t s is a fact t o which ° ^
 R a w l s ' s O p p o r t u n i t y Principle, 14.5 165

social institutions m u s t a d j u s t t h e m s e l v e s in s o m e way, it is at least

doubtful that b e i n g female o r black m a k e s o n e naturally h a n d i c a p p e d
or that social i n s t i t u t i o n s m u s t a d j u s t t h e m s e l v e s to t h e natural diver­
sity of skin colors a n d g e n d e r s (or of h e i g h t o r h a i r growth, for that
5
matter). These r e m a r k s m a k e it a p p e a r doubtful that a conception of
justice can plausibly p l a c e a s m u c h w e i g h t o n t h e distinction between
natural and social c o n t i n g e n c i e s a s Rawls d o e s in interpreting his
second principle. I will s u b s t a n t i a t e t h e s e d o u b t s m o r e concretely in a
moment.
144. With this b a c k g r o u n d , let u s c o n s i d e r w h a t Rawls takes the
content of the o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e to b e . He is clear throughout that
this principle r e q u i r e s at l e a s t formal equality of opportunity, that is
"equality as c a r e e r s o p e n t o t a l e n t s " (TJ 65). This requirement is scant­
ily explained. Surely Rawls m e a n s t o p r e c l u d e g r o u n d rules that call for
exclusion of specific p e r s o n s o r g r o u p s from certain careers. Presum­
ably he wants t o r e q u i r e f u r t h e r t h a t g r o u n d rules m u s t positively
mandate that o p p o r t u n i t i e s b e a l l o c a t e d in certain ways (for example,
byfirmsand schools). I c o n j e c t u r e t h a t to m a i n t a i n formal equality of
opportunity i n s t i t u t i o n s m u s t p r e s c r i b e t h a t information about open-
m
gs be reasonably w i d e l y available a n d t h a t n o g r o u p be excluded
wholesale from t h e c o m p e t i t i o n for a n o p e n i n g , u n l e s s this g r o u p is
defined by its m e m b e r s ' (1) inability o r u n w i l l i n g n e s s to pay the access
Pice (tuition, for e x a m p l e ) , (2) inferior suitability or qualifications as
reasonably related to p r o s p e c t s of s u c c e s s in t h e relevant career, or (3)
age. I think d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b y a g e n e e d n o t b e prohibited for the sake ot
maintaining formal equality^ of o p p o r t u n i t y as Rawls would specify it.
% not admitting s t u d e n t s a b o v e t h e age of thirty-five, law schools
*™Jd not be affecting p e r s o n s ' lifetime s h a r e s differentially.
J n e s e conjectures still leave i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s open. May otne
f u n d s (race, g e n d e r , g o o d looks, religious o r political affiliation)be
to the extent t h a t d o i n g s o m e r e l y h a m p e r s s o m e group*.butdoes
exclude t h e m a l t o g e t h e r ? M a y s u c h criteria b e considered compo­
r t s of suitability a f least, w h e n p a t i e n t s - t o take E m i s s i o n s to
JJJcal schools a s a n e x a m p l e - h a v e m o r e trust in white, male, ugly,
""stian, or conservative d o c t o r s ? , ^^.njtv
0 I
Rawls clearly b e l i e v e s t h a t m e r e formal equality of ° P P ™ J
JjWed ^ t h e n a t u t a t i o n of the « « > £ K
r a H i b i n t e r p r e
T j
£ 65-72), is n o t e n o u g h of a c o n s t r a i n t o n a market economy
U S f
ctr l° a m b i g u i t i e s ^ h i s a c c o u n t , however, it * ™ f
which s t r o n g e r v e r s i o n of t h e s e c o n d principle h e m e a n s to
T T g a s h i s o w n ( d e m o c r a t i c - e q u a l i t y ) interpretation
views a s a n i m p r o v e m e n t (over n a t u r a l liberty) t h e WW*

^ t h o u g h t retains its validity even if it is believed ^f^XpubuS

51 e n d 0 W m e n t f o r
CSH ' even then one can question (as£lato did m« H
s h o u l d a d u s t
^WtT T°™ ' themselves to natural differences in
•"an directly to the diversity in talents.
166 Rawls's O p p o r t u n i t y Principle, 14.5

equality i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e (TJ 73-74), on which the

o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e c o n s t r a i n i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e of efficiency is
s t r e n g t h e n e d i n t o " t h e p r i n c i p l e of fair e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y . " In first
i n t r o d u c i n g this p r i n c i p l e , h e w r i t e s : " T h e t h o u g h t h e r e is that posi­
t i o n s a r e t o b e n o t o n l y o p e n i n a formal s e n s e , b u t t h a t all should have
a fair c h a n c e t o a t t a i n t h e m . Offhand it is n o t c l e a r w h a t i s meant, but
w e m i g h t s a y t h a t . . . t h o s e w h o a r e a t t h e s a m e level of talent and
ability, a n d h a v e t h e s a m e w i l l i n g n e s s t o u s e t h e m , s h o u l d have the
s a m e p r o s p e c t s of s u c c e s s r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r initial p l a c e in the social
s y s t e m . . . . C h a n c e s t o a c q u i r e c u l t u r a l k n o w l e d g e a n d skills should not
d e p e n d u p o n o n e ' s c l a s s p o s i t i o n , a n d so t h e s c h o o l system, whether
p u b l i c or private, s h o u l d b e d e s i g n e d t o e v e n o u t c l a s s b a r r i e r s " (TJ 731.
T h e i n d e x ofA Theory ofJustice lists t h i s a s t h e p l a c e w h e r e "equality of
fair o p p o r t u n i t y [is] d e f i n e d " (TJ 594). T h e r e a r e t w o r o u g h l y parallel
p a s s a g e s : fair e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y r e q u i r e s " e q u a l c h a n c e s of educa­
tion a n d c u l t u r e for p e r s o n s similarly e n d o w e d a n d motivated" (TJ
275), a n d " t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e . . . r e q u i r e s e q u a l life p r o s p e c t s in all
6
s e c t o r s of society for t h o s e similarly e n d o w e d a n d m o t i v a t e d " (TJ 3011.
This e v i d e n c e s u g g e s t s that Rawls's o w n d e m o c r a t i c - e q u a l i t y inter­
p r e t a t i o n of t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e — " c o m b i n i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e of fair
equality of o p p o r t u n i t y w i t h t h e difference p r i n c i p l e " (TJ 75)—follows
t h e liberal-equality i n t e r p r e t a t i o n in invoking t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between
inequalities of o p p o r t u n i t y t h a t a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e a l l o w s to arise
from social c o n t i n g e n c i e s a n d t h o s e it a l l o w s t o a r i s e from natural
c o n t i n g e n c i e s (TJ 72-75). T h e f o r m e r w o u l d b e e n t i r e l y p r o h i b i t e d by
t n e o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e , w h e r e a s t h e l a t t e r w o u l d b e left to "the
o i t t e r e n c e p r i n c i p l e [which] w o u l d a l l o c a t e r e s o u r c e s in education,
t0 Pr e
thu!°^ S
™T t h e l o n
« - t e n n e x p e c t a t i o n of t h e least favored. If
a t t a m e d b i v i
r ™ !?i y S n g m o r e a t t e n t i o n t o t h e b e t t e r e n d o w e d , it is
p e r m i s s i b l e ; o t h e r w i s e n o t " (TJ 101)
eanSl!? 8
^
t a n d i n g of Rawls's o w n democratic- u n d e r s

9 1 0 n t h 6 r e i n d i
e S l T J ™ '
^ t i o n s t h a t Rawls w a n t s all in-
t 0 b e
Thufhe c h n r , O P P O r t
u n s t r a i n e d b y a m a x i m i n criterion.
1
, n i t y

3 d a S S i n d u c e
orincinl-Th - d i n e q u a l i t y t o i l l u s t r a t e h i s difference
m T Z e r t v nZ* ° ° **» e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l classU t m e m b e r s f

in p r o p e r t y - o w n i n g d e m o c r a c y , say, h a v e a b e t t e r p r o s p e c t t h a n those
6
I n what follows. 1 soealt r.r,t rvf^u .
0 r r o s e
Rawls i s c o n c e r n e d with c ^ a n r p , P P « s b u t of a c c e s s . O n e reason is that
similarly e n d o w e d and r n o S h P P a c r o s s social c l a s s e s o n l y for those K
r o s e c t s

to take advantage of the!r o n n n ' I !• ° «he l o w e s t class may be l e s s motivated b m tato

inferior. Such i i S w u a X d o n I ° * * ^ T H A T H E L R L I F E T I M E S H A L S T E N D , 0

o r t u n i t
quires merely that those d i s a d v n a L e B V T F ' °PP y principle, w h i c h re-
a D
R R W L S S

C l a l c o n
the s a m e s u c c e s s as similarlv ™ A 7 « n g e n c i e s s h o u l d be a M e to achieve
B d o w e d m e m
c o n c e r n e d with inequalities o f " ° e r s of other c l a s s e s , and w h i c h thus is
S o c
c a u s e l class-related differences in rT? > ° e c o n o m i c inequalities that arise from tor
0 n o t
tunity principle, t h o u c h s u c h i n ^ i V " ' " ' therefore, violations of t h e o p p ° r
m
principle. ^ inequalities are c o n s t r a i n e d , of c o u r s e , by t h e difference
 R a w l s ' s O p p o r t u n i t y Principle, 14.5 167

who begin in t h e c l a s s of u n s k i l l e d l a b o r e r s . . . . [T]his kind of initial

inequality in life p r o s p e c t s . . . is justifiable only if t h e difference in
expectation is to t h e a d v a n t a g e of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e m a n w h o is worse
of [TJ 78). And h e w r i t e s t h a t " a n inequality of opportunity must
enhance the o p p o r t u n i t i e s of t h o s e w i t h t h e lesser opportunity" (TJ
303)7
The first ambiguity, t h e n , c o n c e r n s t h e kind of limitation Rawls
wants to impose u p o n s o c i o e c o n o m i c inequalities that institutions
allow to arise from social c o n t i n g e n c i e s . Is h e requiring rough statisti­
cal equality a m o n g p e r s o n s b o r n i n t o different classes w h o are sim­
ilarly endowed a n d m o t i v a t e d , o r m a y t h e basic structure generate
inequalities so l o n g a s d o i n g s o r a i s e s t h e s o c i o e c o n o m i c position of
the least advantaged in a b s o l u t e t e r m s ?
The second a m b i g u i t y c o n c e r n s t h e q u e s t i o n Equality or inequali­
ties of what?' On o n e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , Rawls w a s postulating a separate
social primary g o o d of i n t e r m e d i a t e i m p o r t a n c e , a n d such a good,
opportunities, i n d e e d a p p e a r e d o n t h e c a n o n i c a l list of social primary
goods (TJ 62, 92). It w o u l d i n c l u d e a c c e s s to "cultural knowledge and
skffls" (TJ 73) a n d t o " e d u c a t i o n a n d c u l t u r e " (TJ 275). Postulating such
a
good, Rawls c o u l d e x p l a i n t h e d e s i g n priority of t h e opportunity
Principle over t h e difference p r i n c i p l e as follows: a basic structure
under which t h e least a d v a n t a g e d suffer a shortfall from fair equality ot
opportunity is a l w a y s u n j u s t , e v e n w h e n this enables t h e m to have a
b e t t e r
^ d e x p o s i t i o n , b e c a u s e o p p o r t u n i t i e s are incommensurably
m o r e
important t h a n i n d e x g o o d s (just as first-principle goods are
«commensurably m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n opportunities). In this vein
Rawls writes: "It is n o t e n o u g h to a r g u e . . . that t h e whole of society
deluding the least favored b e n e f i t from certain restrictions on equality
I opportunity. W e m u s t a l s o c l a i m t h a t t h e a t t e m p t to eliminate these
^qualities w o u l d s o i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e social system a n d the opera-
tons of the e c o n o m y t h a t i n t h e l o n g r u n a n y w a y t h e opportunities ot
disadvantaged w o u l d b e e v e n m o r e limited" (TJ 300-1). An in-

'Healsos t h a , ..^ redefines the grounds for s o d d q u a l i t i e s

J^Pomt B i n t h i s s e n t e n c e . j t e n d t o t h i n k h e is suggesting that me a b v

8 t h e
C«W dWerence p r i n c i p l e for that of fair equality of " P P ^ ^ ^ e context
W U l d S U r t w h a

s° & ° f PP° * ^ w l s is s e e k i n g to s h o w , namely, « h a t w t l i n the ^

'SSw\° i U S U c
° ' <
a k e r C o n s t r a i n t
e a s a w h l e h e r e
H e m a t t n o t h e r r e a d i n g is i s m u c h l M S U r g e n C y

Pos Mpr S ^ m o r e easily satisfied. But I concede.that ano h e n s

W M < C f M a r t i n R R n t
* W • ° ' ™- T h e democratic-equality • ^ ^ £ l e for
•CnwT"
n c
U p o n
^ e q u a l i t i e s in r e w a r d s by substituting the d>fferencep
f 6 f f i c i e n C T h i s
£l ° >'- u n d e r s t a n d i n g , too, w o u l d lend s o m ^ s u p P ^ g
that nCe
T
•*fcd
n g t 0 s h o w

UaJities
H e w o u l d b e a s s u m i n
6 be very great ° l«woufd7ot
and 1 S
feir i n t h e
r e w a r d s a t t a c h e d t o the v a n o u s )obs w o u ^
4 « quality of o p p o r t u n i t y w o u l d b e e n h a n c e d for those g their h a m o n
t o t h
1 * 5 e m o r e egalitarian distribution of i n c o m e a n d wean
168 Rawls's O p p o r t u n i t y P r i n c i p l e , 14.5

equality of o p p o r t u n i t y m u s t e n h a n c e t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s of those with

8
t h e l e s s e r o p p o r t u n i t y " (TJ 3 0 3 ) — n o t m e r e l y t h e i r i n d e x position.
Alternatively, Rawls m i g h t h a v e b e e n c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e possibility
t h a t social c o n t i n g e n c i e s m i g h t b e a l l o w e d t o give rise t o inequalities in
i n d e x g o o d s — i n i n c o m e a n d i n p o w e r s a n d p r e r o g a t i v e s of offices and
p o s i t i o n s of responsibility. T h i s v i e w is s u g g e s t e d , for example, by his
p a r a p h r a s e : "Positions a r e t o b e n o t o n l y o p e n i n a formal sense, b u t . .
all s h o u l d h a v e a fair c h a n c e t o a t t a i n t h e m " (TJ 73). There is no
9
s e p a r a t e social p r i m a r y g o o d " o p p o r t u n i t i e s " .
Cast a s q u e s t i o n s , t h e t w o a m b i g u i t i e s c a n b e s u m m e d u p this way:
F i r s t u n d e r t h e ideal b a s i c s t r u c t u r e , a r e i n e q u a l i t i e s of opportunity
arising from social c o n t i n g e n c i e s [1] p e r m i t t e d insofar as, ceteris par­
ibus, t h e y (interschemically) e n h a n c e t h e w o r s t s o c i o e c o n o m i c posi­
tion, o r a r e t h e y [2] strictly r u l e d o u t ? S e c o n d , d o e s t h e opportunity
p r i n c i p l e limit h o w social c o n t i n g e n c i e s m a y give r i s e t o differentials in
a c c e s s t o [A] i n d e x g o o d s o r t o [B] o p p o r t u n i t i e s u n d e r s t o o d as a social
p r i m a r y g o o d in t h e i r o w n right? T h e s e t w o a m b i g u i t i e s permit (ini­
tially) four m u t u a l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e r e a d i n g s of R a w l s ' s democratic-
equality i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e , i n c l u d i n g four different
v e r s i o n s of t h e o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e a s it c o n s t r a i n s t h e difference
principle, as follows:

11A] I n e q u a l i t i e s i n i n d e x g o o d s a r e g o v e r n e d b y t h e d i f f e r e n c e p r i n c i p l e ,
C O N D I T I O N ( O P o f
2 y ™ *° IA) f o r m a l e q u a l i t y of oppor-

F IB] Inequalities.in i n d e x g o o d s are g o v e r n e d b y t h e difference principle,

c dm n
n ™ T ° ( O P
' B > t h a t t h e r e m u s t b e f o r m a l e q u a l i t y of
to £ h £ L r ^ ' , " ^ ^ t i e s o f o p p o r t u n i t y (for e x a m p l e , i n a c c e s s
n d , 0 w e d t o
if anrlTn,of * ™ c o n t i n g e n c i e s only
t h e m t o a r i s e o p t i m i z e s t h e r t u n i t i e s o f
•SS^^tSST* °pp°
[ 2 A 1 8 0 0 m v e m e d
I S c f t o l ^ " ^ * S° ^ ' h e difference principle,

i s > acc toindexgoodsmust

classes).
Zi£y zz™* u

e n d o w e d p e r s o n s b o r n i n t o different social
T r 5

"Here o n e m i g h t a d d that u n d e r l e « t h , , , , . i , „f
y f a v o r a
o p p o r t u n i t y c o u l d , theoretically a n v w J T ^ W e c o n d i t i o n s a n inequality o
U S i f i e d
to o p t i m i z e the worst package of n r W n r i n r ^ i ' i « « " F ^ B Y M U I N T H A T I S N E

P g o o d s B u t f o r , h
t o simplify matters by restrictine t h * Hi. - - e t i m e b e i n g w e d o best
- T h o u g h not a socialprfm«Jg£d, o o o o r t l " H ° ^ -,l
P rtUn ,llke
g o o d , o n a p a r w i t h t h e i n d e x g o o d s £ p o r t "y
unir
e d u c a t i o n ) w o u l d s u l l b e a social
i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h m a k e accessible a n ~ r y w o u l d b e a m o n g t h e things that
b a s e s of self-respect. Presumably also a m o n g t h e residual social
'"Though it r e a d s t h e o p p o r t u n i t y princinl^ ,. „f
q u u i n
o p p o r t u n i t y . [1A1 i s n o t t h e s a m e a s t h e N A I F F , ^ 8 m e r e l y formal equality ot
r , y i n t e r
principle, b e c a u s e it i m p o s e s t h e d i f f e r e n t • p r e t a t i o n of the second
P n n C l p l e i n 8 t e a d o f
principle of efficiency (TJ 66-70), as a s e c o n d a ' t h e m u c h weaker
inequalities. ™y constraint u p o n s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c
 Rawls's O p p o r t u n i t y Principle, 14.6 169

(2B) Inequalities in index goods are governed by the difference principle,

subject to the condition (OP ) that there must be formal equality of
2B

opportunity, a n d no inequalities of opportunity may be allowed to

arise from social contingencies (that is, access to education and the
like must be equal for similarly endowed persons bom into different
11
social classes!.

Since the texts d o n o t c l e a r l y favor o n e reading, let m e p r o c e e d with a

brief analysis, w h i c h will s h o w t h a t o n l y version [1A] is tenable.
14.6. Version [IB] involves t h e i d e a t h a t o p p o r t u n i t i e s constitute a
separate category of social p r i m a r y g o o d s , intermediate in t h e lexical
hierarchy b e t w e e n f i r s t - p r i n c i p l e g o o d s a n d index goods. It implies a
preference for t h e feasible b a s i c s t r u c t u r e t h a t optimizes the worst (set
of) opportunities. But t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t m a k e s n o sense. For oppor­
tunities must b e u n d e r s t o o d e i t h e r i n a b s o l u t e or in relative terms. If we
understand t h e m i n absolute t e r m s (as reflecting, for instance, h o w
much education o n e h a s a c c e s s to), t h e n [IB] requires that resources
must without limit b e d e v o t e d t o t h e p r o d u c t i o n of opportunities in
preference t o i n d e x g o o d s , b e c a u s e t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s of the least ad­
vantaged take p r e c e d e n c e o v e r t h e i r i n d e x position. This priority is
absurd. On t h e o t h e r h a n d , if w e u n d e r s t a n d opportunities in relative
'erms (as reflecting h o w m u c h e d u c a t i o n o n e h a s access to as a per­
centage of t h e average, for e x a m p l e ) , t h e n t h e s e c o n d principle allows
no inequalities of o p p o r t u n i t y at all, a n d [IB] collapses into [2B]. This
dilemma u n d e r m i n e s [IB], t o g e t h e r w i t h Rawls's idea that t h e w a y to
Justify inequalities of o p p o r t u n i t y is t o s h o w t h a t they "enhance the
opportunities of t h o s e w i t h t h e l e s s e r o p p o r t u n i t y " (TJ 303, cf. 300).
Version [2B] p r e s u p p o s e s a r a t i o n a l e i n w h i c h opportunities are
fonceived in relative t e r m s , a s a p o s i t i o n a l good. What is presumecI to
°eimportant is n o t h a v i n g a c c e s s t o a s m u c h e d u c a t i o n as possible out
^ving n o less a c c e s s t o e d u c a t i o n t h a n others. With t h e good so
Jfined, the p a r t i e s , r e a s o n i n g i n a c c o r d a n c e with t h e maximm rute,
f adopt a n equality of o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e . They will not care^how
"J«h there is b y w a y of o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n absolute terms (and t h u c a n
the political p r o c e s s t o g o v e r n overall allocations to education),
prohibit i n e q u a l i t i e s of o p p o r t u n i t y b e c a u s e a n y sucfi m-
0 1
g » t a h » m u s t (logically) r e d u c e t h e w o r s t set of W ^ ^
^ - g i v e n t h e lexical priority w i t h i n t h e s e c o n d P™^*
as lowering t h e w o r s t social p o s i t i o n overall (even w h e n they
the w o r s t i n d e x p o s i t i o n ! . " A l t h o u g h it p r e s u p p o s e s s u c h a

Parent
eqIiS hetical
8 clauses might also be, for [2AI, "prospect
KS^ * a i
endowed and motivated persons bom " t o
r a s e
endowed Jg^gy
«dW P P « s for education and the like must be^qualforsmu
mohvated persons bom into different social classes. Compare n.*• ^
^ aoSfl' ^ h e r e
disregarding that an inequality ° ° P P ° ! ^ ^ , " sentative first- f m
re

6 firet P r i n i p l 6 8 8 b E i n g n e c e S s a r y 1 0
Kff^ore " ' ^
170 Rawls's O p p o r t u n i t y P r i n c i p l e , 14.7

tionale, [2B] is also i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h it, b e c a u s e [2B] allows inequalities

of o p p o r t u n i t y b a s e d u p o n natural c o n t i n g e n c i e s , allows, for example,
a s Rawls clearly w a n t s t o allow
(e.g., TJ 101), inferior a c c e s s to education
for p e r s o n s less well e n d o w e d .
Version [2A] involves t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t o p p o r t u n i t i e s d o not con­
s t i t u t e a social p r i m a r y g o o d i n t h e i r o w n right, t h a t socioeconomic
p o s i t i o n s a r e d e t e r m i n e d b y i n d e x g o o d s a l o n e . O n this assumption,
t h e p a r t i e s will prefer a c r i t e r i o n of social j u s t i c e t h a t a s s e s s e s all social
a n d e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t i e s t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n s t e n d t o p r o d u c e by refer­
e n c e t o t h e lowest i n d e x p o s i t i o n . T h e y h a v e n o r e a s o n to allow this
lowest i n d e x p o s i t i o n t o b e l o w e r e d i n o r d e r t o e q u a l i z e across classes
t h e i n d e x p r o s p e c t s of p e r s o n s similarly m o t i v a t e d a n d endowed. So
(2AI t o o , is i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h its s u g g e s t e d r a t i o n a l e . It collapses into
[1AL w h i c h lets t h e difference p r i n c i p l e g o v e r n all inequalities of oppor­
tunity ( w h e t h e r b a s e d o n social o r n a t u r a l c o n t i n g e n c i e s ) , subject only
t o t h e o n e c o n s t r a i n t of formal e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y .
It m a y s e e m t h a t if t h e p a r t i e s c a r e d o n l y a b o u t i n d e x goods, then
t h e y w o u l d g o even further a n d prefer t o [1A] a p r o p o s a l o n which the
o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e is d e l e t e d entirely. B u t I t h i n k Rawls could de-
t e n d t h e w e a k e s t o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e e v e n if it w e r e n o t correlated
w i t h a social p r i m a r y g o o d of its o w n . F o r m a l e q u a l i t y of opportunity
r e q u i r e s a u m v e r s a l right to c o m p e t e for all o p e n i n g s o n t h e basis of
o n e s suitability a n d qualifications a s well a s o n e ' s ability a n d willing­
n e s s t o p a y t h e a c c e s s price. T h i s i s a n e a r l y cost-free legal mechanism
that, t h r o u g h a gains i n productivity, i s b o u n d t o p a y its o w n way, for it
arg6rn U m b e r o f
th™ I a 0 b 8
1™*®**
A
a p p l i c a n t s a r e available for
d p t i n g i l th d e s a n d
?riorih?rSSr 2U - ° '™ ^ implementation
fowesHnZ t h e
.? f f e r e n
« Principle, involves negligible risks for the
a^^V^T^ B
^ h3S S
P O , n t
n t a d v a n t a g e s in specificity and
s i n i f i c a

3Su£^i^fr» ^ ° ' f t h e
a t institutions p a r t i e s c o n c e m t h

1 s h o u l d e n e n d e r a s h a r e d s e n s e o f e q u a l
S S S f f i ^ ^ ' ! ? ^ §
^ S ^ ^ ^ T . T ^ t h e s t r a i n s
of c o m m i t m e n t ,
sSsted ™i
w i t h "hs f 0 U X V e r S i 0 n S
of Rawls's s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e , each
Seed somf2ln ' W e
^ f
° U n d
y «AJ t h a t o n J i s t e n a b l C

% o f
t h e c a n o n i c a l list of s o d a f n ^ ^ ° P P o r t u n i t y . T h u s , on D

" o p p o r t u n i t i e s " (TJ 62,92 FG s S ^ ^

r e
P l a c 6 S ' *** !"E
c h o i c e of o c c u p a t i o n against a ! f ° ° baTkL ^ m f m o v e m e n t a n d

(KCMT 526; BLP 22; Js^^ST^

° ™ opportunities f d e

passage o n the opportunity ^ ^ J ^ ^ g X

•n-his is strangely redundant, for "freedom rrf ra
m o v e m e n t a n d
tion" are also i n c l u d e d u n d e r t h e freedom r t free c h o i c e of occupa- a n
8 o f t h e
protection i s t h u s already required b y t h e first n ' " " i ^ p e r s o n (BLP 50); their
A n da
o p p o r t u n i t i e s " w o u l d s e e m a rather o d d ( p u b l i c ) ^ ? i ' "background of diverse
s i o n Rawls w a n t e d t o d r o p a social primarv ffnrJfc?
Prinwiy g o o d . I h a v e t h e impres-
P m a r y g o o d from t h e list w i t h o u t s a y i n g s o .
 R a w l s ' s O p p o r t u n i t y Principle, 14.8.1 171

suggest a r e q u i r e m e n t of formal e q u a l i t y of opportunity: "Announce­

ments of jobs a n d p o s i t i o n s c a n b e f o r b i d d e n to contain statements
which exclude a p p l i c a n t s of c e r t a i n d e s i g n a t e d ethnic a n d racial
groups, or of e i t h e r s e x T h e n o t i o n of fair equality of o p p o r t u n i t y . . .
has a central r a n g e of a p p l i c a t i o n w h i c h consists of various liberties
together with c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h t h e s e liberties can be
effectively exercised" (BLP 79).
14.8. We have f o u n d n o p l a u s i b l e r a t i o n a l e in A Theory of Justice for
the view that i n e q u a l i t i e s i n a c c e s s t o e d u c a t i o n ([2B]) or to jobs with
associated r e w a r d s <[2A)), a r e a c c e p t a b l e w h e n related to natural con­
14
tingencies, b u t u n j u s t w h e n r e l a t e d t o social c o n t i n g e n c i e s . But one
might think t h a t t h i s v i e w is n e v e r t h e l e s s morally plausible or that it
appeals to t h e p a r t i e s for o t h e r r e a s o n s (such a s publicity, equal cit­
izenship, or stability). Let m e p r e s e n t t w o r e a s o n s for doubting that this
is so.
14.8.1. The first difficulty c a n b e illustrated by a social system whose
Participants a r e d i v i d e d i n t o r i c h a n d p o o r , b e t t e r e n d o w e d a n d worse
endowed. So t h e r e a r e f o u r g r o u p s : RB, PB, RW, a n d PW. Suppose this
social system h a s b a s i c s t r u c t u r e O N E , w h i c h t e n d s to e n g e n d e r signifi­
cant class-induced differentials i n e d u c a t i o n a l opportunities. Admis­
sion to the better s c h o o l s r e q u i r e s little b y w a y of talents a n d motiva­
tion but is mainly r e g u l a t e d b y h i g h t u i t i o n charges. Many m e m b e r s of
"Wean and d o a t t e n d s u c h s c h o o l s , b u t m o s t of t h o s e born a m o n g the
Poor cannot d o likewise, w h a t e v e r t h e i r e n d o w m e n t s . Assume further
mat the tuition b a r r i e r is in fact justified o n t h e [1A] reading of the
second principle ( w h e r e it r e q u i r e s only formal equality of oppor-
^ t y ) . There a r e e n o u g h RB e n t r a n t s t o fill t h e m o s t important offices
th
2 qualified g r a d u a t e s , e v e n w i t h o u t offering subsidies to m e m b e r s ot
d
f" the tuition b a r r i e r p r o v i d e s a powerful incentive to parents to
*°rk especially h a r d for t h e s a k e of financing their children s educa-
J»n-These t w o factors, b y m a x i m i z i n g overall income, make O N E t h e
^ e m e that o p t i m i z e s t h e i n d e x p o s i t i o n of t h e least advantaged (PW),
„ T e r e n c e principle requires. , .. . ,
On the A ] a n d [2B] r e a d i n g s of t h e s e c o n d principle, this social
[2

W e m stands i n n e e d of i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform. T h e educational^or job

P^spects b e t w e e n g r o u p s RB a n d PB, a n d b e t w e e n groups RW a n d r w ,

w e a k e r c o n s t r a i n t n t n e d u T e r e n c e p r i n c p l e
^ ° : , - " ^ T b o S n S K
S m e l y a n
on" a "s ' economic system under which the socia^ class one is.bom «a
R e c e s s to education, say but not one's access to index
^ q u o t a s that give persons b o m into the lower classes Bur'access to bet J ^
fig*** qualifications, merely on the basis of their tatente and ™ ^
6 r e
^
Cnnh P ° n , e supplements that compensate * " * D O T O ^
3 X 6 s e c i a l m c
RF

n d u
f s u s p e c t insofar as these are due to the ^ ^ ? ^ unliMy
a t n T h e r e
tw S ' £ * certain remoteness about s u c h P ' , " esatisfiedin o s s

•hese Siu y
o r
difference principle would ever favor hat O F W S
i e n c
* ^
t h e
h 0 D

^ ways , r a t h e r ^. e d inequalities in
h a n
[ZA] B) redu c l a i n d u C ^f^ a n d [ 2

mandate). I am Therefore taking the liberty of treating IZW

e r m
what follows.
172 Rawls's O p p o r t u n i t y P r i n c i p l e , 14.8.2

m u s t b e e q u a l i z e d . A s s u m e t h e r e is a feasible alternative basic struc­

t u r e , T W O , u n d e r w h i c h t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l a n d motivational entrance
r e q u i r e m e n t s a r e r a i s e d a n d t u i t i o n fees m a d e affordable to members
of PB; T W O c o m e s m u c h c l o s e r t h a n O N E t o satisfying O P ^ and 0 P . It 2B

also satisfies t h e difference p r i n c i p l e , w h i c h t h i s t i m e , of course, is

subject to a m o r e d e m a n d i n g o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e ( O P ^ or 0P ). 2B

N o w s u p p o s e i n d e x p o s i t i o n s a r e t h o s e given i n T a b l e 3. On reading
[1A], O N E is p r e f e r r e d b e c a u s e it g e n e r a t e s t h e h i g h e r m i n i m u m index
p o s i t i o n (20 a s a g a i n s t 17). O n r e a d i n g s [2A] a n d (2B), T W O is preferred
b e c a u s e it avoids a h i g h e r - o r d e r i n j u s t i c e . U n d e r O N E t h e p o o r (PB and
1 5
PW) suffer a m u c h g r e a t e r i n e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y .
T h i s p r e f e r e n c e for T W O i l l u s t r a t e s t h e first difficulty. Yes, thanks to
t h e m u c h l o w e r p r o s p e c t s i n RW, t h e l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d (PW) now enjoy
s o m e t h i n g a p p r o a c h i n g "fair e q u a l i t y of e d u c a t i o n a l opportunity.'' But
t h e i r e d u c a t i o n is n o t o n e bit b e t t e r u n d e r T W O t h a n u n d e r O N E , nor is
t h e i r overall d i s a d v a n t a g e at all r e d u c e d ; t h e y a r e still effectively ex­
c l u d e d from t h e b e t t e r s c h o o l s , w h i c h c o n t i n u e t o b e accessible to
o t h e r s . It is a b s u r d t o r e g a r d t h e i r p o s i t i o n a s m u c h b e t t e r u n d e r TWO
t h a n u n d e r O N E just b e c a u s e t w o other g r o u p s , PB a n d RW, have (so to
speak) e x c h a n g e d p l a c e s . " A n d it w o u l d b e similarly bizarre to allow
2
• t u ?J ? P
F l m l e m e n t
a t i o n p r i o r i t y over t h e difference principle, that
is, t o h o l d t h a t efforts t o w a r d reversing t h e p r o s p e c t s of PB a n d RW are
always m o r e u r g e n t t h a n efforts t o m i t i g a t e e v e n s e v e r e poverty within
(as w h e n t h e i r i n d e x p o s i t i o n falls far s h o r t of t h e feasible minimum

6 8
u n d t r S ^ ro * t h a t fair e q u a l i t y of opportunity, as
eauSn „ m M ]
""J f 2 B L C a n n e v
b e satisfied, at least if thee r

mueVZrl^T S l m
? l a r l y 6 n d o w e d a n d
m o t i v a t e d " (TJ 301). More
d i t i o n a j
^ m ^ ^ f r ^ r 6
f RESOURCES T O E N S U R E
H t h
ck
g r o u n d s whTairT » , a d
^ - f r - v k c h i l d r e n from p o o r e r back­
g r o u n d s w h o a r e equally well e n d o w e d a n d m o t i v a t e d . A n d even if they

tto2^^SSl^tiSd£SS!fc^ iss^ of c o u r e e t h a t
° t h e r t h i n
s s
•« t e ( u a l , p a r
"
tunity!T alsoisumeXT.treare^^^/-P^'Plegoods a n d / o r m a / e q u a l i t y of oppor-
c , a s s l n d u c
" T h i s objection c a n b e c o u n t P r ^ J I K - e d differentials i n motivation,
S p 6 C l f y i n 6 t h e ( 2 A ) o r 2 B n o t i o n o f f a i r o p p C
tunity in terms of a c c e s s to index n « I e 1 ' ""
o p o r t u n
ments. This specification w o u l d email thT P i t i e s consonant with ones endo»-
r N E o n h / t h e
higher-order injustice a n d are therefore t h - i " " ° m e m b e r s of PB suffer a
a d v a n t a
suffer n o higher-order injustice u n d e r either g e d g r o u p . T h e m e m b e r s ot HW
N rW b e c a u s e
are, they have l e s s of a n e e d for better j o b , n ° J L ° ° ' - w o r s e e n d o w e d as they
e d u c a
rationale for Rawls's d e c i s i o n to h a n d l e in** , < i o n T h i s c o u n t e r provides a
e q u a l l e s
differently from t h o s e related to natural ,. " related t o social contingencies
c o n
8 B u t i H s n o t a
for at least four r e a s o n s . T h e difficulties o t T ^ I f p r o m i s i n g counter
e n g a reasona
c o n s o n a n c e , suitable a s part o f a public criterion r - Wy s h a r p notion ot
s t , c e m
priority of t h e o p p o r t u n i t y principle, s o u n d e n t ' V ' o v e r w h e l m i n g . T h e lexical
e e m s f a r t o
specification is e x p o s e d t o t h e t w o objections n^Jt ? ° risky. T h e proposed
8 1 0 A 2 Z a a i n s t s o c
primary g o o d s relative to natural attributes. A n d s u h ^ defining
a
tent with Rawls's s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m . definition i s , at a n y rate, inconsis-
 Educational a n d E m p l o y m e n t Opportunities, 15.1 173

Table 3. Index positions u n d e r alternative b a s i c structures ^ ^

Representative groups

RB PB RW PW

Basic structure ONE 90 24 60 20

Basic structure TWO 75 60 22 17

did not do this, their c h i l d r e n w o u l d have many intangible advantages

in terms of the contact p e r s o n s t h e y are exposed to in their home,
1 7
neighborhood, and p e e r g r o u p . A s c h o o l system that does literally
even out class barriers" (TJ 73)—if possible at all—is bound to be
extremely expensive a n d therefore w o u l d reduce index positions (in­
cluding that of t h e least advantaged). Requiring s u c h an education
system is thoroughly i m p l a u s i b l e a n d surely unacceptable to the risk-
averse parties, especially if t h e opportunity principle entailing this
requirement is to have n o t o n l y d e s i g n but also implementation pri­
ority over the difference principle. T h e s e difficulties show decisively, I
^ that [1A] is preferable to [2A] a n d [2BJ.

1 5
-Educational a n d E m p l o y m e n t Opportunities

!5.1. There is a n o t h e r w a y of saving Rawls's intuition (at the time of

anting A Theory of Justice) that the difference principle should be
unstrained by s o m e t h i n g stronger than merely formal equality ot
opportunity. This n e w version of the s e c o n d principle addresses our
A c u i t i e s by u n d e r s t a n d i n g the opportunity principle so that it
Quires more o n behalf of t h e w o r s e e n d o w e d and also requires less
wan strict equality (though it still u n d e r s t a n d s opportunities in relative
"ns). Let m e b e g i n w i t h t h e former improvement,
un
major defect of Rawls's attempts to formulate an °PP°^ ^
P^ciple r e q u i r i n g m o opportunity is his idea
r e { h a n formal e q u a l i t y o f
at
J distinction b e t w e e n social a n d natural contingencies is mor
^ • g n t f c a m . If Rawls is right that inequalities of opportunity are too
"JPortant to be left to t h e i n d e x - g o o d calculus, then t h »
^ c e - i n d u c e d a n d g e n d e r - i n d u c e d as m u c h as of < * » * ™ * ™ *
JJUaBtfas. And it w o u l d s e e m to b e true of talent-inducedlinequah
& e s
<* o p , ,
p o r t u n i t y a d e d from education on
s w e ] n f a c t b e i n g e x d u

inSLE^ 'J E
° E d u c e s a g o o d deal of empiricalI
O F w h
«gen« «>
of aSed ^f^i^r
3ffair
W t a u
i m p l e m e n t i n g t h i s p r i n c i p l e , w h i c h h e calls

c o
N a t i o n a l e x p e n d i t u r e for children born mto
n a l d e w w a y s of i m p l e m e n t i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t mvo
classes.
rf thejam^
s u c h

^ a u t o n o m y , it l e a r w h e t h e r Rawls takes t h e first P ™ ^ £ conception of

i s u n c

(see J sii). m a n y c a s e , it w o u l d b e rather embarrassing rfn.sc

T

" ^ d i d , practice, require s u c h i n v a s i o n s of family autonomy.

m
174 Educational and Employment Opportunities, 15.1
the ground that o n e ' s talents aren't worth developing may well be more
devastating to one's self-respect than exclusion on the ground that
one's parents cannot afford to pay tuition. Yet all four readings of Rawls
that we have considered may support as ideal a basic structure under
which very little education and training are available to the less well
endowed. In each case their disadvantage is justified by appeal to the
difference principle. The cost of offering more education to the worse
endowed is a bad investment, is not fully redeemed by their greater
productivity later in life. Skimping on their education maximizes over­
all income and therefore, given the difference principle, also the in­
come of the least advantaged (most of whom may themselves be among
the worse endowed). Hence, severe talent-induced inequalities in edu­
cational opportunity may well be required by Rawls's second principle,
e v e n under the best of circumstances.
Rawls seeks to mitigate this harsh result by emphasizing "the role of
education in enabling a person to enjoy the culture of his society and to
take part in its affairs, and in this way to provide for each individual a
secure s e n s e of his o w n worth" (TJ 101); "resources for education are
not to be allotted solely or necessarily mainly according to their return
as estimated in productive trained abilities, but also according to their
worth in enriching the personal and social life of citizens" (TJ 1071
Stated in proper form, his thought must be this: The severe educational
inequalities in question are justified only when they (interschemicallyi
optimize the index position of the least advantaged. But they are un­
likely to do this, because any gain in the income of the least advantaged
they may produce will probably be outweighed by a loss in their self-
respect." Hence, only rather mild talent-induced inequalities of educa­
tional opportunity will be justifiable by the difference principle.
Ot course, lacking any notion of how the various index goods are to
be weighted and aggregated, we have no way of evaluating this claim.
16 1 d e indeedtakea
ShlJh . !?^" d ° "nCe ccount of education in this waythen
™rLrS* t h e
^rP P r f n c i l e n e e d t o
be subjected to a further
constraint specifically upon cfass-induced inequalities of opportunity'
This question presses toward [1A]. But let me here pursue the inverse
e eeda PeCial C n S t r a i n t
?uXZsZ ^ ? ° "P™ Equalities of oppor­
tunity ansmg from socia/ contingencies, then why shouldn't this con­
straint need to be extended to inequalities X S ^ L y related to
other kinds of conhngencies? This question presses toward a new
version of the democratic-equality mterpretationTthe second princi-

[3B) I n e q u a l i t i e s i n i n d e x g o o d s ar*> «, . ,
subject to the condition ( O P ^
' ^
TJT
t n a t
b y
^ Terence
principle^
there m u s t b e formal equality of
'"See § 1 4 2 . S u c h e d u c a t i o n a l inequalities m=>, „> • W e rt h e a c c e s s t h e l e a S t 3
„
taged h a v e to p o w e r s a n d prerogatives of S a
f ^°
n d
^
Rawls lists as a n o t h e r i n d e x g o o d . P ° « H o n s of responsibility, w h i d
 E d u c a t i o n a l a n d E m p l o y m e n t Opportunities, 15.2 175

opportunity a n d rough equality of actual opportunity (that is, partici­

pants must have roughly equivalent access to education and the
19
like).

0P requires, in a d d i t i o n t o formal e q u a l i t y of opportunity, that every­

3B

one should have a c c e s s t o a r o u g h l y equivalent education, with equiva­

2 0
lence defined in t e r m s of c o s t . T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n that persons must
actually receive s u c h a r o u g h l y e q u i v a l e n t e d u c a t i o n , only that it must
be genuinely a c c e s s i b l e t o t h e m . P e r h a p s g e n u i n e access is incompat­
ible with d i s c o u r a g e m e n t s of t h e k i n d t h a t have b e e n subtly hampering
the education of w o m e n . P r e s u m a b l y g e n u i n e access also does not
exist when p a r e n t s m a y r e f u s e e d u c a t i o n a l opportunities o n their
childrens' behalf ( w h i c h w o u l d s u g g e s t t h a t t h e earlier stages of educa­
tion must be c o m p u l s o r y ) .
Governed b y t h e o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e , s u c h access is inalienable,
^ o t be g a m b l e d o r given o r s o l d a w a y (cf. §10.7). Nevertheless, there
may be cases of p e r s o n s h a v i n g g e n u i n e access t o but declining a
roughly equivalent e d u c a t i o n . S u c h c a s e s d o n o t indicate an injustice
in the relevant e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m .
Finally, O P is i n s e n s i t i v e t o how a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e ensures that all
3 B

have access to a r o u g h l y e q u i v a l e n t e d u c a t i o n . Schools a n d universities

m
ay be publicly financed, o r s t u d e n t s m a y have access to sufficient
Personal or p a r e n t a l f u n d s , s c h o l a r s h i p s , s u m m e r jobs, or loans from
Public or private s o u r c e s .
154. Version [3B] a c c o r d s w i t h [B] b y conceiving opportunities as a
primary g o o d in t h e i r o w n right. In t h e o t h e r dimension, 13W is
egalitarian, like [2], i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s in relative terms -w
? Positional good). In t h i s , it diverges from t h e a s s u m p t i o n implicit^in
in namely, t h a t a p e r s o n g a i n s b y h a v i n g m o r e access absolutely even u
^ greater a c c e s s c o m e s at t h e e x p e n s e of having less access than
Jfoers. C o m p a r e d t o [2], [3B] is more egalitarian by having the oppor-
J " % principle c o n s t r a i n all i n e q u a l i t i e s of o p p o r t u n i t y - n o t only
* * * arising from social c o n t i n g e n c i e s b u t also those a n s m g from
"fural c o n t i n g e n c i e s o r l u c k . T h u s [3B] a s s u m e s that a p e r s o n . c o m
J j * ^ r e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s n o t only with those: h a d by o A e r s
J»e talents a n d l u c k Z s i m i l a r t o h e r o w n . But t h e n [3B] i u d
JtaMtan t h a n [2] in t h a t it e m p l o y s a less d e m a n d i n g notion
as I will e x p l a i n . . , A i and H t h [ 2

Venuon [ ] a v o i d s t h e first m a i n difficulty associated wrth12A\ a n a

3 B
f2B]
- fa the h y p o t h e t i c a l c a s e w e h a v e c o n s i d e r e d , [3B1 would require
6
b e ' S l f ^ * P a r e n t h e s e s m i g h t also b e 'prospects for education .ndthe like must
q U a l for
«%kV P e r s o n s similarly motivated." Compare nn. e q u i v alence,
d a i s
*Uc2' , ^ P P o r t e d in G a l s t o n , JHG 262-63. For there to be 3 H g ,
^ . " W t u n i t i e s m u s t a l s o b e diverse, s o as to match the " J m e n t ^ m
a t i o n
Pa?de^ ' interests, a n d a m b i t i o n s . T h e H " * * ^ * ^ ^ presumably
b»dS!? U p 0 n e a c h s o c i
a l s y s t e m s c i r c u m s t a n c e s and, theretore,
t 0
" ^ d t h e legislative stage.
176 E d u c a t i o n a l a n d E m p l o y m e n t O p p o r t u n i t i e s , 15.2

i n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms t o w a r d y e t a n o t h e r b a s i c s t r u c t u r e , T H R E E , under
w h i c h , b e c a u s e of a s t r o n g e r c o n s t r a i n t u p o n t h e difference principle,
t h e i n d e x p o s i t i o n of t h e l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d (PW) w o u l d o n c e again be
w o r s e t h a n u n d e r O N E . This t i m e , h o w e v e r , t h e justification for this
a b s o l u t e d e c l i n e i n t h e i r i n d e x p o s i t i o n (from O N E t o T H R E E ) is not
blatantly i m p l a u s i b l e . T h e r e f o r m of t h e e d u c a t i o n system would
greatly i m p r o v e t h e e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s of t h e least advantaged,
t h e r e b y s t r e n g t h e n i n g o n e i m p o r t a n t b a s i s of t h e i r self-respect. It
w o u l d also t e n d to i m p r o v e t h e i r relative i n d e x p o s i t i o n , because [3B],
unlike Rawls's four v e r s i o n s of t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e , d o e s not allow
t h e i r h a n d i c a p in t e r m s of m a r k e t a b l e t a l e n t s t o b e c o m p o u n d e d by the
d i s a d v a n t a g e of an inferior e d u c a t i o n .
Moreover, [3B] is a great i m p r o v e m e n t i n simplicity. To determine
w h e t h e r O P ^ a n d O P are satisfied, w e m u s t b e a b l e to delimit the
2 B

various social classes a n d , w i t h i n e a c h of t h e s e classes, t h e subsets of

p e r s o n s similarly m o t i v a t e d a n d e n d o w e d ; a n d w e m u s t b e able to
a s c e r t a i n t h e p r o b a b i l i t y - w e i g h t e d average e x p e c t a t i o n for educational
o p p o r t u n i t i e s ([2B]) o r future s u c c e s s ([2A]) w i t h i n all t h e s e relevant
s u b s e t s . In o r d e r to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r O P is satisfied, w e n e e d only 3 B

u n d e r s t a n d w h a t e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s t h e v a r i o u s participants
have. T h i s is also m u c h closer to h o w o t h e r social p r i m a r y goods are
2 1
understood. ^
Version [3B] h a s t h e s a m e sort of a d v a n t a g e over [1A], w h i c h presup­
p o s e s a c o m p l e x (and quite p o s s i b l y u n m a n a g e a b l e ) i n d e x calculus for
a s s e s s i n g t a l e n t - i n d u c e d inequalities of e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t y -
w h i c h calculations, Rawls s e e m s t o think, w o u l d justify only minor
t a l e n t - i n d u c e d inequalities in a n y c a s e (TJ 101, 107). Version [3B] is
m u c h s i m p l e r t h a n eRawls's n n v e r s i o n s a n d t h e r e f o r e m o r e suitable as
P P
R1C
T' ° ° > f S O c i a l
^ a t is t o e n g e n d e r stability, u s t i c e

8 V e r S i n S f t h e S e c o n d
derrmr^he ° °
P r i n c i p l e a r e liable to un-
P f t h e W o r s e
^hZ^nf. ** ° "
e n d o w e d " b y p e r m i t t i n g that
t 0 C d u c a t i o n w h e n
£ e m Z i o ^ Z TT , ™ ° r e c a n b e achieved for
d e v
O I I S S ^ p m e n t of g r e a t e r t a l e n t s . By c o n t r a s t , [3B1
between t n e better and wo endowed
^^JS^I^T^ 0 1
™
^ ^ ^ ^ T T T n o w i s t o o f f e r
™z™y e a
* u a l e n c o u r
'

m^yTav b e r X th t
d e v e l o m
P < ™ of different t a l e n t s , whatever
6 1 8 f r
o p t i m i z i n g t h e i n d e x position o n h e ^ L ? ^ " *° ^ ***
By d e p a r t i n g from R^wls to t n ^ ^ f ^ ^ ' , t o an
e x t r e m e t h a t Rawls w a n t s to avoW Th2 1
T n 0 t g e t t 0
° C l
° S 6
<Z
avoid. T h e p r i n c i p l e of r e d r e s s , as h e refers
-•Version ( 3 B ) a l s o a c c o r d s with m v Drorw>»i it,- 1
primary g o o d s ( e n s h r i n e d in Rawls's o r i t » ^ ' S l l . 6 . 1 ) to u s e t h e a c c o u n t of social
g r o u p s , especially the least advantaged Versions m s t
> c e ) to identify representative
, u e
n Of iuslirel i i j „ „ » ; t . ^
dent w"a v of identifying
<_n...k_l .-J. « O
relevant social c l a s s y i i. P u p p o s e s o m e indepen-
1 2 8 1 r e s ^ ontfltive
n c

1 s n o w
plausible w a v of d o i n g this. later ( § 1 7 5 ) that Rawls h a s no
 E d u c a t i o n a l a n d E m p l o y m e n t O p p o r t u n i t i e s , 15.2 177

to it ITJ100-1), r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e " b e t t e r e n d o w e d " have inferior access

to education o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e y c a n still achieve as m u c h as
22
others whose inferior e n d o w m e n t s a r e b r o u g h t to fruition. This ex­
treme and Rawls's v e r s i o n s of t h e s e c o n d principle fail, I believe, for
much the same r e a s o n s . First, t h e y view e d u c a t i o n a s merely a m e a n s
for producing s o m e d e s i r a b l e social result, w h i c h in both cases is
evaluated in t e r m s of i n d e x g o o d s . Yet in virtue of its crucial role in
shaping not only o u r i n d e x - g o o d p r o s p e c t s b u t t h e very p e r s o n s we
are, education is a pivotal s o c i a l g o o d in its o w n right, an essential
precondition for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e t w o moral powers a n d of a
secure sense of self-respect. T h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s u p p o r t ranking
access to e d u c a t i o n a b o v e i n d e x g o o d s , a s s o m e passages of,4 Theory of
Justice suggest. But if e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s have this elevated
status, they m u s t h a v e it i n all i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o m p a r i s o n s , not just in
comparing t h e social p o s i t i o n s of p e r s o n s similarly e n d o w e d . Second,
Rawls's versions a n d t h e p r i n c i p l e of r e d r e s s allow indefinite inequali­
ties in educational o p p o r t u n i t i e s for p e r s o n s differentially endowed.
°n[3B], by contrast, n o r a n k i n g of n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s is incorporated
mto the public c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . All p e r s o n s , n o matter what their
endowments m a y b e , h a v e t h e s a m e claim u p o n educational resources.
% understanding t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e in this way, w e (or t h e parties)
avoid u n d e r m i n i n g t h e s e l f - r e s p e c t of t h o s e w h o m Rawls treats as the
e
worse endowed a n d e n s u r e t h a t t h e o p p o r t u n i t y principle <OP >. JJ 3B

™ first principle, is a firm a n d p e r s p i c u o u s pillar of a shared public

notion of equal c i t i z e n s h i p . ,. .
The argument for [3B] c a n b e f u r t h e r s t r e n g t h e n e d by attending; to
m e
other main k i n d of c o n t i n g e n c i e s t h a t Rawls exempts from_ tne
^ P e of h i o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e — l u c k . C o n s i d e r a society in whicn
s

*rne 20 p e r c e n t of all c h i l d r e n c a n n o t gain a d m i s s i o n to any school.

scheme is d e f e n d e d o n t h e g r o u n d that t h e inequality is not
J**? to social c o n t i n g e n c i e s , s i n c e s c h o o l s select pupils at random.
J j i " versions of t h e o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e all allow this d e f e n s e ^
m
^ d u a l s a n d g r o u p s c o m p e t e for a d m i s s i o n o n equal terms (formal

«2aS T P ^
a c c o m m o d a t e natural
USible ^ I M ^ ^ ^usims,
CaSw > ed
m
W p o i n t s b e t w e e n t w o extremes Icf. S - ^ ™ ^ " inequalities
,atUral
1 0 4

«Ti i differentials i n e n d o w m e n t to give rise to c o ™ " * ™ ^ ^ ^ese

^ to education a n d i n d e x g o o d s . T h e principle of redress suggests^mverung ^
2££? e c o n o m i c inequalities that institute™.generalsn
8 0 C i a l a n d
^
rathBr
SRS- * m i t i
i"«J - °r a nd
a t e n
a nXral
a

( a n d a a
t U
basis of self-
r a l u a l i t i e s T W S
pr S

*seertl
e
e m

d
q u e n t i a l i s m . A s a natural primary g o o d
!
o
c o n s e

w m
f w h i c feasible " "i h
^ i " e n t s are e x c l u d e d from t h e Master Pattern m terms ot , d
C h a w t 0 b e
«* m e s s e d . Still, reforms indicated by the second P ™ P
5Jh»
w o u ] d

P ^ g r e s s even b y t h e lights of t h e principle of ^ ^ s I c f . T J 100-1).

A ^ ^ e extent to w h i c h social inequalities aggravate
a
odg across endow- j?*"*l
""ent emP ' inequalities i n a c c e s s t o e d u c a t i o n a n d ^ f £ »
R a w , s
some- [ 3 B ] g o e s

•NfcP* c o n s t r a i n e d b y t h e difference P
m t o b e
^ / T ^ ^ to this
e q u a l a c c e s s t o education foraBandJ
K requires rou h,
8y
^""'"n lets index inequalities b e g o v e r n e d b y t h e difference p n n a p l e .
178 E d u c a t i o n a l a n d E m p l o y m e n t O p p o r t u n i t i e s , 15.3

equality of o p p o r t u n i t y ) , a n d similarly e n d o w e d a n d motivated per­

s o n s b o r n i n t o different social c l a s s e s h a v e e q u a l p r o s p e c t s for educa­
tion (OP ) a n d a c h i e v e m e n t ( O P ) . Rawls's a s s e s s m e n t of this scheme
2B 2A

w o u l d t h e n t u r n u p o n w h e t h e r it satisfies t h e difference principle—

a n d this it m i g h t well do, b e c a u s e it is c h e a p e r a n d m i g h t yield an
equally s u i t a b l e w o r k force. O P , b y c o n t r a s t , p r o h i b i t s this scheme;
3 B

a n d t h i s is surely p l a u s i b l e , s e e i n g t h a t t h e 20 p e r c e n t w h o are ex­

c l u d e d from e d u c a t i o n will b e m a r k e d off for life as a distinct social
g r o u p w h o s e inferior s t a t u s c a n n o t b e o u t w e i g h e d b y a n y gain in the
m i n i m u m index position.
1 5 . 3 . Version [3B] h a s at l e a s t t w o m a i n w e a k n e s s e s . It is exposed to
an a n a l o g u e of t h e s e c o n d difficulty w i t h v e r s i o n s [2A] a n d [2B]. The
d i s p o s i t i o n of m o r e affluent p a r e n t s to s p e n d m o r e on t h e education of
t h e i r c h i l d r e n m a y n e c e s s i t a t e an i m p l a u s i b l y e x p e n s i v e education
s y s t e m t h a t m a k e s accessible to all an e d u c a t i o n e q u a l to t h e best.
Moreover, [3B] r e q u i r e s t h a t r o u g h l y e q u a l r e s o u r c e s b e available for the
e d u c a t i o n of all, e v e n w h e r e s u c h r e s o u r c e s w o u l d h a v e a negative net
i m p a c t on available i n d e x g o o d s . T h i s c o n s t i t u t e s a risk for the (abso­
lute) i n d e x p o s i t i o n of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d .
T h e s e w e a k n e s s e s c a n b e m i t i g a t e d in t w o w a y s . First, o n e should
n a r r o w t h e definition of educational o p p o r t u n i t i e s s o as to exclude
m a n y e x p e n s i v e b u t n o t so c e n t r a l i t e m s (flying, m u s i c , a n d skiing
l e s s o n s ; e d u c a t i o n a l travel; a h o m e t e l e s c o p e o r l a b o r a t o r y ; etc.). It
s e e m s difficult to p u t this idea i n t o m o r e p r i n c i p l e d f o r m so that it can
b e e v a l u a t e d b e h i n d t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e ( a n d d o e s n o t strike us as ad
hoc), b u t it surely m u s t b e e m p l o y e d to s o m e e x t e n t .
S e c o n d , o n e c a n t r y to define r o u g h e q u i v a l e n c e in a w a y t h a t is both
s o m e w h a t liberal a n d especially sensitive to t h e p a r t i e s ' c o n c e r n for
t h o s e w i t h t h e w o r s t e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s . W h a t is n e e d e d is not a
m e a s u r e for t h e overall equality of c o s t (like t h e Gini coefficient), but a
SP C C y
noT,n^ f ,f t p
f
° C
T f ° d U p n t
t o w h i c h t h e worst h e e x t e n t
op-
^rZf , H RT
° F T H
&- E M
T h e intuitive i d e a
I D D L E
ran
that is
nt3T, U
n" n a C
^ e S S
° t 0 S m e
" * s o n b l y high proportion what a of
oSdTnerS ^ ^ j * ™ m a y b e specified
f d U C a t i
follows: T h e Stan-
n m a s o c i a l
as
t teZ hn Tn ^ ° r ° s y s t e m is d e f i n e d not as
aLrTXano,^«1ermS ° f S O m e
Percentile(s), w h e r e b y t h e m o r e extrav­
a g a n t e d u c a t i o n a l p n v u e g e s enjoyed by a f c h i l d r e n of very rich or ew

simnh,
very c o m m i t t e d p a r e n t s a r e j , ,,
m i n i m M y
. y

quite e d u c a t i o n is S ^ ^ ^ T ^ ' '

then *
fWhich d 6S
s h o r t of t h e s t a n d a r d by more t h m T ° a n S O °
2 3
" uy more m a n s o m e fixed p e r c e n t a g e . F o r exam-
"Clearlv, specifying this s e c o n d idea ( D a r t l v r * , . * . . . • «
P S a t e
stages) will again b e ad h o c to s o m e extent but Ph • constitutional o r legislative
8 n o t a s , r o
reject (3BI in favor of (1A) If rough e q u i v a l e n t ' ' f " g reason for t h e parties to
a , i o n a l
crucially important (in light of equal cUizensh n , . i r o p p o r t u n i t i e s really is
res ct
interests), t h e n t h e parties will want it protected| Pf ' * n d t h e t w o highest-order
a
d e g r e e arbitrary, rather t h a n n o t have it D m t ~ * ! 2 ^ definition that is in s o m e
a
protected * aU- Let m e a d d that s u c h arbitran-
 EDUCATIONAL AND EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES, 15.4 179

80%
(percentiles! 40% 30%

Specify^ w h a ( i s
m i n i m a l l y adequate" u n d e r the opportunity principle

PIE, ONE MIGHT DEFINE t h e STANDARD AS THE MEAN of PER CAPITA EDUCA­
TED COSTS AT THE 80TH, 40TH, a n d 30TH PERCENTILES and AN EDUCATION AS
^ a l l y ADEQUATE WHEN its COST DOES not fall SHORT OF THE STANDARD BY
["WE THAN 2 5 PERCENT. OBVIOUSLY, THE DETAILS OF THIS PROPOSAL, AS GIVEN
and IN GRAPH 2 ARE for PURPOSES OF ILLUSTRATION ONLY. VERSION [3BJ
J * SUBJECTS THE DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE TO THE REQUIREMENT that ALL par-
&
«PANTS ARE TO ENJOY FORMAL EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY and MINIMALLY
^ U A T E EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES (that IS, ACCESS TO AT LEAST A MIM-
ADEQUATE EDUCATION). _ ...
154. MY PROPOSED SPECIFICATION of [3B] PUTS n o WEIGHT on RAWLS S
Junction BETWEEN SOCIAL a n d NATURAL CONTINGENCIES. HENCE,,U rt a s «
(VE
>Y) SENSITIVE t o WHETHER A FEW RICH PARENTS HIRE PRIVATE: TUTORS
CHUDREN, it is ALSO n o t (VERY) SENSITIVE to WHETHER THERE ARE
J » SMALL but EXPENSIVE EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS DESIGNED to IMPROVE
^ppli p o o l for SOME ECONOMICALLY CRUCIAL SET of f * S J J J
c a n t

c e s c o n e n i a i t h e m a x i n i e w h i c h f s e
i , 6 *° ™ ™ ' r r h t Sow
J J O N LESS o n h o w far THOSE AT THE VERY t o p ARE ABOVE, THAN ONHOW
at THE VERY BOTTOM fall BELOW, THE middle RANGE- T AUOWS

3JJ»
J * * * * INSTITUTIONS t o GENERATE WHATEVER MINOR EDUCAHONIIN

*E
ARE MOST STRONGLY FAVORED by THE DIFFERENCE PRMAPTEThat S,
£ I O N S to RISING THE LOWEST
G R E A T E S T ^xpo*mrt
C O N T R I
as
i N a t i o n o f [ 3 B ] ALSO ACCORDS WITH THE IDEA-~WHJCHL«e
THE SECOND PRINCIPLE < § 1 3 . 5 ) - o f not OVERCONSTRAINMG

0 1 8 i n m a o t h e t h e
Ste" ^ * "y r important cases, such a s * ^ S S h S
" r v a--vl u e of the
luijjui lain L>(i3c^, nu(.,i «J soecificahon
^ ar * . . .
d f t h e
^ S . ° J«K.ir.l Kh-rri««
fcC"* goods t . C ""''value o f t h e political liberties or the specification and weighting
U n a v o i d a
^ " c e d i in* W e a l s o for Rawls's versions (Ml a n d [2B). The prohibition of
' e q u a h n e s of o p p o r t u n i t y c a n n o t require literal equality.
180 E d u c a t i o n a l a n d E m p l o y m e n t O p p o r t u n i t i e s , 15.5

political p r o c e s s . W h e n t h e s t a n d a r d c o s t of e d u c a t i o n is defined in
t e r m s of s o m e s u i t a b l e p e r c e n t i l e ( s ) , t h e n it c a n n o t easily b e forced into
e s c a l a t i o n b y t h e d e t e r m i n e d efforts of s o m e p a r e n t s to give their
c h i l d r e n a h e a d start. T h i s s t a n d a r d c o s t r e m a i n s largely under the
c o n t r o l of t h e political p r o c e s s , w h i c h , t h o u g h it m u s t not permit
significant e d u c a t i o n a l a d v a n t a g e s a n d (especially) disadvantages for
p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n s o r g r o u p s , c a n r a i s e o r l o w e r t h e overall allocation of
social r e s o u r c e s to t h e e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m .
Unlike Rawls's v e r s i o n s [2AJ a n d [2B], [3B] c o n t a i n s , I believe, a princi­
ple of fair equality of o p p o r t u n i t y w h o s e p r i o r i t y over t h e difference
p r i n c i p l e is plausible. I have n o t t r i e d t o d e c i d e w h e t h e r t h e oppor­
t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e s h o u l d take t h i s form o r b e c a s t a s a r e q u i r e m e n t for
m e r e l y formal equality of o p p o r t u n i t y (as i n [1A]). H e r e a crucial ques­
tion is w h e t h e r t h e p a r t i e s w o u l d a c c e p t t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n priority of
O P over t h e difference p r i n c i p l e . Is it p l a u s i b l e t o reform a n institu­
3 B

tional s c h e m e t h a t g e n e r a t e s severe s o c i o e c o n o m i c inequalities by

b e g i n n i n g from t h e l o w e r age g r o u p s , w i t h t h e e q u a l i z a t i o n of educa­
tional o p p o r t u n i t i e s ? S h o u l d political efforts a n d social resources be
primarily devoted t o mitigating n o t t h e excessive p o v e r t y of t h e least
a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p b u t t h e e d u c a t i o n a l d i s a d v a n t a g e s suffered by its
y o u n g e r m e m b e r s ? Are excessive e d u c a t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t i e s a higher-
o r d e r injustice t h a n excessive i n d e x i n e q u a l i t i e s ? Affirmative answers
to t h e s e q u e s t i o n s a r e m a d e at least p o s s i b l e b y m y p r o p o s e d amend­
ment to the firstprinciple. We can
a s s u m e t h a t b a s i c social a n d eco­
n o m i c n e e d s a r e satisfied o r w o u l d in a n y c a s e h a v e implementation
priority over reforms of the e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m
T h e u l t i m a t e tenability of [3B] also d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r it can be
w h
Snnn? > y
K v!° ° t h e
^ t h e i d e a of fair equality of
r a r e a s i n

o p p o r t u n i t y m i g h t b e a p p r o p r i a t e . I will d i s c u s s t w o s u c h extensions.
1 5 . 5 . Rawls takes t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of formal e q u a l i t y of opportunity
h S y Z T H° y a C C 6 S S t 0 e d u c a t i
° n * l facilities also a c c e s s to jobs but
S a n ^ b e f o ^ Tn C C O m a i n statem S y S t G m :
" A n n w m c e m e n t s * Jobs posi- and
oSrSn d e s S S i ° w h i c h e x c l u d e applicants«nts
Tn~ r ^ a n
" suggests me i d e a of c o n s t r a i n i n g t h e difference p r u r
C ,
O n e ^

f e m P
ment opportunity togetheremallfSr ^ ° V
f em l ent p r
tunitv. but t h o u g h it is p e r h a m t ^ 7 ^ °U a I Pi t°y™
ies
° P ° ;
opportunity related toi S ^ t i S S ^ T?of e m1p l q y n j e n
for the other main kinds S ^ S ^ ^ T ' ^ ^ ^
ketable talents or bad luck, some of f h ^ ^
t e r m u n e m p l o y m e n t , even n"f thouS S * ^ I t 0 W D I m

t 0 )
a

3
y

m m i m a i i y
a d e q u a t e e d u c a t i o n and fonnal e q u a t e ? ! ? ^
q U d , t y o f
maintained. e m p l o y m e n t o p p o r t u m t y is
 M e d i c a l Opportunities, 16.1 181

Ranking fair a c c e s s t o e m p l o y m e n t above t h e index goods is not an

implausible idea, given t h e s p e c i a l significance of s u c h access for self-
respect, for the realization a n d e x e r c i s e of t h e two moral powers, a n d
for a shared sense of e q u a l c i t i z e n s h i p . T h o s e w h o are involuntarily
unemployed for long p e r i o d s t e n d t o b e c o m e a separate a n d disadvan­
taged social group w h o s e d i s a d v a n t a g e c a n n o t b e c o m p e n s a t e d by a
better index position (by g e n e r o u s u n e m p l o y m e n t benefits, for exam­
ple). This reason in favor of a r e q u i r e m e n t of fair equality of employ­
ment opportunity r a i s e s t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r O P c a n b e extended to 3 B

include such a r e q u i r e m e n t . H e r e w e m i g h t i n t r o d u c e a notion of

standard participation in s o c i a l c o o p e r a t i o n (such as m e d i a n n u m b e r
of hours worked in s o m e life p h a s e ) , w i t h minimally adequate employ­
24
ment denned as s o m e fraction of t h i s s t a n d a r d . O P would t h e n 3 B

require that social i n s t i t u t i o n s m u s t safeguard minimally adequate

employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s ( a c c e s s to minimally adequate employ­
ment)forall. Once again, t h e d e t a i l e d specification of this requirement
focuses on those w h o fall below t h e m i d d l e range a n d leaves some
™ude so as n o t overly t o c o n s t r a i n t h e difference principle and the
Political process. T h u s it l e a v e s t h e political p r o c e s s free to adjust the
°wall level of e c o n o m i c activity, s u b j e c t only to t h e condition that
such adjustments m u s t n o t selectively i m p o s e severe hardships^Laws
Policies m a y d e c r e a s e j o b s available in s o m e profession with con­
sent
lthro
short-term u n e m p l o y m e n t a n d m a y affect working hours
ugh annual v a c a t i o n s , a r e t i r e m e n t age, or s u c h like), but they
mus
t n o t p r o d u c e significant l o n g - t e r m u n e m p l o y m e n t , except w h e n
8 c a
J n be justified b y a p p e a l t o t h e first principle or to other parts ot
™ opportunity p r i n c i p l e .

