YHT Realty Corporation v CA

FACTS: Private respondent McLoughlin, an Australian businessman-philanthropist, used

to stay at Sheraton Hotel during his trips to the Philippines prior to 1984 when he met
Tan. Tan befriended McLoughlin by showing him around, introducing him to important
people, accompanying him in visiting impoverished street children and assisting him in
buying gifts for the children and in distributing the same to charitable institutions for
poor children. Tan convinced McLoughlin to transfer from Sheraton Hotel to Tropicana
where Lainez, Payam and Danilo Lopez were employed. Lopez served as manager of
the hotel while Lainez and Payam had custody of the keys for the safety deposit boxes
of Tropicana. Tan took care of McLoughlin's booking at the Tropicana where he started
staying during his trips to the Philippines from December 1984 to September 1987.

On 30 October 1987, McLoughlin arrived from Australia and registered with Tropicana.
He rented a safety deposit box as it was his practice to rent a safety deposit box every
time he registered at Tropicana in previous trips. As a tourist, McLoughlin was aware of
the procedure observed by Tropicana relative to its safety deposit boxes. The safety
deposit box could only be opened through the use of two keys, one of which is given to
the registered guest, and the other remaining in the possession of the management of
the hotel. When a registered guest wished to open his safety deposit box, he alone
could personally request the management who then would assign one of its employees
to accompany the guest and assist him in opening the safety deposit box with the two
keys.

McLoughlin allegedly placed the following in his safety deposit box: Fifteen Thousand US
Dollars (US$15,000.00) which he placed in two envelopes, one envelope containing Ten
Thousand US Dollars (US$10,000.00) and the other envelope Five Thousand US Dollars
(US$5,000.00); Ten Thousand Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00) which he also placed in
another envelope; two (2) other envelopes containing letters and credit cards; two (2)
bankbooks; and a checkbook, arranged side by side inside the safety deposit box.

On 12 December 1987, before leaving for a brief trip to Hongkong, McLoughlin opened
his safety deposit box with his key and with the key of the management and took
therefrom the envelope containing Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000.00), the
envelope containing Ten Thousand Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00), his passports and
his credit cards. 6 McLoughlin left the other items in the box as he did not check out of
his room at the Tropicana during his short visit to Hongkong. When he arrived in
Hongkong, he opened the envelope which contained Five Thousand US Dollars
(US$5,000.00) and discovered upon counting that only Three Thousand US Dollars
(US$3,000.00) were enclosed therein. After returning to Manila, he checked out of
Tropicana on 18 December 1987 and left for Australia. When he arrived in Australia, he
discovered that the envelope with Ten Thousand US Dollars (US$10,000.00) was short of
Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000). He also noticed that the jewelry which he bought in
Hongkong and stored in the safety deposit box upon his return to Tropicana was
likewise missing, except for a diamond bracelet.

When McLoughlin discovered the loss, he immediately confronted Lainez and Payam
who admitted that Tan opened the safety deposit box with the key assigned to him. 11
McLoughlin went up to his room where Tan was staying and confronted her. Tan
admitted that she had stolen McLoughlin's key and was able to open the safety deposit
box with the assistance of Lopez, Payam and Lainez. 12 Lopez also told McLoughlin that
Tan stole the key assigned to McLoughlin while the latter was asleep.

Lopez wrote on a piece of paper a promissory note dated 21 April 1988. The promissory
note reads as follows:
I promise to pay Mr. Maurice McLoughlin the amount of AUS$4,000.00 and US$2,000.00
or its equivalent in Philippine currency on or before May 5, 1988.

However, Lopez refused to accept the responsibility relying on the conditions for renting
the safety deposit box entitled "Undertaking For the Use Of Safety Deposit Box," 15
specifically paragraphs (2) and (4) thereof, to wit: To release and hold free and
blameless TROPICANA APARTMENT HOTEL from any liability arising from any loss in the
contents and/or use of the said deposit box for any cause whatsoever, including but
not limited to the presentation or use thereof by any other person should the key be
lost
ISSUE:
whether a hotel may evade liability for the loss of items left with it for safekeeping by its
guests, by having these guests execute written waivers holding the establishment or its
employees free from blame for such loss in light of Article 2003 of the Civil Code which
voids such waivers

RULING:
NO. In case of loss of any item deposited in the safety deposit box, it is inevitable to
conclude that the management had at least a hand in the consummation of the
taking, unless the reason for the loss is force majeure
The management contends, however, that McLoughlin, by his act, made its employees
believe that Tan was his spouse for she was always with him most of the time. The
evidence on record, however, is bereft of any showing that McLoughlin introduced Tan
to the management as his wife. Such an inference from the act of McLoughlin will not
exculpate the petitioners from liability in the absence of any showing that he made the
management believe that Tan was his wife or was duly authorized to have access to
the safety deposit box. Mere close companionship and intimacy are not enough to
warrant such conclusion considering that what is involved in the instant case is the very
safety of McLoughlin's deposit.
In light of the circumstances surrounding this case, it is undeniable that without the
acquiescence of the employees of Tropicana to the opening of the safety deposit box,
the loss of McLoughlin's money could and should have been avoided.
G.R. No. L-2820 June 21, 1951

FAUSTO ISAAC, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

LEOPOLDO MENDOZA

For the amount of four hundred and fifty pesos, Japanese currency, Fausto Isaac,
plaintiff, sold to Leopoldo Mendoza, defendant, a parcel of land in Pili, Camarines Sur,
reserving the right to repurchase within four years. The sale took the place in February
1944. After liberation, the seller offered to redeem, but defendant objected, saying the
redemption was premature. Hence this litigation instituted in the court of first instance of
said province, in February 1946, to compel re-transfer.

After having been duly summoned, the defendant failed to answer. Consequently,
upon plaintiff's motion, he was defaulted by order of May 10, 1947. Thereafter, i.e. on
September 23, 1947, considering the plaintiff's evidence the court rendered judgment
requiring the defendant to execute a deed of re-sale of the land, to receive the
amount of P90 Philippine currency, which Fausto Isaac had consigned in court, to pay
damages in the sum of P95.

On December 9, 1947 Leopoldo Mendoza submitted a petition to set aside the

judgment invoking accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Opposed by plaintiff,
the petition was denied. Wherefore defendant appealed directly to this court.

Basis of defendant's petition was the allegation that as his attorney Jorge C. Briones had
not received notice of the court's denial of his motion to dismiss the complaint, he had
reason to believe the time to answer had not expired.

It appears from the record that, duly summoned, defendant through Attorney Briones
filed a motion to dismiss, which was overruled by order of April 8, 1946. At the bottom of
that order there is notation that had been furnished Attorney Briones by ordinary mail.
On February 8, 1947, the plaintiff filed his motion for default, asserting that, defendant's
motion to dismiss had been denied and that so far, defendant had interposed no
answer. On February 15, 1947 the court issued an auto suspending consideration of
plaintiff's motion and giving the defendant a period of ten days within which to reply
thereto, if so desired. Copy of this directive was sent by registered mail to Attorney
Briones, but the latter "refused to claim the registered letter despite the notices given
him by the postmaster". And according to an affidavit submitted to the court, Attorney
Peñas for the plaintiff, had again and gain reminded Briones that the time was come
for the answer.

Apprised of the foregoing circumstances, the court of first instance denied the petition
to set aside.
We think such denial was entirely proper. According to the rules, Attorney Briones is
deemed to have received the copy of the auto of February 15, 1947 which he declined
to accept from the mails (Rule 27 section 8). That order was sufficient to advise him of
the rejection of his previous motion of dismissal, supposing he had not actually received
the copy of the order of April 8, 1946, which had been forwarded to him by ordinary
mail.

The appellant insist here that "the record fails to show a conclusive evidence that Atty.
Jorge C. Briones . . . was notified". This is refuted by the above account of the facts and
of the governing principles. It is remarkable that, to meet the conclusions therein set
forth, defendant has not introduced any sworn statement of Attorney Briones.

In connection with the argument that defendant should not suffer for his lawyer's
shortcoming, it should be explained that the client is bound by the acts, even mistakes
of his counsel in realm of procedural technique1; but if the client is prejudiced by the
attorney's negligence or misconduct he may recover damages.2

Another point, which is equally decisive. Unless the appellant has filed a motion to set
aside the order of default, on any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 38, he has no
standing in court nor the right to appeal.3 Examining appellant's motion of December 9,
1947 we observe that he merely requested for the annulment of the decision rendered
after his default (September 23, 1947) without praying for the revocation of the order of
May 10, 1947declaring him to be default. But granting, for the sake of argument that
the aforesaid pleading impliedly included the second prayer, we are met by the
insuperable objection that the petition was too late. Because filed beyond the six-
month period within which applications for relief under Rule 38 may be entertained.
From May 10 to December 9 seven months had elapsed.

Wherefore, this appeal being without merit, we affirm the order of the trial judge
denying the petition to set aside. With costs.

STEPHEN CANG AND GEORGE NARDO Y JOSOL v. HERMINIA CULLEN

G.R. No. 163078, 25 November 2009

Negligence is conduct that creates an undue risk of harm to others. It is the failure to
observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that circumstances justly
demand.

Facts: Nardo was operating a taxi when Saycon, who was travelling on a motorcycle
without protective headgear, veered into his lane and bumped him. After the impact,
Nardo drove back to help Saycon, two traffic enforcers ordered Nardo to take Saycon
to the hospital. No sketch of the accident was done by the enforcers. Saycon claims
that it was Nardo that sideswept him and that Nardo tried to speed away until he was
flagged down by peace officers. Cullen, the employer of Saycon, shouldered the
hospital expenses of Saycon and is now claiming damages from Nardo and Cang, the
owner of the taxi. The RTC dismissed the case stating that Cullen is not entitled to
damages. The CA reversed the RTC decision claiming that the RTC did not give credit
to a witness‘ account of the accident.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in awarding damages to respondent

Held: YES. Saycon was operating the motor vehicle as a student-driver without being
accompanied by a duly licensed driver. Article 2185 provides that it is presumed that a
person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation. Negligence is conduct that creates an undue risk of
harm to others. It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
that circumstances justly demand.

To determine whether there is negligence in a given situation, the Supreme Court

laid down this test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in
the same situation? If not, the person is guilty of negligence. Saycon was negligent
since he should not have been driving alone. The law requires that the holder of a
student-driver‘s permit should be accompanied by a duly licensed driver when
operating a motor vehicle. Further, he was not wearing a helmet and he was speeding.
All these prove that he was negligent.

Neither can Cullen as Saycon‘s employer be entitled to claim damages. Cullen

was negligent in the selection and supervision of her employee. When an employee
causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties, there arises
the juris tantum presumption that his employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of
observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. The fact that Saycon was
driving alone is proof enough that Cullen was negligent. Either she did not know that he
only had a student‘s permit or she allowed him to drive alone knowing this deficiency.

Bondoc vs Mantala

GR No. 203080 November 12, 2014

Facts: Respondent was admitted at the Oriental Mindoro Provincial Hospital (OMPH) on
April 3, 2009, at around 11:00am, with referral from the Bansud Municipal Health Office.
She was due to deliver her 5th child and was advised for a caesarian section because
her baby was big and there was excessive amniotic fluid in her womb. She started to
labor at 7:00am and was initially brought to the Bongabon Health Center. However,
said health center also told her to proceed directly to the hospital. In her complaint-
affidavit, respondent alleged that inside the delivery room of OMPH, she was attended
to by petitioner who instructed the midwife and two younger assistants to press down
on respondent‘s abdomen and even demonstrated to them how to insert their fingers
into her vagina. Thereafter, petitioner went out of the delivery room and later, his
assistants also left. After hours of being in labor, respondent pleaded for a caesarian
section. The midwife and the younger assistants pressed down on her abdomen
causing excruciating pains on her ribs and made her very weak. They repeatedly did
this pressing until the bay and placenta came out. When she regained consciousness,
she was already at the recovery room, she learned that an operation was performed
on her by petitioner to removed her ruptured uterus but what depressed her most was
her stillborn baby and the loss of her reproductive capacity. The respondent noticed
that her vulva swollen and there is an open wound which widened later on and was re-
stitched by petitioner. Petitioner was heard uttering words unbecoming of his profession
pertaining to the respondent‘s states while in labor. Respondent filed then a complaint
for grave misconduct against the petitioner before the ombudsman. The petitioner
resigned as medical officer of OMPH, alleging that the complaint against him is now
moot and academic.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner‘s conduct during the delivery of respondent‘s baby
constitute grave misconduct.

Held: Yes. Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule
of action, more particularly unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and
not mere error in judgement. It generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct
motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. The term, however
does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. To constitute an administrative
offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the
official functions and duties of a public officer. On the other hand, when the elements
of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule are
manifest, the public officer shall be liable for grave misconduct.

In deliberately leaving the respondent to a midwife and two inexperienced assistants

despite knowing that she was under prolonged painful labor and about to give birth to
a macrosomic baby by vaginal delivery, petitioner clearly committed a dereliction of
duty and a breach of his professional obligations. The gravity of respondent‘s conditions
is highlighted by the expected complications she suffered – her stillborn baby, a
ruptured uterus that necessitated the immediate surgery and blood transfusion and
vulvar hematomas.

Article II section 1 of the code of medical ethics of the medical profession in the
Philippines states: A physician, should attend to his patients faithfully and
conscientiously. He should secure fore them all possible benefits that may depend upon
his professional skill and care. As the sole tribunal to adjudge the physician‘s failure to
fulfill his obligation to his patient is, in most cases, his own conscience, violation of this
rule on his part is discreditable and inexcusable.

A doctor‘s duty to his patient is not required to be extraordinary. The standard

contemplated for doctors is simply the reasonable coverage merit among ordinarily
good physicians i.e. reasonable skill and competence. Even by this standard, petitioner
fill short when he routinely delegated an important task that requires his professional skill
and competence to his subordinates who have no requisite training and capability to
make crucial decisions in difficult child births.

A physician should be dedicated to provide competent medical care with full

professional skill and accordance with the current standards of care, compassion,
independence, and respect for human dignity.
 Wright V. Manila Electric (1914)

G.R. No. L-7760 October 1, 1914

Lessons Applicable: Intoxication (Torts and Damages)

FACTS: August 8, 1909 night time: Wright who was intoxicated drove in his calesa and
as his horse leap forward along the rails of the Manila Electric company and it fell

Wright was thrown and got injured

that the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their
depth out of the ground making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above
the level of the street

RTC: both parties were negligent, but that the plaintiff's negligence was not as great as
defendant's and under the authority of the case of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co.
apportioned the damages and awarded Wright a judgment of P1,000

ISSUE: W/N Wright's negligence contributed to the 'principal occurrence' or 'only to his
own injury (NOT contributory) thereby he cannot recover

HELD: NO. Affirmed

Mere intoxication is not in itself negligence. It is but a circumstance to be considered

with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. It is the general rule that it is
immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence
can be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is required than by a sober one.

Manila Electric or its employees were negligent by reason of having left the rails and a
part of the ties uncovered in a street where there is a large amount of travel

If the Wright had been prudent on the night in question and had not attempted to
drive his conveyance while in a drunken condition, he would certainly have avoided
the damages which he received

Both parties were negligent and both contributed to the resulting damages, although
the Wright, in the judgment of the court, contributed in greater proportion to the
damages

no facts are stated therein which warrant the conclusion that the Wright was negligent
It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the
conditions described

It having been found that the plaintiff was not negligent, it is unnecessary to discuss the
question presented by the appellant company with reference to the applicability of
the case of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co. and we do not find facts in the opinion of the court
below which justify a larger verdict than the one found.

Dissenting Opinion by Carson:

if the case is to be decided on the findings of fact by the trial judge, these findings
sufficiently establish the negligence of Wright

The fact finding of the RTC judge, the fact that there is negligence though not fully
sustained should be assumed that there were evidentiary facts disclosed which were
sufficient to sustain that there is negligence

LILIUS, ET AL. vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY

FACTS: Lilius was driving with his wife and daughter for sightseeing in Pagsanjan Laguna.
It was his first time in the area and he was entirely unacquainted with the conditions of
the road and had no knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing. Before
reaching the crossing in question, there was nothing to indicate its existence and, it was
impossible to see an approaching train. At about seven or eight meters from the
crossing the plaintiff saw an autotruck parked on the left side of the road. Several
people, who seemed to have alighted from the said truck, were walking on the
opposite side. He slowed down and sounded his horn for the people to get out of the
way. With his attention thus occupied, he did not see the crossing but he heard two
short whistles. Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge black mass fling itself upon him,
which turned out to be locomotive No. 713 of the MRC‘s train. The locomotive struck
the plaintiff‘s car right in the center. The 3 victims were injured and were hospitalized.

Lilus filed a case against MRC in the CFI. Answering the complaint, it denies each and
every allegation thereof and, by way of special defense, alleges that the Lilius, with the
cooperation of his wife and coplaintiff, negligently and recklessly drove his car, and
prays that it be absolved from the complaint.

The CFI decided in favor of Lilius. The 2 parties appealed said decision, each assigning
errors on said judgement.
ISSUE: WON Manila Railroad Company is liable for damages

HELD: The judgment appealed from is affirmed in toto, with the sole modification on
interest to be added on the indemnity in favor of Lilius.

1. YES Upon examination of the oral as well as of the documentary evidence, this court
is of the opinion that the accident was due to negligence on the part of the
defendant-appellant company alone, for not having had on that occasion any
semaphore at the crossing to serve as a warning to passers-by of its existence in order
that they might take the necessary precautions before crossing the railroad; and, on
the part of its employees — the flagman and switchman, for not having remained at his
post at the crossing in question to warn passers-by of the approaching train

Although it is probable that the defendant-appellant entity employed the diligence of

a good father of a family in selecting its aforesaid employees, however, it did not
employ such diligence in supervising their work and the discharge of their duties. The
diligence of a good father of a family, which the law requires in order to avoid
damage, is not confined to the careful and prudent selection of subordinates or
employees but includes inspection of their work and supervision of the discharge of
their duties.

Arada v. CA

Alejandro Arada, doing business under the name and style ―South Negros Enterprises‖
versus Honorable Court of Appeals, (210 SCRA 624, July 1, 1992)

Facts: Petitioner Arada, who was the owner of M/L Maya, a common carrier, entered
into contract on March 24, 1982 with the private respondent San Miguel Corporation to
transport its 9,824 cases of beer empties valued at P176,824.80 from the port of San
Carlos City, Negros Occidental to Mandaue City.

On the day of its departure he was not given clearance by the Philippine Coast Guard
due to a typhoon but was allowed to leave on the next day as there was no storm and
the sea was calm. While navigating towards Cebu, a storm developed and the vessel
capsized along with its cargo. The crew was rescued and brought to Palompon, Leyte
where Vivencio Babao, its crew captain, filed a marine protest. The Board and Marine
Inquiry and the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard both exonerated and
absolved the owner/operator officers and crew of the ill-fated M/L Maya from any
administrative liability on account of said incident.

The private respondent filed a complaint in the RTC, Branch 12 of Cebu City for
recovery of the value of the cargoes anchored on breach of contract of carriage, and
after due hearing, said court rendered decision dismissing the plaintiff‘s claim with
respect to the first cause of action. The counterclaim was also dismissed.

Private respondent appealed to the CA and said court reversed RTC‘s decision ruling
that petitioner failed to observe extraordinary diligence over the cargoes, ordering him
to pay San Miguel Corporation the amount of P176,824.80 representing the value of the
cargoes lost with interest at legal rate from the date of filing of the complaint.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable for the value of the lost cargoes?

Held: There is no doubt that petitioner was exercising its functions as a common carrier
when it entered into a contract with private respondent to carry and transport the
latter‘s cargoes. He is burdened by law with the duty of exercising extraordinary
diligence not only in ensuring the safety of passengers, but in caring for the goods
transported by it.

The loss or destruction or deterioration of goods turned over to the common carrier for
the conveyance to a designated destination raises instantly a presumption of fault or
negligence on the part of the carrier, save only where such loss, destruction or damage
arises from extreme circumstances such as a natural disaster or calamity.

In order that the common carrier may be exempted from responsibility, the natural
disaster must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss. However, the
common carrier must exercise due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before,
during and after the occurrence of flood, storm or other natural disaster in order that
the common carrier may be exempted from liability for the destruction or deterioration
of the goods.

Records show that Babao knew of the coming of a typhoon but did not check where it
was headed by using his vessel‘s barometer and radio. Neither did he monitor and
record the weather conditions everyday. Had he done so, while navigating for 31 hours,
he could have anticipated the strong winds and big waves and had taken shelter. For
failing to do this, it constitute lack of foresight and minimum vigilance over its cargoes
taking into account the surrounding circumstances of the case.

The decision was affirmed.

Cruz vs Court of Appeals

GR No. 122445 November 18, 1997

Facts: On March 22, 1991, prosecution witness, Rowena Umali de Ocampo,

accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital situated in
Balagtas Street, San Pablo City, Laguna. They arrived at the said hospital at around 4:30
in the afternoon of the same day. Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was examined by the
petitioner who found a ―Myoma‖ in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy
operation on March 23, 1991. Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening
of March 22, 1991 as the latter was to be operated on the next day at 1pm. According
to Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the windows and the floor were
very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant fora rag to wipe the window and floor
with. Prior to the operation, Rowena tried to convince her mother to not proceed with
the operation and even asked petitioner for it to be postponed, however it still pushed
through after the petitioner told Lydia that operation must be done as scheduled.
During the operation, the assisting doctor of the petitioner, Dr. Ercillo went out of the
operating room and asked that tagmet ampules be bought which was followed by
another instruction to buy a bag of blood. After the operation, when Lydia came out of
the OR, another bag of blood was requested to be bought, however, the same was
not bought due to unavailability of type A from the blood bank. Thereafter a person
arrived to donate blood which was later transferred to Lydia. Rowena then noticed her
mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breathe apparently, the
oxygen tank is empty, so her husband and petitioner‘s driver bought an oxygen. Later,
without the knowledge of Lydia‘s relatives,she was decided by the doctors to be
transferred to San Pablo District Hospital were she was supposed to be re-operated.
After Lydia experienced shocks, she died.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has been negligent which caused the death of Lydia
Umali.

