lslam in the Balkans
Broun
he fear of a resurgenl mifitant Islam is gowing rr
parts of Europe. "The situation in southeastem Europe
will soon require the formation of a new Balkan alliance
of Orttrodox countries, including Serbia Bulgaria and Greece,
in order to resist the encroachment of Islam." This is the snrdied
opinion of Vuk Draskovic, flamboyant leader of Serbia's largest
opposition party, the Serbian Renewal Movement, which, like
Serb President Milosevic's govemment, seeks to recreate a Great-
er Serbia. Draskovic is not the only Balkan politician to voice
such fears. I would argue, however, that any present problem
conceming Islam in the Balkans lies not with tlrc Muslims them-
selves but with other people's projections of them.
With tire partial collapse of communism, atrd the consequent
destabilization of the Balkans, national chauvinism made its ugly
r€enffance. If the Serb-Croat confrontation is the immediate flash
point, ancient memories are stirring, not least those of five cen-
turies of subjugation to tlrc Ottoman Turkish yoke. At its great-
est extent in Europe, the Ottoman empire included much of
what is today Hungary and Yugoslavia and the whole of Romania
Bulgaria, Albania and Greece.
The llttoman Empire
The Ottoman Empire got an undeservedly bad name in the West.
Much of the time it provided a model of religrous and culnral
toleration, comparing favorably with Christian Europe of the
Reformation and Counter-Reformation. The Orthodox, who ac-
count for most Balkan Christiaru, had no doubt as to whose
mle they prefened, MusLim or Catholic! Christians and Jews,
provided they recognized Ottoman ru1e and paid tlrcir taxes prompt-
ly, were allowed almost complete local self-govemment. The
Turks had no sustained interest in large-scale conversion because
their empire was largely dependent on the exfa poll-tax paid
by non-Muslims.
Those who did convert to Islam, did so primarily for higher
social status, as with the feudal nobilities of Albania and Bosni4
or to escape taxation. So the roots of Balkan Islam do not run
deep; the new Minister of Culture in Albania, the only predomi-
nantly Muslim counffy in Europe, told Ron MacMillan of News
Network Intemational that today Albanians realize that their
underlying national faith is Cluistianity. Although atrocities were
committed by bodr sides during the Balkan peoples' struggle
for independence, these were ftu€ black spots in five centuries
ol peaceful MusLim-Chnstian co-existence.
When the Ottoman Empire finally collapsed in 1912, almost
all the Turkish ruling classes, administrators, intelligentsia and
large landownen withdrew to a Turkey soon to be shaken by
Kemel Atanrrk and secularism. Turks who stayed on were main-
Janice A.
ly peace-loving people, peasants, artisans and traders. The Islam-
ic communiSr experienced a reversal of social status, except in
Bosnia and southem Albania where local landownen were
indigenous Muslims. The only Turkish minorities of any size
werc to be found in areas adjacent to Turkey, in southeast Bul-
garia and in Greek Thrace.
Any present problem concerning Islam
in the Balkans lies not with the Muslims
themselves but with other people's
projections of them.
Between 1920 wtd 1928, wi*r the repatriation of 380,000
Turks in exchange forovera million Greeks from Turkey, Greece's
Turkish minority fell fiom 13.9 percent to a mere 1.6 percent.
Hostility between Greece and Turkey has left their status in
unsatisfactory condition. On tire other hand, Bulgaria's Turks
and Pomaks (Slavs who converted to Islam), enjoyed parliamen-
tary representation and religious, culnral and local autonomy.
During the Second World War Bulgaria added about a half
million to its Muslim population by taking over the southem
Danube delta, the Dobrudzha, with its Turks and Tatars, and
thus reduced Romania's Muslim minori{ to a negligible 45,000
or 0.2 percent. Under communism, ttrese Muslims fared no wone
than most other religious groups, keeping their places of wonhip.
Four decades of Communist penecution put all Islanic
development into cold storage except in Yugoslavia. There the
six million Muslims, Slavs and Albanians, enjoyed more tol-
erance than elsewhere, and an autonomy equal to that of the
Christian churches. They even got around the ban on religious
schools for children. They benefited particularly from Tito's tactical
promotion of close relations with *re Arab world. In conffast,
Bulgaria's Muslims shared at fint ttre sarne severe restrictions
and subordination to state confol as the Christian churches. But
in the latler half of Communist rule, they fared wone in the
face of a brutal campaign to eradicate ttreir ethnic, cultural and
religious consciousness. Wone still, Albania's two million Mus-
lims officially ceased to exist as all religion became illegal and
churches and mosques were closed.