,6
-Medical Opportunities
J8.1.
f
Rawls s i m p l y leaves m e d i c a l n e e d s aside, apparently in the
2 fat
the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a r e is of only ^ g m * health
^
M T
8

J for the a p p r a i s a l of a c o n c e p t i o n of justice (e.g., ^ " f ^

2 He seems far t o o s a n g u i n e in t h i s respect, however The fact oi
J * * a l medical n e e d s c a s t s u p o n a cardinal ten*. ° H » s doubt
critical Ch3llenge
to? - ° °This is r e^a s oPn° t o" lgo o k for a plausible Rawlsian responseto
J*-Jwn.
n f j U S t i c e s i a
? Isoonse

6
^k^L^ n o t i o n o f
adequacy must be enriched by ^fjf^^j^e P
to her
^ ^ 0 ° P P ° r t U n U i e s
' to a person must be ^ ^ ^
a v a i l a b e
o f appropri-
a b d i t i e s a n d
Tin^K < again, it seems impossible to specify this no
"le abstract.
182 Medical Opportunities, 16.1
which access to medical care is used as a n incentive or channeled to
where it will most effectively e n h a n c e patients' economic productivity.
Such a scheme violates central commitments of Rawls's conception of
justice, however, for it palpably values the life a n d health of different
participants unequally and thus u n d e r m i n e s the self-respect of those
having less access as well as the hope for a shared public notion of
equal citizenship. These are strong reasons for believing that medical
care, like education and employment, is special vis-a-vis the index
goods and that the difference principle should not govern inequalities
in access to health care by itself but should be constrained in this
regard by some fair-equality requirement.
But how can such a requirement be part of the opportunity princi­
ple? How is access to health care an opportunity? Rawls seems to use
the term opportunity restrictively, to refer to access to goods that are
useful in the competition for the better jobs. Nevertheless, his emphasis
on the highest- and higher-order interests a n d his concern for the least
advantaged favor a broader understanding of the term. The first princi­
ple alone cannot fully secure o u r opportunity—fundamental to the
spirit of Rawls's conception—to participate in h u m a n interaction, to
form (and revise) a conception of the good in t h e context of the political,
cultural, a n d associational life around us. Rawls should, therefore, see
the importance of education at least as m u c h in the fact that it enables
one to understand, cherish, a n d participate in m a n y diverse forms of
human good as in the fact that it may give o n e a shot at occupying a
leadership office. He should appreciate, similarly, that the importance
ot being employed consists not just in the chance to gather the skills
and experience necessary to rise through the ranks but at least equally
in the chance to collaborate with others a n d to share responsibility for
the continuance of humankind. These considerations broaden the
notion of opportunity sufficiently for it to cover access to medical care
S g 0 d i S f g r e a t
.' « . ° ° ^ t e g i c importance; its distribution
H L I L 6 ? ^ 0 1 1 5 ' a C C e s s t o n e a % a» ft"™ of h u m a n g o o d -
evnti wh S y n o m e a n s l i m
i t e d to, the better j o b s . - Let us then
u

explore whether another extension of O P can yield a constraint upon 3B

t h a t c o p e s t h e M c a [ needs
sr. S E E ™ ^ * —
Prequire, first of ^formal equality of medi-
i°S:Sr
So extended O P would

Sod•SS?a5TS2? ' reS

3B

w h o l e s a l e d any avail- b e 6 X C l u d e d

m e d i c a t i o
n s , a n d other health-relevant
goods There are three exceptions, analogous to those in the case of
educational and ,ob openings. The medical syltem may Zude whole­
sale from certain medical goods and services g ^ ^ d e f i n e d by their
members (1) inability or unwilling™** . 6»""ps u e i m e u uy
p a
uungness y the access pnce, W
"See also Daniels, JHC 27-28, and chap. 3
 Medical Opportunities, 16.2 183

medical unsuitability (as w h e n the procedure would be unnecessary or

26
ineffective), or (3) age.
16.2 What more does fair equality of medical opportunity require?
In outlining my answer, I first make the simplifying assumption that
medical needs occur naturally, that is, are due to factors beyond hu­
man control. Once a reasonably clear specification for this central case
is on hand, it will be easier to fit in medical needs of other kinds.
While Rawls brackets the entire subject of medical needs, he is
otherwise a thoroughgoing semiconsequentialist. He defines and com­
pares relevant positions solely in terms of social primary goods, irre­
spective of natural differentials in endowments, needs, good looks,
tastes, and desires. Now one may think that semiconsequentialism is
dearly untenable for the assessment of a medical system. What must be
fair, in this area, is the distribution not of health care but (roughly) of
health, that is, the distribution of medical care relative to medical
needs.
Contrary to this view, I will here provisionally preserve Rawls's semi­
consequentialism also in respect to medical care, even though Rawls
27
himself, of course, is not committed to its tenability in this area. There
«e two main reasons for taking this approach. Denying semiconse-
jjuentialism in one area would have enormous repercussions for
™vls's conception of justice as a whole. Suppose an exception is made
in respect to medical n e e d s — a natural primary good plays a role in
measuring distributive shares for purposes of assessing the justice ot
^ a l institutions, a n d the social good of health care is used to com­
i t a t e for differentials in this natural primary good. It would then be
Jfe difficult to reject other exceptions in a principled way. If we take
n t e I
Terences in persons' native medical needs into account in > P ^ '
comparisons, then why shouldn't we have regard to other• con-
diflfe
E fu " « i c e s too? Once the original position is redescnbed so
a r t i e s 8
2 P ^ r e not merely about social positions j f P ™ " * * ? *
* • * ) but also about medical needs, then why wou d hey no be
^ e m e d with the worst overall situation? Why would they not, in
e
2 * n g the distribution of income, bear in mind f*\*W ^_
clot
hes are more important for the ugly or instruments for those espe
nfa n
*SS ?y°d ab0Ut
* ^
^
b i s
acceptable, once again, because it ^ ^ J ^ S K
U f e t i m e a r e
s of medical care. This account leaves open the q ^
^i D
f a c e
R a w 1
^ ^count of formal equality a f o f f r t ^ ^ , „g y
M 0

»Aftu
^ s o .m* ' e
' S e n d e r <^ ligi°^
r e ] y ^ ° £P °
h
affiliation) re
be f them
exclude
s
^ ^ "a tl ht oe rg ?e m
m e
r l i t i c a l

b u { d o e s n o t
u

R a W l s e sa
° ™ y s thaf "disease and illness support claurwtem g f

nj^JW08 atWe
14), but he may here be suggesting not ^ / ' ^ 4 i U ««««° n

^&T '
aUewTJ 0 w P '
d U
* °
P e r h a f
™*£Ze
*y> because I find the semiconsequentialist ^emem
S t o
em"nt o u r
attractive
^ ^
n a t U r a l
and am
of

h , l t h e a d s t 0 S t U 1 1 M f y realiZe , h 3 t
*«*Wi? ' ' '
se
- X v e T s of abstraction on
" • " f f l ? S micon entialism by retreating to higher_levels °
h e Sequ
could altogether avoid taking a stand on this issue Icf. Chap 3, n
184 M e d i c a l O p p o r t u n i t i e s , 16.2

cially m u s i c a l ? W h y w o u l d n ' t t h e y , i n a s s e s s i n g t h e distribution of

e d u c a t i o n , also t a k e a c c o u n t of t h e fact t h a t s o m e l e a r n more slowly
a n d t h u s n e e d m o r e e d u c a t i o n t o a c q u i r e t h e s a m e knowledge or
28
s k i l l s ? Taking a fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t a p p r o a c h i n o n e area would
exert c o n s i d e r a b l e p r e s s u r e s t o w a r d a fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t approach
a c r o s s t h e b o a r d , t o w a r d u t i l i t a r i a n i s m o r a c o n c e p t i o n like Sen's.
T h e o t h e r m a i n r e a s o n is t h a t if m e d i c a l c a r e is t o compensate for
m e d i c a l n e e d s , t h e n a j u s t m e d i c a l s y s t e m w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y have to
m a i n t a i n r o u g h e q u a l i t y of r e s u l t , w h i c h c o u l d b e e n o r m o u s l y expen­
sive. If h e a l t h i s t h e g o o d w i t h r e s p e c t t o w h i c h fair equality of oppor­
t u n i t y m u s t b e m a i n t a i n e d , t h e n — s u b j e c t o n l y t o t h e proviso that
sufficient r e s o u r c e s b e d e v o t e d t o e n s u r i n g fully a d e q u a t e packages of
first-principle g o o d s — a n y shortfalls from g o o d h e a l t h m u s t be re­
d u c e d a s m u c h a s p o s s i b l e , n o m a t t e r w h a t t h e cost m a y b e in terms of
2
i n d e x g o o d s . 9 T h i s result, h o w e v e r , is i m p l a u s i b l e . If existing medical
(and educational) s y s t e m s a r e u n j u s t , t h e n t h i s is n o t , it w o u l d seem,
b e c a u s e s o m e m e d i c a l (or e d u c a t i o n a l ) n e e d s r e m a i n u n m e t but be­
c a u s e s o m e have s o m u c h less a c c e s s t o m e d i c a l c a r e ( a n d education!
than others with comparable needs.
T h e s e r e a s o n s motivate m y a t t e m p t t o s k e t c h a semiconsequentialist
n o t i o n of fair equality of m e d i c a l o p p o r t u n i t y t h a t fits w i t h h o w 0 P 3B

w a s specified m t h e areas of e d u c a t i o n a n d e m p l o y m e n t . As far as

l u s t r a is c o n c e r n e d , m e d i c a l n e e d a s s u c h d o e s n o t t h e n support a
m e d i c a l c a r e 1 1 i s n o t a n
l^tu ?vl?, injustice, even i n a very affluent
society, if kttle is s p e n t o n h e a l t h c a r e (or e d u c a t i o n ) .
a
oiS^ JJS^^^ 6
I U U n k
' for
«»» w a y N o r m a n D a n i e l s e x t e n d s Rawls s
msSSSdl?,. •nrtttutfanal distribution of m e d i c a l care. He affirms mat
not e q u a ^ d s W b u , S S S f t ^ T ^ ° c o m p e n s a t e for " n e e d s which are S a s , 0

m(iUais U H C4 6 1 Y e t h de t h e
data for*edn^fon- ^ ^ n r " * ™° f * 1
P e n S a t e
"disease a n d disabaity^ri t^^HfT c
f
° r n a t U r a J h a n d i c a
P s

8 0 o
normal range h i s skills a n d U a W . f U W
P P r t u n i t y relative t o that portion of the
m a d e a v a a b l e t o h i m w e r e h e
UHC 34). But w h y ^ e n o u t l n m t
" r a l J*™ *****
(groups of) »XTZir Q u a l i t i e s b u t n oreStricted
t others? Consider two
ftEFS^W
from w o r t h w h i l e u «
P "*
prebtaWta^h^ ^ °
congenital m e d i c a l
ne C a s e t h e restriction
'
*
*Z
3 c o n e n
restriction c a n b e overcome bv e ™ l n . £ C
S >
n s a t 0
t a l lack of talent. In b o t h cases the
Why m u s t t h e former programs r ^ a ™ i l » h . T ^ ^ m e d i c a l / e d u c a t i o n a l programs
intellectuals a n d c o m p o i e n T o t " I " ?
latter. ^
l h e
U l e o
< °P 'n
W h f b e n e e d i n g the former b u t hardly the e s
, m
l a , t e r ? I t s n o t 1 h e D e c a U S C
T
" D a n i e l s i n fact d r a w s this c o n c l u s i o n
1 8 e q u a l a c c e s s a t l e a s t t o t h e
tier" o f health-care services, c o m p r i s i n c " ^ " " " "
8 n e e d e
p e n s a t e for normal species-typical f u n r t ^ " ^ d t o m a i n t a i n , restore, or corn-
programs, h e requires institutions to'WiT^
' * i d e s various preventive I J H C

6 1
7 9 1

8 0 1 1 8
B e

n
p o s s i b l e t o t h e idealization" a n d t o d t o v W « P " > a w a y that i s a s close as
e , e n d e d
services f o r . . . t h o s e w h o can In n o wav b e h * m e d i c a l a n d social support
1 c l o s e r t o t h e
O n e m a y w o n d e r w h e t h e r a n y existing soitet^ idealization" UHC 481.
a f f r d t o m a k e a v a i l a b l e t o S
c i t i z e n s whatever s u c h restoring a n d c o m p m s a t °
ervices
^ "
s p e c i e s - t v p i c a l functioning, irrespective o f t h * #U bring t h e m closer to ^Tu f
mi

ratio
c h a p . 5 ) . But m y d o u b t s c o n c e r n t h e separate V- involved (cf. Fried, RW
must, a s a matter o f justice, e m b o d y s o h e a w „ „ „ . w h e t h e r a basic structure really
•y an e m p h a s i s o n health r,™.
 M e d i c a l O p p o r t u n i t i e s , 16.3 185

16.3. In view of t h e g r e a t differences in natural constitutions, it

would be bizarre to r e q u i r e t h a t p e r s o n s , over their lifetimes, should
receive roughly e q u i v a l e n t b u n d l e s of h e a l t h care. Such an equal dis­
tribution would w a s t e r e s o u r c e s o n t h o s e lucky a n d robust enough not
to need much m e d i c a l a t t e n t i o n at all, a n d it w o u l d also waste re­
sources in cases w h e r e s o m e w h a t m o r e t h a n a n equal b u n d l e would be
needed to make t h e difference. I p r o p o s e i n s t e a d that w e conceive the
social good that is t o s e r v e a s t h e a n a l o g u e to e d u c a t i o n a n d employ­
ment as health protection, d e f i n e d a s a c c e s s to medical care when
needed. The s t i p u l a t i o n is t h a t p e r s o n s h a v e a n equal n e e d to have, and
to have the a s s u r a n c e t h a t t h e y will have, s u c h access. O P requires, 3 B

*en, that everyone s h o u l d h a v e a c c e s s to roughly equivalent health

protection. My i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d specification of this requirement will
»eguided by t h e i d e a t h a t , a s w i t h e d u c a t i o n , overall allocations to the
medical system s h o u l d b e g o v e r n e d b y t h e political process as a matter
°fpure procedural j u s t i c e , a n d t h a t t h i s m e t h o d is plausible so long as
rough equivalence in a c c e s s t o h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n is preserved.
It may seem t h a t fair e q u a l i t y of a c c e s s to h e a l t h protection would in
Practice d e m a n d a c o n s i d e r a b l e e x p a n s i o n of existing medical sys­
tems, which w o u l d c o n s t i t u t e a grave risk to t h e index position of the
teast advantaged. But t h i s c a n b e a v o i d e d b y utilizing two ideas already
fetched in t h e c o n t e x t of e d u c a t i o n . First, n e e d e d medical care should
* defined narrowly a s c a r e t h a t d i r e c t l y alleviates a n existing medical
condition (which, b y definition, i m p a i r s a p e r s o n ' s capacity for normal
P^cipation in social i n t e r a c t i o n ) . T h i s definition w o u l d exclude vaca-
jjmsin a health s p a , first-class h o s p i t a l b e d s , c o s m e t i c surgery, a n d the

Second, in a s s e s s i n g t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of h e a l t h protection one should

^concerned n o t w i t h overall i n e q u a l i t i e s b u t with h o w f a r those at the
£V bottom fall b e l o w t h e m i d d l e r a n g e . T h e intuitive idea is, once
e v
2 ' e r y o n e s h o u l d h a v e a c c e s s t o s o m e reasonably h i g h p r o -
jWjon of w h a t o t h e r s a c t u a l l y h a v e . N o d o u b t , this idea_can^be i m p *
*£»ed m m a n y different w a y s , b u t 1 will h e r e , s o m e w h a t a r t a f t ^ y
J * one of t h e s e for p u r p o s e s of illustration. I begin with a d e t a j t t
J* <* the various n a t u r a l m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s , e a c h defined by refer
° % to m e d i c a l f a c t o r s (affecting t h e u r g e n c y o r « * * * ^ ™
^ t r e a t m e n t s ) a n d t h e a g e of t h e p a t i e n t , w i t h o u t reference toMttw
5*W'« race, g e n d e r , s o c i a l s t a t u s , a n d t h e like. We t h e n find the c o *
d m e d i c a l u l
u e S l cart, t h a t p e r s o n s in various P ° P f f ^
by a n y statistically r e l e v a n t p a r a m e t e r s , s u c h as M*™*^
6
K'/r «f r e s i d e n c e ) t e n d t o receive in t h e
* * w b c a l c o n d i t i o n . D e f i n i n g a medical history as a j ^ ^ ^ e d e d
^ m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s , w e c a n similarly find t h e cost of n e e d
* * * * * care t h a t p e r s o n s i n v a r i o u s p o p u l a t i o n clusters tend

,m
P a r e Daniels, J H C c h a p . 2.
186 M e d i c a l O p p o r t u n i t i e s , 16.4

ceive in t h e e v e n t of s o m e p a r t i c u l a r m e d i c a l history. We can then

e s t i m a t e a p e r s o n ' s e x p e c t e d lifetime c o s t of n e e d e d medical care by
averaging t h e cost of n e e d e d m e d i c a l c a r e t h a t p e r s o n s in his popula­
tion c l u s t e r receive in t h e e v e n t of v a r i o u s m e d i c a l histories. This is a
w e i g h t e d average b a s e d o n ( w h a t o n e m i g h t call) " t h e average medical
history," a realistic p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n over medical histories
b a s e d o n t h e i r relative f r e q u e n c i e s in t h e relevant social system. The
e x p e c t e d lifetime c o s t of n e e d e d m e d i c a l c a r e is h i g h e r for those who,
for t h e s a m e m e d i c a l h i s t o r i e s , w o u l d r e c e i v e m o r e o r b e t t e r caie than
o t h e r s . Given t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of e x p e c t e d lifetime c o s t of n e e d e d medi­
cal care w i t h i n t h e social s y s t e m , w e c a n d e f i n e s t a n d a r d medical care
in t e r m s of s o m e p e r c e n t i l e s for e x p e c t e d lifetime c o s t a n d minimally
a d e q u a t e m e d i c a l c a r e as s o m e fraction of s t a n d a r d medical care.
Finally, w e c a n define minimally adequate health protection as access to
m i n i m a l l y a d e q u a t e m e d i c a l c a r e . O P r e q u i r e s t h a t every participant 3 B

b e able t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e e x p e c t e d lifetime c o s t of h i s n e e d e d medical

c a r e is at least X p e r c e n t of t h e cost of s t a n d a r d m e d i c a l care (that is, of
t h e cost of m e d i c a l c a r e t h a t t h e s t a n d a r d p a r t i c i p a n t is expected to
receive).
While t h e first of t h e s e t w o i d e a s limits t h e s c o p e of O P - the second 3B

ensures t h a t it w o n ' t b e (very) sensitive t o t h e e x t r a v a g a n t medical care

t h a t a few rich (or h y p o c h o n d r i a c a l ) p e r s o n s m a y s e c u r e for themselves
o r to t h e special m e d i c a l c a r e p e r h a p s e n j o y e d b y a few prominent
individuals. (And t h e r e is t h e n n o r e a s o n t o i m p o s e legal limits upon
t h e h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n enjoyed at t h e very t o p , even if t h e first principle
a l l o w e d s u c h limitations.) P r e s u m a b l y , m o s t e x i s t i n g societies do not
s e c u r e a c c e s s to minimally a d e q u a t e h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n for all and
overall m e d i c a l e x p e n d i t u r e w o u l d u n d e n i a b l y i n c r e a s e if t h e y did. But
t h e n e c e s s a r y i n c r e a s e is quite limited. It is n o t r e q u i r e d t h a t everyone
h a v e a c c e s s to h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n close t o t h e very b e s t enjoyed by
a n y o n e — w h i c h w o u l d b e q u i t e similar to t h e r e q u i r e m e n t , rejecte
e a r l i e r . t h a t all m e d i c a l n e e d s m u s t b e m e t . T h e p r i n c i p l e demands
S t 0 h 6 a I t h r o t e
^.T 6 P « i o n b e i m p r o v e d for t h o s e in the
M rrTnhTn V°'J° b
P r i n g t h e
d o s e ) t o t h e m i d d l e range m U ( o r

nlriZn th f 1S d 6
' m
h a l f of t h o s e whose a c c e s s is much
a n d i n b e

s u
se^-resner. °H T*\ * * P P ° * e d b y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ot
entails n o m o r e t h a n t h
tion priority over t h e S ^ ^ S S S ! ^ #"* * ^
a c c e s st o
ta tSSSTS T m M l

m a y h a v e s u f fyi c i e n t <inc
* a d e u a t e h e a l t h

K^»SSSS52^ G a r l y a s m u c h
r: h
standard oartirinant i , ir, fao. ^ m e d i c a l c a r e as the
L ^ n S K ^ ^ p S S ^ ; ^ Possibility is a ?tax-
tection to all o r aVleast Zxho^th^^ a d e q U a t G h e a l t h
Z
Alternatively, the ^^eT^l^T' ^ \ » ™ *™ °Z
H 3 1 8 0
^ be satisfied t h r o u g h a com-
 M e d i c a l O p p o r t u n i t i e s , 16.4 187

petitive market for h e a l t h i n s u r a n c e . In this case, if medical expenses

are generally p a i d t h r o u g h i n s u r a n c e a n d if lifetime p r e m i u m s are
roughly proportional t o e x p e c t e d lifetime m e d i c a l expenses, t h e n ev­
eryone would h a v e t o b e a b l e t o afford s o m e h e a l t h i n s u r a n c e coverage
costing at least X p e r c e n t of s t a n d a r d h e a l t h i n s u r a n c e coverage. If, for
example, the cost of h e a l t h i n s u r a n c e for t h e s t a n d a r d citizen (defined
in terms of percentiles) is $2,000 p e r y e a r , t h e n everyone m u s t be able to
afford health i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e c o s t i n g at least (say) 75 percent of this
amount, that is, $1,500 a n n u a l l y . In a j u s t s c h e m e of this sort, adults
may still be at liberty n o t t o i n s u r e t h e m s e l v e s (so long as they can
# r d minimally a d e q u a t e h e a l t h i n s u r a n c e ) , just as they may normally
forgo needed m e d i c a l c a r e t o w h i c h t h e y have access. The principle is
formulated so as t o r e q u i r e access to minimally a d e q u a t e access to
needed medical c a r e , w h i c h is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h institutions u n d e r
31
which persons h a v e t h e o p t i o n t o d e c l i n e o n either level. Obviously,
the three possibilities I h a v e s k e t c h e d c a n b e c o m b i n e d in various
ways.
By focusing o n overall h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n m e a s u r e d in terms of cost,
0 P
is also insensitive t o which m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s o n e is protected
3B

against and t o w h a t e x t e n t . O n e m a y b e able, t h r o u g h health insurance

o r
personal f u n d s , t o m e e t all h e a l t h - c a r e e x p e n s e s u p to a certain
or o n e m a y h a v e , t h r o u g h i n s u r a n c e or a publicly financed
medical system, q u a n t i t a t i v e l y u n l i m i t e d p r o t e c t i o n that is confined to
m m
medical c o n d i t i o n s o r m e d i c a l p r o c e d u r e s . The political pro-
s
<* s can be left free to m a k e d e c i s i o n s affecting t h e s e matters and also
^ o v e r a l l allocation of r e s o u r c e s t o m e d i c a l care. It will no d o u b t be
TO by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of efficiency. It will ensure, for example, that
helical care for e a c h m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n is accessible at least insofar as

t W n k C
" e d ' s P™P°*al represents one plausible
386opportunity
h a r i e s F
t***?*™^
c o Z l d £emain£ined.Let
as
XLT"*
gktyo f m e d i c a ]

5 pro
incomes; befa.r,andle[person*
h e a l t h i n s u r a n c e a n d as m u c h med.cal c a r t , « » t h e > w « h
s a J is ace D a n i e l s < J H C 2 2 U q U l t e
S hf
«* min ^
J* Probable,
P ° that
> wPh e n °- "."tdfromlsa^ Erl
t h e difference principle .s satisfied Oncomes are
Um
m£T i
"ffi<*s t o b u y m i n i m a l l y adequate health P ^ ^ a en c o m e s
j,
J ? * * inequalities u n d e r s u c h c o n d i t i o n s w o u l d B E M N « « J *™£ ed s

S t T P t h e i n ™ u m i n c o m e (and t h e health insurance that can be P»™

m

U t W h y s h o u l d f a i r
<Cnr? q u a l i t y of m e d i c a l opportunity be reqwred aX^J
fcfi L P n n C i P l e g h f y l f t e l y i o s e c u r e t h e s a m e e n d by *ff™™
i s

cl
h i
a ting

from the « ^ i,mendment the first P^ Ptrniwprmci P le

d e f e n s t o

*I S , , '
V S U
0 f f

e r f l
a i r
q u a l i t y of a c c e s s t o h e a l t h protection into the W fP°«™Z er ^
« K S P " o u s in i d e a l theory. So t h e requirement's d « « « h e a ] t h

N t S ? ™ * is q u i t e p o s s i b l y insignificant. What must be secure d s

, S , n d e e
, d . like e d u c a t i o n a n d e m p l o y m e n t , s p e « a l vts-a-vis the m a g
*«SSS' T t mand
cha
P ' ~ t h e r e q u i r e m e n t ' s implementsnon pnonry.
W h e n t
difference p r i n c i p l e is not satisfied, h e
toAj^" £
1

o m e do
( i s
Tn ^
^atl l!
"tight Z '
i n s
t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s e n s u r i n g that
e n e n
« d e r e x c e s s i v e inequalities in a c c e s s to health pro ecu
demand e^"^^, s n C

M e d j c a i d

p^pport f , ^ 0ra , i o n of ^ e t h m g l ^ e m e
e x ^ e t h e i n t u t i o n a ] i z
1 , w h j
sch^ * , a s Fried s u g g e s t s , m a y i n d e e d b e unnecessary witn.n I
188 M e d i c a l O p p o r t u n i t i e s , 16.5

its m a r g i n a l cost is o u t w e i g h e d b y i t s m a r g i n a l benefits in terms of

i n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i v i t y , b e c a u s e s u c h m e d i c a l c a r e will t e n d to raise all
i n d e x p o s i t i o n s . T h i s d e s i d e r a t u m w o u l d s t r o n g l y s u p p o r t preventive
m e a s u r e s i n t h e a r e a s of p u b l i c h y g i e n e , p r o p h y l a x i s (vaccinationsi,
a n d t h e like. But t h e n [3B] a l s o a l l o w s t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s t o go far
b e y o n d w h a t efficiency m a n d a t e s b y a l l o c a t i n g a very large proportion
of t h e social p r o d u c t t o m e d i c a l c a r e a t t h e e x p e n s e of index goods.
N o w s o m e p e r s o n s , a t (almost) a n y level of h e a l t h protection, will be
u n l u c k y e n o u g h t o e n c o u n t e r a c o m b i n a t i o n of m e d i c a l conditions for
w h i c h t h e y c a n n o t o b t a i n t h e m e d i c a l c a r e t h e y n e e d . Indeed, some
m a y even b e b o r n w i t h m e d i c a l p r o b l e m s t h a t e x c e e d any level of
h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n t h e y c a n afford. S u c h c a s e s i n t r o d u c e radical in­
equalities i n p e r s o n s ' quality of life. But, n o t b e i n g social inequalities,
t h e s e a r e n o t , o n a s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t a p p r o a c h , v i e w e d as indica­
ting a n injustice. Rather, t h e y a r e natural i n e q u a l i t i e s for which, or for
t h e e r a d i c a t i o n of w h i c h , social i n s t i t u t i o n s b e a r n o responsibility.
Nevertheless, s u c h n a t u r a l i n e q u a l i t i e s a r e a t least m i t i g a t e d by defin­
ing t h e relevant social g o o d s o t h a t it is s e n s i t i v e t o differentials in
m e d i c a l n e e d s . A m o n g p e r s o n s w i t h t h e s a m e h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n , those
w i t h w o r s e m e d i c a l histories s h o u l d receive m o r e m e d i c a l care—up to
a certain point.
1 6 . 5 . Insofar a s m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s a r e u n p r e d i c t a b l y distributed (so
m a t e v e r y o n e faces r o u g h l y t h e s a m e p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n over
litehme m e d i c a l histories), t h e a l l o c a t i o n of s o c i a l r e s o u r c e s among the
various n a t u r a l m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s p o s e s n o d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o b l e m . Sup-
e x a i p l e t h a t
SwS 1 ? ' minimaUy a d e q u a t e h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n is pro-
rnrnlh / - P e s o n s
° r e d m e d i c a l s y s t e m a n d is defined
m e d
unTverSlL M iCal c o n d i t i
° n s for w h i c h s p e c i f i e d t r e a t m e n t is
nJedSS^S? ^l°f * - C h a i
R a w i n g u p t h e list of coverede H e r e

n S c o r r e s
™ £ o ^ ° ' ^ tSr P ° n d i n g t r e a t m e n t s , c a n b e left to the
SSiSSS^.?8 ° tT fp u r
P ^ c e d u r a l j u s t i c e . W h e n partici- e

S 5 i T S e ^ S ? d , rep reSentatives)
^ e x p o s e d t o a r o u g h l y eoua^

o f t h o s e
condition an. rpnwllr!.^- w h o will b e afflicted w i t h the

m e d l C a I c o n d i t i o n s t h a t eC
c h i l d r e n i n p a r t i c u l a r Although t h f \
P a t i n g i n t h e P
p r o c e s s a r e n o t a n d n e v e r * ^ S n ^ f ^ChUdren
^? one can tak
f f
° ? r
g r a n t e d t h a t a large andZwZ^i** ft h e m Care f r3t ' *°
s o m e m e m b e r s of t h e y S S S S
descendants. y° &st un
generation, for e x a m p l e , t h e i r own
zlZrT* ° ° ^
But t h e n m a n y n a t u r a l medical , •
d i s t r i b u t e d . T h e r e a r e m e d i c a l con^dihnrT I K ™ *** "np n o t r e d i c t a b l V

0 n l y e r s o n s i n c e r t a i n
d e t e r m i n a t e g e n e t i c categories have o T P
8 C e p t i b l e
p o s s i b l e for t h e political process—domiJi? , f " t o . It is t h u s
u o m i n a t e d b y m a j o r i t y of p e r s o n s a
 M e d i c a l Opportunities, 16.5 189

certain that they ( a n d t h e i r loved o n e s ) will never suffer the medical

condition in q u e s t i o n — t o d e f i n e a s t a t e - s p o n s o r e d package of mini­
mally adequate h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n s o t h a t s u c h conditions are excluded.
It may seem p r o m i s i n g t o r u l e o u t t h i s possibility t h r o u g h t h e require­
ment that minimally a d e q u a t e h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n m u s t be defined in
terms of cost only, s o t h a t e a c h p e r s o n is t o have access t o health
protection that s e c u r e s a c c e s s t o all kinds of available medical care (for
natural medical c o n d i t i o n s ) u p t o a c e r t a i n overall cost. But this is at
best a partial s o l u t i o n b e c a u s e t h e p r o b l e m r e c u r s in the allocation of
social resources t o v a r i o u s a r e a s of m e d i c a l research, which influences
what medical p r o c e d u r e s a r e available a n d at w h a t price. Again, the
Political process m a y t e n d t o a l l o c a t e few, if any, resources to research­
ing medical c o n d i t i o n s t h a t o n l y affect genetically h a n d i c a p p e d minor­
ities.
On a s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t a p p r o a c h w e c a n n o t criticize a medical
system guided b y s u c h m a j o r i t y d e c i s i o n s as unjust even though it is
unresponsive to t h e m e d i c a l n e e d s of s u c h minorities. One may think
that semiconsequentialism i s t h e r e f o r e implausible here, but this is at
'east not obvious. O u r h y p o t h e t i c a l m e d i c a l system would secure
mu
g h l y equal h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n for n a t u r a l medical conditions that
«eryone is r o u g h l y e q u a l l y likely t o h a v e . If m o r e is required on behalf
«those w h o , t h r o u g h n o fault of t h e i r own, are genetically handi-
^PPed, then w h y s h o u l d n o t m o r e b e r e q u i r e d also o n behalf of those
who, through n o fault of t h e i r o w n , h a v e r u n out of health protection,
'he fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h involves the dubious
"ewthat an i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e , r a t h e r t h a n generate a fair distnc-u-
ton of benefits a n d b u r d e n s for its p a r t i c i p a n t s , should operate in a
jnedial way, s h o u l d d i s t r i b u t e benefits a n d b u r d e n s so as to balance
out a m o n g its p a r t i c i p a n t s for t h e sake of t h e overall fairness ot
universe. C o r r e c t i v e l y , t h e fully consequentialist alternative ap-
a b a n d o n s t h e a t t r a c t i v e i d e a t h a t justice d o e s not mandate very
3aU 0 c a t i o . n s t o t h em e t e m s but requires, onfy
d c a ] Q r e d u c a t i o n s y s
l
2 s y s t e m s f u n c t i o n in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h s o m e plausible p n n c i
H o t 3 2
fair equality of a c c e s s
c p
This way of d e a l i n g w i t h m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s involving & ™ " * ]
^Positions m a y b e r a d i c a l l y t r a n s f o r m e d t h r o u g h contemporary ad

^atment they lack pereonal funds, health msu^mo*an ^

m a y j U S t b e c u t
^San^ off entirely from all ^ r i m e * ^ ^ ofmu.ua.
y C a s e s b ea
*» (cf M^, violation by the other participants of the nam -
™»e™XXfof
c a |
y
p ^ M ^ n , RR _ , 1 8 9discharged
9 0 T h i s d u t ymutual aid c a n b e
a ro c a r e
P^um,M. PP Prwting some resources for humanitarian ; \ ' treatment and
* S ^ 7 does not mandate the provision of expensive l°J^™ l system. edica
Canj,ot ex
T l i e a J ln a t i 0 nsignificantlv
s
affect overall allocations to an ; * " j tionofthe ndexposi

^tiS a t i s s u e
would nevertheless slightly " ^„ ^ , the difference red c
nd a

W n f f i W 1 s u c h eduction is permissible on the ground ma

subject to our collective natural duties.
190 M e d i c a l O p p o r t u n i t i e s , 16.6

v a n c e s i n m e d i c a l t e c h n o l o g y t o w a r d m a k i n g g e n e t i c h a n d i c a p s avoid­
able. O n c e s u c h t e c h n o l o g i e s h a v e c o m e i n t o w i d e u s e , a genetic handi­
c a p will reflect a social d i s a d v a n t a g e ( r a t h e r t h a n a n a t u r a l handicap).
T h i s s c e n a r i o w o u l d s u g g e s t y e t a n o t h e r e x t e n s i o n of O P , which I 3B

w o n ' t d i s c u s s — a r e q u i r e m e n t of r o u g h l y e q u a l a c c e s s to available
p r o c e d u r e s for e n s u r i n g t h e c o n c e p t i o n of c h i l d r e n w h o a r e not genet­
ically h a n d i c a p p e d — w h i c h r e q u i r e m e n t m i g h t c o v e r n o t only genetic
h a n d i c a p s relevant to h e a l t h , b u t a l s o t h o s e r e l e v a n t t o education and
3 3
employment.
1 6 . 6 . So far w e h a v e at b e s t a first a p p r o x i m a t i o n t o t h e [3B] require­
m e n t of fair equality of m e d i c a l o p p o r t u n i t y . W e m u s t yet consider
m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s t h a t are socially produced, t h a t is, d u e to actions of
a n d i n t e r a c t i o n s a m o n g p a r t i c i p a n t s in t h e social s y s t e m . Socially pro­
d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s fall u n d e r t h e "benefits a n d b u r d e n s of
social c o o p e r a t i o n " (TJ 4-5), w h o s e i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n Rawls's
criterion of justice is m e a n t t o g o v e r n . S u c h d i s e a s e s a n d disabilities,
unlike n a t u r a l m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s , a r e p a r t of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s ' shares
a n d t h u s d o play a role in identifying a n d e v a l u a t i n g t h e worst social
p o s i t i o n b y reference t o w h i c h a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e is to be as­
s e s s e d . I will a r g u e t h a t O P s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e r e q u i r e full health pro­
3 B

t e c t i o n against socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s .
Let u s begin w i t h socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s that are
u n p r e d i c t a b l y d i s t r i b u t e d , d i s e a s e s c a u s e d b y g e n e r a l pollution, for
e x a m p l e . O n e m a y t h i n k t h a t t h e s e at least c a n b e a c c o m m o d a t e d just
like n a t u r a l m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s . T h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s c a u s i n g t h e m and
t h e m e d i c a l r e s p o n s e t o t h e m c a n b o t h b e left t o t h e p o l i t i c a l process as
m a t t e r s of p u r e p r o c e d u r a l justice b e c a u s e e v e r y o n e h a s a roughly
e q u a l c h a n c e of suffering t h e m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s i n q u e s t i o n . This
a r g u m e n t fails for t h e r e a s o n I n o t e d earlier in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the
e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m t h a t r a n d o m l y e x c l u d e s 20 p e r c e n t of all children
(§15.2)—those actually afflicted w i t h t h e m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n , even if they
a r e n o t identifiable in a d v a n c e , suffer d i s a d v a n t a g e s t h a t p l a c e them
b e l o w t h e best m i n i m u m social i n s t i t u t i o n s c a n s e c u r e . T h i s would
h a p p e n if, t h r o u g h o b t a i n i n g m e d i c a l c a r e for a socially p r o d u c e d
m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n , t h e i r e n t i t l e m e n t s (personal f u n d s , p o t e n t i a l insur­
a n c e benefits, o r whatever) d e c l i n e t o a p o i n t at w h i c h t h e y (or mem­
b e r s of t h e i r family) fall b e l o w t h e b e s t feasible m i n i m u m s h a r e of social
p r i m a r y g o o d s . It m i g h t also h a p p e n if t h e y s i m p l y c o u l d n o t obtain
n e e d e d m e d i c a l c a r e for a socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n . In
; u
O n e major p r o b l e m h e r e is to d e c i d e w h n » „ „ u i n

3 t T
the o p p o r t u n i t y of a child to b e b o m S & u ^ ^
ueslions ? ^nal
pe
identity. If I h a d not b e e n b o m genetically h m £ £ £ £ ^
at all (but at best a sibling or corrected v S o f f i S f l
* ^tt°l nS
^
^
a n n e S a y t h a t
a certain o p p o r t u n i t y ? T o ascribe the o p p o r t u n i t y ^ , L 1
° °
W O u W S e e m
t h e n , to d e c l i n e t h e opportunity, in w h i c h caTeTev ™ S T " * ',°
e n e t i c a U h a
c a p p e d c h i l d r e n . For an interesting d i s c u s s i o n o f s u * ^ « , y f,ts
a|,
r n 4 " " o i s u c t i complexities, s e e Ackerman, SJU>
 M e d i c a l O p p o r t u n i t i e s , 16.6 191

such cases, t h e u n l u c k y c a n validly c o m p l a i n t h a t t h e institutional

distribution of t h e b e n e f i t s a n d b u r d e n s of social c o o p e r a t i o n h a s left
them at a n excessive d i s a d v a n t a g e vis-a-vis o t h e r s . T h e s a m e potential
complaint s h o w s t h a t r e a s o n a b l e efforts m u s t b e m a d e to p r o d u c e t h e
knowledge, facilities, a n d m e d i c a t i o n s n e c e s s a r y to care for socially
produced m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s .
So e x t e n d e d , O P w o u l d r e q u i r e t h a t n e e d e d m e d i c a l care for so­
3 B

cially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s m u s t b e m a d e available. Moreover,

(the cost of) s u c h m e d i c a l c a r e is n o t c o n s i d e r e d p a r t of p e r s o n s ' shares
for p u r p o s e s of a n y o t h e r r e q u i r e m e n t of Rawls's criterion of justice.
Persons m u s t h a v e a fully a d e q u a t e p a c k a g e of first-principle goods,
minimally a d e q u a t e h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n for n a t u r a l medical conditions,
minimally a d e q u a t e e d u c a t i o n a l a n d e m p l o y m e n t opportunities, a n d a
fair index p o s i t i o n apart from w h a t e v e r n e e d e d medical c a r e they
receive for socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s . Such c a r e is viewed
as mitigating o r offsetting t h e s e m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s .
The cost of c a r i n g for socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l p r o b l e m s may still
be privatized, b u t o n l y insofar a s n o s h a r e s of social p r i m a r y g o o d s are
thereby r e d u c e d b e l o w t h e b e s t feasible m i n i m u m . P e r h a p s it is prefer­
able, however, n o t t o privatize s u c h costs at all. This way at least the
measurable e x t e r n a l i t i e s of political decisions are fully internalized.
The political d e c i s i o n a b o u t w h e t h e r , to w h a t extent, a n d o n w h a t
terms p o l l u t i o n s h o u l d b e p e r m i t t e d is m a d e o n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g
that the m e d i c a l c o s t s of p o l l u t i o n c a n n o t b e shifted off u p o n a n
unluckv f e w b u t m u s t b e i m p o s e d u p o n t h e polluting firms a n d h o u s e ­
holds o r else b e b o m e b y society at l a r g e - a n d similarly w i t h medical
costs arising from c r i m e s a n d traffic accidents, w h o s e incidence is
affected b y p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s a b o u t police d e p l o y m e n t a n d trattic
34
regulations.
Insofar a s socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s are not u n p « « d i c » -
Wy distributed, t h e s a m e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s apply, but they a p p l v Jth
greater s t r i n g e n c y . W h i l e victims of u n p r e d i c t a b l y d i s t n b u t e d , m e d i c a l
conditions L ( t h a n k s t o t h e n a t u r a l veil of ignorance) adequately
C 1
represented i n t h e political p r o c e s s , this is n o t true o ^ P « ™
8 f r
groups (those living n e a r a d a m , factory, or p o w e r P^ "*' ° ^ rorts
This c o n s i d e r a t i o n p r o v i d e s a n o t h e r reason against ™P™^™™*
of socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s u p o n t h e i r victims insofar
they c a n afford t h e m .

" U d o e s n o t matter, in m y view, w h e t h e r s u c h •f^^^^n^p^S'tE

m e e
Produced m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s w e r e foreseeable. If > ^ ™ b e i m p 0 S s i b l e las these
resulting m e d i c a l c o s t s u p o n t h e (private) producers of harmi may ^ ^ a ^ c t e d
a
w s t s e x c e e d their a s s e t s a n d i n s u r a n c e coverage) and " ^ ~ a b l e impose these
t o
d
« e care a n d w i t h i n legal constraints). It m a y also s e e m unrea* adopted the
s

c
° f ts u p o n t h e p o p u l a t i o n at large, w h i c h , through *hf P ™ ? ™ they fell, with the
relevant legal c o n s t r a i n t s . Still, t h e c o s t s m a y not )ust o e ie t n e m without falling
H^ucky W c t i m s - a t least n o t insofar a s s u c h victims onnw e requires a
below t h e b e s t feasible m i n i m u m s h a r e of social primary g o o d s .
«n<J of strict liability, b o m e ultimately by society at large.
192 M e d i c a l O p p o r t u n i t i e s , 16.6

Moreover, t h e i m p o s i t i o n of c o n s i d e r a b l e m e d i c a l risks u p o n small

g r o u p s , e v e n if t h e c o s t s of t r e a t m e n t a r e fully c o v e r e d , will often run
afoul of t h e first p r i n c i p l e . T h e political p r o c e s s n e e d n o t be con­
s t r a i n e d t o a d o p t l a w s a n d p o l i c i e s t h a t r e d u c e t h e r a t e of crime or of
p o l l u t i o n - i n d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s a s far a s feasible. An institu­
tional s c h e m e u n d e r w h i c h h i g h e r r a t e s a r e b e i n g a l l o w e d through the
political p r o c e s s (treating c r i m e / p o l l u t i o n v i c t i m s m a y b e c h e a p e r than
c r i m e / p o l l u t i o n - p r e v e n t i o n p r o g r a m s ) m a y b e just, s o l o n g a s t h e basic
right of all t o t h e integrity of t h e i r p e r s o n is still sufficiently well-
p r o t e c t e d . W h e n t h e risks a r e c o n c e n t r a t e d u p o n s m a l l g r o u p s , how­
ever, this c o n s t r a i n t will often n o t b e satisfied. I n s o m e such cases,
special risks m a y b e r e d u c e d b y offering risk g r o u p s full information
a b o u t k n o w n d a n g e r s a n d h e l p i n r e l o c a t i n g o r o t h e r w i s e protecting
t h e m s e l v e s . In o t h e r c a s e s , p r o p o s e d l a w s a n d p o l i c i e s m a y have to be
35
abandoned altogether.
O P w o u l d t h e n also r e q u i r e full h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n against socially
3 B

p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s ( m o d u l o feasibly p r o v i d a b l e medical
care). Unlike t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of m i n i m a l l y a d e q u a t e h e a l t h protection
against n a t u r a l m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s , t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t will materially
c o n s t r a i n t h e difference p r i n c i p l e e v e n i n i d e a l t h e o r y b y mandating
t h e allocation of social r e s o u r c e s t o m e d i c a l c a r e a t t h e expense of
i n d e x g o o d s . But t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t i s n o t i m p l a u s i b l e , for w h a t it de­
m a n d s is n o t t h a t i n d e p e n d e n t l y e x i s t i n g s o c i a l r e s o u r c e s b e diverted
t o m e d i c a l c a r e b u t t h a t alternative r e g u l a t i o n s a n d p o l i c i e s b e evalu­
a t e d o n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t t h e i r ( i m p a c t o n ) m e d i c a l c o s t s must be
fully covered. If s o m e social project, p o l i c y , o r r e g u l a t i o n is not, by and
large, collectively beneficial e n o u g h t o c o v e r t h e c o s t of treating any
(additional) m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s it e n g e n d e r s , t h e n it s h o u l d not be
u n d e r t a k e n i n t h e first p l a c e . T h e difference p r i n c i p l e i s t h e n under­
s t o o d a s governing o n l y t h e net b e n e f i t s of social c o o p e r a t i o n , that is, its
benefits m i n u s its b u r d e n s . T h i s r e a s o n i n g is p l a u s i b l e b e c a u s e the
h i g h e r m i n i m u m i n d e x p o s i t i o n a t t a i n a b l e i n t h e a b s e n c e of this re­
q u i r e m e n t w o u l d b e a c h i e v e d at t h e e x p e n s e of a g r o u p of medical

f U S t i c e e s e c i a
•W^SSJ^Sf u ' ' P % o n e s that require p e r s o n s t o h a v e certain mafen-
be revised by c o n s e n t ? May a p o p u l a t i o n d e c i d e n o t t o count certam
certalrfso^^
ProdUCed
?
m
i n c

e d i
n s i
° * t e n t w i t h rights t o p e r s o n a l integrity, d e c i d e to
c a l
ta^nl c o i t i o n s t h e l e s s e " s t a t u s of natural medical conoV
C l r c u m s
m u s t Hhlnk L , t a n c e s c o n d u c i v e t o informed c o n s e n t obtain, s u c h revision
or w h o d o n „ ^ « n ' ^ ' T F
° N L Y
° N A C C O U N T O F T H O S E W H O C A
™ O T C O N S E N T , E G
- C H J
H W
U t V O t e d d o e s n o t
c l r t for S l v 9
^ °
i n s t i t u t e c o n s e n t ) . As regards medical
dZdv^efL ^^ f ° < » i t i o n s , t h e s e two g r o u p s c o u l d b e accommo-
m d i C a J c n

responSw f t
E o S r a n r l
? °Z
T * ? 1C ° S , S ^
3
s o c i e t y m u t u a l l y release o n e another from
traffic (thereby r e d u c i n g gasoUn c a r

t h 8 t W O U , d
c h t t c k n ^ o t h e r w i s e cover s u c h c o s t s ! they can exempt
T H E P O R
m S SeTrnnlT ° ^ s b e i n g least likely t o drive cars. b

mchZll] nusiaSTH^Jhe,r T ^
cZ ihZ s h S d S H ™ * ^ 6 P
% P r o d u c e d m e d i c a l conditions). But i
e C d l i m i l S
' » ^ - d r i v i n g laws, or unleaded g a s o l i n e ^ d r
s o c i a

mey shield children and n o n c o n s e n t e r s from v i o l a t i o n s of their p e r s o n a l integrity.

 M e d i c a l O p p o r t u n i t i e s , 16.8 193

victims of s o c i a l c o o p e r a t i o n w h o s e s o c i a l p o s i t i o n , t h o u g h i t w o u l d
look a c c e p t a b l e o n p a p e r , i s e r o d e d b y m e d i c a l c o s t s i m p o s e d upon
them b y o t h e r s ( i f i n d e e d t h e y a r e a b l e t o o b t a i n a d e q u a t e t r e a t m e n t a t
ail). T h e b u r d e n s i m p o s e d u p o n s u c h v i c t i m s m u s t b e t a k e n into ac­
count i n a n y i n t u i t i v e l y plausible criterion for identifying t h e least
advantaged a n d e v a l u a t i n g t h e i r s o c i a l p o s i t i o n .
16.7. T h e r e are, finally, self-caused medical conditions, defined a s
ones t h a t foreseeably arise from an agent's o w n reasonably avoidable
conduct. I a s s u m e that [ 3 B ] p l a c e s s u c h d i s e a s e s a n d disablities o n a
Par w i t h o r d i n a r y tastes a n d d e s i r e s a n d t h u s counts demand for
treatment o f t h e s e m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s a s o n a p a r w i t h d e m a n d for
3 6
ordinary c o m m o d i t i e s a n d s e r v i c e s . I n e q u a l i t i e s i n a c c e s s t o treat­
ment of, o r h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t , s e l f - c a u s e d m e d i c a l conditions
are t h e n g o v e r n e d n o t b y t h e o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e b u t b y t h e d i f f e r ­
ence p r i n c i p l e . T h u s t h e p o l i t i c a l process m a y n o t allocate f u n d s to
researching a n d t r e a t i n g l u n g d i s e a s e s c a u s e d b y s m o k i n g e x c e p t i n s o ­
far as s u c h a l l o c a t i o n s p a y f o r t h e m s e l v e s ( f o r e x a m p l e , t h r o u g h t h e
improved p r o d u c t i v i t y o f t r e a t e d s m o k e r s ) . T h i s c o n s t r a i n t p r e c l u d e s a
majority o f s m o k e r s f r o m u s i n g t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s t o i m p o s e m e d i c a l
c
» s t s a r i s i n g from t h e i r h a b i t u p o n s o c i e t y a t l a r g e . U s e o f t h e p o l i t i c a l
Process i n t h i s w a y w o u l d g i v e s m o k e r s a n u n f a i r a d v a n t a g e v i s - a - v i s
nonsmokers a n d a l s o v i s - a - v i s p e r s o n s w h o c h o o s e t o r u n o t h e r , l e s s
Popular, s p e c i a l r i s k s . G r o u p s c h o o s i n g t o r u n s p e c i a l risks o f i n c u r r i n g
^ - c a u s e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s a r e , t h e n , i n l a r g e p a r t t h e m s e l v e s re­
sponsible f o r
a r r a n g i n g (or n o t arranging) t h e additional health protec­
tion t h e y n e e d . T h e v m a y organize t h e m s e l v e s to finance pertinent
Judical r e s e a r c h , e i t h e r o n t h e i r o w n o r t h r o u g h a p p e a l t o c h a n t y ;
m
y *y w o r k m o r e o r c o n s u m e l e s s s o a s t o b e a b l e to afford .nsur-
a
JJj 3 «ainst o r t r e a t m e n t o f s e l f - c a u s e d m e d i c a l conditions; a n d s o
16.8 O n [3BL t h e n , fair e q u a l i t y o f m e d i c a l opportunity requires
2 j » » y a d e q u a t e h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n for natural medical conditions
^full h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n fo^jauy p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l conditrans^
f h e
S° ! °f d e v e l o p s a n e v e n halfway
Pooled a n d p l a u s i b l e ) c r i t e r i o n for a s s e s s i n g «nstituUonaI
y m d
morally convincing enough to merit further exp
m e i C a l C O n d i , i s
1*2? ? °» ^ ^ d u t y of mutual aid, though this duty is
e
V?** h e r e
than in t h e c a s e of natural medical c o n d m o n s s m o m g

Smokere
i^!nT
P S i n g i n c o n d
"pon h ° tWs w a y t h e responsibility for medical ;''°f f
a a d o i e s c e n t s face
t h e m s e l v e s m a v w e l l b e unacceptable s o long^' hazards i s n t
*i<teh p r e s s
" r e s t o w a r d s m o k i n g or information about ure foreseeably
6 m i n a t e d
*2w - T
° c o u n t a s s e l f - c a u s e d , a medical c o n d h o n m u ^
, f C O n d u c t
o«*S- t h a t i s r e a s o n a b l y avoidable. Imposition ot ^ s t o

«S5SS§: a n d avoidability) p r o v i d e s useful senseless health

y 3 , 1 6 s a t i s f i e d w h i c h i n t u m t e n d
Problems - ^
194 Medical O p p o r t u n i t i e s , 16.8

Here t h e q u e s t i o n is, in p a r t i c u l a r , w h e t h e r t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between

n a t u r a l , self-caused, a n d socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s can be
m a d e sufficiently p r e c i s e t o b e a b l e t o c o p e w i t h t h e tremendous
c o m p l e x i t i e s of t h e m e d i c a l c a s e s t h a t a c t u a l l y arise. T h o u g h I cannot
possibly d i s c u s s t h i s q u e s t i o n t h o r o u g h l y , I will briefly indicate some of
t h e complexities. I t h i n k t h e s e c a n b e s u m m a r i z e d u n d e r three main
h e a d i n g s : first, it will s o m e t i m e s b e u n c l e a r h o w given c a u s e s of medi­
cal c o n d i t i o n s s h o u l d b e classified; next, t h e r e a r i s e p r o b l e m s about
h o w t o classify a given m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n w h e n several c a u s e s of dif­
ferent k i n d s c o m b i n e to p r o d u c e it (for e x a m p l e , s o m e form of pollu­
t i o n t h a t affects only p e r s o n s w i t h a c e r t a i n g e n e t i c trait); last, ascer­
t a i n i n g w h a t c a u s e d a given m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n a l s o involves difficulties,
c o m p o u n d e d b y t h e u n d e s i r a b l e i n c e n t i v e s t o w a r d c h e a t i n g that a
m e d i c a l s y s t e m s t r u c t u r e d in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h m y p r o p o s a l may pro­
vide. Let m e offer a few r e m a r k s o n t h e first t w o k i n d s of complexities in
t h e h o p e of s h o w i n g that at least a large r a n g e of o r d i n a r y medical
c o n d i t i o n s c a n straightforwardly a n d p l a u s i b l y b e classified in accor­
d a n c e w i t h m y p r o p o s e d e x t e n s i o n of O P t o h e a l t h c a r e .
3 B

Injuries from m o t o r vehicle a c c i d e n t s will s o m e t i m e s have a natural

c a u s e ( s u c h as a h e a r t attack) b u t a r e n o r m a l l y e i t h e r self-caused
(negligence, d r u n k e n n e s s , etc.) o r socially p r o d u c e d ( w h e n someone
else is at fault). In t h e latter case, a c c i d e n t v i c t i m s m u s t b e in a position
to cover t h e i r m e d i c a l c o s t s w i t h o u t falling b e l o w t h e best feasible
m i n i m u m s h a r e of social p r i m a r y g o o d s . T h i s c o n d i t i o n might best be
m e t b y i m p o s i n g (excess) c o s t s n o t u p o n society at large (including
n o n d n v e r s ) b u t primarily u p o n t h o s e c a u s i n g a c c i d e n t s a n d secondar­
ily u p o n all drivers (through m a n d a t o r y i n s u r a n c e , g a s o l i n e taxes, or
w h a t e v e r ) . T h i s w a y of internalizing m e d i c a l c o s t s is applicable to a
w i d e r a n g e of activities a n d p r o j e c t s t h r o u g h w h i c h p e r s o n s or associa­
38
t i o n s c r e a t e special h e a l t h risks, from i n d u s t r i a l facilities t o firearms
Medical c o n d i t i o n s suffered by victims of c r i m e s a r e generally so­
cially p r o d u c e d . H e n c e crime victims m u s t b e in a p o s i t i o n to cover
t h e i r m e d i c a l costs w i t h o u t falling b e l o w t h e b e s t feasible m i n i m u m
s h a r e of social p r i m a r y goods. It m a y b e infeasible to i m p o s e s u c h costs
fully u p o n c n m i n a l s , a n d t h e y m u s t t h e n in p a r t b e b o r n e b y society at
large. T h t s result s e e m s plausible in t h a t it p r o v i d e s i n c e n t i v e s to the
p o h t i c a l p r o c e s s t o reduce c r i m e rates even b e l o w w h a t is r e q u i r e d by
t h e first p r i n c i p l e . W h e n costs a r e b o r n e by all, t h e political process is
m o r e likely t o e x t e n d a d e q u a t e police p r o t e c t i o n t o m i n o r i t y areas, say,
b e c a u s e n o t d o i n g so will also b e expensive
In e x c e p t i o n a l cases, m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s c a u s e d b y c r i m e m a y be
M
I f the first principle is compatible with ic* i .•
C r e a t i n a t 0 o w n
( w h i c h m a y d e p e n d u p o n statist cal S ^
0 t h e m a r n a l e f f e c t 0 t
legislation u p o n rates of firearm r e l a t e d ^ * " ^ g* ? %
a c c i
s u c h a right e n g e n d e r s is best covered t h r o u i h . d e n t s ) , t h e n t h e m e d i c a l cosi
n g U n o w n e r s h i , m 0 S
u p o n criminals, o r strict liability by g u n w w e r s *° P' P
 Medical O p p o r t u n i t i e s , 16.9 195

considered self-caused, namely, w h e n t h e victim foreseeably p l a c e d

himself in a high-risk s i t u a t i o n . S u c h e x c e p t i o n s are likely t o exist for
almost all m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s w i t h given n a t u r a l o r social c a u s a l c o m ­
ponents. P e r s o n s w h o k n o w t h e y a r e allergic t o certain k i n d s of food
can r e a s o n a b l y b e h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e for avoiding s u c h food; p e d e s t r i a n s
may r e a s o n a b l y b e h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e for staying clear of b u s y s u p e r h i g h ­
ways; a n d s o forth.
Infection i n t h e c o u r s e of a n e p i d e m i c s u c h a s AIDS w o u l d in general
be c o n s i d e r e d t o h a v e a n a t u r a l c a u s e (assuming, of c o u r s e , that t h e
virus d i d n o t o r i g i n a t e in s o m e i n d u s t r i a l o r military experiment). But it
may c o m e a b o u t t h r o u g h c a u s e s of t h e o t h e r t w o k i n d s as well. W h e n
information a b o u t t h e d i s e a s e is w i d e s p r e a d , a case of AIDS c o n t r a c t e d
through a high-risk activity (reused h y p o d e r m i c needles, u n p r o t e c t e d
intercourse) is p r e s u m a b l y self-caused, at least w h e n alternatives
(clean n e e d l e s , c o n d o m s ) are readily available. And if t h e infection
occurs in t h e c o u r s e of m e d i c a l t r e a t m e n t (blood transfusion) o r
through a c r i m e (rape) it w o u l d b e socially p r o d u c e d .
O c c u p a t i o n a l h e a l t h p r o b l e m s , w h e n arising from risks that are fully
u n d e r s t o o d a n d c o n s e n t e d to, are self-caused (and socially p r o d u c e d
otherwise). It m a y s e e m , to t h e contrary, t h a t o c c u p a t i o n a l h a z a r d s
should b e m i n i m i z e d e v e n if t h e cost of d o i n g so is m u c h greater t h a n
the savings d u e t o r e d u c e d risk incentives. This view, however, is
vulnerable t o t h e c h a r g e of p a t e r n a l i s m . If workers prefer t h e higher
risks a n d h i g h e r i n c o m e s (part of w h i c h t h e y c a n s p e n d o n additional
health i n s u r a n c e ) t h e n w h y p r o h i b i t ? This c h a r g e s e e m s plausible at
least i n ideal t h e o r y , a s s u m i n g t h a t a n institutional s c h e m e satisfying
Rawls's c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e w o u l d provide t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s for gen­
uine c o n s e n t (especially by p r e c l u d i n g dire poverty a n d long-term
39
unemployment).
16.9. M y p r o p o s e d v e r s i o n of t h e o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e r e q u i r e s
formal e q u a l i t y of e d u c a t i o n a l , e m p l o y m e n t , a n d medical opportunity,
h also r e q u i r e s t h a t all p a r t i c i p a n t s "have a c c e s s to a minimally a d e ­
quate e d u c a t i o n , t o m i n i m a l l y a d e q u a t e e m p l o y m e n t , a n d to mini­
mally a d e q u a t e h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n for n a t u r a l a n d full medical care for
socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s .
To c o n c l u d e , let m e r e s t a t e t h e t h r e e principal objectives of this
discussion. First, i n specifying w h a t I take t o b e t h e strongest tenable
version of Rawls's o p p o r t u n i t y principle, I h o p e t o have provided a
reasonably c l e a r c o n c e p t u a l framework w i t h i n w h i c h alternative speci-

S O c c u a , i o n a S a
* T h e s e remarks are c o m p a t i b l e , I think, with a d e f e n s e of the U P f. ^ r

and Health A d m i n i s t r a t i o n requirement that medical conditions.arising fromtoxic a n d

other harmful materials at t h e w o r k p l a c e m u s t be avoided "to the extent feasible (see
Daniels, JHC 144). At p r e s e n t s u c h m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s c a n stiUI count as socially pro
duced o n t h e g r o u n d s that workers are either not fully informed about relevant heal £
"sks or c a n n o f r e a s o n a b l y avoid jobs i m p o s i n g s u c h risks (given t h e current extent ot
u n e m p l o y m e n t a n d poverty).
196 T h e Difference Principle, 17.1

fications of t h e o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e c a n b e d i s c u s s e d . S u c h specifica­
t i o n s m a y vary in s t r e n g t h in at least t h r e e d i m e n s i o n s : t h e opportunity
p r i n c i p l e m a y r a n g e over e d u c a t i o n a n d / o r e m p l o y m e n t a n d / o r health
c a r e ; in a n y of t h e s e a r e a s it m a y r e q u i r e e i t h e r m e r e l y formal or fair
(including formal) e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y ; a n d a n y of its requirements
m a y h a v e e i t h e r m e r e l y d e s i g n p r i o r i t y o r b o t h d e s i g n a n d implementa­
40
tion priority over t h e difference p r i n c i p l e .
S e c o n d , I h a v e m a i n t a i n e d t h a t Rawls's n o t i o n of formal equality of
o p p o r t u n i t y is r a t h e r v a g u e a n d t h a t h e offers n o t e n a b l e specification
of fair equality of o p p o r t u n i t y at all. He s e e m s n o w t o favor a variant of
[1A], r e q u i r i n g m e r e l y formal e q u a l i t y of ( p r e s u m a b l y e d u c a t i o n a l and
e m p l o y m e n t ) o p p o r t u n i t y . As a n a l t e r n a t i v e , I h a v e t r i e d to outline a
t e n a b l e specification of fair e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y . In d o i n g so, I have,
third, b e e n c o n c e r n e d t o d e f e n d a s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t approach in
a r e a s w h e r e initially it w o u l d s e e m least p l a u s i b l e . A t t a i n m e n t of these
last t w o objectives ultimately d e p e n d s u p o n t h e practicability of [3B]
a n d u p o n t h e availability of p o t e n t i a l l y s u p e r i o r alternatives.

17. T h e Difference P r i n c i p l e

1 7 . 1 . Rawls's t h r e e p r i n c i p l e s differ n o t o n l y in r e s p e c t t o t h e social

p r i m a r y g o o d s t h e y cover b u t also in t h e w a y t h e y c o n s t r a i n the institu­
tional d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e s e g o o d s . F i r s t - p r i n c i p l e g o o d s a r e b y a n d large
41
d e f i n e d in a b s o l u t e t e r m s . T h e y a r e definite p r o t e c t i o n s of the basic
n e e d s of n o r m a l p e r s o n s as Rawls c o n c e i v e s t h e m . W h e n s o m e partici­
p a n t s (avoidably) h a v e a less t h a n fully a d e q u a t e p a c k a g e of these
g o o d s , t h e n t h i s is a n injustice q u i t e i r r e s p e c t i v e of w h a t packages ot
42
these goods the others have.
""Allowing mixtures, t h e s e three p a r a m e t e r s permit at least 124 p o s s i b l e specifications
(more, if different priorities m a y attach to the t w o c o m p o n e n t s of fair equality of oppor­
tunity). Let F = fair (with formal), f = formal, 0 = the principle d o e s not apply, a n d let P -
d e s i g n a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n priority and p = d e s i g n priority o n l y T h e n there are at least
five possibilities in e a c h area: FP, Fp, fP, f , a n d 0. For three areas, this y i e l d s 5 X 5 X 5 -
p

125 possibilities. Subtract o n e b e c a u s e if it applies i n n o n e of the three areas (0/0/Ot, « «

principle d i s a p p e a r s , if the opportunity principle is o n e of either fair o r formal equality ot
o p p o r t u n i t y t h r o u g h o u t a n d if it h a s d e s i g n a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n priority over the differ­
e n c e p n n c i p l e , t h e n there are only 2 x ( x x - l ) «
2 2 2 M possibilities, ranging from the
strongest p n n c . p l e r e q u i n n g fair equality of educational e m p l o y m e n t , a n d medical
o p p o r t u n i t y (F/F/F), t o the three weakest principles requiring m e r e l y formal equality of
o p p o r t u n i t y m o n l y o n e area (f/0/0). H o w strong a n o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e the parties
w o u l d a d o p t d e p e n d s t o s o m e extent u p o n general empirical information (available in
the original p o s . t i o n l - f o r example, about the marginal effects of alternative specifica­
tions u p o n t h e l o w e s t i n d e x position.
• • T h o u g h t h e r e are relative e l e m e n t s in the definition of s o m e first-principle require­
m e n t s , a s vvith t h e / a . r value of the political liberties a n d the culturalI variability in the
n o t i o n of s t a n d a r d b a s i c s o c i o e c o n o m i c n e e d s
« T h i s is not to d e n y that e v e n if a requirement is formulated in clearly a b s o l u t e terms,
a n inferior p a c k a g e m a y strtl b e especially intolerable. It m a y b e m o r e d a m a g i n g t o self-
r e s p e c t (as w h e n w o m e n are d e n t e d the vote u n d e r a s c h e m e rfunJ^wSmate « W '
a n d it m a y involve a c o m p e t i t . v e disadvantage (as w h e n t h e a d h e r e m s r f s o m e religions
m a y n o t o r g a n i z e o r advertise t h e m s e l v e s w h i l e others are p e ^ t t e d to d o so).
 T h e Difference Principle, 17.2 197

The s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e i m p o s e s t w o relative c o n s t r a i n t s u p o n t h e
social a n d e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t i e s a n institutional s c h e m e m a y t e n d to
generate. T h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s a l l o w t h e political p r o c e s s to govern overall
43
levels of e d u c a t i o n , h e a l t h care, a n d e c o n o m i c activity, so long as
such political d e c i s i o n s affect r o u g h l y equally t h e o p p o r t u n i t y a n d
index p o s i t i o n s of t h e v a r i o u s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e g r o u p s (the least a d v a n ­
taged in p a r t i c u l a r ) . T h u s t h e o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e is largely i n s e n s i ­
tive to w h e t h e r p e r s o n s h a v e m u c h a c c e s s or little, requiring only t h a t
no one's o p p o r t u n i t i e s fall significantly below t h e m i d d l e r a n g e . T h e
difference p r i n c i p l e i m p o s e s a n even less definite relative c o n s t r a i n t
upon t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of index g o o d s . It r e q u i r e s t h a t
social i n s t i t u t i o n s , insofar a s t h e y p r o d u c e i n d e x inequalities, be s t r u c ­
tured so as to o p t i m i z e t h e i n d e x p o s i t i o n of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d . H e r e
even t h e d e g r e e of i n e q u a l i t y is left entirely o p e n , to b e d e t e r m i n e d ,
however, n o t b y t h e political p r o c e s s b u t by empirical facts (for e x a m ­
ple, c o n c e r n i n g t h e effectiveness of various incentives).
It has s o m e t i m e s b e e n overlooked that t h e difference principle e n ­
tails n o g e n e r a l d e m a n d to raise t h e i n d e x position of t h e least a d v a n ­
taged by all feasible m e a n s a s far as possible—even by s t r i p - m i n i n g
national p a r k s , by s h o r t e n i n g l u n c h breaks, or t h r o u g h subliminal
messages p i p e d to w o r k s t a t i o n s . It is only insofar as t h e y g e n e r a t e
social a n d e c o n o m i c inequalities t h a t social institutions m u s t b e d e ­
signed t o o p t i m i z e t h e i n d e x p o s i t i o n of t h e least advantaged. T h e
political p r o c e s s is a l l o w e d t o govern, as m a t t e r s of p u r e p r o c e d u r a l
justice, t h o s e o t h e r f e a t u r e s of t h e institutional s c h e m e that affect
index p o s i t i o n s r o u g h l y e q u a l l y — s u c h as restrictions o n t i m e worked,
resource d e p l e t i o n , a n d p o l l u t i o n . T h e s e restrictions m a y be q u i t e
hght; to b e just, a s o c i e t y n e e d n o t b e affluent or aim to be (cf. FG 5451.
17.2. Before d i s c u s s i n g this p o i n t further, let m e m a k e a few c o m ­
ments o n t h e i n d e x . Rawls often d i s c u s s e s t h e difference principle in
its simplest form, w h e r e it g o v e r n s the institutional distribution of o n l y
income a n d w e a l t h (SUPG 162-63). Here it is i m p o r t a n t for p u r p o s e s of
the i n d e x t h a t s h a r e s of i n c o m e a n d wealth b e corrected for a n y ex­
penses c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e first a n d o p p o r t u n i t y principles. Whatever
entitlements p e r s o n s h a v e to minimally a d e q u a t e e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r ­
tunities o r w h a t e v e r f u n d s t h e y n e e d to gain access to first-pnnciple
goods ( i n c l u d i n g g o o d s to m e e t t h e i r s t a n d a r d basic s o c i o e c o n o m i c
needs), for e x a m p l e , a r e n o t t o b e i n c l u d e d in their i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h
as evaluated u n d e r t h e difference principle. Persons c a n n o t be said t o
enjoy fair e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y and a r e a s o n a b l e a m o u n t of d i s p o s ­
able i n c o m e , if i n fact t h e y face a c h o i c e b e t w e e n having only o n e o r t h e
other. T h i s p o i n t is o n l y marginally i m p o r t a n t w h e n s u c h higher-order
expenses (for e x a m p l e , t h e cost of m e e t i n g one's s t a n d a r d socioeco-

" T h e r e a r e l o w e r .imits o n t h e s e levels. There must be e n o u g h e c o ^ a g ^ v r f t h

™%£*ff£ &
whatever e d u c a t i o n a n d h e a l t h care this p r e s u p p o s e s / tcicover the t
especially t h e c o s t s of satisfying the first principle, and there m u s . be e n o u g n
to ensure t h e p r o p e r f u n c t i o n i n g of legal a n d political institutions.
198 T h e Difference P r i n c i p l e , 17.2

n o m i c n e e d s ) a r e r o u g h l y t h e s a m e for e v e r y o n e . But they may not be.