Held: Yes. Whether or not a physician has committed an ―inexcusable lack of

precaution‖ in the treatment of his patient to be determined according to the standard
of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar
circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of
treatment or the present state of medical science. A doctor in effect represents that,
having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in
the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his
patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other
reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same
circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is
essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the
physician‘s conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard. Further, in as
much as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable
only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is
usually necessary to the conclusion as to causation.

In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing
appellant‘s negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be
proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as causal connection of
such breach and the resulting death of his patient. In order that there may be recovery
for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must
be legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the
negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural reference of events, unbroken
by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the proximate
cause of the injury. For negligence, no matter what it consists, cannot create a right of
action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of and the proximate
cause of an injury is that cause, which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result
would have occurred.

The elements of reckless imprudence are:

That the offender does or fails to do an act;

That the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary;

That it be without malice;

That material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and

That there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.

The possible causes of hemorrhage during an operation are: 1.) the failure of the
surgeon to tie or suture a cut blood vessel; 2.) allowing a cut blood vessel to get out of
control; 3.) the subsequent loosening of the tie or suture applied to a cut blood vessel;
and 4.)and a clotting defect known as DIC
G.R. No. 112160 February 28, 2000

OSMUNDO S. CANLAS and ANGELINA CANLAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ASIAN
SAVINGS BANK, MAXIMO C. CONTRARES and VICENTE MAÑOSCA, respondents.

FACTS:

Osmundo Canlas agreed to sell parcels of land to Vicente Mañosca, for and in
consideration of P850,000.00.

Osmundo Canlas delivered to Vicente Mañosca the transfer certificates of title of the
parcels of land involved. Vicente Mañosca, as his part of the transaction, issued two
postdated checks in favor of Osmundo Canlas in the amounts of P40,000.00 and
P460,000.00, respectively, but it turned out that the check covering the bigger amount
was not sufficiently funded.

On September 3, 1982, Vicente Mañosca was able to mortgage the same parcels of
land for P100,000.00 to a certain Attorney Manuel Magno, with the help of impostors
who misrepresented themselves as the spouses, Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas.

On September 29, 1982, private respondent Vicente Mañosca was granted a loan by
the respondent Asian Savings Bank (ASB) in the amount of P500,000.00, with the use of
subject parcels of land as security, and with the involvement of the same impostors who
again introduced themselves as the Canlas spouses. When the loan it extended was
not paid, respondent bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage.

ISSUE:

WON ASB exercised due diligence in granting the loan application of respondent. NO.

RULING:

In the case under consideration, from the evidence on hand it can be gleaned
unerringly that respondent bank did not observe the requisite diligence in ascertaining
or verifying the real identity of the couple who introduced themselves as the spouses
Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas. It is worthy to note that not even a single
identification card was exhibited by the said impostors to show their true identity; and
yet, the bank acted on their representations simply on the basis of the residence
certificates bearing signatures which tended to match the signatures affixed on a
previous deed of mortgage to a certain Atty. Magno, covering the same parcels of
land in question.

For not observing the degree of diligence required of banking institutions, whose
business is impressed with public interest, respondent Asian Savings Bank has to bear the
loss sued upon.

G.R. No. 130003 October 20, 2004

JONAS AÑONUEVO, Petitioner. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JEROME VILLAGRACIA,
Respondent.
FACTS:

The present petition seeks to bar recovery by an injured cyclist of damages from the
driver of the car which had struck him. The argument is hinged on the cyclist‘s failure to
install safety devices on his bicycle.

Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while Añonuevo, traversing
the opposite lane was driving his Lancer car with plate number PJJ 359. The car was
owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Añonuevo‘s brother, Jonathan.
Añonuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards Libertad Street when the
collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result, which necessitated his
hospitalization several times in 1989, and forced him to undergo four (4) operations.

ISSUE:

WON Villagracia is precluded from recovering damages for his failure to install safety
devices on his bicycle. NO.

RULING:

The failure of the bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety practices, whether or
not imposed by ordinance or statute, is not sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery
unless a causal connection is established between such failure and the injury sustained.

Añonuevo had the burden of clearly proving that the alleged negligence of Villagracia
was the proximate or contributory cause of the latter‘s injury.

By Añonuevo‘s own admission, he had seen Villagracia at a good distance of ten (10)
meters. Had he been decelerating, as he should, as he made the turn, Añonuevo
would have had ample opportunity to avoid hitting Villagracia. Moreover, the fact that
Añonuevo had sighted Villagracia before the accident would negate any possibility
that the absence of lights on the bike contributed to the cause of the accident.

The fact that Añonuevo was recklessly speeding as he made the turn likewise leads us
to believe that even if Villagracia‘s bicycle had been equipped with the proper brakes,
the cyclist would not have had opportunity to brake in time to avoid the speeding car.

G.R. No. 124354 December 29, 1999

ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS, in their own behalf and as natural guardians
of the minors, ROMMEL RAMOS, ROY RODERICK RAMOS and RON RAYMOND RAMOS,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. ORLINO
HOSAKA and DRA. PERFECTA GUTIERREZ, respondents.

FACTS:

Erlinda Ramos was a 47-year old robust woman. Except for occasional complaints of
discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by the presence of a stone in her gall
bladder, she was as normal as any other woman. She was married to Rogelio E. Ramos
and has three children.
Because the discomforts somehow interfered with her normal ways, she sought
professional advice. She was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a
stone in her gall bladder. She underwent a series of examinations which included blood
and urine tests which indicated she was fit for surgery.

Dr. Hosaka (head of the surgical team) decided that she should undergo a
"cholecystectomy" operation. During the anesthesia phase, Dra. Gutierrez
(anesthesiologist) failed to properly intubate the patient. As a result, she had been in a
comatose condition.

ISSUES:

1. What is the responsibility of Dr. Hosaka as the head of the surgical team?

2. Is doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable? YES.

RULING:

1. As the so-called "captain of the ship," it is the surgeon's responsibility to see to it that
those under him perform their task in the proper manner. Respondent Dr. Hosaka's
negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority (as the "captain"
of the operative team) in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper
anesthesia protocols. In fact, no evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr.
Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient.
Furthermore, it does not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another
procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and
was in fact over three hours late for the latter's operation. Because of this, he had little
or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This
indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient. Thus, he shares
equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda's condition.

2. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself." It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and
on the basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced
from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in
conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.

Before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be
satisfactorily shown:

1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone's negligence;

2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or

defendants; and

3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated.

In the above requisites, the fundamental element is the "control of instrumentality"

which caused the damage.
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to
prove that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the
standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the
plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury
itself provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the
necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of
medical science, and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of
mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts.

Normally, a person being put under anesthesia is not rendered decerebrate as a

consequence of administering such anesthesia if the proper procedure was followed.
Furthermore, the instruments used in the administration of anesthesia, including the
endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control of private respondents, who
are the physicians-in-charge. Likewise, petitioner Erlinda could not have been guilty of
contributory negligence because she was under the influence of anesthetics which
rendered her unconscious.

Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain) is injured or
destroyed while the patient is unconscious and under the immediate and exclusive
control of the physicians, we hold that a practical administration of justice dictates the
application of res ipsa loquitur.

G.R. No. 152040 March 31, 2006

MARIKINA AUTO LINE TRANSPORT CORPORATION and FREDDIE L. SUELTO, Petitioners, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ERLINDA V. VALDELLON, Respondents.

FACTS:

The Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation (MALTC) is the owner-operator of a

passenger bus with Plate Number NCV-849. Suelto, its employee, was assigned as the
regular driver of the bus.

At around 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, Suelto was driving the aforementioned
passenger bus along Kamias Road, Kamuning, Quezon City, going towards Epifanio de
los Santos Avenue (EDSA). The bus suddenly swerved to the right and struck the terrace
of the commercial apartment owned by Valdellon located along Kamuning Road.

ISSUE:

WON Suelto was able to prove that he acted in an emergency when a passenger
jeepney coming from EDSA towards the direction of the bus overtook another vehicle
and, in the process, intruded into the lane of the bus. NO.

RULING:

The sudden emergency rule was enunciated by this Court in Gan v. Court of Appeals,
thus:

[O]ne who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without
time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger,
is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection
may appear to have been a better method unless the emergency in which he finds
himself is brought about by his own negligence.

The severe damages sustained could not have resulted had the accused acted as a
reasonable and prudent man would. The accused was not diligent as he claims to be.
What is more probable is that the accused had to swerve to the right and hit the
commercial apartment of the plaintiff because he could not make a full stop as he was
driving too fast in a usually crowded street.

Petitioner Suelto‘s reliance on the sudden emergency rule to escape conviction for the
crime charged and his civil liabilities based thereon is, thus, futile.

G.R. No. L-29803 September 14, 1979

LEOPOLDO POBLETE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. DONATO FABROS and GODOFREDO DE LA

CRUZ, defendants-appellees.

FACTS:

This is an action for damages, arising from a vehicular accident, filed by the plaintiff
Godofredo Poblete as owner of the damaged taxicab against the driver and owner of
the allegedly offending vehicle, Donato Fabros and Godofredo de la Cruz,
respectively.

ISSUE:

WON there is presumed negligence on the part of Donato Fabros, employer of

Godofredo de la Cruz. YES.

RULING:

It is such a firmly established principle, as to have virtually formed part of the 'law itself,
that the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on
the part of the employer. This is the presumed negligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee. The theory of presumed negligence, in contrast with the
American doctrine of respondent superior, where the negligence of the employee is
conclusively presumed to be the negligence of the employer, is clearly deducible from
the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides that the
responsibility therein mentioned shall cease if the employers prove that they observed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages.

G.R. No. 52159 December 22, 1989

JOSE PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALATCO TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY, INC., respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner-plaintiff Jose Pilapil, a paying passenger, boarded respondent-defendant's

bus bearing No. 409 at San Nicolas, Iriga City on 16 September 1971 at about 6:00 P.M.
While said bus No. 409 was in due course negotiating the distance between Iriga City
and Naga City, upon reaching the vicinity of the cemetery of the Municipality of Baao,
Camarines Sur, on the way to Naga City, an unidentified man, a bystander along said
national highway, hurled a stone at the left side of the bus, which hit petitioner above
his left eye. Petitioner lost partially his left eye's vision and sustained a permanent scar
above the left eye.

ISSUE:

WON respondent is liable for damages sustained as a result of the stone-throwing

incident. NO.

RULING:

In case of death of or injuries to passengers, the law presumes common carriers to be at

fault or to have acted negligently.

The injury sustained by the petitioner was in no way due to any defect in the means of
transport or in the method of transporting or to the negligent or willful acts of private
respondent's employees, and therefore involving no issue of negligence in its duty to
provide safe and suitable cars as well as competent employees, with the injury arising
wholly from causes created by strangers over which the carrier had no control or even
knowledge or could not have prevented, the presumption is rebutted and the carrier is
not and ought not to be held liable. To rule otherwise would make the common carrier
the insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers which is not the intention of the
lawmakers.

G.R. No. 126297 January 31, 2007

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, vs. NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA,

Respondents.

FACTS:

Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital (Medical City
Hospital) because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. After a
series of medical examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from
"cancer of the sigmoid."

Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff of the Medical City Hospital, performed an
anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy in her sigmoid
area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it.
Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividad‘s husband, Enrique Agana, to permit
Dr. Juan Fuentes to perform hysterectomy on her.

After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the
operation and closed the incision.

However, the operation appeared to be flawed. Two pieces of gauze measuring 1.5
inches in width each were left in her vagina causing her excruciating pain in her anal
region.
ISSUES:

1. WON Dr. Ampil is liable for negligence and malpractice. YES.

2. WON Dr. Fuentes should be absolved from liability. YES.

RULING:

1. Dr, Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the duty to remove all foreign objects, such as
gauzes, from Natividad‘s body before closure of the incision. When he failed to do so, it
was his duty to inform Natividad about it. Dr. Ampil breached both duties. Such breach
caused injury to Natividad, necessitating her further examination by American doctors
and another surgery. That Dr. Ampil‘s negligence is the proximate cause of Natividad‘s
injury could be traced from his act of closing the incision despite the information given
by the attending nurses that two pieces of gauze were still missing. That they were later
on extracted from Natividad‘s vagina established the causal link between Dr. Ampil‘s
negligence and the injury. And what further aggravated such injury was his deliberate
concealment of the missing gauzes from the knowledge of Natividad and her family.

2. The Aganas assailed the dismissal by the trial court of the case against Dr. Fuentes on
the ground that it is contrary to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. According to them, the
fact that the two pieces of gauze were left inside Natividad‘s body is a prima facie
evidence of Dr. Fuentes‘ negligence.

The requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the
occurrence of an injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control and
management of the defendant; (3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary
course of things, would not have happened if those who had control or management
used proper care; and (4) the absence of explanation by the defendant. Of the
foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the "control and management of the thing
which caused the injury."

We find the element of "control and management of the thing which caused the injury"
to be wanting. Hence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not lie.

To our mind, it was this act of ordering the closure of the incision notwithstanding that
two pieces of gauze remained unaccounted for, that caused injury to Natividad‘s
body. Clearly, the control and management of the thing which caused the injury was in
the hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes. In addition, Dr. Fuentes was no longer in the
operating room and had, in fact, left the hospital when Dr. Ampil directed that the
incision be closed.
Solidum vs People of the Philippines (2014)

Facts: Gerald Albert Gercayo was born on June 2, 1992 with an imperforate anus. Two
days after his birth, Gerald under went colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one
end of the large intestine out through the abdominal walls, enabling him to excrete
through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body. On May 17, 1995, Gerald
was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. Dr. Leandro
Resurreccionheaded the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr. Joselito Lucerio,
Dr.Donatella Valeria and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologist included Drs. Abella,
Razon and Solidum. During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia and went
into a coma. His coma lasted for two weeks , but he regained consciousness only after
a month. He could no longer see, hear, or move. A complaint for reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries were filed by Gerald‘s parents against the team of
doctors alleging that there was failure in monitoring the anesthesia administered to
Gerald.

Issues: Whether or not petitioner is liable for medical negligence.

Whether or not res ipsa liquitor can be resorted to in medical negligence cases.

Held: No. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Reckless
imprudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without
malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person to perform or failing to perform such act. The
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence no matter in
what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the
injury complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence and unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.

• An action upon medical negligence – whether criminal, civil or administrative – calls

for the plaintiff to prove by competent evidence each of the following four elements
namely: a.) the duty owed by the physician to the patient, as created by the physician-
patient relationship, to act in accordance with the specific norms or standards
established by his profession; b.) the breach of the duty by the physician‘s failing to act
in accordance with the applicable standard of care; c.) the causation, is, there must
be a reasonably close and casual connection between the negligent act or omission
and the resulting injury; and d.) the damages suffered by the patient.

• In the medical profession, specific norms on standard of care to protect the patient
against unreasonable risk, commonly referred to as standards of care, set the duty of
the physician in respect of the patient. The standard of care is an objective standard
which conduct of a physician sued for negligence or malpractice may be measured,
and it does not depend therefore, on any individual‘s physician‘s own knowledge
either. In attempting to fix a standard by which a court may determine whether the
physician has properly performed the requisite duty toward the patient, expert medical
testimony from both plaintiff and defense experts is required.

• The doctrine of res ipsa liquitor means that where the thing which causes injury is
shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have management use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by defendant
that the accident arose from want of care.

• Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa liquitor has been measurably
enlarged, it does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to
mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of
the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa liquitor is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be
perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the
circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases
where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation,
that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have
followed if due care had been exercised. A distinction must be made between the
failure to secure results, and the occurrence of something more unusual and not
ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of
those skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res
ipsa liquitor can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which
involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is
not required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why
any particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired results. Thus, res ipsa
liquitor is not available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result
of an operation or treatment was not accomplished. The real question, therefore, is
whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual
event outside the routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of
customary professional activity in such operations, which if unexplained would
themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent case or causes of
the untoward consequence. If there was such extraneous intervention, the doctrine of
res ipsa liquitor may be utilized and the dependent is called upon to explain the matter,
by evidence of exculpation, if he could.

Res ipsa loquitur; concept of; requirements for the doctrine to apply. In Tan v. JAM
Transit, Inc. (G.R. No. 183198, November 25, 2009), the Court noted that res ipsa loquitur
is a Latin phrase that literally means ―the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.‖ It is a
maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the
surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of
negligence, or make out a plaintiff‘s prima facie case, and present a question of fact
for defendant to meet with an explanation. Where the thing that caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants;
and the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had
management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence—in the
absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by defendant—that the
accident arose from or was caused by the defendant‘s want of care. This rule is
grounded on the superior logic of ordinary human experience, and it is on the basis of
such experience or common knowledge that negligence may be deduced from the
mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, the rule is applied in conjunction with
the doctrine of common knowledge.‖

Tan vs. JAM Transit, Inc.

Facts: Luz Palanca Tan (Tan) alleged that she was the owner of a passenger-type jitney
with plate number DKF-168.On March 14, 1997, at around 5:00 a.m., the said jitney
figured in an accident at an intersection along Maharlika Highway, Barangay Bangyas,
Calauan, Laguna, as it collided with a JAM Transit passenger bus bound for Manila,
bearing plate number DVG-557 and body number 8030.The bus was driven by Eddie
Dimayuga (Dimayuga).At the time of the collision, Tans jitney was loaded with quail
eggs and duck eggs (balot and salted eggs).It was driven by Alexander M. Ramirez
(Ramirez).

Tan alleged that Dimayuga was reckless, negligent, imprudent, and not observing
traffic rules and regulations, causing the bus to collide with the jitney which was then,
with care and proper light direction signals, about to negotiate a left turn towards the
feeder or barangay road of Barangay Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna going to the
Poblacion.The jeepney turned turtle along the shoulder of the road and the cargo of
eggs was destroyed.Ramirez and his helper were injured and hospitalized, incurring
expenses for medical treatment at thePagamutang Pangmasain Bay, Laguna.Tan
prayed for damages in the amount of P400,000.00 for the damaged jitney,P142,210.00
for the destroyed shipment,P20,000.00 for moral damages, attorneys fees of P20,000.00
plus P1,000.00 per court appearance of counsel, and other reliefs warranted under the
premises.

In its Answer with Counterclaim, respondent JAM Transit, Inc. (JAM) admitted ownership
of the subject passenger bus and that Dimayuga was under its employ.However, it
denied the allegations in the Complaint, and claimed that the accident occurred due
to the gross negligence of Ramirez.As counterclaim, JAM sought payment of
P100,000.00 for the damages sustained by the bus,P100,000.00 for loss of income, and
P50,000.00 as attorneys fees plusP3,000.00 per court appearance of counsel. The RTC
ruled in favor of Tan and the CA ruled in favor of JAM Transit,There was no evidence as
to who between Ramirez and Dimayuga was negligent in connection with the
vehicular accident.

The CA held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can only be invoked when direct
evidence is nonexistent or not accessible.

Issue: Whether direct evidence is needed to prove the omission or negligence of Jam
Transit.

Held: No. Verily, although there was no direct evidence that the JAM passenger bus
was overtaking the vehicles running along the right lane of the highway from the left
lane, the available evidence readily points to such fact.There were two continuous
yellow lines at the center of the highway, which meant that no vehicle in the said area
should overtake another on either side of the road.The double yellow center lines
regulation, which this Court takes judicial notice of as an internationally recognized
pavement regulation, was precisely intended to avoid accidents along highways, such
as what happened in this case.This prohibition finds support in Republic Act (R.A.) No.
4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code), Section 41(e).Furthermore, it is observed
that the area of collision was an intersection.Section 41(c) of R.A. No. 4136, likewise,
prohibits overtaking or passing any other vehicle proceeding in the same direction at
any intersection of highways, among others.

Thus, by overtaking on the left lane, Dimayuga was not only violating the double yellow
center lines regulation, but also the prohibition on overtaking at highway
intersections.Consequently, negligence can be attributed only to him, which
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury sustained by petitioner. This prima
facie finding of negligence was not sufficiently rebutted or contradicted by Dimayuga.
Therefore, a finding that he is liable for damages to petitioner is warranted.Whenever
an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a
presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families
in the section (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando)of its employees.

To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by its employee, an employer must

overcome the presumption, by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee.To warrant an award of actual or compensatory damages for repair to
damage sustained, the best evidence should be the receipts or other documentary
proofs of the actual amount expended.However, considering that it was duly proven
that the jitney was damaged and had to be repaired, as it was repaired, and that the
cargo of eggs was indeed destroyed, but the actual amounts expended or lost were
not proven, we deem it appropriate to award P250,000.00 by way of temperate
damages. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code,temperate damages may be recovered
when pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.The Decision dated June 2, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89046 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.The Decision dated
December 20, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Civil
Case No. SC-3838 is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION.