As we look at ttle cunent sifuation in several countries we
must recognize the unreliability of all demographic statistics from
Communist-ruled countries. Accurate, upto-date statistics are not
yet available since the governments of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria,
and even Greece's democratic one, have had ethnic axes to grind.
With an overall rise in living standards, the Muslim birtlrate
November-December 199 I lFreedom Reviev' 31
is fm outstripping that of the Slavs, and their fertility is seen
as a threat.
Grcece-+nd ibTuil<s
Greece regards its 120,000 Turks as a potential fifth column.
When relations between tlrc two counffies deteriorate-as when
Turkey invaded Cyprus-so do conditions for the Turkish minor-
rqr. Along with the 60,000 Pomaks, ttrey have been under con-
stant pressure to assimilate, even to adopt Greek names, or to
emigate. Classed as "foreign nationals" they cannot obtain credit
or loans to build or buy property. Despite Greece's recognition
of religious rninoriry rights, ttrey cannot get permission to buiid
or repair mosques. Thus their settlements have become increas-
ingly dilapidated.
They encounler obstructions in carrying out their most basic
civic obligations, and they are virnally excluded from local
govemment. Educationally ttrey have been gradually isolated from
modem Turkish cultuie and religious teaching. ff they visit Turkey
they have no automatic right to be readmined to Greece. Other
ethnic minorities, Greek-speaking ones, have been given financial
inducements to settle in westem Thrace where Muslims constitute
a third of the population. Increasingly polarization of ethnic groups
there could escalate into violence.
In confast to the worldwide condemnation eventually aroused
by the forced assimilation of Muslim Turks in Bulgan4 similar
policies of successive Grcek govemments have failed to attract
outside attention. Their methods have never reached the Bulgarian
level of violence, but they have been pursued rutlrlessly over
a much longer time. When local Turkish leaders appealed to
the European Community, of which Greece is now a member,
they were th,rown into prison.
Bu lgafi a-nd anti-Tud<ish programs
The chief motive behind the Communist assimilation campaign
must have been fear of a rapidly increasing Muslim population.
The 1965 census, which showed that they formed over 10 percent
of the population, w.ls the last to give Muslim statistics. Now
in a dwindling national population of about 8.4 million, in which
Slavs are no longer replacrng tttemselves, Muslims constitute
about 2.4 million. Of these, 1.5 milLion are Turks, 0.5 million
Gypsies and Tatars, and 400,000 Pomaks. Gypsies have only
a tenuous adherence to Islaq the Pomaks are more committed
Muslims than the Turks. Anti-Turkish chauvinism was revived
by President Zhivkov's notorious campaign of 1984-89. Most
ordrnary Bulgarians, however, respect the Turks for their honesff,
stabiliry and industriousness, and for their valuable contribution
to the economy as tobacco farmers.
Under communism, in the face of the progessive closure
of Turkrsh cultural instin"rtions and effective atheisfic indoctrination
coupled with some persecution, assimilation had been proceeding
slowly but surely. By the start of the eighties the younger Turkish
generation was tending to speak Bulgarian, and their observance
of Ittu.n was lapsing-hardly surprising since their enfrance to
tlrc four hundred remaining mosques was banned'
A campaign to force the Bulgarian-speaking Pomaks to change
32 Volume 22 . No. 6l Freedom Review
ther adopted Islamic names back to Bulgarian failed to attract
outside attention in the early seventies. When, however, Ztivkov
decided to launch a similar campaign against the Turkish minor-
ity in 1984, following it up with measures designed to desfoy
the last vestiges of Muslim religious and culnrral life, he made
a fatal mistake. The result was a hardening of Turkish rcsolve
to preserve their national identity. Turks became a key element
in ttre democratic forces which brought about Ztivkov's down-
fatl. In May i989 they resorted to mass peaceful demonsffa-
tions; several dozen were mowed down by the police.
In a final bid to get rid of a peaceful commudg, that he
had tumed into an opposition, Zrivkov opened the fiontien, and
300,000 Turks fled or were forcibly expelled into Turkey. Most
sold their Foperly at knock-down prices. Then, in the auhmn,
Zhivkov fe1l. At least 120,000 of the refugees retumed, appalled
at the poverty in Turftey. This led to some local anti-Turkish
demonsfations, which were fanned by ttre remnant Communist
paffy, as it tried to cling onto power. Fear of Turktsh fecundiry
was exploited as a way of destabilizurg the sinradon and thus
slowing up Bulgaria's progrcss towards genutne democracy.