T h e r e m a y b e great differences, for i n s t a n c e , in t h e e x p e n s e s persons
4 4
i n c u r for socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s .
With regard to a n o n g o i n g e c o n o m i c s c h e m e , t h e difference princi­
p l e r e q u i r e s t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n a l f e a t u r e s affecting relative index positions
( i n c o m e tax rates, for e x a m p l e ) s h o u l d b e d e s i g n e d , insofar as feasible,
s o that they, ceteris paribus, o p t i m i z e t h e i n d e x p o s i t i o n of the least
a d v a n t a g e d in a b s o l u t e t e r m s . T h i s r e q u i r e m e n t involves t h e assump­
tion t h a t i n a s s e s s i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t i e s , p e r s o n s (as represented
in t h e original p o s i t i o n ) take a n i n c o m m e n s u r a b l y g r e a t e r interest in
t h e i r absolute t h a n in t h e i r relative i n d e x p o s i t i o n . F o r t h e simplest
case of i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h t h i s a s s u m p t i o n is q u i t e clearly implausible.
S o m e of "the g o o d t h i n g s in life" a r e p o s i t i o n a l g o o d s . A c c e s s to them is
s c a r c e a n d therefore c o m p e t i t i v e . W h e t h e r I c a n o w n a s e c l u d e d lake-
front property, s e e a f a m o u s o r c h e s t r a p e r f o r m , s h o w generosity to­
w a r d friends a n d relations, o r b u y m y c h i l d r e n t h e t o y s o w n e d by their
p e e r s , d e p e n d s in p a r t o n h o w m u c h m o n e y o t h e r s c a n devote to these
s a m e p u r p o s e s . If s u c h p o s i t i o n a l g o o d s a r e of s o m e i m p o r t a n c e or if
p e r s o n s a r e s u s c e p t i b l e to feelings of relative d e p r i v a t i o n (or excusable
envy), t h e n it m a y b e p l a u s i b l e t o a t t a c h s o m e c o m m e n s u r a t e impor­
t a n c e t o relative e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n s . T o deflect s u c h criticisms, Rawls
c a n b r i n g in t h e o t h e r t w o i n d e x g o o d s — t h e r e s i d u a l social bases of
self-respect ( a c c o m m o d a t i n g e x c u s a b l e envy) a n d p o w e r s a n d preroga­
tives of offices a n d p o s i t i o n s of responsibility—which are, at least in
large part, intrinsically p o s i t i o n a l (or c o n s t a n t - s u m ) g o o d s a n d will
t h e r e f o r e limit t h e sacrifice of relative for t h e sake of a b s o l u t e income
a n d w e a l t h . But since Rawls s a y s n o t h i n g a b o u t h o w t h e s e other two
g o o d s are to b e specified a n d w e i g h t e d w i t h i n t h e i n d e x , I won't
d i s c u s s t h i s i s s u e further.

It s e e m s clear t h a t t h e i n d e x m u s t a l s o i n c l u d e leisure time as a

d i s t i n c t social p r i m a r y good. This g o o d c a n b e d e f i n e d s i m p l y as the
45
i n v e r s e of time w o r k e d , w h i c h is a b u r d e n of social c o o p e r a t i o n .
A l S 0 0 m e P e r S n S r a i S e m o r e c h U d r e n
wl 'Ji ° than others and may then face additional

C W o n , 0 h a v e c h U d
o l h e f conTumnt?on d e ^ o r i T h £ ™ would be treated like any
^ S below
not fall ^ ^ thet best
X feasible
^ S m im
^imt£mlw
S T ° P °a counS ' u s S ,
"
W
g e
U , d
x e n s
reqUtre
e s i n t o
^ "J? of
n I y

course, this responsibility may b e T s S t ^ ™ ^ *"lor c a J c u l a , e d

children suifer a shortfall of^ret^rinck>le^ir^r^ ^t*^y insofar as neither parents nor

always measured ex post. P™»«Ple or opportunity-principle goods, which are

"ifTece^
Jeffrey R e i m a n advocates an wLn^^Efi^J* «*P " '" , a n d f i d ( P R I G 2 5
h

governs onlv work time. This proposal ^ / ^ , s n i

d l f f e
l
r e n
P™<=iple on which"
c e

money can buy is produced b/ot&r S ^ ^ ^ , ^ S S

 T h e Difference Principle, 17.2 199

Leisure t i m e m u s t p l a y a role in i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o m p a r i s o n s t h r o u g h
which t h e least a d v a n t a g e d w i t h i n a n existing social s y s t e m are identi­
fied. Even t h o u g h t h e i r a n n u a l o r lifetime i n c o m e is r a t h e r low, t h o s e
who c h o o s e to d o o n l y a few h o u r s of well-paid work e a c h w e e k c a n n o t
plausibly b e c o n s i d e r e d less a d v a n t a g e d t h a n o t h e r s w h o work m a n y
46
more h o u r s p e r w e e k in a l o w e r - p a y i n g j o b .
Leisure t i m e m u s t b e t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t in i n t e r s c h e m i c c o m p a r ­
isons as well. T o s e e w h y , c o n s i d e r that o n e p r o m i n e n t w a y in w h i c h a
relative r e d u c t i o n c a n l e a d to a n a b s o l u t e i m p r o v e m e n t in t h e lowest
index p o s i t i o n is t h r o u g h incentives. T h e s e m a y b e u s e d to improve t h e
matching of p e r s o n s to c a r e e r s a n d also to elicit greater efforts from
persons a l r e a d y c o m m i t t e d to a certain career. To satisfy t h e difference
principle, t h e r e s u l t i n g i n c r e a s e s in productivity m u s t suffice to finance
the incentives and also to raise t h e i n d e x position of t h e least advan­
taged. T h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of s u c h incentives w o r s e n s t h e relative b u t
improves t h e a b s o l u t e i n d e x p o s i t i o n of those w h o fail to w i n t h e m . In
the spirit of t h i s R a w l s i a n idea, effective leisure-time incentives s h o u l d
be equally w e l c o m e . P r o m i s i n g a n extra m o n t h of vacation to t h o s e
willing to e n t e r a c e r t a i n profession or to t h o s e willing t o m a k e special
efforts m a y e n h a n c e efficiency so that (holding p r o d u c t i o n constant)
everyone will g a i n a few extra vacation days. T h e desirability of this
institutional c h a n g e will register o n Rawls's i n d e x only if leisure t i m e is
47
included.

good in m o s t s o c i e t i e s , a n d offices have b e e n sold o r auctioned off in many. Moreover,

different k i n d s of work often differ greatly—in being more or less prestigious, healthful,
dirty, d a n g e r o u s , interesting, tiring, a n d the like. Surely, s u c h differences must be taken
mto a c c o u n t in a s s e s s i n g the justice of an e c o n o m i c s c h e m e . If o n e accepts "tune
labored" o r "effort e x p e n d e d " (Reiman, LTDP 143) as an interpersonally invanant mea­
sure for the b u r d e n s of social cooperation, however, then o n e is constrained to view as
the appropriate equalitarian b a s e l i n e a s c h e m e under w h i c h hours of work are rewarded
equally, w h e t h e r the work is that of a gardener, miner, executive, or musician (cf. LTDP
143-44). Rawls p r o v i d e s at least the h e a d i n g s u n d e r w h i c h these complexities can be
taken into a c c o u n t . T h e difference principle governs the institutional distribution not
only of i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h (including what is obtainable therewith! but also of p o w e r s
f n d prerogatives of offices a n d of p o s i t i o n s of responsibility and of the (residual) social
bases of self-respect. So Rawls leaves room for the plausible idea that persons index
Position m a y differ m e r e l y b e c a u s e their jobs are differentially prestigious or demanding.
s t a n d a n
^ * r h i s c o n f o r m s to Rawls's suggestion that "twenty-four hours less a ^ ° * «
day might b e i n c l u d e d in t h e i n d e x as leisure. Those w h o are unwilling to work w o u l d
have a standard w o r k i n g d a y of extra leisure. . S o those w h o surf all day offMal.bu must
find a w a y to s u p p o r t t h e m s e l v e s and w o u l d not be entitled to public funds I P W C ^ n .
7 b e a s
' Unlike the o t h e r t w o i n d e x g o o d s Rawls proposes, leisure tune can ™ u r e ™
made c o m m e n s u r a b l e w i t h i n c o m e a n d wealth in a straightforward way. Here o n e * l d e a

to define an e x c h a n g e rate of i n c o m e vs. work time by reference to he relevant so«aJ

^ t e r n ' s aggregate rate of productivity (the rate at w h i c h the populal o n at large trans
w o r k h m e i n t o i n c o m e a n d wealth). T h o u g h the details are complicated, this task

t ' S t e S o n for the i n c l u s i o n of leisure time is that it can make t h e ^ ^ e x ^ e n s i t i v e

1 0 n , s
socially i m p o r t a n t but u n p a i d work. In a s s e s s i n g the e c o n o m i c po t.orvJ P ^ °
s a m p l e , o n e m a y take into a c c o u n t not merely their e x p e n s e s m raising
children but a l s o t h e t i m e t h e y s p e n d on t h e s e activities. Whether s u c h tune
200 T h e Difference P r i n c i p l e , 17.3

1 7 . 3 . W i t h t h e s e r o u g h i d e a s a b o u t t h e i n d e x , let u s see how the

difference p r i n c i p l e m a y b e a p p l i e d . G r a p h 3 r e p r e s e n t s h o w the lowest
(absolute) i n d e x p o s i t i o n varies a s a f u n c t i o n of its relative status. This
relative s t a t u s c a n b e given a s a p e r c e n t a g e of t h e m e a n (absolute) index
p o s i t i o n so t h a t t h e leftmost vertical l i n e r e p r e s e n t s 100 percent or
48
perfect e q u a l i t y .
In o r d e r t o e l u c i d a t e t h e force of t h e difference p r i n c i p l e , as I pro­
p o s e t o u n d e r s t a n d it, let m e d i s t i n g u i s h four ideal-typical kinds of
i n s t i t u t i o n a l c h o i c e s . First, t h e r e a r e c h o i c e s t h a t affect n e i t h e r relative
n o r a b s o l u t e i n d e x p o s i t i o n s , for e x a m p l e , d e c i s i o n s a b o u t h o w the law
specifies f r e e d o m of t h e p r e s s o r r e g u l a t e s m a r r i a g e a n d divorce. Inso­
far a s s u c h c h o i c e s a r e n o t p r e e m p t e d b y p r i o r p r i n c i p l e s of justice,
t h e y c a n b e g o v e r n e d b y t h e political p r o c e s s a s m a t t e r s of p u r e pro­
c e d u r a l justice. T h e difference p r i n c i p l e h a s n o b e a r i n g o n t h e m .
S e c o n d , t h e r e are c h o i c e s t h a t — t h r o u g h t h e i r i m p a c t o n available
i n d e x g o o d s overall—affect t h e vertical l o c a t i o n of t h e c u r v e . They do
n o t affect relative i n d e x p o s i t i o n s b u t r e s u l t o n l y in p a r a l l e l transforma­
t i o n s u p or d o w n . Of this k i n d a r e c h o i c e s a b o u t limits o n working
h o u r s a n d p r o d u c t i o n ( i n t e n d e d , p e r h a p s , t o c o n s e r v e r e s o u r c e s or to
p r o t e c t t h e e n v i r o n m e n t ) , a b o u t a l l o c a t i o n s t o a n d w i t h i n the educa­
t i o n a n d m e d i c a l s y s t e m s , a b o u t t h e r a t e of i n v e s t m e n t , about the
p r o d u c t i o n of p u b l i c g o o d s , a n d so o n . T h e difference principle, gov­
e r n i n g only (institutional) i n d e x inequalities, d o e s n o t c o n s t r a i n such
c h o i c e s at all. They, too, insofar a s t h e y a r e n o t p r e e m p t e d by the first
a n d o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e s , c a n b e left t o t h e political p r o c e s s as
m a t t e r s of p u r e p r o c e d u r a l justice. T h e r e is n o significant risk of bias
against t h e least a d v a n t a g e d b e c a u s e all r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n d e x positions
a r e affected r o u g h l y equally.
Third, t h e r e are c h o i c e s of institutional f e a t u r e s of t h e economic
s y s t e m t h a t affect relative i n d e x positions, s u c h a s t h e c h o i c e of income
tax r a t e s . S u c h c h o i c e s , r e p r e s e n t a b l e a s m o v e m e n t s a l o n g t h e curve,
a r e p a r a d i g m a t i c a l l y g o v e r n e d b y t h e difference p r i n c i p l e , w h i c h favors
w h a t e v e r unified s o l u t i o n to t h e i s s u e s of t h i s k i n d w o u l d o p t i m i z e the
lowest index position in absolute terms
T h e m o s t difficult a r e institutional c h o i c e s of t h e f o u r t h kind, which
affect t h e s h a p e of t h e curve. S u p p o s e , for e x a m p l e , t h a t in a capitalist
counted as work wil depend on contextual factors. If birth rates are hieh enough
high), ratsing chudren presumably need (/should) no, beTonsfdlre^I Sribution. But
suppose hat n other circumstances it would not be unjust tTrZo^e such time
burden of social cooperation, a contribution to the reproducton S «" t h i s c a S 6

optimizing the lowest index position might require such measures as subsidized d
care services^for large, poor families.) The inclusion of l e t a S n ^ f a tte ta2^Uh«« F
way in which such matters can be accommodated
**The graph cannot show how chances in th» .LI-M. .hat
»
atU f .. .
leave the relative status of the lowest index positton ,n?K ? ° ""T Lwe
the lowest index position. Rawls excludes thU S w l ^ ^
index positions are close-knit (TJ 80-82), ^^^y^T™** 'U" ^ ^ne
index position wil, affect ev.ry other index S S ^ ^ ' S S ^
 T h e Difference Principle, 17.3 201

Minimum i n d e x
position in
absolute t e r m s

best feasible
social minimum

first-principle
social m i n i m u m

R e l a t i v e s t a t u s of t h e inequality
equality •
m i n i m u m index position

Graph 3. Lowest i n d e x p o s i t i o n as a function of its relative status

economic s y s t e m t h e minimum i n d e x position is highest w h e n index

inequalities a r e fairly large, w h i l e in a socialist e c o n o m y t h e m i n i m u m
mdex p o s i t i o n is h i g h e s t w h e n i n d e x inequalities are less significant.
Can the difference p r i n c i p l e b e b r o u g h t to b e a r u p o n a choice of this
kind?
f o r a c o m p a r a t i v e a s s e s s m e n t to b e meaningful, w e m u s t m a k e
strong ceteris paribus a s s u m p t i o n s . T h e two s c h e m e s m u s t not differ
"t the e x t e n t t o w h i c h a n d m a n n e r in w h i c h t h e y d o a n d can satisfy t h e
first a n d o p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e s , a n d institutional choices of the sec­
ond kind m u s t a l s o b e t h e s a m e as far as possible. S u p p o s e t h e s e
a s s u m p t i o n s a r e satisfied. D o e s it t h e n follow, in analogy to choices of
the third kind, t h a t Rawls's criterion of justice requires capitalism (in
Graph 4) b e c a u s e it m a k e s feasible a h i g h e r social m i n i m u m ? Or may, in
analogy t o c h o i c e s of t h e s e c o n d kind, socialism b e c h o s e n t h r o u g h a
democratic political p r o c e s s o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t the adverse effect of
tnis c h o i c e u p o n t h e a b s o l u t e i n d e x position of t h e least advantaged is
no greater t h a n its a d v e r s e effect u p o n t h e o t h e r representative index
Positions?
Rawls s e e m s t o p r e f e r t h e latter answer: "The theory of justice d o e s
n
° t by itself favor e i t h e r form of r e g i m e " (TJ 280; also BLP 12 n. 13). But it
* u n c l e a r w h a t "by i t s e l f is s u p p o s e d to m e a n . Does his theory favor
°ne form of r e g i m e o n c e t h e empirical information contained m the
f a p h is s u p p l i e d ? It s e e m s not, for h e c o n t i n u e s : "Which system is best
fo
r a given p e o p l e d e p e n d s u p o n t h e i r circumstances, institutions,^and
^ t o r i c a l t r a d i t i o n s " (TJ 280, cf. 274). This statement suggests^that
* a w l w a n t s t h e c a p i t a l i s m / s o c i a l i s m issue to b e d e t e r m i n e d by t n e
s
 202 T h e Difference Principle, 17.3

Minimum index
position in
absolute terms

best feasible social

m i n i m u m u n d e r capitalism
best feasible social
m i n i m u m u n d e r socialism

first-principle
social m i n i m u m

equality • R e l a t i v e s t a t u s of t h e , inequality
minimum index position

Graph 4. M i n i m u m i n d e x p o s i t i o n s u n d e r different e c o n o m i c s y s t e m s

fictional p a r t i e s t o a " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n " (as h e calls it), who

" n o w k n o w t h e relevant g e n e r a l facts a b o u t t h e i r society, that is, its
n a t u r a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d r e s o u r c e s , its level of e c o n o m i c advance
a n d political c u l t u r e , a n d so o n " (TJ 197). T h i s i d e a of a g r a d u a l lifting of
t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e s e e m s t o arise from Rawls's t e n d e n c y to think of
t h e political p r o c e s s a s exclusively a n i n s t a n c e of i m p e r f e c t p r o c e d u r a l
justice, a t e n d e n c y from w h i c h I h a v e d e p a r t e d . I find t h e i d e a of a
h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n ( a n d h y p o t h e t i c a l legislature)
u n p a l a t a b l e b e c a u s e it suggests t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s m u s t c h o o s e their
c o n s t i t u t i o n , l a w s , a n d policies, d o w n to t h e m i n u t e s t detail, in refer­
e n c e t o w h a t it w o u l d b e rational to c h o o s e (by Rawls's s t a n d a r d s ) for
t h e p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e i r social s y s t e m T h e s e circum­
s t a n c e s , t r a d i t i o n s , etc., fix t h e " c o r r e c t " political d e c i s i o n s , regardless
4 9
of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s o w n c o n c e r n s a n d p r e f e r e n c e s
My d i s c u s s i o n of t h e political p r o c e s s ( c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e c i s i o n s in­
c l u d e d ) s u g g e s t s t h e i d e a t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s of a social s y s t e m may
d e c i d e t h e c a p i t a l i s m / s o c i a l i s m i s s u e d e m o c r a t i c a l l y in lizht of their
c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d historical t r a d i t i o n s . Like c h o i c e s of t h e s e c o n d
k i n d a n d u n l i k e t h o s e of t h e third, t h i s decision b e t w e e n socialism and
c a p i t a l i s m is p r o t e c t e d b y t h e political liberties a n d t h e r e f o r e t r e a t e d as
a m a t t e r of p u r e p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e . T h i s a n s w e r is of c o u r s e still

4i,
Ravvls'sgradua]liftingoftheveilofignoranceisnotonlv „,: m . . . • „;hi
P
m l a
a m b i t i o n to let justice settle everything ( f. § " 3 h S X " ^
c m P " ^
m d e p e n d e n
c o n s t i t u t e s a n u n n e c e s s a r y s h u f f l e - o r s o I have a ^ ^ c X 3 ™ 2 >n *
 T h e Difference Principle, 17.5 303

neitherof T, f me f K , ° P ^ " t o G r a p h 4) t h a t
t e a s , b I e
S S U m p t l n ( i n c o r o r a d

and socialism m i n i m u m i n d e x p o s i t i o n s ( u n d e r capitalism

res ectlvel
both 3 P y' ceteris paribus, w o r s e t h a n t h e o t h e r
i n r e [ a t i
u v e a n d in a b s o l u t e t e r m s ,
can Ltd^tr?™568 ^ , g
c a
difference p r i n c i p l e
, t a J l s m / s
h R a W l s i n h o , d i n t h a t t h e

result will h P ° c i a J i s m i s s u e o n l y in special cases. This

W e l c o m e i n P a r t
stabilitvhv ar OVVmg
T h r e e , for it p r o m o t e s international
Pe ]
to 4an? h S compelling another peo-
f t > m i
t h e

f r e
r o u

i n i e
n d s o

6 x 5 1 1 1
n w n i c n

versa miffhtK * • ° S capitalism to socialism or vice

j U s t i f i e d b 5
17 4 Th y a p p e a l to Rawls's criterion of justice. "
6 c o n s i d e r a n o n s
Presum hi i n d i c a t e h o w an ideal e c o n o m i c system,
3 u n l i z i n
resourr- n & t h e m a r k e t m e c h a n i s m a t least for purposes of
c a t i o n ( c f T J 2
ceduraT - ™ > c a n be viewed as an instance of p r o -
, l t l C e w n o s e
justice ^ g r o u n d r u l e s a r e governed by Rawls's criterion of
33 b y c o , ,
Proce* Q e c t i v e p r e f e r e n c e s as e x p r e s s e d through the political
S a n e c
feet ° n o m i c s y s t e m w o u l d e m b o d y an e l e m e n t of p e r -
C e t u r a u s
e q u i l ^ h * * J t i c e i n s o f a r as it, for example, reliably maintains fair
0 o r t u n
son" °^ P P i t y a n d e n s u r e s that everyone's s t a n d a r d basic
1 0 e o n o m
p f i c n e e d s a r e m e t . It e m b o d i e s an element of imperfect
cedural
m f o r ep
j u s t i c e i n s o f a r as t h e r e will p r e s u m a b l y always be s o m e
so °
C l o e c
about h o w ror design the institutions t h a t g e n e r a t e to
j ° n o m i c i n e q u a l i t i e s so as to optimize (ceteris paribus) the abso-
e i n d e x p o s i t i o n of t h e least advantaged. And it e m b o d i e s an e l e m e n t
p u r e p r o c e d u r a l j u s t i c e insofar as it regulates h o w individuals get
s t r i b u t e d " over t h e various index positions.
Let me c o n c l u d e Part Two with a brief sketch of t h e interper­
sonal a n d i n t e r s c h e m i c c o m p a r i s o n s involved in Rawls's criterion of
Justice (as
I h a v e d e v e l o p e d it)—which c o m p a r i s o n s serve, respec­
tively t o identify t h e least advantaged g r o u p within e a c h s c h e m e a n d
t 0
c o m p a r e t h e p r o s p e c t s of least advantaged g r o u p s that w o u l d exist
u n d e r feasible alternative s c h e m e s .
Rawls d e f i n e s t h e least advantaged in t e r m s of index g o o d s alone,
making t h e i d e a l - t h e o r y a s s u m p t i o n that t h e first a n d o p p o r t u n i t y
Principles are fully satisfied. If his criterion is to g u i d e t h e c o u r s e of
s
° c i a l c h a n g e , h o w e v e r , t h e n it m u s t also rank feasible basic s t r u c t u r e s
toat do not satisfy t h i s ideal-theory a s s u m p t i o n . My a t t e m p t to e x t e n d
definition a c c o r d i n g l y is based on the idea of specifying the size of
least a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p as an interschemically invariant p e r c e n t a g e
RawlsPproposeTto define least advantaged u n d e r difference the the
S 0
Snr.h o • „ ~,.i!H still appeal to the difference principle w h e n , u n d e r the

o t h e r fo™ I f ^rm^nunifeasible
e index
s p o s i t i o n w o u l d be, ceteris paribus,
& / „ X S * « *"" PP U
<
fl eal
fi^t principle t o h e

w h e n th f is preferred by the parucipants themselves a n d w o u l d n o t

°*?
Wolawh IS r l b n n
A similar burden of proof m u s t b e met in Ihe c a s e of o t h e r

expenditure-tax s c h e m e s [cf. TJ Z7»-

204 T h e Difference Principle, 17.5
p r i n c i p l e a s "all t h o s e w i t h t h e a v e r a g e i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h of [unskilled
workers], o r less," o r a s "all p e r s o n s w i t h l e s s t h a n half of the median
i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h " (TJ 981. But, s o d e f i n e d , t h e least a d v a n t a g e d group
m a y t u r n o u t to b e very large o r very s m a l l o r e v e n nonexistent. It is
h a r d l y r a t i o n a l t o d e m a n d t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s s h o u l d aim to
5 1
i m p r o v e t h e p o s i t i o n of a fictional social g r o u p .
S o m e w h a t m o r e p r o m i s i n g is t h e i d e a of s e a r c h i n g out whatever
least a d v a n t a g e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e g r o u p s , r e a s o n a b l y h o m o g e n e o u s but
of varying sizes, w o u l d e m e r g e u n d e r t h e feasible alternative institu­
tional s c h e m e s . W i t h t h i s idea, as w i t h Rawls's earlier definitions, how­
ever, i n t e r s c h e m i c c o m p a r i s o n s involving a s m a l l e r a n d worse-posi­
t i o n e d v e r s u s a larger b u t b e t t e r - p o s i t i o n e d least a d v a n t a g e d group
52
become indeterminate.
T h e r e is s u r e l y s o m e a r b i t r a r i n e s s in s t i p u l a t i n g t h e size of least
a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p s in a d v a n c e , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e c a s e of institutional
s c h e m e s t h a t w o u l d i n fact p r o d u c e a r e a s o n a b l y h o m o g e n e o u s "natu­
ral" u n d e r c l a s s . But t h i s is n o t a s e r i o u s p r o b l e m . T h e fraction to be
c h o s e n m u s t fall w i t h i n a c e r t a i n r a n g e — m u s t b e large e n o u g h to
a p p e a l t o t h e p a r t i e s ' i n t e r e s t t h a t t h e i r c r i t e r i o n s h o u l d i s s u e in defi­
n i t e a n d significant d e m a n d s for s i t u a t i o n s of injustice a n d m u s t be
small e n o u g h to a p p e a l t o t h e p a r t i e s ' i n t e r e s t to a i m t h e s e d e m a n d s
specifically at i m p r o v i n g t h e w o r s t s h a r e s . Half a p e r c e n t is too small
a n d 60 p e r c e n t t o o large, t h o u g h b o t h 4 p e r c e n t a n d 20 p e r c e n t may be
a r g u a b l e . " Fortunately, t h e p r e c i s e fraction size (within t h e reasonable
range) is n o t t o o i m p o r t a n t , b e c a u s e different s t i p u l a t i o n s w o u l d lead
t o t h e s a m e o r n e a r l y t h e s a m e p r a c t i c a l d e m a n d s . I n s t i t u t i o n a l re-
evi d
^T 18
~ ™ t o
o p t i m i z e t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d as
d e n n e d will e i t h e r h a v e a s t r o n g t e n d e n c y t o i m p r o v e t h e general

" n e ™ whnff'' y
^\ advantaged "very roughly" as those
t h e l e a s t

PSS^J^T m 6
^ are m o r e d i s a d v a n t a g e d t h a n others, whose
s oli
$™
e n d o w m e n t s have p e r m u t e d t h e m to fare l e s s well, a n d whose fortune a n d luck have
S S S o t • ^ T ^ 2 n'
S d t , w l ^ 1 6 4 )
*K
S
m e a s u r e s are b " e d o n social
l n C e
"
t h e i d e a of d e n n i n g the least
P r o p 0 s
t h e

a l s u
PP
relevan
«
o r t
*
a M e t i m e
™ f S ,K ° W e S t
social primary g o o d s a n d is at least
s h a r e o f

c o m p a t i b l e w i t h m y s u g g e s t i o n to delimit this g r o u p by some p e r c I S t o b e kept fixed

for p u r p o s e s of i n t e r s c h e m i c comparisons) perceniue n o D e Kepi
" T h i s p o i n t is s u g g e s t e d b y Scanlon (RTJ 195). O n e m a y think that o n a contractarian
v i e w the s i z e of a g r o u p s h o u l d not matter, s o l o n e a* it ™n, • ? f- Zt„"it«"
institutional s c h e m e , but ignoring group £ ^ ^ 1 ^ , ^
,ng t w o basic structures u n d e r w h i c h t h e t w o (d leJx^ZSZZs a e n
e
narrowly as p o s s i b l e w h i l e still preserving their n > n n . « , , , groups < " ™ n

a n d 4 p e r c e n t o f p o p u l a t i o n , respectively s e c o n d n . ^ P ™ * P ^ t , v e n e s s 2

w e c a n n o t p r e s u m e that t h e parties v M ^ u t9 S ^ ^ ^ ^ 1 ^ ^ ^
fact if it i s r e a s o n a b l y o b v i o u s m a t the lower h X f ^ Z S ? * " * a s s e s s m e n t on this
"representative" gr/up, is w o r s e off than the g^S?££ES' Tthe
idea of d e f i n i n g an i n t e r s c h e m i c a U y i n v ^
m
* T o s o m e extent, the c h o i c e of a larger fraction J ™ ^ b d
t h e g r o u p s c o r e s of the least advantaged i^TyulZ^^^^ * S

«
s c o r e s w i t h i n this g r o u p . T h u s oneway u s e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
gate individual s c o r e s w i t h i n g r o u p s . ' example, to a g g i e
 T h e Difference Principle, 17.5 305

prospect of a s m a l l e r o r invariably i m p r o v e t h e general p r o s p e c t s of a

larger actual u n d e r c l a s s . T h e p a r t i e s ' i n t e r e s t s a r e a c c o m m o d a t e d ei­
ther way. Within t h e r e a s o n a b l e r a n g e , t h e p r o p o r t i o n of t h e least
advantaged t o total p o p u l a t i o n d o e s t h e n n o t m a t t e r very m u c h ,
though it m a t t e r s , of c o u r s e , t h a t t h i s p r o p o r t i o n b e kept fixed for
purposes of i n t e r s c h e m i c
comparisons.
Once t h e relative s i z e of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p h a s b e e n stipu­
lated, the m e m b e r s of t h i s g r o u p a r e identified t h r o u g h t h e staggered
application of t h r e e m e a s u r e s c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o the lexically o r d e r e d
account of social p r i m a r y g o o d s . W e m a y r e p r e s e n t e a c h participant's
snare as a n o r d e r e d t r i p l e t o r triscore, <X,Y,Z>. Here X m e a s u r e s first-
Principle g o o d s , Y o p p o r t u n i t i e s , a n d Z index goods. All t h r e e scores
ar 54
e c a p p e d a t 1 0 0 . T h e f o r m u l a X = 100 represents a fully a d e q u a t e
Package of b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties; Y = 100 r e p r e s e n t s (taking t h e
strongest v e r s i o n of O P ) formal equality of educational, e m p l o y m e n t ,
3 B

«nd medical o p p o r t u n i t y , p l u s a c c e s s to a t least a minimally a d e q u a t e

education, m i n i m a l l y a d e q u a t e e m p l o y m e n t , minimally a d e q u a t e
health p r o t e c t i o n for n a t u r a l m e d i c a l conditions, and full medical care
for socially p r o d u c e d m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s ; Z - 100 represents an index
Position t h a t d o e s n o t fall b e l o w t h e best feasible social minimum
modulo i n s t i t u t i o n a l choices of t h e second and fourth lands.** Z-
s c o r e s - u n l i k e X- a n d Y - s c o r e s - a r e inherently comparative in an in-
^ c h e m i c s e n s e . T o s c o r e t h e i n d e x position of t h e l e a s t ^ a n ^ e d ,

* j n lexically o0 v e rSr ti di ep Z - s c o n e s . J ^ J ^ ^ f S s ordering. W h e n t h e

U l
Z P
T ° n I ' f
H X cores Sone
will often suffice. In that
«rst p r i n c i p l e is n o t satisfied, X-scores
. d o not represent wha 11 have called shares
It is b e c a u s e t h e y are c a p p e d that t n s c o r e s ^ identical triscores, their shares
O T
°r social p o s i t i o n s . W h e n t w o persons [signifies o n l v that opportunities are no
z score
m a
y still b e u n e q u a l . A Y-score or " f L J v that a n index position i s n o worse than
*orse t h a n m i n i m a l l y a d e q u a t e or, r ^ t * ^ ^ ' ^ j o e c o n o m i c positions might b e q u i t e
•he feasible m i n i m u m . In a perfectly ' " j ^ ' t <ioo,100,100>.
unequal, w h i l e triscores w o u l d be untfoni ^ ^ required b e m u c h above what is
t o

" D e f i n e d in this way, a just social T ™ n o m i c n e e d s . T h e level of affluence of a just

necessary t o m e e t standard basic ^j~~Lj d u a i a n d collective c h o i c e s of its m e m b e r s ,
social s y s t e m i s d e t e r m i n e d t ^ ^ . „ , t j o n patterns or their environmental c o n c e r n s
D

s u c h a s t h e i r leisure, savings, or con*"" H n rf ^

J e a s , ^ d u n d e r a just basic
a d v a n t a e

J
t is t h e n p o s s i b l e that t h e ^ ^ V ^ terms, than the excessively l o w index position of
st
n t c r u r e ONE i s m u c h lower, m a b s o ' ^ ^ ^ T W g i s t h e c a s e w h e n t h e e c o n o m i c

1
the least a d v a n t a g e d u n d e r t ^ ^ * ^ b e reorganized in respect only to the index
system of TWO, b u t n o t tha' ot " " V , , ^ raises t h e l o w e s t index p o s i t i o n (in absolute
inequalities it tends to produce in «
terms).
 306 T h e Difference Principle, 17.5

case t h e least a d v a n t a g e d a r e t h o s e w h o s e p a c k a g e of basic rights and

l i b e r t i e s — i n c o m p l e t e o r ill p r o t e c t e d — i s l e a s t a d e q u a t e . They may
suffer excessive e x p o s u r e t o violent c r i m e , b e u n a b l e t o meet their
s t a n d a r d basic s o c i o e c o n o m i c n e e d s , b e significantly disadvantaged as
regards (the fair value of) b a s i c political liberties, o r suffer abridgments
of their civil liberties.
The n e x t s t e p c o n s i s t s i n a g g r e g a t i n g t h e X-scores, t h e Y-scores, and
the Z-scores of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d i n d i v i d u a l s . Here, I think, one can
simply u s e t h e g e o m e t r i c (or a r i t h m e t i c ) m e a n t o derive t h e lowest
representative triscore, w h i c h is t h e p r i m a r y m e a s u r e for assessing the
basic s t r u c t u r e a s a w h o l e . Basic s t r u c t u r e s c a n t h e n b e r a n k e d by their
lowest r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t r i s c o r e s , j u s t a s s h a r e s w i t h i n a basic structure
56
were o r d e r e d o n t h e b a s i s of t h e i r t r i s c o r e s .
To attain a perfectly j u s t b a s i c s t r u c t u r e , w e s h o u l d t h e n aim at
institutional r e f o r m s t h a t raise all r e p r e s e n t a t i v e triscores toward
<100,100,100>. H e r e t h e c o u r s e of social c h a n g e is g u i d e d by two
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n p r i o r i t i e s : t h e p r i o r i t y of t h e least advantaged (the
worst triscore) a n d , s e c o n d a r i l y , t h e p r i o r i t y of X-scores over Y-scores
over Z-scores. T h u s political efforts a n d social r e s o u r c e s m u s t be de­
voted first a n d f o r e m o s t t o i m p r o v i n g t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e X-score of the
least advantaged, followed b y t h e i r Y-score a n d Z-score, w h i c h in turn
are followed b y t h e X-score, t h e Y-score, a n d t h e Z - s c o r e of t h e second
5 7
least a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p , a n d s o o n
The d i s c u s s i o n of P a r t T w o h a s , I h o p e , m a d e t h e Rawlsian criterion
of justice c l e a r e r a n d m o r e specific. Still, a g r e a t d e a l r e m a i n s to be
d o n e before w e c a n arrive at s o m e t h i n g like a w o r k a b l e notion of
representative t r i s c o r e s t h a t c o u l d really serve a s a p u b l i c criterion of
social justice. O n e n e e d s t h e size of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e g r o u p s a n d a clearer
idea of i n t r a p e r s o n a l a g g r e g a t i o n of social p r i m a r y g o o d s . M o r e impor­
tant, t h e v a r i o u s b a s i c rights a n d liberties m u s t b e d e f i n e d m o r e pre­
cisely, a n d w e i g h t s m u s t b e a s s i g n e d t o v a r i o u s w a y s i n w h i c h a pack­
age of b a s i c rights m a y b e i n c o m p l e t e o r ill p r o t e c t e d . M y s c h e m a for
u n d e r s t a n d i n g fair e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y m u s t b e f u r t h e r specified by
s h a r p e n i n g t h e n o t i o n s of e d u c a t i o n , e m p l o y m e n t , m e d i c a l condition,
standard, m i n i m a l l y a d e q u a t e , socially p r o d u c e d , a n d s o o n . It m u s t be
sketched h o w " p o w e r s a n d prerogatives of offices a n d positions of
responsibility" a n d t h e (residual) social b a s e s of self-respect c a n be
made c o m m e n s u r a b l e w i t h t h e o t h e r i n d e x g o o d s , i n c o m e / w e a l t h and
leisure t i m e . T h e s e t a s k s a r e less p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h a n t h e o n e s I have
here u n d e r t a k e n a n d w o u l d s e e m t o r e q u i r e c o n s i d e r a b l e expertise in

'"Should l o w e s t triscores b e equal, t h e triscores o f m o r e a d v a n t a g e d representative

groups m a y have t o b e b r o u g h t in as tie breakers. C o m p a r e h e r e Rawls's lexical difference
principle (TJ 83).
"This formulation i n c o r p o r a t e s m y p r o p o s a l (§12.3) that t h e priority c o n c e r n for the
least advantaged g r o u p m u s t override t h e lexical priority of t h e first over t h e s e c o n d (and
of the o p p o r t u n i t y over t h e difference) principle, w h e n t h e s e are u n d e r s t o o d as imple­
mentation priorities.
 T h e Difference Principle, 17.5 307

other fields. I h o p e t h i s d i s c u s s i o n h a s at least m a d e clearer h o w s u c h

expertise might b e e m p l o y e d . I also h o p e that my development of
Rawls's criterion of j u s t i c e h a s r e a c h e d a level of specificity on which
we can gain at least a r e a s o n a b l y p r e c i s e idea of the institutional
reforms that this criterion, a s a p p l i e d to a particular institutional
scheme, would likely d e m a n d if it w e r e fully spelled out.
PART T H R E E

GLOBALIZING THE
RAWLSIAN CONCEPTION
OF J U S T I C E
 CHAPTER 5

From Modus Vivendi

to Value Overlap

18. The P r a c t i c a l I m p o r t a n c e o f J u s t i c e

1M. When a p h i l o s o p h e r s p e n d s h i s life developing and refining an

^borate theory of j u s t i c e , it m a y b e interesting to ask about the impor-
ance of his w o r k a n d a b o u t its a u t h o r ' s view thereof. Insofar as Rawls
t e s f o r
!" an a c a d e m i c a u d i e n c e , t h e a n s w e r is straightforward: h e has
town how c e n t r a l s t r a n d s of K a n t ' s m o r a l a n d political philosophy
be restated in a w a y t h a t m a k e s t h e m i n d e p e n d e n t of Kant s
r i s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y w i t h its pervasive dualisms (WOS 18/. « e
a d e a
S,!K ? c o n t r i b u t i o n t o m o r a l theory, the comparative s udy of
^bstantive m o r a l c o n c e p t i o n s , b y bringing the neglected contractar-
T Paradigm u p t o d a t e ? H e h a s s u r e l y achieved m a n y other valuable
^ b e s i d e s , s u c h a s d e v e l o p i n g n e w ideas for theory construction
C o n c
ue^ « P t i o n s ) a n d justification (reflective ^ ^ ^ ^
uest«,n h e r e c o n c e r n s t h e p r a c t i c a l political message of Rawls s^pht
0s
°Phy, w h i c h is c o n c e r n e d he says, w i t h the indefinite
politician l o o k s o n l y "to t h e n e x t election, the s t a t e s m a r t o t h e
^ g e n e r a t i o n " (IOC z / w h a t is t h e m o r a l import of h i s ^ w o r ^ r .
J * * r e a d e r s h i p of p e r s o n s of g o o d will w h o also have the mdehnite
ure at h e a r t ? J R N P

« a w l s s u g g e s t i o n s o n t h i s s c o r e go in two
s ^T^dutv to
0 V e
any i n j u s t i c e s " i n e x i s t i n g institutions. His tneoiy

'evX *T P
r a c t
iS

i o n
t Q r e s e n t a
c o n c e p t i o n of justice w h i c h generafees ™^™ *°*Se, y

"ousseaf, ^ e familiar theory of the social contract as i hy

h i ] o s o p

mus K«nt" (TJ 111 "The m a i n c o n c e p t i o n s in the ^ ^ e x c n a

8 , 1 ( 1
^ e d and by
C n , i n u a l l
incortvf ,° y r e n e w e d . . . by n o t i n g the criticisms that are
r

furanng i n e a c h t h e a d v a n c e s of t h e others (IMT 22/.

211
213 T h e Practical I m p o r t a n c e of J u s t i c e , 18.1

w e are to identify " t h e m o s t g r i e v o u s " i n j u s t i c e s in d e v e l o p e d Western

societies (TJ 246). W h e r e s u c h s u g g e s t i o n s a r e at all c o n c r e t e , they refer
to t h e first p r i n c i p l e a n d in p a r t i c u l a r t o t h e fair value of t h e political
liberties (TJ 226; BLP 74-79). R e m a r k s o n w h a t n e e d s t o b e d o n e for the
sake of t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e a r e r a r e a n d c u r s o r y .
In h i s l a t e r w r i t i n g s , Rawls is m o r e p r o n e t o e m p h a s i z e the impor­
t a n c e of h i s w o r k for e n h a n c i n g t h e l e g i t i m a c y of o u r social institutions.
He w a n t s to d e v e l o p a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e t h a t , t h r o u g h appeal to
c o m m o n l y h e l d c o n v i c t i o n s , s t r e n g t h e n s c i t i z e n s ' m o r a l allegiance to
t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e : " T h e real t a s k [of political p h i l o s o p h y ] is to
discover a n d f o r m u l a t e t h e d e e p e r b a s e s of a g r e e m e n t w h i c h one
h o p e s are e m b e d d e d in c o m m o n s e n s e , o r e v e n to o r i g i n a t e a n d fash­
ion s t a r t i n g p o i n t s for c o m m o n u n d e r s t a n d i n g b y e x p r e s s i n g in a new
form t h e c o n v i c t i o n s f o u n d in t h e h i s t o r i c a l t r a d i t i o n b y connecting
t h e m w i t h a w i d e r a n g e of p e o p l e ' s c o n s i d e r e d c o n v i c t i o n s : those
w h i c h s t a n d u p to critical reflection" (KCMT 518). Rawls calls this a
"practical social task" (KCMT 519), b u t n o t in a l l u s i o n t o o u r political
task to b r i n g existing social i n s t i t u t i o n s i n t o l i n e w i t h t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s
of justice. Rather, h e is e x p r e s s i n g a v i e w of t h e criteria for a d e q u a c y
w i t h i n political p h i l o s o p h y , w h i c h s h o u l d n o t " s e a r c h for m o r a l truth"
(KCMT 519) b u t seek a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e t h a t t h e p r e s e n t citizens of
t h e U n i t e d States find c o n v i n c i n g . If " o u r h i s t o r y a n d t h e traditions
e m b e d d e d in o u r p u b l i c life," " o u r d i s p u t e s s i n c e , let's say, t h e Declara­
t i o n of I n d e p e n d e n c e , " o r " p e o p l e s c o n s i d e r e d c o n v i c t i o n s " (KCMT
519, 518) w e r e different, t h e real task of political p h i l o s o p h y w o u l d be
c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y different as well.
Lest this t h o u g h t b e m i s u n d e r s t o o d , let m e d i s t i n g u i s h t w o s e n s e s in
w h i c h a m o r a l c o n c e p t i o n m a y b e p a r o c h i a l . O n t h e o n e h a n d , it may
b e p a r o c h i a l b y b a s i n g itself u p o n t h e v a l u e s a n d c o n s i d e r e d moral
j u d g m e n t s p r e v a l e n t in o n e society at a c e r t a i n p e r i o d . Rawls's c o n c e p ­
t i o n of justice is self-consciously p a r o c h i a l in t h i s s e n s e . Its criterion of
justice a n d t h e justification of t h i s c r i t e r i o n a r e c h o s e n for t h e i r s u p ­
p o s e d a p p e a l t o t h e reflective c o m m o n s e n s e of (primarily) p r e s e n t - d a y
A m e r i c a n s . Rawls w a n t s t o h a v e p r e s e n t e d in a d e v e l o p e d a n d ide­
alized form t h e w a y t h o u g h t f u l c o n t e m p o r a r y A m e r i c a n s w o u l d see the
world, w o u l d a s s e s s t h e i r o w n p a s t a n d p r e s e n t i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d the
i n s t i t u t i o n s of o t h e r historical s o c i e t i e s . T h i s h e s e e s a s h i s practical
s o a a l task. His c o n c e p t i o n fails if it d o e s n o t a p p e a l t o t h e moral
c o n s c i o u s n e s s of h i s c o m p a t r i o t s .
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , a m o r a l c o n c e p t i o n m a y claim a l i m i t e d d o m a i n ,
t h u s it m a y view itself as a p p l i c a b l e o n l y t o c e r t a i n k i n d s of social
s y s t e m s u n d e r c e r t a i n k i n d s of e m p i r i c a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , o r e m b r a c i n g
s o m e v e r s i o n of c u l t u r a l relativism, it m a y s e e itself a s a p p l y i n g only
w i t h m a c e r t a i n c u l t u r e a n d e p o c h , m u c h like a set of r u l e s of e t i q u e t t e .
Rawls s c o n c e p t i o n in A Theory of Justice is o n l y slightly p a r o c h i a l in
m i s s e n s e . I h o u g h it is in s o m e w a y s a d a p t a b l e t o v a r i o u s e m p i r i c a l
 T h e Practical I m p o r t a n c e of Justice, 18.1 313

and cultural c o n d i t i o n s , it is n e v e r t h e l e s s applicable to all essentially

self-contained social s y s t e m s existing u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of jus­
2
tice (TJ §22).
On the view s t r e s s e d in t h e l a t e r writings, t h e i m p o r t a n c e of Rawls's
work consists t h e n in f i n d i n g a w a y of arranging prevalent considered
judgments o n all levels of g e n e r a l i t y into a unified a n d p e r s p i c u o u s
whole, giving d u e w e i g h t to t h e values alive in this c u l t u r e — t o the
liberty of t h e a n c i e n t s a n d t h a t of t h e m o d e r n s (TJ 201); to freedom,
equality, a n d fraternity (TJ 105); to t h e ideas of Hobbes, Locke, Rous­
seau, Kant, a n d Sidgwick; t o rational choice theory a n d the perspective
sub specie aeternitatis (TJ 587). Here the principal task is to resolve "an
impasse in o u r r e c e n t political h i s t o r y T h e requisite u n d e r s t a n d i n g
of freedom a n d e q u a l i t y . . ., a n d t h e most suitable way to balance the
claims of t h e s e n o t i o n s , h a v e n o t b e e n expressed so as to meet general
approval" (KCMT 517). If t h i s i m p a s s e c o u l d b e resolved, w e would
perhaps feel differently a b o u t s o m e of o u r current institutions a n d
change t h e m , b u t it is p r i m a r i l y t h e h o p e for broad public consensus,
and not for s u c h c h a n g e s , t h a t l e n d s urgency to Rawls's work.
Recently (JFPM; a n d e s p . IOC), Rawls h a s tried to explain m o r e fully
why this justificatory t a s k is s o i m p o r t a n t . It matters that citizens have a
mora/ (rather t h a n a m e r e l y p r u d e n t i a l ) allegiance to the institutions of
their society. T h e task of political p h i l o s o p h y is to develop a kernel of
Political m o r a l i t y t h a t c a n b e at t h e c e n t e r of an overlapping c o n s e n s u s
and h e n c e c a n p e r m a n e n t l y resolve t h e fundamental assurance prob-
>em. Such a k e r n e l of political morality m u s t first a n d foremost settle
what it is politicallv u r g e n t to settle: h o w to c h o o s e n o w a m o n g feasible
•nstitutional a l t e r n a t i v e s . But stability requires that citizens s h o u l d also
agree in b r o a d o u t l i n e u p o n the g r o u n d of s u c h settlements, that is,
^ o n a c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e . S u c h a criterion identifies a n d evaluates the
m
° r a l l y salient p r o p e r t i e s a n d features of institutional schemes a n d
thereby a n t i c i p a t e s h o w s u c h a s c h e m e may a n d (especially! h o w i t
nay not b e a d a p t e d to c h a n g i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . If s u c h a shared politi­
cal morality a s s u r e s t h e v a r i o u s social groups that there will continue
t° be r o o m for t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r values a n d way of life, then each s u c h
&°up c a n d e v e l o p a m o r a l allegiance to t h e basic institutions (as hey
a n d will be), i n c l u d i n g a willingness to u p h o l d these institutions

J think this is h o w w e m u s t interpret Rawls's r^^^^ffJ^

p r e s e n t s a p e r s p e c t i v e sub specie aetemUatis 0 7 587, and that »™ t a

P * * n c o n s t i t u t e s a n A r c h i m e d e a n point (TJ 584, §41). He was not danmn*to pre

P
umversal theory . . . w h i c h p e o p l e in different c i r c u m s t a n c e ^ P ^ « ^ n o .
J»»wn cultures, w o u l d have equal reason to accept"
a

f ^ u f t y T o societies
s 0

P^pared to a d m i t that t h e parochial basis of his theory l.m.tto»PPj'™*Z* out ^

. W °h U r d o m i n a n t
^ p a r a d i g m prevails: " ^ . ^ S . ^ well
« ° w n point of v i e w h o w to treat t h o s e w h o dissentfromit TJ 3W>£
s
, , t l £ 6 9

^ t e r n a t i o n a i i y . For this antireJativism, Rawls has been c n n c u e d by u ^ ^ ^

^ ° n g others, a n d it s e e m s that h e has n o w c o m e ^ " " ^ f ^ h i c h he takes his
* * n a t t e a l i y s h r u n k , s i n c e TJ, t h e d o m a i n of social systems to win
n c e
P t i o n to b e a p p l i c a b l e Icf. Chap. 6, n. 31).
214 T h e Practical I m p o r t a n c e of J u s t i c e , 18.1

even w h e n it is a b l e t o c h a n g e , s u b v e r t , o r b y p a s s t h e m to its own

rational a d v a n t a g e . T h u s a s h a r e d political m o r a l i t y is a p r e r e q u i s i t e for
a w i d e s p r e a d categorical s e n s e of justice, w h i c h i n t u r n is a n important
c o m p o n e n t of a w e l l - o r d e r e d social s y s t e m .
To s o m e extent, t h e t w o v i e w s a r e h a r m o n i o u s a n d m u t u a l l y rein­
forcing. Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is t o p r o v i d e a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d ­
i n g a n d a p p r e c i a t i o n of o u r v a l u e s a n d t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o o n e another.
S u c h a p p r e c i a t i o n d e e p e n s t h e m o r a l a l l e g i a n c e t o o u r social institu­
t i o n s (insofar a s t h e y a r e just) a n d a l s o g u i d e s a n d facilitates institu­
tional reforms t h a t c a n b e s h o w n t o e n h a n c e t h e j u s t i c e of o u r basic
s t r u c t u r e . A n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s for t h e s a k e of justice t e n d to
b o l s t e r m o r a l allegiance t o o u r v a l u e s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s .
O n e m a y t h i n k t h a t t h e p r a c t i c a l political i m p o r t a n c e of this twin
p r o j e c t is n e v e r t h e l e s s q u i t e l i m i t e d . T h e political c o m p e t i t i o n in the
U n i t e d States a l r e a d y takes p l a c e i n t h e c o n t e x t of a n overlapping
c o n s e n s u s t h a t a s s u r e s t h e m a j o r i n t e r e s t g r o u p s t h a t shifts in the
political b a l a n c e of p o w e r will n o t b e e x p l o i t e d i n a n a t t e m p t t o shift
t h e very t e r m s of t h e political c o m p e t i t i o n a g a i n s t t h e m . In fact, com­
p a r e d t o o t h e r d e v e l o p e d W e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s , s o m u c h h a s b e e n taken
off o u r political a g e n d a (cf. IOC 14 n . 22) t h a t o n e m a y b e e x c u s e d for
3
finding A m e r i c a n political d e b a t e s positively d u l l . M o r e o v e r , t h e em­
p h a s i s o n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s l i m i t s t h e i m p o r t a n c e of a t t a i n i n g the
k i n d of d e e p e r p h i l o s o p h i c a l a g r e e m e n t Rawls e n v i s i o n s i n favor of
a g r e e m e n t o n just a c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e . W e n e e d n o t agree o n the
m e r i t s of v a r i o u s d o c t r i n e s b y Kant a n d Sidgwick o r o n t h e m e a n i n g ol
f r e e d o m a n d equality b u t only " o n t h e w a y b a s i c social institutions
s h o u l d b e a r r a n g e d if t h e y a r e t o c o n f o r m t o t h e f r e e d o m a n d equality
of citizens a s m o r a l p e r s o n s " (KCMT 517). Again, it s e e m s that U.S.
citizens—sharing a rhetorical c o m m i t m e n t to these values—already
agree, b y a n d large, t h a t t h e i r b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s c o n f o r m t o t h o s e
4
values.
Still, Rawls m i g h t t h i n k it w o r t h w h i l e t o e x t e n d a n d d e e p e n agree­
m e n t o n how a n d why t h e y s o c o n f o r m , for s u c h d e e p e r a g r e e m e n t
w o u l d m a k e t h e c o n s e n s u s a b o u t i n s t i t u t i o n s m o r e resilient t o c h a n g ­
ing c i r c u m s t a n c e s . A n d h e m a y , of c o u r s e , w a n t t o e x t e n d t h e existing
3
R a w l s may disagree. At least h e seriously c o n s i d e r s (and t h e n d e n i e s ) t h e objection
that t h e idea o f a n overlapping c o n s e n s u s i s Utopian." Unfortunately h e leaves this
objection a m b i g u o u s — w h a t is s u p p o s e d l y Utopian is "either to bring about an overlap­
p i n g c o n s e n s u s ( w h e n o n e d o e s n o t exist), o r t o r e n d e r o n e stable ( s h o u l d o n e exist)"
(IOC 18). And h i s e n s u i n g reply t o t h e o b j e c t i o n i s s o abstract that o n e can't tell w h a t he
thinks about t h e political life of the s o c i e t y that i s t h e primary object o f h i s reflections.
T h i s is n o t said to criticize Rawls. O n e c a n hardly fault h i s t h e o r y for t h e unexciting-
n e s s of its c o n c l u s i o n s , if this is d u e to t h e fact that there is s o little left to d o for t h e sake of
justice. I s h o u l d a d d , t h o u g h , that s o m e w o u l d n o t v i e w t h e n a r r o w n e s s of t h e American
political d e b a t e a s reflecting a n overlapping c o n s e n s u s b u t w o u l d regard this debate a s
c o n d u c t e d a n d controlled by a small elite, w h o s e e to it that m a n y significant i s s u e s never
get o n t h e political a g e n d a in t h e 6rst p l a c e . T h e lack of d i s a g r e e m e n t reflects resignation
a n d c o n s e q u e n t political apathy, n o t c o n s e n s u s
 T h e Practical I m p o r t a n c e of Justice, 18.2 215

overlapping c o n s e n s u s b y i n c o r p o r a t i n g into it some d e m a n d s tradi­

tionally raised b y s e g m e n t s of t h e D e m o c r a t i c party: t h e reform of legal
regulations g o v e r n i n g t h e f i n a n c i n g of election campaigns, increased
taxation o n t h e i n h e r i t a n c e of large estates, a n d improved educational
5
opportunities for c h i l d r e n b o r n into disadvantaged environments.
18.2. This r a t h e r m a i n s t r e a m p r o g r a m of institutional reform be­
comes a little m o r e d e f i n i t e a n d exciting if o n e thinks through t h e
deeper p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o m m i t m e n t s of Rawls's conception. One m a y b e
led, in reflecting u p o n t h e first principle, to look beyond the letter of the
constitution, i m p o r t a n t legislation, a n d S u p r e m e Court decisions. A
high crime r a t e i n u r b a n g h e t t o s may, for example, force the conclusion
that their r e s i d e n t s lack a right (in t h e relevant sense) to personal
integrity. I h a v e a l s o a r g u e d t h a t involuntary malnutrition a n d h o m e -
lessness, w h e n a v o i d a b l e , m u s t b e considered injustices of t h e first
order of priority, a n d I h a v e d i s c u s s e d other modifications, especially
in regard t o h o w R a w l s ' s c o n c e p t i o n s h o u l d treat t h e unemployed, t h e
"worse e n d o w e d , " a n d t h o s e suffering from socially produced medical
problems.
Vet all t h e s e m a t t e r s p a l e i n c o m p a r i s o n to a n inquiry of truly mo­
mentous u r g e n c y a n d i m p o r t a n c e . S u p p o s e Rawls has correctly recon­
structed t h e c r i t e r i o n b y w h i c h sincere a n d thoughtful Americans
would assess t h e j u s t i c e of social institutions a n d the ideal of a well-
ordered s o c i e t y t h a t t h e y w o u l d affirm u p o n reflection. Then h o w
would s u c h A m e r i c a n s reflect u p o n t h e justice of the prevailing inter­
national i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e ; w h a t vision might they form of a well-
ordered global social s y s t e m ; a n d h o w would they evaluate U.S. foreign
Policy insofar a s it will h a v e (and h a s had) any bearing on the structure
o f
global i n s t i t u t i o n s ? T h e t h i r d part of this essay is devoted to these
'ssues.
/ Proceed b y d i s c u s s i n g i n reverse order the international analogues
J the two v i e w s of t h e i m p o r t a n c e of Rawls's work. Thus I explore m
next c h a p t e r w h a t t h e s u b s t a n c e of Rawls's conception ot justice

h t a s
"Though Rawls h a s s c r u p u l o u s l y avoided associating *™*3t^conw"?-
" the United States, h e tentatively and reluctantly suggests that j ^ ^ ^ ^ p p g , _ d r a f t :
m e w a V s
Z has b e e n seen a s social democrat, and in s ° . ; . ^ preference for
f i n c a t e s h i s
u s e
™«ht be referred to"). In t h e s a m e preface, Rawls , ^ " S degree of economic
h e S
g n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s that, a s far as possible, maintain ' ^"' ? value of the n t n e a i r
( 3 S d
S ^ , m a n d a t e d b y t h e difference principle ^ Pern P a
05 0
Political liberties) t h r o u g h a n equalization of s t a r t i n g . P ' " " ' ' ™ f u g a l tendencies of ntri

J^ded welfare s c h e m e that continually c o u n t e r b a l a n c e * c e n 8 ^ Q f rf

e t f r c e s B a s i c
^ „ ° " i n s t i t u t i o n s must from the ^ ^ ^ o p e r a t i n g members «rf
and n o t o n l y of a few, t h e productive means tobetuiry l o f c a p l t a

^ o c e t y . The e m p h a s i s falls o n t h e steady dispersal over ttmetf un.ty Q f o p p o r t

d
£ resources b y t h e l a w s o f inheritance a n d b e q u e s t o n M ^ ^ institutions
^ u r e d by p r o v i s i o n s for e d u c a t i o n and training, " ^ J ^ force of the difference
& U p p o n f h e
Drin fe'r of Ihe political liberties. y lor of a liberal d e m o c r a C

P ^ ' P l e it s h o u l d b e t a k e n i n t h e context of properry-owmng

^ ' a b s i regime) a n d n o t a welfare state" IPFE 61.
Z16 T h e Practical I m p o r t a n c e of J u s t i c e , 18.3

m i g h t i m p l y for t h e a s s e s s m e n t of t h e e x i s t i n g w o r l d o r d e r and of
v a r i o u s p o s s i b l e efforts t o w a r d global i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m . But before
looking at t h e c o n t e n t of s u c h a c o n c e p t i o n of global justice, I try to
s h o w that ( a n d w h y ) w e m u s t a c h i e v e a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s upon
s u c h a c o n c e p t i o n in t h e first p l a c e . So t h e p r e s e n t c h a p t e r argues for
t h e g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e , a n d t h e possibility, of w o r k i n g t o w a r d a n interna­
tional c o m m u n i t y t h a t is w e l l - o r d e r e d , at least in t h e s e n s e of sharing a
k e r n e l of political m o r a l i t y t o g e t h e r w i t h a c a t e g o r i c a l allegiance to it.
1 8 . 3 . Let m e b e g i n b y e x p l a i n i n g h o w t h e i d e a l of a well-ordered
w o r l d society differs from t h e (broadly H o b b e s i a n ) ideal of a n effective
w o r l d g o v e r n m e n t , f e a t u r i n g c e n t r a l m e c h a n i s m s of a d j u d i c a t i o n and,
especially, e n f o r c e m e n t . I n t h e c o u r s e of this e x p l a n a t i o n , I will try to
s u p p o r t t h e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t t h e a b s e n c e of w o r l d g o v e r n m e n t is nor the
c e n t r a l p r o b l e m w i t h o u r c u r r e n t global o r d e r , s o l a c k i n g i n p e a c e and
justice.
T h e c o n v e n t i o n a l q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e r e s h o u l d b e a w o r l d gov­
e r n m e n t is m i s l e a d i n g . By p r e s e n t i n g t h e i s s u e in stark e i t h e r / o r terms,
it reflects a d e e p a n d historically influential m i s t a k e . T h e traditional
form of this m i s t a k e m i g h t b e called t h e d o g m a of a b s o l u t e sovereignty,
t h e belief t h a t a juridical state (as d i s t i n c t from a l a w l e s s s t a t e of nature)
p r e s u p p o s e s a n a u t h o r i t y of last r e s o r t . T h i s v i e w a r i s e s (in H o b b e s a n d
Kant, for example) r o u g h l y a s follows. A j u r i d i c a l state, b y definition,
involves a r e c o g n i z e d d e c i s i o n m e c h a n i s m t h a t u n i q u e l y resolves any
d i s p u t e . This m e c h a n i s m r e q u i r e s s o m e active authority because a
m e r e w r i t t e n o r u n w r i t t e n c o d e (a h o l y s c r i p t u r e , set of legal docu­
m e n t s , o r w h a t e v e r ) c a n n o t settle d i s p u t e s a b o u t its o w n interpreta­
tion. A l i m i t e d or d i v i d e d a u t h o r i t y w o u l d n o t d o , h o w e v e r , since
conflicts m i g h t a r i s e over t h e p r e c i s e l o c a t i o n of t h e limit o r division.
T h e r e m u s t t h e n exist o n e u l t i m a t e , s u p r e m e , a n d u n l i m i t e d authority
6
if civil p e a c e is t o b e p o s s i b l e at all.
T h i s d a z z l i n g r e a s o n i n g is n o w safely b u r i e d b e n e a t h t h e historical
facts of t h e p a s t t w o h u n d r e d y e a r s , w h i c h s h o w c o n c l u s i v e l y t h a t w h a t
c a n n o t w o r k in t h e o r y w o r k s q u i t e well in p r a c t i c e . Law-governed
societies are p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t a s u p r e m e a n d u n l i m i t e d authority.
T h e r e is, it is t r u e , t h e possibility of ultimate conflicts, of d i s p u t e s in
w h i c h even t h e legally c o r r e c t m e t h o d of r e s o l u t i o n is c o n t e s t e d . One
n e e d o n l y i m a g i n e h o w a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y ' s t h r e e b r a n c h e s of
g o v e r n m e n t m i g h t e n g a g e in a n all-out p o w e r struggle, e a c h going to
t h e very brink of w h a t , o n its u n d e r s t a n d i n g , it is c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y
a u t h o r i z e d to d o . F r o m a t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t of view, t h i s possibility
s h o w s t h a t w e are n o t i n s u r e d a g a i n s t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l crises, a n d t h u s

•This d o g m a — p r e f i g u r e d in Aquinas, Dante, Marsilius, a n d B o d i n — i s m o s t fully

8 e d o b J e s s
f, ! " ? ' leviathan, c h a p s . 1 4 , 2 6 , 2 9 . For Kant's s t a t e m e n t s of it, s e e KPW 75,81,
1 4 4 - 4 5 . T h e d o g m a m a i n t a i n e d its h o l d well i n t o t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , w h e n it d e c l i n e d
together w i t h the Austinian c o n c e p t i o n of j u r i s p r u d e n c e . Cf. Marshall, PSC pt. V, Benn
a n d Peters, SPDS c h a p s . 3, 12; a n d Hart CL.
 T h e Practical I m p o r t a n c e of Justice, 18.4 217

live in p e r m a n e n t d a n g e r of t h e m . But this d a n g e r n o longer u n d e r ­

mines o u r c o n f i d e n c e i n a g e n u i n e division of p o w e r s . We have l e a r n e d
that such crises n e e d n o t b e f r e q u e n t o r irresolvable. From a practical
point of view, w e k n o w t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c i e s can e n d u r e ,
7
can ensure a r o b u s t j u r i d i c a l s t a t e .
Now all t h i s is h a r d l y s e r i o u s l y in d i s p u t e . What is p e r h a p s n o t
generally u n d e r s t o o d is t h a t t h e s a m e p o i n t applies o n t h e "vertical"
axis as well. J u s t a s it is n o n s e n s e to s u p p o s e that (in a juridical state)
sovereignty m u s t r e s t w i t h o n e of t h e b r a n c h e s of government, it is
similarly n o n s e n s i c a l t o t h i n k t h a t in a federalist s c h e m e sovereignty
must" rest e i t h e r o n t h e federal level or with t h e m e m b e r states.
Making this a s s u m p t i o n , o n e is b o u n d to c o n c l u d e that it m u s t rest on
the federal level, for if it r e s t e d w i t h t h e states, t h e n t h e r e w o u l d n ' t b e a
federalist s c h e m e a t all. But t h e n t h e a s s u m p t i o n is philosophically
8
unsound, d e s c r i p t i v e l y i n a c c u r a t e of existing federalist c o n s t i t u t i o n s ,
and (as I will s h o w ) politically d i s a s t r o u s for the p r o s p e c t s of world
peace a n d global j u s t i c e .
18.4. O n c e w e d i s p e n s e w i t h t h e traditional concept of sovereignty
and leave b e h i n d t h e silly all-or-nothing debates about world govern­
ment, t h e r e e m e r g e s a c l e a r p r e f e r e n c e for an intermediate solution,
which p r o v i d e s for s o m e c e n t r a l organs of world government, t h o u g h
or
g a n s t h a t lack a n y u l t i m a t e sovereign p o w e r or authority. It is just
such a n i n t e r m e d i a t e s o l u t i o n , of course, that we have now, in the form
°f some i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w w i t h s o m e m e c h a n i s m s of adjudication a n d
enforcement ( s u c h a s t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Court of Justice a n d the United
Nations Security C o u n c i l ) .
Admittedly, t h e s e existing institutions have not exactly been suc-
oessful, a n d o n e m a y well claim that t h e i r failure, even by their o w n
standards, m u s t b e e x p l a i n e d b y t h e w e a k n e s s of existing m e c h a n i s m s
o f
adjudication a n d e n f o r c e m e n t , that t h e violence a n d injustice per­
vading o u r w o r l d r e s u l t from t h e r e being not enough world govern­
ment.
P r o p o n e n t s of t h i s view c a n u s e t h e weakness of international ad­
judication m e c h a n i s m s to explain t h e pervasive ambigmty a n d vague­
ness of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. So l o n g as only a small fraction of in tejjovern-
"tental d i s p u t e s a r e ever s e t t l e d impartially, there *?f£h *
authoritative p r e c e d e n t s , a n d major disagreements about the inter

'Quite apart from the (anachronistic) historical ^^^J^Sd^S'sl^M

^ h e v e that t h e a r g u m e n t for a b s o l u t e sovereignty ^^^JZpveme authority
n
«ver have b e e n taken s o seriously. Even the most ^ ^ ^ ^ n L c h a n i s m . It is
c o m , e , e
g i v i n g m o n a r c h i c a l sovereign d o e s not prov.de a
a P ^ , o r , whether
i m p o s

[Possible for d i s p u t e s to arise about whether this is the tang o r a n H^ ^ m s

t o r
^stenday's king h a s transferred authority or is d e a d "^"^ , , were whal ii
f t n a

successor is. A logically" c o m p l e t e decision m e c h a n i s e . » a w a g e .

t h e n w e c o u l d n o t in principle transcend the » « ^ ™ ^ !application of
W m e

. U.S. S u p r e m e Court, for e x a m p l e , is not e m p o w e r e d to rev.

state law
218 I n t e r n a t i o n a l Relations a s a M o d u s Vivendi, 19.1

p r e t a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w s a n d t r e a t i e s will p e r s i s t unresolved.
Moreover, s o l o n g as g o v e r n m e n t s c a n p r e s u m e t h a t , in all likelihood,
t h e y will b e a b l e to avoid a n a u t h o r i t a t i v e r e b u k e , t h e y will b e tempted
to p u t f o r w a r d s u r p r i s i n g ( a n d e v e n l u d i c r o u s ) i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of inter­
n a t i o n a l l a w s a n d t r e a t i e s in justification of t h e i r c o n d u c t .
Similarly, o n e c a n u s e t h e w e a k n e s s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l enforcement
m e c h a n i s m s t o e x p l a i n d i s r e g a r d of ( a n d c y n i c i s m a b o u t ) international
law. So l o n g a s i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w s a n d t r e a t i e s a r e r a r e l y enforced for
t h e i r o w n sake, g o v e r n m e n t s will b e t e m p t e d t o violate, abrogate, or
r e i n t e r p r e t t h e m if t h e n e t benefit of d o i n g s o is c o n s i d e r a b l e . This
t e n d e n c y will affect even g o v e r n m e n t s s t r o n g l y c o m m i t t e d t o t h e ideal
of a l a w - g o v e m e d w o r l d o r d e r . W i t h o u t a s s u r a n c e s t h a t o t h e r govern­
m e n t s will fulfill t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s , t h e y c a n n o t find it
e i t h e r r e s p o n s i b l e o r m o r a l l y r e q u i s i t e t h a t t h e y a l o n e s h o u l d make
m a j o r u n i l a t e r a l sacrifices for t h e s a k e of l a w .
T h o u g h t h e r e is s o m e t r u t h i n s u c h (essentially H o b b e s i a n ) accounts,
I d o n o t t h i n k t h e y get t o t h e h e a r t of t h e p r o b l e m . O u r global institu­
tional o r d e r is s h a p e d b y i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l a g r e e m e n t s a n d , more
i m p o r t a n t , b y g o v e r n m e n t p r a c t i c e a n d a c q u i e s c e n c e — a l l of w h i c h are
b a s e d o n p r u d e n t i a l d e l i b e r a t i o n s i n f o r m e d b y t h e c u r r e n t distribution
of p o w e r . I n s u c h a n e n v i r o n m e n t , s t a t e s m e n a n d c i t i z e n s a r e left
w i t h o u t a morai' r e a s o n for w a n t i n g t h e i r s t a t e t o s u p p o r t t h i s order,
w h i c h is s e e n a s m e r e l y t h e crystallization of t h e m o m e n t a r y b a l a n c e of
p o w e r . I w o u l d like t o e x p l o r e t h e possibility t h a t t h i s fact a b o u t inter­
n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , if it a n i m a t e s t h e d o m i n a n t a t t i t u d e t o w a r d them,
is t h e c a r d i n a l o b s t a c l e b l o c k i n g m o r a l p r o g r e s s in i n t e r n a t i o n a l affairs.
In suggesting this hypothesis as a n alternative to Hobbesian accounts, I
d o n ' t m e a n to i m p l y t h a t s t r o n g e r p r u d e n t i a l r e s t r a i n t s w o u l d n ' t b e a
g o o d thing, o n l y t h a t t h e y will b e difficult t o e s t a b l i s h w i t h o u t c h a n g i n g
this d o m i n a n t a t t i t u d e . M y h o p e is t h e n t h a t t h e a n a l y s i s of t h e next
section, if it c o u l d b e fully w o r k e d out, w o u l d offer a d e e p e r u n d e r ­
s t a n d i n g of o u r p r e d i c a m e n t , i n c l u d i n g a n e x p l a n a t i o n of w h y p r o g r e s s
t o w a r d m o r e effective c e n t r a l m e c h a n i s m s of a d j u d i c a t i o n a n d en­
3
forcement has b e e n so elusive.