Reyes vs. Sisters of Mercy Hospital

Facts: Jorge Reyes has been suffering from recurring fever with chills for around days.
Home medication afforded him no relief so he went to Mercy Community Clinic. He
was then attended by Dr. Marlyn Rico. Since typhoid fever was common at that time,
the Widal test was performed and he was found positive for typhoid. Thereafter, Dr.
Marlyn Rico indorse Jorge Reyes to Dr. Marvie Blanes. Suspecting that that Jorge had
typhoid fever, Dr. Marvie Blanes ordered that Jorge be tested for compatibility with
chloromycetin, an antibiotic. Such test was conducted by Nurse Pagente. As there was
no adverse reaction, Dr. Blanes administered 500 mg of the antibiotic. Another dose
was given 3 hours later. Subsequently, Jorge Reyes developed high fever and
experienced vomiting and convulsions. He then turned blue due to deficiency in
oxygen – cyanosis – and died.

The cause of death was stated to be ―ventricular arrhythmia secondary to hyperpyrexia

and typhoid fever.‖ The heirs of Reyes filed with the RTC a complaint for damages
against Sisters of Mercy, Sister Rose Palacio, Dr. Blanes, Dr. Rico and Mercy Community
Clinic contending that the death of Jorge was due to the wrongful administration of
chloromycetin. Petitioners contend that Dr. Marlyn Rico hastily and erroneously relied
upon the Widal test, diagnosed Jorge‘s illness as typhoid fever, and immediately
prescribed the administration of the antibiotic chloromycetin. Dr. Marvie Blanes erred in
ordering the administration of the second dose of 500 milligrams of chloromycetin
barely 3 hours after the first was given. Dr. Apolinar Vacalares, (Chief Pathologist of the
Northern Mindanao Training Hospital) who performed an autopsy on the body, testified
that Reyes did not die of typhoid fever but of shock undetermined, which could be due
to allergic reaction or chloromycetin overdose.

Issue: WON there was medical malpractice. (No) WON res ipsa loquitur is applicable.
(No)

Held: Dr. Apolinar Vacalares is not a specialist of typhoid fever and he is thus not
qualified to prove that Dr. Marlyn Rico erred in her diagnosis. While petitioners
presented Dr. Apolinar Vacalares as an expert witness, the Court did not find him to be
so as he is not a specialist on infectious diseases like typhoid fever. Furthermore,
although he may have had extensive experience in performing autopsies, he admitted
that he had yet to do one on the body of a typhoid victim at the time he conducted
the postmortem on Jorge Reyes.
 It is also plain from his testimony that he has treated only about three cases of typhoid
fever. On the other hand, the two doctors presented by respondents clearly were
experts on the subject. Dr. Peter Gotiong, a diplomate whose specialization is infectious
diseases and microbiology and an associate professor at the Southwestern University
College of Medicine and the Gullas College of Medicine, testified that he has already
treated over a thousand cases of typhoid fever. According to him, when a case of
typhoid fever is suspected, the Widal test is normally used, and if the results of the Widal
test on Jorge Reyes had been presented to him along with the patient‘s history, his
impression would also be that the patient was suffering from typhoid fever. As to the
treatment of the disease, he stated that chloromycetin was the drug of choice.
Respondents also presented the testimony of Dr. Ibarra T. Panopio who is a member of
the Philippine and American Board of Pathology, an examiner of the Philippine Board of
Pathology, and chief pathologist at the MetroCebu Community Hospital, Perpetual
Succor Hospital, and the Andres Soriano Jr. Memorial Medical Center.

He corroborated Dr. Gotiong‘s testimony that the danger with typhoid fever is really the
possible complications which could develop like perforation, hemorrhage, as well as
liver and cerebral complications. (res ipsa loquitur – not applicable) There is nothing
unusual about the death of Jorge Reyes (absence of 1st requisite that the accident
was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent). In this case,
while it is true that the patient died just a few hours after professional medical assistance
was rendered, there is really nothing unusual or extraordinary about his death. Prior to
his admission, the patient already had recurring fevers and chills for five days unrelieved
by the analgesic, antipyretic, and antibiotics given him by his wife. This shows that he
had been suffering from a serious illness and professional medical help came too late
for him. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no
application in a suit against a physician or a surgeon which involves the merits of a
diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril
to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific
treatment did not produce the desired result.

Africa vs. Caltex

Facts: In the afternoon of March 18, 1948, a fire broke out at the Caltex service station
at the corner of Antipolo St. and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was
being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the
receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread to and burned
several houses. The owners, among them petitioner spouses Africa and heirs of Ong,
sued respondents Caltex Phil., Inc., the alleged owner of the station, and Mateo
Boquiren, the agent in charge of its operation, for damages.
The CFI and CA found that the petitioners failed to prove negligence of the
respondents, and that there was due care in the premises and with respect to the
supervision of their employees.

Issue: Whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on the part of the
respondents.

Held: Yes. Res ipsa loquitur literally means ―the thing or transaction speaks for itself.‖ For
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply, the following requisites should be present: (a)
the accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone‘s
negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant or defendants; and (c) the possibility of contributing conduct which would
make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. In the case at bar, the gasoline station, with
all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of respondents. A
fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons
who knew or could have known how the fire started were respondents and their
employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and
reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care. The
negligence of the employees was the proximate cause of the fire, which in the ordinary
course of things does not happen. Therefore, the petitioners are entitled to the award
for damages.

Pedro Layugan vs. IAC

FACTS: Pedro T. Layugan and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck
loaded with ten (10) big round logs which was parked along the right side of the
National Highway. A warning device consisting of a kerosene lamp was placed three or
four meters from the back of the truck. However, Godofredo Isidro‘s truck, driven
recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured.
The collision dislodged the jack from the parked truck and pinned the plaintiff to the
ground. As a result thereof, plaintiff sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot.

The left leg of the plaintiff from below the knee was later on amputated thereby
rendering him incapacitated for work depriving him of his income. Defendant Isidro
admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident driven by Daniel
Serrano. Defendant countered that the plaintiff was merely a bystander, not a truck
helper being a brother-in-law law of the driver of said truck; that the truck allegedly
being repaired was parked, occupying almost half of the right lane. Respondent Isidro
posits that a parked truck, poses serious danger to a moving vehicle which has the right
to be on the highway and that it was incumbent upon the driver as well as the helper of
the truck driver, to exercise extreme care so that the motorist negotiating the road
would be properly forewarned of the peril of a parked vehicle. Isidro submits that the
burden of proving that care and diligence were observed is shifted to the petitioner, for
the immobile cargo truck had no business to be there. Absent such proof of care, as in
the case at bar, Isidro concludes, would, under the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur, evoke
the presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as
well as his helper, the petitioner herein, who was fixing the flat tire of the said truck.

The trial court rendered its in favor of Layugan and the Intermediate Appellate Court
reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the complaint, the third-party
complaint, and the counter- claims of both appellants. In its decision it stated that in
the case at bar the burden of proving that care and diligence was observed is shifted
evidently to the plaintiff. Absent such proof of care, will evoke the presumption of
negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, on the part of the driver of the
parked cargo truck as well as plaintiff who was fixing the flat tire of said truck.

ISSUES: 1. Whether the decision of the respondent court is correct in finding the
petitioner negligent under the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur (The thing speaks for itself).

2. If the doctrine is inapplicable, then who is negligent?

RULING: 1. The respondent court wrongfully applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The
doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved,
direct evidence is absent and not readily available. Hence, it has generally been held
that the presumption of inference arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is
overcome, where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the
specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury complained of or where
there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and
circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. Once the actual cause of
injury is established beyond controversy, no presumptions will be involved and the
doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances have been so completely
eludicated that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made,
whatever the source of the evidence, as in this case.

2. It is clear from the foregoing disquisition that the absence or want of care of Daniel
Serrano has been established by clear and convincing evidence. When an injury is
caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption
of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer. In disclaiming
liability for the incident, the private respondent stresses that the negligence of his
employee has already been adequately overcome by his driver's statement that he
knew his responsibilities as a driver and that the truck owner used to remind him to be
careful in driving. The evidence on record discloses that three or four meters from the
rear of the parked truck, a lighted kerosene lamp was placed which is sufficient in the
eyes of the Court. Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the
shoulder of the right side of the road would be of no moment taking into account the
warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed three or four meters
from the back of the truck. But despite this warning, Daniel Serrano, still bumped the
rear of the parked cargo truck.

As a direct consequence of such accident the petitioner sustained injuries on his left
forearm and left foot. His left leg was later amputated from below the knee when
gangrene had set in. It is clear that the driver did not know his responsibilities because
he did not check his vehicle before he took it on the road. If he did he could have
discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut, and could have
repaired it and thus the accident could have been avoided. The fact that the private
respondent used to instruct his driver to be careful in his driving is not sufficient to
destroy the finding of negligence. The Court holds that Isidro failed to prove that the
diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of his employees which would
exculpate him from solidary liability with his driver to the petitioner. There is no proof that
Isidro exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of his driver,
Daniel Serrano, as well as in the selection of his mechanic, if any, in order to insure the
safe operation of his truck and thus prevent damage to others

Metro Manila Transport Corp., Pedro Musa, Conrado Tolentino, Feliciana Celebrado
AND GSIS vs. CA, and Sps. Rodolfo and Lily Rosales

FACTS: MMTC is the operator of a fleet of passenger buses within the Metro Manila
area. Musa was its driver assigned to MMTC Bus No. 27. The spouses Rosales were
parents of Liza Rosalie, a third-year high school student at the University of the
Philippines Integrated School. MMTC Bus No. 27, which was driven by Musa, hit Liza
Rosalie who was then crossing Katipunan Avenue in Quezon City. Musa was found
guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The spouses Rosales filed an
independent civil action for damages against MMTC, Musa, MMTC Acting General
Manager Conrado Tolentino, and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).

ISSUE: Whether or not MMTC sufficiently proved diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of Musa.

HELD: No. If the driver is negligent and causes damage, the law presumes that the
owner was negligent and imposes upon him the burden of proving the contrary.
Employers may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of their employees
within the scope of their assigned tasks only if they can show that "they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." In the selection of
prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records. with respect to the supervision of
employees, employers should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. To establish
these, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence. MMTC
sought to prove its exercise of diligence employees by presenting mainly testimonial
evidence on its hiring procedure. While there is no rule which requires that testimonial
evidence, to hold sway, must be corroborated by documentary evidence, or even
object evidence for that matter, inasmuch as the witnesses‘ testimonies dwelt on mere
generalities, we cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that there
was observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. MMTC
submitted brochures and programs of seminars for prospective employees on vehicle
maintenance, traffic regulations, and driving skills and claimed that applicants are
given tests to determine driving skills, concentration, reflexes, and vision, but there is no
record that Musa attended such training programs and passed the said examinations
before he was employed.

Austria vs. CA

FACTS: Maria G. Abad received from Guillermo Austria apendant with diamonds to be
sold on a commission basis or to be returned on demand. While walking home, the
purse containing the jewelry and cash was snatched by two men. A complaint of the
incident was filed in the Court of First Instance against certain persons. Abad failed to
return the jewelry or pay for its value despite demands made by Austria. Austria brought
an action against the Abad spouses for the recovery of the pendant or of its value and
damages. Abad spouses set up the defense that the alleged robbery had extinguished
their obligation. ISSUE: Should the Abad spouse be held liable for the loss of the
pendant? RULING: No. The Court ruled that the exempting provision of Article 1174 of
the Civil Code is applicable in the case. It is a recognized jurisdiction that to constitute a
caso fortuito that would exempt a person from responsibility, it is necessary that the
event must be independent of the human will or of the obligor‘s will; the occurrence
must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and
that the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the
creditor.

To avail of the exemption granted, it is not necessary that the persons responsible for
the event should be found or punished. It is sufficient that to unforeseeable event which
is the robbery took place without concurrent fault or negligence on the part of the
obligor which can be proven by preponderant evidence. It was held that the act of
Maria Abad in walking home alone carrying the jewelry was not negligent for at that
time the incidence of crimes was not high.

Southeastern College vs Court of Appeals

FACTS: Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay City,
while petitioner owns a four-storey school building along the same College Road. On
October 11, 1989, at about 6:30 in the morning, a powerful typhoon Saling hit Metro
Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of petitioners building was partly ripped
off and blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private
respondents house. After the typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection of the
destroyed buildings was conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city
building official, Engr. Jesus L. Reyna. In their report, they imputed negligence to the
petitioner for the structural defect of the building and improper anchorage of trusses to
the roof beams to cause for the roof be ripped off the building, thereby causing
damage to the property of respondent. It then recommended that to avoid any further
loss and damage to lives, limbs and property of persons living in the vicinity, the fourth
floor of subject school building be declared as a structural hazard. Respondents filed a
complaint before the RTC for damages based on culpa aquiliana.

They alleged that the damage to their house rendered the same uninhabitable, forcing
them to stay temporarily in others houses. And so they sought to recover from petitioner
P117,116.00, as actual damages, P1,000,000.00, as moral damages, P300,000.00, as
exemplary damages and P100,000.00, for and as attorneys fees; plus costs. Petitioner
averred that subject school building had withstood several devastating typhoons and
other calamities in the past, without its roofing or any portion thereof giving way; that it
has not been remiss in its responsibility to see to it that said school building, which
houses school children, faculty members, and employees, is in tip-top condition; and
furthermore, typhoon Saling was an act of God and therefore beyond human control
such that petitioner cannot be answerable for the damages wrought thereby, absent
any negligence on its part. The trial court, giving credence to the ocular inspection
report to the effect that subject school building had a defective roofing structure,
found that, while typhoon Saling was accompanied by strong winds, the damage to
private respondents house could have been avoided if the construction of the roof of
[petitioners] building was not faulty. Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
trial courts disposition by reducing the award of moral damages from P1,000,000.00 to
P200,000.00.

Issues:

1. Whether the damage on the roof of the building of private respondents resulting
from the impact of the falling portions of the school buildings roof ripped off by the
strong winds of typhoon ―Saling‖, was, within the legal contemplation, due to fortuitous
event.

2. Whether or not the ocular inspection is sufficient evidence to prove negligence.

Held: 1. Yes. Petitioner should be exonerated from liability arising from the damage
caused by the typhoon. Article 1174 provides that: Art 1174. Except in cases expressly
specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature
of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those
events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. In
order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he
be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may
have been occasioned. An act of God cannot be invoked for the protection of a
person who has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its possible
adverse consequences. When a person‘s negligence concurs with an act of God in
producing damage or injury to another, such person is not exempt from liability by
showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a
fortuitous event. When the effect is found to be partly the result of the participation of
man whether it be from active intervention, or neglect, or failure to act the whole
occurrence is hereby humanized, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of
God. The lower court accorded full credence to the finding of the investigating team
that subject school buildings roofing had no sufficient anchorage to hold it in position
especially when battered by strong winds.

Based on such finding, the trial court imputed negligence to petitioner and adjudged it
liable for damages to private respondents. There is no question that a typhoon or storm
is a fortuitous event, a natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable
despite any amount of foresight, diligence or care. In order to be exempt from liability
arising from any adverse consequence engendered thereby, there should have been
no human participation amounting to a negligent act. In other words, the person
seeking exoneration from liability must not be guilty of negligence. Negligence, as
commonly understood, is conduct which naturally or reasonably creates undue risk or
harm to others. It may be the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, or the omission to do something
which a prudent and reasonable man, guided by considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do.

2. It bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the negligence of another
has the burden of proving the existence of fault or negligence causative of his injury or
loss. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by
competent evidence, not merely by presumptions and conclusions without basis in
fact. Private respondents, in establishing the culpability of petitioner, merely relied on
the aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an ocular inspection of
petitioners school building after the typhoon. As the term imparts, an ocular inspection
is one by means of actual sight or viewing. What is visual to the eye though, is not
always reflective of the real cause behind. For instance, one who hears a gunshot and
then sees a wounded person, cannot always definitely conclude that a third person
shot the victim.

It could have been self-inflicted or caused accidentally by a stray bullet. The

relationship of cause and effect must be clearly shown. In the present case, other than
the said ocular inspection, no investigation was conducted to determine the real cause
of the partial unroofing of petitioners school building. Private respondents did not even
show that the plans, specifications and design of said school building were deficient
and defective. Neither did they prove any substantial deviation from the approved
plans and specifications. Nor did they conclusively establish that the construction of
such building was basically flawed. There is no clear and convincing evidence to
sustain the judgment of the appellate court. We thus hold that petitioner has not been
shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its school
building in question and that typhoon Saling was the proximate cause of the damage
suffered by private respondents house.

Private respondents claim for actual and moral damages as well as attorneys fees must
fail. Petitioner cannot be made to answer for a purely fortuitous event. More so
because no bad faith or willful act to cause damage was alleged and proven to
warrant moral damages. Private respondents failed to adduce adequate and
competent proof of the pecuniary loss they actually incurred. It is not enough that the
damage be capable of proof but must be actually proved with a reasonable degree
of certainty, pointing out specific facts that afford a basis for measuring whatever
compensatory damages are borne. Private respondents merely submitted an
estimated amount needed for the repair of the roof of their subject building.

25 PEDRO VASQUEZ, SOLEDAD ORTEGA, CLETO B. BAGAIPO, AGUSTINA VIRTUDES,

ROMEO VASQUEZ and MAXIMINA CAINAY, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
FILIPINAS PIONEER LINES, INC., respondents. G.R. No. L-42926 September 13, 1985

This litigation involves a claim for damages for the loss at sea of petitioners' respective
children after the shipwreck of MV Pioneer Cebu due to typhoon "Klaring" in May of
1966.

When the inter-island vessel MV "Pioneer Cebu" left the Port of Manila bound for Cebu,
it had on board the spouses Alfonso Vasquez and Filipinas Bagaipo and a four-year old
boy, Mario Marlon Vasquez, among her passengers. The MV "Pioneer Cebu"
encountered typhoon "Klaring" and struck a reef on the southern part of Malapascua
Island, located somewhere north of the island of Cebu and subsequently sunk. The
aforementioned passengers were unheard from since then.

Plaintiffs Pedro Vasquez and Soledad Ortega are the parents of Alfonso Vasquez;
plaintiffs Cleto Bagaipo and Agustina Virtudes are the parents of Filipinas Bagaipo; and
plaintiffs Romeo Vasquez and Maxima Cainay are the parents of the child, Mario
Marlon Vasquez. They seek the recovery of damages due to the loss of Alfonso
Vasquez, Filipinas Bagaipo and Mario Marlon Vasquez during said voyage.

Issue: W/N case which is the sinking of the vessel was caused by force majeure, and
that the defendant's liability had been extinguished by the total loss of the vessel.
Held: When the vessel left Manila, its officers were already aware of the typhoon Klaring
building up somewhere in Mindanao. There being no typhoon signals on the route from
Manila to Cebu, and the vessel having been cleared by the Customs authorities, the
MV "Pioneer Cebu" left on its voyage to Cebu despite the typhoon. When it reached
Romblon Island, it was decided not to seek shelter thereat, inasmuch as the weather
condition was still good. After passing Romblon and while near Jintotolo island, the
barometer still indicated the existence of good weather condition continued until the
vessel approached Tanguingui island. Upon passing the latter island, however, the
weather suddenly changed and heavy rains felt Fearing that due to zero visibility, the
vessel might hit Chocolate island group, the captain ordered a reversal of the course so
that the vessel could 'weather out' the typhoon by facing the winds and the waves in
the open. Unfortunately, at about noontime on May 16, 1966, the vessel struck a reef
near Malapascua island, sustained leaks and eventually sunk, bringing with her Captain
Floro Yap who was in command of the vessel.

The trial Court found the defense of caso fortuito untenable due to various decisive
factors, thus:

... It is an admitted fact that even before the vessel left on its last voyage, its officers
and crew were already aware of the typhoon brewing somewhere in the same general
direction to which the vessel was going. The crew of the vessel took a calculated risk
when it proceeded despite the typhoon advisory. This is quite evident from the fact that
the officers of the vessel had to conduct conferences amongst themselves to decide
whether or not to proceed. The crew assumed a greater risk when, instead of seeking
shelter in Romblon and other islands the vessel passed en route, they decided to take a
change on the expected continuation of the good weather the vessel was
encountering, and the possibility that the typhoon would veer to some other directions.
The eagerness of the crew of the vessel to proceed on its voyage and to arrive at its
destination is readily understandable. It is undeniably lamentable, however, that they
did so at the risk of the lives of the passengers on board.

Contrariwise, respondent Appellate Court believed that the calamity was caused solely
and proximately by fortuitous event which not even extraordinary diligence of the
highest degree could have guarded against; and that there was no negligence on the
part of the common carrier in the discharge of its duties.

Upon the evidence and the applicable law, we sustain the trial Court. "To constitute a
caso fortuito that would exempt a person from responsibility, it is necessary that

(1) the event must be independent of the human will;

(2) the occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a
normal manner; and that

(3) the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the
creditor."
In the language of the law, the event must have been impossible to foresee, or if it
could be foreseen, must have been impossible to avoid. There must be an entire
exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury or loss.

Turning to this case, before they sailed from the port of Manila, the officers and crew
were aware of typhoon "Klaring" that was reported building up at 260 kms. east of
Surigao. In fact, they had lashed all the cargo in the hold before sailing in anticipation
of strong winds and rough waters.