Communists and national chauvinists have found cofilmon
ground in tlree new parties that reaffirm Bulgaria's traditional
Orthodox past and press for the repatriation of Turks to their
fatherland. The well-intentioned new democratic govemment, led
by former dissident Thelyo Trclev, in power since last Decem-
ber, is doing its best to atone for Ztivkov's misdeeds, as it
tries to rehabilitate the Turks and reestablish a pluralist society.
The courageous govemment decision to declare null and void
all the properry transactions that took place during ttre 1989
exodus is going to be very diffrcult to implement, especially
finding the money it has pledged to cover the indemnities.
The Muslim parfy, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms,
had to go on hunger strike in protest at controversial clauses
in the new constitution presented to the parliament. Not only
does it fall short of safegumding collective minoriqr rights, but
it proscribes political parties based on race or religion. The Turks
could be forced to look increasingly to Turkey for support and
could become susceptible to a more militant brand of Islam.
The devils unleashed by Zhivkov are proving hmd to conffol.
Much will depend on the parliament that is retumed in the com-
ing elections.
Yugmlavia in general...
Tito promoted Muslim identity by recognizing Islam as a sepa-
rate nationality to counterbalance the mutual antagonism of Ortho-
dox Serbs and Catholic Croats, ttre two largest ethnic groups.
Constituting about a frfth of the population, they are being inexor-
ably dragged against their will into the bloodbath ttrat is en-
gullurg Yugoslavia.
The Muslims are in two major groups, which have until
recently had little contact with each other: the 1.9 million Slavic
Muslims of Bosnia-Hertzegovina and 2 million or more pre-
Slavic Albanians in Yugoslavia's "deep south'-the majonty
in Kosovo where 83 percent now live below subsistence level.
Nearly half the Albanians are actively Muslim and are the most
compact religious goup in Yu-soslavia in contrast Bosnia's Mus-
lims are more secularized and Europear in orientation.
Although Yugosiav Islam has been of fte q.pically tolerant
Balkan vanety, since the rise of militant Islam elsewhere Muslims
in Yugoslavia have been accused of fanaticism, especially by
the former hmdline Communist government of Bosnia. The new
democratically elected President. Dr. Alia Izetbegovic, was one
of a group of moderate Muslim intellecruals given heavy sen-
tences in 1983. They were accused of trying to promote an
ethnically pure Muslim state when ttrey tried to define their reli-
gious idennty in a pluraList society.
and in particular Bosia...
Athwart the divrde belween Croatia and Serbia this large
motntainous republic is an ethnic and religious cocktail in which
no one group predominates. 44 percent are Muslim, speaking
Serbo-Croag 31 percent Serb and 17 percent Croat. Its first
democratically elected govemment reflects this mix. Although
historically accepted as equals of Serbs and Croats, Muslims
now feel vulnerable and fear pafiition betrveen Serbia and Croatia,
whose Presidents, Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman, have
both talked of absorbing Bosnia. They have unhappy memories
of wartime rule by the Nazi puppet Croatian Ustashe. There
were appalling massacres and, although the Serbs were the main
victims, Muslims suffered at the hands of both Croats and Serbs,
and killed some Serbs in retaliation.
The republic's politicians are masters of coalition politrcs,
but the cunent infansigence of the Serb paq/ is rnpeding normal
governrnent and has pushed the Muslims closer to the Croats,
whose relations were fairly cordial. The main Muslim party,
Democratic Action, sees its role as a reconciling one in a federal
Yugoslavia. There have been massive peace rallies marnly of
young people appalled by the revival of bloody vendettas.
Cantonization on the Swiss model has been discussed, but many
municipaiities are so intermixed that this would require the move-
ment of about 200,000 people.
Today the Bosnian govefixnent is under pressure to join
a Greater Serbia if they wish to avoid being brought into the
civil war-such is Milosevic's threat. Izetbegovic would certainly
prefer to throw in his lot with Croatia, but with the Croan facing
defeat they may have to look for help outside Yugoslavia flom
fellow Muslims. Meantime wittr the economic as well as the
political situation detenorating and unemployment rising, tension
between Bosnia's ethnic groups has escalated.
...and Albaniam and othes
The rest of Yugoslavia's Muslims live in southem Serbia, Mace-
donia, Montenegro and particularly in Kosovo wherc, over the
last n.venty years, the Serbian minoriff has dropped from 30
percent to 10 percent. In 1912 Serbia regained Kosovo despite
its Albanian majoriry. The Serbs tried to resettle it, but in recent
times, by means of intimidation (but not "genocide" as claimed
by Serbs) and by their high buthrate (30 per ttrousand), the
Albanians have swamped them. Ancient naditions mean at least
as much to Kosovo's Albanians as their Islamic faith-last
year Muslim and Catholic leaders pleaded for blood-feuds to
be stopped.