19. International R e l a t i o n s a s a M o d u s Vivendi

1 9 . 1 . I n p r o v i d i n g a b a s i c analysis of t h e f u n d a m e n t a l a s s u r a n c e
p r o b l e m a s it a r i s e s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , m y objective is twofold,
w a n t t o suggest a p a r t i a l e x p l a n a t i o n of w h a t is p l a i n l y m o r a l l y objec­
tionable i n t h e p r e s e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d e r , a n d I w a n t t o s h o w , partly

T h e analysis to b e s k e t c h e d is i n t e n d e d to fit w i t h t h e c o n t r a s t Rawls develops (in I O O

b e t w e e n t w o m o d e l s of institutionalized c o e x i s t e n c e . I d o n o t claim, however, that Ra
h a s t h o u g h t about or w o u l d a p p r o v e m y e x t e n s i o n of t h i s c o n t r a s t t o i n t e m a t i o n
relations.
 I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s as a M o d u s Vivendi, 19.1 219
on the basis of t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n , w h y it is of s u c h critical i m p o r t a n c e t o
achieve a global o r d e r t h a t e m b o d i e s s h a r e d values.
In the H o b b e s i a n d i m e n s i o n of p r o g r e s s , a first step bayonet u n ­
limited and u n i v e r s a l w a r is a n e l e m e n t of coordinated self-restrainr
TWo parties ( p e r s o n s , t r i b e s , s t a t e s , o r whatever) u n d e r s t a n d th*t e a c n
s o m
of them is r e s t r a i n i n g itself i n s o m e w a y in o r d e r to elicit ^ " r o P
u n f g
cal self-restraint from t h e o t h e r s i d e . S u c h a m u t u a l ^ ™
c o m m i t n S
need not b e explicit, n o r d o e s it r e q u i r e a n y value ™ / ™ h a

tual assurance c a n r e s t e n t i r e l y u p o n e a c h party's WP™ * ™™^™ 1 11

other party—given its i n t e r e s t s , capabilities, a n d situation

1 0
"rational to d e s t r o y t h e a r r a n g e m e n t . . t b e

The Hobbesian Lai is a n e x t e n s i o n of this m o d e • Peace ^ o be

achieved b y i n a u g u r a t i n g a m o d e of coexistence tofcon
perpetuates itself b y e n s u r i n g t h a t e a c h p a r t y h a s sw p ^ ^ .
to participate s o l o n g a s m o s t o t h e r s are p a r t i c i p a ^ b g { a c i t

ably, large-scale a r r a n g e m e n t s of this sort a r e too co y ^

but no m a t t e r h o w c o m p l e x , t h e m o d e l is s u p p o s e u ^ ^
shared values. E a c h p a r t y ' s c o n t i n u e d participation is
the plain fact t h a t it w o u l d b e foolish t o quit. ^ explicit)
When t h e r e l a t i o n s a m o n g p a r t i e s c e n t e r a r o u n ^ ., frag e
n e
agreements a l o n g t h i s H o b b e s i a n axis—from i hensive, { c o r n p r e

and transitory b i l a t e r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g s t o t h e i z e their co- h a r a c t e r

robust, a n d e n d u r i n g u n i v e r s a l a c c o r d — w e c a n ^ ^ i n t h e

existence a s a modus vivendi. Let m e develop i n

a b s t r a c t
- . l v motivated by their
m a r i

The p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a m o d u s vivendi are p r i m J pothers { Q n e

own self-defined i n t e r e s t s a n d d o not m u c h cat ^i^iona!

"iterests as s u c h . Yet e a c h h a s r e a s o n to s u p p ° c t i c e s and n s p r a

s c h e m e - t h a t is, a s y s t e m of r u l e s a n d conv ^ t m e r e s t s D

Procedures, o r g a n s a n d o f f i c e s - t h a t accornm ^ ^ i n t e r e s t t 0

other parties t o t h e p o i n t w e r e t h e y find it « . agree- g { h e n a n

d u s
Paticipate a s w e l l . O n t h e surface, a m ° ™ e t i t i v e behavior c o m p

f ent a m o n g a p l u r a l i t y of p a r t i e s t o restrain the ^ continued

* certain w a y s S i n c e t h e s c h e m e is t o b e scheme rf t h e

Participation is i n e a c h p a r t y ' s b e s t interes , tn ^ , t be i s m u S

>«ust satisfy t h e c o n d i t i o n of P ™ * " " ^ " " the going t e r n * _ o n

» * that aU p a r t i e s h a v e r e a s o n to' P « f as a c c e p t a b l e ^ o w
e r t n S
t C
Whether a given p a r t y , P, views t h e ^ ^ as P's c h

^ r , d e p e n d s u p o n a n u m b e r of ^ ^ b of power
u t i o n

^erests and, most important, the g e n e ^ t r t at »J rf

^ e c t s P's v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s a n d o p p o r * ^ d i t i o n is then S U D c o n

Which t e r m s satisfy t h e p r u d e n t i a l power h a ,

* * to f l u c t u a t i o n . S u p p o s e , for example- h a t ^ , bre a ( p a r t i a l
s o
that P n o w h a s m o r e t o gain a n d less
chap*-13'
han c
'"For a m o r e e l a b o r a t e a c c o u n t , s e e Hobbes, Le»*
220 I n t e r n a t i o n a l Relations as a M o d u s Vivendi, 19.2

d o w n of o r d e r l y r e l a t i o n s . It m a y t h e n b e p r u d e n t for P t o press for

m o r e favorable t e r m s , a n d o t h e r g r o u p s will p r u d e n t l y a c c e d e to P's
d e m a n d , w e a k e n e d g r o u p s b e i n g o b l i g e d t o a c c e p t less favorable terms
b e c a u s e of t h e i r i n c r e a s e d v u l n e r a b i l i t y o r d e c r e a s e d t h r e a t advantage.
If a m o d u s vivendi is to e n d u r e , t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of benefits a n d burdens
m a y t h e n h a v e to b e a d j u s t e d s o t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n c o n t i n u e s to be each
p a r t y ' s rationally p r e f e r r e d o p t i o n . T h i s p o s s i b i l i t y g e n e r a t e s , below the
surface, a c o m p e t i t i o n over t h e terms of t h e m o d u s vivendi, a n d this
c o m p e t i t i o n is n o t r e s t r a i n e d at all. T h e r e is n o limit t o h o w weak a
p a r t y m a y b e c o m e t h r o u g h shifts i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o w e r (com­
p o u n d e d by shifts in t h e t e r m s of t h e m o d u s vivendi), a n d t h e r e is no
limit t o w h a t a w e a k p a r t y m a y p r u d e n t l y a c q u i e s c e i n w i t h i n a modus
vivendi, in p r e f e r e n c e to q u i t t i n g .
C o n t r a r y t o t h i s c o n c l u s i o n , it m a y s e e m t h a t t h e r e is a limit t o such
shifts. T h e t e r m s of a m o d u s vivendi m u s t at l e a s t b e m u t u a l l y advan­
t a g e o u s in t h e s e n s e t h a t e a c h p a r t y d e r i v e s a n e t benefit from par­
ticipation a s c o m p a r e d t o total isolation. But t h i s is n o t s o . H o w well off
a p a r t y w o u l d b e in s p l e n d i d isolation is i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e bargaining
e q u i l i b r i u m if t h i s p a r t y c a n n o t s e c u r e s u c h i s o l a t i o n for itself. Even
w h e n a c c e p t i n g t r i b u t a r y s t a t u s i n a m o d u s v i v e n d i is clearly less
attractive t h a n isolation, it m a y still b e t h e p r u d e n t t h i n g to d o when
t h e e x p e c t e d alternative is n o t isolation b u t a t t a c k a n d e n s l a v e m e n t , for
11
example.
1 9 . 2 . T h e great virtue of a m o d u s vivendi is t h a t it c a n work, can
p r e v e n t all-out war, even a m o n g p a r t i e s w h o h a v e n o faith in one
a n o t h e r a n d believe t h e y h a v e n o t h i n g in c o m m o n b y w a y of shared
values. In o r d e r t o a s s u r e o n e a n o t h e r ' s c o n t i n u e d c o m p l i a n c e , the
p a r t i e s n e e d only c o n t i n u a l l y a d j u s t t h e g r o u n d r u l e s g o v e r n i n g their
i n t e r a c t i o n s so t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d c o m p l i a n c e c o n t i n u e t o b e each
p a r t y s preferred o p t i o n . In a n o n - c o n s t a n t - s u m w o r l d , o r d e r l y coexis-
1S
JL°? ° 6 V e n W i
« ^ d m u t u a l trust. t

Nevertheless precisely this virtue, w h i c h m a k e s t h e m o d u s vivendi

h U t s h a r e d v a I u e

ZltI I W O n
edy d e r M a rem
against war, r e n d e r s it u n s u i t a b l e for
SSS^f^06 - ° J U S t i c e
> t h e indefinite mal- n t h e o n e h a n d

1 8 n e e d a U t o a m o d u s
rhTn^J^th e wendHs e n d u r a n c e through
h Trh» rr'
P
i n
* f » * t s , a n d s i t u a t i o n of its p a r t i c i p a n t s . Yet, o n
m a l l e a b i l i
danger A ™ H ' ^ t y * a s o u r c e of instability a n d great
e n d l c a n
™ Persist t h r o u g h s u c h c h a n g e s o n l y if its
^cuZn^Tu ? ' a p p r o p r i a t e l y reflecting
f
m e

Wer
a g r e e o n t e r m s

of a Z vZTnrV n
°r
< t h e l o n g S e r m malleability
JBn era
M
° r e o v e r

mir^^^ ? ^ 1 ^ « n instabUity; e a c h p a r t i c i p a n t s h o r t

m u s t b e afraid of getting m t o a vicious cycle i n w h i c h its d e c l i n e in

would^dTraTioX G a u t h i e r s c o n c l u s i o n that self-interested parties
p l W i s ( M A c h a p 7 S B C t 5 >
a r g u m e n t for this c o n c l u s i o n ^ s e e ^ T m e » ^ V ° ' ' 8
Tt o m e a i n l
here. P' y mistaken, t h o u g h 1 c a n n o t s h o w this
 I n t e r n a t i o n a l Relations a s a M o d u s Vivendi, 19.2 221

power reinforces a n d is r e i n f o r c e d by a deterioration in t h e t e r m s of its

participation. If it a n t i c i p a t e s s u c h a t r e n d , it m a y prefer to fight n o w
rather t h a n await a f u r t h e r d e c l i n e in its p o w e r . O r if o t h e r s s u s p e c t that
this might b e i t s e v a l u a t i o n , t h e y m a y find it p r u d e n t t o p r e e m p t by
attacking it first. S u c h d i s t u r b a n c e s c a n lead to a partial o r c o m p l e t e
breakdown of o r d e r e d r e l a t i o n s . A n d even if the m o d u s vivendi sur­
vives, s o m e of its p a r t i c i p a n t s m a y n o t (or m a y see their freedom a n d
values d e s t r o y e d ) . T h e r e i s n o lasting p r o t e c t i o n against even t h e very
worst o u t c o m e s .
Therefore, v a l u e s , h o w e v e r d e e p l y held, will have only a marginal
impact u p o n t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s ' c o n d u c t a n d (through this) u p o n t h e
terms of t h e m o d u s vivendi. Since t h e parties are fearful of o n e another,
each will g i p r e c e d e n c e t o its survival a n d to the long-term security of
v e

its values over t h e i r s h o r t - t e r m instantiation. No party is likely to im­

pose s e r i o u s e t h i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s u p o n its pursuit of p o w e r t h r o u g h
which a l o n e it c a n h o p e t o survive a n d (ultimately) prevail. And e a c h
will want t o prevail so a s t o e r a d i c a t e t h e threat from others, w h o m u s t
be s u s p e c t e d of w a n t i n g t o prevail for just this reason.
Let me illustrate e a c h p a r r y ' s r e a s o n i n g with a hypothetical train of
thought:
w
O t h e r s m a y b e s e e k i n g to shift t h e balance of p o w e r against us,
hich, in t h e l o n g r u n , m i g h t e n a b l e t h e m t o eradicate us or o u r values
altogether. W e c a n n o t e l i m i n a t e this d a n g e r for t h e time being. T h u s
°ur best c o u n t e r s t r a t e g y for n o w consists in trying, within a m o d u s -
vivendi framework, t o s t e m a n v a d v a n c e s on their part a n d to weaken
their p o s i t i o n . Since t h i s is a m a t t e r of survival, we m u s t not constrain
these efforts b y o u r v a l u e s , for if w e d o , w e will b e c o m p e t i n g at a
disadvantage. T h e y will certainly n o t constrain their c o n d u c t by o u r
^ u e s , a n d s i n c e t h e y a r e fearful (and p e r h a p s bent u p o n prevailing/,
they a r e unlikely t o c o n s t r a i n it even b y their o w n values. In this
situation, we m u s t n o t e n d a n g e r o u r survival a n d that of our values by
Rowing t h e s e v a l u e s to h a m p e r o u r efforts to block a n d neutralize the
threat from o t h e r s
I c o n c l u d e t h a t r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n a m o d u s vivendi will b e neither
Peaceful n o r j u s t . T h e l o n g - t e r m d a n g e r s to which a m o d u s vwench
eposes its p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e b o u n d l e s s a n d p e r m a n e n t , d e m a n d i n g
fiexr p e r s i s t e n t a n d u t m o s t vigilance; t h e competition over t h e chs
b e f u
n b u t i o n of p o w e r a n d over t h e t e r m s of association will ™ ° ^
Moreover, e v e n if t h e p a r t i e s t o a m o d u s vivendi have d e e p a n c s i m e r e
^ u e c o m m i t m e n t s , ft is likely that their values vvill n * » ^ J g ^
n
j n t i m p a c t u p o n t h e i r e x t e r / a l c o n d u c t , will f ^ ^ Z t n Z
^ e i r d e c i s i o n s a b o u t c o m p l i a n c e or in their efforts to ^
°f t h e s c h e m e . S i n c e e a c h participant cares P ^ ^ f j Z S c
Position, t h e t e r m s of a m o d u s vivendi will ^ ^ ^ ^ Z > v
bargaining e q u i l i b r i u m w h i c h - b a s e d u p « J ^ P ^ J ? hey may
* * strategic"interests-is largely ^ t T a X e l y o l e r ^ «°
have. T h e i n c o n s t a n t terms of a m o d u s vivendi a r e Ulceiy o
222 I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s as a M o d u s Vivendi, 19.3.1

violate a n y ethical c o n c e p t i o n ( u n l e s s t h e belief i n " t h e right of the

s t r o n g e r " c o u n t s as o n e s u c h c o n c e p t i o n ) .
1 9 . 3 . Let m e t r y t o b r i n g t h e s e a b s t r a c t o b s e r v a t i o n s t o b e a r upon
i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . H e r e t h e e x p l a n a t o r y p a r t of m y a c c o u n t cen­
t e r s a r o u n d t w o h y p o t h e s e s : c u r r e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s are in
e s s e n c e a m o d u s vivendi, a n d t h e chief r e a s o n w h y i n t e r n a t i o n a l in­
s t i t u t i o n s a r e so m u c h less successful t h a n t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of well-
e s t a b l i s h e d n a t i o n a l s o c i e t i e s is t h a t t h e l a t t e r e n s h r i n e s h a r e d values
(and not that they include m o r e central government).
I n a p p l y i n g t h e m o d u s - v i v e n d i m o d e l t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l relations, I
t a k e for g r a n t e d a global b a c k g r o u n d c o n v e n t i o n . T h e l a n d of t h e world
is d i v i d e d u p i n t o clearly d e m a r c a t e d t e r r i t o r i e s . E a c h t e r r i t o r y h a s one
g o v e r n m e n t , t h e p e r s o n o r g r o u p w i e l d i n g o v e r w h e l m i n g p o w e r (ul­
timately, c o n t r o l l i n g irresistible m e a n s of c o e r c i o n ) w i t h i n t h e territory,
a n d e a c h g o v e r n m e n t is r e c o g n i z e d b y o t h e r s a s h a v i n g full jurisdiction
over all p e r s o n s a n d r e s o u r c e s w i t h i n its d o m a i n . Given t h i s back­
g r o u n d c o n v e n t i o n , t h e a c t o r s s h a p i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s are,
first a n d foremost, governments, a n d m y h y p o t h e s i s p o s t u l a t e s t h e n an
intergovernmental m o d u s vivendi.
My first h y p o t h e s i s c a n n o w b e s t a t e d , m o r e specifically, a s follows.
G o v e r n m e n t s a r e e n g a g e d in a c o m p e t i t i o n t h a t is r e g u l a t e d b y what­
ever i n s t i t u t i o n s t h e m a i n a d v e r s a r i e s find it a d v a n t a g e o u s t o agree
u p o n o r t o a c q u i e s c e in from t i m e t o t i m e . Yet t h e y a l s o s e e t h e i r rivalry,
o n a d e e p e r level, as unlimited. No society's values, i n s t i t u t i o n s , o r way
of life a r e b e y o n d t h e t h r e a t of violent s u b v e r s i o n b y e x i s t i n g e n e m i e s
o u t s i d e t h e n a t i o n a l territory. At b o t t o m , i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s are a
struggle t o t h e d e a t h . T h a t t h e y are p r o v i d e s at l e a s t a p a r t i a l explana­
tion of t h e a b s e n c e of p e a c e a n d j u s t i c e i n t h e w o r l d t o d a y , a n e x p l a n a ­
tion t h a t , in p a r t i c u l a r , n e e d m a k e n o reference t o t h e content of the
values affirmed b y t h e c o m p e t i n g g o v e r n m e n t s . I c a n n o t h e r e provide
t h e d e t a i l e d political analysis t h a t m i g h t d e f e n d m y first h y p o t h e s i s but
m u s t settle for a brief illustrative o u t l i n e .
1 9 . 3 . 1 . T h e m o d u s - v i v e n d i analysis of t h e s t a t u s q u o e x p l a i n s the
a b s e n c e of g e n u i n e p e a c e b y viewing u s as t r a p p e d in a vicious cycle.
T h e very fact t h a t g o v e r n m e n t s fear a n d d i s t r u s t o n e a n o t h e r gives
t h e m g o o d r e a s o n for s u c h fear a n d d i s t r u s t . T h e r e a r e n o realistic
p r o s p e c t s of e s t a b l i s h i n g p e a c e t h r o u g h a w o r l d s t a t e , b e c a u s e n o
n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t c a n c o m e to rule t h e w o r l d w i t h o u t a global war,
a n d t h e s t r o n g e s t g o v e r n m e n t s w o n ' t allow t h e c r e a t i o n of i n d e p e n ­
d e n t effective m e c h a n i s m s of a d j u d i c a t i o n a n d e n f o r c e m e n t Given
t h e i r a v e r s e n e s s t o risk (their g r e a t e r c o n c e r n for surviving t h a n for
prevailing), it w o u l d b e irrational to a c c e p t powerful o r g a n s of w o r l d
g o v e r n m e n t , w h i c h , a l t h o u g h d e s i g n e d to c u r b e a c h g o v e r n m e n t ' s
p o w e r , c o u l d affect its s e c u r i t y in e i t h e r d i r e c t i o n . T h i s is t r u e i n a
w o r l d of c o m p e t i n g i n t e r e s t s , a n d it is e v e n m o r e t r u e in a w o r l d of
d i s p a r a t e values, in w h i c h e a c h g o v e r n m e n t m u s t fear t h a t c e n t r a l
 International Relations as a ^ ^ ^ J ^ .

tic institutions and national form of lite ou&n ^ of m e c h a n i s m s

Weaker governments, of course, may w a i ^

m a
, s u b m i t u n i a t e r

adjudication and enforcement and y J * be forced and c a n n o t

alyto such mechanisms, but the strongest ones ^ d e p e n d e n t

will not submit. The strongest governrnents may nt e n f o r c e m e

antral mechanisms, which require u n ^ effective .because

o i h e

poweroftheir own, but such m e » ^ ^ t

they are impotent in regard to the P^c^P^ dertheruleof lyun

bringthe competition among the major P ^ J ^ t parha- s t r o n g e s

law.Toseewhyconsideramodusvavend! whose ^
pants are authorized to adjudicate fthat any three are
voteP and suppose the distribution of powen coab- t

actually strong enough to enforce ^ ^ S e m u s t ^ d ^ ^

tionincluding the other two. Here each of the hve^
d o m
^ fear tf m

thatthe others must-try to join a ^ ° g a i n s t itself. Far from

e
a
r
that such a coalition would °* ™*?£Z^ merely anothe i s

dfordinglong-term security, this sort of arrang ^ ^ ^ ^ c i p

version of the ferocious competmon » mpt to be part atte

pals bargaining over one another ssupp , isions orOV

dominant coalition. .„ honor individual V

n n t ^
1 M * Governments generally wrll ^ f noncompbanee
h
° b e n e f i t o r

of an ongoing modus vivendi when thejet ben ^ ^ofh

substantial, and they u n d e r ^ t a n d ^ n d ^ ^ ^ ^ J t f ^
Since mutual trust and other assurance;o m e n t ) are
enforce

effective mechanisms of adjudication an "reinterp^ t h e y

each government must assume thai: o n ^ traces W - r f o t h e r 8

negotiate, or abrogate fernanona account** . e t c J

Perceive this to be in their best mteresi ^ credibility d i o n

^f-restraint toward oneself, propagana *™* le a c t issib

Given this assumption about others, « ^ . p ^ J ^ e d bar-

Doing so seems both permissible ana it-n o n l y se Q t h e r

because international laws and ^ a t ^ r e ^ because m ^

tan 6
o n e

gaining Shave no inherent ethical s ^ de l y do n o t ^

sur

governments take the same attitude because* f for the

d
e C t

other's good faith. It seems necess impr" £* ^ t a g e o f b y

allows itself to be seriously h a m p ^ J ^ t a t e n a d ^ j t s

G r i l l e s of i h e g a n i e r u n s a ^ ^ . ^ survival ot
others and thereby endangers tne peung COItl

values.
o r e
"Hobbes clearly a p p e l a t e d * " £ K alues ^ even m stretches o V a s t

ferial interests, may block a c c e p t a « « « showvng t r £ % he com e t 1

«*leviathan (in parts 3 and 4) are severe^ eve
**» Christians ought to accept: and obey Na U n i t e d

observances they consider W f P ^ n e d version ot

''One might think here of a strengw
Council.
224 I n t e r n a t i o n a l Relations as a M o d u s Vivendi, 19.3.3

T h i s d o m i n a n t a t t i t u d e e n g e n d e r s w a r s a s g o v e r n m e n t s exploit per­
c e i v e d o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o g a i n t h r o u g h (illegal) a g g r e s s i o n , t h r o u g h pre­
e m p t i n g s u p p o s e d l y i m p e n d i n g (illegal) a g g r e s s i o n s , o r t h r o u g h pun­
i s h i n g s u p p o s e d violations of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w s o r t r e a t i e s . T h e ground
r u l e s of a n i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l m o d u s v i v e n d i c a n t h e r e f o r e furnish only
w e a k p r u d e n t i a l r e s t r a i n t s u p o n g o v e r n m e n t c o n d u c t . T h e i r infringe­
m e n t o r a b r o g a t i o n is c o n s i d e r a b l y m o r e likely t h a n significant viola­
t i o n s of d o m e s t i c g r o u n d r u l e s , w h i c h a r e b a c k e d b y s h a r e d ultimate
14
values (and m o r e effective s a n c t i o n s ) .
Moreover, t h i s a t t i t u d e fosters a p e r m a n e n t c l i m a t e of t e n s i o n and
insecurity, a s g o v e r n m e n t s m u s t a l w a y s r e c k o n w i t h n o n c o m p l i a n c e
b y o t h e r s a n d t h u s c a n n e v e r t a k e full a d v a n t a g e of t h e freedom of
a c t i o n t h e y m i g h t h a v e if a d h e r e n c e t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w s a n d treaties
c o u l d b e t a k e n for g r a n t e d . No d e c l a r a t i o n of n e u t r a l i t y , p e a c e treaty,
m u t u a l - d e f e n s e alliance, o r n o n a g g r e s s i o n p a c t , for e x a m p l e , can re­
lieve a g o v e r n m e n t of t h e fear of f i n d i n g itself a l o n e i n t h e face of a
13
foreign military a t t a c k .
1 9 . 3 . 3 . T h e e n d u r i n g c l i m a t e of i n s e c u r i t y a n d hostility is aggravated
b y t w o a d d i t i o n a l t e n d e n c i e s . First, t h e (bargaining) p o w e r of govern­
m e n t s w i t h i n a m o d u s - v i v e n d i f r a m e w o r k is m a i n l y a f u n c t i o n of the
d i s t r i b u t i o n of military s t r e n g t h (roughly, t h e c o m p a r a t i v e u n a c c e p -
tability of war), w i t h economic s t r e n g t h p l a y i n g a n i m p o r t a n t — p a r t l y
subsidiary, p a r t l y i n d e p e n d e n t — r o l e . Any g o v e r n m e n t w h o s e military
s t r e n g t h is g r e a t e r t h a n its e c o n o m i c s t r e n g t h ( e a c h relative t o other
g o v e r n m e n t s ) enjoys i n c r e a s e d b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r d u r i n g p e r i o d s of
h e i g h t e n e d t e n s i o n b e c a u s e of t h e g r e a t e r i m p o r t a n c e of military (in
c o m p a r i s o n t o e c o n o m i c ) s t r e n g t h . A p e r i o d of crisis, for example,
m a k e s it e a s i e r for a military giant to exact c o n c e s s i o n s from a n eco­
n o m i c a l l y s t r o n g b u t militarily w e a k ally. Of c o u r s e , g o v e r n m e n t s
w h o s e relative e c o n o m i c s t r e n g t h is g r e a t e r t h a n t h e i r relative military
s t r e n g t h m a y m u c h prefer a m o r e r e l a x e d global e n v i r o n m e n t , b u t their

" T h e d o m i n a n t attitude of g o v e r n m e n t s toward international l a w s a n d treaties is then,

o n m y h y p o t h e s i s , like t h e prevalent d o m e s t i c attitude t o w a r d parking regulations,
international a g r e e m e n t s are treated as moralized rules in g o v e r n m e n t rhetoric, but as
u n m o r a l i z e d rules m g o v e r n m e n t c o n d u c t , it i generally t h o u g h t a c c e p t a b l e that deci­
s

s i o n s a b o u t c o m p l i a n c e s h o u l d b e b a s e d o n a self-interested calculation of (probability-

w e i g h t e d ) c o s t s a n d benefits. T h i s claim is evidently c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e fact that many
treaties (covering copyrights, patents, postal cooperation, a n d s u c h like) are rarely or
n e v e r violated. In t h e s e matters the strains of c o m m i t m e n t are m i n i m a l , a n d weak
prudential restraints are therefore fully sufficient. (Moreover, t h e s e treaties w o u l d s e e m
to b e t o o marginal in a n y c a s e to qualify as being part of the global basic structure.)
" E v e n w h i t e it is u n d e r s t o o d that any government will break a n y international law or
treaty w h e n t h e n e t benefit of d o i n g s o ,s substantial, s u c h g r o u n d r u l e s c a n still have
great value. T h e y serve to c o o r d i n a t e expectations and to make certain future e v e n t s less
likely a n d l e s s f r e q u e n t In this role international laws a n d treaties h e l p k e e p t h e ongoing
m o d u s v i v e n d . in equilibrium. I s h o u l d a d d that I a m h e r e a d d r e s s i n g t h e current global
institutional framework^ In s o m e local contexts, s u c h as Western E u r o p e , international
H
relations are b e g i n n i n g to acquire a value-based character.
 I n t e r n a t i o n a l Relations a s a M o d u s Vivendi, 19.3.4 225

preference is of little m o m e n t insofar a s it is very m u c h easier to

a u g m e n t t h a n t o r e d u c e i n t e r n a t i o n a l tension.
Second, t h e t e n d e n c y t o w a r d t e n s i o n is further s t r e n g t h e n e d by
each g o v e r n m e n t ' s i n t e r e s t in i n c r e a s i n g its s u p p o r t from its o w n
population, w h i c h will e n h a n c e its international bargaining p o w e r .
Vilifying o p p o n e n t s a n d i n d u c i n g crises is o n e m e t h o d of increasing
d o m e s t i c s u p p o r t , exploiting t h e p r e d i c t a b l e t e n d e n c y of p o p u l a t i o n s
"to rally a r o u n d t h e flag" in r e s p o n s e to a h e i g h t e n e d s e n s e of insecu­
rity. Obviously, a g o v e r n m e n t m a y b e t e m p t e d to e m p l o y s u c h m e t h o d s
in t h e i n t e r e s t of less p a t r i o t i c p u r p o s e s as w e l l — t o i m p r o v e its
c h a n c e s for r e e l e c t i o n p e r h a p s , or to consolidate its position at h o m e .
Though t h e m o t i v e s for fueling s u c h crises arise domestically, the
opportunity t o d o s o d e p e n d s o n t h e hostility e n d e m i c t o c u r r e n t
international r e l a t i o n s .
19.3.4. In a m o d u s vivendi a m o n g hostile p o w e r s , t h e p r e s s u r e s
toward s t r a t e g i c (amoral) g o v e r n m e n t c o n d u c t are overwhelming. Even
if s o m e s t a t e s m a n s e e s himself as c o m m i t t e d to his nation's values a n d
as c o m p e t i n g w i t h o t h e r s (partly) in behalf of t h e s e values, h e c a n n o t
allow himself t o b e s e r i o u s l y h a m p e r e d by these values in t h e c o m p e t i ­
tion. He m u s t leave s u c h values b e h i n d w h e n h e e n t e r s t h e foreign-
policy a r e n a , w h e r e surviving a n d prevailing ("national security") take
p r e c e d e n c e o v e r all else. T h u s values are unlikely t o play m u c h of a
g e n u i n e (as o p p o s e d to a propagandistic) role in t h e c o n d u c t of foreign
policy a n d i n t h e e m e r g e n c e of international institutions (through
explicit o r tacit bargaining).
This a c c o u n t e x p l a i n s , o n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e prevailing disregard for
the p o o r e s t a n d strategically least significant societies a n d regions. No
g o v e r n m e n t will s h o w m u c h unilateral c o n c e r n for foreigners, for s u c h
c o n c e r n t e n d s t o w e a k e n its o w n bargaining position. Moreover, gov­
e r n m e n t s a r e unlikely t o agree to i n c o r p o r a t e s u c h c o n c e r n into t h e
s h a r e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e — b e i n g risk-averse, each will be reluctant
to a c c e p t e v e n a d i s t r i b u t i o n of b u r d e n s that s e e m s to weaken itself n o
more t h a n it w e a k e n s its relevant c o m p e t i t o r s .
On t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h i s a c c o u n t also explains two p r o m i n e n t aspects
of the t e r m s of a n i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l m o d u s vivendi: First, t h e s e t e r m s
t e n d to e m b o d y little c o n c e r n for h o w p e r s o n s are treated within.their
own society. E a c h g o v e r n m e n t ' s interest in controlling s o m e p a ^ a r
m a t t e r w i t h i n its o w n territory normally vastly outweighs its; .uteres in
influencing h o w t h e s a m e m a t t e r is dealt w i t h abroadL P e r h a p M h e
I n , e
value c o m m i t m e n t s o n all sides w o u l d favor clear, ™ ™ ^ e
d
p e n i s e d r u l e s a g a i n s t g o v e r n m e n t a b u s e , but since it is " " P ^ ' ™
h o w s u c h r u l e s w o u l d affect t h e b a l a n c e of p o w e i , ™k^ave«e P ^ r s
a m unlikely t o c r e a t e effective, i n d e p e n d e n t ^ ^ " r ^ r a l
thoritative a p p l i c a t i o n of s u c h rules, ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ i
sacrifices for h u m a n n e e d s a n d welfare. U n d e r the e x i g e n c e s ot com
226 I n t e r n a t i o n a l Relations a s a M o d u s Vivendi, 19.4

petition, g o v e r n m e n t s m u s t b e e x t r e m e l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h their own

a n d t h e i r allies' i n t e r n a t i o n a l (bargaining) p o w e r , w h i c h d e p e n d s to a
significant e x t e n t u p o n t h e i r s t r e n g t h at h o m e . T h e y m a y t h e n have to
1 6
u s e — a n d s u p p o r t t h e i r allies w h e n t h e y u s e — r e p r e s s i v e measures
( s u c h a s secrecy, d i s i n f o r m a t i o n , s u r v e i l l a n c e , infiltration, intimidation,
a n d worse) t o stifle d o m e s t i c d i s s e n t a n d t o m a x i m i z e d o m e s t i c con­
17
trol.
S e c o n d , t h e t e r m s of a n i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l m o d u s vivendi are likely
t o i n c l u d e a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t e a c h g r e a t p o w e r h a s special claims
t o r e g i o n s t h a t a r e g e o g r a p h i c a l l y o r e c o n o m i c a l l y m o r e i m p o r t a n t to
its s e c u r i t y t h a n t o t h a t of a n y o t h e r g r e a t p o w e r . W i t h i n its s p h e r e of
influence ( " h e m i s p h e r e " ) , a great p o w e r m a y o p e r a t e w i t h o u t serious
i n t e r f e r e n c e from o t h e r great p o w e r s . It m a y force w e a k states to
c h a n g e t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t o r political s y s t e m ; t o " r e q u e s t " o r a c c e p t its
military b a s e s a n d advisers (even invasion); t o o p e n t h e i r d o o r s for its
e x p o r t s , its c r e d i t s , a n d its a c q u i s i t i o n of t h e i r r e s o u r c e s a n d p r o d u c ­
tive facilities; a n d s o forth. S u c h a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g is, again, mutually
a d v a n t a g e o u s for risk-averse p l a y e r s .
1 9 . 4 . T h i s c o n c l u d e s m y o u t l i n e of h o w s o m e of t h e less appealing
f e a t u r e s of o u r c o n t e m p o r a r y w o r l d m i g h t b e e x p l a i n a b l e , i n part, in
t e r m s of t e n d e n c i e s e n d e m i c t o a n i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l m o d u s - v i v e n d i
framework. Even if t h e s e t e n d e n c i e s a r e n o t a l w a y s s t r o n g o r d o m i n a n t ,
t h e y d o a d d u p t o a firm e x p e c t a t i o n r e g a r d i n g a global o r d e r that
p r i m a r i l y reflects t h e c o m m o n i n t e r e s t s of, a n d b a r g a i n s a m o n g , deeply
h o s t i l e g o v e r n m e n t s : So long a s t h i s o r d e r p e r s i s t s , o u r w o r l d will b e
p e r v a d e d b y violence (and t h e t h r e a t a n d d a n g e r of violence), political
r e p r e s s i o n , a n d e x t r e m e poverty of strategically w o r t h l e s s p o p u l a t i o n s .
T h i s is n o t t o d e n y t h a t v a l u e s s o m e t i m e s d o h a v e a r e a l i m p a c t u p o n
foreign policy a n d u p o n i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s (over a n d above their
p r o p a g a n d i s t i c e m p l o y m e n t t o justify self-interested c o n d u c t ) . It is
e n o u g h t h a t t h e s y s t e m i c e x p l a n a t i o n is a p p r o x i m a t e l y t r u e , t h a t t h e
c u r r e n t m o d e of c o e x i s t e n c e is essentially a m o d u s vivendi, t h a t it
e n g e n d e r s r o u g h l y t h e t e n d e n c i e s I have o u t l i n e d , a n d t h a t t h e s e
t e n d e n c i e s a c c o u n t for a g o o d deal of c u r r e n t h u m a n m i s e r y .
A n d this m i s e r y is significant. U p t o one-fifth of h u m a n k i n d s p e n d
t h e i r e n t i r e hyes , n p o v e r t y a n d o n t h e e d g e of s t a r v a t i o n - p o l i t i c a l l y
i m p o t e n t , m a l n o u r i s h e d , a n d w i t h o u t reserves for t h e e v e n t of even a
m i n o r n a t u r a l o r social m i s f o r t u n e . Millions of c h i l d r e n d i e every y e a r
from m a l n u t r i t i o n a n d e a s d y c u r a b l e d i s e a s e s - t h e vast majority of
t h e m u n d e r e v e r y d a y c o n d i t i o n s i n t h e m i d s t of p l e n t y r a t h e r t h a n i n

1 6
O n e m a y b e obliged to s u p p o r t brutal allies w h e n t h p v « , i „ K . . . .
t o t h e
p o s i t i o n by b e c o m i n g less tractable or b y s w i t c h i n g s f c W ™ s e damage one s
m e f t h e w o r i d s W O T S
tyrants have b e e n quite a d e p t at expoiting this fact °
, 7
T h e s e m e t h o d s , a s well, g o v e r n m e n t s will be t e m p t e d t o enrol •
1
patriotic, p u r e l y d o m e s t i c p u r p o s e s , a n d again, their ornmH,.^^" ! i n t e r e s t of l e s s
S P
t h e hostility a n d insecurity e n d e m i c t o current international regions ° °"
 A Value-Based World Order, 20.1 227

well-publicized f a m i n e s . S i m u l t a n e o u s l y , roughly a trillion dollars a r e

spent a n n u a l l y o n " d e f e n s e " w o r l d w i d e , o n a t t e m p t s to shift o r p r e ­
serve t h e existing d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o w e r . T h r o u g h t h i s p r e o c c u p a t i o n ,
further m i l l i o n s of p e r s o n s a r e t r a p p e d in wars, civil wars, a n d c a m ­
paigns of r e p r e s s i o n a n d i n s u r r e c t i o n (often incited a n d a b e t t e d by
third parties), w i t h t h e i r m e t h o d i c a l massacres, d e s t r o y e d h o m e s a n d
livelihoods, o r g a n i z e d starvation, torture, rapes, a n d d i s a p p e a r a n c e s .
Such h o r r o r s a r e t o o pervasive to b e explained, ultimately, b y refer­
ence t o p o w e r f u l a c t o r s w h o h a v e perverse values o r n o n e a t all. Rather,
I submit, t h e y a r e in large p a r t e n g e n d e r e d by t h e reigning m o d u s -
vivendi f r a m e w o r k , w i t h i n w h i c h t h e fear for one's security a n d t h a t of
one's values is p a r a m o u n t . T h i s is n o t t o d e n y that a g o o d n u m b e r of
powerful a c t o r s a r e evil, b u t w e c a n n o t , I think, explain t h e p r o m i n e n c e
and s u c c e s s of s u c h a c t o r s w i t h o u t reference to t h e c u r r e n t inter­
g o v e r n m e n t a l m o d u s vivendi, in w h i c h they have a n excellent c h a n c e
to receive r e c o g n i t i o n a n d s u p p o r t in t h e n a m e of s o m e national inter­
est, a n d in w h i c h c o n c e r t e d action against t h e m is highly unlikely.

20. A V a l u e - B a s e d World Order

If the analysis of current international relations as an inter­

governmental modus vivendi could b e successfully completed, it
would provide a systemic explanation of the sordid realities just
sketched. Now it might be thought that such an explanation tends to
condone prevalent government conduct, and thus lets statesmen off
the hook too easily. But this need not be so. For suppose there is
another kind of institutional scheme, feasible on a global scale, that
would not engender the violence and injustice endemic to our modus-
vivendi framework. Then the account I have sketched would merelv
reconceive the political task and responsibilities. We must transcend
the prevailing modus vivendi and aim to establish that superior form of
institutional scheme.
We have seen how the modus-vrvendj m o d e l contrasts, on the one
hand, with the total absence of restraints, as m a state of unlimited war
though a modus vivendi is surely compatible with limited violence,
excluding certain times, targets, or methods in warfare). I will now
explore how this model contrasts, o n the other hand, with another
conception of mutual accommodation-envisaging another way for a
shared institutional scheme to emerge and be sustained even while its
Participants have divergent interests and values.
S e ^ S d S a is to * * * insUtutions that are based not upon free
bargalnmg^^ ofpower but upon
1 S C h S h a r e d v a J u e s d
s o S ^ ^ m B ^ ^ ^ - " ° "ot exist
if aTl oartlTpants seek secunry orrfeach wants its religion or form of
f o t h e y m 3 V s t i d i f f e r
regimetoS * " *" ^ " about
228 A Value-Based W o r l d O r d e r , 20.2

whose s e c u r i t y o r which religion (form of r e g i m e l t h e y c a r e for. Nor can

w e s p e a k of s n a r e d v a l u e s w h e n t h e p a r t i e s h a v e a c o m m o n i n t e r e s t -
in p e a c e , for e x a m p l e — t h a t is instrumental t o t h e i r d i s p a r a t e deeper
c o m m i t m e n t s a n d p r o j e c t s . T h e y are t h e n n o t c o m m i t t e d to peace as
s u c h . E a c h merely, for its o w n r e a s o n s , p r e f e r s p e a c e u n d e r current
c o n d i t i o n s . So t h e i r c o e x i s t e n c e is still a m o d u s vivendi, b e c a u s e they
d o n o t s h a r e o n e a n o t h e r ' s u l t i m a t e v a l u e s , w h i c h in a different context
m i g h t l e a d t h e m t o w a r . An i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e is v a l u e - b a s e d only if
its p a r t i c i p a n t s h o l d in c o m m o n s o m e i m p o r t a n t ultimate values (in­
c l u d i n g s o m e p r i n c i p l e s for b a l a n c i n g o r o r d e r i n g t h e m ) t h a t are signif­
icantly e m b o d i e d in t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s r e g u l a t i n g t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n s .
2 0 . 2 . It m a y s e e m t h a t s u c h r e l i a n c e o n s h a r e d v a l u e s p r e s u p p o s e s a
s h a r e d v a l u e s y s t e m , s u c h a s C a t h o l i c i s m in t h e M i d d l e Ages, a n d that
in a w o r l d of diverse f u n d a m e n t a l o u t l o o k s a p p e a l t o values c a n only be
divisive. But t h i s objection is b a s e d u p o n a false d i c h o t o m y . W e need
n o t envision for t h e w o r l d w h a t is lacking in every n a t i o n a l society,
namely, a comprehensive a g r e e m e n t o n v a l u e s (cf. IOC 14-15). Instead,
w e c a n start from w h a t w e a l r e a d y h a v e , a w o r l d in w h i c h some values
are s h a r e d . O u r p r i m a r y p r e d i c a m e n t is n o t t h a t t h e r e is n o value
overlap, o r e v e n t h a t t h e r e is t o o little, b u t t h a t e v e n t h o s e c o r e values
t h a t a r e w i d e l y s h a r e d p l a y t o o m a r g i n a l a role in t h e d e s i g n of interna­
t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d in t h e c o n d u c t of foreign policy (including the
prevailing a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d existing i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t s ) .
Moreover, s h a r e d values n e e d n o t b e all-pervasive. In a national
society r e s o u r c e s m a y b e a l l o c a t e d t o t h e h i g h e s t b i d d e r , a n d many
legislative i s s u e s m a y b e d e c i d e d by self-interested b a r g a i n i n g (logroll­
i n g a n d s o o n ) . Still, i n a well-governed s o c i e t y some m a t t e r s a r e n o n n e -
gotiable—for e x a m p l e , t h a t n o n e will b e slaves o r b e left to starve and,
in particular, t h a t t h e b a s i c t e r m s of t h e political c o m p e t i t i o n m a y not
b e shifted against t h o s e w h o s e s t r e n g t h d e c l i n e s . T h e s e m a t t e r s are
p r o t e c t e d n o t by a n e n d u r i n g majority preference b u t b y t h e citizens'
s e n s e of justice, w h i c h h e r e s u p e r s e d e s t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s . In the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r e n a , b y c o n t r a s t , t h e d o m i n a n t a s s u m p t i o n — a n d well-
g r o u n d e d f e a r — i s t h a t everything is negotiable, t h a t a n y l a w , treaty,
c h a r t e r , o r d e c l a r a t i o n m a y b e " r e i n t e r p r e t e d , " violated, r e n e g o t i a t e d ,
a b r o g a t e d , a b a n d o n e d , or simply forgotten.
T h e p r o g r e s s I envision begins, t h e n , from s o m e c o n s e n s u s o n val­
u e s , h o w e v e r n a r r o w , t h a t allows t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of institutional
fixed p o i n t s t h a t s t a n d a b o v e o r d i n a r y n e g o t i a t i o n a n d b a r g a i n i n g a n d
t h u s a r e i m m u n e to shifts in t h e p o w e r , interests, a n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s of
t h e m a j o r p a r t i e s . T h e foremost p r e r e q u i s i t e of s u c h a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n is
t h a t s o c i e t i e s s h o u l d a c c e p t — m o r a / / y r a t h e r t h a n o n l y p r u d e n t i a l l y (as
a vexing n e c e s s i t y i m p o s e d b y t h e p r e s e n t d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o w e r ) — t h e
c o n t i n u e d e x i s t e n c e of o n e a n o t h e r a n d of t h e v a l u e s c e n t r a l t o t h e i r
d o m e s t i c social c o n t r a c t s . B e y o n d this p r e r e q u i s i t e , t h e p r o s p e c t s for a
v a l u e - b a s e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e will d e p e n d u p o n w h a t , concretely,
 A Value-Based World Order, 20.3 229

theirvalues a n d a t t i t u d e s a r e , a n d u p o n t h e following t h r e e c o n d i t i o n s .
First, the p a r t i e s a r e c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e r e ought to be a s c h e m e t h a t
through a fair d i s t r i b u t i o n of benefits a n d b u r d e n s a c c o m m o d a t e s all of
them to t h e p o i n t w h e r e e a c h c a n m a k e a s i n c e r e a n d reliable c o m m i t ­
ment that will w i t h s t a n d t e m p t i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s a s well a s shifts in
relative p o w e r a n d self-defined i n t e r e s t s . Second, t h e parties c a n i d e n ­
tify and p e r h a p s e x t e n d s o m e c o m m o n values—a starting p o i n t for a
shared c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e , for e x a m p l e , o r s o m e m u t u a l l y valued
institutional r e f o r m s . T h i r d , t h e p a r t i e s a r e willing for t h e sake of w h a t
<s itself a v a l u e d goal t o modify t h e i r values t o s o m e extent. Here t h e
Ptvotal q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r t h e y c a n s e e their w a y to e m b r a c m g a n
institutional s c h e m e t h a t is m o r e tolerant of s o m e b r o a d e r r a n g e ot
diverse values t h a n e a c h w o u l d have liked, a n d tolerant e n o u g h t o
guarantee t h a t t h e (similarly modified) values of others can, in their
essentials, survive forever. „ „
» s u c h a t r a n s i t i o n s u c c e e d s , t h e typical participant m a y w e 1 c o m e
to value t h e r e s u l t i n g o r d e r in its o w n right r a t h e r t h a n c o n t i n u e toe
^ h for less t o l e r a n t i n s t i t u t i o n s built u p o n its o w n valhi«^°™™
commitment to a mutually acceptable scheme
deepen a s a c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e t r a n s i h o n itself ( t h r o u g h . t h e expert
ence of m u t u a l t r u s t a n d cooperation), ^ ^ £ ^ S n ^ r f
shared values e x p a n d s . This, at least, w o u l d be t h e favored o u t c o m e ot

S h o p e that t h e * ^ ^ ^ ^ X " ^ ,
c
heterogeneous world, including T Z n e may sound f o r m o f regim

over t h e global i m p o s i t i o n of °™*°^J°Zr-by historicai experi-

h
utopian. T h a t it can h a p p e n f « ^ " Christian faiths devel- m e

ence—for example, by h o w relahonsamo 6 ^ ^ d e c a d e s of

o p e d after t h e P r o t e s t a n t u g h n e i t h e r side gave u p T h o
m d u s
bloody w a r f a r e e m e r g e d a ° J , b o t h sides realized that t e r m s

»s goal t o reunify t h e c h u r c h o n n s ^ reunification a n d t h u s

they w e r e for n o w u n a b l e to " " P c o n t i n u e d warfare. Since
r e n c e t o

a c c e p t e d a fragile bargain in d e s , t h e bargain struck, o n b o t n s i

p o w e r w a s h e l d by a u t o c r a o c p interests: cuius regio eius

c o m j n o n

not surprisingly, reflected religion u p o n h i s subjects w i t h o u t

religio, e a c h lord m a y ^ f ^ j ^ p o r a r y c o n v e n i e n c e w a s gradually
t e m
1
o u t s i d e interference. * Snh, d value c o m m i t m e n t w i t h quite a
g h a r e
e n u j n
t r a n s f o r m e d into a £ ^ j ] t i o n with deference t o t h e individual's
e r a
re i5
different c o n tent, ^°I cience. ons No a u t h o r i t y w h a t e v e r m a y e n -
f r e e d o m of t h o u g h t oral conviction is n o w at t h e very core of
m

force religious beliefs- A e t h e r a c a d e m i c o r p o p u l a r , a n d is widely

W e s t e r n political thougn ' f h relevant d e n o m i n a t i o n s ,
m b e r s Q t e

t a k e n for g r a n t e d a m o n g m
Is the t w o last-mentioned a s p e c t s of the intergovernmental
"This
J
m o d u s vivendi ( § 1 »
230 A Value-Based W o r l d O r d e r , 20.3.1

T h e decisive c o n d i t i o n for a n a n a l o g o u s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n in our cur­

r e n t w o r l d is, I believe, w i d e s p r e a d a c c e p t a n c e of w h a t o n e might call
international pluralism, t h e i d e a t h a t k n o w l e d g e a b l e a n d intelligent
p e r s o n s of g o o d will m a y r e a s o n a b l y favor different forms of (national)
social o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h e r e are t w o m a i n g r o u n d s for w a n t i n g this idea
as a s h a r e d b a s i s from w h i c h t o w o r k t o w a r d a b e t t e r w o r l d .
2 0 . 3 . 1 . T h e first is r e a l i s m . A t t a i n i n g a w o r l d of p e a c e a n d justice
requires w i d e s p r e a d a c c e p t a n c e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p l u r a l i s m , at least if
t h e m o r e violent a v e n u e s of p r o g r e s s ("prevailing over t h e o t h e r side")
are morally e x c l u d e d . It is a m i n i m a l d e m a n d u p o n political ideal
t h e o r y t h a t it d e v e l o p a n ideal of a future w o r l d , t h a t is, of a w o r l d that is
c o n n e c t i b l e to t h e s t a t u s q u o b y a m o r a l l y a d m i s s i b l e r o u t e (one that
d o e s n o t p a s s t h r o u g h W o r l d W a r III, for e x a m p l e ) . T h i s d e m a n d is not
m e t by a n ideal t h a t e n v i s i o n s t h e a b o l i t i o n of capitalist states or
socialist s t a t e s or b o t h . A useful c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e political task at
h a n d , t o o v e r c o m i n g violence a n d starvation, j u s t cannot consist in
a r g u i n g t h a t all n a t i o n a l societies m u s t c o n f o r m to t h e w r i t e r ' s favored
19
social i d e a l .
In fact, s u c h a r g u m e n t s contribute to o u r p r e d i c a m e n t , our im­
p r i s o n m e n t in a n i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l m o d u s vivendi. T o d a y , powerful
factions i n e a c h of several m a j o r s o c i e t i e s a r e c o m m i t t e d t o t h e belief
t h a t t h e i r form of r e g i m e is plainly s u p e r i o r t o t h a t of s o m e opposing
societies a n d t h a t it w o u l d n o t b e w r o n g i n p r i n c i p l e t o destroy the
o p p o n e n t s ' d o m e s t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s b y force (so a s t o l i b e r a t e t h e people
t h e y o p p r e s s ) . T h e r e is, in fact, s o m e e a g e r n e s s to " t u r n a r o u n d " re­
g i m e s o n t h e o t h e r s i d e b e c a u s e t h e y , too, m a y r e c o g n i z e n o ultimate
r e s t r a i n t s against "liberating" a s y s t e m of o u r t y p e a n d a r e liable to do
s o w h e n t h e y c a n in o r d e r to r e m o v e t h r e a t s to t h e i r l o n g - t e r m survival.
But t h e n , u n d e r t h e p r e s e n t d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o w e r , n e i t h e r s i d e c a n be
c o n f i d e n t to survive a n all-out a t t e m p t to l i b e r a t e t h e societies o n the
S 1 m t a i y s t a J e m a
S^H l ^ ? b6 the
t ec o an dmi o n g t h e s u p e r p o w e r s is, a n d
^5^°£V° ' ^ «™ «br
c o n t i n u e d coexis-
wnuTri h e i S I , J t b e l i e v e s t h a t
w e r e it significantly w e a k e r , its values

take its o p p o n e n t s t o a s s u m e t h a t t h e o t h e r s i d e s t a n d s r e a d y to use

a n y m e a n s a t all, i n c l u d i n g global war, even for its s e c o n d a r y goal of
h e c o n u d 1
prevailing, s o l o n g as ts p r e e m i n e n t c n A i ^ f o ^ ^ »
g 0 a l f S u m v a l 1 8 n o t
endangered thereby. ° significantly
T h e e s s e n t i a l fragility of t h i s s t a t u s q u o is clear from its c o m p l e x

' T h e r e are countless advocates of homoemo™,.

1
i_, . , j. • „
6 t h e S O C i a H s t
typically disagreeing quite warmly over t h £ I ?f ^ " ' l
globalized. But homogeneity has its capitalistTriv^. . socialism that ought to be 3 8 W e T h u s M i c h a e l y
wants a world of "liberal" states, defined £ d t ™ " °°
property economies" (KLL 212, cf. 208). Doyle s h o w ? ^ ^ "maAet P™?^
e n u m o e o f
a n d

democracies has increased over the past two centuriT j * r capitalist

will be "liberal" by the year 2113 (KLL 352) T h e w o r t h ^ . P ° e s that all states e x t r a l a t

calculate an analogous projection based o n the prolifrrar P ™ scientist neglects to 0 3 1

the same argument, are similarly destined to cover m ^ o r i d ' ' C l a l i s t s t a t e s w h i c h b y

 A Value-Based World Order, 20.3.1 231

preconditions. At least t h e g r e a t p o w e r s (know o n e a n o t h e r to) c a r e

much m o r e for t h e i r o w n r e g i m e ' s survival t h a n for t h e e r a d i c a t i o n of
opposing r e g i m e s . T h e y a r e risk-averse, in p a r t b e c a u s e t h e s t a t u s q u o
is, for now, q u i t e satisfying to t h e m . Moreover, t h e s e g o v e r n m e n t s have
and know o n e a n o t h e r t o h a v e rational p r u d e n c e a n d a cool a p p r e c i a ­
tion of t h e c u r r e n t d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o w e r . Finally, t h e d o m i n a n t govern­
ments also a r e , a n d k n o w o n e a n o t h e r to be, convinced that this
distribution (the b a r g a i n i n g equilibrium) is not a b o u t to shift d r a m a t ­
ically against a n y o n e of t h e m i n t h e m e d i u m t e r m (which w o u l d m a k e
that p o w e r a likely a g g r e s s o r a n d a likely target for p r e e m p t i o n ) . We
have n o right o r r e a s o n to h o p e that t h e s e fortunate c o n d i t i o n s will last
forever. A n d w h i l e t h e r e is every r e a s o n to w e l c o m e t h e existing inter­
governmental m o d e of c o e x i s t e n c e insofar as it postpones global war,
we m u s t u s e t h e t i m e to w o r k for institutional reforms that will bring
peace.
W i d e s p r e a d a c c e p t a n c e of t h e idea of international pluralism w o u l d
make p o s s i b l e a w o r l d in w h i c h certain value clusters, with t h e i r coor­
dinate n a t i o n a l f o r m s of regime, a r e morally a c c e p t e d a n d p e r m a n e n t l y
Protected a g a i n s t violent extinction. Once societies k n o w of o n e an­
other t h a t t h e y s i n c e r e l y a c c e p t t h e c o n t i n u e d existence of o n e an­
e
other's n a t i o n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s , t h e n it b e c o m e s r e a s o n a b l t ^ o r d e r
ones preferences concerning a ^ S ^ ^ ^ ^ Z ^
c o n s i d e r i n g h o w well v a r i o u s alternatives reflect o n e s values rather
than b y hoi t h e y affect t h e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
survive a n d prevail in a ferocious competition^ i
Pluralism e n
P
. shared
a b l e s f^X^of^^^S a
fickle p o w e r e q u i l i b r i u m b u t u p o n ^ ^ reasonable t o c o m p l y
t h e n
scheme c a n be established, ^ ™ w o u l d vield a n e t benefit, r

with its t e r m s , even w h e n n o n W ^ n c e ^ ^ ^ because ^

b e c a u s e t h e s c h e m e b e t t e r reflects o n e ^ ^ ^
long-term survival of o n e ' s society a n d torm g
sta
Je• s c e n t i n g international pluralism h a s at
T h e realist a r g u m e n t tor w h o , c o n c e r n e d about t o t h o s e

b o t t o m a n e t h i c a l character, t ^ r e j e c t t h e o p t i o n of fighting it o u t . It
t h e l o n g - t e r m d a n g e r otgiooaa vi f t Q t n e i r s i o n Q a j u s t

w h o
also a p p e a l s t o t h o s e ^ be i m p l e m e n t e d , r a t h e r t h a n
p e i t c a n

global o r d e r t o t h e p o i n t w n ^ ^ o n p a p e r j n a w o r l d

insist o n a n "ideal" vision jj t a r g u m e n t it is, t h e n ,

i c e Q n t n e rea s
m
p e r v a d e d by violence a n d * t w e s h o u l d modifv t h e s e
n s e i v e s t n a
v a J u e
for t h e s a k e of o u r ® , . §9.4.4,. e r a n c e l c f

v a l u e s i n t h e direction of greaie
to a piece °f "perfect t e c h n o l o g y of justice" that w o u l d
3<>This is t h e next best * ^ ^ values to b e altered or e x t i n g u i s h e d by force 'cf.
t e

m a k e it permanently ""PP^^, s u c h an a n a l o g u e a perfect t e c h n o l o g y of justice 10

Ackerman, SJLS e s p . «>• *~Ljbfe to destroy t h e values o t h e r s ho!d;it w o u l d also c a n c e l
w o u l d n o t o n l y make it " " " r ^ a n t i n g to d o s o in the first p l a c e — t h e fear that thev m a v
t h e m o s t important reason
s e e k to destroy o u r value*.
232 A Value-Based W o r l d O r d e r , 20.3.2

2 0 . 3 . 2 . T h e s e c o n d g r o u n d tor a c c e p t i n g t h e i d e a of pluralism is its

plausibility. In fact, t h e i d e a is r o b u s t l y p l a u s i b l e , in t h a t it can be
a c c e p t e d for v a r i o u s a n d even i n c o m p a t i b l e r e a s o n s . It a c c o m m o d a t e s
t h o s e w h o , t h o u g h c o n v i n c e d t h e y k n o w w h a t a just a n d humane
society w o u l d look like, realize t h a t t h e y c a n n o t e s t a b l i s h t h e superi­
ority of t h e i r ideal from s h a r e d p r e m i s e s . It a c c o m m o d a t e s those who
d o u b t t h a t t h e y c a n n o w (or t h a t a n y o n e c a n ever) b e r e a s o n a b l y certain
to h a v e f o u n d the best w a y of o r g a n i z i n g a h u m a n society. It accommo­
d a t e s t h o s e w h o believe t h a t t h e b e s t social w o r l d w o u l d contain a
variety of f o r m s of n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . It a c c o m m o d a t e s t h o s e who
a r e c o n v i n c e d t h a t different i n s t i t u t i o n a l i d e a l s m a y b e a p p r o p r i a t e to
societies t h a t differ in n a t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t a n d level of development.
A n d it a c c o m m o d a t e s t h o s e w h o t h i n k t h a t e a c h n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y
m u s t b e left free (within b r o a d limits) t o w o r k o u t its o w n constitution
in light of its h i s t o r y a n d c u l t u r e , w h i c h it a l o n e is a b l e a n d entitled to
i n t e r p r e t a n d to e x t e n d into t h e f u t u r e . No d o u b t , s o m e of t h e s e rea­
s o n s c a n b e c o m b i n e d , a n d n e w o n e s c o u l d b e a d d e d t o t h e list, but
p e r h a p s t h e s e five a r e e n o u g h t o s h o w t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l pluralism is
p l a u s i b l e — a n d m o r e p l a u s i b l e t h a n its o p p o s i t e , t h e c l a i m that some­
o n e is i n p o s s e s s i o n of a c o m p l e t e b l u e p r i n t for a just a n d h u m a n e
society w h o s e s u p e r i o r m e r i t s c o u l d b e d e n i e d only b y t h e morally
corrupt a n d the dim-witted.
Of c o u r s e , I a m n o t c l a i m i n g t h a t o n e m a y r e a s o n a b l y favor any form
of social o r g a n i z a t i o n . O n t h e c o n t r a r y , it is not reasonable t o advocate,
say, slavery, colonialism, a p a r t h e i d , o r a u t o c r a c y . So t h e i d e a of plural­
i s m t h a t s h o u l d b e w i d e l y s h a r e d is b y n o m e a n s t a n t a m o u n t to a
g e n e r a l a g n o s t i c i s m w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e j u s t i c e of n a t i o n a l institutions.
W h a t is n e e d e d is t h e r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t k n o w l e d g e a b l e a n d intelligent
p e r s o n s of g o o d will m a y reasonably d i s a g r e e a b o u t t h e f u n d a m e n t a l
i s s u e s dividing t h e w o r l d t o d a y . F o r e x a m p l e , s h o u l d t h e m e a n s of
p r o d u c t i o n b e c o n t r o l l e d b y n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t s , o r locally b y work­
e r s o r b y private o w n e r s ? Is t h e b e s t f o r u m for d e m o c r a t i c d i s c u s s i o n
a n d d e c i s i o n m a k i n g afforded by a single-party, t w o - p a r t y , o r multi­
p a r t y s y s t e m ? W h i c h is m o r e i m p o r t a n t in t h e a p p r a i s a l a n d reform of
social i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h e p r o t e c t i o n of civil a n d political liberties o r the
satisfaction of b a s i c social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s ? If o n l y w e c o u l d
u n d e r s t a n d o u r d i s a g r e e m e n t s a b o u t s u c h m a t t e r s a s reasonable dis­
a g r e e m e n t s , t h e n w e c o u l d jointly w o r k t o w a r d a w o r l d in w h i c h
alternative a n s w e r s to t h e s e q u e s t i o n s c o u l d coexist i n a peaceful,
friendly, a n d s u p p o r t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l e n v i r o n m e n t Insofar a s w e see
a t t e m p t s to realize n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l ideals different from o u r o w n
a s n e i t h e r evil n o r d e l u d e d (and n e e d n o t fear from t h e m violence
a g a i n s t o u r d o m e s t i c v a l u e s a n d institutions) w e have n o g o o d r e a s o n
t o resist s u c h a t t e m p t s . W e c o u l d c o m e t o r e s p e c t a n d e v e n t o l e a r n
f r o m t h e variety of n a t i o n a l regimes existing b e y o n d o u r b o r d e r s . At
l e a s t t h e m e r e fact t h a t t h e p e o p l e of a n o t h e r society live u n d e r social
 A Value-Based World Order, 20.4 233

institutions different from t h o s e w e favor gives u s n o g r o u n d at all to

interfere in t h e i r affairs.
20.4. It will c e r t a i n l y b e said that there is very good r e a s o n for
rejecting i n t e r n a t i o n a l p l u r a l i s m . T h e reason is o u r historical experi­
ence with t h e a d h e r e n t s of t h o s e o t h e r values, which i n c l u d e s a n
abundance of h o r r e n d o u s crimes c o m m i t t e d or s u p p o r t e d b y t h e m .
Even a c u r s o r y g l a n c e at t h e o p p o n e n t s ' record of military aggression,
economic e x p l o i t a t i o n , o r political repression, it is said, s h o u l d con­
vince a n y r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n that either their values are intolerable o r
their p r o f e s s e d c o m m i t m e n t to t h e s e values is nothing b u t a cynical
exercise in b a d faith. H e n c e w e m u s t not compromise o u r values to the
point of a c c e p t i n g t h e i r right to exist, for to do so w o u l d a m o u n t to a
wholesale b e t r a y a l of o u r m o s t venerable commitments.
But t h e fact t h a t o u r historical experience s u p p o r t s s u c h a n argu­
ment against one o r b o t h m a i n forms of regime—and I will n o t d e n y
this—does n o t s h o w t h a t a n y acceptable global o r d e r w o u l d have to
exclude r e g i m e s of this sort. What our historical experience s h o w s is
how capitalist a n d socialist governments design global institutions a n d
how t h e y b e h a v e (within a n d outside their borders) in the context of a
modus-vivendi framework. This may teach us very little a b o u t h o w
capitalist a n d socialist governments would design global institutions
and h o w t h e y w o u l d interact if surviving and prevailing w e r e n o l o n g e r
at issue. Let u s at least entertain the thought that t h e h o r r o r s of this
world a r e n o t , o r at least n o t primarily the horrors of capitalism a n d / o r
socialism p e r s e b u t the horrors of an inconstant m o d u s vivendi a m o n g
deeply h o s t i l e g o v e r n m e n t s , each fearing the eventual d e s t r u c t i o n of its
values
This t h o u g h t b a l a n c e s t h ^ ^ ^ ^
the existing m o d u s - ™ ^ * ^ j S * * r and distrust m a k e s it m o r e
o p h r m s m . J u s t a s a climate of ^ c U m a t e o f m u t u a ]

rational to fear others and di r u s t { o h a y e t m s t ^ C Q n f i

^ d c o n f i d e n c e w o u l d make H ^ M U T U A ] A S S U R A N C E H

a e n c e i n o t h e r s . Small mcreas g w Q u J d ^ f Q

2 1
greater
tirm v a l u e - b a s e d ^ ^ . ' ^ c e . Being c a u g h t in a circle of fear
^ c r e a s e s in overall mutual as ^ ^ . i n h e r e n t ] v u n t r u s t w o r

a n d d i s t r u s t d o e s not show that m v

... .{rated as follows. A thinks that B is less inclined to
2 ,
T h i s multiplier effect can be Ulu ^ to fear that B m a y try to destrov A s
r e a s o n
s e
e k to d e s t r o y A's values; hence ft ^ destroy B's values, h e n c e B h a s less reason to
t o
values; h e n c e A h a s less reason | , hence B has less reason to seek to destrov A s
o e s ;

fear that A m a y try to destroy B s ^ ^ ^ destroy A s values. A n d s o

B m a v t r y ( o

values; h e n c e A h a s even less ^ f a ) progress of the h u m a n race. Kant writes that

o r m D r

forth. In d i s c u s s i n g the prospect ^ French Revolution h a s a r o u s e d in the hearts

n 0 t
«ven w h i l e its s u c c e s s is ^ f „ ^ not themselves caught u p in it a sympathy w h i c h
and d e s i r e s of all spectators ^ very utterance of this s y m p a t h y w a s fraught
borders a l m o s t o n enthusiasm-» ^ , parallel in o u r tune in t h e sympathy, h o w e v e r
v & t > i p
with danger" (KPW tSZ). L that have recently b e e n e m a n a t i n g from the Soviet
s

O p t i c a l evoked by the i m p " ^

Onion.
234 A Value-Based W o r l d O r d e r , 20.5

t h y o r t h a t t h e i r v a l u e s a r e intrinsically s o i r r e c o n c i l a b l y o p p o s e d that
i n s t i t u t i o n s b a s e d o n v a l u e o v e r l a p a r e o u t of t h e q u e s t i o n . Rather, their
u n t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s is, q u i t e p r e d i c t a b l y , e n g e n d e r e d b y t h e situation
t h e y p e r c e i v e t h e m s e l v e s t o b e i n ( a n d t h e r e f o r e really are in), a situa­
tion in w h i c h e a c h p a r t i c i p a n t is p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h e n s u r i n g that its
v a l u e s will survive a n d prevail.
W h e t h e r a v a l u e - b a s e d global o r d e r is a t t a i n a b l e a n d w h a t it might
l o o k like a r e , I t h i n k , still o p e n q u e s t i o n s . It h a s n e v e r y e t b e e n tried, for
existing a g r e e m e n t s a r e , a n d a r e u n d e r s t o o d t o b e , b a s e d u p o n strate­
gic b a r g a i n i n g . While t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a m o d u s vivendi often use
a p p e a l t o v a l u e s (to justify t h e i r o w n c o n d u c t o r t o c o n d e m n the
c o n d u c t of o p p o n e n t s ) , t h e y d o n o t e n g a g e o n e a n o t h e r in a serious
ethical d i s c o u r s e a b o u t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t ideally ought t o regulate
their interactions.
2 0 . 5 . So o n m y view a s well, g o v e r n m e n t s a n d s t a t e s m e n bear a
special r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for t h e i n j u s t i c e a n d (actual a n d i m m i n e n t ) vio­
l e n c e p e r m e a t i n g o u r w o r l d t o d a y . Yet I s e e t h e m a s p r i m a r i l y responsi­
ble n o t vis-a-vis a n existing global o r d e r , w h i c h t h e y all t o o often violate,
b u t vis-a-vis a p o s s i b l e f u t u r e o r d e r , w h i c h t h e y lack t h e will a n d vision
to h e l p b r i n g a b o u t . T h i s is t h e u l t i m a t e c r i m e a g a i n s t p e a c e a n d justice
b e c a u s e it p e r p e t u a t e s t h e m o d u s - v i v e n d i c h a r a c t e r of international
relations, w h i c h is i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h g e n u i n e p e a c e a n d w i t h justice
22
however conceived.
T h i s c r i m e is especially s e r i o u s b e c a u s e it w o u l d n o t b e s o h a r d to
m a k e p r o g r e s s . I a m envisioning n o t h i n g extravagant, o n l y t h e gradual
e s t a b l i s h m e n t , o n e b y o n e , of firm v a l u e - b a s e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l fixed points
t h a t s t a n d above o r d i n a r y n e g o t i a t i o n a n d b a r g a i n i n g a n d a r e i m m u n e
to shifts i n t h e p o w e r , i n t e r e s t s , a n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s of g o v e r n m e n t s .
Even i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t o n c e b e g a n a s n e g o t i a t e d b a r g a i n s c o u l d slowly
a n d u n d r a m a t i c a l l y d e v e l o p i n t o s u c h fixed p o i n t s . T h i s c o u l d h a p p e n
t h r o u g h t h e g r a d u a l l y escalating w i l l i n g n e s s o n t h e p a r t of different