Under the circumstances, while, indeed, the typhoon was an inevitable occurrence,
yet, having been kept posted on the course of the typhoon by weather bulletins at
intervals of six hours, the captain and crew were well aware of the risk they were taking
as they hopped from island to island from Romblon up to Tanguingui. They held
frequent conferences, and oblivious of the utmost diligence required of very cautious
persons, they decided to take a calculated risk. In so doing, they failed to observe that
extraordinary diligence required of them explicitly by law for the safety of the
passengers transported by them with due regard for an circumstances 10 and
unnecessarily exposed the vessel and passengers to the tragic mishap. They failed to
overcome that presumption of fault or negligence that arises in cases of death or
injuries to passengers.

26 MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MIAA), petitioner, vs. ALA INDUSTRIES

CORPORATION, respondent. G.R. No. 147349. February 13, 2004

FACTS: The contract for the structural repair and waterproofing of the IPT and ICT
building of the NAIA airport was awarded, after a public bidding, to respondent ALA.
Respondent made the necessary repair and waterproofing. After submission of its
progress billings to the petitioner, respondent received partial payments. Progress billing
remained unpaid despite repeated demands by the respondent. Meanwhile petitioner
unilaterally rescinded the contract on the ground that respondent failed to complete
the project within the agreed completion date. Respondent objected to the rescission
made by the petitioner and reiterated its claims. The trial court directed the parties to
proceed to arbitration. Both parties executed a compromise agreement and jointly
filed in court a motion for judgment based on the compromise agreement. The Court a
quo rendered judgment approving the compromise agreement.

For petitioner‘s failure to pay within the period stipulated, respondent filed a motion for
execution to enforce its claim. Petitioner filed a comment and attributed the delays to
its being a government agency. The trial court denied the respondent‘s motion.
Reversing the trial court, the CA ordered it to issue a writ of execution to enforce
respondent‘s claim. The appellate court ratiocinated that a judgment rendered in
accordance with a compromise agreement was immediately executory, and that a
delay was not substantial compliance therewith.

Issue: Whether or not the delay of petitioner in complying with its obligation under the
Compromise Agreement is justified under the principle that no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen,
were inevitable.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Delay in Payment by Reason of a Fortuitous Event

A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal

concessions to resolve their differences, thus avoiding litigation or putting an end to one
that has already commenced. Generally favored in law, such agreement is a bilateral
act or transaction that is binding on the contracting parties and is expressly
acknowledged by the Civil Code as a juridical agreement between them. Provided it
is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, it is
immediately executory.

The Christmas Season Not a Fortuitous Event

The failure to pay on the date stipulated was clearly a violation of the Agreement.
Within thirty days from receipt of the judicial Order approving it -- on December 20, 1997
-- payment should have been made, but was not. Thus, nonfulfillment of the terms of
the compromise justified execution. It is the height of absurdity for petitioner to attribute
to a fortuitous event its delayed payment. Petitioner‘s explanation is clearly a gratuitous
assertion that borders on callousness. The Christmas season cannot be cited as an act
of God that would excuse a delay in the processing of claims by a government entity
that is subject to routine accounting and auditing rules.

A fortuitous event is one that cannot be foreseen or, though foreseen, is inevitable. It
has the following characteristics:

(a) [T]he cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the
debtor to comply with his obligations, must be independent of human will;

(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it
can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;

(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner; and

(d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury
resulting to the creditor.

None of these elements appears in this case.

First, processing claims against the government and subjecting these to the usual
accounting and auditing procedures are certainly not only foreseeable and
expectable, but also dependent upon the human will. Liquidation and payment
resulting therefrom can be deliberately delayed or speeded up.
Second, the Christmas season is not a caso fortuito, but a regularly occurring event. It is
in fact foreseeable, and its occurrence has absolutely nothing to do with the processing
of claims.

Further, in order to claim exemption from liability by reason of a fortuitous event, such
event should be the sole and proximate cause of the injury to or the loss or destruction
of the object of the contract or compromise, which was the payment to be made by
petitioner. Certainly, this payment was not lost or destroyed, but merely delayed, thus
causing injury to respondent. Granting arguendo such loss or destruction, the Christmas
season could not have been the sole and proximate cause thereof.

Third, the occurrence of the Christmas season did not at all render impossible the
normal fulfillment of the obligation of petitioner; otherwise, few claims would ever be
paid during this period. It ought to have taken appropriate measures to ensure that a
delay would be avoided. When it entered into the Agreement, it knew fully well that the
30-day period for it to pay its obligation would end during the Christmas season. Thus, it
cannot now be allowed to renege on its commitment.

Fourth, petitioner cannot argue that it is free from any participation in the delay. It
should have laid out on the compromise table the problems that would be caused by
a deadline falling during the Christmas season. Furthermore, it should have explained to
respondent that government accounts would be examined carefully and thoroughly to
the last detail, in strict compliance with accounting and auditing rules issued by and
pursuant to the constitutional mandate of the Commission on Audit.

Indeed, the liquidation of government obligations involves a long process beginning

with the preparation of disbursement vouchers; followed by the processing of requests
for allotment as supported by vouchers, job orders and requisitions; and ending with the
issuance of the corresponding checks. Without first securing the necessary certification
as to the availability of funds and allotment against which expenditures may be
properly charged, no funds shall be disbursed; and no expenditures chargeable
against any authorized allotments shall be incurred or authorized by agency heads.

Moreover, it is important to note that under government accounting principles, no

contract involving the expenditure of public funds shall be made until there is an
appropriation therefor, the unexpended balance of which, free of other obligations, is
sufficient to cover the proposed expenditure. In the present case, there was already an
antecedent appropriation for the contract when petitioner entered into it. Obviously,
prior planning had not taken into account the liquidation process in the conduct of the
compromise.

The sheer neglect shown by petitioner in failing to consider these matters aggravated
the resulting injury suffered by respondent. The former cannot be allowed to hide now
behind its government cloak.

Fortuitous Event Negated by Negligence

The act-of-God doctrine requires all human agencies to be excluded from creating the
cause of the mischief. Such doctrine cannot be invoked to protect a person who has
failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of loss or injury. Since
the delay in payment in the present case was partly a result of human participation --
whether from active intervention or neglect -- the whole occurrence was humanized
and was therefore outside the ambit of a caso fortuito.

Furthermore, none of the requisites we have earlier mentioned are present in this case,
a fact that clearly prevents petitioner from being excused from liability. Under the rules
of evidence, the burden of proving that a loss is due to a caso fortuito rests upon the
party invoking it. This responsibility, it failed to discharge.

Verily, an assiduous scrutiny of the records convinces us that it was negligent, and that it
thereby incurred a delay in the performance of its contractual obligation under the
judicial compromise. It thus created an undue risk or injury to respondent by failing to
exercise that reasonable degree of care, precaution or vigilance that the
circumstances justly demanded, and that an ordinarily prudent person would have
done.

27 GLORIA SONDAYON, vs P.J. LHUILLER, INC. and RICARDO DIAGO, G.R. No. 15358
February 27, 2008

Facts: Respondent P.J. Lhuillier, Inc. is a domestic corporation that owns and operates
pawnshops under the business name La Cebuana Pawnshop. Respondent Ricardo
Diago acts as manager in one of its pawnshops in Paranaque. Respondent company
contracted the services of the Sultan Security Agency and the agency assigned
Guimad Mantung to guard the La Cebuana Pawnshop in Maywood. Petitioner Gloria
Sondayon, a store manager of Shekinah Jewelry & Boutique, secured a loan from La
Cebuana and pledged her Patek Philippe solid gold watch worth P250,000. The watch
was given to her as part of her commission by the owner of the shop where she works.
She had pawned the watch to La Cebuana a few times in the past and, each time,
she was able to redeem it. Guimad Mantung, employing force and violence, robbed
La Cebuana, resulting in the deaths of respondent company‘s appraiser and vault
custodian.

An information for Robbery with Homicide was filed against Mantung, and the
information alleged that Mantung divested the pawnshop of P62,000 in cash and
several pieces of jewelry amounting to P5,300,000.

Later, respondent company received a letter from petitioner‘s counsel demanding for
the gold watch that she had pawned. But respondent company failed to comply with
the demand letter because the watch was among the articles of jewelry stolen by
Mantung. Petitioner then, filed a complaint for recovery of possession of personal
property with prayer for preliminary attachment against respondent company and its
Maywood branch manager, Ricardo Diago. In their Answer, respondents averred that
petitioner had no cause of action against them because the incident was beyond their
control. RTC: The company cannot be held liable for damages, the loss of the thing
having been due to a fortuitous event. The parties are bound by the contract of
pledge, among the terms and conditions of which states that the company should not
be held liable if the thing was lost due to a fortuitous event, said condition not being
contrary to law, morals or public policy should be upheld. The pertinent portions of the
Decision read: Culled from the testimonies of all the witnesses presented as well as the
pieces of documentary evidence offered, this Court, after a thorough and careful
evaluation and deliberation thereof is of the honest and firm belief that plaintiff failed to
establish a sufficient cause of action against defendant as to warrant the recovery of
the pledged Patek Philippe Solid Gold Watch which was allegedly concealed,
removed or disposed of by the latter defendants as the facts and evidence proved
otherwise as said watch was lost on account of a robbery with double homicide that
happened on August 10, 1996 perpetrated by one Guimad Mantung, the security
guard of defendant employed by Sultan Security Agency as found out by the Court
(Exh. 7); thus, defendants were not negligent in the safekeeping of the watch of
plaintiff. Not only that. The pledge bears the terms and conditions which the parties
should adhere being the law between them pursuant to Art. 1159 of the New Civil
Code. Paragraph 13 of Exhibits A and B specifically provides: The pawnee shall not be
liable for the loss or damage of the article pawned due to fortuitous events or force
majeure such as fire, robbery, theft, hold-ups and other similar acts. When the loss is due
to the fault and/or negligence of the pawnee, the amount of its liability, if any, shall be
limited to the appraised value appearing on the face hereof. Said provision is not
violative of law, customs, public policy or tradition, hence, has the force of law
between the plaintiff and defendants, and the incident that happened which led to
the loss of the thing pledged cannot be considered as negligence but more of a
fortuitous event which the defendants could not have foreseen or which though
foreseen, was inevitable. This finds support in Art. 1174 of the Civil Code. The
defendants, therefore, are not bound to return the thing pledged nor the Court to fix its
value. There was no unjustifiable refusal on the part of the defendants to return the
thing pledged because, as testified by plaintiff herself, she has pawned the watch at
least five (5) times to defendant corporation. CA: Affirmed RTC ruling.

Issues: Whether the robbery is a fortuitous event to which the company cannot be held
liable;

Ruling: Yes, as discussed by the RTC. The pawnee shall not be liable for loss or damage
of the article pawned due to fortuitous events or force majeure such as fire, robbery,
theft, and other similar acts. When the loss is due to the fault and/or negligence of the
pawnee, the amount of its liability, if any, shall be limited to appraised value appearing
on the face thereof. As to the causal connection between respondent company‘s
violation of the legal obligation to insure the articles pledged and the heist-homicide
committed by the security guard, the answer is simple: had respondent company
insured the articles pledged against burglary, petitioner would have been
compensated for the loss from the burglary. Respondent company‘s failure to insure
the article is, therefore, a contributory cause to petitioner‘s loss.
Considering, however, that petitioner agreed to a valuation of P15,000 for the article
pledged in case of a loss, the replacement value for failure to insure is likewise limited to
P15,000. Nevertheless, this Court, taking into account all the circumstances of this case,
deems it fair and just to award exemplary damages against respondent company for
its failure to comply with the rule and regulation requiring it to insure the articles
pledged against fire and burglary, in the amount of Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000)
Pesos. This Decision is without prejudice to appropriate proceedings to recover any
excess value of the article pledged from amounts that may be or have been awarded
payable by third parties answerable for the loss arising from the robbery.‖

28 MONDRAGON LEISURE AND RESORTS CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ASIAN

BANK CORPORATION, FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, and UNITED COCONUT
PLANTERS BANKG.R. No. 154188 June 15, 2005

Facts: Mondragon Leisure and Resorts Corp. v CA, 460 SCRA 279(2005)Facts:
Mondragon International Philippines, Inc., Mondragon Securities Corporation
and petitioner entered into a lease agreement with the Clark Development
Corporation for the development of Mimosa Leisure Estate. To help finance the
project, petitioner, entered into an Omnibus Loan and Security Agreement with
respondent banks for a syndicated term loan in the aggregate principal amount of
US$20M. Under the agreement, the proceeds of the loan were to be released through
advances evidenced by promissory notes to be executed by petitioner in favor of
each lender-bank, and to be paid within a six-year period from the date
of initial advance inclusive of a one year and two quarters grace period. Petitioner,
which had regularly paid the monthly interests due on the promissory notes until
October 1998, thereafter failed to make payments. Consequently, written notices of
default, acceleration of payment and demand letters were sent by the lenders to the
petitioner. Then, respondents filed a complaint for the foreclosure of leasehold rights
against petitioner. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint but was
denied. Further, petitioner also contends that the provisions on default in the Omnibus
Agreement have been rendered inapplicable and unenforceable by fortuitous events,
namely the Asian economic crisis and the closure of the Mimosa Regency Casino,
which was petitioner‘s primary source of revenues

Issue: Whether or not its contention regarding fortuitous event tenable?

Held: The issue on fortuitous event is untenable. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 is not
among the fortuitous events contemplated under Art 1174 of the Civil Code.
To exempt the obligor from liability for a breach of an obligation by reason of a
fortuitous event, the following must concur:

a. The cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the
debtor
b. The event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable
 c. The event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfil his
obligation in a normal manner
d. The debtor must be free from any participation in or aggravation of the injury to
the creditor.

The loan agreement was entered into on June 30, 1997 or when the Asian economic
Crisis had already started. Petitioner, as a long established corp. should well aware of
the economic environment at that time, yet it still took the risk to expand operations.
Likewise, the closure of the Mimosa Regency Casino was not an unforeseeable or
unavoidable event, in the context of the contract of lease between petitioner and
CDC. Every business venture involves risks. Risks are not unforeseeable and are inherent
in business.

29 G.R. No. 53401. November 6, 1989.] THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY,
petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (First Division) LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE
JUAN YABES, VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN CARAG, and PURISIMA JUAN,
respondents.

FACTS: in the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967 a strong
typhoon by the code name "Gening" buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing
heavy rains and consequent flooding in its wake. Between 5:30 and 6:00 A.M. on June
29, 1967, after the typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to
recede, the deceased Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called Nana Belen, ventured out of the
house of her son-in-law, Antonio Yabes, on No. 19 Guerrero Street, Laoag City, and
proceeded northward towards the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she
was the owner and proprietress, to look after the merchandise therein that might have
been damaged. Wading in waistdeep flood on Guerrero, the deceased was followed
by Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl at the Five Sisters Grocery, also owned by the deceased,
and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller at the YJ Cinema, which was partly owned
by the deceased. Aida and Linda walked side by side at a distance of between 5 and
6 meters behind the deceased. Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly
sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them from
doing so because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire
dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shouts for
help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to
the deceased, but at four meters away from her he turned back shouting that the
water was grounded. Aida and Linda prodded Ernesto to seek help from Antonio Yabes
at the YJ Cinema building which was four or five blocks away.

When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-in-law had been
electrocuted, he acted immediately. With his wife Jane, together with Ernesto and one
Joe Ros, Yabes passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask the people
of defendant Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the electric current.
Then the party waded to the house on Guerrero Street. The floodwater was receding
and the lights inside the house were out indicating that the electric current had been
cut off in Guerrero. Yabes instructed his boys to fish for the body of the deceased. The
body was recovered about two meters from an electric post.

In another place, at about 4:00 AM. on that fateful date, June 29, 1967, Engineer
Antonio Juan, Power Plant Engineer of the National Power Corporation at the Laoag
Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated
such abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines. Between 6:00 and 6:30 A.M., he
set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an inspection. On the way, he saw grounded
and disconnected lines. Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the ground. Since
he could not see any INELCO lineman, he decided to go to the INELCO Office at the
Life Theatre on Rizal Street by way of Guerrero.

At about 8:10 A.M., Engr. Juan went out of the compound again on another inspection
trip. Having learned of the death of Isabel Lao Juan, he passed by the house of the
deceased at the corner of Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar streets to which the body had
been taken.

In the afternoon of the same day, he went on a third inspection trip preparatory to the
restoration of power. The dangling wire he saw on Guerrero early in the morning of June
29, 1967 was no longer there. An action for damages in the aggregate amount of
P250,000 was instituted by the heirs of the deceased with the aforesaid CFI on June 24,
1968.

Defenses:

(1) electric service system of the INELCO in the whole franchise area did not suffer from
any defect that might constitute a hazard to life and property.

(2) service lines, devices and other INELCO equipment in Area No. 9 had been newly-
installed prior to the date in question.

(3) installed safety devices to prevent and avoid injuries to persons and damage to
property in case of natural calamities such as floods, typhoons, fire and others.

(4) 12 linesmen charged with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of the
areas respectively assigned to them.

(5) deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to
negligence attributable only to herself and not to petitioner.

(6) deceased, without petitioner's knowledge, caused the installation of a burglar

deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate and fence of steel
matting, thus, charging the latter with electric current whenever the switch is on.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) CFI – Ilocos Norte: defendant is hereby sentenced to pay plaintiffs

ISSUE: Whether INELCO is liable

RULING:
Yes. PETITIONER NOT EXONERATED AS VICTIM'S DEATH IS CAUSED BY ITS NEGLIGENCE. —
The respondent CA acted correctly in disposing the argument that petitioner be
exonerated from liability since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. While it is true
that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held
responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim's death. It was
through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place.

Under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no
harm is done to the general public". . . considering that electricity is an agency, subtle
and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be
commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high
degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be"
(Astudillo vs. Manila Electric, 55 Phil. 427). The negligence of petitioner having been
shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was
solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God combines or concurs with the
negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury
would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission" (38 Am. Jur., p.
649).

A PERSON WHO VOLUNTARILY ASSENTS TO A KNOWN DANGER MUST ABIDE BY THE

CONSEQUENCES; EXCEPTIONS. — The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" (To a willing person,
injury is not done) relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. It is
imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to
leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified by Linda
Alonzo Estavillo and Aida Bulong the deceased, accompanied by the former two, were
on their way to the latter's grocery store "to see to it that the goods were not flooded."
As such, shall We punish her for exercising her right to protect her property from the
floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of
personal injury? Definitely not. For it has been held that a person is excused from the
force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by
the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another
is in peril (65A C.S.C. Negligence (174(5), p. 301), or when he seeks to rescue his
endangered property (Harper and James, "The Law of Torts." Little, Brown and Co.,
1956, v. 2, p. 1167). Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a
source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased,
at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be
without regard to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her
merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering
damages as a result of the death caused by petitioner's negligence.

"When a storm occurs that is liable to prostrate the wires, due care requires prompt
efforts to discover and repair broken lines" (Cooley on Torts, 4th ed., v. 3, p. 474). The
fact is that when Engineer Antonio Juan of the National Power Corporation set out in
the early morning of June 29, 1967 on an inspection tour, he saw grounded and
disconnected lines hanging from posts to the ground but did not see any INELCO
lineman either in the streets or at the INELCO office. The foregoing shows that
petitioner's duty to exercise extraordinary diligence under the circumstance was not
observed, confirming the negligence of petitioner.

30. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), vs. ALFONSO VERCHEZ,
GRACE VERCHEZ-INFANTE, MARDONIO INFANTE, ZENAIDA VERCHEZ-CATIBOG, AND
FORTUNATO CATIBOG, G.R. No. 164349 January 31, 2006

Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for
damages.

Respondent Grace Verchez-Infante (Grace) hired the services of Radio

Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) to send a telegram to her sister
respondent Zenaida Verchez-Catibog (Zenaida), asking her to send money for their
mother Editha Verchez (Editha) who at that time was confined in a hospital in Sorsogon.
But it took 25 days before such message was conveyed to Zenaida.

When Editha died, her husband, respondent Alfonso Verchez (Alfonso), along with his
daughters Grace and Zenaida and their respective spouses, filed an action for
damages against RCPI before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon. They alleged
that the delay in the delivery of the message contributed to the early death of Editha.
RCPI argues that there is no privity of contract between other respondents except with
Grace, also the delay in the delivery is caused by force majeure, maintaining further
that they exercised due diligence in choosing their employees; hence they must be
released from any liability. The

RTC rendered judgement against RCPI. RCPI appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the award of moral damages is proper despite the fact that there
was no direct connection between the injury and the alleged negligent acts

HELD: RCPI‗s stand fails. It bears noting that its liability is anchored on culpa contractual
or breach of contract with regard to Grace, and on tort with regard to her co-plaintiffs-
herein-co-respondents. Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who in the
performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those
who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.

In the case at bar, RCPI bound itself to deliver the telegram within the shortest possible
time. It took 25 days, however, for RCPI to deliver it. RCPI invokes force majeure,
specifically, the alleged radio noise and interferences which adversely affected the
transmission and/or reception of the telegraphic message. Additionally, its messenger
claimed he could not locate the address of Zenaida and it was only on the third
attempt that he was able to deliver the telegram.

For the defense of force majeure to prosper, it is necessary that one has committed no
negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot
be invoked to protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible
adverse consequences of such a loss. One‗s negligence may have concurred with an
act of God in producing damage and injury to another; nonetheless, showing that the
immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event would
not exempt one from liability. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a
person‗s participation – whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act – the
whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.

Assuming arguendo that fortuitous circumstances prevented RCPI from delivering the
telegram at the soonest possible time, it should have at least informed Grace of the
non-transmission and the non-delivery is that she could have taken steps to remedy the
situation. But it did not. There lies the fault or negligence.