Kosovo's status as an autonomous pror,ince of the Serbian
republic was revoked by Serbia's Communist govemment last
year, and it was put under a vntual army of occupation. Serbs
also replaced Albanians in its administration, adding 50,000 to
an already serious unemployment problem (running at 30 per-
cent). Milosevic formed a tacit alliance with the Orthodox Church
which dreads the loss of its treasured Kosovo monasteries, and
most Serbian opposition groups see the recovery of Kosovo in
terms of a crusade against encroaching Islam.
The Ottoman Empire got an
undeservedly bad name in the West.
So far, fear of the army and the police, and wise counsel
from democratic leaders and Muslim and Catholic churchmen,
have kept the Albanians from responding to this brutal provo-
cation. Their restraint has eamed them the sympathy of Croals
and Slovenes, which has led to Serbian accusations of Vatican
involvement in the promotion of Albanian separatisml Serbs also
fear that Kosovo might secede to Albania, paticularly now that
that country is begnning to dismantie is draconian atheistic sys-
tem. Albania is actually threatening to come to the aid of its
fellow counfrymen though whether it is capable of mounting
an effective offensive is another matter.
The adjacent republics of Macedonia and Montenegro have
Albanian minorities amorxrting to about a fifth of their popula-
tions, some of them refugees from Kosovo. In the past they
have been well treated in Macedonia, but their increasing
assefiiveness is antagonizing the Slavic Macedonians. not jusi
the Orthodox ones, but also the 40,000 Pomak Muslims. Mean-
time Slavic Muslims in southem Serbia. known as Sandzak.
have made it known that they want autonomy.
Ihe future
Yugoslavia's six million Muslims are in extreme danger, as Reis-
el-I-Ilema Jakub Selimowsky (the religious head of their com-
muniry in Bosnia) informed the Islamic States Conference this
year. Fundamentalism and extremism could now furd a fertile
soil there, and to the tragic polarization betrveen Catholic and
Orthodox, a third volatile element might be added-Islamic
nationalism, with bloody results. ln May, Selimowsky met Alb-
anian lead-ers, the first signs of the two mdn goups getting
together.
Albania
No other Balkan Muslim community suffered as ex0€me perse-
cution under communism as did the Albanian Muslims. who
constituted 70 percent of the population. With all their leaders
imprisoned or executed, the most severe blow came in 1967
when all mosques were closed and all religious practices made
criminal offenses. Even children were interrogated at school as
to what they ate at home dunng Ramadan.
Not,ember-December I 99 I lFreedom Reyiew 33
 Although some Muslims were sustained in prison by their
faittr, almost all have been damaged psychologically, and now
that the ban on religion has been lifted many Muslims are show-
ing alarming signs of irrational behavior. Most are now ignorant
of the most basic Islamic teaching; dietary laws are ignored,
and shoes not always removed in mosques. Though many young
people are atffacted to religion, Muslim or Clristian, their in-
terest is usually ephemeral and they could fall prey to any char-
latan or extremist. Basically what most of them want is to get
out of Albania, where starvation threatens. A Tirana pediatri-
cian estimates that half *re nation's children suffer from mal-
nutnfion.
In this grim economic and fluid political situarion it is hard
going for devout Muslims to reestablish Islamic life, especial-
ly since Albanians' deepest loyalties lie wittr clan and nation
rather than with religion. hr the partly Catholic north where resist-
ance to sffong man President Enver Hoxha was sffongest, the
hrst, unofficial service for lwenty three years, in the open air,
drew 60,000 people last November. Mosques in Tirana are full.
But it is significant that religious revival has hardly sarted in
the traditionally Muslim south, the powerbase of Hoxha and
the CommurList paq/.
One sign of promise is that under persecution Albanians
of ffierent religious penuasions, Musiim, Catholic and Orttrodox,
helped each other. Muslims attrend Catholic great feasts, just as
in Kosovo. The future of Albania's Muslims is going to be
inexorably linked with their fellow nationals in yugoslavia. One
possibiliry eventually is of an Albania genuinely represenring
Albanian population, embracing Kosovo and westem Macedonia.
But that is a possibiJiry which Serbs could not accept. r
Janice A. Braut. East European con-espondent of News Nenuork
Intetnaiotnl. is the qurhor o/ Conscience & Captivity ancl of
the Pueblo Insinte's sntet s of religious tights in Czechoslovakia,
Albanio. Bulgaria and Ronwnia.