» M y primary e m p h a s i s h e r e is o n g o v e r n m e n t a l efforts t o w a r d institutional reform

ra er
^, nlw n
o v
»° S ; !P
e m e n t
i n d u c t w i t h i n a n o n g o i n g institutional s c h e m e . T h u s , I am
Mn^hl^™e[^y,hm0 1 S t l C 3 8
° P p o s e d t o a
"realistic" foreign p o l i c y (in Hans
M o r g e n t h a u s s e n s e ) . Rather, m y point is that w i t h i n a m o d u s - v i v e n d i framework, foreign
p o l i c y wU a l w a y s b e realistic in s u b s t a n c e (though it may, in a d d i t i o n , b e moralistic in
rhetoric). If w e w a n t t o s e e o u r values e m b e d d e d in international i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d in our
g o v e r n m e n t s c o n d u c t o f fore.gn affairs, t h e n we m u s t t r a n s c e n d t h e m o d u s - v i v e n d i
framework, w i t h i n w h i c h t h e c o n c e r n w i t h t h e surviving a n d prevailing of national
c o n s t i t u t i o n s is p a r a m o u n t . In t h e a b s e n c e of perfect t e c h n o l o g i e s , t h U r e q u i r e s a shared

consider themselves I have n o t h i n l u l t i m a . e £ £ S Z X K Z £ ^ £ £ £ Z

lion m a y require that states take s o m e moral s t e p s o n their ownwnfcTmus'at"tea* in
t h e b e g i n n i n g , b e a c c e p t a b l e from a p r u d e n t i a l Btmdp^^^^j^te
ex^ple.unUaterallysignal^
u l u , v , m :
o r d e r b y d e s i g n i n g foreign p o l i c i e s that w i t h o u t e n d a n e p r i n * " ' r ,
security) d e m o n s t r a t e its w i l l i n g n e s s t o forgo a d w t t i S S f t a T ^ t i n T " t t l e
W O u l d b e
w i t h a just global o r d e r (as it itself e n v i s i o n s it). ^ ^compatible
 A Value-Based W o r l d Order, 20.5 235

g o v e r n m e n t s t o m a k e g e n u i n e sacrifices for t h e m , to h o n o r a l a w or
a g r e e m e n t e v e n w h e n d o i n g so is against t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s i n t e r e s t s , all
things c o n s i d e r e d . Yet over a n d over again, g o v e r n m e n t s c r e a t e t h e
opposite p r e c e d e n t ; t h e y i g n o r e laws, c h a r t e r s , treaties, a n d d e c l a r a ­
tions t h a t t h e y h a d o n c e i n a u g u r a t e d w i t h great s h o w s of c o m m i t m e n t
and t h e r e b y reinforce t h e d o m i n a n t c o n c e p t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l rela­
tions a s a m o r a l .
A c a s e in p o i n t is t h e c o n d e m n a t i o n of w a r c r i m e s a n d (especially)
crimes a g a i n s t h u m a n i t y , w h i c h , at Nuremberg, w e r e said t o s h o c k t h e
c o n s c i e n c e of h u m a n k i n d . In situations w h e r e t h e i r o w n military a c ­
tions o r t h o s e of t h e i r allies w e r e at stake, t h e relevant p o w e r s h a v e
since b e e n willing, for t h e sake of even m i n o r objectives, t o ignore t h e
w a r - c r i m e s s t a t u t e s t h e y formulated. This is n o t a c a s e w h e r e s h a r e d
values a r e s a d l y a b s e n t . W h a t is lacking is t h e political will t o make
effective t h e v a l u e s t h a t a r e s h a r e d , b y e m b o d y i n g t h e m as fixed p o i n t s
into a global i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r d e r w h e r e t h e y w o u l d b e m a i n t a i n e d
t h r o u g h t h e moral allegiance they evoke a m o n g t h e p e o p l e s of t h e
world. T h i s is a m o r a l failure, primarily of politicians, w h o t h e r e b y
subvert t h e v e r y i d e a t h a t international d o c u m e n t s c o u c h e d in t h e
language of f u n d a m e n t a l law a n d s u p r e m e morality c o u l d ever b e
a n y t h i n g m o r e t h a n t e m p o r a r y bargains reinforced by p r o p a g a n d a
penalties.
Value-based i n s t i t u t i o n a l fixed p o i n t s might also develop, m o r e for­
mally, t h r o u g h a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l ethical dialogue. Just as t e a m s of n u ­
c l e a r - w e a p o n s e x p e r t s are asked to negotiate a draft a g r e e m e n t o n
a r m s c o n t r o l , s o t e a m s of political p h i l o s o p h e r s a n d international law­
yers m i g h t b e a s k e d to identify, codify, a n d e x t e n d t h e area of s h a r e d
value c o m m i t m e n t s . S u c h d i s c u s s i o n s w o u l d lead n a t i o n s to a better
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of o n e a n o t h e r ' s m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e values, w h i c h is
b o u n d to b r o a d e n a n d d e e p e n t h e c o m m i t m e n t to t h e value of toler­
a n c e — a n d t o l e r a n c e of alternative forms of national organization in
Particular. T h e y m i g h t also lead to a g r e e m e n t on s o m e p a t h of institu­
tional r e f o r m s t h a t a r e g e n u i n e l y valued by b o t h sides a n d eventually,
P e r h a p s , to a s h a r e d c o n c e p t i o n of justice that could guide t h e a p ­
praisal a n d g r a d u a l reform of t h e global institutional order.
At least in t h e b e g i n n i n g (before m u c h m u t u a l confidence h a s b e e n
built up), t h e a g r e e m e n t s emerging from s u c h a high-level ethical di­
alogue will h a v e t o affect t h e participant states in a b a l a n c e d - ™ W > £ £
to m i n i m i z e t h e s t r a i n s of c o m m i t m e n t . For instance,
might b e u n a b l e at p r e s e n t to give a reliable ^ " " ^ f ^
tolerate t h e a p o s t a s y of a major ally b e c a u s e this undertaking w o u l d

« * . C h a p t e r e, , ar^ue for a particular ^ ^ ^ ' ^ ^ ^

w h i c h s e e m s t o m e to b e a n especially »PPT°W S![ r °m it is based o n a small family
international ethical dialogue. T h o u g h ^ f ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ e national institutional
of w i d e l y a c c e p t e d values a n d also tolerant of s o m e r a n g e o f d r ^ r s e n
t h e m e s , i n c l u d i n g , in particular, s c h e m e s with a soc.ahst e c o n o m y
236 A Value-Based W o r l d O r d e r , 20.6

i m p o s e severe s t r a i n s u p o n w h i c h e v e r s i d e w o u l d b e called u p o n to
h o n o r it first. T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t t h e d i s c o u r s e m u s t aim (like
n e g o t i a t i o n s of t h e a r m s - c o n t r o l type) for a g r e e m e n t s t h a t a r e mutually
a d v a n t a g e o u s . S u c h a g r e e m e n t s m i g h t , a n d p e r h a p s s h o u l d , rather be
24
m u t u a l l y d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s . T h e g o v e r n m e n t s of t h e m o r e affluent
n a t i o n s might, for e x a m p l e , a g r e e t o c r e a t e a n d f u n d a n agency, inde­
p e n d e n t from t h e m s e l v e s , t h a t is c h a r g e d w i t h p r o m o t i n g t h e eco­
n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e w o r l d ' s p o o r e s t c o u n t r i e s a n d regions (com­
b a t t i n g m a l n u t r i t i o n , illiteracy, d i s e a s e , a n d e c o n o m i c dependence).
W i t h s o m e g o o d will, s u c h a reform s h o u l d b e feasible (in a period of
r e d u c e d t e n s i o n ) b y finding a m u t u a l l y a c c e p t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n of bur­
d e n s t h a t p r e s e r v e s t h e relative b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n of t h e relevant
g o v e r n m e n t s . While s u c h a s c h e m e w o u l d r e d u c e t h e benefits these
g o v e r n m e n t s derive from t h e i r s u p e r i o r p o s i t i o n , it w o u l d r e d u c e them
p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y a n d h e n c e n o t (dis)advantage a n y o n e of t h e m vis-a-vis
t h e o t h e r s . T h e m o r a l significance of s u c h t a n g i b l e c o n c e r n for the
w o r l d ' s m o s t d i s a d v a n t a g e d p o p u l a t i o n s w o u l d g o far b e y o n d its im­
m e d i a t e effects. By d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o give increasing
weight to values a t t h e e x p e n s e of c o n c e r n for t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n and
e x p a n s i o n of n a t i o n a l p o w e r , t h e relevant g o v e r n m e n t s w o u l d build
u p , t h r o u g h t h e e x p e r i e n c e of n o n p r u d e n t i a l c o l l a b o r a t i o n , t h e mutual
r e s p e c t a n d trust t h a t a r e n e c e s s a r y for t h e g r a d u a l t r a n s i t i o n to a
25
value-based world order.
2 0 . 6 . So far, t h i s c h a p t e r h a s s k e t c h e d a s y s t e m i c analysis of one
feature of a global institutional s c h e m e , d e t e r m i n i n g t h e d e g r e e to
w h i c h it h a s a m o d u s - v i v e n d i o r v a l u e - b a s e d c h a r a c t e r . I h a v e argued
t h a t t h i s feature h a s a t r e m e n d o u s i m p a c t o n t h e o r d i n a r y level of day-
t o - d a y h u m a n m i s e r y a s well a s o n t h e s h a r e d risk of extraordinary
c a t a s t r o p h e ( t h r o u g h a n o t h e r w o r l d w a r , for i n s t a n c e ) . T h e s e t h o u g h t s
a r e straightforwardly generalizable t o o t h e r w o r l d - o r d e r f e a t u r e s . The
i d e a is t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e existing f r a m e w o r k of i n t e r n a t i o n a l relations
as a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e i n t h e s e n s e of C h a p t e r 1, a n d t h e n t o investigate
h o w v a n o u s morally significant m a c r o p h e n o m e n a vary w i t h variations
m t h e features of t h e global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e
T h i s s o r t of investigation is obviously m o r e difficult w h e n t h e d o m a i n
is t h e w o r l d a t large. F o r o n e thing, it is m o r e difficult t o w o r k with

"Yet even if they are mutually disadvantageous, the mere fact of having achieved
16 b e n e f i t h h s i d
cooperaton" * * " ^ « * • ^ fostering trade and economic
" T h i s transition would be facilitated through jointly established adjudication and
enforcement mechanisms that are independent of Tny ofhe^cjXHrt
firmly
commuted to the transformation process so that theyVvill t e ^ C ^ e r t w t a n c e any
strains of the transition. As the strength of independent forces increases thev would add
we^ht to the reasons in favor of continued compliance SCSSSo^few
m e T a n ^ ^
T o m e l m ^ ^ and it is thus of
 A Value-Based World Order, 20.6 237

comparative statistical i n f o r m a t i o n b e c a u s e t h e r e are n o s i m u l t a n e o u s

alternative w o r l d s t o b e o b s e r v e d . Still, social theory w o u l d s e e m to
provide e n o u g h of a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g to s u p p o r t s o m e significant,
though general, c o n c l u s i o n s . T h e centrifugal t e n d e n c i e s e n d e m i c to
laissez-faire m a r k e t s c h e m e s , for e x a m p l e , are well e n o u g h d o c u ­
mented in t h e c o n t e x t of various national a n d regional e c o n o m i c
schemes to a l l o w g e n e r a l i z a t i o n t o t h e global p l a n e . This generalization
enables a s y s t e m i c e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e fact that international inequali­
ties are vast, a n d still i n c r e a s i n g , a s t h e poorest c o u n t r i e s t e n d to have
26
the lowest (often negative) r a t e s of e c o n o m i c g r o w t h . T h e c u r r e n t
distribution i n n a t i o n a l r a t e s of infant mortality, life expectancy, a n d
disease a n d t h e global i n c i d e n c e of starvation a n d poverty can t h e n be
accounted for, in large p a r t , b y reference to t h e existing world market
27
system w i t h its lack of d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s .
Again, s u c h m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s c a n n o t b e fully p r e e m p t e d b y the
c o r r e s p o n d i n g m i c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s . Having explained various particular
wars a n d i n s u r r e c t i o n s b y reference to intrinsic factors, w e m u s t vet
account for t h e overall rate of internal a n d external government vio­
lence, w h i c h (I h a v e s u g g e s t e d ) requires reference to an international
modus vivendi t h a t p e r p e t u a t e s military competition a n d the a b s e n c e
of effective m e c h a n i s m s for t h e creation, application, a n d enforcement
°f i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w . Similarly, microexplanations of w h y this or that
less d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r y h a s o r h a s n o t "taken off" economically d o not
add u p to a n e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e centrifugal t e n d e n c y in p e r capita gross
2 8
national p r o d u c t .
And again, t h e t w o levels are separable not only for p u r p o s e s of
explanation b u t also from a moral point of view. In m y h o m i c i d e
example (§2.3), it w a s c o n s i s t e n t to h o l d e a c h a n d every m u r d e r e r fully
responsible for h i s act and to criticize t h e legal system (lacking effective
h a n d g u n legislation) o n a c c o u n t of s o m e percentage of these m u r d e r s .
Similarly, h e r e , w e s h o u l d s u r e l y h o l d t h e Somozas a n d Marcoses fully
a c c o u n t a b l e for t h e plight of their compatriots. But, consistent with
this, w e c a n a l s o criticize t h e prevailing international order o n account
of c u r r e n t m i s e r y , s o l o n g as t h e prevalence of corrupt military dictator­
' s , g r o w t h differentials are partly d u e to differential birth rates, but then high birth
fates are t h e m s e l v e s c a u s e d partly by poverty.
1
^ S e e Nagel, PF, for a clear a n d eloquent elaboration o t h . | P ™ ^ ff ^ m t h e f a c (

" T h u s , it is fallacious to infer that all p o o r societies coulc' havejaken ° n

s o m e | . g . S o u t h Korea a n d Taiwan) have, i n i s a t leas. ^ ™
e between a
i e d

f ^ c e s s of t h e f e w w a s c o n d i t i o n a l u p o n the compeftt.ve' ™ ™ ^ £ , .
l a r advan­ c o s t

c e n u m b e r of m o r e d e v e l o p e d societies (over w h i c h they e n . o y e d a .a ^

<age) a n d a large n u m b e r of l e s s developed soctehe i ^ r u e , .Vfo.lows
^ v a n t a g e in capital a n d technology). If s o m e s u c h m a c " ^ P ' * " w greater ( f o r

y it w a s i m p o s s i b l e for all Third World countries t o . s u c c e e d / f o r

competition w i t h i n the n i c h e w o u l d have greatly reducedline a ^ o u l d h a v e

f f t s ) . At best, t h e s u c c e s s stories c a n s h o w that « ^ ™ d ^ w o n ^ ( q

•fken off b y o c c u p y i n g t h e n i c h e (and that rn.croexplanat.ons are tne

s h o w w h y these rather t h a n those countries succeeded).
238 A Value-Based W o r l d O r d e r , 20.7

s h i p s in T h i r d W o r l d c o u n t r i e s is itself e x p l a i n a b l e i n t e r m s of systemic
factors—if it is t h e r e i g n i n g m o d u s - v i v e n d i f r a m e w o r k , for example,
t h a t e x p l a i n s w h y typically e v e n t h e m o s t m u r d e r o u s t y r a n t c a n induce
s o m e p o w e r f u l g o v e r n m e n t s t o give h i m political a n d military support
(against h i s d o m e s t i c a n d foreign o p p o n e n t s ) b y a p p e a l i n g t o or agree­
i n g t o serve t h e i r larger s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s .
2 0 . 7 . T h a t social i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e i m p l i c a t e d i n t h i s w a y makes it
m o r a l l y u r g e n t t o investigate w h e t h e r t h e r e a r e realistic possibilities for
i n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e , for a N e w Deal, o n t h e g l o b a l p l a n e . S u p p o s e we
believe that, o t h e r t h i n g s b e i n g e q u a l , (1) t h e r e is m o r a l r e a s o n to prefer
a w o r l d w i t h l o w e r r a t h e r t h a n h i g h e r r a t e s of m a l n u t r i t i o n , infant
mortality, a n d g o v e r n m e n t v i o l e n c e a n d (2) t h e r e is a feasible alternative
global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e u n d e r w h i c h s u c h r a t e s w o u l d b e significantly
l o w e r . T h e n w e h a v e r e a s o n to v i e w t h e e x i s t i n g w o r l d o r d e r as unjust
a n d t o h o l d t h o s e collaborating i n its p e r p e t u a t i o n m o r a l l y responsible
for t h e i m p o s i t i o n of t h i s o r d e r u p o n (in p a r t i c u l a r ) t h o s e w h o are most
likely t o b e m a s s a c r e d , t o r t u r e d , o r s t a r v e d u n d e r t h e c u r r e n t regime. At
s t a k e h e r e a r e n o t m e r e l y positive b u t n e g a t i v e r i g h t s a n d d u t i e s . Posi­
tive d u t i e s (of m u t u a l aid, for e x a m p l e ) e s t a b l i s h a d i r e c t link b e t w e e n
p e r s o n s in d i s t r e s s a n d t h o s e able t o alleviate t h e i r plight, irrespective
of a n y further facts a b o u t t h e social c o n t e x t . C o n s i d e r a t i o n s of justice
e s t a b l i s h a n i n d i r e c t link, p r e s u p p o s i n g f u r t h e r c o n t e x t u a l features, as
follows: Certain d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s a r e u n d e r s t o o d as
e s t a b l i s h e d o r e n g e n d e r e d by a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e . T h i s s c h e m e is
u n j u s t a g a i n s t t h e b a c k g r o u n d of at least o n e feasible alternative
s c h e m e t h a t w o u l d n o t give rise t o similarly severe d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d
d i s a d v a n t a g e s . A n d t h e m o r e a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e prevailing
i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e are collectively r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e i n j u s t i c e of the
29
s c h e m e insofar a s t h e y actively p e r p e t u a t e it a n d resist its r e f o r m .
S u c h c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of justice are h e r e at stake. By i g n o r i n g t h e misery
of t h e w o r l d s p o o r e s t p o p u l a t i o n s , w e a r e d i s r e g a r d i n g n o t m e r e l y our
positive d u t y of m u t u a l aid b u t o u r negative d u t y n o t t o m a k e o t h e r s the
v i c t i m s of u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s . As c i t i z e n s of t h e d e v e l o p e d n a t i o n s , w e
h a v e c r e a t e d a n d are p e r p e t u a t i n g b y u s e of o u r e c o n o m i c a n d military
p o w e r a global institutional o r d e r u n d e r w h i c h t e n s of mUlions avoida­
bly c a n n o t m e e t t h e i r m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l n e e d s for f o o d a n d p h y s i c a l
r J
security.

T h e n e x t c h a p t e r a t t e m p t s to specify a n d s u p p o r t t h e foregoing
r e m a r k s b y o u t l i n i n g a Rawlsian c o n c e p t i o n of global j u s t i c e . T h e s e
r e m a r k s m a y b e s u m m a r i z e d as claims a b o u t h o w j n g e n e r a l t e r m s , w e
s h o u l d a n s w e r t w o q u e s t i o n s T h e first is t h e a n a l o g u e to " w h o is m y
n e i g h b o r ? m morality: h o w far s h o u l d m y m o r a l c o n c e r n for social
i n s t i t u t i o n s e x t e n d ? H e r e o n e m i g h t b e t e m p t e d to d e n y t h a t s u c h
2 9
A s before (Chap. 1, n. 26), I a m leaving aside thp r „ - . i ' . m , , u
Plu qU6Sti n f When
^ r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for injustice is blamewoX but VtT? f^ ° ° ."
of injustice a n d responsibility in t h e c o n c l u d ^ s 2 o * £ h n 3 ^ ^
 A Value-Based World Order, 20.7 239

responsibility e x t e n d s b e y o n d n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s : "We s h a r e r e s p o n ­
sibility only for o u r n a t i o n a l institutional s c h e m e , in w h i c h w e partici­
pate as c i t i z e n s , a n d w h i c h w e c a n m o s t i m m e d i a t e l y affect (e.g.
through voting)." I reject this view b e c a u s e it treats t h e existing global
institutional f r a m e w o r k a s a n a t u r a l or God-given fact. If we, t h e cit­
izens of p o w e r f u l a n d a p p r o x i m a t e l y democratic countries, d o not
share s o m e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for this global order, t h e n n o o n e d o e s . And
this is i m p l a u s i b l e , given t h a t w e are advantaged p a r t i c i p a n t s in this
order, w h o h e l p m a i n t a i n a n d are (collectively) capable of c h a n g i n g it.
My affirmation of t h e m o r a l salience of (and of a collective moral
responsibility for) t h e global basic structure, a m o u n t s to a partial d e ­
fense a n d d e v e l o p m e n t of §28 of t h e Universal Declaration of Human
Rights: " E v e r y o n e is e n t i t l e d to a social and international o r d e r in w h i c h
the rights a n d f r e e d o m s set forth in this Declaration can be fully real­
ized" (my e m p h a s i s ) .
The s e c o n d q u e s t i o n is h o w w e s h o u l d assess a global institutional
framework from a m o r a l p o i n t of view. Here I favor a broadly c o n s e ­
quentialist a s s e s s m e n t t h a t is c o n c e r n e d , first a n d foremost, with its
least a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s , those in o u r world w h o lack well-pro­
tected f u n d a m e n t a l rights a n d liberties (as stipulated, for e x a m p l e by
the Universal Declaration o r by Rawls's first principle in its a m e n d e d
form).
C H A P T E R 6

A Criterion of
Global Justice

21. T h e Traditional Law of Nations

2 1 . 1 . 1 . Rawls r e c o g n i z e s t h e c o s m o p o l i t a n c h a r a c t e r of h i s t h e o r y by
sketching, at least, h o w h i s criterion for a s s e s s i n g t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of a
n a t i o n a l society m i g h t b e c o m p l e m e n t e d b y a d d i t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s of
justice governing i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . T h i s brief o u t l i n e jars, how­
ever, w i t h c e n t r a l c o m m i t m e n t s of h i s t h e o r y , chiefly h i s focus o n the
b a s i c s t r u c t u r e a n d h i s c o n c e p t i o n of all h u m a n b e i n g s a s free a n d
e q u a l m o r a l p e r s o n s . T h e s e c o m m i t m e n t s w o u l d i n s t e a d , 1 will argue,
l e a d o n e t o a b a n d o n Rawls's p r i m a r y e m p h a s i s o n d o m e s t i c institu­
t i o n s in favor of globalizing h i s entire c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e .
S u c h a globalization is n o t i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s
of Rawls's w o r k t h u s far. It is o n l y for t h e p u r p o s e of' a first a p p r o x i m a ­
t i o n " (BSS 70 n . 8), t h a t h e w a n t s t o "leave a s i d e h e r e t h e p r o b l e m of
justice b e t w e e n n a t i o n s " (BSS 57) a n d b e g i n w i t h t h e i d e a l i z e d c a s e of a
s e l f - c o n t a i n e d society. "At s o m e level t h e r e m u s t exist a c l o s e d back­
g r o u n d s y s t e m , a n d it is t h i s subject for w h i c h w e w a n t a t h e o r y . W e are
b e t t e r p r e p a r e d t o take u p t h i s p r o b l e m for a s o c i e t y (illustrated by
n a t i o n s ) c o n c e i v e d a s a m o r e o r less self-sufficient s c h e m e of social
c o o p e r a t i o n a n d a s p o s s e s s i n g a m o r e o r less c o m p l e t e c u l t u r e . If w e
a r e successful in t h e c a s e of a society, w e c a n try t o e x t e n d a n d t o adjust
o u r initial t h e o r y a s f u r t h e r i n q u i r y r e q u i r e s " (BSS 70 n 8; cf TJ 8).
a 1
Vif* C
£( C e d e t h a t a c r i t e r i
° n of justice for d o m e s t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s
w o u l d b e sufficient if m o d e m states w e r e i n d e e d c l o s e d s c h e m e s . I n
t h i s c a s e t h e r e s i m p l y w o u l d n o t be a global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e for p r i n c i ­
p l e s of global justice to a p p l y to. Of c o u r s e , t h e n a t u r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of
a s s e t s (climate, soil, m i n e r a l resources) a m o n g a p l u r a l i t y of self-con­
t a i n e d s o c i e t i e s m a y b e radically u n e q u a l , a n d it w o u l d t h u s n o t b e

240
 T h e Traditional Law of Nations, 21.1.3 341

difficult to s h o w t h a t Rawlsian p a r t i e s w o u l d a d o p t s o m e t h i n g like

Charles Beitz's i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e s o u r c e redistribution principle, even for
1
a world of t r u l y s e l f - c o n t a i n e d societies. But this d o e s n o t suffice t o
demonstrate t h a t Rawls is really c o m m i t t e d to r e q u i r e m e n t s of global
distributive j u s t i c e t h a t m a k e d e m a n d s even in t h e a b s e n c e of i n t e r n a ­
tional i n t e r a c t i o n . It r e m a i n s to b e s h o w n that t h e c o n s t r u c t of t h e
onginal p o s i t i o n is r e l e v a n t t o t h e question w h e t h e r m e m b e r s of truly
self-contained s o c i e t i e s h a v e a n obligation to establish contact a n d to
develop joint i n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h o t h e r s u c h societies. This Rawls s e e m s
to deny: H e r e s t r i c t s t h e r e l e v a n c e of t h e original position t o q u e s t i o n s
ofjustice a n d c o n c e i v e s (in)justice a s a property of social institutions
(which, b y h y p o t h e s i s , a r e a b s e n t o n t h e global plane). T h e r e a r e cer­
tain "relations of i n d i v i d u a l s t o o n e a n o t h e r which set t h e stage for
questions of j u s t i c e " (TJ 130). I s u r m i s e Rawls would agree with Kant's
more p r e c i s e f o r m u l a t i o n t h a t (just) institutions are required " a m o n g
human b e i n g s . . . w h o c a n n o t avoid mutually influencing o n e a n ­
other.'^ Within h i s t h e o r y a s a w h o l e , there are g r o u n d s for bringing his
contractarian d e v i c e t o b e a r o n t h e global plane only if there is signifi­
3
cant global i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e .
Fortunately, t h e c o n c e s s i o n a n d t h e debate s u r r o u n d i n g it a r e e n ­
tirely a c a d e m i c , s i n c e all a g r e e that t h e r e is and will b e extensive global
i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e . If m o d e r n societies are not closed, w e m u s t at s o m e
Point g o b e y o n d Rawls's "first approximation" and ask h o w his c o n c e p ­
tion of j u s t i c e m i g h t best b e a d a p t e d to t h e complexities of t h e real
world. Rawls h a s n o t y e t seriously a d d r e s s e d this issue. The central
Place of d o m e s t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s in his work u p to n o w rests o n n o t h i n g
deeper t h a n h i s (entirely plausible) h u n c h that making the simplifying
^ s u m p t i o n of n a t i o n a l isolation h a s significant expositional advan­
tages for i n t r o d u c i n g h i s b r o a d l y consequentialist approach.
. 21.1-3. H o w o n e a d a p t s Rawls's conception to m o r e complex real­
t i e s will e v i d e n t l y affect h o w t h e deliberations of t h e p a r t e s m t n e
original p o s i t i o n will eventually be p r e s e n t e d a n d ^ J ^ ™
argue for v i e w i n g t h e p a r t i e s as immediately addressing t h e world at

'Cf. Beitz, PTIR 1 3 6 - 4 3 . f ^..^tp a broader requirement,

J K a n t , KPW 7 3 (cf. MEJ §§8-9). Vet Kant does " ^ J ^ ^ n l .
^ d r e s s e d t o "all m e n w h o c a n at all influence o n e a n o t n e r e c o n o m i c

'Scanlon m a k e s t h e s a m e point, relying on the f a c t o y

or "regularized c o m m e r c e " IRTJ 202). (n h.s book, ^^gritt** s 1 3 1

I R 143-53).
1 5 1 ) a n d

( P T

f ^ e s elaborately for t h e e x t e n s i v e n e s s of current global m i H ^ ^ ,„ t h e

Ye
t . p r o m p t e d b y criticism from David Richards [VOl g upon
d e p e n d e n t
c n
opposite v i e w - f h a t m a k i n g t h e validity of a f " ° " " X r a r U y favor the status quo
y
he factual q u e s t i o n o f global i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e " " ^ f t e r b e r s of differer,
former
t h e m e m

N S 595, a n d cf. n . 8) I fail to s e e this ^ g e r ,

( C [

m ^
societies c a n o r c a n n o t avoid m u t u a l l y influencing one arca ^ i s . i c a l l y avo d
^ t t e r , surely n o t u p t o t h e m . At this stage of world ^ mcenuve to
™ e m t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n , a n d s o the • n f ^ ^ S
e
a Zt h a v e

applytfsocieties were self-

n 0

*Ptoit t h e fact that t h e criterion of global , u s n c e would n

contained.
242 T h e T r a d i t i o n a l L a w of N a t i o n s , 21.2

large a n d a s d e a l i n g w i t h t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of n a t i o n a l societies only

w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t s o p r o v i d e d . T a k e n s e r i o u s l y , Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of
justice will m a k e t h e social p o s i t i o n of t h e globally l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d the
t o u c h s t o n e for a s s e s s i n g o u r b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s .
T h i s c o n c l u s i o n n e e d s d e f e n s e o n t w o levels. In t h i s s e c t i o n a n d the
next, I s h o w h o w m y global i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Rawls's c r i t e r i o n of justice
is p l a u s i b l e within h i s framework, h o w it is s u p p o r t e d , especially, by his
i n d i v i d u a l i s m a n d h i s a r g u m e n t s for t h e f o c u s o n t h e b a s i c structure.
I n §23 I a r g u e t h a t o n t h i s , its m o s t u n i f i e d a n d e l e g a n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,
Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n is still p l a u s i b l y a p p l i c a b l e t o o u r w o r l d — d e s p i t e ,
in particular, significant i n t e r c u l t u r a l diversity of c o n v i c t i o n s even
a b o u t justice. D r a w i n g o n a r g u m e n t s from all p a r t s of t h i s book, the
c o n c l u d i n g s e c t i o n a d d r e s s e s t h e p r a c t i c a l m e a n i n g of a Rawlsian
c o n c e p t i o n of global j u s t i c e i n o u r w o r l d .
2 1 J*. In d i s c u s s i n g h o w t h e c o n s t r u c t of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n s h o u l d
b e b r o u g h t t o b e a r u p o n t h e p r o b l e m of global justice, I will c o n c e n ­
t r a t e u p o n t h r e e m a i n alternatives, t w o of w h i c h are s u g g e s t e d by
4
Rawls's o w n brief r e m a r k s o n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . T h e s e remarks
are clear insofar a s t h e y p r o p o s e t h a t after a c r i t e r i o n of d o m e s t i c
j u s t i c e h a s b e e n c h o s e n , t h e c o n t r a c t a r i a n device s h o u l d b e r e u s e d on
t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l level. B e y o n d this, Rawls's d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e s e c o n d ,
global s e s s i o n of t h e original p o s i t i o n p e r m i t s t w o c o m p e t i n g r e a d i n g s ,
w h i c h h e d o e s n o t k e e p distinct. O n t h e f i r s t — h e n c e f o r t h R j — t h e
global p a r t i e s are viewed as r e p r e s e n t i n g persons from t h e various
societies, w h o , o n c e again, are "to m a k e a r a t i o n a l c h o i c e to p r o t e c t
t h e i r i n t e r e s t s " (TJ 378). T h e y m u s t d o so, h o w e v e r , e v e n t h o u g h "they
k n o w n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e i r o w n society,
its p o w e r a n d s t r e n g t h i n c o m p a r i s o n w i t h o t h e r n a t i o n s , n o r do they
know their place in their own society" (TJ 378, m y e m p h a s i s ) .
O n t h i s r e a d i n g , t h e p a r t i e s will again b e g u i d e d by t h e i r clients'
i m p u t e d d e s i r e for social p r i m a r y g o o d s , a n d s i n c e t h e i r p l a c e in their
o w n society a n d t h a t of t h e i r society a m o n g o t h e r s a r e u n k n o w n , the
p a r t i e s will, b y m a x i m i n , c h o o s e a c r i t e r i o n t h a t m a k e s t h e globally
least a d v a n t a g e d t h e p r e e m i n e n t t o u c h s t o n e of global j u s t i c e , n o m a t ­
t e r w h i c h s o c i e t i e s t h e y m a y b e l o n g t o . Global i n s t i t u t i o n s will t h e n b e
a s s e s s e d b y h o w w e l l t h e y satisfy Rawls's c r i t e r i o n i n t e r p r e t e d glob­
5 H
ally.
This claim—that the parties w o u l d choose essentially the same
c r i t e r i o n in t h e s e c o n d s e s s i o n as in t h e first—is s u p p o r t e d b y Rawls's
e n d o r s e m e n t of a thick veil of i g n o r a n c e . T h e p a r t i e s d o n o t k n o w "the
<TJ 3 7 7 - 7 9 . Rawls offers these t w o p a g e s as part of a d i s c u s s i o n of c o n s c i e n t i o u s
refusal It w o u l d therefore be unfair to regard this p a s s a g e a s a c o n s i d e r e d p r o p o s a l for
1 3 a r o x , m a t , o n s h o u l d
dence PP * » « * » t e d to t a t e a c c o u n t of global i n t e r d e p e n -

'Evidently, I a m here k e e p i n g fixed Rawls's a r g u m e n t s to t h e effect that h i s criterion

(the c o m b i n a t i o n of the general a n d special c o n c e p t i o n s ) is t h e m a x i m i n s o l u t i o n l e t
§11.1.1).
 T h e Traditional Law of Nations, 21.3 243

general c o n f i g u r a t i o n of society, its political s t r u c t u r e a n d e c o n o m i c

organization, a n d s o o n "—including p r e s u m a b l y its size a n d t h e d e ­
gree of its e t h n i c , c u l t u r a l , a n d geographical diversity—because s u c h
knowledge w o u l d at b e s t " o b s c u r e h o w intimately t h e p r i n c i p l e s
adopted are t i e d t o t h e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n " (KCMT 550; cf. BSS 58;
WOS VI). M o r e o v e r , i n f o r m u l a t i n g t h e parties' task, Rawls refers o n l y
vaguely to t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of a n inclusive, self-contained system. For
aught t h e y k n o w , t h e p a r t i e s might be deliberating about t h e w o r l d at
large.
On t h e o t h e r r e a d i n g of Rawls's r e m a r k s — R — t h e s e c o n d session
2

involves a m o r e d r a m a t i c a d j u s t m e n t of t h e original position, s i n c e t h e

parties are n o w c o n c e i v e d as "representatives of states" (TJ 378,379, m y
emphasis). R a w l s tells u s t h a t s u c h representatives w o u l d b e c o n ­
cerned to f u r t h e r " t h e i r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . . . [as] defined by the princi­
ples of j u s t i c e t h a t h a v e a l r e a d y b e e n acknowledged [A] n a t i o n will
aim above all t o m a i n t a i n a n d to preserve its just institutions a n d t h e
conditions t h a t m a k e t h e m p o s s i b l e " (TJ 379). So the parties' ideal of a
just w o r l d w o u l d b e , essentially, a world of just states. For a world
falling s h o r t of t h i s ideal, t h e parties, a s s u m i n g they again e m p l o y t h e
maximin r u l e , w o u l d a d o p t a priority rule focused u p o n the states
whose d o m e s t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e least just. So R, entails weaker con­
straints t h a n R o n i n t e r n a t i o n a l inequalities. In this regard, a just
t

global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e n e e d m e r e l y e n s u r e that n o states are too p o o r to

6
°e able to satisfy Rawls's criterion domestically.
Despite this difference, t h e two readings agree that first-principle
7
goods a r e p a r a m o u n t T h o s e farthest from having a complete a n d
well-protected p a c k a g e of basic rights a n d liberties ipso facto c o u n t as
the globally l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d u n d e r R„ a n d those societies w h o s e least
advantaged suffer t h e g r e a t e s t shortfall from s u c h a fully a d e q u a t e
Package i p s o facto c o u n t as t h e least just u n d e r R . However mconsis- 2

tently Rawls m a y h a v e d e s c r i b e d t h e parties' second, global session, it

^ill q u i t e clearly yield a criterion that assesses global basic structures
hy t h e severity of t h e first-principle violations each t e n d s to P r o d u c e
»1 A It is t h e n a s t o n i s h i n g that Rawls takes this global session to

Q ^ ^ J ^ ^ / . J S
' T h e r , m a y b e r e a d i n g s or e x l e n s i o n s of the
Perhaps e n v i s a g i n g a criterion sensitive to the per capita income „ m e p
s
' k i P s u c h c o m p l e x i t i e s , a s s u m i n g that m y arguments against H, and 2

mediate i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s as well. „;„„;„i ;<= s u s o e n d e d in favorofthe

PS

U n l e s s , o f c o u r s e , t h e lexical ordering of the two P ™ ^ " " ^ £ hope that my ( n e

general c o n c e p t i o n . I neglect this complication in my^argun ^ ^ .. h a J f t v a y

a m e n d m e n t i o t h e first principle allows u s » « f * | ? c a£ i b l v apply. In any

n p u s

favorable") c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h the special c ° n c e £ i o n H ^ ^ ^ PQORER

case, e v e n if t h e g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n applied to toda>- s wt< for s m e n t of t h e a s s e s
s
, °ctetie (R ), R w i ' criterion w o u l d still have r a d i c a W
S 2 a s s j conception
( h e s p e c i a

'he current global b a s i c structure, especially if, as Kawis ^ i m p l i c a

d e t w m i n e s t h e long-range d e m a n d s of justice (TJ I*A ^ ' _ ent I

( h e a c t u a I a r g u m

h ° b s c o u l d b e d e v e l o p e d will be clear e n o u g h by analogy

Present in t h e text.
244 T h e T r a d i t i o n a l Law of N a t i o n s , 21.3

result in a reaffirmation of t h e "familiar" p r i n c i p l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law,

for w h i c h h e relies o n t h e s e m i n a l b u t d a t e d a c c o u n t in J a m e s Brierly's
b o o k The Law of Nations. U n d e r t h i s r e g i m e , " s t a t e s h a v e c e r t a i n funda­
m e n t a l e q u a l r i g h t s . . . a n a l o g o u s to t h e e q u a l r i g h t s of citizens in a
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e g i m e " (TJ 378). As e x a m p l e s , Rawls m e n t i o n s (TJ 378-
79) t h e rights t o s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , n o n i n t e r v e n t i o n , a n d self-defense;
t h e r u l e s ofj u s in bello; a n d t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t t r e a t i e s c o n s i s t e n t with
t h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s are t o b e k e p t (the r e m a i n i n g t r e a t i e s b e i n g void ab
initio).
T h e p a r t i e s , o n e i t h e r R o r R , h a v e v a r i o u s r e a s o n s for rejecting this
1 2

p r o p o s a l . T o b e g i n w i t h , it is w h o l l y i n s e n s i t i v e t o d i s t r i b u t i o n a l con­
c e r n s . I n t e r n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s s h a p e d by free bargaining
( a m o n g g o v e r n m e n t s a n d o t h e r e c o n o m i c a g e n t s ) afford n o a s s u r a n c e
t h a t n a t i o n a l societies will n o t avoidably lack "a sufficient m a t e r i a l base
for m a k i n g t h e e q u a l liberties effective" (FG 545). But t h e p a r t i e s w o u l d
u r g e n t l y w a n t a global i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k t h a t p r o v i d e s s u c h as­
surance.
Next, a w o r l d of g r e a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t i e s will give rise to
c o n s i d e r a b l e s t r a i n s of c o m m i t m e n t . M a n y a g o v e r n m e n t will b e b o u n d
b y very b u r d e n s o m e treaties, w h o s e t e r m s , n e g o t i a t e d p e r h a p s by
s o m e p r e d e c e s s o r g o v e r n m e n t , reflect a b y g o n e a n d unfavorable dis­
t r i b u t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r . T h e c o m m i t m e n t to k e e p s u c h treaties
will frequently c o m e u n d e r severe s t r e s s .
Moreover, t h e r e are, o n Rawls's p r o p o s a l , n o effective m e c h a n i s m s of
a d j u d i c a t i o n a n d e n f o r c e m e n t t h a t c o u l d offset t h e s e c o n s i d e r a b l e
s t r a i n s of c o m m i t m e n t a n d t h e r e b y k e e p t h e s i t u a t e d a s s u r a n c e p r o b ­
l e m from arising. In t h e a b s e n c e of s u c h r e c o g n i z e d m e c h a n i s m s ,
g o v e r n m e n t s have n o a s s u r a n c e s t h a t o t h e r s will c o m p l y w i t h t h e
g o i n g g r o u n d r u l e s even w h e n t h e n e t c o s t s of c o m p l i a n c e (including
o p p o r t u n i t y costs) are high. T h e lack of s u c h a s s u r a n c e s m a k e s it m o r e
often advisable a n d also m o r a l l y m o r e a c c e p t a b l e n o t to c o m p l y oneself
w h e n c o m p l i a n c e is costly or even risky. T h i s c l i m a t e of a c t u a l a n d
potential noncompliance, together with "honest disagreements"
a m o n g g o v e r n m e n t s t h a t are equally e n t i d e d to j u d g e a n d enforce
i n t e r n a t i o n a l laws a n d treaties, e n s u r e s t h a t t h e p e r e n n i a l s c o u r g e of
w a r will c o n t i n u e , as Rawls implicitly a c k n o w l e d g e s b y c o n c e n t r a t i n g
m o s t of h i s f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n u p o n t h e r u l e s of warfare.
T h i s p e r m a n e n t d a n g e r from n o n c o m p l i a n c e a n d w a r ( a n d t h e fear,
hostility, a n d s u s p i c i o n a s s o c i a t e d w i t h it) will in t u m a c t u a l i z e t h e
f u n d a m e n t a l a s s u r a n c e p r o b l e m . E a c h g o v e r n m e n t will, a n d will d e e m
itself m o r a l l y e n t i t l e d to, shift t h e g r o u n d r u l e s in its favor w h e n it can,
s o a s t o m a k e itself a n d its d o m e s t i c p o p u l a t i o n less v u l n e r a b l e to
n o n c o m p l i a n c e or attack by other governments.
T a k e n t o g e t h e r , t h e s e four c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s h o w t h a t u n d e r t h e r u l e s
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w Rawls e n d o r s e s e v e n a n initially w e l l - o r d e r e d (sta­
ble) i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e m w o u l d t e n d t o d e g e n e r a t e i n t o a m o d u s vi-
 T h e Traditional Law of Nations, 21.4 245

vendi in w h i c h c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e s e g r o u n d rules a n d t h u s their

endurance w o u l d b e p r o b l e m a t i c . In o t h e r words, it is n o t t h e case that
the familiar l a w of n a t i o n s (at Brierly's time or our's) w o u l d work well if
only t h e r e w e r e mutual t r u s t . Rather, t h e prevailing modus-vivendi
framework is t h e e q u i l i b r i u m state t o w a r d w h i c h a n international sys­
tem g o v e r n e d b y t h i s l a w of n a t i o n s will t e n d regardless of initial
governmental a t t i t u d e s a n d g o o d will. A world o r d e r based o n t h e s e
ground r u l e s is inherently u n s t a b l e , a s can be s h o w n by e x t e n d i n g
Rawls's o w n o b s e r v a t i o n s a b o u t t h e strains of c o m m i t m e n t a n d t h e two
8
assurance p r o b l e m s .
We h a v e s e e n h o w t h e p a r t i e s have important r e a s o n s for rejecting
the traditional i n t e r n a t i o n a l - l a w regime Rawls e n d o r s e s . The inequality
and instability (fostering n o n c o m p l i a n c e a n d wars) s u c h a regime
tends t o e n g e n d e r w o u l d j e o p a r d i z e t h e parties' aspiration for a world
in w h i c h first-principle g o o d s are universally secure. These r e a s o n s
apply even if w e a s s u m e t h a t all of t h e world's societies are firmly
committed to p r o t e c t i n g first-principle goods within their b o r d e r s (at
least insofar as t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e levels of development permit). Since this
assumption is h i g h l y unrealistic, however, one s h o u l d also consider
whether p r o p o s e d g r o u n d rules for international relations are plausi­
ble w h e n s o m e societies are less t h a n just a n d w h e t h e r they will exert
some i n f l u e n c e u p o n n a t i o n a l regimes to gravitate toward domestic
justice. Rawls's p r o p o s a l of equal state rights fails on these two c o u n t s
as well. Societies a n d t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t s are to be accepted as equals
under t h o s e r u l e s , e v e n if t h e i r internal constitutions are characterized
°y tyranny, r e p r e s s i o n , exploitation, a n d radical inequalities. Persons
abused by t h e i r o w n g o v e r n m e n t s have no official remedies a n d m u s t
"ely on t h e w i l l i n g n e s s of o t h e r governments or agents to intercede in
their behalf. M o r e o v e r , s i n c e e a c h state is sovereign over its internal
^ a i r s , this i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d e r generates no countervailing forces that
* o u l d resist t h e d e g e n e r a t i o n of a national basic s t r o c h r o . Such in­
stitutional indifference to t h e d o m e s t i c (in)justice of national regimes
aggravates t h e instability of t h e p r o p o s e d world o r d e r b e c a u s e , u n d e r ­
l i n e s t h e moral r e a s o n s for unconditional compliance with interna­
tional l a w s a n d t r e a t i e s . , „„tr,fthPtradi-
d o r e e
21.4. T h e s e Rawlsian criticisms of Rawls's ^ Xrlns oft
"onal i n t e r n a t i o n a l - l a w regime indicate three ^ ^S5tT-nd
ftitutional r e f o r m t o w a r d a global order u n d e r ™
Gerties w o u l d be more c o m p l e t e a n d ^ J ^ ^ X
« e w o u l d favor an organization of the world economy that makes
S

sensitive to d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c o n c e r n s , so that ^ ^ ^ S X - S b c
sufficient m a t e r i a l b a s e to satisfy t h e first P T ^ ^ T t o i r t t t a d
° n d , t h e y w o u l d w a n t (more) international disputes to oe
c « RMC 144 On what I have
*On t h e strains of c o m m i t m e n t , s e e TJ 176-78; RAM 6 5 3 , ™ ^ I O C n

called t h e s i t u a t e d a n d fundamental assurance problems,

and 1 9 - 2 0 , respectively.
246 T h e I n t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 22

t h r o u g h m u t u a l l y r e c o g n i z e d legal p r o c e d u r e s r a t h e r t h a n t h r o u g h
w a r o r t h r e a t a d v a n t a g e — a reform t h a t in d u e c o u r s e m i g h t b e comple­
m e n t e d b y c e n t r a l e n f o r c e m e n t m e c h a n i s m s . P r o g r e s s t o w a r d this
s e c o n d goal w o u l d r e d u c e o r e l i m i n a t e t h e i n c i d e n c e of w a r a n d make
it m u c h m o r e likely for right r a t h e r t h a n m i g h t t o prevail in interna­
t i o n a l conflicts. T h i r d , t h e p a r t i e s w o u l d p r e f e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l law to
afford s o m e r e m e d i e s t o p e r s o n s a g a i n s t a b u s e b y t h e i r o w n govern­
m e n t s , s o m e i n c e n t i v e s for societies t o reform t h e m s e l v e s — m i n i m a l l y
b y p r o v i d i n g for d i p l o m a t i c a n d e c o n o m i c s a n c t i o n s ( w h e n these
w o u l d b e effective) against u n j u s t n a t i o n a l r e g i m e s . S e e i n g t h a t prog­
9
ress h a s b e e n m a d e s i n c e Brierly's t i m e , o n t h e l a t t e r t w o fronts, a n d
t h a t t h e p a r t i e s , o n a n y textually t e n a b l e c o n s t r u a l of t h e i r s e c o n d
s e s s i o n , w o u l d a d o p t a criterion t h a t favors s u c h r e f o r m s , I a m at a loss
t o e x p l a i n Rawls's quick e n d o r s e m e n t of a b y g o n e s t a t u s q u o . Given the
g e n e s i s of t h e i n t e m a t i o n a l - l a w r e g i m e a s a n i n s t r u m e n t d e v e l o p e d by
g o v e r n m e n t s t o serve t h e i r o w n s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s , it w o u l d s e e m a
s u r p r i s i n g c o i n c i d e n c e i n d e e d if it (in a n y of its h i s t o r i c a l versions)
w e r e t h e m o s t s u i t a b l e i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k for realizing b a s i c rights
a n d liberties.
In o n e c o n c r e t e c a s e Rawls himself s h o w s a c o n c e r n for b a s i c liber­
ties t h a t radically d e p a r t s from t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. He writes
t h a t a n a r m y of c o n s c r i p t s r a t h e r t h a n m e r c e n a r i e s m a y b e " d e m a n d e d
for t h e defense of liberty itself, i n c l u d i n g h e r e n o t o n l y t h e liberties of
t h e c i t i z e n s of t h e society i n q u e s t i o n , b u t a l s o t h o s e of p e r s o n s in other
societies a s well. Therefore if a c o n s c r i p t a r m y is l e s s likely to b e a n
i n s t r u m e n t of unjustified foreign a d v e n t u r e s , it m a y b e justified o n this
b a s i s a l o n e d e s p i t e t h e fact t h a t c o n s c r i p t i o n infringes u p o n t h e equal
liberties of c i t i z e n s " (TJ 380). This d e m a n d g o e s far b e y o n d h i s c o n s e r ­
vative e n d o r s e m e n t of t h e l a w of n a t i o n s . O n e m i g h t , t h e r e f o r e , best
d i s c o u n t t h i s e n d o r s e m e n t , r a t h e r t h a n r e c o g n i z e it a s e v i d e n c e
a g a i n s t a n y r e a s o n a b l e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of h o w Rawls d e s c r i b e s t h e
p a r t i e s s e c o n d , global s e s s i o n .

22. The Internal Argument

Let m e t h e n r e t u r n t o t h e t w o i d e a s Rawls h a s s u g g e s t e d for e x t e n d ­

i n g t h e original p o s i t i o n t o t h e subject of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s a n d
field a g a i n s t t h e s e i d e a s m y o w n alternative, G. I n s t e a d of t w o s e p a r a t e
9
F o r e x a m p l e , t h e International Covenant o n Civil a n d Political Rights a n d t h e Interna­
tional Covenant o n E c o n o m i c , Social, and Cultural Rights b o t h involve specific legal
obligations, t h o u g h o n l y a minority of states h a v e a c c e d e d to t h e m . T h e former o f t h e s e
e n v i s i o n s jurisdiction by the U.N. H u m a n Rights C o m m i t t e e (1CCPR §41) a n d also c o n ­
tains a n o p t i o n a l protocol recognizing the right to individual p e t i t i o n t o this U.N. b o d y
Similar p r o v i s i o n s are c o n t a i n e d in the E u r o p e a n C o n v e n t i o n o n H u m a n Rights. Reflect­
ing t h e parties' c o n c e r n for first-principle rights a n d liberties, a criterion of global justice
a c c e p t a b l e to t h e m w o u l d d e m a n d substantial further reforms a l o n g t h e s e l i n e s .
 T h e Internal Argument, 22.1.1 247

sessions in w h i c h t h e p a r t i e s a d o p t criteria for national a n d t h e n for

international i n s t i t u t i o n s , G envisions a single, global, original position.
This modification, again a p p e a l i n g t o t h e thick veil of ignorance, leaves
intact Rawls's w h o l e a r g u m e n t for t h e two principles, directing it how­
ever at o u r e n t i r e social w o r l d . T h e relevant "closed s c h e m e " is n o w
taken t o b e t h e w o r l d at large. This section will first s h o w h o w R is 2

incompatible w i t h Rawlsian c o m m i t m e n t s a n d t h e n p r e s e n t a n u m b e r
of a r g u m e n t s t h a t favor G over R, (and R ). 2

22.1.1. O n e m a i n r e a s o n Rawls gives for taking t h e basic s t r u c t u r e a s

the p r i m a i y m o r a l s u b j e c t is that institutional inequalities, at least
insofar a s t h e y a r e b a s e d u p o n natural o r social contingencies, a r e
inescapable a n d p r e s e n t from birth. They deeply s h a p e o u r c h a r a c t e r
and interests, g o a l s a n d aspirations, even talents a n d abilities (BSS V; TJ
7,259). T h u s t h e y affect o u r lives m u c h m o r e profoundly a n d call m o r e
urgently for m o r a l reflection t h a n inequalities arising from w h a t indi­
viduals c h o o s e t o d o (including participation in associations s u c h as
firms, c h u r c h e s , o r universities) a n d from h o w their activities h a p p e n t o
turn o u t .
Nationality is j u s t o n e further d e e p contingency (like genetic e n d o w ­
ment, race, g e n d e r , a n d social class), o n e more potential basis of in­
stitutional i n e q u a l i t i e s t h a t a r e inescapable a n d p r e s e n t from birth.
Within Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n , there is n o reason to treat this case dif­
ferently from t h e o t h e r s . A n d s o it w o u l d seem that w e can justify o u r
global i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r d e r only if w e c a n s h o w that the institutional
inequalities it p r o d u c e s t e n d to optimize (against t h e b a c k d r o p ot
feasible a l t e r n a t i v e global regimes) t h e worst social position.
N o w o n e m a y t h i n k t h a t t h e r e is a n o t h e r kind of justification peculiar
to t h e global c a s e , w h e r e t h e claims of states m u s t also b e given their
w h i c h h
due. S u c h a t h o u g h t is suggested by R , on 2 * °P^™^™Zt
as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of stales. Even conceding ^\Xh^nZorm^l
e
alternative i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s that would genera e a « " P " ™ ^
m u m s h a r e , o n e c a n still a r g u e that a n y s u c h f f ™ ^ ^ ^ e
infringe m o r e i m p o r t a n t rights a n d interests ™ g
a p l a u s i b l e i n s t a n c e of s u c h a justification, b u t in ^J™*^™
not fit i n t o a Rawlsian framework, *^^S?Jtice
with Rawls's individualistic conviction ^ ^ ^ L a l con-
a l ) m o r a

only persons a r e t o b e viewed as " ' t i m a t e u n i t s , ^ d o f

c e m : "We w a n t t o a c c o u n t for the social values, o r t h e m q {

institutional, c o m m u n i t y , a n d associative a c " ™ ^ ^ q (

justice t h a t i n its theoretical basis i s j n m v u n pt

d e f i n e d c o n c e

clarity a m o n g o t h e r s , w e d o not w a n t to relyjo ^ ^ a Jife

s o c i e n
of c o m m u n i t y , o r to s u p p o s e t h a t ; f J m b e r s in their
i t s m e

of its o w n d i s t i n c t from a n d superior-to i n however mdividu-

relations w i t h o n e a n o t h e r . . . . From this cone v . q { c o r n m u

alistic it m a y s e e m , w e m u s t eventually explain

nity" (TJ 264-65).
248 T h e I n t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 22.1.2

C o n s e q u e n t l y , Rawls r e c o g n i z e s o n l y p e r s o n s a s "self-originating
s o u r c e s of valid c l a i m s " (KCMT 543) a n d s o c o m m i t s h i m s e l f to basing
h i s criterion of social j u s t i c e exclusively u p o n d a t a a b o u t individual
s h a r e s . This c o m m i t m e n t favors a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e original posi­
tion t h a t , like G a n d R„ c o n s i s t e n t l y c o n c e i v e s t h e p a r t i e s as represent­
i n g persons, n e v e r a s s o c i a t i o n s o r s t a t e s a s in R . In a n y c a s e , h o w
2

a s s o c i a t i o n s , c o m m u n i t i e s , a n d s t a t e s a r e t o b e c o n c e i v e d a n d what
roles t h e y a r e t o p l a y w i t h i n a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d social s y s t e m m u s t for
Rawls d e p e n d o n l y u p o n h o w a l t e r n a t i v e s o l u t i o n s w o u l d affect this
10
social s y s t e m ' s i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n p a r t i c i p a n t s .
2 2 . 1 . 2 . Let u s t u r n to Rawls's s e c o n d m a i n r e a s o n for b e g i n n i n g with
t h e s u b j e c t of b a s i c social i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d for a s s e r t i n g t h a t t h e in­
equalities t h e y t e n d to p r o d u c e m u s t b e g o v e r n e d b y n o t h i n g less
d e m a n d i n g t h a n a m a x i m i n criterion. I n t e r p e r s o n a l a g r e e m e n t s c a n
c a r r y m o r a l w e i g h t o n l y if t h e y are freely e n t e r e d i n t o u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s
t h a t are fair (cf. BSS 5 2 - 5 3 ) . This, Rawls believes, is often n o t t h e case
w h e n s o m e p a r t i c i p a n t s ' b a s i c rights a n d liberties, o p p o r t u n i t i e s , or
e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n s are grossly inferior. T h e attractive i d e a of "interac­
t i o n a m o n g c o n s e n t i n g a d u l t s " c a n b e m o r a l l y a p p e a l i n g o n l y if dif­
ferentials in b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r d o n o t e x c e e d c e r t a i n l i m i t s . A t e n d e n c y
t o g e n e r a t e excessive i n e q u a l i t i e s is a p a r t i c u l a r l y d e e p m o r a l defect in
a social s y s t e m b e c a u s e m a n y of t h e v o l u n t a r y i n t e r a c t i o n s t a k i n g p l a c e
w i t h i n it will b e m o r a l l y flawed as a r e s u l t . It is t h e n of c o n s i d e r a b l e
m o r a l i m p o r t a n c e t h a t social s y s t e m s b e s o s t r u c t u r e d t h a t t h o s e limits
are m a i n t a i n e d , o r (as Rawls p u t s it) " b a c k g r o u n d j u s t i c e " is p r e s e r v e d .
This is given a s o n e m a i n r e a s o n for t h e p r e e m i n e n c e , w i t h i n m o r a l
reflection, of t h e q u e s t for a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e for t h e b a s i c s t r u c ­
ture.
T h i s r e a s o n , too, e x t e n d s to t h e global p l a n e b e c a u s e , e v e n if e a c h
state maintained a distributional b a c k g r o u n d ensuring that interac­
t i o n s a m o n g its c i t i z e n s a r e free a n d fair, i n t e r n a t i o n a l ( i n c l u d i n g inter­
g o v e r n m e n t a l ) inequalities in i n f o r m a t i o n a n d b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r m a y
still b e s o g r e a t as t o r e n d e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n s unfair a n d
1 1
c o e r c i v e — h e n c e t h e n e e d for a c o n c e p t i o n of global b a c k g r o u n d
justice.

" T h i s constraint is still c o m p a t i b l e with the claim that the m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l right of

persons is the right t o live i n a state that h a s t h e k i n d of state rights a c c o r d e d by
international law. If this w e r e true, t h e n the p r e s e n t o r d e r m i g h t i n d e e d b e t h e b e s t w e
c a n h o p e for. At least the foremost right of p e r s o n s is fairly s e c u r e . Given all Rawls h a s
s a i d a b o u t the basic liberties, t h i s p i e c e of conservative i n g e n u i t y will n o t fit i n t o h i s
c o n c e p t i o n of justice, but it is p o p u l a r w i t h others, m o s t notably Walzer (JUW 5 3 - 5 4 ;
MSS).
" H e r e , w e s h o u l d think not m e r e l y of individual transactions, s u c h a s a treaty e s t a b ­
l i s h i n g a foreign military b a s e o r a n a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n a W e s t e r n tourist a n d a Bangkok
prostitute. T h e r e are m o r e c o m p l e x c a s e s , as w h e n , in s o m e p o o r country, local d e m a n d
for grain a n d b e a n s c o m p e t e s w i t h foreign d e m a n d for c o t t o n a n d coffee. Even if the
coffee c o n s u m e r s are n o m o r e affluent than the relevant l a n d o w n e r s a n d n e v e r h a v e any
d e a l i n g s w i t h t h e ( m u c h poorerl w o u l d - b e c o n s u m e r s of grain, g r o s s l y u n e q u a l bargain-
 T h e Internal A r g u m e n t , 22.1.2.1 249

The c u r r e n t l a w of nations is a c o m p l e t e failure in t h i s r e s p e c t

because it is e n t i r e l y insensitive to s u c h differentials in bargaining
power.
On R t h e global p a r t i e s w o u l d a d o p t a criterion that a s s e s s e s t h e
2

terms of i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n b y h o w t h e y t e n d t o affect t h e inter­

nal justice of (especially t h e least just) states. This criterion might
support s o m e i m p o r t a n t institutional reforms in t h e c u r r e n t i n t e r n a ­
tional-law r e g i m e . In p a r t i c u l a r , it w o u l d require a reorganization of t h e
world e c o n o m y s o a s t o e n s u r e that, a s far a s possible, e a c h society has
"a sufficient m a t e r i a l b a s e for m a k i n g t h e equal liberties effective" (FG
545). Still, t h i s c r i t e r i o n d o e s not offer an acceptable c o n c e p t i o n of
global b a c k g r o u n d j u s t i c e in Rawls's sense, b e c a u s e it c o u l d b e fully
satisfied d e s p i t e indefinite i n t e r n a t i o n a l inequalities. Let m e e l u c i d a t e
this p o i n t by d i s c u s s i n g s o m e w h a t m o r e concretely two i s s u e s w i t h
respect to w h i c h R , t h o u g h s u p p o r t e d by ordinary prejudice, conflicts
2

with Rawlsian c o m m i t m e n t s (which are a c c o m m o d a t e d by G a n d R,).

2 2 . 1 . 2 . 1 . O n e conflict c o n c e r n s t h e relative r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e first
principle, w h i c h ( b e y o n d specific "threshold" safeguards) envision
rough equality in r e g a r d to s o m e basic liberties. T h u s decisions t h r o u g h
the political p r o c e s s a r e r e q u i r e d to b e m a d e in s u c h a w a y that t h o s e
significantly affected b y t h e m have equal rights a n d roughly equal
o p p o r t u n i t i e s to p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e deliberations a n d to influence their
o u t c o m e s (cf. TJ §36). S h o u l d this r e q u i r e m e n t e x t e n d also to political
choices significantly affecting t h e citizens of m o r e t h a n o n e society?
R , v i e w i n g t h e p a r t i e s a s r e p r e s e n t i n g states a n d t h u s yielding a
2

criterion t h a t a s s e s s e s i n t e r n a t i o n a l institutions exclusively in t e r m s ot

t h e i n t e r n a l j u s t i c e of s t a t e s , w o u l d lead h e r e to a break m continuity.
The right t o e q u a l political participation extends u p to but not b e y o n d
the n a t i o n a l level. Political m a t t e r s of supranational significance Jd c o u

t h e n b e d e c i d e d by o n e state unilaterally, provided only that the(deci­

sion is s a n c t i o n e d t h r o u g h t h e d o m e s t i c political process a n d d o e s . n o t
u n d e r m i n e o r e n d a n g e r t h e internal justice of o t h e r socie ^ F o r ­
eigners, if u n a b l e to exact a treaty, w o u l d b., <* igated to
d e c i s i o n s from w h i c h t h e y a r e by right e x c l u d e d . " This result is consis

^ w e r m a y y e t p l a y a p e r n i c i o u s role. By
d e m a n d for coffee t e n d s to raise food prices,
^f^^^J^S^ demand. (Such
Poorest l o c a l s t o transform their n e e d for food into ettecnv ^ If starvation
scenarios of d e c l i n i n g "exchange entitlements are discusse ea for i t u n d e r
c o n s u m e r e
results in t h i s c a s e , w e c a n n o t h o l d the ° f X b e requUed to anticipate such
Principle of morality. Market participants_cannot,possmiy hl q {
r
remote effects of their transactions (cf. BSS " "y e f s u c h problems
r o o t o

that a t t e n d s Jo t h e effects of institutions can correctly locate tne

and t h u s p e r h a p s h e l p eradicate them. matters of pure procedural
rana ,0
. "Political c h o i c e s , i n c l u d i n g^P ; XXn™rcannot be settled through the
m s t i c e that for r e a s o n s of fairness or collective rational^^c , ratjons d.- m A m

c u m u l a t i v e result of u n c o o r d i n a t e d d e c i s i o n ^ r p r o c e d u r a l justice,
viduals. Or t h e y m a y involve a more ^^^^J^ith
as t h e y m a y a c c o r d more or less well with moral enter.
r f e c

social justice, u s n c e (
250 T h e I n t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 22.1.2.2

t e n t w i t h t h e s t a t u s q u o , b u t it conflicts w i t h Rawls's individualistic

c o m m i t m e n t , w h i c h links t h e first p r i n c i p l e , i n p a r t i c u l a r , t o t h e status
of all h u m a n b e i n g s as free a n d e q u a l m o r a l p e r s o n s . T h i s c o m m i t m e n t ,
w h i c h m a k e s t h e r e s t r i c t i o n of political e q u a l i t y t o t h e n a t i o n a l a n d
s u b n a t i o n a l levels a p p e a r arbitrary, is h o n o r e d b y b o t h R a n d G, w h i c h t

s u p p o r t a right t o e q u a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n (for t h o s e significantly affected) in

t h e m a k i n g a l s o of s u p r a n a t i o n a l political d e c i s i o n s .
22.1J2J2. T h e o t h e r conflict c o n c e r n s t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of Rawls's
second principle. According to R , international institutions should
2

e n c o u r a g e a n d s u p p o r t t h e fulfillment of t h i s p r i n c i p l e within each

state. T h e t e r m s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n m i g h t t h e n b e perfectly
just, even if t h e y t e n d t o p r o d u c e vast i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t i e s in
a c c e s s t o h e a l t h c a r e a n d e d u c a t i o n a n d in i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h . T h e
c r i t e r i o n of global justice, a s Rawls's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of states w o u l d
fashion it, d e m a n d s only t h a t global c o n d i t i o n s b e m a x i m a l l y s u p p o r t ­
ive of e a c h society's a t t a i n i n g its n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t "to m a i n t a i n a n d to
p r e s e r v e its just i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t m a k e t h e m possi­
b l e " (TJ 379). Yet if excessive social a n d e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t i e s are
u n j u s t d o m e s t i c a l l y , h o w c a n like i n e q u a l i t i e s a r i s i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y be
a m a t t e r of m o r a l indifference? T h e g r o u n d s o n w h i c h Rawls h o l d s t h a t
fair e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y a n d t h e difference p r i n c i p l e c o n s t i t u t e
r e q u i r e m e n t s of b a c k g r o u n d justice militate a g a i n s t c o n f i n i n g t h e s e
requirements within national borders.
Let m e explicate this i d e a of a globalized s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e s o m e w h a t
m o r e concretely b y examining the natural a n d social contingencies
that international socioeconomic inequalities m a y be based u p o n or
r e l a t e d t o (cf. §14.3). Let u s b e g i n w i t h a reflection u p o n t h e m o r a l s t a t u s
of t h e n a t u r a l a s s e t s ( s u c h as m i n e r a l r e s o u r c e s , fertility, c l i m a t e , etc.) of
t h e v a r i o u s s t a t e s . T h e g e o g r a p h i c a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of s u c h a s s e t s is cer­
t a i n l y m o r a l l y arbitrary in Rawls's s e n s e . " T h e n a t u r a l a s s e t s in a state's
t e r r i t o r y are n o t a reflection of t h e m o r a l w o r t h o f — a r e n o t Deserved
b y — e i t h e r this s t a t e o r its citizens. T h e m o r a l a r b i t r a r i n e s s of t h e
d i s t n b u t i o n of n a t u r a l a s s e t s s u p p o r t s (within a R a w l s i a n framework)
t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h o s e w h o s e territory i n c l u d e s e x c e p t i o n a l n a t u r a l
a s s e t s h a v e n o c l a i m t h a t a j u s t global e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s h o u l d offer
a n y p a r t i c u l a r r e w a r d s for m a k i n g t h e s e a s s e t s available. J u s t a s G e n i u s

b e t w e e n g e n e r a t i o n s , or our natural duties (including t h o s e toward o t h e r f o r m s of life).