And for quasi-delict, RCPI is liable to Grace‗s co-respondents following Article 2176 of
the Civil Code which provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

RCPI‗s liability as an employer could of course be avoided if it could prove that it

observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage provided in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. RCPI failed, however, to prove that it observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

31 CHAN KEEP, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. LEON CHAN GIOCO, ET AL., defendants-
appellants. [G.R. L-No. 4378. August 18, 1909]

FACTS
Plaintiffs filed an action to recover the value of 120 cavanes of rice, which plaintiffs
claim to have delivered to defendants upon a contract for its transportation by boat
(parao) from the port of Luna, in the Province of La Union, to the port of San Fernando,
in the same province, in consideration of the sum of twenty-five centavos per cavan;
the rice, as it is alleged, having been lost through the negligence, carelessness, and
lack of due precaution taken by the defendants in the management of the boat on
which it was being transported, as result of which the boat sank as she entered the port
of San Fernando, on the night of the 8th of April, 1907.

Leon Chan Gioco denied having entered into the transportation contract. Counsel for
appellants contends that the loss of the rice was due to the sinking of the boat on
which it was loaded, as a result of a strong wind which struck her as she was entering
the port of San Fernando; and that appellants should not be held responsible therefor,
the loss having resulted from an act of God ( fuerza mayor) or an unavoidable
accident (caso fortuíto), and without blame upon their part.

Lower court: ruled in favour of plaintiff

ISSUE: W/N Defendant should be held liable for the lost of goods?

RULING: Yes. Plaintiffs succeeded in establishing the transportation contract set out in
the complaint, and the delivery of the rice to the defendant Leon Chan Gioco and his
codefendant, Anastasio Atregenio, the latter being the patron or captain of the boat
on which the rice was loaded, employed as such by Leon Chan Gioco.

The evidence in support of appellants' claim that the loss of the rice was the result of an
act of God or an unavoidable accident is not satisfactorily established; the burden of
proof in this regard rested upon the defendants.

It not having been otherwise expressly stipulated, it is to be presumed that the owner of
the boat, Leon Chan Gioco, when he contracted to transport the rice in question over
the high seas, obligated himself to furnish a boat suitable for the work which he
undertook to perform, and a capable crew to man her; and the mere fact that a
strong wind was blowing when the boat changed its course is not in itself sufficient to
excuse her owners for losses incurred as a result of so poor an execution of this
maneuver as to result in sinking her. In the absence of proof of such a violent storm or
such an exceptionally high sea that, despite the proper equipment of the boat and the
exercise of due skill and diligence by the patron and crew, those in charge of the boat
were overpowered by the force of the elements, we do not think that the sinking of the
boat can justly be said to have been the result of an act of God or of an unavoidable
accident; the blowing of strong winds must always be anticipated by men who go
down into the sea in ships, and in the absence of evidence of some unusual intervening
cause, we must hold that the exercise of due diligence in the performance of their duty
by the patron and the members of his crew, had they been reasonably expert as
seafaring men, could have and would have avoided the accident which actually
occurred, provided the boat was suited to the work required of her.

32 VIRGINIA REAL vs SISENANDO H. BELO G.R. NO. 146224 January 26, 200

Petitioner owned and operated the Wasabe Fastfood stall located at the Food Center
of the Philippine Womens University (PWU) along Taft Avenue, Malate, Manila.
Sisenando H. Belo (respondent) owned and operated the BS Masters fastfood stall, also
located at the Food Center of PWU.

Around 7:00 oclock in the morning of January 25, 1996, a fire broke out at petitioners
Wasabe Fastfood stall. The fire spread and gutted other fastfood stalls in the area,
including respondents stall. An investigation revealed that the fire broke out due to the
leaking fumes coming from the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) stove and tank installed
at petitioners stall. For the loss of his fastfood stall due to the fire, respondent demanded
compensation from petitioner. However, petitioner refused to accede to respondents
demand.

Hence, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner. Respondent

alleged that petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in the upkeep and
maintenance of her cooking equipments, as well as the selection and supervision of her
employees; that petitioners negligence was the proximate cause of the fire that gutted
the fastfood stalls.

Petitioner denied liability on the grounds that the fire was a fortuitous event and that
she exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees

MeTC rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant

The MeTC held that the investigation conducted by the appropriate authority revealed
that the fire broke out due to the leaking fumes coming from the LPG stove and tank
installed at petitioners fastfood stall; that factual circumstances did not show any sign of
interference by any force of nature to infer that the fire occurred due to fortuitous
event; that the petitioner failed to exercise due diligence, precaution, and vigilance in
the conduct of her business, particularly, in maintaining the safety of her cooking
equipment as well as in the selection and supervision of her employees; that even if
petitioner passes the fault to her employees, Article 2180 of the Civil Code finds
application; that in the absence of supporting evidence, the amount of actual
damages and unrealized profits prayed for by respondent cannot be granted; that,
nonetheless, respondent is entitled to temperate damages since respondent sustained
pecuniary loss, though its true value cannot, from the very nature of the case, be
proved with certainty.

Issue: Whether the herein petitioner could be held liable for damages as a result of the
fire that razed not only her own food kiosk but also the adjacent foodstalls at the Food
Center premises of the Philippine Womens University, including that of the respondent?

Held: Jurisprudence defines the elements of a fortuitous event as follows:

(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence must be independent of
human will;

(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it
can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;

(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner; and

(d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury
resulting to the creditor.

Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides that no person shall be responsible for a
fortuitous event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was
inevitable. In other words, there must be an entire exclusion of human agency from the
cause of injury or loss.

It is established by evidence that the fire originated from leaking fumes from the LPG
stove and tank installed at petitioners fastfood stall and her employees failed to prevent
the fire from spreading and destroying the other fastfood stalls, including respondent‘s
fastfood stall. Such circumstances do not support petitioner‘s theory of fortuitous event.

Petitioners bare allegation is far from sufficient proof for the Court to rule in her favor. It is
basic in the rule of evidence that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are
not equivalent to proof. In short, mere allegations are not evidence.

The Civil Code provides:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. x x x

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter
are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.

Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there

instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise
diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in
vigilando) of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his
employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing
proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employee.

In this case, petitioner not only failed to show that she submitted proof that the LPG
stove and tank in her fastfood stall were maintained in good condition and periodically
checked for defects but she also failed to submit proof that she exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her employees. For
failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of her cooking equipment and
in the selection and supervision of her employees, the necessary inference was that
petitioner had been negligent.

33. G.R. No. L-25906 May 28, 1970, DIOQUINO vs .FEDERICO LAUREANO, et. al.
FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS
Attorney Pedro Dioquino, a practicing lawyer of Masbate, is the owner of a car. He met
the defendant Federico Laureano, a patrol officer of said MVO office, who was waiting
for a jeepney to take him to the office of the Provincial Commander, PC, Masbate.
Attorney Dioquino requested the defendant Federico Laureano to introduce him to
one of the clerks in the MVO Office, who could facilitate the registration of his car and
the request was graciously attended to. Defendant Laureano rode on the car of Atty.
Dioquino on his way to the P.C. Barracks at Masbate. While about to reach their
destination, the car driven by plaintiff's driver and with defendant Federico Laureano as
the sole passenger was stoned by some 'mischievous boys,' and its windshield was
broken. Defendant Federico Laureano chased the boys and he was able to catch one
of them. The boy was taken to Atty. Dioquino [and] admitted having thrown the stone
that broke the car's windshield. The plaintiff and the defendant Federico Laureano with
the boy returned to the P.C. barracks and the father of the boy was called, but no
satisfactory arrangements [were] made about the damage to the windshield.
Defendant refused to pay arguing that a minor boy who threw stones is a force
majeure and therefor, he cannot be liable for the same. Plaintiff sued against the
defendant in the trial court and prevailed, the judgment however going only against
the principal defendant, his spouse and his father being absolved of any responsibility.
Nonetheless, all three of them appealed directly to us.

ISSUE
WON the lower court ERRED to dismiss such a suit as no liability could have been
incurred as a result of a fortuitous event;

RULING
We agree that the lower court ought to have dismissed the suit, but it does not follow
that thereby damages for the inclusion of the above two other parties in the complaint
should have been awarded appellants.

The law being what it is, such a belief on the part of defendant Federico Laureano was
justified. The express language of Art. 1174 of the present Civil Code reads thus: "Except
in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or
when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be, foreseen, or which, though foreseen
were inevitable."
There is no requirement of "diligence beyond what human care and foresight can
provide."
The error committed by the lower court in holding defendant Federico Laureano liable
appears to be thus obvious. Its own findings of fact repel the motion that he should be
made to respond in damages to the plaintiff for the broken windshield. What
happened was clearly unforeseen. It was a fortuitous event resulting in a loss which
must be borne by the owner of the car. An element of reasonableness in the law would
be manifestly lacking if, on the circumstances as thus disclosed, legal responsibility
could be imputed to an individual in the situation of defendant Laureano. Art. 1174 of
the Civil Code guards against the possibility of its being visited with such a reproach.
Unfortunately, the lower court was of a different mind and thus failed to heed its
command.

It is, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or
participated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to
avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the
same.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of November 2, 1965 insofar as it orders
defendant Federico Laureano to pay plaintiff the amount of P30,000.00 as damages
plus the payment of costs, is hereby reversed. It is affirmed insofar as it dismissed the
case against the other two defendants, Juanita Laureano and Aida de Laureano, and
declared that no moral damages should be awarded the parties. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
34. [G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996], SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and
SPOUSES LITO and MARIA CRISTINA SANTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF
PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH
181,
REGALADO, J.:

FACTS
On August 26, 1982, an action for the grant of an easement of right of way was filed
by Pacifico Mabasa against Custodio, Morato, Santos before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig.
Perusing the record, this Court finds that the original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died
during the pendency of this case and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving
spouse [and children].
The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated
at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila. Said property may be
described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to defendants herein.
Taking P. Burgos Street as the point of reference, on the left side, going to plaintiffs
property, the row of houses will be as follows: That of defendants Custodio, then that of
Santos and then that of Mabasa. On the right side (is) that of defendant Rosalina
Morato and then a Septic Tank. As an access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiffs property,
there are two possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter
wide and is about 20 meters distant from Mabasas residence to P. Burgos Street. Such
path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second
passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasas residence
to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a
meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length has to be
traversed.

Sometime in February, 1982. one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when
plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw that there had been built an adobe
fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first
constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is also along the first
passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended
said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. And it was then
that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area. Defendant Ma.
Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence because there was an incident
when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants
in said apartment along the first passageway. She also mentioned some other
inconveniences of having (at) the front of her house a pathway such as when some of
the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows. Some of their
footwear were even lost.

On February 27, 1990, a decision was rendered by the trial court, ordering
defendants Custodios and Santos to give plaintiff permanent access - ingress and
egress, to the public street and ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and
Santos the sum of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of
the passageway. Not satisfied therewith, therein plaintiff went to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

ISSUE
WON the grant of right of way to herein private respondents is proper, and whether or
not the award of damages is in order.

RULING
With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising the
same for failure to appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private
respondents the right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the
adjudication therein.

However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners that the Court
of Appeals erred in awarding damages in favor of private respondents. A reading of
the decision of the Court of Appeals will show that the award of damages was based
solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form
of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the
closure of the passageway.
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right
to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of
action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff
therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a
cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury
caused by a breach or wrong.[8]

In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage,
that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.[13] If, as
may happen in many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to
his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission
which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque
injuria.[14]

The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of
their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The
law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other
limitations than those established by law.[16] It is within the right of petitioners, as owners,
to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that (e)very
owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or
dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted
thereon.

WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises, the appealed

decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
judgment of the trial court is correspondingly REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
35. [G.R. No. 140420. February 15 , 2001] SERGIO AMONOY, petitioner, vs. Spouses JOSE
GUTIERREZ and ANGELA FORNILDA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS
This case had its roots in the settlement of the estate of the deceased Julio Cantolos,
involving six (6) parcels of land situated in Tanay, Rizal. Amonoy was the counsel of
therein Francisca Catolos, Agnes Catolos, Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda. On
12 January 1965, the Project of Partition submitted was approved and two (2) of the
said lots were adjudicated to Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda. The attorneys
fees charged by Amonoy was P27,600.00 and on 20 January 1965 Asuncion Pasamba
and Alfonso Formilda executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the said two (2) lots
adjudicated to them, in favor of Amonoy to secure the payment of his attorneys
fees. But it was only on 6 August 1969 after the taxes had been paid, the claims settled
and the properties adjudicated, that the estate was declared closed and terminated.

Asuncion Pasamba died on 24 February 1969 while Alfonso Fornilda passed away on 2
July 1969. Among the heirs of the latter was his daughter, plaintiff-appellant Angela
Gutierrez.
Because his attorneys fees thus secured by the two lots were not paid, on 21 January
1970 Amonoy filed for their foreclosure before the CFI of Pasig, Rizal, and this was
assigned to Branch VIII. The heirs opposed, contending that the attorneys fees charged
[were] unconscionable and that the agreed sum was only P11,695.92. But on 28
September 1972 judgment was rendered in favor of Amonoy. They failed to pay. On 6
February 1973, the said lots were foreclosed and on 23 March 1973 the auction sale was
held where Amonoy was the highest bidder at P23,760.00. On 2 May 1973 his bid was
judicially confirmed. A deficiency was claimed and to satisfy it another execution sale
was conducted, and again the highest bidder was Amonoy at P12,137.50. Included in
those sold was the lot on which the Gutierrez spouses had their house.

WHEN THE Respondents house had already been destroyed, supposedly in accordance
with a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower court, a Complaint for damages in
connection with the destruction of their house was filed by respondents against
petitioner before the RTC on December 15, 1989.

In its January 27, 1993 Decision, the RTC dismissed respondents suit. On appeal, the CA
set aside the lower courts ruling and ordered petitioner to pay respondents P250,000 as
actual damages. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was also
denied.
Hence, this recourse.[6]
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in deciding that the petitioner
[was] liable to the respondents for damages[8]

RULING
YES. Well-settled is the maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of
a persons rights is a loss without injury -- damnum absque injuria -- for which the law
gives no remedy.[9] In other words, one who merely exercises ones rights does no
actionable injury and cannot be held liable for damages.

We reject this submission. Damnum absque injuria finds no application to this case.
True, petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents house on May 30, 1986
under the authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC. But the records show that
a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining the demolition of respondents house,
was issued by the Supreme Court on June 2, 1986. The CA also found, based on the
Certificate of Service of the Supreme Court process server that a copy of the TRO was
served on petitioner himself on June 4, 1986.
Petitioner, however, did not heed the TRO of this Court. We agree with the CA that
he unlawfully pursued the demolition of respondents house well until the middle of
1987. Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outset, their
continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his
right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad faith.
The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is
abused, especially to the prejudice of others. The mask of a right without the spirit of
justice which gives it life, is repugnant to the modern concept of social law. It cannot
be said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another.
Clearly then, the demolition of respondents house by petitioner, despite his receipt
of the TRO, was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. In insisting
on his alleged right, he wantonly violated this Courts Order and wittingly caused the
destruction of respondents house.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

36. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK V. RUBEN BASCO G.R. No. 142668 August 31, 2004
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Ruben E. Basco has been employed with the petitioner United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB) for seventeen (17) years. He was the Bank Operations Manager of
UCPB Olongapo Branch and also a stockholder thereof and owned 804 common
shares of stocks at the par value of P1.00. Aside from his employment with the bank,
respondent also worked as an underwriter at the United Coconut Planters Life
Association (Coco Life) which is a subsidiary of UCPB. He also solicited insurance policies
from UCPB employees. In or about the period May to June 1992, respondent was,
together with other fellow officers and employees, investigated by UCPB in connection
with various anomalies. He was recommended terminated as a result of the
investigation, in which he was found guilty of committing or taking part in the
commission of the following: a. Abuse of discretion in connection with actions taken
beyond or outside the limits of authority; b. Borrowing money from bank client; c. Gross
negligence or dereliction of duty in the implementation of bank policies or valid orders
of management; d. Direct refusal or willful failure to perform, or delay in performing, an
assigned task; e. Fraud or willful breach of trust in the conduct of his work; and f.
Falsification or forgery of bank records/documents. The respondent thereafter decided
to contest his termination by filing a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of
salaries and damages against the bank before the NLRC. However, the respondent still
frequented the UCPB main office in Makati City to solicit insurance policies from the
employees and even discussed the complaint he filed against the bank with the said
employees. Petitioner Ongsiapco, upon seeing respondent Basco within UCPB‘s
premises even after his dismissal and filing of complaints against the said bank, was
worried that bank records could be purloined and employees could be hurt. Thus, on
November 15, 1995, Ongsiapco issued a Memorandum to Vice President of the Security
Department Jesus Belanio directing the latter not to allow the respondent access to the
bank premises. On December 7, 1995, the respondent wrote Ongsiapco, requesting for
the reconsideration of the Memorandum and that he be allowed entry into the bank
premises. He insisted on seeing and talking to the bank‘s employees, claiming he
needed to do this in connection with his insurance solicitation activities. Petitioner did
not reconsider. Respondent Basco was undaunted. On January 31, 1996, respondent
again went to the UCPB Makati Branch to receive a check from Rene Jolo and to
deposit money for a friend. Jose Regino Casil, a bank employee, was asked by Jolo to
deliver the check to the respondent. Casil motioned to the respondent to approach
him in his working area to receive his check, but when respondent proceeded in the
direction of Casil, he was approached by the bank‘s security guards and was shown
Ongsiapco‘s Memorandum. On March 11, 1996, the respondent filed a complaint for
damages against the petitioners UCPB and Ongsiapco in the RTC Manila alleging
petitioners‘ vindictive intent to prevent him from carrying out his job as an insurance
agent, that such discriminatory policy as well as Ongsiapco‘s Memorandum have
caused him undeserved embarrassment. RTC rendered judgment in favour of the
respondent. It held that petitioners abused their rights; hence, were liable to the
respondent for damages. The petitioners appealed the decision to the CA. On March
30, 2000, it rendered a decision affirming the decision of the RTC with modifications. The
CA deleted the awards for moral and exemplary damages, but ordered the petitioner
bank to pay nominal damages due to the January 31, 1996 incident.

ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner bank abused its right when it issued, through petitioner
Ongsiapco, the Memorandum barring the respondent access to all bank premises.

HELD
NO.
The petitioners aver that the petitioner bank has the right to prohibit the respondent
from access to all bank premises under Article 429 of the New Civil Code.
The petitioners contend that the said provision, which enunciates the Principle of Self-
Help, applies when there is a legitimate necessity to personally or through another,
prevent not only an unlawful, actual, but also a threatened unlawful aggression or
usurpation of its properties and records, and its personnel and customers/clients who
are in its premises. The petitioners assert that Ongsiapco issued the Memorandum
because the respondent had been dismissed from his employment for varied grave
offences; hence, his presence in the premises of the bank posed a threat to the
integrity of its records and to the persons of its employees. The Court held that banks
are mandated to exercise a higher degree of diligence in the handling of its affairs than
that expected of an ordinary business enterprise because they handle transactions
involving millions of pesos and properties worth considerable sums of money. Further,
the banking business will thrive only as long as it maintains the trust and confidence of
its customers/clients. For this reason, the Court agreed with the petitioner bank that it
has the right to exclude certain individuals from its premises or to limit their access
thereto to protect not only its premises or records, but also the persons of its personnel
and its customers while in the premises. However, it must also be noted that while the
Court agreed that the petitioner may prohibit non-employees from entering the
working area, it also held that the Memorandum, as worded, violates the right of the
respondent as a stockholder or a depositor of the petitioner bank, for being capricious
and arbitrary. It is likewise contrary to the intention of the petitioners, as they did not
intent to bar the respondent from access to all bank premises under all circumstances.

Petitioner Ongsiapco testified that a former employee of the bank who is a

customer/client also has access to the bank premises, except those areas reserved for
its officers and employees, such as working areas.
Thus, it is necessary for the petitioners to revise such Memorandum to conform to its
actual intention, which is to bar the respondent only in areas reserved for the petitioner
bank‘s officers and employees, such as working areas.

37. G.R. No. 174646, DOLE PH VS RODRIGUEZ

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS
Checkered Farms entered into an Exclusive Purchasing Agreement with petitioner
which bound itself to purchase all the acceptable bananas that would be produced
by the former. Checkered Farms, in return allow petitioner to introduce installations and
improvements on the land and to dismantle and remove all non-permanent
installations and improvements it has introduced upon the expiration of the period of
the contract. Rodriguez, the new owner of the said land, authorized petitioner to
manage the plantation under an interim arrangement pending final resolution of their
negotiation. In the same letter, Rodriguez demanded for the accounting of fruits
harvested from the expiration of their contract, petitioners failed and refused to pay, in
fact, raided the subject plantation destroying the facilities therein arguing that the
contract expires and have the right to dismantle their own installations. In the court,
petitioner insists that it cannot be held liable for damages' allegedly suffered by
respondents based on the principle of damnum absque injuria and such act was acts
contra bonus mores.

ISSUE
Whether the principle of damnum absque injuria justifies the petitioner‘s right to remove
the impr
ovements on the subject plantation?