G r o s s i n e q u a l i t i e s i n political i n f l u e n c e are u n j u s t in b o t h t h e s e c a s e s , albeit for s o m e ­
w h a t different r e a s o n s . Possible e x a m p l e s of supranational political c h o i c e s are p o l i c i e s
p e r t a i n i n g to t h e installation a n d proliferation of nuclear t e c h n o l o g i e s ; d i s e a s e control;
g e n e t i c engineering; the preservation of historical a n d cultural treasures; t h e storage, use,
a n d d i s s e m i n a t i o n of information; exploitation of natural assets (air a n d w a t e r p o l l u t i o n ,
u s e of o c e a n s a n d o u t e r s p a c e , d e s t r u c t i o n of tropical forests a n d o z o n e layer); d e c i m a ­
t i o n a n d e x t i n c t i o n of biological s p e c i e s ; experimentation w i t h a n i m a l s global capital
a c c u m u l a t i o n ; g r o u n d rules for international trade a n d investment (operation of interna­
t i o n a l financial i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d multinational corporations).
" A s a r g u e d in Beitz, PTIR 1 3 6 - 4 2 — t h o u g h Beitz d o e s not u s e "morally arbitrary" in
(what I think is) Rawls's s e n s e .
 T h e I n t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 22.1.2.2 251

has no prior c l a i m t h a t s h e b e offered a n y specific i n c o m e a d v a n t a g e for

the d e v e l o p m e n t a n d e x e r c i s e of h e r g r e a t e r talents (cf. §6.3), s o t h e
Saudis have n o p r i o r c l a i m t o b e i n g offered a n y specific i n c o m e advan­
tage for p r o d u c i n g a n d delivering c r u d e oil. T h e t e r m s of international
cooperation m a y a n d s h o u l d therefore be d e s i g n e d s o that t h e social
inequalities t h e y a l l o w t o a r i s e from n a t u r a l c o n t i n g e n c i e s (the dis­
tribution of n a t u r a l a s s e t s ) t e n d to o p t i m i z e t h e w o r s t representative
individual s h a r e (cf. §6.4). I n t h i s way, a globalized s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e
would c o n s t r a i n b u t n o t p r e c l u d e i n c o m e inequalities t h a t reflect
skewed t e r m s of t r a d e (for e x a m p l e , c r u d e oil versus cotton) arising, via
patterns of s u p p l y a n d d e m a n d , from t h e morally arbitrary g e o g r a p h ­
ical d i s t r i b u t i o n of n a t u r a l a s s e t s .
Beitz w a n t s t o d e r i v e m o r e from t h e parallel b e t w e e n n a t u r a l e n d o w ­
ments a n d n a t u r a l a s s e t s , n a m e l y a global r e s o u r c e redistribution prin­
ciple (which h e believes s h o u l d a p p l y even in t h e a b s e n c e of a n y
international i n t e r a c t i o n ) . He w a n t s t h e criterion of global justice to
govern n o t m e r e l y t h e t e r m s o n w h i c h states c a n develop a n d market
their n a t u r a l a s s e t s b u t a l s o rights over t h e s e assets themselves. But
Beitz's a r g u m e n t for h i s global r e s o u r c e redistribution principle cru­
cially d e p e n d s u p o n Nozick's m i s t a k e n interpretation of h o w Rawls
treats n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s . If social institutions m a y be d e s i g n e d to
rectify i n e q u a l i t i e s i n n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s — p e r h a p s t h r o u g h organ
transplants o r t h r o u g h collective o w n e r s h i p of (or a h e a d tax on) spe­
cial g i f t s - t h e n w e c a n i n d e e d c o n c l u d e that social institutions m a y
also r e d i s t r i b u t e n a t u r a l a s s e t s (provided t h e s e are relevantly similar to
natural e n d o w m e n t s ) . But t h e n , as w e have seen (§5.1.1), Rawls is not
c o m m i t t e d t o t h e p r e m i s e of this a r g u m e n t . There is n o r e a s o n vvrthrn
his s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e - n o t e v e n a ^ a j
overidden b y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of p e r s o n a l
the n a t u r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of special gifts a n d h a n d i c a p ^ E a c h . p e r s o n *
to have a right t o h e r n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s a n d » » ^ ™ ^ 5
e e
d e v e l o p m e n t a n d exercise. W h a t w o u l d follow from ? £ ^ * ™
Parallel of n a t u r a l a s s e t s w i t h n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t t h e r e f o r e quite
different from w h a t h e c o n c l u d e s . E a c h state is t . h a v e a n g h t t o ^
n a t u r a l a s s e t s a n d t h u s m a y beefy ^ ^ " ^ ^ S a e d
them domestically, o r to market them ^ ^ T e n T o f such a
s c
within a j u s t global e c o n o m i c h e m e Under t n e , n s

scheme s i a t e s r i c h in natural assets ^^^S^magni-

f o r t u
could d e r i v e a d v a n t a g e s from their g o o d , " ^ ™ d e s i g n e d s 0

t u d e of t h e s e a d v a n t a g e s is limited by t h e s c h m e s b ^ ^ d u a l
as t o o p t i m i z e t h e social position of t h e least aov
Participants." ^ s t a t e s and their natural
C
"These limits would probably be less ^ " J E n d o w m e n t s because states can
assets than in the case of individuals « ^ . ^ ™ l ^ £ a m l n g more self-rehant The
more easily reduce their economic p a r t ^ ° ^ ^ i s o f cooperation would then
terms of an economic scheme designed to ^J*™^ to gifted persons.
t h a n

Probably be relatively more favorable to asset-ncu

252 T h e I n t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 22.1.2.2

But t h e n Beitz's parallel b e t w e e n n a t u r a l a s s e t s a n d n a t u r a l e n d o w ­

m e n t s is m i s t a k e n . Yes, t h e g e o g r a p h i c a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of n a t u r a l assets
is just a n a t u r a l fact o r c o n t i n g e n c y , b u t h a v i n g a p r o p e r t y right or
e m i n e n t d o m a i n over n a t u r a l a s s e t s is very m u c h a social fact. Such
rights a r e a m o n g t h e benefits a n d b u r d e n s of social c o o p e r a t i o n , a n d
t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n , unlike t h e n a t u r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of en­
15
d o w m e n t s , d o e s t h e n s t a n d in n e e d of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Part of t h e dis­
t r i b u t i o n of i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h , t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of n a t u r a l
a s s e t s is i n c l u d e d i n t h e m a s t e r p a t t e r n i n t e r m s of w h i c h a Rawlsian
c r i t e r i o n of global justice w o u l d a s s e s s a n y p a r t i c u l a r global basic
structure. This d o e s not m e a n t h a t — a s s u m i n g global interdepen­
d e n c e — B e i t z ' s r e s o u r c e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n p r i n c i p l e c a n after all b e de­
rived from Rawlsian c o m m i t m e n t s . Rather, h o w a j u s t global institu­
tional s c h e m e w o u l d regulate o w n e r s h i p a n d c o n t r o l over natural
a s s e t s d e p e n d s u p o n t h e empirical q u e s t i o n of w h i c h institutional
d e s i g n w o u l d o p t i m i z e t h e w o r s t social p o s i t i o n .
T h e parallel b e t w e e n individuals a n d s t a t e s , w h i c h t h e parallel be­
t w e e n n a t u r a l a s s e t s a n d n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s is p a r a s i t i c u p o n , will
n o t fit i n t o a Rawlsian m o r a l c o n c e p t i o n . F o r Rawls, i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n
p e r s o n s , a n d t h e y a l o n e , a r e t h e u l t i m a t e u n i t s of m o r a l c o n c e r n . While
p e r s o n s , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e i r n a t u r a l a t t r i b u t e s , a r e t h e f u n d a m e n t of his
s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of justice, all o t h e r u n i t s (firms a n d
families, states, c h u r c h e s , a n d universities) a n d t h e i r a t t r i b u t e s are
v i e w e d a s d e p e n d e n t o n a n d r e g u l a t e d b y social i n s t i t u t i o n s , w h i c h are
t o b e d e s i g n e d for t h e sole benefit of p e r s o n s , v i e w e d as potential
p a r t i c i p a n t s in t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s .
It m a y s e e m t h a t a globalized s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e is m u c h l e s s plausible
a s a c o n s t r a i n t o n inequalities b a s e d u p o n social c o n t i n g e n c i e s . But I
d o n ' t t h i n k t h i s is so. For s u p p o s e , o n t h e c o n t r a r y , t h a t s o m e n a t i o n a l
s o c i e t y is p o o r o w i n g to a g r e a t e r aggregate p r e f e r e n c e for l e i s u r e t i m e
a n d c o n s u m p t i o n , d e p r e s s i n g t h e r a t e of savings. Even t h e n , t h e rela­
tive n e g l e c t of t h e h e a l t h a n d e d u c a t i o n of its c h i l d r e n c a n n o t b e
justified m e r e l y b y t h e fact t h a t o t h e r s in this s o c i e t y d i d n o t m a k e
a d e q u a t e savings. W i t h its e m p h a s i s o n i n d i v i d u a l lifetime s h a r e s ,
Rawls's criterion of justice w o u l d favor i n s t i t u t i o n s d e s i g n e d s o t h a t
p e r s o n s w h o b y c h o i c e enjoy m o r e leisure t i m e o r c o n s u m p t i o n m u s t
n o r m a l l y b e a r t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s b y receiving less of (other) g o o d s ,
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y o r at o t h e r t i m e s . B e y o n d t h i s provision, Rawls r e q u i r e s

" I t m a y b e helpful (though slightly m i s l e a d i n g in light of t h e n e x t paragraph) to recall

here w h a t I have said about Rawls's distinction b e t w e e n natural a n d social c o n t i n g e n ­
c i e s . Social inequalities related to the distribution of natural a s s e t s d o n o t really arise
e i t h e r from a natural c o n t i n g e n c y (as d o t a l e n t - i n d u c e d inequalities) or from a social
c o n t i n g e n c y (as d o c l a s s - i n d u c e d inequalities). T h e y are c l o s e s t to g e n d e r - a n d race-
i n d u c e d inequalities. T h e y are b a s e d o n natural facts that, a b s e n t certain social facts,
m i g h t n e v e r have h a d the slightest social i m p o r t a n c e . It is a social fact that h u m a n b e i n g s
c a m e to a t t a c h s u c h e n o r m o u s moral i m p o r t a n c e t o skin color, a n d it is a social fact that
t h e y d i v i d e d the w o r l d into national properties.
 T h e Internal Argument, 22.1.3 253

domestic i n s t i t u t i o n s t o d i s t r i b u t e w h a t e v e r b u r d e n s r e m a i n in w a y s
satisfying t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e , a n d h e s h o u l d t h u s require i n t e r n a ­
tional i n s t i t u t i o n s t o d i s t r i b u t e s u c h b u r d e n s analogously. P e r s o n s
should suffer from t h e u n p r o d u c t i v e n e s s of their p a r e n t s o r c o m ­
patriots o n l y i n s o f a r a s ( b e c a u s e of t h e resulting incentives) t h e i r social
position w o u l d still b e b e t t e r t h a n t h e worst social position u n d e r all
feasible a l t e r n a t i v e e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s (including o n e s that d o n o t
permit selective p e n a l i z a t i o n at all). Rawls's individualistic perspective
never allows b u r d e n s to b e i m p o s e d u p o n s o m e o n e merely on a c c o u n t
of t h e c o n d u c t of h e r relatives or compatriots. Their propensities to­
ward l e i s u r e t i m e a n d c o n s u m p t i o n a r e inappropriate d e t e r m i n a n t s of
her social p o s i t i o n — n o l e s s morally arbitrary t h a n t h e geographical
distribution of n a t u r a l a s s e t s .
22.1.3. O n e m a y think, d e s p i t e t h e arguments presented, that t h e
description of t h e global p a r t i e s as representatives of states can y e t be
saved o n s o m e o t h e r interpretation. T h e global parties could b e d e ­
scribed, for e x a m p l e , a s c o n c e r n e d for t h e (political, economic, mili­
tary) s t r e n g t h of t h e s t a t e s t h e y represent, so that they w o u l d c h o o s e a
criterion t h a t is sensitive t o t h e wealth a n d bargaining p o w e r of t h e
worst-off s t a t e s . But s u c h modifications of ^ - b e s i d e s simply assum­
ing a m o r a l l y f u n d a m e n t a l role for t h e s t a t e - s t i l l d o not adequately
cope w i t h t h e relative a s p e c t s of justice. If the problem is split u p s o
that i n e q u a l i t i e s a m o n g c o m p a t r i o t s a n d inequalities a m o n g states a r e
l t i e
dealt w i t h s e p a r a t e l y , t h e n n o excessive ^ ^ ^Za7ZrdeS
view even t h o u g h e n o r m o u s inequalities exist across
Togiveasimplfexamp^^
by a ratio of 30:1. Allowing t h e separation of-levels w o ^ ^ ^
weaken fhY«
n a i n t h e
tional H n poorest state {with a p e r capita gross
, N C O M E

f 2 M m i g h t v a r y b e t w e e n 3 6 0 12 w b i i e
b e h e s t si i ° ' ° and < in t h e
a e r
spread " h P capita gross national product of 6,000) the
t W G e n 6 0 0 0 a n d 2 0 0 0 lm sin
tions c ^ f °' ' - P° S two separate 30:1 Umita-
l 2 r t a b , y e r r n i t
'- T ° i? n - P s inequalities of 5,000:1 (a spread of 60,000 to
e S n t
qualit\ / ^ c a n b e a d a p t e d to m o r e complex measures of in-
a s n e
°f c o m . t Gini coefficient} or to nonquantifiable dimensions
a n s o n S u c n
'ar t h ^ ^ a s political influence). It undermines, in particu-
1 ( e a t W O s e a r a t e
°f inrT ^ ° ^ P maximin criteria, one formulated in terms
W
othp f s h a r e s a n d applying to domestic basic structures, t h e
irisft . ^ " l a t e d i n t e r m s of national shares a n d applying to the global
o n a
gloh ^ n J framework. Even if both are satisfied, t h e position of the
a n y l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d could still b e far worse than is unavoidable.
U n a c c e
on ^ P t a b i l i t y of s u c h a dual criterion emerges clearly when
6
e x ° h s e r v e s that it w o u l d provide a n incentive to "just-ify" otherwise
cessive i n t e r p e r s o n a l inequalities (in political influence, socioeco-
1C p o s i n o n
borH ' a n d t h e like) through t h e interposition of national
refers. A n unjust state can conveniently be split into two just ones,
' " h a b i t e d , respectively, b y the rich and the poor. This "reform" would
254 T h e I n t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 22.2.1

b e essentially c o s m e t i c , r e m o v i n g t h e injustice (as d e n n e d b y t h e p r o ­

p o s e d d u a l criterion) w i t h o u t m i t i g a t i n g t h e g r o s s i n e q u a l i t i e s in bar­
g a i n i n g p o w e r a n d social p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o g r o u p s . S u c h i n c e n ­
tives a r e n o t a farfetched possibility. T h e y m a y w e l l b e at w o r k i n South
Africa, w h e r e t h e w h i t e s a r e p u r s u i n g s u c h " r e f o r m s " b y c r e a t i n g a
n u m b e r of s e p a r a t e " h o m e l a n d s " ; a n d o n e m a y a l s o a r g u e t h a t t h e First
W o r l d ' s r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of a formerly colonial p e r i p h e r y i n t o sovereign
s t a t e s w a s p a r t l y m o t i v a t e d b y i n c e n t i v e s of t h i s sort. I n o u r world,
n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s f u n c t i o n a s w e l c o m e b l i n d e r s for o u r m o r a l sen­
16
sibilities.
T h e individualistic b a s i s of Rawls's t h e o r y a s e m b o d i e d i n h i s con­
c e r n for b a c k g r o u n d justice s u p p o r t s , t h e n , a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e
original p o s i t i o n o n w h i c h t h e global p a r t i e s r e p r e s e n t p e r s o n s a n d
t h e r e f o r e a s s e s s a global i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e b y t h e w o r s t r e p r e s e n t a ­
tive i n d i v i d u a l s h a r e it t e n d s t o p r o d u c e . Ideally, t h e y w o u l d w a n t s u c h
a s c h e m e to b e m a x i m a l l y s u p p o r t i v e of b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties, to
foster fair e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y w o r l d w i d e , a n d t o g e n e r a t e social
a n d e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t i e s o n l y insofar a s t h e s e o p t i m i z e t h e s o c i o e c o ­
n o m i c p o s i t i o n of t h e globally least a d v a n t a g e d p e r s o n s . H e n c e Ri
p r o v i d e s t h e s y s t e m a t i c a l l y m o r e satisfactory r e a d i n g of Rawls's re­
m a r k s , a n d t o it I will n o w t u r n .
2 2 . 2 . 1 . O n e a r g u m e n t favoring G over R is c o n t i n u o u s w i t h t h e
1

i s s u e s j u s t d i s c u s s e d . O n R t h e p a r t i e s , c o n c e i v e d a s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of
a

persons, l e a m at t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e s e c o n d s e s s i o n t h a t t h e i r society
is n o t really c l o s e d a n d self-sufficient b u t p a r t of a m u l t i n a t i o n a l
s c h e m e . T h i s b r i n g s o u t a n i n c o h e r e n c e in R , for t h e p a r t i e s (to p u t it
1

dramatically) w o u l d c o m e t o regret t h e i r p r i o r c h o i c e of a c r i t e r i o n of
d o m e s t i c j u s t i c e . T h e y w o u l d n o w , b y m a x i m i n , favor a c r i t e r i o n b y
w h i c h all b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s are a s s e s s e d by r e f e r e n c e t o t h e globally
w o r s t social p o s i t i o n . Only p r i n c i p l e s for i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s re­
m a i n t o b e c h o s e n , h o w e v e r , s i n c e e a c h n a t i o n a l b a s i c s t r u c t u r e is
a l r e a d y p l e d g e d t o its o w n d o m e s t i c least a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p . A n d
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s d e v i s e d for t h e m a x i m u m benefit of t h e glob­
1 7
ally least a d v a n t a g e d m a y n o t benefit t h e m very m u c h . In a n y c a s e , t o
w h a t e v e r e x t e n t t h e d a m a g e c a n b e c o n t a i n e d , t h e p a r t i e s w o u l d at t h i s
p o i n t w a n t t o u n d o t h e i r first a g r e e m e n t , s u b s t i t u t i n g t h e s t i p u l a t i o n
t h a t all b a s i c social i n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d b e g o v e r n e d b y t h e t w o p r i n c i ­
p l e s , i n t e r p r e t e d globally.
, 6
I elaborate this t h o u g h t in a forthcoming e s s a y o n mora! i n c e n t i v e s .
, 7
F o r e x a m p l e , the m o r e favorable the t e r m s of international trade are t o t h e globally
least a d v a n t a g e d , the l e s s s u c h trade there w o u l d t e n d to be. Overly favorable t e r m s
u n d e r m i n e their o w n p u r p o s e a n d therefore will n o t b e favored b y t h e global difference
p r i n c i p l e . T h u s , e v e n i n a w o r l d that fully satisfies b o t h criteria a d o p t e d o n R„ institu­
t i o n s m a y n o t sufficiently mitigate t h e effects of c o n t i n g e n c i e s — m a y a l l o w e x c e s s i v e
inequalities p r e s e n t from birth or m a y fail t o e n s u r e the fairness of individual transac­
tions.
 T h e Internal Argument, 22.2.2 255

2 2 . 2 . 2 . My s e c o n d a r g u m e n t targets m o r e generally t h e priority of t h e

domestic c a s e . S u p p o s e w e finally begin (as Rawls d o e s provisionally)
with a n a t i o n a l s e s s i o n of t h e original position, yielding a criterion of
domestic j u s t i c e , a n d t h e n c o m p l e m e n t this result with p e r h a p s quite
elaborate i n t e r n a t i o n a l g r o u n d rules for preventing global injustice.
This p r o c e d u r e involves a n implausible a n d u n n e c e s s a r y a s s u m p t i o n ,
namely t h a t t h e favored m o d e l of t h e national basic s t r u c t u r e can b e
developed w i t h o u t p a y i n g a n y attention to t h e international environ­
ment in w h i c h n a t i o n a l societies exist.
This a s s u m p t i o n is i m p l a u s i b l e b e c a u s e the fact of a plurality of
nations c a n n o t b e a c c o m m o d a t e d simply by a d d i n g further rules. O n e
difficulty, w h i c h Rawls raises in regard to d o m e s t i c institutions, is that
the r u l e s g o v e r n i n g a g r e e m e n t s a n d individual transactions c a n n o t b e
too c o m p l e x , o r r e q u i r e t o o m u c h information to be correctly a p p l i e d "
(BSS 54). In t h e global c o n t e x t , it is even less reasonable to i m p o s e u p o n
the v a r i o u s i n t e r a c t i n g a g e n t s t h e responsibility to c o n d u c t t h e i r trans­
actions s o a s t o p r e c l u d e , say, t h e e m e r g e n c e of excessive d i s c r e p a n ­
cies in b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r . S u c h agents " c a n n o t c o m p r e h e n d t h e ramifi­
cations of t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n s viewed collectively, n o r can they b e
e x p e c t e d t o foresee future c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t s h a p e a n d transform
p r e s e n t t e n d e n c i e s " (ibid.). T h e r e are t h u s n o practicable rules that
could reliably p r e v e n t t h a t "the invisible h a n d guides things in the
w r o n g d i r e c t i o n a n d favors a n oligopolistic configuration of a c c u m u l a ­
tions t h a t s u c c e e d s in m a i n t a i n i n g unjustified inequalities a n d restric­
tions o n fair o p p o r t u n i t y " (ibid.). H e n c e there is a n e e d for "institutions
that d e f i n e t h e social b a c k g r o u n d a n d . . . continually adjust a n d
c o m p e n s a t e for t h e inevitable t e n d e n c i e s away from background fair­
n e s s " (ibid.).
This difficulty is h e i g h t e n e d by t h e fact that if a n international in­
stitutional s c h e m e is t o e n d u r e , it m u s t e n g e n d e r in national govern­
m e n t s a n d p o p u l a t i o n s sufficient c o m p l i a n c e with a n d a basic moral
allegiance t o its g r o u n d rules. W h e t h e r it will e n g e n d e r s u c h com­
p l i a n c e a n d allegiance, however, d e p e n d s in large part on the internal
i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of national societies. Reflections o n national
i n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d therefore be c o n d u c t e d with a n eye to s u c h consid­
e r a t i o n s , r a t h e r t h a n o n t h e counterfactual a s s u m p t i o n of national
isolation. T h i s p r o b l e m , again, c o r r e s p o n d s to o n e Rawls discusses on
t h e n a t i o n a l level. He h o l d s that it w o u l d be pointless to address the
internal o r g a n i z a t i o n of associations or to describei various roles n
social c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e prerogatives a n d obligations a t t j c h e d t o
t h e m , before d e v e l o p i n g a c o n c e p t i o n of background jusnce which
s t i p u l a t e s w h a t features t h e society as a whole d should P?»™™£%
BSS II). o r a n a l o g o u s r e a s o n s o n e ^ /^£^JSS^-M t
F

global b a c k g r o u n d justice from t h e start. Jf^ ^«SSZel

nation of s o c i e t i e s m u s t b e developed t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e preferred ,o
256 T h e I n t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 22.2.3
of a global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e w i t h w h o s e stability a n d o p t i m a l functioning
1 8
they are to h a r m o n i z e .
I n v i e w of t h e a p p a r e n t c o m p l e x i t y of t h e p r o b l e m of b a c k g r o u n d
justice, it is t h u s i m p e r a t i v e t o take a global p e r s p e c t i v e from t h e start,
to a d j u s t o u r m o r a l reflections a b o u t t h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of so­
cieties a n d a s s o c i a t i o n s a n d a b o u t t h e a p p r o p r i a t e c o n s t r a i n t s u p o n
i n d i v i d u a l c o n d u c t in light of o u r a s p i r a t i o n for a s t a b l e a n d just global
basic structure.
A look a t i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e in t h e o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n
c o n f i r m s t h i s r e s u l t . As is p l a i n from o u r h i s t o r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e , the
stability a n d o p t i m a l f u n c t i o n i n g of a society's d o m e s t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s
are heavily d e p e n d e n t u p o n its global e n v i r o n m e n t . O r in Kant's w o r d s ,
" T h e p r o b l e m of e s t a b l i s h i n g a perfect civic c o n s t i t u t i o n is d e p e n d e n t
u p o n t h e p r o b l e m of a lawful e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n a m o n g s t a t e s , a n d
c a n n o t b e solved w i t h o u t a s o l u t i o n t o t h e l a t t e r p r o b l e m " (KPW 47).
Since n a t i o n a l a n d global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s s t r o n g l y affect e a c h o t h e r ' s
stability a n d a r e closely i n t e r r e l a t e d i n t h e i r effects u p o n individual
lives, w e s h o u l d t h i n k a b o u t o u r b a s i c social i n s t i t u t i o n s in general a n d
from a global p o i n t of view, t h e r e b y a i m i n g for a n i n t e g r a t e d solution, a
just a n d stable i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e p r e s e r v i n g a d i s t r i b u t i o n of basic
rights, o p p o r t u n i t i e s , a n d i n d e x g o o d s t h a t is fair b o t h globally a n d
w i t h i n e a c h n a t i o n . S u c h a n institutional s c h e m e , if c o n s t r u c t e d along
Rawlsian lines at all, w o u l d b e d e v e l o p e d t h r o u g h a single unified
original p o s i t i o n global in s c o p e .
2 2 . 2 . 3 . Let m e reinforce t h e p r e c e d i n g t w o a r g u m e n t s t h r o u g h a
parallel p o i n t t h a t c a n b e m a d e w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e to global i n s t i t u t i o n s .
If w e follow Rawls's brief s k e t c h (in TJ §58) a n d a p p l y h i s c o n c e p t i o n of
justice for a self-contained social s y s t e m t o t h e s t a t e s of o u r closely
i n t e r d e p e n d e n t w o r l d , t h e n w e r e p e a t a failing t h a t is c o m m o n t o all
historical s o c i a l - c o n t r a c t d o c t r i n e s . In a s s e s s i n g t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c ­
t u r e of a s o c i e t y b y looking m e r e l y at h o w it affects ( d i s t r i b u t e s benefits
a n d b u r d e n s a m o n g ) its members, w e fail t o c o m e t o t e r m s w i t h h o w
o u r s o c i e t y affects t h e lives of foreigners ( a n d h o w o u r lives a r e affected
b y h o w o t h e r societies a r e o r g a n i z e d ) — w e d i s r e g a r d t h e (negative)
externalities a n a t i o n a l social c o n t r a c t m a y i m p o s e u p o n t h o s e w h o are
19
not p a r t i e s t o i t . T h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e t h e p a r t i e s w o u l d p r e f e r
for t h e i r c l i e n t s ' o w n society n e e d n o t c o i n c i d e w i t h t h e o n e t h e y
w o u l d rationally w a n t in t h e o t h e r societies of a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n t

"^National d e m o c r a t i c control over a given territory a n d its natural a s s e t s , say, s e e m s

o b v i o u s l y desirable in itself a n d y e t m a y have distributive effects that t e n d t o subvert the
fairness of international e c o n o m i c relations. T h i s consideration is a n a l o g o u s to Rawls's
point that rules p e r m i t t i n g free transfer a n d bequest, t h o u g h u n o b j e c t i o n a b l e i n t h e m ­
selves, w o u l d t e n d to disrupt a fair distribution of opportunities a n d bargaining p o w e r
(BSS 54). B a c k g r o u n d justice m i g h t b e preserved i n the face of differential n a t i o n a l a s s e t s
t h r o u g h s o m e form of s h a r e d control over, (or an extraction tax u p o n ) n o n r e n e w a b l e
natural a s s e t s .
, 9
R a w l s is s o m e t i m e s aware of this point, a s I have s h o w n i n §21.4 (TJ 380)
 T h e Internal Argument, 22.2.4 357
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e m . A n d s i n c e impartiality (/the veil of ignorance)
p r e c l u d e s u s ( / t h e parties) from making a n exception of o u r (/their
clients') o w n society, t h e criterion of d o m e s t i c justice m u s t t h e n b e
a d o p t e d from a p o i n t of view that c o m b i n e s b o t h perspectives—from
the s u i t a b l y c o n s t r a i n e d s t a n d p o i n t of p e r s o n s w h o a r e b o t h insiders
a n d o u t s i d e r s of (different) national societies. Precisely s u c h a s t a n d ­
point is afforded b y t h e global original position I have p r o p o s e d .
2 2 . 2 . 4 . F u r t h e r m o r e it w o u l d s e e m difficult in a context of tight
global i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e t o m a i n t a i n t h e s h a r p distinction b e t w e e n
national a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l institutions t h a t Rj a n d R p r e s u p p o s e . H o w 2

does o n e d e c i d e w h e t h e r s u c h institutions as "competitive markets,

private p r o p e r t y i n t h e m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n , a n d t h e m o n o g a m o u s
family" (TJ 7) a r e n a t i o n a l o r international, a n d therefore a r e t o b e
g o v e r n e d b y t h e d o m e s t i c criterion a d o p t e d in t h e first or by t h e global
criterion a d o p t e d in t h e s e c o n d session of t h e original position? By
r e c o u r s e to t h e i r history, by t h e a m o u n t of international interaction
they involve, o r b y s o m e c o n c e p t u a l criterion? Or c a n w e follow Rawls,
w h o s i m p l y d e c l a r e s t h a t t h e task of t h e global parties is confined to
c h o o s i n g " t h e f u n d a m e n t a l principles to adjudicate conflicting claims
20
a m o n g s t a t e s " (TJ 378)?
But e v e n t h i s s t i p u l a t i o n o n l y highlights t h e most intractable i s s u e —
the institution of the modern state as a particular form of political a n d
e c o n o m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n c e n t e r i n g a r o u n d governments that have emi­
n e n t d o m a i n i n a d e m a r c a t e d territory, control overwhelming force
w i t h i n it, a n d i n t e r p r e t a n d enforce international law beyond its bor­
21
d e r s . T h i s i n s t i t u t i o n w o u l d simply b e taken for g r a n t e d . In Rawls's
sketch, t h e m e r e e x i s t e n c e of t h e states system in its c u r r e n t form
r e d u c e s t h e a g e n d a of t h e parties' global session to dealings between
g o v e r n m e n t s a n d motivates t h e priority of d o m e s t i c over global p n n c i -
2
° P r e s u m a b l y Rawls here has conflicting claims among state 8™™™*?*
Constricting the a g e n d a for the global session in this way would c ^ a ^ m a t e t easier
to have the p a r t i e f a d o p t s o m e t h i n g like the familiar W ^ ™ ^ ^ o y

w o u l d e n s u r e in a d v a n c e that the a d o p t e d critenon could ^ P ^ ^ ' t h e oToor-

0 1

»he other, w h a t m a n y believe to b e t h e most significant in,ust>c e . o t o u r ^ ^ T ^ .

•unities for international exploitation that the world martet affords to powerful e c o
e
n o m i c a g e n t s o p e r a t i n g in impoverished Third World ™™™™^ titutes j a d e f i n i t v e
2
' T h e claim that a b s o l u t e military and territorial ™^*^^ Z£$Z, T
characteristic of states, and h e n c e must be ^ ^ J ^ ^ ^ ^ S ^ A l
c o n c e p t i o n of global justice, w o u l d go counter to Rawls s repea ,
substantive q u e s t i o n s c a n n o t b e settled ^ Z^ZZvX^o defined
Even a c c e p t i n g t h e p r o p o s e d definition, w e ^ . ^ j l t a . e s system funda-
ought t o exist. Let m e also n o t e h o w transcending the Prevaumg _^^2-63, 301,
5n

m e n t a l l y differs from abolishing the institution of the: t a m u y i e l e m e n t a r y

7411 w o u l d think that t h e latter goal, unlike t h e former f o r i n
w h
facts a b o u t p e r s o n s a n d their place nature, i™ ^ ^ differences, re)evant

Rawls's t h e o r y a n d i n t h e original position 11J &n..IIK historical develop-

e a c h s i n g l y sufficient, first, t h e nation-state is a ^ P ^ * ™ ^ , second, what is
m e n t a n d t h u s certainly u n c o n n e c t e d to a n y ^ , e r n , t i o n a l organiza-
a ) i n s t i u

« i s s u e is n o t t h e abolition of states but the reform o ^ ™ *™ . b A e n a i a a

tion a n d (especially) of the g r o u n d rules regulating intemanoi

258 T h e I n t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 22.2.6

p i e s of j u s t i c e . His e n d o r s e m e n t of this i n s t i t u t i o n c a n h a v e force,

h o w e v e r , only if it h a s b e e n s u b j e c t e d t o m o r a l e x a m i n a t i o n (like o t h e r
social i n s t i t u t i o n s ) . O t h e r w i s e Rawls w o u l d b e b e g g i n g a c r u c i a l q u e s ­
tion, p r o v i d e d w e allow, as r e a s o n a b l y w e m u s t at t h e o u t s e t , t h a t
j u s t i c e m a y fail to require t h e s t a t e s s y s t e m in its p r e s e n t form. Here
Rawls, given h i s i n d i v i d u a l i s m , c a n n o t r e s p o n d t h a t s t a t e s o r t h e tradi­
t i o n s a n d c o m m u n a l life t h e y p r o t e c t h a v e in t h e i r o w n right a claim to
exist. A n d w h i l e t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of a n y i s o l a t e d s t a t e m i g h t b e justified
b y r e f e r e n c e t o its least a d v a n t a g e d m e m b e r s , a system of sovereign
s t a t e s r e q u i r e s a global justification, w h i c h , w i t h i n a R a w l s i a n c o n c e p ­
tion, m u s t involve a c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e t h a t e m b o d i e s a p r i o r i t y c o n c e r n
for t h e social p o s i t i o n of t h e globally least a d v a n t a g e d p e r s o n s .
2 2 . 2 . 5 . My final a r g u m e n t in favor of G is t h a t it offers a significant
e x p o s i t i o n a l a d v a n t a g e . Not o n l y c a n t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e original
p o s i t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e motivational a s s u m p t i o n c h a r a c t e r i z i n g t h e
p a r t i e s a s r e p r e s e n t i n g persons w h o s e s h a r e of social p r i m a r y g o o d s
t h e y seek t o o p t i m i z e , r e m a i n t h e s a m e o n t h e global level. (Rj also h a s
this advantage.) But in a d d i t i o n w e s e c u r e t h e c o h e r e n c e a n d h a r m o n y
of o u r c o n c l u s i o n s in a d v a n c e . All i n s t i t u t i o n a l m a t t e r s , i n c l u d i n g t h e
ideal e x t e n t of n a t i o n a l sovereignty, a r e n o w systematically a d d r e s s e d
22
w i t h i n a single f r a m e w o r k . T h e r e is n o c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n institu­
tional d e s i d e r a t a i s s u i n g from t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s of p a r t i e s differently
defined, n o r a r e specific institutional features p r e s u p p o s e d a d h o c
p r i o r t o t h e original p o s i t i o n . By n o t taking t h e p r e s e n t s t a t e s s y s t e m for
g r a n t e d , b y letting t h e p a r t i e s d e c i d e (as it were) a m o n g criteria t h a t
a c c o m m o d a t e e t h n i c a n d c u l t u r a l diversity in different w a y s , w e c a n
t h e n c o n s i d e r a b l y d e e p e n Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n , m a k e it m o r e unified
a n d e l e g a n t . T h i s gain is significant in its o w n right, e s p e c i a l l y i n v i e w of
Rawls's c o n s t r u c t i v i s m , w h i c h a i m s t o s y s t e m a t i z e o u r m o r a l c o n ­
s c i o u s n e s s i n t o a p r i n c i p l e d a n d surveyable w h o l e . Rawls h o l d s t h a t
w h a t m o v e s u s t o a c c e p t a c o n c e p t i o n of justice over o t h e r s is first its
c o m p r e h e n s i v e n e s s i n a c c o m m o d a t i n g o u r c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s (the
a g g r e g a t e initial plausibility of its v a r i o u s e l e m e n t s ) a n d , s e c o n d , t h e
u n i t y a n d e l e g a n c e a c h i e v e d in their s y n t h e s i s (cf. KCMT 5 1 8 - 1 9 ) . G is a
m a r k e d i m p r o v e m e n t in b o t h t h e s e r e s p e c t s .
2 2 . 2 . 6 . Let m e a d d t h a t G is also i n g r e a t e r h a r m o n y ( t h a n R a n d R ) t 2

w i t h a n ideal to w h i c h Rawls s e e m s to b e q u i t e a t t r a c t e d , t h e i d e a l of a
c o m m u n i t y of h u m a n k i n d . T h u s , in h i s d i s c u s s i o n of stability, h e m a i n ­
t a i n s t h a t o u r "sense of justice is c o n t i n u o u s w i t h t h e love of m a n k i n d "
(TJ 476) a n d a d d s t h a t w e w o u l d ideally d e v e l o p a "devotion t o i n s t i t u -
2 a
T h i s greater u n i t y is a l s o reflected in n o n i d e a l c o n t e x t s w h e r e , for i n s t a n c e , national
b o r d e r s m a y b e controversial. What looks like t h e repression of a local d i s t u r b a n c e from
o n e p e r s p e c t i v e m a y a p p e a r to b e d e n i a l of t h e right to self-determination from a n o t h e r .
Given t h e p r o p o s e d m o d i f i c a t i o n , o n e c a n systematically tackle s u c h q u e s t i o n s t h r o u g h a
specification of t h e basic political liberties, w h e r e a s conceiving justice a s w i t h i n a n d
b e t w e e n s o c i e t i e s p r e s u p p o s e s that their b o r d e r s are already b e y o n d d i s p u t e . Cf.
D'Amato, J 268.
 The External Argument, 23.1 259

tions a n d t r a d i t i o n s . . . w h i c h serve the general interests of m a n k i n d "

(TJ 489, cf. 501). In e n l a r g i n g u p o n Humboldt's ideal of a social u n i o n of
social u n i o n s , Rawls again finds himself "led to t h e n o t i o n of t h e
c o m m u n i t y of h u m a n k i n d the m e m b e r s of w h i c h enjoy o n e a n o t h e r ' s
excellences a n d individuality elicited by free institutions, a n d t h e y
recognize t h e g o o d of e a c h as a n e l e m e n t in t h e c o m p l e t e activity t h e
w h o l e s c h e m e of w h i c h is c o n s e n t e d t o a n d gives p l e a s u r e t o all" (TJ
523).

33. T h e E x t e r n a l A r g u m e n t

So far I h a v e s h o w n only t h a t Rawls's idea of a global interpretation of

the original p o s i t i o n , o n a n y of t h e t h r e e specifications I have consid­
ered, y i e l d s a c r i t e r i o n of global justice that is unlikely to vindicate t h e
traditional i n t e r n a t i o n a l - l a w regime, w h i c h Rawls also e n d o r s e s . T h e
i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y c a n b e dissolved in two ways. We might say that d e s p i t e
this e n d o r s e m e n t , Rawls is really c o m m i t t e d to s u p p o r t i n g global in­
stitutional r e f o r m s t o w a r d a regime u n d e r which radical inequalities
and d e p r i v a t i o n s (especially of basic rights a n d liberties) w o u l d b e less
w i d e s p r e a d a n d severe. Alternatively, o n e might h o l d that s u c h a crite-
n o n of global j u s t i c e is so implausible that one s h o u l d rather reaffirm
Rawls's e n d o r s e m e n t of t h e law of nations a n d t h e n modify drastically,
or even w i t h d r a w h i s i d e a of globalizing the original position. I will
defend t h e f o r m e r s o l u t i o n .
In m a k i n g t h i s defense, I will not worry about the charge that a global
order satisfying Rawlsian principles w o u l d be morally unacceptable in
itself, for t h i s w o u l d b e a n objection to Rawls's entire conception a n d
not to its g l o b a l i z a t i o n . His c o n c e p t i o n centrally involves the claim that
any s e l f - c o n t a i n e d social system satisfying the two principles is morally
acceptable.
My c o n c e r n is w i t h objections asserting that in the world as it is t h e r e
are s p e c i a l factors, relevant o n the global but not the national plane,
that m a k e it i n a p p r o p r i a t e to apply Rawls's maximin criterion to the
global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e It is convenient to sort s u c h objections into four
categories, d e p e n d i n g o n whether they appeal to (A) realist or IB) moral
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , a n d o n w h e t h e r they concern (1) the ideal of a just
world o r d e r o r (2) t h e transition toward s u c h an order. This section
P r o c e e d s i n t h r e e s t e p s . I will first (§23.1) s h o w that only objections in
category (fil) c a n seriously e n d a n g e r m y main t h e s i s - n a m e l y that
given R a w l s i a n c o m m i t m e n t s , w e s h o u l d assess t h e justice,ot our
global i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e b y reference to the worst representahve
s h a r e it t e n d s t o g e n e r a t e . I will t h e n (§23^) discuss three less impor
' a n t o b j e c t i o n s i n this category, before (§23.3) J^^^iiX
s'der t h e m o s t s e r i o u s objection, the argumentTrom ^ers'ty.
W e m i g h t still c o n c l u d e in t h e end, after the most thorough
260 T h e E x t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 23.1

analysis of i n s t i t u t i o n a l o p t i o n s w i t h t h e i r c o o r d i n a t e p a t h s of transi­
tion, t h a t t h e r e is n o feasible a n d m o r a l l y viable a v e n u e of institutional
reform t o w a r d a j u s t e r global r e g i m e . P e r h a p s o u r w o r l d , s o full of
o p p r e s s i o n , starvation, a n d w a r , p r o v i d e s t h e b e s t feasible m i n i m u m
2 3
s h a r e . O r p e r h a p s j u s t e r global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s a r e o u t of r e a c h from
w h e r e w e a r e . If t h i s w e r e really t r u e , it w o u l d g o s o m e w a y t o w a r d
s h o w i n g t h a t t h e w o r l d is a s just as w e n o w c a n o r m a y m a k e it, b u t it
w o u l d not s h o w t h a t a R a w l s i a n c r i t e r i o n is i n a p p r o p r i a t e o n t h e global
p l a n e . It still " c a n serve a s a s t a n d a r d for a p p r a i s i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d for
g u i d i n g t h e overall d i r e c t i o n of social c h a n g e " (TJ 263), t o b e c a r r i e d "as
far a s c i r c u m s t a n c e s p e r m i t " (TJ 246). S u c h a s t a n d a r d w o u l d n o m o r e
b e refuted b y t h e fact t h a t it c a n n o t b e fully satisfied t h a n a n achieve­
m e n t test w o u l d b e refuted b y t h e fact t h a t n o o n e c a n a n s w e r all the
q u e s t i o n s in t h e allotted t i m e . It is n o t a n e c e s s a r y t r u t h a b o u t justice
t h a t a just w o r l d is a t t a i n a b l e t h r o u g h m o r a l l y p e r m i s s i b l e i n s t i t u t i o n a l
reforms.
It i s a l s o possible, t h o u g h n e v e r k n o w a b l e , t h a t w h a t e v e r i m p r o v e ­
m e n t s a r e feasible will never t a k e p l a c e . P e r h a p s it is n a i v e o r Utopian t o
h o p e t h a t a n y future w o r l d will b e t t e r a c c o r d w i t h a Rawlsian c o n c e p ­
tion of global justice. But this is a n i n d i c t m e n t n o t of t h a t c o n c e p t i o n
b u t of o u r s e l v e s . Realism h a r d l y r e q u i r e s t h a t p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e m u s t
c o n f o r m t h e m s e l v e s t o t h e prevailing s o r d i d realities. W e d o n ' t feel
justified t o give u p o u r ideals of d o m e s t i c j u s t i c e o r p e r s o n a l h o n e s t y
just b e c a u s e w e d e s p a i r of achieving t h e m fully. W e c a n n o t r e a s o n a b l y
d e m a n d of m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s t h a t t h e y v i n d i c a t e t h e s t a t u s q u o . All w e
m a y a s k is t h a t a c o n c e p t i o n of justice p r o v i d e a c r i t e r i o n for a s s e s s i n g
o u r global o r d e r t h a t allows u s t o c h o o s e from a m o n g t h e feasible a n d
m o r a l l y a c c e s s i b l e a v e n u e s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e a n d t h u s specifies
o u r m o r a l t a s k g r a d u a l l y t o improve t h e j u s t i c e of t h i s o r d e r .
T h o u g h t h e y d e f e n d m y c e n t r a l thesis, t h e s e r e m a r k s a r e i n a n
i m p o r t a n t s e n s e a w e a k defense, leaving o p e n w h e t h e r t h e existing
global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e c a n b e criticized a s u n j u s t . W h e t h e r it c a n d e ­
p e n d s o n g e n e r a l e m p i r i c a l facts t h a t I c a n n o t e s t a b l i s h : Is t h e r e a
feasible alternative global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e t h a t w o u l d t e n d t o g e n e r a t e
less s e v e r e d e p r i v a t i o n s i n first-principle g o o d s ? Is t h e r e a feasible p a t h
of i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform t o w a r d s u c h a w o r l d o r d e r ? T h e R a w l s i a n crite­
r i o n of global j u s t i c e still m a k e s it p o s s i b l e to justify t h e prevailing
i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d e r b y d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t all feasible a l t e r n a t i v e
s c h e m e s w o u l d t e n d t o p r o d u c e e v e n g r e a t e r d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d in­
equalities.

^ S u c h a d e m o n s t r a t i o n w o u l d b e akin to t h e "slaveholder's argument" i n Rawls (TJ

1 6 7 - 6 8 ) . Yet this justification of t h e s c h e m e w o u l d still leave o p e n w h e t h e r w e are
entitled t o t h e particular p o s i t i o n s w e o c c u p y w i t h i n t h e s c h e m e Even if t h e a i m i m e n t
justifies slavery (the institution), t h e slaves m i g h t still argue that this slaveholder is n o t
e n t i t l e d t o h i s advantaged p o s i t i o n , a p o i n t Rawls d o e s n o t take n o t i c e of l i k e w i s e e v e n if
the prevailing institutional s c h e m e w e r e a s just a s w e c a n or m a y m a k e it it c o u l d still b e
true that b e c a u s e o f past c r i m e s o r injustices, m a n y p e r s o n s a n d g r o u p s are n o w m o r e
(dis)advantaged t h a n b y right t h e y o u g h t to b e .
 T h e External A r g u m e n t , 23.1 261

Alternatively, o n e c a n a r g u e t h a t all feasible w a y s of working for o r

implementing i n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms are blocked by m o r a l c o n s i d e r ­
ations. Yet t h i s is a h o p e l e s s claim. T h e r e surely are i m p o r t a n t m o r a l
constraints o n h o w to p r o m o t e institutional c h a n g e , centrally i n c l u d ­
ing c o n s t r a i n t s o n violence, b u t t h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s still leave us, the
more a d v a n t a g e d , m a n y o p t i o n s (though t h e y limit w h a t t h e less ad­
vantaged m a y d o w h e n t h e m o r e advantaged resist institutional re­
forms t h a t j u s t i c e d e m a n d s ) .
Similarly s p u r i o u s ( t h o u g h c o n v e n i e n t a n d therefore popular) are
claims t o t h e effect t h a t t h o u g h w e may p r o m o t e institutional reform,
we also may insist o n t h e p e r p e t u a t i o n of o u r advantaged position. Let
me briefly d i s c u s s t w o c l a i m s of this kind. First, it is said o n behalf of the
advantaged p a r t i c i p a n t s in a n unjust institutional s c h e m e that t h e y
formed " l e g i t i m a t e e x p e c t a t i o n s " guiding their choice of a profession,
their d e c i s i o n s t o f o u n d a family, t o save money, a n d so forth a n d that it
is unfair t h a t t h e y s h o u l d have to c h a n g e their lives now, after having
m a d e c o n s e q u e n t i a l d e c i s i o n s o n t h e basis of sincere, albeit false,
moral beliefs. T o b e g i n with, s u c h a view is questionable in that it w o u l d
increase t h e i n c e n t i v e s t o w a r d p e r s u a d i n g others (for example, o u r
children) t h a t p r e v a i l i n g institutions are just even w h e n w e are not at
all c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e y are. By inculcating s u c h legitimate expectations
in t h e m , w e i n s u r e t h e m against institutional reforms that w o u l d re­
d u c e t h e i r a d v a n t a g e d p o s i t i o n . Moreover, t h e view clashes with w h a t
is w i d e l y affirmed for morality, t h a t y o u have n o moral claim to stolen
Property b e q u e a t h e d to y o u by y o u r mother, n o m a t t e r h o w (inno­
cently) a t t a c h e d y o u m a y h a v e b e c o m e to it in t h e m e a n t i m e . Why
s h o u l d m a t t e r s b e different w h e n w h a t is b e q u e a t h e d to y o u is a n
excessively a d v a n t a g e d p o s i t i o n in a n unjust institutional s c h e m e ?
Finally, t h e a p p e a l t o fairness c a n be raised m u c h m o r e plausibly for
the o t h e r s i d e . F o r it is h a r d l y fair that t h o s e w h o have been h a r m e d
a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e d b y u n j u s t institutions should continue to suffer so
that t h o s e w h o h a v e b e e n unjustly advantaged by t h e m will not have
their e x p e c t a t i o n s d i s a p p o i n t e d . , , ...
S e c o n d , it is often said t h a t p e r s o n s have an indefeasible right
'strictly: privilege) t o s p e n d m o s t of their i n c o m e a n d wealth as they
Please, t h a t w e enjoy, as J a m e s Fishkin p u t s it, a cutoff for heroism
a n d a " r o b u s t z o n e of [moral] indifference" (LO c h a p s . 3-4). Let us> grant
(for t h e s a k e of a r g u m e n t ! ) t h a t there is s u c h a n ^erno^gpn^ege.
h a t
P e r h a p s l i m i t i n g m o r a l l y m a n d a t e d e x p e n d i t u r e s to 2 P « « £ ° ( £
w e o w n . W e m a y "sacrifice" m o r e b u t c a n n o t be m o r a l l y £
-o- Again, s u c h a f u n d a m e n t a l privilege c a n ^ ^ X ^ Z ) Z
morally e n t i t l e d t o . It n e e d n o t a p p l y to w h a t
a c q u i r e d t h r o u g h c r i m e s or w i t h i n a n unjust i n s t i t u t i o n ^ scheme. S o
even if w e g r a n t t h e overriding moral privilege
a r g u m e n t l e l d s n o w h e r e if it is t r u e ^ ^ J T ^ S ^ S ^
P a n t s u n d e r prevailing institutions a n d *£^£S£ scheme
a g a i n s t t h e b a c k g r o u n d of a t least o n e accessible alternau
362 T h e E x t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 23.2.1

u n d e r w h i c h p e r s o n s c o u l d e n j o y t h e i r (ex hypothesi) p r e e m i n e n t Fish-

kinian privilege, w h i l e l e s s e r r i g h t s (to b e free from v i o l e n c e a n d starva­
tion) a r e also b e t t e r p r o t e c t e d .
A parallel r e s p o n s e a p p l i e s t o t h o s e w h o i n v o k e o t h e r v a l u e s — s u c h
a s o u r c o m p a t r i o t i c fellow feeling o r o u r d e e p loyalties a n d c o m m i t ­
m e n t s , c o n s t i t u t i v e a t t a c h m e n t s a n d f r i e n d s h i p s , a n d e s s e n t i a l proj­
e c t s — t o a r g u e t h a t w e m a y resist p r o g r e s s t o w a r d global justice.
W i t h i n a j u s t w o r l d o r d e r , all p e r s o n s , a n d n o t j u s t a small minority,
c o u l d l e a d lives t h a t e m b o d y a n d a r e e n r i c h e d b y t h e s e v a l u e s . T h e r e ­
fore, t h o s e c o n c e r n e d for s u c h v a l u e s h a v e r e a s o n t o s u p p o r t global
i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s . Yet all t o o often w h a t s u c h critics c a r e a b o u t is
n o t t h a t s u c h v a l u e s s h o u l d thrive b u t t h a t they ( p e r h a p s w i t h t h e i r
family, friends, c o m m u n i t y , o r nation) s h o u l d e n j o y t h e m . Yes, p r o g r e s s
w o u l d entail t h a t w e w o u l d h a v e less of a c h a n c e t o p u r s u e o u r m o r e
e x p e n s i v e p r o j e c t s , b u t t h e n t h e q u e s t i o n is a g a i n w h y t h e existing
c o m m i t m e n t s of t h o s e greatly a d v a n t a g e d b y u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s
s h o u l d take p r e c e d e n c e over t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h o s e w h o , at t h e m a r g i n s
of survival, are i n l a r g e p a r t d e p r i v e d of t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o form a n d
p u r s u e s u c h c o m m i t m e n t s in t h e first p l a c e .
My r e s p o n s e s t o c l a i m s of t h i s g e n e r a l k i n d a r e s o m e w h a t t a n g e n t i a l
t o m y m a i n goal. Even if t h e r e w e r e significant m o r a l o b s t a c l e s to
i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s (be t h e y e n t i t l e m e n t s of t h e m o r e a d v a n t a g e d or
f u r t h e r c o n s t r a i n t s o n action), t h e y w o u l d n o t c o u n t a g a i n s t t h e Rawls­
ian criterion of global j u s t i c e . T h e y w o u l d m e r e l y s h o w t h a t it is m o r e
difficult t o m a k e p r o g r e s s t o w a r d satisfying t h i s c r i t e r i o n .
2 3 . 2 . Let m e n o w d i s c u s s t h r e e o b j e c t i o n s of c a t e g o r y (Bl), w h i c h , b y
a p p e a l t o s p e c i a l factors p r e s e n t o n t h e global p l a n e , s e e k t o d e n y t h e
a p p l i c a b i l i t y of Rawls's m a x i m i n c r i t e r i o n t o t h e w o r l d at large.
2 3 . 2 . 1 . C o n s i d e r t h e view t h a t w h e r e a s Rawls's c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e is
m e a n t t o a p p l y to t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d social s y s t e m
w h o s e p a r t s a r e closely i n t e r d e p e n d e n t , i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n is in
fact r a t h e r insignificant. C o m i n g , as it d o e s , from t h e m o r e affluent
c i t i z e n s of t h e First W o r l d , t h i s objection is m a r r e d b y h i s t o r i c a l c o n s i d ­
e r a t i o n s . P e r h a p s our history, e c o n o m y , a n d social life h a v e n o t b e e n
affected v e r y m u c h b y e x o g e n o u s influences, b u t c o n s i d e r t h e i n v e r s e
v i e w p o i n t . T h e N o r t h Atlantic s t a t e s have, r a t h e r brutally, i m p o s e d a
single global s y s t e m of military a n d e c o n o m i c c o m p e t i t i o n , d e s t r o y i n g
in t h e p r o c e s s t h e social s y s t e m s i n d i g e n o u s t o four c o n t i n e n t s . O u r
political a n d e c o n o m i c t r a n s a c t i o n s , even t h o s e i n t e r n a l t o t h e devel­
o p e d W e s t , c o n t i n u e t o exert a n o v e r w h e l m i n g influence o n n a t i o n a l
i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d social p o s i t i o n s i n T h i r d W o r l d c o u n t r i e s .
My p o i n t h e r e is n o t t h a t w e m u s t m a k e g o o d for colonial p l u n d e r ,
slavery, a n d e x p l o i t a t i o n . N o r a m I a r g u i n g t h a t t h e s e historical e v e n t s
c o n t r i b u t e d t o o u r a d v a n t a g e d p o s i t i o n w i t h i n t o d a y ' s radically u n ­
e q u a l g l o b a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of social p o s i t i o n s a n d t h a t w e a r e t h e r e f o r e
beneficiaries of p a s t c r i m e s a n d i n j u s t i c e s ( t h o u g h it s e e m s difficult t o
 T h e External Argument, 23.2.2 263

deny that w e a r e ) . It is e n o u g h t h a t t h e lives of t h e vast majority of

human b e i n g s a r e p r o f o u n d l y s h a p e d a n d affected b y events rever­
berating t h r o u g h a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l s c h e m e of trade a n d d i p l o m a c y i n
24
which w e a r e h i g h l y a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s .
But c o u l d w e n o t g o b a c k t o a w o r l d of closed, self-contained s o ­
cieties in w h i c h , a s I h a v e a l r e a d y c o n c e d e d , a Rawlsian criterion of
global j u s t i c e w o u l d b e o u t of place, since t h e r e w o u l d be n o global
basic s t r u c t u r e for t h e m t o a p p l y to? Or couldn't w e move t o w a r d a
world of m i n i m a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l interaction in w h i c h straightforward
25
rules of r a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n m i g h t be a p p r o p r i a t e ? 1 a m n o t d e n y i n g
such possibilities, b u t t h e y a r e a c a d e m i c . T h e world is not, a n d h a r d l y
will b e again, o n e i n w h i c h a criterion of global justice is u n n e c e s s a r y o r
undemanding.
23.2.2. Still, s u c h a c a d e m i c speculations are relevant for a s e c o n d
objection t o g l o b a l i z i n g Rawls, w h i c h asserts that a criterion of justice
is to b e r e j e c t e d if t h e s c h e m e it favors would not be mutually benefi­
cial. T h e m o r e p r o s p e r o u s states, t h e objection continues, would d o
better w i t h o u t a n y i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation t h a n within a global in­
stitutional s c h e m e satisfying a Rawlsian criterion. This objection is
raised b y Brian B a r r y against Beitz: "I d o not think that [a global differ­
ence p r i n c i p l e ) c a n p l a u s i b l y b e said to b e advantageous to rich as well
as p o o r c o u n t r i e s ' ' (HJGP 232, cf. 233-34).
Barry's o b j e c t i o n c a n b e c o n s t r u e d in two ways. He c a n be taken to
assert t h a t t h e transition to a j u s t global s c h e m e m u s t benefit even
those n o w u n j u s t l y a d v a n t a g e d . Barry would then be insisting that
existing a d v a n t a g e s i n capital, technology, education, a n d t h e like,
need n o t b e r e l i n q u i s h e d voluntarily. This is the construal to which
David R i c h a r d s r e s p o n d s : " W h e n . . . J o h n Stuart Mill . . . cnticizfed)
'"-justices to w o m e n , h e c o n c e d e d that m e n , as a class, would suffer
some l o s s e s w h e n t h e y s u r r e n d e r e d their unjust domination, just as
slaveowners d i d w h e n slavery w a s e n d e d ; Mill's argument is quite d e a r
* a t t h e g a i n is n o t o n e of a c t u a l reciprocal » ^ ' " ^
*hey lose), b u t t h e g a i n in justice w h e n m e n regulate their conduct by
Principles t h e y w o u l d r e a s o n a b l y accept if they were w o m e n o n t h e
" t ^ ^ ^ o as claiming that t h e n e w institu-
• FI « intprpsl rates or speculative
" E v e n a p p a r e n t l y d o m e s t i c events, s u c h as changes i n . " ™ , have a
s t a t e s t h a

*» c o m m o d i t y futures, c a n have a tremendous'™P*" Jcash , require

c r o p s o r

M e a n t foreign d e b t , rely o n the export ° ex ^ ed. ^ W M W r n governments and their

f m m

tood i m p o r t s . Or c o n s i d e r t h e direct influence ^ t^^ediafe impact of arms sales

r
organs ( s u c h a s t h e International Monetary Fund) ° the m m e c u ^ ^ w h o l e g Q o d

^ d foreign i n v e s t m e n t s . At i s s u e here is not v v h e m e r m e s e e ^ ^ , m a k e n e

or bad. W h a t m a t t e r s i s h o w profound W™J£<^cMI w a r

< or government
* f t r e n c e b e t w e e n life a n d death, e.g„ through starvanon,
repression. ri „„ (trading apples and pears). A
^ S e e Beitz, PTIR 165, for t h e idea of minimal ^ ^ ^ J ^ r ^ i e l s o n , VP.
theory o f global j u s t i c e a s rational cooperation is suggestea
"See a l s o m y last n o t e to Chap. 2.
264 T h e External A r g u m e n t , 23.2.2

tional s c h e m e , once in place, m u s t b e a m u t u a l l y beneficial o n e . He

c o u l d t h e n r e p l y to R i c h a r d s that, w h e r e a s m e n d o b e t t e r w i t h sex
equality t h a n if t h e y d i d n o t i n t e r a c t w i t h w o m e n at all, t h e United
States, say, w o u l d d o w o r s e i n a Rawlsian w o r l d o r d e r t h a n in s p l e n d i d
27
isolation.
T h i s objection m a y rest o n a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e m a x i m i n
criterion. T h e t e r m s of social c o o p e r a t i o n a r e r e q u i r e d t o o p t i m i z e
(interschemically) t h e w o r s t social p o s i t i o n , a n d t h e y will d o s o o n l y if
t h e y e n g e n d e r a g o o d d e a l of c o o p e r a t i o n . C o o p e r a t i o n , h o w e v e r —
b e t w e e n p e r s o n s o r c o l l e c t i v i t i e s — c a n n o t b e c o e r c e d ; it m u s t b e elic­
ited. P a r t i c i p a n t s will b e p r e p a r e d t o c o n d u c t i n t e r p e r s o n a l / i n t e r c o l -
lective t r a n s a c t i o n s only insofar a s t h e s e benefit t h e m u n d e r t h e p r e ­
vailing t e r m s . Here t h e e q u a l i z i n g t e n d e n c y of t h e m a x i m i n c r i t e r i o n is
c h e c k e d . T h o u g h a n egalitarian s c h e m e e n s u r e s for t h e least a d v a n ­
t a g e d (the p o p u l a t i o n s of less d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s ) a large relative
s h a r e of t h e benefits of social c o o p e r a t i o n , it m a k e s s u c h c o o p e r a t i o n
less attractive t o o t h e r s a n d t h u s less extensive. F o r t h i s r e a s o n , it m a y
2 8
b e less j u s t t h a n a m o r e inegalitarian s c h e m e . In a n y c a s e , a global
o r d e r t h a t is j u s t b y Rawlsian lights is o n e u n d e r w h i c h p e r s o n s a n d
collectivities a r e free t o s h u n e c o n o m i c t r a n s a c t i o n s of specific k i n d s .
T h e p o p u l a t i o n s of m o r e d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s a n d r e g i o n s , i n p a r t i c u ­
lar, w o u l d b e free t o t r a d e only d o m e s t i c a l l y a n d w i t h o n e a n o t h e r a n d
h e n c e c a n b e p r e s u m e d to benefit from w h a t e v e r f u r t h e r t r a n s a c t i o n s
t h e y w o u l d c o n d u c t . In this s e n s e o n e c a n say, b a r r i n g externalities,
t h a t a n a t i o n a l o r global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e satisfying t h e Rawlsian crite­
r i o n is, by t h e very construction of this criterion, m u t u a l l y beneficial for
i n d i v i d u a l s a n d collectivities a s against a b e n c h m a r k of n o n c o o p e r a -
t i o n ( t h o u g h p r e s u m a b l y n o p a r t i c i p a n t s w o u l d benefit a s m u c h a n d as
d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y from t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s a s w e
in t h e d e v e l o p e d West d o at p r e s e n t ) .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , Barry's objection m a y b e r e n e w e d o n e last t i m e . A
global difference p r i n c i p l e m a y justify n o t m e r e l y a g e n e r a l a d j u s t m e n t
of m a r k e t p r i c e s b u t a different specification of p r o p e r t y rights over
n a t u r a l assets—involving, for e x a m p l e , a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l t a x o n (or inter­
n a t i o n a l o w n e r s h i p a n d c o n t r o l of) n a t u r a l a s s e t s . It is t h e n q u i t e
p o s s i b l e t h a t a n a s s e t - r i c h society or g r o u p of s o c i e t i e s w o u l d d o w o r s e
u n d e r a just global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e t h a n i n perfect isolation, n a m e l y ,
w h e n t h e benefits of c o o p e r a t i n g are o u t w e i g h e d b y t h e c o s t s of s h a r ­
ing natural assets.
But is t h i s a p r o b l e m ? S h o u l d o n e , in c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l
isolation s c e n a r i o s t h a t are t o serve as b e n c h m a r k s , t a k e as given t h e

"Barry's objection, s o c o n s t r u e d , arises n o t o n l y in t h e global c o n t e x t It c a n e q u a l l y b e

raised w i t h i n a state, o n behalf of a w e a l t h y province, for e x a m p l e , or b y a g r o u p of s u c h
p r o v i n c e s s e e k i n g to e x c l u d e a p o o r o n e . Quite apart from the i s s u e of globalization, then,
it is crucial for Rawls's theory that this objection b e m e t , as I h o p e t o d o in t h e text.
*»Cf. Rawls's d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n "perfectly just" a n d "just t h r o u g h o u t " (TJ 7 8 - 7 9 ) .
 T h e External Argument, 23.2.3 265

natural a s s e t s of t h e v a r i o u s societies (territories w i t h their m i n e r a l

resources, fertility, c l i m a t e , etc.)? Doing s o involves t w o p r e s u p p o s i ­
tions, b o t h of w h i c h s e e m q u e s t i o n a b l e a n d difficult t o defend. First,
one w o u l d b e p r e s u p p o s i n g t h a t t h e institution of s t a t e s s h o u l d b e
understood a s i n c l u d i n g full national o w n e r s h i p of all n a t u r a l assets
within t h e n a t i o n a l territory, regardless of t h e distributional effects of
this u n d e r s t a n d i n g . H e r e little is gained by simply declaring in t h e style
of Nozick t h a t t h i s p r i n c i p l e of national sovereignty "is f u n d a m e n t a l . "
Arguing for t h e p r i n c i p l e w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y involve t h e claim t h a t it is
morally i m p e r a t i v e t h a t s t a t e s o r national c o m m u n i t i e s , p e r h a p s c o n ­
ceived a s u l t i m a t e u n i t s of moral c o n c e r n , s h o u l d fully o w n s o m e
territory. It w o u l d n o t b e e n o u g h t o s h o w that they s h o u l d fully control
some n a t i o n a l territory, b e c a u s e s u c h control w o u l d b e compatible
with, for e x a m p l e , a n international tax o n t h e extraction of national
mineral r e s o u r c e s t h r o u g h w h i c h at least t h e distributional effects of
the morally a r b i t r a r y g e o g r a p h i c a l distribution of natural assets c o u l d
h
e mitigated. S i n c e t h e p r e m i s e that t h e r e ought to b e full national
control of n a t u r a l a s s e t s d o e s n o t s u p p o r t t h e desired conclusion, t h e
complaint d o e s t h e n involve t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n that nations have a
moral claim fully t o own t h e natural assets within their territory. It
seems d o u b t f u l t h a t t h i s full-ownership claim h a s sufficient plausibility
to furnish (part of) a n i n d e p e n d e n t constraint against w h i c h a criterion
°f global j u s t i c e c a n b e c h e c k e d .
The s e c o n d p r e s u p p o s i t i o n is that the currently existing distribution
of n a t u r a l a s s e t s a m o n g states is morally acceptable. I find this i m ­
plausible i n light of h o w s u c h assets w e r e in fact acquired m a history
involving g e n o c i d e , colonialism, slavery, unjust wars, andI t h e hke.
These h L o r i c a l facts c a n n o t b e corrected for. We cannot
natural ( a n d social) assets w e w o u l d n o w ^ * t * * ™ ^ ^
and injustices of t h e p a s t h a d never occurred. Who would w e e v e n
be, i n s u c h a c o u n t e r f a c t u a l world? This ^ f ^ ^ Z t l
different specification of Barry's benchmark,yielding:a ^ ™ ™ J
Rawlsian m a x i m i n criterion m e e t s easily. °
societies, m u s t b e m o r e p r o s p e r o u s c o o p e r a t m g ^ £ g £ « £ t t h
e e c t
basic s t r u c t u r e t h a n it/they w o u l d be if e x i s h n g m P ^ J° , . a

a s h a r e of t h e w o r l d ' s n a t u r a l assets proportionate to its/tne p P

T I
' 0 N 2 9
. H th^t o u r global social system, in
c
t n a t i
3 3 . 2 . 3 . A t h i r d objection c o n t e n d s j 'f ^ short of being
f l s s o f a r
c o n t r a s t t o s o m e d e v e l o p e d Western ocienes,iaiis
S ^
w e l l - o r d e r e d i n Rawls's s e n s e that w e cannot apply

1
"So understood, the constraint, rather ^ ^ X ^ ^ O ^ ' ^ ^
Rawlsian criterion of global justice, ^^^^^.Weyyoutdcan^^^
societies, those falling f i r below the " f * * * ^ ? ^ insofar as some soc.eues or
Bavvlsian grounds, that the existing ^ovder » un^^ ^ sted in t h e v exa

groups of societies would be more P I ^ P ^ . ' r a l assets,

r i d a r u

isolation with a proportionate share ot tne won

266 T h e E x t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 23.2.3
30
c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e a s w e m i g h t a p p l y to t h e l a t t e r . Rawls, however,
3 1
w a n t s h i s c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e t o b e m o r e w i d e l y a p p l i c a b l e His
n o t i o n of a w e l l - o r d e r e d society is n o r m a t i v e , n o t d e s c r i p t i v e : "It em­
b o d i e s . . . c e r t a i n g e n e r a l f e a t u r e s of a n y s o c i e t y t h a t it s e e m s one
w o u l d , o n d u e reflection, w i s h t o live in a n d w a n t to s h a p e o u r interests
a n d c h a r a c t e r " (RAM 634). T h u s , w h e n t h e p a r t i e s a r e s a i d to c h o o s e a
criterion of j u s t i c e for a w e l l - o r d e r e d society, t h i s c a n n o t m e a n t h a t
t h e i r c r i t e r i o n is a p p l i c a b l e only to w e l l - o r d e r e d s o c i e t i e s , t h a t a dif­
ferent c r i t e r i o n s h o u l d b e u s e d for a s s e s s i n g s o c i e t i e s t h a t a r e n o t well-
o r d e r e d . (If it m e a n t this, t h e n Rawls's p r i n c i p l e s w o u l d b e entirely
irrelevant b e c a u s e m o s t of h i s twelve c o n d i t i o n s for w e l l - o r d e r e d n e s s
[RAM 634-36] a r e n o t satisfied b y a n y e x i s t i n g n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y either.)
Rather, it m e a n s t h a t t h e c h o s e n c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e m u s t h a r m o n i z e
w i t h a c l u s t e r of o u r c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s t h a t R a w l s c o l l e c t s t o g e t h e r
i n t o t h e " m o d e l c o n c e p t i o n " of a w e l l - o r d e r e d society. It m u s t be
satisfiable u n d e r t h e ideal c o n d i t i o n s of a w e l l - o r d e r e d social s y s t e m .
B e y o n d this, h o w e v e r , it m u s t also g u i d e u s t o w a r d s u c h i d e a l c o n d i ­
t i o n s , m u s t " p r o v i d e a n A r c h i m e d e a n p o i n t for a p p r a i s i n g existing
i n s t i t u t i o n s . . . a n i n d e p e n d e n t s t a n d a r d for g u i d i n g t h e c o u r s e of
social c h a n g e " (TJ 520). Precisely t h i s f u n c t i o n of Rawls's criterion
w o u l d b e j e o p a r d i z e d if t h e A r c h i m e d e a n p o i n t itself shifted in re­
s p o n s e t o c h a n g i n g c o n d i t i o n s , for e x a m p l e , o u r c h a n g i n g d i s t a n c e
from a w e l l - o r d e r e d social s y s t e m .
T h i s p o i n t is clear o n t h e n a t i o n a l level. W h e n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l de­
m o c r a c y l a p s e s into t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m or a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m (as G e r m a n y
d i d i n t h e 1930s o r Chile in t h e 1970s), w e a r e h a r d l y l e d t o t h i n k t h a t
n o w a different criterion of j u s t i c e s h o u l d b e u s e d t o a p p r a i s e t h e n e w
r e g i m e a n d t o g u i d e o u r efforts to effect c h a n g e . Similarly, I w o u l d
think, w e c a n n o t c o n c e i v e of o u r criterion of global j u s t i c e , o u r r a n k i n g
of alternative global i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s , a s c h a n g i n g i n r e s p o n s e to
varying i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s . Of c o u r s e , m a n y i n s t i t u t i o n a l m e c h a ­
n i s m s c r u c i a l for a n y t h i n g like a w e l l - o r d e r e d w o r l d c o m m u n i t y are
p r e s e n t l y lacking, b u t h o w d o e s this l a c k u n d e r m i n e t h e belief t h a t in a

3 0
I o w e t h i s objection, forcefully stated, t o Robert F u l l i n w i d e r of t h e University of
Maryland Center for P h i l o s o p h y a n d Public Policy.
"Originally Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n w a s t o have b e e n applicable to all s e l f - c o n t a i n e d social
s y s t e m s e x i s t i n g i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of justice (TJ §22). Rawls h a s s i n c e b e e n n a r r o w i n g
the s c o p e h e c l a i m s for h i s c o n c e p t i o n . He n o w says that "justice a s fairness is f r a m e d to
a p p l y t o w h a t I have called t h e basic structure' of a m o d e r n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y .
W h e t h e r justice a s fairness c a n b e e x t e n d e d to a general political c o n c e p t i o n for different
k i n d s of s o c i e t i e s . [or] to a general moral c o n c e p t i o n . . . are a l t o g e t h e r separate
q u e s t i o n s . I avoid p r e j u d g i n g t h e s e larger q u e s t i o n s o n e w a y or t h e other" (JFPM 2 2 4 - 2 5 ) .
He d o e s n o t m e a n , I a m afraid, that the ideal of a just b a s i c structure h e s e e k s t o specify is
to e n v i s i o n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y . Rather, h e s e e m s to b e d e l i m i t i n g w h a t i s n o w the
s c o p e of h i s theoretical c o n c e r n . His c o n c e p t i o n is to apply to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c ­
racies; it m a y o r m a y n o t be relevant to social s y s t e m s t h a t are s t r u c t u r e d differently. It is
t h e r e b y left o p e n w h e t h e r it is still applicable e v e n to Great Britain, w h i c h d o e s n o t h a v e a
constitution.
 T h e External A r g u m e n t , 23.3 267

just w o r l d s u c h m e c h a n i s m s w o u l d exist a n d t h a t t h e y o u g h t to be
established? T h e c r e a t i o n of political a n d legal institutions o n b o t h t h e
national a n d g l o b a l levels w o u l d s e e m p a r a d i g m a t i c i n s t a n c e s of o u r
natural d u t y "to a s s i s t in t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of just a r r a n g e m e n t s w h e n
they d o n o t e x i s t " (TJ 334, cf. 115).
2 3 . 3 . T h e final o b j e c t i o n I will c o n s i d e r is that t h e ideal of a global
regime t h a t is j u s t b y Rawlsian lights m a y c o h e r e well with our cultural
heritage a n d our c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s b u t is nevertheless i n a p p r o p r i ­
ate o n a c c o u n t of existing i n t e r c u l t u r a l diversity of traditions a n d m o r a l
j u d g m e n t s . W e m u s t n o t i m p o s e o u r values u p o n t h e rest of t h e world,
m u s t n o t p u r s u e a p r o g r a m of institutional reform that envisions t h e
gradual s u p p l a n t i n g of all o t h e r c u l t u r e s by a globalized version of o u r
32
own c u l t u r e a n d v a l u e s .
This is, I t h i n k , t h e m o s t s e r i o u s objection to globalizing Rawls a n d
33
the o n e t h a t s e e m s to have influenced Rawls himself. C o n s i d e r this
passage:

We take our examination of the Kantian conception of justice as addressed

to an impasse in our recent political history; the course of democratic
thought over the past two centuries, say, shows that there is no agreement
on the way basic social institutions should be arranged if they are to
conform to the freedom and equality of citizens as moral persons.. [W]e
are not trying to find a conception of justice suitable for all societies
regardless of their particular social or historical circumstances. We want to
settle a fundamental disagreement over the just form of basic institutions
within a democratic society under modem conditions How far the
conclusions w e reach are "of interest in a wider context i s a separate
question. [KCMT 5 1 7 - 1 8 ]

It is w o r t h n o t i n g , t o begin with, that in t h e r a t h e r agnostic final

s e n t e n c e Rawls is careful n o t to prejudge the question of an eventual
global e x t e n s i o n (as h e says explicitly at JFPM 225). Moreover by a p ­
p e a l i n g t o s u c h l a n d m a r k s of "our" political culture as t h e D e d a r a t m n
of I n d e p e n d e n c e , I m m a n u e l Kant, a n d t h e French Revolution, Rawls

- T h e p l e a n o t t o ride r o u g h s h o d over the values ^ ^ ^ S S A ^

w e i g h , . But i, c a n b e a m u s i n g to observe ^ J ^ ^ t e arena
7
e m p h a t i c p r o t e s t a t i o n s against pursuing our .deals o - V ^ £ L d v a n t a g e d ones at that,
c o m e from m e m b e r s of o u r o w n culture, and from «™ without protection from
There is n o c o m p a r a b l e outcry from that global m a j a r f l j l v m g vvi. j-^ ^ ^
h
h u n g e r a n d o p p r e s s i o n . Asserting that tyranny and « ^ « » ^ ewell be
T h e r e m a v
e s
a c c e p t e d parts of its culture is often convenient b u t ' * ° v , e e m e n t than is
d i s a g r

m u c h l e s s g e n u i n e l y Intercultural (and thus m o r a U y . ^ ^ t u ^ e n « y from a

often taken for g r a n t e d . See Bergen ATHR tor s o m e iu
sociologist. . c .u„ f global justice a n d n o
D

3 3
T h e later Rawls, that is, w h o is withdrawingfron>*e top.c^ j j j ^ ^ T h e

longer a s s e r t s that h i s c o n c e p t i o n of justice is appropi m s to have

U c a b ] e t o s e e

s p a t i o t e m p o r a l d o m a i n that h e claims his conception i ^he United States in the

w a
u n d e r g o n e substantial shrinkage t ° r d J h e centrat ma for foUowirig m y
t a n
1960s a n d '70s. T h o s e u n e a s y with thus » ? £ £ ™ £ accommodates it.
b u t

interpretation. G d o e s n o t s i d e s t e p cultural divergence out

268 T h e Externa] A r g u m e n t , 23.3

i m p l i e s that h e takes this c u l t u r e to e x t e n d well b e y o n d o u r national

3 4
borders.
M o r e i m p o r t a n t , Rawls's h e s i t a t i o n s affect o n l y o n e a s p e c t of the
global e x t e n s i o n . T h e y i n d i c a t e s o m e d o u b t as to w h e t h e r h e should
take a s t a n d o n h o w societies c u l t u r a l l y different from o u r o w n should
b e o r g a n i z e d a n d o n h o w t o a s s e s s t h e j u s t i c e of t h e i r d o m e s t i c institu­
t i o n s . C o n c e r n i n g this q u e s t i o n , t h e r e m a y s e e m to b e a m o r a l l y attrac­
tive alternative, namely, t o leave t h i s u p t o t h e m e m b e r s of t h a t society.
No s u c h alternative is available, h o w e v e r , w i t h r e g a r d to t h e d e e p e r
q u e s t i o n of h o w t h e global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s h o u l d b e a s s e s s e d a n d
reformed. This q u e s t i o n w e c a n n o t e v a d e s h o r t of r e n o u n c i n g interna­
tional i n t e r a c t i o n altogether. Nor c a n w e a d e q u a t e l y r e s p o n d to it
e x c e p t t h r o u g h a c o n c e p t i o n of b a c k g r o u n d j u s t i c e . T h e r e is n o recog­
n i z e d natural criterion of justice. Nor c a n t h e r e b e a neutral criterion
equally c o n g e n i a l to all v a l u e s a n d c u l t u r e s — m i n i m a l l y b e c a u s e t h e r e
is o u t r i g h t d i s a g r e e m e n t a b o u t w h a t f o r m s of n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a
just global o r d e r s h o u l d allow. S o m e will a d v o c a t e t o l e r a n c e for as
m a n y diverse forms of n a t i o n a l r e g i m e as c a n coexist, w h i l e o t h e r s will
insist o n t h e global proliferation of s o m e n a r r o w l y d e f i n e d form of
35
regime.
But if t h e s e t w o a p p r o a c h e s fail a n d if global i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e p o s e s
a g e n u i n e p r o b l e m of b a c k g r o u n d justice, t h e n h o w c a n Rawls even
h e s i t a t e t o globalize t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s — h i s c r i t e r i o n for assessing
b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s ? H o w c a n h e d e c l i n e t o take a s t a n d , a Rawlsian stand,
o n a global o r d e r in w h i c h t h e social p o s i t i o n of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d is
u n i m a g i n a b l y w o r s e t h a n t h a t of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d i n t h e d e v e l o p e d
West, in w h o s e behalf Rawls h a s criticized t h e d o m e s t i c b a s i c s t r u c ­
t u r e s of a d v a n c e d W e s t e r n societies?
T h e a n s w e r h a s to d o , I believe, w i t h Rawls's c o n s t r u c t i v i s t m o d e of
justification. Reflective e q u i l i b r i u m is a c h i e v e d a m o n g , a n d relies u p o n ,
o u r c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s , at least s o m e of w h i c h a r e m o r a l o n e s :
"There is a n a p p e a l t o intuition at t h e b a s i s of t h e t h e o r y of j u s t i c e ' ' (TJ
124-25). Rawls d o e s n o t s p e a k of i n t u i t i o n s in t h e t r a d i t i o n a l s e n s e ,
h o w e v e r , as a priori a n d s h a r e d b y all r a t i o n a l b e i n g s . He r e c o g n i z e s
t h a t o u r m o r a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s evolves h i s t o r i c a l l y a n d o n t o g e n e t i c a l l y
a n d t h a t its fixed p o i n t s , t h o u g h w e h a v e n o t h i n g e l s e t o g o on, lack a n y

M
S e e also his references to "the c o u r s e of d e m o c r a t i c t h o u g h t over the past two
centuries, say" (KCMT 517), to "a d e m o c r a t i c s o c i e t y u n d e r m o d e m c o n d i t i o n s " (KCMT
518, 537), a n d to "a m o d e m constitutional d e m o c r a c y " UFPM 224).
" A n o t h e r flaw in the ideal of neutrality is that alternative global basic s t r u c t u r e s differ
in t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e y w o u l d s u p p o r t a n y particular form of national organization.
T h i s is a n a l o g o u s to a point Rawls m a k e s w h e n h e s a y s that the c h o i c e of a d o m e s t i c basic
structure will differentially affect t h e c h a n c e s of alternative religions a n d c o n c e p t i o n s of
the g o o d t o gain a d h e r e n t s (FG 549). T h e idea of institutional a r r a n g e m e n t s u n d e r w h i c h
all v a l u e s f l o u n s h equally is d e e p l y i n c o h e r e n t .Any institutional s c h e m e c a n b e o p p o s e d
o n t h e (accurate) g r o u n d that it is comparatively i n h o s p i t a b l e t o s o m e particular v a l u e or
form of life.
 T h e Externa] Argument, 23.3 269

ultimate foundation—rational or empirical (cf. JFPM 235). Rawls's ex­

plicit s t r a t e g y is therefore to convince others of t h e criterion h e p r o ­
p o s e s b y b r i n g i n g t h e i r o w n considered j u d g m e n t s to b e a r u p o n t h e
issue of social i n s t i t u t i o n s . T h e idea of globalizing Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n
of j u s t i c e is t h e n c h a l l e n g e d by the great international diversity of
c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s , w h i c h rules out any "appeal to intuition" in t h e
36
global s e t t i n g .
But I d o n ' t t h i n k this p r o b l e m defeats t h e idea of globalization, at
least w h e n t h e " s e a r c h for reasonable g r o u n d s for r e a c h i n g a g r e e m e n t
. . . r e p l a c e s t h e s e a r c h for moral truth," a n d "the practical social task is
p r i m a r y " (KCMT 519). To attain this practical goal o n t h e global p l a n e ,
an a g r e e m e n t n e e d n o t specify a particular derivation of o r rationale for
t h e c r i t e r i o n of justice, "there can, in fact, b e considerable differences
in c i t i z e n s ' c o n c e p t i o n s of justice provided that t h e s e c o n c e p t i o n s lead
to s i m i l a r political j u d g m e n t s . And this is possible, since different
p r e m i s e s c a n yield t h e same conclusion. In this case t h e r e exists w h a t
w e m a y refer t o as overlapping rather t h a n strict c o n s e n s u s (TJ 387-
88- cf JFPM 246-51- IOC). What counts, then, regardless of t h e consid­
e r e d j u d g m e n t s a n d other reasons mat m a y motivate a p a r t i c u l a r
p e r s o n , is c o n v e r g e n c e u p o n the criterion itself T h e p r e s e n t objection
to t h e globalization of Rawls's criterion m u s t t h e n s h o w m o r e t h a n
c u l t u r a l diversity; it m u s t at least show that a g r e e m e n t o n s u c h a
c r i t e r i o n of global justice is out of r e a c h ^
I s a y "at l e a s t " because, v * ^ e n d o r e e d j f f e r e n t M o f

overlapping consensus. i f a j u s t e r w o r d o r d e r m a v s m

justice a n d a different long-term v> ^ ^ , fe & t h e o r e t i c a

agree a b o u t t h e first stretch oi in , politically s u p - reforms

possibility. M a n y proposals ro , d hv Rawlsian prin-b v f a v o r e

p o r t e d b y T h i r d World nations an « ^ ^ . g w e m m e n t s o f t h e d e

ciples, h a v e b e e n blockea m diversity is exploited to

v e l o p e d West. Here the taci ^ ^ j i t i v e self-interest l e u p h e -
c o e c

c o m p l e m e n t t h e tedious a p p moral justification for s u c h

a

mistically, t h e "national intere ^ i d aU,

e r g e s t o resist u w o u o w U

resistance. Such a j u s t i n c a t i o ^ ^ s w e ourselves u n d e r s t a n d

u s u c e a

i n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms d e m a n - recognize as unjust advantages w e

&

it a n d t o exploit what we ou o n a J the g r o u n d s that o t h e r

o r d e n o n

e n j o y w i t h i n t h e current int h i s is a n a l o g o u s
c o n v i c t i o n s ( T

c u l t u r e s d o n o t (nifty) share ^ , . c h r i s t i a n s w e m a v c o l o

to t h e familiar if outdated beiiei

3 6
T h o u e h culturaloMversih/mmor
nral concepoon*
,ceptions is
^
•»>-'=•""•".' n-*—,
certainly great,
„
cumciy clear
il isn'l• entirety iiear
,
t o o m u c h a e n t i o n | 0 g o v e m m e n

h o w g r e a f i t is. Here om! s h o u l d ^ ^ ^ e o n s d . u t i o n s or international d o c u m e n t s

s
behavior. In adopting h ^ : ° ^ £ i g n audience, and s u c h d o c u m e n t s may then n o
r e

g o v e r n m e n t s may be catering ' ^ „ ° ^ p o l i t i c a l pnsonere. o n the other hand, govern

f^.^!"„i^ilconsensus.lntorWnngK-^ m e m o p a ) c o m m i ( m e n ( s o f
showinterculturalconsens^m^ — i n g , the moral c o m m i t m e n t s of their
e x p r e s s

m e n t s m a y well be violating, ™™
culture.
270 T h e E x t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 23.3

n i z e a n d enslave o u r n e i g h b o r s so long a s t h e y a r e n o t C h r i s t i a n s
themselves.) If w e m a y not, t h e n w e n e e d a c o n c e p t i o n of global justice
at least for t h e critical a s s e s s m e n t a n d g u i d a n c e of o u r o w n govern­
m e n t ' s policies, w h i c h m a y c o n s t i t u t e very significant o b s t a c l e s to
global i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform t o d a y — o b s t a c l e s , m o r e o v e r , for w h i c h w e
would be most immediately responsible.
H o w e v e r n a r r o w a m o r a l o v e r l a p w e m a y a i m for, I a d m i t w e w o n ' t
get it. T h e r e are b o u n d to b e p e r s o n s w h o d i s a g r e e w i t h u s , in g o o d
faith, e v e n a b o u t t h e very first s t e p s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m . T o t h e m , t h e
Rawlsian f r a m e w o r k p o s e s a c h a l l e n g e t o w o r k o u t t h e i r o w n c o n c e p ­
t i o n of justice or at least to e x p o u n d t h e g r o u n d s of t h e i r d i s a g r e e m e n t .
P e r h a p s s o m e of t h e i r criticisms c a n b e u n d e r c u t internally, or Rawls s
m a i n c o n c l u s i o n s c a n b e p r e s e r v e d b y justifying a n d e x p l a i n i n g t h e m
in t h e objectors' t e r m s t o t h e i r satisfaction. M a y b e t h e Rawlsian con­
c e p t i o n will h a v e t o b e revised in light of t h e i r c r i t i q u e . S u c h t h i n g s
c a n n o t b e k n o w n in a d v a n c e . Only t h e e n s u i n g d i s c u s s i o n c a n s h o w
w h e r e c o n v e r g e n c e is a t t a i n a b l e a n d w h e r e a g r e e m e n t o n p a r t i c u l a r
reforms c a n i n d e e d n o t b e achieved.
Even if d i s a g r e e m e n t p e r s i s t s , w e m a y still c o n c l u d e t h a t a c o m p e t ­
ing p o s i t i o n is w r o n g , a n d w e m a y t h e n w o r k for a j u s t e r w o r l d w i t h o u t
or e v e n a g a i n s t o u r o p p o n e n t s , insofar a s d o i n g s o is m o r a l l y p e r m i s s i ­
ble b y o u r lights. T h i s is w h a t h a p p e n e d in t h e A m e r i c a n Revolution, in
t h e Civil War, a n d in t h e N e w Deal. Social i n s t i t u t i o n s derive n o special
m o r a l s a n c t i t y from t h e m e r e fact t h a t t h e y n o w exist. If w e a r e c o n ­
v i n c e d o n reflection t h a t t h e y are u n j u s t , t h e n w e o u g h t t o w o r k t o w a r d
feasible i m p r o v e m e n t s , even if s o m e g e n u i n e m o r a l d i s a g r e e m e n t s
c a n n o t n o w b e resolved. T h e fact of d i s a g r e e m e n t is n o r e a s o n n o t to
act in light of w h a t e v e r (factual and) m o r a l beliefs w e n o w t h i n k a r e best
s u p p o r t e d . O u r c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s s u p p o r t a c o n c e p t i o n of justice
3 7
w h o s e s c o p e is universal, even t h o u g h its p r e s e n t a p p e a l is n o t . A n d
w e a r e s u r e l y n o t morally r e q u i r e d t o a c q u i e s c e i n a n y c o n d u c t or
p r a c t i c e b a c k e d b y t h e (sincerely held) c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s of o t h e r s .
As Rawls says, "A t h e o r y of justice m u s t w o r k out from its o w n p o i n t of
view h o w to t r e a t t h o s e w h o d i s s e n t from it" (TJ 370). W h y s h o u l d
liberals s h u n t h e political struggle over i n s t i t u t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s ,
leaving t h e i r d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o t h e n o n l i b e r a l d i s p u t a n t s ?
T h e c e n t r a l p o i n t of t h e last t w o p a r a g r a p h s is t h a t t h e difficulty is
n o t u n i q u e t o t h e global p l a n e . I n t e r c u l t u r a l diversity is o n l y a s p e c i a l
c a s e of diversity of c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s in g e n e r a l . T h u s , p r e d i c t a b l y ,
critics of Rawls h a v e rejected h i s ideal of a w e l l - o r d e r e d s o c i e t y by
refusing a l l e g i a n c e t o t h e "requisite u n d e r s t a n d i n g of f r e e d o m a n d
e q u a l i t y " (KCMT 517) t h a t h e c l a i m s is implicit i n o u r p u b l i c c u l t u r e .
Rawls w a s n o t d e t e r r e d b y t h e c e r t a i n t y t h a t o t h e r t h i n k e r s in t h e W e s t
w o u l d , in light of t h e i r m o r a l convictions, c o m e to reject h i s c o n c l u -

37
C f . Beitz, CINS 596.
 The; External Argument, 23.3 271

sions. He c o u l d n o t a n d d i d n o t achieve even the narrowest overlap

within a single n a t i o n a l society. He c o u l d h o p e to (and, I think, did)
express t h e c o n v i c t i o n s of a s e g m e n t of t h e intelligentsia in the United
States a n d s o m e o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , b u t c a n h e claim to speak for t h e
o'ack, Hispanic, a n d native A m e r i c a n s u b c u l t u r e s or even for ordinary
fa
nners, clerks, h o u s e w i v e s , o r factory workers? Rawls left s u c h q u e s ­
tions open, a t t e m p t i n g m e r e l y to systematize "one (educated) p e r s o n s
sense of j u s t i c e " (TJ 50). He h a s thereby initiated a discourse a b o u t
Justice from w h i c h g r e a t e r clarity a n d convergence m a y emerge m d u e
course
The idea of g l o b a l i z i n g Rawls a i m s for n o more a n d w^™?™*
"ot be d i s h e a V t e n e d - o r feel a b s o I v e d ! - b y P ^ l ^ Z T X T o f
'bout t h e a p p e a l a n d political s u c c e s s
J W K » o r of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms it ^ ^ . T Z t h objections
develop a n d p r o p o s e this c o n c e p t i o n a n d then d e a ^ ^
and c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l s from o t h e r cultures o r fromrw*
they a c t u a l l y a r i s e . A cross-cultural ^ c o u r s e J b o vision of its t h e

moral i s s u e of g r e a t c o m m o n concern ™ t i o n s involved less c e p

Participants a n d will t e n d to m a k e the moral y i r a b I e or even t o e

Parochial a s e a c h tries to a c c o m m o d a t e w h a t
38
valuable in o t h e r c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s . of justice is a n especially
c o n e
A g l o b a l i z e d v e r s i o n of Rawls's f P ross-cultural discourse. It is
suitable o n e w i t h w h i c h to e n t e r sucn ^ ^ j d e a s a n d i t c a n
aCC
based u p o n a s m a l l set of widely X i d g i n g a n d incorporating lovV e

°ffer a g o o d d e a l of flexibility for-a ^ dical, s o m e w a y s m o r e ra

cultural diversity. My proposal G, m a - w n sketch of global B a w J s s 0

h a s m o s t t o offer by way or
of s u c h n e w ^ e r y national w o M m w h i c h e V

j u s t i c e — o n e i t h e r Ri ^T^esaiae
two principles, toward a p r e -
society p r o g r e s s e s , in light ot ° ? ajjovvs s o m e variation in national J s

d e t e r m i n e d institutional i d e a l - ^ d through a hypo- d e t e r m i n e

c o n s t i t u t i o n s by letting each oi u
g behind a thinner featurin p a r t i e s

thetical "constitutional levant co^"

general facts a b o u t their ^
veil of i g n o r a n c e , w h o know flexibility ( T J 1 9 7 ) B u t t h e

society" including i » P ^ U of ignorance is quite limited,f t h e v e

afforded b y this g r a d u a l ^ J ^ o n in h o w m s c n t e n o n of d o m e s t i c
1 d o e S a W
T h o u g h Rawls a l l o ^ e d ^ " ° c n t e n o n itself t o vary
j u s t i c e m a y be specif^
from society to society- ^ ^ believing that an international d i s c u s s i o n of
ther i n i ^ ^ ^ c a t a l v s t for moral progress Many persons in the West
3 s a
T h e r e is a n o m <*n » g^mmem t b e c a u s e thev believe that—
t h e t o p i c of 8 " * ftacign
a c q u i e s c e in the ^^ggy, P
s ( i c e

f&^J^ps
J^
f

it >s justified but b e c a u s e thev have n o settled

6
n o

vor the other In view of the enormity of prevailing

c u l t n , a t
thanks to ^ t h i s ^ ° h o w e v e r . this is an issue that o n e ought to reflect u p o n . If
t
8 3
moral b e l i e f s ^ j j s a d V s n ' ^ ' ^ , ^ make a substantial moral difference, then a
r e a v

deprivations ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ well be it
a <
a n y t h i n g j * „ , global ju» , d e n c v to think of the political p r o c e s s as an instance of
e n

discourse a O T ^ ^ ^ < r f n » D
(§13-2-3'. Rawls ties even the limited international
0

39 oreover, ^ d u r a l
M e

e r f e C t V
only i m P
272 T h e E x t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 23.3

G is m o r e liberal in t h i s r e s p e c t . T h e global p a r t i e s a r e n o t con­

s t r a i n e d b y a n y p r i o r c r i t e r i o n of d o m e s t i c justice; a n d t h e y will t h e n
specifically d e c i d e h o w m u c h r o o m t o leave for differences in n a t i o n a l
i n s t i t u t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s a n d in n a t i o n a l c o n c e p t i o n s of d o m e s t i c
justice. Seeing h o w t h e original p o s i t i o n is d e s c r i b e d , t h e p a r t i e s d e c i d e
this q u e s t i o n b y b a l a n c i n g t w o d e s i d e r a t a (cf. §13.3 a n d §13.5): T h e y
w a n t t o e n a b l e c i t i z e n s t o c h o o s e a n d revise t h e i r o w n d o m e s t i c c o n s t i ­
t u t i o n , e v e n t h e i r o w n c o n c e p t i o n of d o m e s t i c j u s t i c e , s o l o n g a s s u c h
c h o i c e r e s u l t s from a n d g u a r a n t e e s for t h e f u t u r e free a n d i n f o r m e d
d e c i s i o n s . Yet t h e y also w a n t t o p r e c l u d e i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t t e n d to
p r o d u c e severe d e p r i v a t i o n s o r d i s a d v a n t a g e s for s o m e p a r t i c i p a n t s .
T h e r e s u l t i n g c r i t e r i o n of global j u s t i c e m i g h t b e s i m i l a r t o t h e crite­
rion I h a v e d e v e l o p e d in Part T w o . A s s u m i n g t h e s p e c i a l c o n c e p t i o n
a p p l i e s , t h e globalized first p r i n c i p l e m i g h t b e v i e w e d a s r e q u i r i n g a
" t h i n " set of b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties ( a n a l o g o u s t o t h e Universal
Declaration of Human Rights a n d i n c l u d i n g a n effective right to emi­
grate), w h i c h e a c h n a t i o n a l society c o u l d , in light of its n a t i o n a l c o n ­
c e p t i o n of d o m e s t i c justice, "inflate" a n d specify i n t o its o w n bill of
rights. T h i s s u g g e s t i o n is in line w i t h o u r c u r r e n t m o r a l beliefs. While
w e firmly believe t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n s of o u r (Western) societies o u g h t
t o p r o h i b i t t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of d a y s of g o v e r n m e n t - e n f o r c e d religious
fasting, w e c a n still a c c e p t as just a global i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e i n w h i c h
s u c h legislation is n o t u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l in s o m e ( n o n - W e s t e r n ) so­
cieties. (Yet w e c a n n o t a c c e p t as just a global o r d e r i n w h i c h t o r t u r e is
n o t r u l e d o u t in all societies, w h a t e v e r t h e i r culture.)
Similarly, w h i l e t h e global s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e w o u l d c o n s t r a i n h o w
s o c i e t i e s m a y a r r a n g e t h e i r e c o n o m i e s , t h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s w o u l d b e less
s t r i n g e n t t h a n Rawls's r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t e a c h s o c i e t y m u s t satisfy t h e
difference p r i n c i p l e internally. This m a y b e so b e c a u s e a c o u n t r y ' s
c h o i c e a m o n g v a r i o u s forms of e c o n o m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n ( m o r e o r less
egalitarian t h a n Rawls's n a t i o n a l difference p r i n c i p l e w o u l d require)
d o e s n o t affect t h e globally w o r s t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h a r e of social p r i m a r y
g o o d s o r b e c a u s e t h i s c h o i c e is p r o t e c t e d b y t h e b a s i c political liberties
w h i c h a l l o w t h e c i t i z e n s of e a c h n a t i o n t o c h o o s e , w i t h i n c e r t a i n limits,
t h e i r o w n m o d e of e c o n o m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h e r e s u l t i n g global institu­
t i o n a l ideal w o u l d t h e n a l l o w e a c h society a g o o d d e a l of c h o i c e as
r e g a r d s its i n t e r n a l p r a c t i c e s ( a n d m o r a l principles), s o l o n g a s s u c h
c h o i c e s a r e s u p p o r t e d b y m o s t of its c i t i z e n s a n d are c o n s i s t e n t w i t h
4 0
t h e b a s i c r i g h t s of all h u m a n beings, c i t i z e n s a s well as o u t s i d e r s .

variation h e a l l o w s to t h e diversity of national c i r c u m s t a n c e s , rather t h a n to t h e diversity

of national collective p r e f e r e n c e s (§17.3). Even w h e r e constitutional a n d political c h o i c e s
m a y differ from c o u n t r y t o c o u n t r y , h e requires s u c h differences to b e rationally related
to differences in national c o n d i t i o n s . Actual c i t i z e n s a n d legislators are required to
a c c o m m o d a t e t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s i n their deliberations a n d d e c i s i o n s t h r o u g h t h e t h o u g h t
e x p e r i m e n t of h o w R a w l s i a n rational parties (placed b e h i n d a veil of i g n o r a n c e of t h e
a p p r o p r i a t e thickness) w o u l d a c c o m m o d a t e t h e m .
"°Rawls m a y n o w actually agree w i t h this view. At least this is o n e p o s s i b l e w a y of
m a k i n g s e n s e of this cryptic remark: "The political liberties, a s s u r e d their fair-value a n d
 Conclusion, 24.1.2 273
C 0 U h 6 S e d 6 t a i l s a r e n I U I u s t
• !? . u T ! ° ^ r a t i v e s p e c u l a t i o n . What m a t t e r s
is t h a t by b a l a n c i n g t h e liberty interest in collective a u t o n o m y against
o t h e r liberty i n t e r e s t s , G g o e s b e y o n d R, a n d R in t h e liberal q u e s t to
2
0 5 re,igi US M o s h i
Sts^I^ ^ °' P ° P c a l , a n d m o r a l convictions"

24. Conclusion

2 4 . 1 . Let m e r e c a p i t u l a t e t h e main s t e p s t h r o u g h w h i c h I have c o m e

to d o u b t t h e a p p e a l i n g m o r a l conviction that t h e r e is n o t h i n g seriously
w r o n g , m o r a l l y speaking, w i t h the lives w e lead. I s h o u l d say in a d v a n c e
t h a t s t e p s 1, 2, 3, a n d 6 are essential to m y a r g u m e n t ; s t e p s 4 a n d 5
m e r e l y b r o a d e n a n d s t r e n g t h e n its conclusion.
2 4 . 1 . 1 . T h e r e a r e t h e a b u n d a n t l y d o c u m e n t e d facts of w i d e s p r e a d
e x t r e m e d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d disadvantages. Large s e g m e n t s of h u m a n ­
kind suffer severe o p p r e s s i o n a n d poverty. They have n o effective civil
a n d political rights a n d are helplessly e x p o s e d to violence a n d a b u s e by
s o l d i e r s a n d guerrillas, l a n d o w n e r s a n d officials. Moreover, t h e y are
e x c l u d e d from t h e n a t u r a l a n d social r e s o u r c e s of this p l a n e t : t h e y are
so p o o r a s to b e chronically exposed to malnutrition a n d outright
starvation; t h e y lack a c c e s s to even minimal health care, a n d are liable
to die early from t h e m o s t trivial diseases; they rarely have e n o u g h
e d u c a t i o n e v e n t o b e able to read, write, or d o e l e m e n t a r y arithmetic.
Finally m o s t a r e in n o position to improve their situation or to e s c a p e
from it. S u c h w i d e s p r e a d h u m a n misery provides t h e occasion for
m o r a l reflection, w h i c h m u s t e x a m i n e two ways in w h i c h w e might be
c o n n e c t e d to this misery: Why d o s u c h radical inequalities persist, a n d
w h a t r o l e (if any) d o w e p l a y in their p r o d u c t i o n ? And h o w might s u c h
radical i n e q u a l i t i e s be overcome, a n d w h a t role (if any) can w e play in
their eradication?
2 4 . 1 . 2 . T h e r e are t r u e m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s of s u c h extreme depriva­
t i o n s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s . T h e s e d o n o t c o m p e t e with true microex­
p l a n a t i o n s , s u c h a s : this villager is killed by a d e a t h s q u a d b e c a u s e its
l e a d e r believes h i s village to b e sympathetic to t h e rebels, this baby is
s t a r v e d b e c a u s e h e r father lost his job, this s t u d e n t is r a p e d a n d tor­
t u r e d b e c a u s e s h e p a r t i c i p a t e d in a d e m o n s t r a t i o n against the reigning
military j u n t a . M a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s aim for a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of w h a t
m i c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s leave u n e x p l a i n e d : Why d o e s o u r world have s u c h
h i g h rates of m a l n u t r i t i o n , illiteracy, a n d infant mortality? What ac­
c o u n t s for t h e incidence of torture a n d poverty; for the frequency ot
w a r s , d e a t h s q u a d s , a n d military j u n t a s ; for the increasing gap between
rich a n d p o o r ? T h e t r u e m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s of these aggregate p h e ­
n o m e n a p r o m i n e n t l y involve reference to basic global institutions. 1 h e

"other r e l e v a n t g e n e r a l principles, properly circumscribed, may of course supplement the

p r i n c i p l e s of justice'' (BLP 49-50).
274 C o n c l u s i o n , 24.1.4

f r e q u e n c y of w a r s a n d military j u n t a s c a n n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d a p a r t from
t h e fact t h a t o u r global political o r d e r reflects a n i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l
m o d u s vivendi. A c c o u n t i n g for t h e p r e v a i l i n g r a t e s of m a l n u t r i t i o n a n d
infant m o r t a l i t y r e q u i r e s in a d d i t i o n r e f e r e n c e to h o w t h e existing
global e c o n o m i c s c h e m e a s s i g n s e m i n e n t d o m a i n over n a t u r a l a s s e t s
a n d h o w it r e g u l a t e s i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n t h r o u g h u n c o n s t r a i n e d
market m e c h a n i s m s . Such macroexplanations m a y be highly complex,
b u t w h a t is i m p o r t a n t h e r e is o n l y t h a t o u r global f r a m e w o r k of basic
i n s t i t u t i o n s figures p r o m i n e n t l y in t h e t r u e m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s of m o r ­
ally significant p h e n o m e n a a n d t h a t r e f o r m s of t h i s f r a m e w o r k c o u l d
l e a d t o s u b s t a n t i a l i m p r o v e m e n t s in r e s p e c t to t h e s e p h e n o m e n a . I d o
n o t p r e t e n d to h a v e p r o v i d e d satisfactory m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s o r t o have
s k e t c h e d in a n y detail p a t h s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m t o w a r d a w o r l d
order that w o u l d not t e n d to p r o d u c e radical inequalities.
2 4 . 1 . 3 . In t h i n k i n g a b o u t t h e a s s e s s m e n t a n d reform of b a s i c institu­
tions, w e m u s t n o t i g n o r e t h e i r effects a n d , in p a r t i c u l a r , t h e benefits
a n d b u r d e n s t h e y t e n d t o engender. By d e n y i n g t h e r e l e v a n c e of e n g e n ­
d e r e d p h e n o m e n a , o n e c o u l d insist t h a t o u r global i n s t i t u t i o n a l frame­
w o r k is perfectly j u s t a l r e a d y : " T h e g r o u n d r u l e s d o n o t d i r e c t l y call for
d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s . O n t h e c o n t r a r y , s t a t e s a r e officially
a s s i g n e d e q u a l r i g h t s a g a i n s t o n e a n o t h e r a n d e q u a l sovereignty to
r e g u l a t e t h e i r o w n i n t e r n a l affairs. (Even p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r s h i p i n t h e
U n i t e d N a t i o n s S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l is b a s e d o n e n g e n d e r e d i n e q u a l i t i e s in
power.) Any i n e q u a l i t i e s i n t h e political a n d e c o n o m i c s t r e n g t h of
s t a t e s a n d in t h e r i g h t s a n d affluence of t h e i r c i t i z e n s , h o w e v e r radical
and predictable they m a y be, are not established but only engendered
b y t h e prevailing global o r d e r a n d h e n c e c a n n o t b e h e l d a g a i n s t this
o r d e r . " In c o n t r a s t t o s u c h a s t r o n g l y d e o n t o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t i o n of
justice, I h a v e i n t e r p r e t e d Rawls a s c o m m i t t e d to a b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n ­
tialist ( m o r e specifically, a s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t ) a p p r o a c h to t h e s u b ­
ject of social justice, w h i c h e s t a b l i s h e d a n d e n g e n d e r e d benefits a n d
b u r d e n s a r e c o n s i d e r e d o n a p a r . A l t h o u g h I h a v e myself d e f e n d e d this
a p p r o a c h , m y m a i n c o n c l u s i o n d o e s n o t p r e s u p p o s e s o s t r o n g a claim.
So l o n g as e n g e n d e r e d d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s c o u n t for a n y ­
t h i n g at all i n t h e a s s e s s m e n t of social i n s t i t u t i o n s , a g o o d c a s e c a n b e
m a d e t h a t t h e c u r r e n t global o r d e r is u n j u s t against t h e b a c k g r o u n d of
feasible i n s t i t u t i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e s t h a t w o u l d n o t e n g e n d e r s u c h r a d i c a l
i n e q u a l i t i e s . Even a m i l d l y d e o n t o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e w o u l d
s u p p o r t this conclusion.
2 4 . 1 . 4 . T h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e existing global i n s t i t u t i o n a l
s c h e m e t e n d s t o p r o d u c e affords a n a p p r o p r i a t e v a n t a g e p o i n t for
a s s e s s i n g t h e j u s t i c e of t h i s o r d e r a s a w h o l e . I n a s s e s s i n g t h e e x i s t i n g
global o r d e r i n c o m p a r i s o n t o its feasible i n s t i t u t i o n a l alternatives, o n e
s h o u l d b e p r e e m i n e n t l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e worst-off p a r t i c i p a n t s
u n d e r e a c h i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e . N o w it m a y b e d e n i e d t h a t t h e c o n ­
c e r n for t h e least a d v a n t a g e d s h o u l d h a v e t h e a b s o l u t e priority it h a s for
 C o n c l u s i o n , 24.1.5 275

Rawls. O n e m a y s a y that, w h i l e terrible poverty a n d o p p r e s s i o n a r e

certainly p r e v a l e n t a n d w i d e s p r e a d , h u m a n k i n d h a s m a d e g r e a t p r o g ­
ress, a s w i t n e s s e d b y t h e s e c u r i t y a n d affluence enjoyed by t h e citizens
of t h e d e v e l o p e d W e s t e r n n a t i o n s . Although t h e least a d v a n t a g e d a r e as
badly off a s ever, at least t h e b e t t e r positions (the t o p quintile o r so of
world p o p u l a t i o n ) h a v e b e e n i m p r o v e d considerably. But s u c h p r o g ­
ress, w h i c h c e r t a i n l y exists, also raises t h e p r o b l e m of justice in s h a r p e r
form. B e c a u s e w e a r e s o affluent a n d powerful, almost everything w e d o
has a significant i m p a c t u p o n living c o n d i t i o n s elsewhere, a n d b e c a u s e
we a r e s o affluent a n d powerful, w e are in a u n i q u e position to take u p
the t h e o r e t i c a l a n d p r a c t i c a l task of institutional reform. In a n y case, it
s e e m s q u i t e i m p o s s i b l e to d e n y that t h e position of its least a d v a n t a g e d
p a r t i c i p a n t s is at least o n e i m p o r t a n t m e a s u r e of t h e justice of a n
i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e . If s o m e feasible institutional reform is e x p e c t e d
to lead t o a significant i m p r o v e m e n t in t h e worst position, t h e n this is
surely a n i m p o r t a n t r e a s o n in its favor.
2 4 . 1 . 5 . A p l a u s i b l e evaluation of t h e morally significant c o n s e ­
q u e n c e s of feasible institutional s c h e m e s m u s t give a p r o m i n e n t p l a c e
to t h e satisfaction of basic social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s . Here it m a y be
too m u c h to r e q u i r e t h a t a n institutional s c h e m e b e so d e s i g n e d that
even t h e s p e c i a l n e e d s of its naturally h a n d i c a p p e d participants are
met. P e r h a p s s u c h special n e e d s raise issues of morality r a t h e r t h a n
justice (as Rawls suggests b y favoring a semiconsequentialist over a
fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t a p p r o a c h ) . W h e n even the s t a n d a r d basic socio­
e c o n o m i c n e e d s of s o m e p a r t i c i p a n t s are not met, however, w e have a
m o s t u r g e n t r e a s o n t o think about, a n d p r o m o t e , institutional reforms.
This c l a i m is often o p p o s e d by t h e assertion that it is m o r e i m p o r t a n t
that social i n s t i t u t i o n s recognize a n d protect basic civil a n d political
rights a n d liberties t h a n that they e n s u r e that basic social a n d eco­
n o m i c n e e d s a r e m e t . Even if this assertion could be sustained (and I
have a r g u e d extensively t h a t it cannot), my m a i n conclusion w o u l d
r e m a i n largely i n t a c t . T h e c u r r e n t global distribution of basic civd a n d
political r i g h t s a n d liberties is extremely uneven. While we, t h r o u g h
exercising c o n t r o l over a very powerful g o v e r n m e n t car. play a s ^ n i h -
c a n t r o l e in s h a p i n g t h e c o m m o n future of h u m a n k i n d ,
lack political rights altogether or exercise s o m e ^cra^ontrol
w i t h i n a s t a t e t h a t is t o o p o o r a n d i m p o t e n t to have any real influence.
While o u r f r e e d o m a n d i n d e p e n d e n c e are s e c u r e o h « t to
u n d e r i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d rulens i n s t a l i e d o r approved' * ^ ^ J ,
iect t o t h r e a t s , subversion, o r invasion from a b r o « L A n d iritate^the ba c
rights a n d liberties r e c o g n i z e d ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ S i f y
tion c l u s t e r s , s u c h basic rights a n d "berties are ° " e n n
e n f o r c e d a b r o a d even w h e r e they are officially o n h e books, n
m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e s e international o f the
a n d political f r e e d o m will again p r o m i n e n t l y involve teatu
existing global o r d e r .
276 C o n c l u s i o n , 24.2

2 4 . 1 . 6 . A global i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e is i m p o s e d b y all of u s o n e a c h
of u s . It is i m p o s e d o n u s i n t h a t w e c a n n o t s i m p l y d r o p o u t a n d
r e n o u n c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n . T h i s fact is m o s t significant in t h e c a s e of t h e
s c h e m e ' s m o s t d i s a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s , w h o a r e literally b e i n g
forced, u l t i m a t e l y w i t h r e s o r t t o violence, to a b i d e b y t h e g o i n g g r o u n d
r u l e s . T h u s a m o t h e r , u n a b l e t o find e m p l o y m e n t a n d d e s p e r a t e t o feed
h e r c h i l d r e n , will b e p u n i s h e d if s h e tries to take food from a s h o p , will
b e c h a s e d a w a y if s h e tries t o g r o w food o n l a n d t h a t is n o t h e r s , will b e
a r r e s t e d if s h e tries t o d e m o n s t r a t e , will b e t u r n e d a w a y if s h e tries t o
c r o s s i n t o a n o t h e r c o u n t r y ( s u c h a s o u r s , for e x a m p l e ) — a n d t h i s n o t b y
crooks a n d t h u g s b u t b y "the law,'' by j u d g e s , i m m i g r a t i o n i n s p e c t o r s ,
a n d t h e police, w h o , b a c k e d b y o u r r e c o g n i t i o n o r a c q u i e s c e n c e , d o
41
t h e i r "duty" in t h e n a m e of h u m a n j u s t i c e . T h i s reflection reveals h o w
unjust institutions e m b o d y not only the d e e p e s t a n d m o s t c o n s e q u e n ­
tial form of h u m a n w r o n g b u t also ( i n d e p e n d e n t l y ) t h e m o s t intoler­
able. At least in t h e m o d e r n era, injustice a p p e a r s in official c l o t h i n g ,
u n d e r t h e n a m e of justice, o p e n l y before t h e e y e s of t h e w o r l d . It
s u b v e r t s n o t m e r e l y w h a t is right b u t t h e very i d e a of right a n d leaves its
victims w i t h o u t a n y r e c o u r s e o r a p p e a l .
A global i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k is i m p o s e d by, especially, its m o r e
advantaged, m o r e powerful participants. Institutions are n o t only
"staffed" a n d e n f o r c e d by h u m a n b e i n g s (are c o m p l e x p a t t e r n s of
h u m a n c o n d u c t ) ; t h e y are also c r e a t e d , s h a p e d , p e r p e t u a t e d , o r
c h a n g e d b y u s . P r o p e r t y a n d p r o m i s e s , m o n e y a n d m a r k e t s , govern­
m e n t s a n d borders, treaties a n d diplomacy—all these d o not o c c u r
n a t u r a l l y b u t are i n v e n t e d b y h u m a n b e i n g s a n d c o n t i n u o u s l y evolve
t h r o u g h h u m a n c o n d u c t . S u c h i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e " u p to u s , " collectively,
a n d w e therefore have a collective causal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for existing
institutions. Together w e change t h e m or preserve t h e m as they are.
Since social i n s t i t u t i o n s are m o r e o r less j u s t d e p e n d i n g o n h o w t h e y
d i s t r i b u t e m o r a l l y significant benefits a n d b u r d e n s a m o n g t h e i r h u m a n
p a r t i c i p a n t s , this c a u s a l responsibility gives rise t o a moral r e s p o n ­
sibility, w h i c h is a collective responsibility for o u r collective role i n
i m p o s i n g existing i n s t i t u t i o n s u p o n , in p a r t i c u l a r , t h e i r m o s t d i s a d v a n ­
t a g e d ( a n d involuntary) p a r t i c i p a n t s . This r e s p o n s i b i l i t y m a y b e of g r e a t
m o m e n t w h e n w e find o u r s e l v e s t o b e (advantaged) p a r t i c i p a n t s in a n
u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e . W e h a v e a negative d u t y n o t t o c o l l a b o r a t e
in t h e i m p o s i t i o n of u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s ; a n d w e m u s t t h e n reflect u p o n
a n d p r o m o t e i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform.
24.2. Taken together, these considerations s u p p o r t two conclusions:
4 1
S u c h r e c o g n i t i o n is not c o n f i n e d w i t h i n national borders; t h e p r a c t i c e s i n a n o t h e r
c o u n t r y are not "a different ballgame." We d o not just take n o t i c e of foreign g o v e r n m e n t s ,
l a w s , judges, a n d p o l i c e m e n (as empirical facts); w e r e c o g n i z e t h e m a s g o v e r n m e n t s ,
l a w s , j u d g e s , a n d p o l i c e m e n . T h e plausibility of t h e i d e a of a global basic structure
derives n o t o n l y from t h e w o r l d w i d e e x i s t e n c e of states w i t h national g o v e r n m e n t s , l a w s ,
j u d g e s , a n d p o l i c e m e n b u t from their international r e c o g n i t i o n a n d their role i n interna­
tional p r a c t i c e s a n d interactions.
 Conclusion, 24.3 277
o u r c u r r e n t global institutional s c h e m e is unjust, a n d as a d v a n t a g e d
p a r t i c i p a n t s in this o r d e r w e s h a r e a collective responsibility for its
injustice. T h e injustice m e a n s , in h u m a n terms, not merely that m a n y
p e r s o n s t o d a y a r e very b a d l y off—are unfree, u n e d u c a t e d , powerless,
starving, a n d p o o r — b u t t h a t they are disadvantaged by existing institu­
tions, d e p r i v e d of f r e e d o m a n d education, o p p r e s s e d , starved, a n d
i m p o v e r i s h e d . T h e responsibility m e a n s that t h o s e w h o u p h o l d a n d
p e r p e t u a t e t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s , all of u s together, are collectively d o i n g
w h a t is d o n e t o (in particular) t h e least advantaged. We have a negative
d u t y t o d e s i s t ; w e o u g h t to u s e o u r m o r e advantaged political a n d
e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n to w o r k for global institutional reforms.
T h e p l a u s i b i l i t y of t h e s e conclusions d o e s not materially d e p e n d on
s t e p s 4 a n d 5 (the priority c o n c e r n for the least advantaged a n d t h e
a m e n d m e n t t o t h e first principle). If they h a d to be w i t h d r a w n or
modified, t h e n t h e c u r r e n t global o r d e r might b e less unjust (and w e
collectively r e s p o n s i b l e for less deprivation) t h a n I a m presently in­
c l i n e d t o believe. Nevertheless, t h e failure of t h e s e two ideas w o u l d not
entail t h e c o l l a p s e of m y a r g u m e n t .
To r e a c h its c o n c l u s i o n s , m y a r g u m e n t m u s t a s s u m e that t h e r e are
feasible p a t h s of institutional reform w h o s e p u r s u i t w o u l d substan­
tially r a i s e t h e globally w o r s t representative share, particularly in re­
gard to t h e satisfaction of s t a n d a r d basic n e e d s (as a c c o m m o d a t e d by
t h e first p r i n c i p l e ) . T h a t t h e r e are s u c h feasible p a t h s of reform is
s o m e t h i n g t h a t , h o w e v e r likely it m a y seem, I have m a d e n o a t t e m p t to
establish.
In o n e r e s p e c t , this is n o t a serious gap. For s u p p o s e my argument
w e r e a c c e p t e d We w o u l d t h e n have gained a reasonably clear a n d
d e t e r m i n a t e i d e a of w h a t a plausible defense of the status q u o m u s t
look like. My a r g u m e n t leaves room for t h e attempt (by s o m e social
scientists, p e r h a p s ) t o provide s u c h a defense by showing, for example,
t h a t t h e globally w o r s t representative share c a n n o t be raised through
i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s . T h e c h a n c e that s u c h a claim could survive col-
legial s c r u t i n y s e e m s slight, given the severity a n d extent of c u r r e n t
h u m a n m i s e r y . Still, t h e r e is a r e m o t e possibility that some such argu­
m e n t will t u r n o u t t o be convincing, a n d so w e
( t h o u g h h a r d l y elated) to learn that o u r global order is n o w as j u s t a s w e
c a n m a k e h a n d that t h e r e is n o t h i n g by way of institutional reform that
we o u g h t to undertake. , , _
l , i^p
l f h t r ) n e

. i n a n o t h e r r e s p e c t , t h e g a p is quite J T S ^ ^ ^ S
a s
in a p o s i t i o n t o offer c o n c r e t e a n d realistic ^ ^ . X achieved As
a n d e c o n o m i c reforms justice d e m a n d s might ' ^ ^ ^ Z
it is, 1 c a n o n l y h o p e that t h e i ^ ^ ^ ^ S ^ ^ ^ o r e
i d e a s (involving politicians, jurists, a n d economi ^ ^
it is c l e a r e r w h a f justice requires ^ ^ S E ^ H ^ , collec-
2 4 . 3 . I have argued that we ^ S ^ S S ^ ^ ^ ^
tive r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for t h e existing global o r d e r (specincany
278 C o n c l u s i o n , 24.4

social p o s i t i o n w e p r o d u c e t h r o u g h its i m p o s i t i o n ) a n d t h a t w e h a v e a
negative d u t y t o h e l p reform t h i s o r d e r insofar a s it is u n j u s t . But I d o
n o t m e a n t h i s c o n c l u s i o n t o entail a n a t t r i b u t i o n of b l a m e o r guilt. It
w o u l d b e (not o n l y c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e b u t also) plainly i m p l a u s i b l e to
claim of m o s t o r d i n a r y citizens of d e v e l o p e d W e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s t h a t
t h e y a r e b l a m e w o r t h y o n a c c o u n t of all t h e existing h u m a n m i s e r y . An
a n a l o g o u s p o i n t c o u l d b e m a d e a b o u t p a s t i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s in­
volving slavery o r a radically inferior s t a t u s for w o m e n . M a n y of t h o s e
w h o c o l l a b o r a t e d t h r o u g h t h e c e n t u r i e s in t h e p e r p e t u a t i o n of s u c h
u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s c a n n o t fairly b e b l a m e d , b e c a u s e t h e y c o u l d n o t
r e a s o n a b l y h a v e a p p r e c i a t e d t h e w r o n g n e s s of t h e i r c o n d u c t . Still, as is
n o w agreed, their c o n d u c t was wrong, a n d they o u g h t to have worked
t o w a r d i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s insofar as t h e y w e r e a b l e t o d o s o . It is in
this k i n d of situation, I believe, t h a t m o s t o r d i n a r y c i t i z e n s of t h e
d e v e l o p e d West a r e t o d a y w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e prevailing global i n s t i t u ­
tional f r a m e w o r k . It w o u l d b e m o r a l i s t i c a n d s o m e w h a t silly, p e r h a p s ,
t o b l a m e s u c h p e r s o n s for v i o l e n c e a n d s t a r v a t i o n a b r o a d . But t h i s d o e s
n o t d e v a l u e t h e a t t e m p t to explain to t h e m h o w , t o t h e best of o n e ' s
u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h e y d o in fact s h a r e responsibility for s u c h w r o n g s a n d
o u g h t t o reflect u p o n a n d h e l p w o r k t o w a r d i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform. T h i s
a t t e m p t is n o t silly o r m o r a l i s t i c , b e c a u s e , insofar a s t h e y a r e m o r a l
p e r s o n s , t h e y w o u l d t h e m s e l v e s w a n t to b e c h a l l e n g e d t o reflect u p o n
s u c h p o t e n t i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a n d d u t i e s . My c o n c e r n , t h e n , is n o t
w i t h b l a m e o r guilt. I m e r e l y w a n t to s h o w w h a t , I think, is n o t easily
a p p r e c i a t e d — t h a t o u r global i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r d e r is u n j u s t , t h a t w e d o
w r o n g i n s i m p l y c o l l a b o r a t i n g in t h e p e r p e t u a t i o n a n d i m p o s i t i o n of
t h i s o r d e r , a n d t h a t w e s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e e x p l o r e n e w w a y s of a c t i n g for
o u r s e l v e s ( w h o c a n h e l p in t h e reform of institutions) a n d for t h o s e w h o
will c o m e after u s (who, t h a n k s t o t h e j u s t e r i n s t i t u t i o n s w e will leave
b e h i n d , s h o u l d find it e a s i e r t h a n w e d i d to live well).
2 4 . 4 . D e s p i t e t h i s qualification, m y c o n c l u s i o n m a y p r o v o k e s o m e
i n c r e d u l i t y (if n o t a n n o y a n c e ) . Please r e m e m b e r t h a t even t h e i n j u s ­
tices w e n o w r e c o g n i z e a s t h e m o s t c o n s p i c u o u s (slavery a n d t h e
inferior s t a t u s of w o m e n ) w e r e o n c e e n t i r e l y t a k e n for g r a n t e d . T h o s e
a d v a n t a g e d b y t h e m f o u n d it e a s y n o t t o t h i n k a b o u t t h e m or, a t b e s t , t o
invoke s o m e s h a l l o w r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s , especially s i n c e t h o s e s u b j e c t e d
t o s e v e r e d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s typically lack t h e r e s o u r c e s
fully to u n d e r s t a n d a n d p r o t e s t t h e i r c o n d i t i o n . Are w e t o d a y a n y m o r e
i m m u n e t o c o m f o r t a b l e e r r o r s of m o r a l j u d g m e n t ?
M o r e o v e r , n o t all t h e f e a t u r e s t h a t m a k e t h e p r o m i n e n t i n j u s t i c e s of
t h e past so c o n s p i c u o u s are present in w h a t I have portrayed as t h e
p r i n c i p a l i n j u s t i c e s of o u r t i m e ( a n d it is therefore p e r h a p s e v e n l e s s
a p p r o p r i a t e t o a t t a c h b l a m e a n d guilt t o t h e m ) . Here t w o factors a r e of
s p e c i a l i m p o r t a n c e . T h e p r e e m i n e n t i n j u s t i c e s of o u r t i m e t y p i c a l l y
involve r a d i c a l i n e q u a l i t i e s t h a t a r e engendered rather than estab-
 Conclusion, 24.4 279
lished, a n d t h e y a r e injustices in the global s t r u c t u r e of h u m a n i n t e r a c ­
tion r a t h e r t h a n in t h e internal s t r u c t u r e of relevant social u n i t s (a
family, city, o r state). T h e r e a r e two ways in w h i c h t h e s e t w o factors
t e n d to o b s c u r e injustice a n d responsibility for it.
O n t h e o n e h a n d , b o t h factors make injustice h a r d e r to d i a g n o s e a n d
i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s h a r d e r to conceive a n d to i m p l e m e n t . T h e q u e s ­
tion w h e t h e r a n institutional s c h e m e establishes excessive depriva­
tions o r d i s a d v a n t a g e s c a n b e a n s w e r e d r a t h e r straightforwardly. But
s u p p o s e w e w a n t to find o u t w h e t h e r existing h a r d s h i p s , t h o u g h n o t
called for by t h e g r o u n d r u l e s of an institutional s c h e m e , are neverthe­
less e n g e n d e r e d b y it a n d w h e t h e r there are feasible institutional r e ­
forms t h r o u g h w h i c h the i n c i d e n c e of the relevant deprivations c o u l d
be r e d u c e d . Before o n e c a n a n s w e r these questions affirmatively, o n e
m u s t h a v e g a t h e r e d a great deal of empirical information, developed
e s t i m a t e s a b o u t w h a t deprivations a n d disadvantages feasible alterna­
tive i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s w o u l d t e n d to p r o d u c e , a n d c o n s t r u c t e d a n d
t e s t e d v a r i o u s m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s . T h e s e tasks are obviously even m o r e
difficult o n t h e global p l a n e b e c a u s e of t h e greater size a n d complexity
of t h e global social system a n d also b e c a u s e of t h e lesser accessibility of
comparative data.
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w h e n excessive deprivations a n d disadvantages
clearly a r e avoidable c o n s e q u e n c e s of t h e prevailing institutional
s c h e m e , b o t h factors also t e n d to make it h a r d e r to appreciate that t h e
relevant s c h e m e is therefore unjust a n d that we, as advantaged partici­
p a n t s in it, s h a r e a m o r a l responsibility for s u c h injustice. Here t h e
injustice of national institutions that establish radical inequalities a n d
t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of citizens for s u c h injustice were easiest to u n d e r ­
s t a n d ( a n d historically the earliest to be widely understood). The wide­
s p r e a d a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e s e points in t h e United States w a s a main
p r e c o n d i t i o n for t h e abolition of slavery in the 1860s a n d the i n t r o d u c ­
tion of w o m e n ' s suffrage in t h e 1920s. Meanwhile w e have (one might
say s o m e w h a t simplistically) advanced to t h e point w h e r e o n e factor-
a l o n e n o l o n g e r o b s c u r e s o u r vision. It is n o w widely u n d e r s t o o d that
national i n s t i t u t i o n s m a y b e unjust o n account of radical inequalities
t h e y engender a n d t h a t citizens may share a moral r e s p o n s e J i t y for
s u c h injustice. T h e w i d e s p r e a d appreciation of t h e s e ^ *
a c h i e v e t h e institutional reforms of the New Deal in t h e , 1 9 3 0 * 1 : u n o w
also g e n e r a l l y u n d e r s t o o d that a global institutional s c h e m e may be
u n j u s t o n a c c o u n t of radical inequalities it e s t a t ^ * r i h a t it
participants ought to contribute » J % Z * £ ^ £ % ^
J o n s . T h i s a p p r e c i a t i o n ^ . J ™ ? ™ ^ Z ^ T t L of o u r global
S ^ ^ f f i S ^ i_
T * P — of
that the citizens of countries tnai
7
d tm
- I t is p r o b a b l y the general ^ ^ ^^Z7hZ a negate duty to w o * for global
d i d n o t h a v e c o l o n i e s h a d merely a positive rather than n e g
280 C o n c l u s i o n , 24.4

c o n c l u s i o n c o m b i n e s t h e s e t w o w i d e l y a c c e p t e d p o i n t s — a global in­
s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e m a y b e u n j u s t o n a c c o u n t of excessive d e p r i v a t i o n s
a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s it engenders.

institutional reform. O n m y view, the d u t y w o u l d be a negative o n e — p r o v i d e d c o l o n i a l ­

i s m is correctly u n d e r s t o o d a s a global institution rather than a set of separate b u t similar
crimes.
 Bibliography

A n
1sity
i r T Press,
£ l ' 1980.
B r U C e S o c i a
' J l l s t i c e
^ d the Liberal State. New Haven: Yale Univer­
w r

Amdur,Robert. "Rawls' Theory of Justice: Domestic and International Perspec-

nves. World Politics 29 (April 1977), 438-61.
Arrow, Kenneth. "Some OrdinaJist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls' Theory of Jus-
tice. Journal of Philosophy 70 (May 1973), 245-63.
udard, Catherine, et al. Individu et justice sociale. Paris: Seuil, 1988.
r i a n D o C o u n t r
Th' ? ' i e s Have Moral Obligations?'' In S. M. McMurrin, ed„
The Tanner Lectures on Human Value, 2. Salt Lake City: University of Utah
Press, 1981.
• Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective." In J. R. Permock and John
W. Chapman, eds., Ethics, Economics, and the Law. New York: New York
University Press, 1982.
" —• The Liberal Theory of Justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1972.
Beitz, Charles. "Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment." Journal'of Phi­
losophy 80 (October 1983), 591-600.
~~—• Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton Univer­
sity Press, 1979.
" , et al., eds. International Ethics. Princeton: Princeton Universitv Press,
1985.
Benn, S. I., a n d R. S. Peters. Social Principles and the Democratic Stale. London:
Allen and Unwin, 1959.
Berger, Peter. "Are There Any Human Rights?" In B. Rubin and E. Spiro, eds.,
Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979.
Berlin, Isaiah. Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969.
Blocker, H. G., and E. H. Smith, eds. John Rawls' Theory of Social Justice. Athens:
Ohio University Press, 1980.
Brierly, James L. The Law of Nations. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963 11928).
Buchanan, Allen. "Revisabiiity and Rational Choice." Canadian Journal of Phi­
losophy 5 (November 1975), 395-408. .
Clark, Barry, and Herbert Gintis. "Rawlsian Justice and Economic Systems.
Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (Summer 1978), 302-25.

281
282 Bibliography

Cohen, G. A. "Capitalism, Freedom, a n d the Proletariat." In Alan Ryan, ed., The

Idea of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.
. "Robert Nozick and Wilt Chamberlain: How Patterns Preserve Liberty." In
John Arthur and William H. Shaw, eds., Justice and Economic Distribution.
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1978.
D'Amato, Anthony. Jurisprudence. Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1984.
Daniels, Norman. Just Health Care. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985.
Danielson, Peter. "Theories, Intuition, and the Problem of World-Wide Distribu­
tive Justice." Philosophy and the Social Sciences 3 (1973), 331-40.
Demarco, Joseph P. "International Application of the Theory of Justice." Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 62 (1981), 393-402.
Doyle, Michael. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs." Philosophy and
Public Affairs 12 (1983), 205-35, 323-53.
Dworkin, Ronald. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1978.
Feinberg, Joel. "The Interest in Liberty on the Scales." In A. I. Goldman and J.
Kim, eds., Values and Morals. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978.
Fellner, William. Probability and Profit. Homewood, 111.: R. D. Irwin, 1965.
Fishkin, James S. Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Family. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1983.
. 77ie Limits of Obligation. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.
Fried, Charles. Right and Wrong. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978.
Galston, William A. Justice and the Human Good. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1980.
. "Moral Personality a n d Liberal Theory." Political Theory 10 (November
1982), 492-519.
Gauthier, David. "Justice and Natural Endowment: Toward a Critique of Rawls'
Ideological Framework." Social Theory and Practice 3 (1974), 3-26.
. Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.
Gibbard, Allan. "Disparate Goods and Rawls' Difference Principle: A Social
Choice Theoretic Treatment." Theory and Decision 11 (1979), 267-88.
Griffin, Keith. International Inequality and National Poverty. London: Holmes &
Meier, 1978.
Gutmann, Amy. "Communitarian Critics of Liberalism." Philosophy and Public
Affairs 14 (Summer 1985), 308-22.
. Liberal Equality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
Hare, R. M. "Rawls' Theory of Justice." In Norman Daniels, ed., Reading Rawls.
New York: Basic Books, 1974.
Harsanyi, John C. "Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A
Critique of John Rawls' Theory." American Political Science Review 69 (1975),
594-606.
Hart, H. L. A. The Concept of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961.
. "Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority." In Norman Daniels, ed., Reading Rawls.
New York: Basic Books, 1974.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin. 1981 [1651],
Hoffe, Otfried. Politische Gerechtigkeit. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1987.
Hoffmann, Stanley. Duties beyond Borders. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
1981.
Humboldt, Wilhelm von. The Limits of State Action. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1968.
 Bibliography 283

T S t a n d a r d o f
^tunirv^f " ^ , "ving: Uncertainty, Inequality, and Oppor­
tunity Appended to Amartya K. Sen, The Standard of Living CambS
Cambndge University Press, 1987. ' ^ e: S L a r n b n d

^ t ^ ^ : ^ ^ ' e d
— b r i d g e : Cam
M e S ^ ^ ^ n t s of Justice, trans. J. Ladd. Indianapolis: Bobbs-

^ P ^ T ^ ^
SeMn'™ te
% ™«°™l Law and Human Rights. New York: Praeger. ,950.
S e 0 / 7 G o v e r w n e ?
1952 ' " Indianapolis. Bobbs-Merrill,
Lyons, David. "Utility and Rights." In J. R. Pennock and John W. Chapman eds
crmcs, Econom/cs, and f/ie Law. New York: New York University Press 198''
viaccallum, Gerald. "Negative and Positive Freedom." Philosophical Review 76
(July 1967), 312-34.
Maclntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1981. '
Macpherson, Crawford B. The Real World of Democracy. Oxford Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1966.
Marshall, Geoffrey. Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Commonwealth. Oxford.
Oxford University Press, 1957.
Martin, Rex. Rawls and Rights. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985.
Michaelman, Frank I. "Constitutional Welfare Rights and A Theory of Justice.'
In Norman Daniels, ed., Reading Rawls. New York: Basic Books, 1974.
Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism, On Liberty, and Considerations on Representa­
tive Government, ed. H. B. Acton. London. Dent, 1972.
Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics among Nations, 5th edition. New York: Knopf,
1973.
Musgrave, R. A. "Maximin, Uncertainty, and the Leisure Trade-Off." Quarterly
Journal of Economics 88 (November 19741, 625-32.
Nagel, Thomas. "Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy." Philosophy and Public
Affairs 16 (Summer 1987), 215-40.
. "Poverty and Food: Why Charity Is Not Enough." In P. Brown and H. S h u e ,
eds., Food Policy. New York: Free Press, 1977.
-. "Rawls on Justice." In Norman Daniels, ed., Reading Rawls. New York:
Basic Books, 1974.
Nardin, Terry. Law, Morality, and the Relations of States. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1983.
Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books, 1974.
Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984
Paul, Jeffrey, ed Reading Nozick. Totowa, NJ : Rowman and Littlefield, 1981
Pettit, Philip. "A Theory of Justice?' Theory and Decision 4 (February and April
1974), 311-24.
Plato. The Republic, trans. G. M. A. Grube. Indianapolis. Hackett, 19.4
Raz, Joseph. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 198h
Reiman, Jeffrey H. "The Labor Theory of the Difference Principle Philosophy
and Public Affairs 12 (Spring 1983), 133-59.
Richards, David A. J. "International Distributive Just.ce.' In J R. Pennock and
284 Bibliography

John W. Chapman, eds., Ethics, Economics, and the Law. New York: New York
University Press, 1982.
.A Theory of Reasons for Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.
Rorty, Richard. "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy " In Merrill D. Peter­
son and Robert C. Vaughan, eds., The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract. Harmondsworth, Kng.: Penguin,
1968.
Sandel, Michael. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982.
Scanlon,T. M. "Preference and Urgency." Journal of Philosophy 72 (November 6,
1975), 655-69.
. "Rawls' Theory of Justice." In Norman Daniels, ed., Reading Rawls. New
York: Basic Books, 1974.
. "The Significance of Choice." In S. M. McMurrin, ed., The Tanner Lectures
on Human Value, 8. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988.
Sen, Amartya K. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. San Francisco: Holden
Day, 1970.
. "Equality of What?" In Choice, Welfare and Measurement. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1982, 353-69.
. Poverty and Famines. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981.
. The Standard of Living. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
. "Well-being, Agency, and Freedom:The Dewey Lectures, 1984 "Journal of
Philosophy 82 (April 1985), 169-221.
Sher, George. Desert. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.
Shue, Henry. Basic Rights. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.
. "The Burdens of Justice." Journal of Philosophy SO (October 1983), 600-8.
Simon, Robert L. "Global Justice and the Authority of States." Monist 66 (Octo­
ber 1983), 557-72.
Singer, Peter, ed. In Defense of Animals. Oxford: Blackwell, 1985.
Smith, Adam. The Wealth of Nations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976.
Taylor, Michael. Community, Anarchy, and Liberty. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni­
versity Press, 1982.
Tuck, Richard. Natural Rights Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1979.
Tucker, R. W. The Inequality of Nations. New York: Basic Books, 1977.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, cited by article number.
van Dyke, Vernon. "The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in
Political Theory." World Politics 29 (April 1977), 343-69.
. "Justice as Fairness: For Groups?" American Political Science Review 69
(1975), 607-14.
Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars. New York: Basic Books, 1977.
. "The Moral Standing of States." Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (Spring
1980), 209-29.
Wellbank, J. H., Dennis Snook, a n d David T. Mason, eds. John Rawls and His
Critics—An Annotated Bibliography. New York: Garland, 1982.
Williams, Bernard. Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
Wolff, Robert Paul. "The Derivation of the Minimal State." In Jeffrey Paul, ed.,
Reading Nozick. Totowa, NJ.: Rowman a n d Littlefield, 1981.
. Understanding Rawls. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.
 Index

Ackerman, liiuce, 58, 190n33, 231n20 Bargaining equilibrium, 2 1 9 - 2 1 , 224nl4,

d i j u d i c a t i o n , 24, 93; international, 2 1 6 - 231; dynamic, 101, 221. See also Modus
18, 2 2 2 - 2 3 , 236n25, 244 vivendi
Advantaged (participants), 5n4, 11-12, 3 4 - Bargaining positions, 73, 80, 225, 236
36, 238-3!), 2 0 0 - 6 3 , 2 7 6 - 7 9 . .See also Bargaining power, 2 3 - 2 4 , 100-101, 2 2 4 -
Disadvantaged; Least advantaged 26, 234n22, 244, 248-49, 253-56
group/class Barry, Brian, 2 6 3 - 6 5
Advantages, 6 8 - 7 1 , 251. Sen also Disad­ Basic liberties. See Basic rights and liber­
vantages ties
AIDS, wr, Basic needs. See Needs; Standard n e e d s
Aiiii;iidnn;iil d o first principle), 138-39, Basic rights and liberties (or first-
r
J 80, 243n7, 27. >, 277; explained, 142-44, principle goods), 10-11, 38, 47n46, 51,
147; justified, 142-47, 160. .Sec also f'iisl §§11-12, 149-50, 156-57, 162, 196-97,
principle, social m i n i m u m u n d e r 205-6, 244-46, 272
Anarchism, 24nl!f, 58 enumerated, 132, 147
Animals, 38, U 2 - 1 3 , 25tinl2 freedom and integrity of the person,
Apartheid, 147n46, )56n60, 232, 254 132, 145, 147, 170nl3, 192
Aquinas, T h o m a s , 2 1 6 n 0 well-protectedness of, 6 - 7 , 129,
A r c h i m e d e a n point (in Rawls), 213n2, 266 192, 215
Aristotelian Principle (in Rawls), 116, liberty of conscience, 96-97, 128, 132,
1 6 1 n i . .See a/so Good, thin theory of 145, 147, 229
Arms control, 2 3 5 - 3 6 liberty of speech, expression, the me­
Arrow, Kenneth, H O n l dia" 51, 124, 132, 134-35
Associations, 21, 23, 25, 9 0 - 9 3 , 113, 145, fair value of, 148n46
182, 2 4 7 - 4 8 , 2 5 5 - 5 6 liberty of thought, 96-97, 128, 132,
145", 229
A s s u r a n c e p r o b l e m , 100-102, 223, 233;
political liberties, 117, 132, 145, §13,
f u n d a m e n t a l , 1 0 1 - 4 , 106,159. 2 1 3 - 1 4 ,
249-50, 258n22, 272
2 1 8 - 2 1 , 2 2 5 - 3 1 , 2 4 4 - 4 5 ; situated, 101,
fair value (worth) of, 10n7, 132, 134,
2 1 8 - 2 0 , 223, 233, 2 4 4 - 4 5 . See also Com­
138-39, 145, 151n52, 153, 212,
p l i a n c e ; Enforcement
215n5
religious liberty, 96, 132,134n28
B a c k g r o u n d justice, 23, 248-50, 2 5 4 - 5 6 ,
rule of law, 132, 145, 147
268
fair value of, 147n46
Balance o f p o w e r , 214, 218, 221, 225,
packages of, 157, 160n67, 206
2 3 4 n 2 2 . S e e also M o d u s vivendi ftlllv adequate, 132, 134-351, 156n60,
Balancing of values, 20, 37, 57, 62, 213, 158n65, 196, 205
228, 2 7 3 complete, 128-29, 147, 149-50
Bargaining, 58, 2 2 3 - 2 9 , 234-35, 244; and well-protected (secure), 47n46,
justice, 71n6, 86
285
 286 Index
Basic rights a n d liberties (conf.l
U 8 n l 4 , 1 2 8 - 3 0 , 135, 147, 148n47,
275
S e e also Effective legal freedom
roughly equal, 1 4 8 - 5 1 , 156n60,
196n42, 249
w o r s t package (score), 53, 131n27,
137, 1 4 9 - 5 1 , 160n67, 168n8, 1 6 9 n l 2 ,
206
a n d standard basic n e e d s , 147, 149,
1 5 6 - 5 7 , 1 9 6 , 277
Basic structure, 8 - 9 . §1; defined, 2 1 - 2 5 ;
as having t w o parts (in Rawls), 123,
1 3 8 - 3 9 , 1 4 8 ; primacy o f (focus on), 1, 3,
9, 25, 6 5 - 7 2 , 247-48* 2 5 5 - 5 6 ; stability of,
100-105; t w o n o t i o n s o f in Rawls, 2 1 -
24. S e e also Global basic structure; In­
stitutional s c h e m e
Beitz, Charles, 2 0 n l l , 270n37; o n global
i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , 241, 263; o n resource
redistribution, 241, 2 5 0 - 5 2
Benefits a n d b u r d e n s (of social coopera­
tion). S e e Goods a n d ills
Benevolence, 88, 9 3 - 9 5
Benn, S. I., 216n6
Berger, Peter, 267n32
Blameworthiness, 31n26, 238n29, 278. S e e
also Responsibility
Bodin, Jean, 216n6
Brierly, J a m e s L., 2 4 4 - 4 6
Buchanan, Allen, 99n36
Buckley v. Valeo, 134
Burdens. See G o o d s a n d ills
Capitalism, 48n48, 58, 132,158n65, 2 0 0 -
203, 215n5, 2 2 9 - 3 0 , 233
Character, 3 , 1 7 , 27, 8 2 - 8 3 , 1 0 5 , 247. See
also C o n d u c t ; Morality
Children, 50, 5 5 , 1 4 3 - 4 4 , 1 5 0 n 5 0 , 1 7 1 - 7 3 ,
175, 1 7 7 - 8 0 , 188, 1 9 0 , 1 9 2 n 3 5 , 1 9 8 n 4 4 ,
199n47, 226, 2 5 2 - 5 3
Circumstances of justice, 93, l l l n 2 , 213,
266n31
Citizenship, equal, 1 2 0 , 1 2 2 - 2 5 , 150n51,
1 7 0 - 7 1 , 177-78, 1 8 1 - 8 2 , 186
Clark, Barry, 158n65
Class, 35, 38, 46,119, 124, 137, 139, 1 4 1 - 4 2 ,
157, 166-74, 176, 178, 2 0 4 - 5 , 247
Clients (of parties i n original position), 46,
53, 56, 9 2 - 9 3 , 96-97, 100, 104, 1 1 1 - 1 3 ,
116-17, 120-26, 129, 198, 242, 2 5 6 - 5 7 ;
w h y distinct from parties, 53n56
Close-knitness (in Rawls), 200n48
Coase, Ronald, 1 9 n 8
Cohen, G. A., 45n42
Colonialism, 232, 254, 262, 265, 269, 2 7 9 -
80
C o m m u n i t a r i a n i s m , 2, 5n4, 73n8, 92. S e e
also Individualism
C o m m u n i t y , 2, 5n4, 7 6 n l 3 , 86n20, 90n25,
92, 1 1 3 , 2 4 7 - 4 8 , 2 5 8 - 5 9
C o m p a r i s o n s : b a s e d o n objective vs. s u b ­
jective criteria, 47n45; interpersonal, 5,
37, 96, 109, 1 1 4 , 1 1 6 , 1 7 7 , 1 8 3 , 1 9 9 , 2 0 3 ;
i n t e r s c h e m i c , 42, 7 0 - 7 1 , 73, 96, 109,
1 1 6 - 1 8 , 125, 133, 199, 2 0 3 - 5 ; intra-
s c h e m i c , 116, 133
C o m p l e t e n e s s . See Basic rights a n d liber­
ties
C o m p l i a n c e , 20, 28, 40. 54, 82, 84, 91, 1 0 0 -
101, 2 2 0 - 2 1 , 2 2 3 - 2 4 , 231, 236n25, 2 4 4 -
45,255
C o n c e p t i o n s of t h e g o o d , 9 2 - 9 3 , 97, 99,
1 0 2 - 4 , 268n35
Conditions:
defined, 139n39
reasonably favorable, 1 2 2 - 2 3 , 125-27,
136n29, 1 3 9 - 4 1 , 146, 149, 160
halfway favorable, 131n27, 149-50,
160n67, 243ri7
truly favorable, 127, 140, 1 4 9 - 5 0 ,
168n8
unfavorable, 140, 146
See also Special c o n c e p t i o n of justice
C o n d u c t , 3, 8 - 9 , 12, 17, 2 5 - 2 7 , 31, 4 0 - 4 3 ,
8 4 - 8 5 . 106, 2 5 5 - 5 6 , 278 S e e also Char­
acter; Morality
C o n s c r i p t i o n , 246, 2 5 6 n l 9
C o n s e n s u s . See Overlapping c o n s e n s u s
C o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m , 3 9 - 4 3 ; indirect, 42. S e e
a/.so Justice; Utilitarianism
Conservatism, 4, 9 - 1 1 , 121, 246, 2 4 8 n l 0 .
S e e also Risk a v e r s e n e s s
C o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s , 37, 8 1 - 8 2 , 97n35,
2 1 2 - 1 5 , 258, 2 6 8 - 7 1 . S e e also Reflective
equilibrium
Constitution, 22, 131, 148n47, 1 5 8 - 5 9 , 1 6 1 ,
202, 2 1 5 - 1 7 , 231, 256, 2 7 1 - 7 2
Constitutional c o n v e n t i o n / s t a g e (in
Rawls), 140, 144, 178n23, 2 0 1 - 2 , 271
Constitutive attributes/traits, 77, 79, 86,
89-90
Constitutive c o m m i t m e n t s , 3, 5 n 4 . 9 0 - 9 2 ,
96-98, 104-6, 262
Constitutive rules, 8, 2 1 - 2 2 , 51
Constructivism, 2 - 3 , 5, 8, 258, 268
C o n t i n g e n c i e s , 73n9, 99, 110, 149n48, 160,
252, 2 5 4 n l 7 ; of c h a n c e (luck), 164, 175,
177, 180; natural, 4 5 , 7 4 n l l , 1 6 4 - 6 6 , 1 7 0 ,
1 7 2 - 7 3 , 175, 179, 247, 2 5 0 - 5 2 ; social,
1 6 4 - 7 1 , 1 7 4 - 7 5 , 177, 180, 247, 250, 252
Contractarianism. See Social contract
doctrines
Contracts, 32, 4 9 n 5 1 , 50, 1 1 2 n 5 , 1 5 5
C o o p e r a t i o n , 2 0 - 2 1 , 181, 1 9 0 - 9 3 , 198-99,
2 6 3 - 6 5 . See also Interaction
Courtney, 8 3 - 8 4
Crimes, 8 3 - 8 4 , 152n54; against humanity,
235; r e l e v a n c e t o a s s e s s m e n t o f institu­
tions, 7, 3 1 , 33, 55, 129, 194n38, 206, 215.
S e e also H o m i c i d e
D'Amato, A n t h o n y , 2 5 8 n 2 2
Daniels, Norman, 182n25, 1 8 4 - 8 5 , 187n31,
195n39
D a n i e l s o n , Peter, 2 6 3 n 2 5
D a n t e (Alighieri), 2 1 6 n 6
Declaration of I n d e p e n d e n c e , 16, 2 1 2 , 2 6 7