RULING
No. Under the principle of damnum absque injuria, the legitimate exercise of a person's
rights, even if it causes loss to another, does not automatically result in an actionable
injury. The law does not prescribe a remedy for the loss. This principle, however, does
not apply when there is an abuse of a person's right as in this case.[72] While we
recognize petitioner's right to remove the improvements on the subject plantation, it,
however, exercised such right arbitrarily, unjustly and excessively resulting in damage to
respondents' plantation. The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless
be in accordance with the proper norm. When the right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly
or excessively and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which
the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Civil Code, Article 21, any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage; this refers to acts contra
bonus mores. The act is within the article only when it is done willfully. The act is willful if it
is done with knowledge of its injurious effect; it is not required that the act be done
purposely to produce the injury. Undoubtedly, petitioner removed the pipes with
knowledge of its injurious effect which is the destruction of the banana plants and fruits;
and failed to cover the diggings which caused ground destruction. Petitioner should,
therefore, be liable for damages.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated June 1, 2006 and Resolution dated September 6, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58632,
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION by reducing the temperate damages from
P200,000.00 to P100,000.00.

38. January 11, 2016, G.R. No. 191033

THE ORCHARD GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., EXEQUIEL D. ROBLES, CARLO R.H. MAGNO,
CONRADO L. BENITEZ II, VICENTE R. SANTOS, HENRY CUA LOPING, MARIZA SANTOS-TAN,
TOMAS B. CLEMENTE III, and FRANCIS C. MONTALLANA,
vs. ERNESTO V. YU and MANUEL C. YUHICO,
PERALTA, J.:

FACTS
The present case is a continuation of Yu v. The Orchard Gold & Country Club,
Inc.4 decided by this Court on March 1, 2007. On May 28, 2000, a Sunday, [respondents]
Ernesto Yu and Manuel Yuhico went to the Orchard Golf & Country Club to play a
round of golf with another member of the club. At the last minute, however, that other
member informed them that he could not play with them. Due to the "no twosome"
policy of the Orchard contained in the membership handbook prohibiting groups of
less than three players from teeing off on weekends and public holidays before 1:00
p.m., [respondents] requested management to look for another player to join them.
Because [Orchard] were unable to find their third player, [respondent] Yu tried to
convince Francis Montallana, Orchard‘s assistant golf director, to allow them to play
twosome, even if they had to tee off from hole no. 10 of the Palmer golf course.
Montallana refused, stating that the flights which started from the first nine holes might
be disrupted. [Respondent] Yu then shouted invectives at Montallana, at which point
he told [respondent] Yuhico that they should just tee off anyway, regardless of what
management's reaction would be. [Respondents] then teed off, without permission
from Montallana. They were thus able to play, although they did so without securing a
tee time control slip before teeing off, again in disregard of a rule in the handbook. As a
result of [respondents‘] actions, Montallana filed a report on the same day with the
board of directors (the board).
Subsequently, on June 29, 2000, the board resolved to suspend [respondents] from July
16 to October 15, 2000, and served notice thereof on them.
On July 11, 2000, [respondents] filed separate petitions for injunction with application for
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction AND assailed the validity
of their suspension IN SEC. On October 31, 2000, the board held a special meeting in
which it resolved to implement the June 29, 2000 order for the suspension of
[respondents] in view of the fact that the writs of injunction issued by the SICD in their
respective cases had already [elapsed] on August 8, 2000 under the SEC guidelines.
Suits ensued thereafter, and at this point, [respondents] filed their petition in this Court
which denied the petitions in G.R. Nos. 150335 and 152687.
Meanwhile, per Order dated September 24, 2002 of the Imus RTC, SEC Case Nos. 001-01
and 002-01 were set for pre-trial conference.6 Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
On December 4, 2008, the Imus RTC ruled in favor of respondents and ordered the
decision of the Club‘s Board of Directors suspending [respondents] Ernesto V. Yu and
Manuel C. Yuhico is hereby declared void and of no effect.
Before the Imus RTC, respondents‘ motion for execution was granted on February 17,
2009. The trial court opined that the proper appellate mode of review was not filed
within the period prescribed by the Rules and that the CA issued no restraining
order.17 On March 2, 2009, the Writ of Execution was issued.18 Eventually, on March 30,
2009, the Sheriff received the total amount of P9,200,000.00, as evidenced by two
manager‘s check payable to respondents in the amount of P4,600,000.00 each, which
were turned over to respondents‘ counsel.19
On September 16, 2009, the CA granted respondents‘ motion for reconsideration,
setting aside its January 15, 2009 Resolution. Petitioners moved to reconsider, 22 but it
was denied on January 21, 2010; hence, this petition.

ISSUE
WON THE DAMAGES WERE PROPERLY GIVEN TO THE RESPONDENTS

RULING
NO.
In the present case, Yu acknowledged that there was an offense committed.29 Similarly,
Yuhico admitted that he was aware or had prior knowledge of the Club‘s "no twosome"
policy as contained in the Club‘s Membership Handbook and that they teed off
without the required tee time slip.30 Also, while Yu recognized telling
Montallana "kamote ka," Yuhico heard him also say that he (Montallana) is "gago."
Respondents assert that the "no twosome" policy was relaxed by the management
when a member or player would not be prejudiced or, in the words of Yu, allowed
when "maluwag."32 Yet a thorough reading of the transcript of stenographic records
(TSN) disclosed that such claim is based not on concrete examples. No specific
instance as to when and under what circumstance the supposed relaxation took place
was cited. Yuhico roughly recollected two incidents but, assuming them to be true,
these happened only after May 28, 2000.

Way different from the trial court‘s findings, there is, therefore, no factual and legal basis
to grant moral and exemplary damages, attorney‘s fees and costs of suit in favor of
respondents. The damages suffered, if there are any, partake of the nature of
a damnum absque injuria.

"One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. Qui jure suo utitur nullum
damnum facit. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum
absque injuria."55 In this case, respondents failed to prove by preponderance of
evidence that there is fault or negligence on the part of petitioners in order to oblige
them to pay for the alleged damage sustained as a result of their suspension as Club
members. Certainly, membership in the Club is a privilege.56 Regular members are
entitled to use all the facilities and privileges of the Club, subject to its rules and
regulations.57 As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the mental anguish respondents
experienced, assuming to be true, was brought upon them by themselves for
deliberately and consciously violating the rules and regulations of the Club. Considering
that respondents were validly suspended, there is no reason for the Club to
compensate them. Indeed, the penalty of suspension provided for in Section 1, Article
XIV of the By-Laws is a means to protect and preserve the interest and purposes of the
Club. This being so, the suspension of respondents does not fall under any of the
provisions of the Civil Code pertaining to the grant of moral and exemplary damages,
attorney‘s fees, and litigation costs.

39. G.R. No. 17226, March 1, 1922 L. S. MOON & CO., vs.
Honorable FRANCIS BURTON HARRISON, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands,
Honorable DIONISIO JAKOSALEM, Secretary of Commerce and Communications, and
Honorable JUSTO LUKBAN, Mayor of the city of Manila,
FACTS
That the Hon. Francis Burton Harrison is the duly appointed, qualified and acting,
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, and, as such, its Chief Executive; that the
Hon. Dionisio Jakosalem is the duly appointed, qualified and acting Secretary of
Commerce and Communications and the official designated by executive order of the
said Govern-General as the executive in charged of rice, its sale and distribution in the
Philippine Islands; that the said Justo Lukban is the duly appointed, qualified and acting
Mayor of the city of Manila, and, as such, designated by the said Governor-General
and Secretary of Commerce and Communications as their assistant in charge for the
city of Manila of rice, its sale and distribution.
That on September 24, the plaintiff was the owner of 2,330 ½ kilos of rice, No. 1 quality,
imported from Siam at a cost to plaintiff of P26.32, Philippine currency, per cavan, and
150 cavans of glutinous rice imported from Hongkong on the 14th day of July, 1919, at a
cost of P22,25 per cavan; that the said rice at the time of its purchase was bought in
the open market and at the then prevailing market prices.

That defendants, pursuant to Act No. 2868 of the Philippine Legislature and pursuant to
Executive Orders No. 56 and 67 issued by authority of said Act, have seized the said
2,330½ kilos of Siam rice of plaintiff and deprived him of it, for the purpose of distribution
to the public at large; that said seizure was made without compensation to plaintiff,
although defendants have promised to pay there for at the rate of P16.25, Philippine
currency, a cavan and no more, which price is below the reasonable value of the rice
and is unjust; that payment at said rate does not constitute just compensation and a
seizure under the circumstances alleged constitutes a confiscation of private property
contrary to the fundamental and organic law of the Philippine Islands and an invasion
of those constitutional rights that no one may be deprived of his property except by
due process of law and with just compensation; that the just and reasonable value of
the rice seized as aforesaid in Manila at the time of said seizure was with respect to the
Siam rice mentioned P26.32 per cavan.

That so much of said Act No. 2868 and its defendant Executive Orders that fix an
arbitrary maximum selling price for rice and corn is unconstitutional and void as being in
contravention of the Constitution of the United States and the Jones Bill, in so far as they
guarantee to individuals the right to own and dispose of lawful property as they please
and guarantee that the same may not be taken without due process of law and just
compensation.

ISSUE
WON HARRISON, JAKOSALEM AND LUKBAN MAY BE HELD LIABLE FOR ENFORCING THE
LAW.

RULING
NO.
This court will take judicial knowledge of the fact that he no longer holds that position,
and that for some time it has been held by the Honorable Leonard Wood.

From the pleadings, we must assume that in the commission of the alleged acts, the
Governor-General was acting in his official capacity, and was engaged in the
performance of a duty enjoined upon him by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands.
Whatever may be the rule as to the personal liability of an Executive, after a law has
been finally declared unconstitutional, no court has ever held and no final decision will
ever be found holding an Executive personally liable in damages for the exercise of a
discretionary power under a law before it has been held unconstitutional.
In the very nature of things, it is not the duty of the Governor to say whether a law is or is
not constitutional. It is his duty to enforce the law until such time as it has legally been
declared unconstitutional. To hold an executive personally liable in an action for
damages for the performance or nonperformance of official duty, in legal effect,
would make him a judge as to when a law is or is not constitutional.

Assuming that the market value of rice was P26.32 per cavan, and that the defendants
were only ready and willing to pay P16.25 per cavan, it may be claimed that the taking
of the rice was a confiscation of his property to the amount of the difference between
the actual value and the proposed value. But, conceding that to be true, the
defendants are not personally liable in an action for damages. Their acts were official
and discretionary, and they had a legal right to assume that the law was valid. In the
commission of the alleged acts, they were acting for, and representing, the
Government of the Philippine Islands under a law enacted by its Legislature, and it is
elementary that without its consent no suit or action lies against the Government itself.
So ordered.

40. G.R. No. 83589, March 13, 1991, RAMON FAROLAN as ACTING COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS, and GUILLERMO PARAYNO, as CHIEF OF CUSTOM INTELLIGENCE and
INVESTIGATION DIVISION, petitioners, vs. SOLMAC MARKETING CORPORATION and
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:

FACTS
Solmac Marketing Corporation was the assignee, transferee, and owner of an
importation of Clojus Recycling Plastic Products of what is technically known as
polypropylene film. Without defect, polypropylene film is sold at a much higher price as
prime quality film. Once rejected as defective due to blemishes, discoloration,
defective winding, holes, etc., polypropylene film is sold at a relatively cheap price
without guarantee or return, and the buyer takes the risk as to whether he can recover
an average 30% to 50% usable matter. This latter kind of polypropylene is known as OPP
film waste/scrap and this is what respondent SOLMAC claimed the Clojus shipment to
be.
The subject importation, consisting of seventeen (17) containers, arrived in December,
1981. Upon application for entry, the Bureau of Customs asked respondent SOLMAC for
its authority from any government agency to import the goods described in the bill of
lading upon examination of the shipment by the National Institute of Science and
Technology (NIST), it turned out that the fibers of the importation were oriented in such
a way that the materials were stronger than OPP film scrap. In other words, the Clojus
shipment was not OPP film scrap, as declared by the assignee respondent SOLMAC to
the Bureau of Customs and BOI Governor Lilia R. Bautista, but oriented polypropylene
the importation of which is restricted, if not prohibited.

Commissioner of Customs - Considering that the shipment was different from what had
been authorized by the BOI and by law, petitioners Parayno and Farolan withheld the
release of the subject importation.
Board of Investments - subject imports may be released but that holes may be drilled on
them by the Bureau of Customs prior to their release. Respondent Solmac filed the
action for mandamus and injunction with the RTC as above mentioned.
RTC - P100,000.00 and P50,000.00 for exemplary damages and attorney's fees and
litigation expenses
Court of Appeals - adjudged these public officers to pay solidarily and in their private
personal capacities respondent Solmac Marketing Corporation temperate damages in
the sum of P100,000.00, exemplary damages in the sum of P50,000.00, and P25,000.00,
as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.

ISSUE
These two issues boil down to a single question, i.e., whether or not the petitioners
acted in good faith in not immediately releasing the questioned importation, or, simply,
can they be held liable, in their personal and private capacities, for damages to the
private respondent.

RULING
We rule for the petitioners.
We hold that this finding of the trial court is correct for good faith is always presumed
and it is upon him who alleges the contrary that the burden of proof lies.15
We had reviewed the evidence on record carefully and we did not see any clear and
convincing proof showing the alleged bad faith of the petitioners. On the contrary, the
record is replete with evidence bolstering the petitioners' claim of good faith. First, there
was the report of the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) dated January
25, 1982 that, contrary to what the respondent claimed, the subject importation was
not OPP film scraps but oriented polypropylene, a plastic product of stronger material,
whose importation to the Philippines was restricted, if not prohibited, under LOI 658-B.17

even the highest officers (Chairman Ongpin, Vice-Chairman Tordesillas, and Governor
Zayco) of the BOI themselves were not in agreement as to what proper course to take
on the subject of the various importations of Oriented Polypropylene (OPP) and
Polypropylene (PP) withheld by the Bureau of Customs. The conflicting
recommendations of the BOI on this score prompted the petitioners to seek final
clarification from the former with regard to its policy on these importations. This resulted
in the inevitable delay in the release of the Clojus shipment, one of the several of such
importations.

When a public officer takes his oath of office, he binds himself to perform the duties of
his office faithfully and to use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the
benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of his duties, he is to use that prudence,
caution, and attention which careful men use in the management of their affairs. In the
case at bar, prudence dictated that petitioners first obtain from the BOI the latter's
definite guidelines regarding the disposition of the various importations of oriented
polypropylene (OPP) and polypropylene (PP) then being withheld at the Bureau of
Customs.
Mistakes concededly committed by public officers are not actionable absent any clear
showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad
faith.21 After all, "even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are
protected by the presumption of good faith.22

MIGUEL "LUCKY" GUILLERMO and AV MANILA CREATIVE PRODUCTION CO., vs. PHILIPPINE
INFORMATION AGENCY and DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS,

Facts: Miguel "Lucky" Guillermo (Guillermo) and AV Manila Creative Production, Co. (AV
Manila) filed a Complaint3 for a sum of money and damages before the Regional Trial
Court. Guillermo and AV Manila alleged that in the last few months of the
Administration of Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo Administration),
then Acting Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways Victor Domingo
(Acting Secretary Domingo), consulted and discussed with Guillermo and AV Manila
the urgent need for an advocacy campaign (Campaign). The purpose of the
Campaign was to counteract the public's negative perception of the performance of
the outgoing Arroyo Administration.5 Guillermo and AV Manila formally submitted in a
letter-proposal, the concept of "Joyride," a documentary film showcasing milestones of
the Arroyo Administration which also includes comics for that matter.6 Acting Secretary
Domingo signed a marginal note on the letter-proposal, which read, "OK,
proceed!"7 Guillermo and AV Manila allegedly worked on "Joyride" which was aired on
NBN-Channel 4.

Guillermo and AV Manila further claimed that communications and meetings on the
Campaign and "Joyride" ensued between them and various government agencies.
Among the government agencies is the respondent Philippine Information Agency.16
Petitioners alleged that Acting Secretary Domingo informed them that the total
consideration of ₱25,000,000.00 for their services and deliverable items was acceptable
and approved.

Petitioners averred to have delivered a total of 10,000 copies of the "Joyride"

documentary to respondent Department of Public Works and Highways,31 and billed
respondent Philippine Information Agency the amount of ₱l0,000,000.00. Thereafter,
petitioners delivered 10,000 "Joyride" comics to the Department of Public Works and
Highways, and subsequently billed the Philippine Information Agency
₱l5,000,000.00. No funds were released by the Philippine Information Agency for the
32

payment of the same.33 After all the deliverables had been delivered, petitioners
followed up on the payment from the Philippine Information Agency. Despite several
demands, no payments were made.

The Office of the Solicitor General moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a
cause of action and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Regional Trial
Court of Marikina granted the Office of the Solicitor General's Motion to Dismiss which
was affirmed by the CA, ruling that petitioners failed to prove the existence of a
contract,47 considering that the elements of a contract were absent.

Issue: Is there a valid contract?

Ruling: No. The Complaint attempted to lay down the elements of a contract between
the petitioners on one hand, and respondents on the other. Thus, it alleged a series of
communications, meetings, and memoranda, all tending to show that petitioners
agreed to complete and deliver the "Joyride" project, and that respondents agreed to
pay ₱25,000,000.00 as consideration. However, as correctly pointed out by the
respondent, contracts involving the expenditure of public funds have additional
requisites to be valid. The Administrative Code of 1987 expressly prohibits the entering
into contracts involving the expenditure of public funds unless two prior requirements
are satisfied. First, there must be an appropriation law authorizing the expenditure
required in the contract. Second, there must be attached to the contract a
certification by the proper accounting official and auditor that funds have been
appropriated by law and such funds are available. Failure to comply with any of these
two requirements renders the contract void. Hence, Any contract entered into contrary
to the requirements shall be void, and the officer or officers entering into the contract
shall be liable to the Government or other contracting party for any consequent
damage to the same extent as if the transaction had been wholly between private
parties.

The Complaint, in the case at bar, completely ignored the foregoing requisites for the
validity of contracts involving expenditure of public funds. Thus, the Regional Trial Court
could not order the enforcement of the alleged contract on the basis of the Complaint,
and the Complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
E. RAZON, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and PIONEER INSURANCE &
SURETY CORPORATION, respondents.

Facts: A civil case was filed by respondent Pioneer Insurance as insurer-subrogee, to

recover from either or both defendants, jointly and severally, the sum of P21,937.75
representing the invoice value, freight costs and other importation expenses of three (3)
cases of radio and phonograph parts short-delivered from a total of eighty-six (86)
cases of said articles from Kobe, Japan, shipped aboard the SS "Don Jacinto II" of the
defendant Northern Lines, Inc., The total shipment was insured by Pioneer.

The shipment was discharged from the carrying vessel into the custody of E. Razon, Inc.,
one of the arrastre operators charged with the obligation of handling, custody and
delivery of all cargo discharged. The shipment was delivered to its consignee, MGM
Importers with losses and damages valued at P 21,937.75. E. Razon certified that out of
86 cases of radio parts loaded on board the SS 'DON JACINTO II" under Bill of Lading No.
KM-18, only 83 cases had been delivered to the consignee.

Formal claims were thus filed by MGM Importers with Northern Lines and E. Razon, as
well as the Pioneer Insurance Company. The latter indemnified the assured.

Court of First Instance of Manila rendered its decision ordering defendant E. Razon to
indemnify plaintiff Pioneer, which was affirmed by the CA.

The sole issue raised by the petitioner is the general limitation of its liability to P 2,000 per
case lost or destroyed as provided in the Revised Management Contract it had
entered into with the Bureau of Customs. It is the petitioner's contention that the
provision of the Revised Management Contract denotes a clear rule in the limited
liability of E. Razon, Inc., that is, it should not exceed P 2,000 per package for lost or
damaged cargo, except only in case the value of the importation is specified,
manifested or communicated in writing together with the certified packing list to the
contractor before the arrival of the goods. Petitioner reads the same to mean
notification before arrival of the vessel. Thus, not having been notified prior to the
docking of the SS "Don Jacinto II," E. Razon denies its liability to MGM Importers or to its
subrogee Pioneer Insurance.

Issue: Is the liability of the petitioner limited to 2k per case lost?

Ruling: NO. It is unrebutted that MGM Importers, upon arrival of the shipment , declared
the invoice, packing list and other shipping documents for tax purposes, as well as for
the assessment of arrastre charges and other fees. For the purpose, the invoice,
packing list and other shipping documents were presented to the Bureau of Customs as
well as to petitioner E. Razon for the proper assessment of the arrastre charges and
other fees. Such manifestation satisfies the condition of declaration of the actual
invoices of the value of the goods before arrival of the goods, to overcome the
limitation of liability of the arrastre operator.
Indeed, the provision in the management contract regarding the declaration of the
actual invoice value "before the arrival of the goods" must be understood to mean a
declaration before the arrival of the goods in the custody of the arrastre operator,
whether it be done long before the landing of the shipment at port, or immediately
before turn-over thereof to the arrastre operator's custody. What is essential is
knowledge beforehand of the extent of the risk to be undertaken by the arrastre
operator, as determined by the value of the property committed to its care that it may
define its responsibility for loss or damage to such cargo and to ascertain
compensation commensurate to such risk assumed (Northern Motors, Inc. v. Prince
Lines, 107 Phil. 253).<äre||anº•1àw> Having been duly informed of the actual invoice
value of the merchandise under its custody and having received payment of arrastre
charges based thereon, E. Razon, Inc., as arrastre operator, cannot in justice insist on a
limitation of its liability, under the contract, to less than the value of each undelivered
case or package consigned to MGM Importers, Inc.
GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents G.R. No. L-68102 July 16,
1992

Facts:
A head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck, Loadstar, owned
by private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car bearing
driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of 3 persons including the driver,
and physical injuries to 3 persons, all passengers of the Ford Escort.

Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with two hundred
(200) cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from Angeles
City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the
other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando. When the northbound
car was about (10) meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, two (2)
boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. The
boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other
side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered
the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes
and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided
with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite
lane, on the said bridge.