D e m o c r a c y , 31, 1 5 3 - 5 9 , 2 0 0 - 2 0 2 , 216-17,
2 4 9 - 5 0 ; direct/indirect, 1 5 3 - 5 4 . S e e
also Political p r o c e s s
Deontological, as applied to. c o n c e p t i o n s
of morality, 44, 47n47; criteria of justice,
39n33, 43, 45, 47, 5 4 - 5 5 , 114, 120, 274;
moral c o n c e p t i o n s in general, 8 8 - 8 9 ;
overall moral c o n c e p t i o n s , 42; the self,
87-88
Deprivations, 39, 122, 2 7 3 - 7 4 , 2 7 7 - 8 0
s o c i o e c o n o m i c (poverty), 1 1 - 1 2 , 32, 35,
1 2 0 - 2 1 , 1 3 3 - 3 5 , 142n38, 145, 171-73,
2 2 6 - 2 7 , 2 3 7 - 3 8 , 275
relative, 162, 198
Desert, 65, 7 5 - 7 7
moral s e n s e : Desert, 7 7 - 8 6 , 250
defined, 7 7 - 7 8
institutional n o t i o n of, 82, 8 5 - 8 6
narrower than entitlement, 78-79,
82-83, 85
S e e also Deservingness; Moral ar­
bitrariness; Moralized ground
rules
ordinary s e n s e ; desert, 77-78, 81, 8 5 - 8 6
S e e also Entitlements
Deservingness, 77-85
D e s i g n priority ( a m o n g principles of jus­
tice), 127, 136-37, 143, 167, 170, 173,
187n31, 196. See also Ideal theory; Pri­
ority: lexical
Difference principle, 6, 29, 4 1 - 4 2 , 63, 6 9 -
76, 8 0 - 8 2 , 1 1 5 n l 2 , 128, 136, 139, 146,
1 6 1 - 6 3 , 1 6 6 - 7 4 , 177-82, 188n32, 1 9 2 -
93, §17, 215n5, 272; cited, 123; global,
2 5 4 n l 7 , 2 6 3 - 6 4 ; a n d political process,
1 5 7 - 5 9 , 2 0 0 - 2 0 3 ; in simplest form,
1 5 n l , 6 6 - 6 7 , 71, 115-16, 197; social
m i n i m u m u n d e r (best feasible mini­
m u m i n d e x position), 198n44, 2 0 1 - 3 ,
205. See also Index goods; Index posi­
tions
D i s a d v a n t a g e d (participants), 11-12, 30,
57, 113, 116, 118, 129, 150n51, 261, 2 7 6 -
78. See also Advantaged; Least advan­
taged group/class
Disadvantages, 3 5 - 3 6 , 39, 196n42, 279;
distinct from handicaps, 115-16, 176,
1 9 0 - 9 1 . See also Advantages
Discrimination, 147n46, 165, 183n26
Distributive justice. See Justice
Diversity, 1 5 5 - 5 6 , 2 4 2 - 4 3 ; of conditions,
54, 123, 243; of e n d o w m e n t s , 115, 143,
1 6 4 - 6 5 , 175n20, 176; of values, 102-5,
143, 175n20, 228-29, 267-72
Division of powers, 23, 216-17
Doyle, Michael, 2 3 0 n l 9
D u t i e s . See Natural duties
Dworkin, Ronald, 75,152n54
Education, 5 5 - 5 7 , 1 4 4 - 4 5 , 166-80, 1M.
184; minimally adequate, 178-81,
205; standard, 178-80
Educational opportunities, §15, 191.
Index 287
96, 215; minimally adequate (access to
minimally adequate education), 179
191, 205
Effective legal freedom, 128-32, 138, 1 4 5 -
46, 149-50; s e c u r e d bv basic rights a n d
liberties, 1 2 8 - 2 9
Efficiency, 59n61, 83, 166, 187-88, 199
Employment, 58, 144. 1 7 0 - 7 1 , 195, 198n45,
199; minimally adequate, 181, 205; stan­
dard, 181
Employment opportunities, 1 8 0 - 8 1 ; mini­
mally adequate (access to minimally
adequate employment), 181, 191, 205
Endowments, §5, 115-16, 164-78, 184n28,
250-52; as common/collective asset, 63,
68-69, 72-77, 80; as morally arbitrary
(not Deservedl, 63, 65, 68, §6
Enforcement, 24, 48, 128, 130-32, 157; in­
ternational, 216-18, 2 2 2 - 2 3 , 244, 246.
S e e also Assurance problem
Engendered p h e n o m e n a (effects of an in­
stitutional scheme), 38-39, 274
attitudes and desires, 43n39, 117
allegiance. 1 0 2 - 3 , 255
compliance/noncomplianee, 55, 255
s e n s e of equal citizenship, 170
sense of justice, 100, 121
strains of commitment, 115
untrustworthiness, 234
benefits and burdens (goods a n d ills).
38-39, 45, 48, 55-56, 114, 274
deprivations/poverty, 16, 3 5 - 3 6 , 39,
55, 274, 2 7 9 - 8 0
freedom, 39n32. 59
medical conditions, 192
distributions ipattems. pattern fea­
tures), 3 0 - 3 1 . 33, 4 6 - 4 7
disadvantages a n d inequalities 3 4 -
36, 38, 47n46, 118, 2 7 8 - 8 0
rates (birth, crime). 7. 31, 33, 38. 55,
129, 194n38, 215
systemic features.
competitive market economy, 33
degenerate form of feudalism. 36
framework for Utopia, 54
linlstability, 100, 148, 176, 220. 245
violence and wars, 224, 227
Entitlement theories of distributive jus­
tice, 15, 17-18, 20n9. 36, 265
Entitlements, 18-19, 35n29, 65. 69, 1 8 9 -
90. 197, 260n23, and desert, 7 8 - 7 9 , 8 2 -
85; and legitimate expectations, 51, 82,
85. 261-62
Environment protection of natural,
59n61. 91, 117. 155, 157, 190-92. 194,
197, 200. 205n55, 250nl2, 2S6nl8: of so­
cial systems, 30, 38, 41, 61, 101, 144. 156.
164. 175n20, 201-2. 224, 2 3 2 - 3 3 , 255-57.
267
Envv. 52: excusable, 162, 198
Equality 38, 52, 57-59, 114-16, 124n21,
148-51, 158063, as benchmark, 64, 70,
2 2 o f
112, 115, I ' opportunity: see Op­
portunity principle
288 Index
Equilibrium, 34, 9 9 - 1 0 4 , 245. See also Re­
flective equilibrium
Established p h e n o m e n a tby a n institu­
tional s c h e m e ) :
benefits a n d b u r d e n s (goods and illsi,
3 8 - 3 9 , 45, 47n46, 48, 5 6 - 5 7 , 114, 274
deprivations, 35, 39, 279
freedom, 39, 5 1 - 5 3 , 5 6 , 5 8 - 5 9
rights a n d liberties, 41, 58
distributions (patterns, pattern fea­
tures), 4 6 - 4 7
disadvantages and inequalities, 3 4 -
35, 3 8 - 3 9 , 52, 118, 137n32, 2 7 8 - 7 9
Explanation, 2 1 7 - 1 9 , 2 2 1 - 2 2 , 2 2 5 - 2 7 ;
invisible-hand, 30, 59; macro-, 3 0 - 3 1 ,
2 3 7 - 3 8 , 2 7 3 - 7 5 , 279; micro-, 3 0 - 3 1 ,
2 3 7 - 3 8 , 273
Externalities, 59n61, 71n6, 117, 191, 256,
264
Fair equality. S e e Opportunity principle
Fair value. See Basic rights a n d liberties
Fairness, 28n23, 5 6 - 5 7 , 189, 193, 229, 2 4 8 -
49, 2 5 4 - 5 6 , 261, 278. See also Justice a s
fairness
Family, 2 2 - 2 3 , 9 3 , 1 1 3 n 9 , 198n44,199n47,
2 5 2 - 5 3 , 257; and fair equality of o p p o r ­
tunity, 5 5 - 5 6 , 167n7, 1 7 1 - 7 5
Favorable c o n d i t i o n s . See C o n d i t i o n s
Federalism, 1 5 5 - 5 6 , 217
Feinberg, Joel, 28n23, 5 l n 5 4
Fellner, William, l l l n 3
Feudalism, 33, 36, 54, 162n3
First principle, 6 - 7 , 1 0 - 1 1 , 47n46, 64,
Chap. 3, 173nl7, 197n43, 203n50, 215,
249-50
cited, 123
a n d equality, 1 4 8 - 5 1 , 156n60,198n42,
249
global, 272
a n d political process, 1 5 6 - 6 0 , 2 4 9 - 5 0 ,
258n22, 272
social m i n i m u m under, 136-37, 139,
160, 2 0 1 - 2
a n d standard basic s o c i o e c o n o m i c
n e e d s , 143-46, 275
a n d standard basic n e e d s , 1 4 7 , 1 4 9 ,
156-57, 196, 277
S e e also A m e n d m e n t
First-principle g o o d s . S e e Basic rights
a n d liberties
Fishkin, James, 1 7 3 n l 7 , 2 6 1 - 6 2
Foreign policy, 215, 2 2 5 - 2 6 , 228, 234n22,
271n38
Foreigners, 1 0 - 1 1 , 225, 249, 256, 275
Formal equality of opportunity. See Op­
portunity principle
Formal legal freedom, 128, 147n45, 149n47
Free c h o i c e , 4 9 , 1 7 0
Free market, 38, 2 4 8 - 4 9 , 2 5 5 - 5 6 , 257n20.
See also Laissez-faire
Free s o c i e t y / s y s t e m , 16, 38, 49, 54, 72n7
Freedom, 38, 4 5 - 4 6 , 4 8 - 5 2 , 116-17, 1 2 7 -
34,248
as c o n s t a n t - s u m , 5 1 - 5 3 , 1 4 9 - 5 0
distribution of, 37, 39, 47, 51, 5 8 - 5 9
e n g e n d e r e d , 39n32, 59
e s t a b l i s h e d , 39. 5 1 - 5 3 , 56, 5 8 - 5 9
f u n d a m e n t a l I first -principle), 130-33,
149-50
w o r t h w h i l e , 1 2 7 - 3 4 , 142, 145
effective legal, 1 2 8 - 3 2 , 138, 145-46,
149-50
formal legal. 128, 147n45, 149n47
institutional, 45, 47, 53
personal, 3 7 - 3 8 , 45, 53, 55, 116
restrictions o n :
natural, 45
social:
e n g e n d e r e d 39n32, 4 5 - 4 6
e s t a b l i s h e d , 39n32, 45, 5 1 - 5 2
F r e e d o m of a s s o c i a t i o n , 132, 145
F r e e d o m of m o v e m e n t , 19, 116, 130-32,
156n60, 170
F r e e d o m of t h e p r e s s (medial, 124, 135,
148n46, 200
F r e e d o m of thought. 9 6 - 9 7 , 128, 132, 145,
229
Fried, Charles, 184n29, 187n31
Full c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m S e e Justice
Fullinwider, Robert. 2 6 6 n 3 0
Future g e n e r a t i o n s , 4 6 n 4 3 , 5Hn60, 113n9,
150, 211, 275
Galston, William A., 104n43, 175n20, 282
Games, 2 1 - 2 2 , 26, 49, 55, 68, 223, 276n41
Gauthier, David, 2 2 0 n l l
Gender, 39, 52, 55. 129, 148n47, 164-65,
171, 173, 175, 180, 183n26, 185, 196n42,
247, 2 5 2 n l 5 , 2 6 3 - 6 4 , 278
General c o n c e p t i o n of justice, 122, 1 2 4 -
26, 1 4 0 - 4 1 , 143, 146, 148, 242n5, 243n7.
S e e also Special c o n c e p t i o n ol justice
Genetics, 45, 1 8 8 - 9 0 , 194, 247, 2 4 9 n l 2
Genius's c o m p l a i n t , 76, 7 8 - 7 9 , 82, 251.
See also E n d o w m e n t s
Gibbard, Allan, 66n2, 125n22
Gini coefficient, 178, 253
Gintis, Herbert, 158n65
Global basic structure, 36, 154, 2 2 4 n l 4 ,
236, 2 3 8 - 3 9 , 240, 263, 2 7 6 n 4 1 . S e e also
Basic structure
Global interpretation of Rawls, 7 - 8 , 1 2 , 36,
1 5 4 - 5 6 , 2 1 5 - 1 6 , 2 3 8 - 3 9 , C h a p . 6; argu­
m e n t s for, 1 5 4 - 5 5 , 203, 235n23, 2 4 7 - 7 2
Good, 4 2 - 4 4 , 8 7 - 9 0 , 94; c o m m o n , 68,
86n20, 91, 93; c o n c e p t i o n s of, 9 2 - 9 3 , 97,
99, 1 0 2 - 4 , 268n35; t h i n t h e o r y of, 43, 62,
116, l 6 1 n l . See also Priority: of the right
over t h e g o o d
G o o d s a n d ills, 30, 3 7 - 4 0
natural, 46, 183
e n d o w m e n t s , § § 5 - 6 , 1 1 5 - 1 6 , 164-78,
184n28, 2 5 0 - 5 2
h a n d i c a p s , 4 5 - 4 6 , 6 4 , 1 1 5 - 1 6 , 164-65,
1 8 0 , 1 8 4 n 2 8 , 1 8 9 - 9 0 , 251, 275
natural primary g o o d s , 6 4 , 1 1 4 ,
177n22, 183

s p e c i a l capabilities/disabilities/
n e e d s , 47n45, 6 4 - 6 9 , 73, 115
s o c i a l (benefits a n d burdens), 22, 5 6 - 5 7
' 0 - 7 1 , 114
d e s e r v e d (entitlements), 81
Deserved, 8 1 - 8 2 . 250
earned, 81, 83, 8 5
e n g e n d e r e d , 3 8 - 3 9 , 4 5 - 4 6 , 48, 5 5 - 5 6
114, 274, 2 7 9 - 8 0
established, 3 8 - 3 9 , 4 5 - 4 6 , 47n46 48
56-57, 114,274,279
p o s i t i o n a l g o o d s (constant-sum), 5 1 -
53, 169, 175, 198
public g o o d s , 157, 170nl3, 200
social primary g o o d s , 43, 46, 64, 9 6 -
99, 1 1 4 - 3 9 , 122-24, 133, 143,
356n60, 2 0 5 - 6
split b y Rawls into civil/political and
s o c i a l / e c o n o m i c , §§11-12
G o v e r n m e n t violence, 9, 93,217, 219, 222,
2 2 6 - 2 7 , 2 3 0 - 3 5 , 2 3 7 - 3 8 , 244, 246, 260,
276
G o v e r n m e n t s , 2 1 6 - 1 8 , 222-27, 231-38,
2 4 4 - 4 6 , 255, 257; minimal, 59; ultra-
minimal, 2 4 n l 9 . See also Modus vi­
vendi; World government/state
G r o u n d rules, 8 - 9 , 16-17. 22, 25, 27-29,
3 6 - 3 9 , 42. 48, 5 1 - 5 4 , 62, 244-45, 255;
moralized, 8 1 - 8 2 , 84-85, 224nl4; origi­
nal, 5 9 - 6 1 ; procedural, 29, 36-37, 39,
53, 203; unmoralized, 81-86, 224nl4.
S e e also Institutional scheme; Practices
G u n s (firearms), 3 0 - 3 1 , 117, 194, 237,
263n24
G u t m a n n , Amy, 3n3, 91n28, 138n34,
158n63, 213n2, 282
H a n d i c a p s , 4 5 - 4 6 , 64, 115-16, 164-65,
180, 184n28, 189-90, 251, 275. See also
Contingencies: natural; Disadvantages
Hare, Richard M., HOnl
Harsanyi, J. C HOnl
Hart, H" L. A., 124n20, 140, 142n37, 149n48,
216n6
Health care. See Medical care
Health insurance, 187, 189n32,190,
191n34, 19Zn35, 193-95
Health problems. See Medical conditions
Health protection (access to n e e d e d med­
ical care), 185-93; full (access to full
m e d i c a l care) for socially produced
m e d i c a l conditions, 190,192-93, 195,
205; minimally adequate (access to
minimally adequate medical care), for
natural medical conditions, 179 (Graph
2), 1 8 6 - 8 9 , 1 9 1 - 9 3 , 195
Higher-order interest, 97n34,103, 161nl
Highest-order interests, 97-99. ™3-4.
lllnZ 124n20, 126,133-34, 143^U9n48,
155n59,161, 178n23; better called deter­
minative, 105n45; first, 99-102, 153; sec­
o n d , 103. See also Moral powers;
Person
Index
Highest-order preference function (in
utilitarianism), 94, 9 7 - 9 8
Hobbes, Thomas, 51n54, 213, 216, 2 1 8 -
223nl2
Hbffe, Otfried, 2 1 n l 2
Holmes, Stephen, 102n41
Homicide, 18, 3 0 - 3 1 , 34, 38, 129, 2 3 7 - 3 8
273
Humanism, 38, 109, 1 1 2 - 1 3
Humankind, 8 - 9 , 32, 56, 60n62, 75, 93,
182, 226, 233n21, 235, 258-59, 263. 273
275
Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 259
Ideal theory, 39, 52, 105, 126-27, 135-36,
138, 146, 149. 150n49, 187n31, 2 3 0 - 3 1 .
See also Design priority; ,\'onideal the
ory
Implementation priority (among princi­
ples of justicel, 127, 130, 136-37, 143,
170, 172-73, 180, 186-87, 196, 206. S e e
also Nonideal theory: Priority: lexical
Inalienability, 16, 52, 120, 175, 192n35
Incentives, 33, 50, 83, 120, 193n37, 194,
199, 253-54, 261
Income (and vvealthi, 84-85, 121. 125,
143-44, 168n9, 197-99: earned vs. De­
served, 8 3 - 8 5 , m i n i m u m , 32, 38,
143n39, 187n31
I n c o m e taxes, 18n5, 6 6 - 7 2 , 81, 198, 200,
203n50
Index goods, 162-63, 167-74, 177-78,
187-88, 192, 200, 203, 206; i n c o m e and
wealth, 8 4 - 8 5 . 121, 125, 143-44, 168n9,
197-99; leisure time, 115nl2, 198-99,
252-53: powers a n d prerogatives, 116,
162-63, 168, 174nl8, 198-99; residual
social bases of self-respect, 163, 168n9,
198. See also Difference principle
Index positions. 205
absolute vs. relative. 163, 198-203
lowest l o r m i n i m u m l , 169-70, 172, 1 7 8 -
79, 192 196n40, 199-201, 203, 206
best feasible m i n i m u m social mini­
m u m u n d e r difference principle),
198n44, 2 0 1 - 3 . 205
Individualism. 38, 109, 113-14, 242, 2 4 7 -
48, 250, 253-54, 258 See also C o m m u ­
nitarian ism
Inequalities:
natural, 4 5 - 4 7 , 5 6 - 5 7 , 64, 114-16,
177n22, 184n28. 188
international, 2 5 0 - 5 1
social, 64, 74. 177n22. 188
institutional. 42, 57, 64, 7 0 - 7 1 , 73.
112. 129. 2 4 7 - 4 8
in basic rights a n d liberties,
137n32, 149, 150n51, 160n67
class-induced. 166-68, 171, 173-74,
176, 178, 247, 2 5 2 n l 5
engendered, 3 4 - 3 5 , 38, 47n46, 118
278-79
established, 3 4 - 3 5 , 3 8 - 3 9 , 52, 118,
137n32, 2 7 8 - 7 9
290 Index
Inequalities tconu
g e n d e r - i n d u c e d , 39, 52, 55, 129,
148n47, 1 6 4 - 6 5 , 173, 175, 183n26,
196n42, 247, 2 5 2 n l 5 , 2 6 3 - 6 4 , 278
global, 237, 2 4 3 - 4 5 , 2 4 8 - 5 4 , 2 7 3 - 7 5 ,
279
initial, 46n43, 119
luck- induced, 175, 180, 1 9 0 - 9 1
r a c e - i n d u c e d , 129, 131, 156n60,
1 6 4 - 6 5 , 173, 183n26, 247, 2 5 2 n l 5
radical, 5n4, 3 4 - 3 5 , 120, 122, 138,
188
( s o c i o ) e c o n o m i c , 1 1 8 n l 3 , 120, 1 2 4 -
25, 1 3 8 - 3 9 , 157, Chap. 4, 250
talent-induced, 1 6 4 - 6 6 , 173-74,
176, 2 5 2 n l 5
infant mortality, 7, 33, 2 3 7 - 3 8 , 2 7 3 - 7 4
Initial situation (in contract doctrinesi,
5 3 , 1 1 0 - 1 1 . See also Original position
Institutional reform. See Reform
Institutional s c h e m e , 8 - 9 , 1 1 - 1 2 , 22, 2 9 -
32, 3 7 - 3 9 , 45, 5 5 - 5 7 , 62, 82, 101, 117,
164, 228, 276, 2 7 9 - 8 0 ; d e n n e d , 2 1 - 2 5 ,
219. See also Basic structure; Ground
rules; Practices
Institutions. S e e Institutional s c h e m e
Integrity, 5n4, 1 0 5 - 6 ; of the person: see
Basic rights a n d liberties
Interaction, 8, 2 1 - 2 8 , 46, 80, 144, 241, 248,
251, 257, 2 6 2 - 6 4 , 268. See also Coopera­
tion
I n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , 8 - 9 ; global, 241, 242n4,
251, 2 5 6 - 5 7 , 2 6 2 - 6 3 , 268
International law, 2 1 6 - 1 8 , 2 2 3 - 2 4 , 228,
235, 237, 2 4 4 - 4 6 , 249, 257, 259
Interpersonal c o m p a r i s o n s , 5, 37, 96, 109,
114, 116, 177, 183, 199, 203
Interschemic benefits/optimizing, 7 0 - 7 2 ,
76, 168, 174, 264
Interschemic c o m p a r i s o n s , 42, 7 0 - 7 1 , 73,
96, 109, 1 1 6 - 1 8 , 125, 133, 199, 2 0 3 - 5
Intraschemic benefits/optimizing, 7 1 - 7 2 ,
76
Intraschemic c o m p a r i s o n s , 116, 133
Johnson, Conrad D., 40n36
Juridical state, 2 1 6 - 1 7 . S e e a l s o State of
nature
Justice (distributive), 1 5 , 1 7 , 28, 37, 50, 84,
188, 241
c i r c u m s t a n c e s of, 93, H l n 2 , 213,
266n31
c o n c e p t i o n s of, 15, 26, 53n55, 110, 229,
235, 269
p a r o c h i a l i s m of, 24, 2 1 2 - 1 4 , 2 6 7 - 7 1
a n d stability, 9 9 - 1 0 4 , l l l n 2 , 143, 148,
171, 176, 203, 2 1 3 - 1 4 , 256, 2 5 8 - 5 9
See also Justice as fairness
criteria of, 24, 170
distribution-sensitive, 4 2 - 4 3 , 4 4 n 4 0
a n d e n d o w m e n t s , 5 6 - 5 7 , 73, 82, 1 1 4 -
16, 177
patterned, 16, 24, 2 8 - 3 1 , 37, 53
broadly consequentialist, 39, 4 2 -
44, 4 6 - 4 7 , 55, 62, 7 5 n l 2
fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t , 4 5 - 4 7 , 55,
57n59, 1 1 4 - 1 5 , 138n34, 184,
189, 275
s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t , 47, 64, 120,
138H34, 156H60, 1 8 8 - 8 9 , 196,
251-52, 274-75
d e o n t o l o g i c a l , 43, 45, 47, 5 4 - 5 5 ,
114, 120, 274
a n d publicity, 6, 42, 78, 83, 91, 96, 98,
l l l n 2 , 112, 114, 123, 126, 128, 148,
171, 172nl6, 1 7 6 - 7 7 , 206
satiahility of, 41
and specificity, 6 - 8 , 129, 141, 144,
157, 2 0 6 - 7 '
subject of, 3, 1 7 - 2 7 , 180, 2 7 4 - 7 5
h o w distinct from morality, 17, 2 6 -
27, 31, 65
h o w related to morality, 9, 11-12, 1 8 -
19, 2 5 - 2 7 , 31, 34-36,^40-43, 47n47,
55, 65, 102, 110, 227, 2 3 4 - 3 5 , 2 3 8 -
39, 270
See also Procedural justice; Retributive
justice; S e n s e of justice
Justice as fairness (Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of
justicel, 1-8, 15, 2 1 1 n l
b a s e d o n c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s , 37,
8 1 - 8 2 , 97n35, 2 1 2 - 1 5 , 258, 2 6 8 - 7 1
a n d c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n , 89, 9 4 -
98
to foster a sense of justice, 91, 9 9 - 1 0 6 ,
121, 132, 212, 214, 258, 271
initial aim of, 1 4 1 - 4 2 , 1 4 7 - 4 8
p r i m a i y a i m of, 161
Rawls's criterion of justice, 12, 110, 266
broadly c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t , 46, 5 4 - 5 5 ,
5 9 - 6 0 . 80, 114, 239, 274
disjunctive c o m b i n a t i o n of general
a n d special c o n c e p t i o n s , 122,
242 n5
d o m a i n of, 2 0 - 2 5 , 29, 266
full satisfiability n o t required, 12, 260
global e x t e n s i o n s of, 235n23, 240,
242-44, 246-72
i n d i v i d u a l i s m of, 38, 109, 1 1 3 - 1 4 , 242,
2 4 7 - 4 8 , 250, 2 5 3 - 5 4 , 258
a n d m a x i m i n , 1, 1 0 - 1 1 , 1 5 n l , 63, 8 0 -
81, 1 0 9 - 1 2 , 1 2 2 - 2 6 , 1 4 0 - 4 3 , 145,
148, 254, 2 6 4 - 6 5
a n d natural inequalities, 4 5 - 4 6 , 5 6 -
57, 6 3 - 6 4 , 7 3 - 7 5 , 1 1 4 - 1 6
a n d neutrality, 95, 9 9 , 1 0 4 , 1 1 6 - 1 7
p a r a m e t e r s of, 1 1 2 - 2 2
p a t t e r n e d , 2 8 - 2 9 , 53, 62
a n d political p r o c e s s , 9 1 , 1 5 6 - 6 0
political role of, 6 n 5 , 78, 8 2 n l 7 , 83, 91,
9 5 - 9 8 , 123
satiable, 41
s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t , 4 6 - 4 7 . 62, 64,
l l S n l l , 138n34, 1 7 2 n l 6 , 181, 2 5 1 -
52
specification of, 6 - 8 , 10, 109,112, 132,
1 3 7 - 3 8 , 1 4 7 - 4 8 , 156, 175n20, 1 9 5 -
96, 2 0 6 - 7 , 2 7 1 - 7 2

See also General c o n c e p t i o n of jus­
tice; Special c o n c e p t i o n of justice
Justification, 3 6 - 3 7 , 4 0 - 4 2 , 5 7 - 5 9 , 61, 6 4 -
65, 87, 95n31, 106, 111, 136, 213, 2 6 8 - 6 9
S e e also Reflective equilibrium
Kanbur, Ravi, 1 1 9 n l 5
Kant, Immanuel, 2, 5, 8, 27, 51n54, 88,
93n29, 99, 100n40, 104-5, 211, 213-14,
216, 233n21, 241, 256, 267
Laissez-faire, 32, 35, 38, 237, 248-49, 2 5 5 -
56, 257n20
Larmore, Charles, 3n3, 93n29, 95n31
95n33, 104n43
Law, 19n7, 3 4 - 3 5 , 8 1 - 8 2 , 192, 276; crimi­
nal, 2 2 n l 3 , 23, 8 3 - 8 4 , 9 3 - 9 5 , 100, 129,
152; international, 216-18, 2 2 3 - 2 4 « 8
235, 237, 2 4 4 - 4 6 , 249, 257, 259; rule of '
132, 145, 147, 223
Least advantaged group/class, 1-2, 9 - 1 1
4 6 - 4 7 , 70, 1 1 7 - 1 9 , 129, 157, 163, 176
1 9 7 - 9 9 , 2 0 3 - 6 , 2 7 4 - 7 5 , d e n n e d a s fixed
fraction, 2 0 4 - 5 ; as defined by Rawls
2 0 3 - 4 ; globally, 239, 2 4 2 - 4 3 , 2 5 3 - 5 4
258, 264, 268, identification of, 1 3 7 - 3 8
142n37,193
Legal freedom .effective, 128-32, 138. 1 4 5 -
46, 149-50; formal, 128, 147n4S. S e e
also Worthwhile freedom
Legislation, 3 0 - 3 1 , 91n28, 151n52, 153-60.
194n38, 202, 215, 228, 237. 2 7 1 - 7 2
Legislative stage (in Rawlsi, 140, 144,
175n20,178n23
Legitimate expectations, 51, 82, 85, 2 6 1 -
62. See also Desert; Entitlements
Leisure, 66-67, 115nl2, 198-99, 205n55,
206, 252-53
Leisure time (an index good), 115nl2.
198-99, 206, 252-53
Lexical (lexicographical serial i ordering.
See Priority: lexical
Liberalism, 2, 76, 87, 145, 213n2. 230nl9,
270, 273
Libertarianism, 24, 45-46. 49n51. 54, 57
120
Liberties. See Basic rights and liberties
Life expectancy, 33, 237
Life prospects. See Shares of social pri­
mary goods
Locke, John, 51n54, 55, 57, 6 0 - 6 1 . 211nl
213
Lockean proviso, 17n3, 49-50. 60n62 120
220nll
Luck. See Contingencies; Inequalities
Lyons, David, 40n36
Maclnlyre, Alasdair, 2n2
Macpherson, Crawford B„ 154nrf
Macroexplanations, 30-31, 2 3 / 3»
75, 279
Index 291
Majority rule, 31, 158n65, 189, 223, 228
Malnutrition a n d starvation, 35. 143n39,
226-27, 2 3 6 - 3 8 , 2 4 8 n l l , 263n24, 2 7 3 -
74, 277
Markets, 9, 35, 71n6, 187, 203, 215n5, 237,
2 4 8 n l l , 251, 264
Marshall, Geoffrey, 216n6
Marsilius (of Padual, 216n6
Martin, Rex, 7 4 n l l , 158n64, 167n7, 189n32
Master Pattern, 4 0 - 4 1 , 62, 64, 112, 177n22;
S e e also Pattern preferences; Pat-
t e m e d / u n p a t t e m e d principles
Master pattern, 30, 37, 40, 64. 252
Maximin criteria, 80, 110-12, 122-26, 248,
253, 264
Maximin idea. 1, 10-11, 63. 109-10, 117.
120
Maximin rule, 96-97, 110-12, 117, 126.
140-41, 169, 179, 242, 254. S e e also Par­
ties in original position
Maximin solution. 110, 122, 124. 134, 141,
145, 148, 242n5
Medical ihealth) care, 49n51, 138n34, §16
for natural medical conditions, 185-89,
194-95
minimally adequate, 186
standard. 186
for socially p r o d u c e d medical condi­
tions, 190-95, 198
full, 190, 192-93, 195
Medical conditions, 185, 206; natural,
185-89, 194-95, 205; self-caused, 1 9 3 -
95; socially produced. 190-95. 198, 205,
215
Medical opportunities, §16, 205. See also
Health protection
Michaelman, Frank I., 138n34. 162n2
Mill, John Stuart, 150-51, 155, 160n67. 263
Minorities, 20, 44, 92, 112n6. 142, 154, 189.
194. 246n9, 262
Mobility (social). 1 1 8 - 2 0
Modus'vivendi, 101, §§19-20; defined.
101. 219; and fundamental assurance
problem 219-21 225-27: intergovern­
mental. 222, 224-27, 229nl8, 2 3 0 - 3 1 ;
and situated assurance problem, 2 1 9 -
20, 223 233
Moral arbitrariness 63, 67, 7 5 - 7 8 , 147n4s,
250-51 253 265. S e e also Desert: Moral
deservingness
Mora! c o n c e p t i o n s 47, 8 2 n l 7 , 88, 212, 252.
269n36 281; of justice a n d of morality
distinguished, 17 2 6 - 2 7 , 31, 65; overall
of justice a n d morality). 4 2 - 4 4 : paro­
chialism of 2 1 2 - 1 4 , 267-71 S e e also
Justice Morality
Moral deservingness (worthi. 73, 77-87,
250 See also Desert
Moral philosophy, 1-2, 5, 113, 211
Moral powers, 9 7 - 9 8 , 104, 132-34, 143,
177, 181: first, 97: s e c o n d , 97, 99n36,
114 S e e also Highest-order interests;
Person
Moral theory, 211
292 Index
Moralism, 234n22, 278
Morality, 5n4, 41n37, 105, 1 0 9 - 1 0 , 113,
183n27, 235, 238, 2 4 8 n l l , 261, 275
c o n c e p t i o n s of, 44, 47, 55
deontological, 4 4
fully consequentialist. 44
semiconsequentialist, 47
political, 1 0 2 - 5 , 144n40, 159, 2 1 3 - 1 4 ,
216
subject of:
c o n c e r n e d w i t h character a n d c o n ­
duct, 3, 17, 2 5 - 2 7 , 65, 275
h o w distinct from justice, 17, 2 6 - 2 7 ,
31, 65
h o w related t o justice, 1 8 - 1 9 , 2 5 - 2 7 ,
31, 3 4 - 3 6 , 4 0 - 4 3 , 47n47, 55, 65, 110,
238-39
S e e also Responsibility
Moralized g r o u n d rules, 8 1 - 8 2 , 8 4 - 8 5 ,
224nl4
Morgenthau, Hans, 234n22
Motivation/motives, 6, 30, 9 9 - 1 0 0 , 1 0 3 - 6 ,
115, 138, 1 6 6 - 6 7 , 1 7 1 - 7 2 , 219, 225, 269;
moral, 9 1 , 1 0 4
Musgrave, R. A., H O n l , 198n45
Mutual benefit (advantage), 20, 60, 220,
226, 236, 2 6 3 - 6 4
Mutual disinterest (of parties), 92, l l l n 2
Nagel, T h o m a s , H O n l , 237n27
Nation slate. See Stale
Nationality (a contingency!, 247
Natural assets; of p e r s o n s : see E n d o w ­
m e n t s ; of States, 222, 2 4 0 - 4 1 , 2 5 0 - 5 2 ,
2 5 6 n l 8 , 2 6 4 - 6 5 , 274
Natural duties, 2 2 n l 3 , 2 4 n l 9 , 42, 78, 8 1 -
82, 8 4 - 8 5 , 113, 189n32, 238, 2 5 0 n l 2 ; d u ­
ties c o n c e r n i n g injury a n d cruelty, 85;
d u t i e s c o n c e r n i n g the justice of s h a r e d
institutions, 32, 3 4 - 3 5 , 82, 211, 238, 267,
2 7 6 - 7 7 , 279n42; duties of mutual aid,
183n27, 189n32,193n36, 238; negative
VS. positive, 32, 3 4 - 3 5 , 238, 2 7 6 - 7 7 ,
279n42
Natural primary g o o d s . See Goods a n d
ills
Natural rights, 78, 81. S e e also Natural d u ­
ties
N e e d s (human), 44, 46, 56, 8 8 - 8 9 , 1 1 4 - 1 6
basic social a n d e c o n o m i c , 1 0 , 1 3 3 - 4 7 ,
180, 232, 275
outlined, 133
medical, 57n59, 1 1 5 , 1 8 1 - 8 9
special, 47n45, 275
See also Standard n e e d s
Neutrality, 95, 9 9 , 1 0 4 , 224, 268; meta-
procedural, 95n31; procedural, 95
N e w Deal, 3 1 - 3 2 , 3 4 - 3 5 , 238, 270, 2 7 8
Noncompliance, 54-56, 61,100-101,121,
2 2 3 - 2 4 , 231, 236n25, 2 4 4 - 4 5 . S e e a l s o
A s s u r a n c e problem; C o m p l i a n c e
N o n i d e a l theory, 8, 12, 39n32, 5 2 , 1 0 5 n 4 6 ,
1 2 6 - 2 7 , 130, 1 3 5 - 3 7 , 1 3 9 , 1 4 5 - 4 7 ,
149n48, 159, 258n22. See also Ideal the­
o i y ; I m p l e m e n t a t i o n priority; Transi­
tion
Nozick. Robert. 2 - 3 , C h a p 1, 78, 120,
157n61
a n d anarchis m, 2 4 n l 9 , 58
a n d capitalism, 48n48, 58
and c o m p e n s a t i o n . 35n29, 48n48,
49n50, 6 0 n 6 2
for b o r d e r c r o s s i n g s , 19n6, 8 5 n l 9
a n d constraints:
c o n s i s t e n c y , 51
equality, 3 8 - 3 9 , 4 5 - 4 6 , 52, 5 7 - 5 9
exhaustiveness, 51-52, 57-58
relatedness, 52
a n d desert, 65, 7 8 - 8 1 , 83, 85
a n d e n d o w m e n t s , 6 4 - 6 5 , 6 8 - 6 9 , 71-76,
251
a n d e n t i t l e m e n t s , 15, 1 7 - 2 0 , 28, 3 5 - 3 6 ,
46, 48n48, 51, 5 9 n 6 1 , 65, 69, 72, 78, 265
a n d e x p l a n a t i o n , 3 0 - 3 1 , 59, 157n61
a n d harnessing, 6 8 - 6 9 , 7 1 - 7 2
a n d initial rights, 4 6 n 4 3 , 52, 5 7 - 5 9 , 120
a n d Ujcke, 48, 55, 6 0 - 6 1
a n d Lockean proviso, 17n3, 4 9 - 5 0 ,
60n62, 120
a n d original grounrirules, 5 9 - 6 1
and original position, 5 3 - 5 5
a n d p a t t e r n e d p r i n c i p l e s , 16, 24, 2 8 - 3 1 ,
37, 53, 6 2
and property, 1 5 - 2 0 , 3 2 - 3 3 , 3 6 - 3 7 , 39,
48n48, 52, 5 8 - 6 1
a n d s i d e c o n s t r a i n t s , 15, 1 8 - 2 0 , 28, 3 5 -
36, 51
a n d slavery, 16, 4 5 - 4 6 , 4 8 - 5 0
a n d Utopia, 54, 56, 61
See also P a t t e m e d / u n p a t t e r n e d princi­
ples
O p p o r t u n i t i e s , 33, 116, 118, 122, 156n60,
157, § § 1 4 - 1 6 , 197, 205, 215, 248, 256; ed­
ucational, §15, 191, 1 9 5 - 9 7 , 205, 215;
e m p l o y m e n t , 1 8 0 - 8 1 , 191, 205; medical,
§16, 205; w h e t h e r a social primary
g o o d , 161, 1 6 7 - 7 0 , 1 7 5 - 7 6
O p p o r t u n i t y p r i n c i p l e , 10n7, 127n25,
147n46, 157, 158n64, § § 1 4 - 1 6 , 197, 205,
215n5, 250, 2 5 4
c i t e d , 123
four readings d i s c u s s e d , 1 6 6 - 7 3
revision of:
fair equality, 1 6 6 - 7 3
of e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s (ac­
c e s s to m i n i m a l l y a d e q u a t e e d u ­
cation), 1 7 2 - 8 0 , 196
of e m p l o y m e n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s (ac­
c e s s to m i n i m a l l y a d e q u a t e e m ­
p l o y m e n t ) , 1 8 0 - 8 1 , 196
of m e d i c a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s (access t o
m i n i m a l l y a d e q u a t e h e a l t h pro­
t e c t i o n for natural, a n d to full
h e a l t h p r o t e c t i o n for socially
p r o d u c e d medical conditions),
183-96
formal equality, 155, 1 6 8 - 7 1 , 1 7 3 - 7 5 ,

177-80
of e d u c a t i o n a l opportunities, 180,
196
of e m p l o y m e n t opportunities, 180,
196
of m e d i c a l opportunities, 1 8 2 - 8 3 ,
196
O p p r e s s i o n , 5, 1 1 - 1 2 , 132, 230, 260,
267n32, 273, 275, 277
Original p o s i t i o n (in Rawls), 2, 24, 28, 37,
53n56, 73n9, 8 1 - 8 2 , 87, 92, 9 5 - 9 6 , 1 1 0 -
12, 136, 141, 148, 183, 213n2, 2 4 1 - 4 2 ,
272; central features of, l l l n 2 ; a n d
global justice, §22; Nozickian analogue
to, 5 3 - 5 5 . See also Initial situation; Par­
ties i n original position; Veil of igno­
rance
Orwell, George, 48
Overlapping c o n s e n s u s , 4, 144n40, 2 1 3 -
16, 269. S e e also Political morality;
Value overlap
Packages. S e e Basic rights a n d liberties
Parfit, Derek, 70n5
Participation, 22, 32, 113, 144-45, 158n63,
1 8 1 - 8 2 , 185, 2 1 9 - 2 1 , 276
political, 38, 93, 117, 153, 188, 2 4 9 - 5 0
principle of equal, 154
Parties in original position, 4 6 - 4 7 , 56-57,
89, 9 2 - 9 3 , 9 6 - 9 8 , 100, 110-13, 123, 1 2 5 -
27, 1 2 9 - 3 0 , 1 3 5 - 3 6 , 139-42, 144n42, 266,
271n39
global, 2 4 2 - 4 9 , 2 5 3 - 5 4 , 256-58, 272
as representatives of states, 243, 2 4 7 -
50, 253
as mutually disinterested, 92, l l l n 2
as risk-averse, 53, 110-12, 1 2 0 - 2 1 ,
1 2 4 - 2 5 , 138n34, 148, 160, 173
See also Clients; Maximin rule; Origi­
nal position; Veil of ignorance
Paternalism, 48n49, 49, 52, 120,195
Pattern features, 50, 65
e n g e n d e r e d vs. established, 12,16, 2 8 -
36, 4 5 - 4 8 , 5 4 - 5 6 , 118, 164, 274, 2 7 8 -
80
distinguished, 38-39
Pattern preferences, 2 8 - 2 9 , 36-37, 53, 55,
59, 6 1 - 6 2 , 65, 71n6, 73, 8 0 - 8 1 ; How-
c o m p o n e n t , 3 7 - 3 8 , 51, 109-10; What-
c o m p o n e n t , 3 7 - 3 8 , 50, 109; Who-
c o m p o n e n t , 3 7 - 3 8 , 1 0 9 . See also Master
Pattern
Patterned/unpatterned principles, 16, 24,
2 8 - 3 1 , 37, S3, 62
Person, 44, 120
Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of, 3, Chap. 2, 112
14, 116, 1 3 3 - 3 4 , 143, 161, 243, 247-48,
252
political role of, 91, 9 8 , 1 0 5 - 6 , 1 1 2
rationale for, 9 9 - 1 0 4
Sandel's c o n c e p t i o n of, 73n8, 86n20,
90n25, 9 2 - 9 4 , 1 1 3 - 1 4
u s e d as m e a n s , 6 3 - 6 4 , 6 8 - 6 9 , 7 2 - 7 4
See also Self
Index 293
Peters, R. S., 216n6
Pettit, Philip, HOnl, 213n2
Philosophy, 2, 4 - 8 , 39n33, 57, 60, 75 94
125, 206-7, 211, 2 1 4 - 1 5 ; moral, 1-2, 5,
113, 211; political, 1-6, 2 4 n l 9 , 53, 98,
2 1 1 - 1 3 , 235
Plato, 4,165n5
Pluralism, 232; international, 2 3 0 - 3 3
Police, 31, 33, 49n51, 135, 147n45. 191, 194
276
Political liberties. S e e Basic rights and lib­
erties
Political morality (kernel of), 102-5,
144n40,159, 2 1 3 - 1 4 , 216. S e e also Over­
lapping c o n s e n s u s
Political philosophy, 1-6, 2 4 n l 9 , 53, 98,
211-13, 235
Political process, 91, 94, 117. 135, 145, §13,
148n46, 271n39
a case of procedural justice, 151
imperfect, 91n28, 153, 155. 202,
249nl2
perfect, 153, 203
pure, 91, 110, 153, 155, 157, 159, 185,
188, 190, 197, 200, 2 4 9 n l 2
evaluated by its fairness and reliability,
153, 159
fairness of (basic political liberties),
134n28, 145, 150-51, 153-54, 156, 159,
160n67, 2 4 9 - 5 0
reliability of (just outcomes). 158-59
qua first principle. 156-57, 1 5 9 - 6 0
qua s e c o n d principle, 157-60, 197
qua difference principle, 157-59,
200-203
qua opportunity principle, 157,
169, 179-80, 185, 187-94
S e e also Democracy; Legislation
Poverty. See Deprivations
Power" 100-102, 104n43, 145. 156, 216-23,
226-31, 234-36, 238. 242, 274-77; bal­
ance of, 214, 218, 221, 225, 234n22. See
also Bargaining p o w e r
Powers and prerogatives (an index good',
116, 162-63, 168. 174nl8, 198-99. 206
Practices, 17-18, 2 1 - 2 3 , 4 0 - 4 1 , 78. S e e
also Ground rules; Institutional s c h e m e
Prices, 49, 66, 72, 74, 125, 144, 189, 2 4 9 n l l ,
264
Primacy of the practical, 1-6, 12, 136, 142,
211-14, 269, 2 7 5 - 7 6
Primary goods. S e e Goods and ills; Social
primary goods
Principles. S e e Special conception of jus­
tice
Priority:
of domestic over global principles, 2 5 5 -
57
of the least advantaged, 2, 9 - 1 0 , 127,
137, 206, 258, 274, 277
lexical. 16nl, 44, 205
of first over s e c o n d principle, 10, 38,
47n46, 96, 122, 125-31, 134-49, 160,
162-64, 206, 243n7
394 Index
Priority Icont.)
of o p p o r t u n i t y over difference princi­
ple, 1 6 1 - 6 2 , 167, 169, 1 7 2 n l 6 ,
196n40, 206
u n d e r s t o o d a s d e s i g n priority, 127,
1 3 6 - 3 7 , 143, 170, 173, 187n31, 196
u n d e r s t o o d a s i m p l e m e n t a t i o n pri­
ority, 127, 1 3 6 - 3 7 , 143, 170, 1 7 2 - 7 3 ,
180, 1 8 6 - 8 7 , 1 9 6 , 206;
See also Special c o n c e p t i o n of justice
of the right o v e r the g o o d , 8 7 - 8 9
See also Good; Right
of the self over its e n d s , 87, 89
See also Self
Procedural justice, 1 5 1 - 5 3
imperfect, 1 5 1 - 5 2
in e c o n o m i c s y s t e m (market), 203
in political p r o c e s s , 91n28, 153, 155,
202, 2 4 9 n l 2
perfect, 1 5 1 - 5 2
in e c o n o m i c s y s t e m (market), 203
in political p r o c e s s , 153, 203
pure, 29, 3 6 - 3 7 , 39, 53, 1 5 1 - 5 2
in e c o n o m i c s y s t e m (market), 203
in political p r o c e s s , 91, 110, 153, 155,
157, 159, 185, 188, 190, 197, 200,
249nl2
Property rights, 1 5 - 2 0 , 23, 27, 3 2 - 3 3 , 3 6 -
37, 39, 48n48, 52, 5 7 - 6 1 , 1 3 2 , 1 4 5 ,
2 3 0 n l 9 , 261
national, 2 5 1 - 5 2 , 264
See also Natural a s s e t s
Prudential equilibrium c o n d i t i o n , 2 1 9 - 2 0 .
See also Bargaining equilibrium
Public g o o d s , 157, 1 7 0 n l 3 , 200
Publicity (of criteria of justice), 6, 42, 91,
96, 98, 112, 114, 123, 126, 1 7 2 n l 6
P u n i s h m e n t . S e e Retributive justice
Pure p r o c e d u r a l justice. See Procedural
justice
Quality of life, 46, 57n59, 114, 188
Race, 16, 27, 129, 131, 147n46, 156, 1 6 4 - 6 5 ,
185, 247, 2 5 2 n l 5 , 271
Raz, J o s e p h , 2 6 n 2 1 , 41n38, 95n31
Realism, 2 3 4 n 2 2
Redistribution, 27, 29, 36, 65, 68, 72, 250;
m i s l e a d i n g n e s s of the term, 1 7 , 1 8 n 5 .
See also R e s o u r c e redistribution princi­
ple
Redress, p r i n c i p l e of, 1 7 6 - 7 7
Reflective equilibrium, 2, 5 , 1 1 0 , 211, 268
Reform:
of institutions, 8 , 1 1 - 1 2 , 27, 32, 34, 51,
1 2 6 - 2 7 , 135, 137, 139n35, 1 4 5 - 4 6 ,
2 0 6 - 7 , 2 1 4 - 1 5 , 2 6 0 - 6 1 , 271, 2 7 4 - 7 9
economic, 118nl3,135
e d u c a t i o n a l , 176, 180
global, 216, 231, 2 3 4 - 3 6 , 238, 2 4 5 - 4 6 ,
249, 2 5 7 n 2 1 , 2 5 9 - 6 0 , 262, 2 6 7 - 7 0 ,
2 7 4 - 7 5 , 277, 279n42
of o t h e r s o c i e t i e s , 246, 256, 257n21
of political p r o c e s s , 153, 158
pseudo-, 253-54
social a n d e c o n o m i c , 160, 177n22
of p e r s o n s , 27
Reiman, Jeffrey, 198n45
Religion, 20, 90, 91n27, 9 6 - 9 8 , 1 0 5 - 6 , 133,
149n47, 196n42, 2 2 7 - 2 9 , 268n35, 2 7 2 -
73; Christian d o c t r i n e s , 1 0 9 - 1 0 , 2 3 8 - 3 9 ,
2 6 9 - 7 0 ; history of, 228, 229; religious
liberties, 96, 1 3 2 , 1 3 4 n 2 8
Representative equal c i t i z e n (in Rawls),
1 2 4 - 2 5 , 137
Representative g r o u p s , 70, 109, 1 1 7 - 1 9 ,
176n21, 197, 206; d e n n e d , 137, 2 0 3 - 4 .
S e e also Least a d v a n t a g e d
R e s o u r c e redistribution p r i n c i p l e (in
Beitz), 241, 2 5 0 - 5 2
Responsibility, 1 1 4 , 1 2 0 , 1 9 3 , 1 9 5 , 198n44,
2 4 9 n l l , 255
for injustice, 9, 1 1 - 1 2 , 2 6 - 2 7 , 31, 102,
2 1 0 - 1 1 , 227, 2 3 4 - 3 5 , 237, 270
related to negative d u t i e s , 3 1 - 3 2 , 3 4 -
35, 2 3 8 - 3 9 , 2 7 6 - 7 8
See also W r o n g
Retributive justice, 2 2 n l 3 , 23, 78, 8 1 - 8 5 ,
9 3 - 9 5 , 100, 152, 224
Richards, David A. J., 241n3, 263
Right, 4 2 - 4 3 , 8 7 - 8 9 , l l l n 2 . See also Good;
Priority: of t h e right over the g o o d
Rights, 18, 30, 32, 37, 5 1 - 5 2 , 5 9 n 6 1 , 123,
194n38, 274; alienability of, 16, 52, 120;
d i s t i n g u i s h e d from v a l u e s , 1 9 - 2 0 ; h u ­
man, 239, 246n9, 272; moral, 32, 59, 113,
2 6 1 - 6 2 ; natural, 60n62, 78, 81; negative
and positive, 32, 238; of states, 2 4 4 - 4 5 ,
2 4 7 - 4 8 , 2 5 1 - 5 2 , 258; utilitarianism of,
20; to welfare, 138n34, 215n5. S e e also
Basic rights a n d liberties; Property
rights
Risk, 22, 31, 34, 112n6, 1 2 0 - 2 2 , 147n46,
1 8 8 , 1 9 1 - 9 5 , 236; in t h e original p o s i ­
tion, 135, 1 3 8 - 3 9 , 141, 146, 170, 1 7 2 n l 6 ,
178,185, 200
Risk a v e r s e n e s s .
of g o v e r n m e n t s , 2 2 2 - 2 3 , 2 2 5 - 2 6 , 231,
244
of parties in original p o s i t i o n , 53, 1 1 0 -
12, 1 2 0 - 2 1 , 1 2 4 - 2 5 , 138n34, 148, 160,
173
See also M a x i m i n rule
R o u s s e a u , Jean-Jacques, 155, 2 1 1 n l , 213
Rule of law, 132, 145, 147, 223. See also
Basic rights a n d liberties
Sandel, Michael, 2 n 2 , 3, 2 6 n 2 1 , 9 5 n 3 2
a n d desert, 7 6 - 7 7 , 7 9 - 8 0 , 83, 8 5 - 8 6
a n d e n d o w m e n t s , 6 4 n l , 67n3, 6 8 - 6 9 ,
72-76
o n priorities, 8 7 - 8 9
o n t h e self:
as Rawls c o n c e i v e s it, 77, 7 9 - 8 0 , 8 5 -

91, 96
a s Sandel c o n c e i v e s it, 73n8, 86n20,
90n25, 9 2 - 9 4 , 1 1 3 - 1 4
S c a n l o n , T. M., 47n45, 7 5 n l 2 , 1 1 4 n l 0 ,
1 1 8 n l 3 , 204n52, 2 4 1 n 3
Scores, 204n53
first-principle (X-scores), 1 2 3 - 2 7 ,
131n27, 134, 1 3 7 - 3 8 , 142n37, 149,
150n49
second-principle (socioeconomic), 2 3 -
27, 134, 1 3 7 - 3 8
i n d e x (Z-scores), 201, 2 0 5 - 6
o p p o r t u n i t y (Y-scores), 179 (Graph 2),
205-6
triscores, 2 0 5 - 6
S e c o n d principle, 10n7, 38, 1 1 8 n l 4 , 1 2 3 -
28, 1 3 5 - 3 9 , 147, C h a p . 4, 250
cited, 123
d e m o c r a t i c - e q u a l i t y interpretation of,
1 6 5 - 6 8 , 174
four r e a d i n g s of, d i s c u s s e d , 1 6 8 - 7 3
e x c l u d e d from c o n s t i t u t i o n , 1 5 8 - 5 9 ,
161
global, 2 5 0 - 5 3 , 263, 272
liberal-equality interpretation of, 1 6 5 -
66
natural-liberty interpretation of, 165,
168nl0
a n d political p r o c e s s , 1 5 7 - 6 0
See also Difference principle; Oppor­
tunity principle
S e c o n d - p r i n c i p l e g o o d s , 124, 1 2 8 , 1 5 8 n 6 3 .
See also I n d e x g o o d s ; Opportunities;
Socioeconomic positions
Self (subject), 77, 80, 8 6 - 9 0 , 99; "deon­
tological," 77, 7 9 - 8 0 , 8 5 - 9 1 , 96; a s prior
to its e n d s (Sandel), 87, 89. See also Per­
son
Self-determination (self-government),
1 5 4 - 5 5 , 244, 2 5 8 n 2 2
Self-interest, 5, 34, 72n6, 9 9 - 1 0 0 , 155, 2 2 3 -
28, 269
Self-respect, 33, 153n55, 162-63, 170,
1 7 1 n l 4 , 1 7 4 - 7 8 , 1 8 1 - 8 2 , 186, 196n42
natural b a s e s of, 177n22
social b a s e s of, 116, 1 5 0 n 5 1 , 1 6 2 - 6 4 , 176
Social systems (societies), 17, 2 0 - 2 6 , 3 3 -
residual social b a s e s of (an index
g o o d ) , 163, 168n9, 198, 199n45, 206
Self-restraint, 219, 2 2 3
Semiconsequentialism:
for justice, 6 4 , 1 2 0 , 1 3 8 n 3 4 , 156n60,
172nl6, 188-89,196, 251-52, 274-75
d e f e n d e d , 5 5 - 5 7 , 114-16, 143,
177n22, 1 8 3 - 8 5 , 189
d e f i n e d , 47, 62
a n d m e d i c a l care, 1 1 5 , 1 8 1 , 1 8 3 - 8 4 ,
Socialism, 132, 145,158n65, 2 0 1 - 3 , 215n5,
188-89,196
for morality, 47
S o c i o e c o n o m i c positions, 130, 134n28,
Sen, Amartya K., 39n33, 4 6 - 4 7 , H O n l , 114,
H S n l l , 143n39, 184, 2 4 9 n l l
S e n s e of justice, 85, 91, 9 9 - 1 0 6 , 1 2 1 , 1 3 2 ,
212, 214, 228, 258, 271
Serial ordering. See Priority: lexical
Index 295
Shares of social primary g o o d s (or social
positions), 4 6 - 4 7 , 5 6 - 5 7 , 1 1 4 - 1 7 , 124,
137,156n60, 1 9 1 - 9 3
c o n c e i v e d as lifetime ex post shares,
1 1 8 - 2 2 , 129, 165, 183n26, 198n44, 252
c o n c e i v e d as representative shares,
117-18, 137
worst (or m i n i m u m ) share, 1, 25, 41-44,
73, 1 1 0 - 1 2 , 115, 117-24, 127, 135-37,
141-42, 204, 206, 2 5 1 - 5 4 , 2 7 4 - 7 5 , 277
best feasible m i n i m u m share (social
m i n i m u m ) , 12, 71,117, 190-91, 194,
253, 260
Shue, Henry, 105n46
Side constraints (in Nozick), 15, 18-20, 28,
3 5 - 3 6 , 51
Sidgwick, Henry, 2 1 3 - 1 4
Singer, Peter, 113n7
Slaveholder's argument (in Rawls), 260n23
Slavery/slaves, 11, 16, 20, 23, 27, 35, 41, 4 5 -
46, 4 8 - 5 0 , 112n4, 122nl8, 132, 262, 2 7 8 -
79
Smith, Adam, 144n41
Smoking, 91, 193
Social contract doctrines, 2 4 - 2 5 , 28n23,
40, 5 3 - 5 5 , 57, 87, 93, 110, 204n52, 211,
228, 2 4 1 - 4 2 , 256
Social m i n i m u m , 12, 71,117, 1 9 0 - 9 1 , 194,
253, 260
u n d e r first principle, 136-37, 139, 1 4 3 -
46, 160, 2 0 1 - 2 , 275
u n d e r s e c o n d principle, 144
u n d e r difference principle, 198n44,
2 0 1 - 3 , 205
u n d e r opportunity principle, 178-79,
181,186-89
Social mobility, 1 1 8 - 2 0
Social positions. See Shares of social pri­
mary g o o d s
Social primary g o o d s , 43, 64, 96-99, 114-
19, 1 2 2 - 2 4 , 1 4 3 , 1 5 6 n 6 0 , 2 0 5 - 6 ; and
standard n e e d s , 46, 56, 133; u s e d to
identify and to compare social posi­
tions, 133, 2 0 3 - 6 . See also Basic rights
and liberties; Second-principle goods;
Shares of social primary g o o d s
34, 6 1 - 6 2 , 92, 102-4, 242-43, 2 4 5 - 4 6
as consisting of two parts (in Rawls),
123, 138-39, 148
global, 215, 265, 279
self-contained, 7, 25, 240-43, 254, 2 6 2 -
63
well-ordered, 99, 104, 106, 2 6 5 - 6 6
just, 6, 28n23, 105n46, 106. 136,
158n65
2 2 9 - 3 0 , 233, 235n23
138 147-48, 162, 170, 205n54, 253-54, of
least advantaged, 11, 157, 167; worst,
123, 137, 140, 142, 146, 157, 163, 168. .See
also Second principle
296 Index
Sovereignty, 2 1 6 - 1 7 , 245. 254, 2 5 7 - 5 8 ,
2 6 4 - 6 5 , 2 7 4 ; absolute, d o g m a of, 2 1 6 - 1 7
Special c o n c e p t i o n (two principles) of
justice, § § 1 1 - 1 2 , 242n5, 243n7, 272;
cited, 123; r e a s o n s against, §11; strat­
egies for improving, 1 3 5 - 4 2 ; s u g g e s t e d
revision of, 1 4 2 - 4 7 . See also A m e n d ­
ment; C o n d i t i o n s ; General c o n c e p t i o n
of justice; Priority, lexical
Stability, l l l n 2 , 143, 148, 171, 176, 2 1 3 - 1 4 ,
2 5 8 - 5 9 ; a n d equilibrium, 9 9 - 1 0 4 , 245;
international, 203, 256. See also As­
s u r a n c e problem; S e n s e of justice
Standard n e e d s , 1 4 3 - 4 4 , 156n60
a n d social primary g o o d s , 46, 56, 133
standard basic n e e d s , 143n39
a n d first-principle g o o d s , 147, 149,
1 5 6 - 5 7 , 196, 277
standard basic s o c i o e c o n o m i c n e e d s ,
144, 157,160, 196n41, 1 9 7 - 9 8 , 203,
205n55, 206, 275
a n d first-principle social mini­
m u m , 143-46, 275
Standard of living (in Sen), 46, 114. See
also Quality of life
Starting positions, 1 1 9 - 2 0 , 215n5
Starvation. S e e Malnutrition a n d starva­
tion
State:
minimal state, 24, 5 4 - 5 5 , 59, 61
n a t i o n state, 226, 230, 234n22, 235, 2 4 3 -
45, 2 4 7 - 5 4 , 2 5 6 - 5 8 , 276n41
institution of, 9 - 1 0 , 2 5 7 - 5 8 , 2 6 4 - 6 5 ,
274
w o r l d state, 156, 2 1 6 - 1 7 , 222
State of nature, 2 4 n l 9 , 49n50, 55, 59, 61,
216-17
Strains of c o m m i t m e n t , 1 0 5 n 4 6 , 1 1 2 , 1 1 5 ,
120, 122, 146, 170, 2 2 4 n l 4 , 235, 2 4 4 - 4 5
Talents. See E n d o w m e n t s
Taxes, 23, 3 3 , 1 0 6 , 186, 194, 215; o n g a s ­
oline, 91, 192n35,194; head, 64, 79, 251;
i n c o m e , 18n5, 6 6 - 7 2 , 81, 198, 200,
203n50; international, 2 5 6 n l 8 , 2 6 4 - 6 5
Taylor, Michael, 93n29
Third World, 237n28, 238, 257n20, 262, 269
Threat advantage, 101, 220, 246. See also
Bargaining p o w e r
Transition, 8, 59, 105n46, 145, 229, 234n22,
2 3 6 , 2 5 9 - 6 0 , 2 6 3 5 e e a/so I m p l e m e n t a ­
tion priority; Nonideal theory
Triscores. S e e Scores
Trust(worthiness), 220, 2 2 2 - 2 3 , 229, 2 3 3 -
34, 236, 245. See also A s s u r a n c e p r o b ­
lem
Tuck, Richard, 16n2
T w o p r i n c i p l e s . See Justice as fairness;
Special c o n c e p t i o n of justice
Ultimate values, 224, 228, 234n22
Unfreedom, 41, 48, 130, 133, 277
United Nations, 246n9; Security Council,
217, 2 2 3 n l 3 , 274
United States, 6, 10, 35, 1 1 8 n l 3 , 125, 131,
134, 140, 142, 1 5 3 - 5 5 , 158n64, 187n31,
195n39, 2 1 2 - 1 5 , 217n8, 263n24, 2 6 4 - 6 5 ,
267n33, 270; D e c l a r a t i o n of I n d e p e n ­
d e n c e , 16, 212, 267; M e d i c a i d , 187n31;
N e w Deal, 3 1 - 3 2 , 3 4 - 3 5 , 238, 270, 278,
O c c u p a t i o n a l Safety a n d Health A d m i n ­
istration, 195n39; S u p r e m e Court,
217n8
Universal Declaration of H u m a n Rights,
239, 272
U n m o r a l i z e d g r o u n d rules, 8 1 - 8 6 , 2 2 4 n l 4
Utilitarianism, 4 0 - 4 4 , 47, 48n48, 59n61, 75,
96, 114, 116, 1 1 8 n l 9 , 135n29, 1 4 1 - 4 2 ,
161, 184; a n d h i g h e s t - o r d e r preference
f u n c t i o n , 94, 9 7 - 9 8
Utilitarianism of rights, 20
Utopia, lin Nozick), 54, 56, 61
Value overlap, 102, 2 2 8 - 2 9 , 234, 2 7 0 - 7 1 .
See also Overlapping c o n s e n s u s
Van Dyke, Vernon, 113n8
Veil of i g n o r a n c e , 28, 53, 93, 100, 111, 178,
188, 191, 242, 247, 257
lifting of (four stages), 140, 144, 155-56,
178n23, 202, 2 7 1 - 7 2
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a g e (convention),
2 0 1 - 2 , 271
legislative stage, 140, 144, 175n20,
178n23
See also Original p o s i t i o n ; Parties in
original p o s i t i o n
Virtual r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , 93, 188, 193
Walzer, Michael, 2n2, 2 4 8 n l 0
War, 9, 93, 219, 227, 230, 235, 244, 246, 260
Wealth, 27, 30, 51n53, 83, 139, 145n43,
151n52, 253. See also I n d e x g o o d s
Welfare, 18n5, 23, 42, 56, 64, 144, 215n5;
rights to, 138n34, 2 1 5 n 5
W e l l - o r d e r e d n e s s , 99, 104, 106, 266; of
w o r l d s o c i e t y , 156, 216, 244, 2 6 5 - 6 6
W e l l - p r o t e c t e d n e s s (of basic rights), 6 - 7 ,
1 2 8 - 2 9 , 147, 192, 215
Williams, Bernard, 2 n 2 , 90n26, 1 0 4 - 6
Wolff, Robert Paul, 2 0 n l l , 6 0 n 6 2
World, 7 - 9 , 1 1 - 1 2 , 36, 60, 86n20, C h a p s .
5-6
World g o v e r n m e n t / s t a t e , 156, 2 1 6 - 1 7 , 222
W o r t h w h i l e (worth of) f r e e d o m , 1 2 7 - 3 4 ,
1 4 2 , 1 4 5 . See also Legal f r e e d o m
Wrong, 2 6 - 2 7 , 31, 34, 36n30, 81, 84, 2 3 4 -
35, 273, 2 7 6 - 7 8 . S e e also Blameworthi­
ness; Responsibility