The Trial Court ruled that it was Jose Koh‘s negligence for invading the lane of the truck
and the collision occurred while still in the truck‘s lane.

The CA reversed the decision ruling that it was the truck driver‘s inattentiveness or
reckless imprudence which caused the accident. The CA further reversed its decision
and upheld the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not Jose Koh‘s act is the proximate cause of the accident.

Ruling: No
Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in
the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and
deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act
of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of the car into
the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the
emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity
to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of
the road, which was the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances,
the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car.

Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds
application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the
contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is
shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence,
have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases,
the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law
solely responsible for the consequences thereof. Clearly, therefore, it was the truck
driver's subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper measures and degree of
care necessary to avoid the collision which was the proximate cause of the resulting
accident.
EMMA ADRIANO BUSTAMANTE, in her own behalf as Guardian-Ad-Litem of minors:
ROSSEL, GLORIA, YOLANDA, ERIC SON and EDERIC, all surnamed BUSTAMANTE, Spouses
SALVADOR JOCSON and PATRIA BONE-JOCSON, Spouses JOSE RAMOS and ENRIQUETA
CEBU-RAMOS, Spouses NARCISO-HIMAYA and ADORACION MARQUEZ-HIMAYA, and
Spouses JOSE BERSAMINA and MA. COMMEMORACION PEREA-
BUSTAMANTE, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FEDERICO DEL PILAR
AND EDILBERTO MONTESIANO,respondents.

Facts: A collision occurred between a gravel and sand truck and a Mazda passenger
bus. The front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left
side wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the said wall from the driver's seat to the last
rear seat. Due to the impact, several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died
as a result of the injuries they sustained.

Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger bus were
approaching each other, coming from the opposite directions of the highway. While
the truck was still about 30 meters away, Susulin, the bus driver, saw the front wheels of
the vehicle wiggling. He also observed that the truck was heading towards his lane. Not
minding this circumstance due to his belief that the driver of the truck was merely
joking, Susulin shifted from fourth to third gear in order to give more power and speed to
the bus, which was ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to overtake or pass
a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of the highway.
While the bus was in the process of overtaking or passing the hand tractor and the truck
was approaching the bus, the two vehicles sideswiped each other at each other's left
side.

The parents of the minors filed a case against the owners and drivers of the two
vehicles. The RTC ruled that the both drivers are solidarily liable for their acts are the
proximate cause of the injury. CA reversed the decision contenting that the doctrine of
last clear chance is applicable, in that it is the bus driver who is liable for he has the last
opportunity to avoid the collision.

Issue: Whether the CA is correct

Ruling: NO. The respondent court adopted the doctrine of "last clear chance." The
doctrine, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a
recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences
to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. As the doctrine is usually
stated, a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to
the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the
accident.

In the recent case of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et
al., the Court citing the landmark decision held in the case of Anuran, et al. v. Buno, et
al. (123 Phil. 1073) ruled that the principle of "last clear chance" applies "in a suit
between the owners and drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a
passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations.
For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners
on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence."

Furthermore, "as between defendants: The doctrine cannot be extended into the field
of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable to the
injured person by reason of his discovery of the latter's peril, and it cannot be invoked
as between defendants concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a negligent
actor cannot defend by pleading that another had negligently failed to take action
which could have avoided the injury." (57 Am. Jur. 2d, pp. 806-807).

All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent Court committed
an error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear chance as between the
defendants, since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the
colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against
both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court erred
in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability.
LBC AIR CARGO, INC. FERNANDO M. YU and JAIME TANO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, Fourth Division, SHERWIN MONTEROLA y OYON-OYON, represented by
PATROCENIA GRONDIANO y MONTEROLA, and PATROCENIA GRONDIANO y
MONTEROLA, respondents.

Facts: Rogelio Monterola, a licensed driver, was traveling on board his Suzuki
motorcycle the right lane along a dusty national road in Bislig, Surigao del Sur. At about
the same time, a cargo van of the LBC Air Cargo Incorporated, driven by defendant
Jaime Tano, Jr., was coming from the opposite direction on its way to the Bislig Airport.
When Tano was approaching the vicinity of the airport road entrance on his left, he saw
two vehicles racing against each other from the opposite direction. Tano stopped his
vehicle and waited for the two racing vehicles to pass by. The stirred cloud of dust
made visibility extremely bad. Instead of waiting for the dust to settled, Tano started to
make a sharp left turn towards the airport road. When he was about to reach the
center of the right lane, the motorcycle driven by Monterola suddenly emerged from
the dust and smashed head-on against the right side of the LBC van. Monterola died
from the severe injuries he sustained.

A civil suit was likewise instituted by the heirs of deceased Monterola against Tano and
LBC Air Cargo Incorporated, for the recovery of damages. The trial court dismissed both
cases on the ground that the proximate cause of the "accident" was the negligence of
deceased Rogelio Monterola.

Private respondent appealed the dismissal of the civil case to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court reversed the court a quo contending that it was the Tano‘s sharp left
which was the proximate cause of the death of Monterola.

Issue: Is the CA correct?

Ruling: Yes. The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Tano who,
despite extremely poor visibility, hastily executed a left turn (towards the Bislig airport
road entrance) without first waiting for the dust to settle. It was this negligent act of
Tano, which had placed his vehicle (LBC van) directly on the path of the motorcycle
coming from the opposite direction, that almost instantaneously caused the collision to
occur. Simple prudence required him not to attempt to cross the other lane until after it
would have been safe from and clear of any oncoming vehicle.

Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to, at times, as
"supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"). The doctrine, in essence, is to the
effect that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one
is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine
whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the
last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable
with the consequences thereof. In the case at bench, the victim was traveling along
the lane where he was rightly supposed to be. The incident occurred in an instant. No
appreciable time had elapsed, from the moment Tano swerved to his left to the actual
impact; that could have afforded the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the
collision.
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL, petitioners, vs. THE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987

Facts:

In the early morning of 15 November 1975 private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on
his way home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss, where he had taken "a
shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed an
intersection, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his
headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2
meters away from his car.

The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix
Construction Inc. was parked on the right hand side of the street facing in the same
direction toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding and facing the oncoming traffic.
The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as
to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no
lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump
truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by
petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his employer
Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning,

Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it
was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision,
Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a
"nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.

Dionisio suffered injuries and filed an action for damages against Carbonel and
Phoenix. Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident to the Dionisio‘s own
negligence in driving at a high speed without curfew pass and headlights, and while
intoxicated. It invoked the Last Clear Chance Doctrine wherein Dionisio had the last
clear opportunity to avoid the accident and so Dionisio, having failed to take such
chance, must bear his own injuries alone.

The trial court and CA ruled in favor of Dionisio.

Issue: Whether the collision is brought by Dionisio‘s own negligence.

Ruling: No

The legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the
wrongful — or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words,
the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck
was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.

Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate
cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to
mitigation by the courts.

Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine.
The petitioners urge that the truck driver should be absolved from responsibility for his
own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased
diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the
truck driver's own wrongful act or omission. To accept this proposition is to come too
close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the
forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts
seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among
the members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken
the very bonds of society.
BANK OF AMERICA NT & SA, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE RACING CLUB, Respondent.
G.R. No. 150228 July 30, 2009

Facts:

Respondent Philippine Racing Club, Inc. is a domestic corporation which maintains

several accounts with different banks in the Metro Manila area, among which is the
account with the petitioner. The authorized joint signatories with respect to said Current
Account were respondent corporation‘s President and Vice President for Finance.

The President and Vice President went on a business trip. In order not to disrupt
operations in their absence, they pre-signed several checks and were entrusted to the
accountant with instruction to make use of the same as the need arose. While they
were on a trip, a John Doe presented to respondent bank for encashment a couple of
the corporation‘s checks with the indicated value of P110,000.00 each. It is admitted
that these 2 checks were among those presigned by plaintiff-appellee corporation‘s
authorized signatories.

The two (2) checks had similar entries with similar infirmities and irregularities. On the
space where the name of the payee should be indicated (Pay To The Order Of) the
following 2-line entries were instead typewritten: on the upper line was the word "CASH"
while the lower line had the following typewritten words, viz: "ONE HUNDRED TEN
THOUSAND PESOS ONLY." Despite the highly irregular entries on the face of the checks,
the bank, without as much as verifying and/or confirming the legitimacy of the checks
considering the substantial amount involved and the obvious infirmity/defect of the
checks on their faces, encashed said checks. A verification process, even by was of a
telephone call to PRCI office, would have taken less than ten (10) minutes. But this was
not done by BA. Investigation conducted by the corporation yielded the fact that there
was no transaction involving PRCI that call for the payment of P220,000.00 to anyone.
The checks appeared to have come into the hands of an employee of PRCI (one
Clarita Mesina who was subsequently criminally charged for qualified theft) who
eventually completed without authority the entries on the pre-signed checks. PRCI‘s
demand for defendant-appellant to pay fell on deaf ears. Hence, the complaint.

The RTC ordered the bank to pay the corporation the value of the two checks.

Issue: whether or not the bank is obligated to verify the said checks to the respondent
corporation?

Ruling: Yes

Even if we assume that both parties were guilty of negligent acts that led to the loss,
petitioner will still emerge as the party foremost liable in this case. In instances where
both parties are at fault, this Court has consistently applied the doctrine of last clear
chance in order to assign liability.
Petitioner bank cannot evade responsibility for the loss by attributing negligence on the
part of respondent because, even if we concur that the latter was indeed negligent in
pre-signing blank checks, the former had the last clear chance to avoid the loss.
Petitioner‘s own operations manager admitted that they could have called up the
client for verification or confirmation before honoring the dubious checks. Verily,
petitioner had the final opportunity to avert the injury that befell the respondent. Failing
to make the necessary verification due to the volume of banking transactions on that
particular day is a flimsy and unacceptable excuse, considering that the "banking
business is so impressed with public interest where the trust and confidence of the
public in general is of paramount importance such that the appropriate standard of
diligence must be a high degree of diligence, if not the utmost diligence." Petitioner‘s
negligence has been undoubtedly established and, thus, pursuant to Art. 1170 of the
NCC, it must suffer the consequence of said negligence.
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., Petitioner, v. MARICAR BASCOS BAESA, thru her
personal guardian FRANCISCA O. BASCOS, FE O. ICO, in her behalf and in behalf of her
minor children, namely ERWIN, OLIVE, EDMUNDO and SHARON ICO, Respondents.

DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO PERSON ACTING

INSTANTANEOUSLY OR BY AVAILABLE MEANS. — This doctrine of last chance has no
application to a case where a person is to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot
be avoided by using all means available after the peril is or should have been
discovered.

Facts: The spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children, among them is
Maricar, together with spouses David Ico and Fe O. Ico with their son and seven other
persons, were aboard a passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic at Malalam River,
Ilagan, Isabela, to celebrate the fifth wedding anniversary of Ceasar and Marilyn
Baesa. The group rode in the passenger jeepney driven by David Ico. From Ilagan,
Isabela, they proceeded to San Felipe, taking the highway going to Malalam River.
Upon reaching the highway, the jeepney turned right and proceeded to Malalam River
at a speed of about 20 kph. While they were proceeding towards Malalam River, a
speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, encroached on the jeepney‘s lane while
negotiating a curve, and collided with it. As a result of the accident David Ico, spouses
Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa and their children, except Maricar, died while the rest
of the passengers suffered injuries. After the accident the driver of the PANTRANCO
Bus, Ambrosio Ramirez, went into hiding.

Maricar Baesa, through her guardian, filed separate actions for damages arising from
quasi-delict against PANTRANCO. The CFI of Pangasinan rendered a decision against
PANTRANCO. The CA affirmed.

Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for not applying the doctrine of the "last clear
chance" against the jeepney driver. Petitioner claims that under the circumstances of
the case, it was the driver of the passenger jeepney who had the last clear chance to
avoid the collision and was therefore negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care
and competence his then existing opportunity to avoid the harm.

Issue: Whether the contention of the petitioner is correct

Ruling: NO. The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior
or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid
the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the
accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff

For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly
had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril
or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One cannot be expected
to avoid an accident or injury if he does not know or could not have known the
existence of the peril. In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David
Ico knew of the impending danger. When he saw at a distance that the approaching
bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt
shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus
to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite direction.

Moreover, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that at the time of the
accident the Pantranco bus was speeding towards Manila. By the time David Ico must
have realized that the bus was not returning to its own lane, it was already too late to
swerve the jeepney to his right to prevent an accident. The speed at which the
approaching bus was running prevented David Ico from swerving the jeepney to the
right shoulder of the road in time to avoid the collision. Thus, even assuming that the
jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before the actual collision, he had
no opportunity to avoid it. This Court has held that the last clear chance doctrine "can
never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury
cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should
have been discovered".

G.R. No. L-56487 October 21, 1991

REYNALDA GATCHALIAN, petitioner,
vs.
ARSENIO DELIM and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

At noon time on 11 July 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded, as a paying

passenger, respondent's "Thames" mini bus at a point in San Eugenio, Aringay, La Union,
bound for Bauang On the way, while the bus was running along the highway in Barrio
Payocpoc, Bauang, Union, "a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of the
bus and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the
road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch.

Several passengers, including petitioner Gatchalian, were injured. 1The passengers were
confined in the hospital, and their bills were paid by respondent‘s spouse, Mrs. Delim on
July 14. She also gave petitioner P12.00 with which to pay her transportation expense in
going home from the hospital.

Before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured passengers sign an already prepared affidavit
waiving their claims against respondents. Petitioner was among those who signed.

Notwithstanding the said document, petitioner filed a claim to recover actual and
moral damages. She alleged in the complaint that her injuries sustained from the
vehicular mishap had left her with a conspicuous white scar measuring 1 by 1/2 inches
on the forehead, generating mental suffering and an inferiority complex on her part;
and that as a result, she had to retire in seclusion and stay away from her friends. She
also alleged that the scar diminished her facial beauty and deprived her of
opportunities for employment. She prayed for an award of: P10,000.00 for loss of
employment and other opportunities; P10,000.00 for the cost of plastic surgery for
removal of the scar on her forehead; P30,000.00 for moral damages; and P1,000.00 as
attorney's fees.

In defense, Respondents raised in defense force majeure and the waiver signed by
petitioner.

The trial court upheld the validity of the waiver and dismissed the complaint. The
appellate court ruled that the waiver was invalid, but also that the petitioner is not
entitled to damages.

(1) Whether there was a valid waiver

(2) Whether the petitioner is entitled to actual and moral damages

Held:

(1) We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeals who held that no valid waiver of
her cause of action had been made by petitioner. A waiver, to be valid and effective,
must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no
doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains
to him. A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do
not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person.

The circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner Gatchalian
need to be considered. Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the effects of
the vehicular accident when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was
presented to her for signing; that while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but
that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she
too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these
circumstances, there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully the
import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of private respondent) she
signed and whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of action against
private respondent.

Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries
sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise
extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly
against the common carrier. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim
damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this
case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted
by the law from common carriers and hence to render that standard unenforceable.
We believe such a purported waiver is offensive to public policy.

(2)Petitioner maintains that on the day that the mini-bus went off the road, she was
supposed to confer with the district supervisor of public schools for a substitute teacher's
job, a job which she had held off and on as a "casual employee."
The Court of Appeals, however, found that at the time of the accident, she was no
longer employed in a public school since, being a casual employee and not a Civil
Service eligible, she had been laid off. Her employment as a substitute teacher was
occasional and episodic, contingent upon the availability of vacancies for substitute
teachers. In view of her employment status as such, the Court of Appeals held that she
could not be said to have in fact lost any employment after and by reason of the
accident. 13 Such was the factual finding of the Court of Appeals, a finding entitled to
due respect from this Court. Petitioner Gatchalian has not submitted any basis for
overturning this finding of fact, and she may not be awarded damages on the basis of
speculation or conjecture. 14

Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead,
is another matter. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that
integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or
compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be
placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before the mishap. A scar,
especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her,
is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her
conditio ante.

Moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the common
carrier is shown. Considering the extent of pain and anxiety which petitioner must have
suffered as a result of her physical injuries including the permanent scar on her
forehead, we believe that the amount of P30,000.00 would be a reasonable award.
Petitioner's claim for P1,000.00 as attorney's fees is in fact even more modest.
G.R. No. 167363 & G.R. No. 177466, December 15, 2010
Sealoader Shipping Corporation v. Grand Cement Manufacturing Corporation

Facts:

Sealoader executed a Time Charter Party Agreement with Joyce Launch for the
chartering of MT Viper in order to tow its unpropelled barges for a minimum of 15 days.
Sealoder also entered into a contract with Grand Cement for the loading of cement
clinkers and the delivery thereof to Manila.

Eventually, Sealoder‘s barge arrived at the wharf of Grand Cement tugged by MT

Viper. It was not immediately loaded as the employees of Grand Cement were loading
another vessel.
The barge was still docked at the wharf of Grand Cement when typhoon Bising struck in
the area of Cebu. As it became stronger, MT Viper tried to tow the barge away but it
was unsuccessful. The towing line connecting the vessels snapped since the mooring
lines were not cast off. As such, the barge rammed the wharf which caused a
significant damage.

Grand Cement filed a complaint for damages when Sealoader ignored its demands for
compensation of the damage caused. They allege that Sealoader was negligent when
it ignored its employee‘s advice to move the vessels after it had received weather
updates. Sealoader filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Joyce Launch is the
one liable since it was the owner of MT Viper, and whose employees were manning the
vessel. Sealoader filed a cross-claim against Joyce Launch. Joyce maintains that the
damages were due to force majeure and faulted Grand Cement‘s employees for
abandoning the wharf leaving them helpless and for not warning them early on.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Grand Cement holding the two companies
liable since there was a complete disregard of the storm signal, the captain of the
vessel was not present and the vessel was not equipped with a radio or any
navigational facility, which is mandatory. Joyce launch did not appeal. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the decision but on MR, it partly reversed its decision finding Grand
Cement to be guilty of contributory negligence since it was found that it was still
loading the other vessel at the last minute just before the storm hit, which was the
reason why Sealoder‘s vessel did not move. The damages were reduced to 50%.

Issue: WON Sealoader should be held liable for the damages incurred by Grand
Cement

Held:

YES. Sealoader was guilty of negligence, hence it is liable. First, because it was not
equipped with a radio or a navigational facility and it failed to monitor the prevailing
weather conditions. Second, it cannot pass the responsibility of casting off the mooring
lines because the people at the wharf could not just cast off the mooring lines without
any instructions from the crew of the vessel. It should have taken the initiative to cast off
the mooring lines early on.

Moreover, there was no contributory negligence on the part of Grand Cement

Manufacturing Corporation. It had timely informed the barge of the impending
typhoon and directed the vessels to move to a safer place. Sealoader had the
responsibility to inform itself of the prevailing weather conditions in the areas where its
vessel was to sail. It cannot merely rely on other vessels for weather updates and
warnings on approaching storms. To do so would be to gamble with the safety of its
own vessel, putting the lives of its crew under the mercy of the sea, as well as running
the risk of causing damage to property of third parties for which it would necessarily be
liable. The evidence proffered by Sealoader to prove the negligence of Grand Cement
was marred by contradictions and are, thus, weak at best. Thus, the contributory
negligence of Grand Cement was not established in this case.

Hence, the award of damages in favor of the petitioner by the lower courts is reversed.
G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910

DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant

Facts:

Plaintiff David Taylor was 15 years old at the time he received the injuries that gave rise
to this complaint. The visit was made on a Sunday afternoon, and it does not appear
that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the power house where they had asked
for Mr. Murphy.

On September 30, 1905, plaintiff and Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, went to
the power plant owned by the defendant to visit one Murphy, an employee of the
defendant, , who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine.
Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently
by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have
taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's premises.

After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's
coal, they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the
company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some
twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. They are intended for
use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a
considerable explosive power.

After some discussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their right to take them, the
boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and
carried them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie
Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The
boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the wires
into an electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap
with a stone and failed. Manuel looked for a hammer, but could not find one. Then they
opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish
substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted
match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all
three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap,
became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel
had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several
particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to
the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.

Plaintiff sued the company for damages.

Issue: WON the company could be faulted for allowing the children to be exposed to
the harmful substances

Held:

NO. It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating
caps been left exposed at the point where they were found, or if their owner had
exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear that
plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and
convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around thereon
without the express permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and
carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises, and had
he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its
contents.

Children are actuated by similar childish instincts and impulses. Drawn by curiosity and
impelled by the restless spirit of youth, boys here as well as there will usually be found
whenever the public is permitted to congregate. The movement of machinery, and
indeed anything which arouses the attention of the young and inquiring mind, will draw
them to the neighborhood as inevitably as does the magnet draw the iron which
comes within the range of its magnetic influence. The owners of premises, therefore,
whereon things attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the public are
expressly or impliedly permitted to enter or upon which the owner knows or ought to
know children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play, "must calculate upon
this, and take precautions accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises can
not be heard to say that because the child has entered upon his premises without his
express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation
whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent the child from
entering his premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that children are
accustomed to roam about of to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to
attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license to enter, and where the child
does enter under such conditions the owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to
guard the child against injury from unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such
premises by the owner, is clearly a breach of duty, responsible, if the child is actually
injured, without other fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a
stranger without his express invitation or permission. To hold otherwise would be expose
all the children in the community to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the
whim of the owners or occupants of land upon which they might naturally and
reasonably be expected to enter.

But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without
defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from
responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such
injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that
under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the
caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the
plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of
the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting
open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of
the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the
defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.

The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only,
and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case." In the
case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more
mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age. The evidence of
record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well
knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series
of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other
explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his
efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors
brought about by the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly
that he knew what he was about.
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding
to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the
contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience
qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that
degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own
deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct
and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that
these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant
in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the
proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.
G.R. No. 160709. February 23, 2005]
NELEN LAMBERT, assisted by her husband, GLENROY ALOYSUIS LAMBERT, petitioners, vs.
HEIRS OF RAY CASTILLON, Represented by MARILOU T. CASTILLON and SERGIO
LABANG, respondents.
Facts:

Ray Castillon visited the house of his brother Joel Castillon at Tambo, Iligan City and
borrowed his motorcycle. He then invited his friend, Sergio Labang, to roam around
Iligan City. Ray drove the motorcycle with Sergio as the backrider.
At around past 10:00 p.m., after eating supper at Honas Restaurant and imbibing a
bottle of beer, they traversed the highway towards Tambo at a high speed. Upon
reaching Brgy. Sto. Rosario, they figured in an accident with a Tamaraw jeepney,
owned by petitioner Nelen Lambert and driven by Reynaldo Gamot, which was
traveling on the same direction but made a sudden left turn. The incident resulted in
the instantaneous death of Ray and injuries to Sergio.
Respondents, the heirs of Ray Castillon, thus filed an action for damages with prayer for
preliminary attachment against the petitioner Nelen Lambert. The complaint was
subsequently amended to include the claim by Joel Castillon for the damages caused
to the motorcycle.
After a full-blown trial, the court a quo rendered a decision in favor of herein private
respondents but reduced petitioners liability by 20% in view of the contributory
negligence of Ray.
The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence the present petition.
Issue: WON the negligence of Ray Castillon was the proximate cause of his unfortunate
death, hence, the petitioner is not liable for damages.
Held:
NO. However, Ray Castillon is guilty of contributory negligence
Our examination of the records shows that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
carefully considered the factual backdrop of the case.

When Reynaldo Gamot was approaching the side road, he slightly veered to the right
for his allowance. Ray Castillon, who was following closely behind, instinctively veered
to the left but it was also the moment when Reynaldo Gamot sharply turned to the left
towards the side road. At this juncture both were moving obliquely to the left. Thus the
motorcycle sliced into the side of the jeepney throwing the driver forward so that his
forehead hit the angle bar on the left front door of the jeepney even as the motorcycle
shot forward and the jeepney veered back to the right and sped away.

The testimonies of the witnesses Frias, Opada, Labang and Sumile show that he did not
stop even for a second, or less before making the left turn. On the contrary, he slightly
veered to the right immediately followed by the abrupt and sudden turn to the left in
order to enter the side road. It is apparent that Reynaldo Gamot did not keep a lookout
for vehicles or persons following him before proceeding to turn left. He failed to take
into account the possibility that others may be following him. He did not employ the
necessary precaution to see to it that the road was clear.

Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo, without first establishing his right
of way, was the proximate cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Ray and
injured Sergio. Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. The cause of the collision is
traceable to the negligent act of Reynaldo for, as the trial court correctly held, without
that left turn executed with no precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have
happened.
Petitioner misunderstood our ruling in Raynera v. Hiceta. That case also involved a
motorcycle crashing into the left rear portion of another vehicle, and we declared
therein that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to
be the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence. In Raynera, the
death of the victim was solely attributable to his own negligence in bumping the rear of
the trailer truck which was traveling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour.
Raynera, being the driver of the rear vehicle, had full control of the situation as he was
in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. The trailer truck therein did not make
a sudden left turn as in the case at bar. Thus, the theory that drivers of vehicles who
bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident is, as
in this case, sufficiently contradicted by evidence, which is the sudden left turn made
by Reynaldo which proximately caused the collision.
While we agree with the trial court that Ray was likewise guilty of contributory
negligence as defined under Article 2179 of the Civil Code, we find it equitable to
increase the ratio of apportionment of damages on account of the victims negligence.
Article 2179 reads as follows:
When the plaintiffs negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages
to be awarded.
The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly
responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must
bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable
only for the damages actually caused by his negligence.[ The determination of the
mitigation of the defendants liability varies depending on the circumstances of each
case. The Court had sustained a mitigation of 50% in Rakes v. AG & P;[16] 20% in Phoenix
Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court[ and LBC Air Cargo, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals;[18] and 40% in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of
Appeals[19] and Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals.[20]
In the case at bar, it was established that Ray, at the time of the mishap: (1) was
driving the motorcycle at a high speed; (2) was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3)
has imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing a protective
helmet.[21] These circumstances, although not constituting the proximate cause of his
demise and injury to Sergio, contributed to the same result. The contribution of these
circumstances are all considered and determined in terms of percentages of the total
cause. Hence, pursuant to Rakes v. AG & P, the heirs of Ray Castillon shall recover
damages only up to 50% of the award. In other words, 50% of the damage shall be
borne by the private respondents; the remaining 50% shall be paid by the petitioner.

G.R. No. 165969 November 27, 2008

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF NOBLE CASIONAN, respondents.

Facts:
In the 1970s, NPC installed high-tension electrical transmission lines of 69 kilovolts
traversing the trail leading to Sangilo, Itogon. Eventually, some lines sagged, thereby
reducing their distance from the ground to only about 8-10 ft. This posed as a threat to
passersby who were exposed to the danger of electrocution. As early as 1991, the
leaders of Ampucao, Itogon made verbal and written requests for NPC to institute
safety measures to protect trail users from their high-tension wires. In 1995, Engr.
Banayot, NPC Area Manager, informed the Itogon mayor that NPC installed 9
additional poles, and they identified a possible rerouting scheme to improve the
distance from its deteriorating lines to the ground.

Noble Casionan worked as a pocket miner. In 1995, Noble and his co-pocket miner
Melchor Jimenez were at Dalicno. They cut 2 bamboo poles, and they carried one pole
horizontally on their shoulder, with Noble carrying the shorter pole. Noble walked ahead
as they passed through the trail underneath the NPC high-tension lines on their way to
their work place. As Noble was going uphill and turning left on a curve, the tip of the
bamboo pole that he was carrying touched one of the dangling high-tension wires.
Melchor narrated that he heard a buzzing sound for only about a second or two, then
he saw Noble fall to the ground. Melchor rushed to him and shook him, but Noble was
already dead.

A post-mortem examination by the municipal health officer determined the cause of

death to be cardiac arrest, secondary to ventricular fibulation, secondary to
electrocution. There was a small burned area in the middle right finger of Noble.

Police investigators who visited the site confirmed that portions of the wires above the
trail hung very low. They noted that people usually used the trail and had to pass
directly underneath the wires, and that the trail was the only viable way since the other
side was a precipice. They did not see any danger warning signs installed. After the GM
of NPC was informed of the incident, NPC repaired the dangling lines and put up
warning signs around the area.

Noble‘s parents filed a claim for damages against NPC. NPC denied being negligent in
maintaining the safety of the lines, averring that signs were installed but they were
stolen by children, and that excavations were made to increase the clearance from
the ground but some poles sank due to pocket mining in the area. NPC witnesses
testified that the cause of death could not have been electrocution since Noble did
not suffer extensive burns. NPC argued that if Noble did die by electrocution, it was due
to his own negligence.

RTC decided in favor of Noble‘s parents. RTC observed that NPC witnesses were biased
because all but one were employees of NPC, and they were not actually present at the
time of the accident. RTC found NPC negligent since the company has not acted upon
the requests and demands made by the community leaders since 1991. CA affirmed
RTC with modification–award of moral damages was reduced from 100k to 50k, and
award of attorney fees was disallowed since the reason for the award was not expressly
stated in the decision.
Issue: WON the award for damages should be deleted in view of the contributory
negligence of the victim
Held:

NO. Petitioner‘s contentions are absurd.

The sagging high tension wires were an accident waiting to happen. As established
during trial, the lines were sagging around 8 to 10 feet in violation of the required
distance of 18 to 20 feet. If the transmission lines were properly maintained by petitioner,
the bamboo pole carried by Noble would not have touched the wires. He would not
have been electrocuted.

Petitioner cannot excuse itself from its failure to properly maintain the wires by
attributing negligence to the victim. In Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,9 this Court held that the responsibility of maintaining the rails for the purpose of
preventing derailment accidents belonged to the company. The company should not
have been negligent in ascertaining that the rails were fully connected than to wait
until a life was lost due to an accident.

Moreover, We find no contributory negligence on Noble‘s part.

Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person,
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury.11 On the other hand, contributory negligence
is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he
has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own
protection.12 There is contributory negligence when the party‘s act showed lack of
ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in
danger.13 It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the
person injured which, concurring with the defendant‘s negligence, is the proximate
cause of the injury.14

The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly

responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must
bear the consequences of his own negligence.15 If indeed there was contributory
negligence on the part of the victim, then it is proper to reduce the award for
damages. This is in consonance with the Civil Code provision that liability will be
mitigated in consideration of the contributory negligence of the injured party. Article
2179 of the Civil Code is explicit on this score:

When the plaintiff‘s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of
his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant‘s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

In Ma-ao Sugar Central, it was held that to hold a person as having contributed to his
injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in
disregard of warnings or signs on an impending danger to health and body. This Court
held then that the victim was not guilty of contributory negligence as there was no
showing that the caboose where he was riding was a dangerous place and that he
recklessly dared to stay there despite warnings or signs of impending danger.16
In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by members of
the community. There were no warning signs to inform passersby of the impending
danger to their lives should they accidentally touch the high tension wires. Also, the trail
was the only viable way from Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for
simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area.

Petitioner further faults the victim in engaging in pocket mining, which is prohibited by
the DENR in the area.

That the pocket miners were unlicensed was not a justification for petitioner to leave
their transmission lines dangling. We quote with approval the observation of the RTC on
this matter:

The claim of NPC that the pocket miners have no right to operate within the
area of Dalicno, Itogon, Benguet as there was no permit issued by DENR is beside
the point. The fact is that there were not only pocket miners but also there were
many residents in the area of Dalicno, Ampucao, Itogon, Benguet using the trail.
These residents were using this trail underneath the transmission lines x x x. They
were using this trail even before the transmission lines were installed in the 1970‘s
by NPC. The pocket miners, although they have no permit to do pocket mining in
the area, are also human beings who have to eke out a living in the only way
they know how. The fact that they were not issued a permit by the DENR to do
pocket mining is no justification for NPC to simply leave their transmission lines
dangling or hanging 8 to 10 feet above the ground posing danger to the life and
limb of everyone in said community. x x x19(Emphasis added)

In sum, the victim was not guilty of contributory negligence. Hence, petitioner is not
entitled to a mitigation of its liability.
G.R. No. 121413 January 29, 2001

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (formerly INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND

AMERICA),petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FORD PHILIPPINES, INC. and CITIBANK, N.A., respondents.

Facts:
This case is composed of three consolidated petitions involving several checks, payable
to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, but was embezzled allegedly by an organized
syndicate.

I. G. R. Nos. 121413 and 121479

On October 19, 1977, plaintiff Ford issued a Citibank check amounting to P4,746,114.41
in favor of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the payment of manufacturer‘s
taxes. The check was deposited with defendant IBAA (now PCIB), subsequently cleared
the the Central Bank, and paid by Citibank to IBAA. The proceeds never reached BIR,
so plaintiff was compelled to make a second payment. Defendant refused to reimburse
plaintiff, and so the latter filed a complaint. An investigation revealed that the check
was recalled by Godofredo Rivera, the general ledger accountant of Ford, and was
replaced by a manager‘s check. Alleged members of a syndicate deposited the two
manager‘s checks with Pacific Banking Corporation. Ford filed a third party complaint
against Rivera and PBC. The case against PBC was dismissed. The case against Rivera
was likewise dismissed because summons could not be served. The trial court held
Citibank and PCIB jointly and severally liable to Ford, but the Court of Appeals only held
PCIB liable.

II. G. R. No. 128604

Ford drew two checks in favor of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, amounting to
P5,851,706.37 and P6,311,591.73. Both are crossed checks payable to payee‘s account
only. The checks never reached BIR, so plaintiff was compelled to make second
payments. Plaintiff instituted an action for recovery against PCIB and Citibank.

On investigation of NBI, the modus operandi was discovered. Gorofredo Rivera made
the checks but instead of delivering them to BIR, passed it to Castro, who was the
manager of PCIB San Andres. Castro opened a checking account in the name of a
fictitious person ―Reynaldo Reyes‖. Castro deposited a worthless Bank of America
check with the same amount as that issued by Ford. While being routed to the Central
Bank for clearing, the worthless check was replaced by the genuine one from Ford.

The trial court absolved PCIB and held Citibank liable, which decision was affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals.

Issue: WON Ford can hold both PCIB and Ciibank liable

Held:

We have to scrutinize, separately, PCIBank's share of negligence when the syndicate

achieved its ultimate agenda of stealing the proceeds of these checks.

a. G. R. Nos. 121413 and 121479

On record, PCIBank failed to verify the authority of Mr. Rivera to negotiate the checks.
The neglect of PCIBank employees to verify whether his letter requesting for the
replacement of the Citibank Check No. SN-04867 was duly authorized, showed lack of
care and prudence required in the circumstances. Furthermore, it was admitted that
PCIBank is authorized to collect the payment of taxpayers in behalf of the BIR. As an
agent of BIR, PCIBank is duty bound to consult its principal regarding the unwarranted
instructions given by the payor or its agent. It is a well-settled rule that the relationship
between the payee or holder of commercial paper and the bank to which it is sent for
collection is, in the absence of an argreement to the contrary, that of principal and
agent. A bank which receives such paper for collection is the agent of the payee or
holder.

Indeed, the crossing of the check with the phrase "Payee's Account Only," is a warning
that the check should be deposited only in the account of the CIR. Thus, it is the duty of
the collecting bank PCIBank to ascertain that the check be deposited in payee's
account only. Therefore, it is the collecting bank (PCIBank) which is bound to scrutinize
the check and to know its depositors before it could make the clearing indorsement "all
prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsement guaranteed".

Lastly, banking business requires that the one who first cashes and negotiates the check
must take some precautions to learn whether or not it is genuine. And if the one cashing
the check through indifference or other circumstance assists the forger in committing
the fraud, he should not be permitted to retain the proceeds of the check from the
drawee whose sole fault was that it did not discover the forgery or the defect in the title
of the person negotiating the instrument before paying the check. For this reason, a
bank which cashes a check drawn upon another bank, without requiring proof as to
the identity of persons presenting it, or making inquiries with regard to them, cannot
hold the proceeds against the drawee when the proceeds of the checks were
afterwards diverted to the hands of a third party. In such cases the drawee bank has a
right to believe that the cashing bank (or the collecting bank) had, by the usual proper
investigation, satisfied itself of the authenticity of the negotiation of the checks. Thus,
one who encashed a check which had been forged or diverted and in turn received
payment thereon from the drawee, is guilty of negligence which proximately
contributed to the success of the fraud practiced on the drawee bank. The latter may
recover from the holder the money paid on the check.

b. G. R. No. 128604

In this case, there was no evidence presented confirming the conscious participation of
PCIBank in the embezzlement. As a general rule, however, a banking corporation is
liable for the wrongful or tortuous acts and declarations of its officers or agents within
the course and scope of their employment. A bank will be held liable for the
negligence of its officers or agents when acting within the course and scope of their
employment. It may be liable for the tortuous acts of its officers even as regards that
species of tort of which malice is an essential element. In this case, we find a situation
where the PCIBank appears also to be the victim of the scheme hatched by a
syndicate in which its own management employees had participated. But in this case,
responsibility for negligence does not lie on PCIBank's shoulders alone.

Citibank failed to notice and verify the absence of the clearing stamps. For this reason,
Citibank had indeed failed to perform what was incumbent upon it, which is to ensure
that the amount of the checks should be paid only to its designated payee. The point is
that as a business affected with public interest and because of the nature of its
functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with
meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. Thus,
invoking the doctrine of comparative negligence, we are of the view that both PCIBank
and Citibank failed in their respective obligations and both were negligent in the
selection and supervision of their employees resulting in the encashment of Citibank
Check Nos. SN 10597 AND 16508. Thus, we are constrained to hold them equally liable
for the loss of the proceeds of said checks issued by Ford in favor of the CIR.
G..R. No. 71159 November 15, 1989

CITY OF MANILA, and EVANGELINE SUVA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, IRENE STO. DOMINGO and for and in behalf of
her minor children, VIVENCIO, JR., IRIS, VERGEL and IMELDA, all surnamed STO.
DOMINGO, respondents.

Facts:

Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. died and was buried in North Cemetery which lot was leased
by the city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021. The
wife paid the full amount of the lease. Apart, however from the receipt, no other
document embodied such lease over the lot. Believing that the lease was only for five
years, the city certified the lots as ready for exhumation. On the basis of the
certification, Joseph Helmuth authorized the exhumation and removal of the remains of
Vicencio. His bones were placed in a bag and kept in the bodega of the cemetery.
The lot was also leased to another lessee. During the next all souls day, the private
respondents were shocked to find out that Vicencio‘s remains were removed. The
cemetery told Irene to look for the bones of the husband in the bodega.

Aggrieved, the widow and the children brought an action for damages against the
City of Manila; Evangeline Suva of the City Health Office; Sergio Mallari, officer-in-
charge of the North Cemetery; and Joseph Helmuth, the latter‘s predecessor as officer-
in-charge of the said burial grounds owned and operated by the City Government of
Manila. The court ordered defendants to give plaintiffs the right to make use of another
lot. The CA affirmed and included the award of damages in favor of the private
respondents.

Issue: WON THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING PETITIONERS
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ALLEGED TORTS OF THEIR SUBORDINATE OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES, INSPITE OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 4 OF THE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 409
(REVISED CHARTER OF MANILA) AND OTHER APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE ON THE
SUBJECT EXEMPTING THE PETITIONERS FROM DAMAGES FROM THE MALFEASANCE OR
MISFEASANCE OF THEIR OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, IF THERE BE ANY IN THIS CASE.

Held:

Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such
endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through
its city government in conformity with law, and in its proper corporate name. It may sue
and be sued, and contract and be contracted with. Its powers are twofold in
character-public, governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate, private
and proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised in
administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they
include the legislative, judicial, public and political. Municipal powers on the one hand
are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include
those which are ministerial, private and corporate. In McQuillin on Municipal
Corporation, the rule is stated thus: "A municipal corporation proper has ... a public
character as regards the state at large insofar as it is its agent in government, and
private (so called) insofar as it is to promote local necessities and conveniences for its
own community (Torio v. Fontanilla, 85 SCRA 599 [1978]). In connection with the powers
of a municipal corporation, it may acquire property in its public or governmental
capacity, and private or proprietary capacity. The New Civil Code divides such
properties into property for public use and patrimonial properties (Article 423), and
further enumerates the properties for public use as provincial roads, city streets,
municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works
for public service paid for by said provisions, cities or municipalities, all other property is
patrimonial without prejudice to the provisions of special laws (Article 424; Province of
Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, et al., 22 SCRA 1334 [1968]).
Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla, supra, the Court declared that with respect to proprietary
functions the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third
persons ex contractu (Municipality of Moncada v. Cajuigan, et al., 21 Phil. 184 (1912)
or ex delicto (Mendoza v. de Leon, 33 Phil. 508 (1916).

Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law, the North
Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila which was created by
resolution of the Municipal Board of August 27, 1903 and January 7, 1904 (Petition, Rollo
pp. 20-21 Compilation of the Ordinances of the City of Manila). The administration and
government of the cemetery are under the City Health Officer (Ibid., Sec. 3189), the
order and police of the cemetery (Ibid., See. 319), the opening of graves, niches, or
tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the purification of the same (Ibid., Sec. 327) are
under the charge and responsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. The City of
Manila furthermore prescribes the procedure and guidelines for the use and dispositions
of burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery through Administrative Order No. 5, s.
1975 (Rollo, p. 44). With the acts of dominion, there is, therefore no doubt that the North
Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary
or private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in
favor of the private respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the
force of law between the contracting parties. Thus a lease contract executed by the
lessor and lessee remains as the law between them. (Henson v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 148 SCRA 11 [1 987]). Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles the
other party to damages even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the
contract. (Boysaw v. Interphil Promotions, Inc., 148 SCRA 635 [1987]).

Under the doctrine of respondent superior, (Torio v. Fontanilla, supra), petitioner City of
Manila is liable for the tortious act committed by its agents who failed to verify and
check the duration of the contract of lease. The contention of the petitioner-city that
the lease is covered by Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1975 dated March 6, 1975
of the City of Manila for five (5) years only beginning from June 6, 1971 is not meritorious
for the said administrative order covers new leases. When subject lot was certified on
January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation, the lease contract for fifty (50) years was still
in full force and effect.

MARITIME TORT

65 FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE

PORTS AUTHORITY, respondents. (VESSEL OWNED BY FAR EAST-REACHED PORT OF
MANILA, THEREBY THERE WAS THIS COMPULSORY PILOTAGE-CAP GAVIANO WAS IN
CHARGED: DURING SUCH , VESSEL RAMMED INTO THE PIER OF RES PPA: LIABILITY? SC:
GAVIANO (COMPULSORY PILOT) KAVAN (MASTER) – NEGLIGENT. LIABLE AS JOINT
TORTFEASORS)

FACTS On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern
Shipping Company, arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia at
about 7:00 o'clock in the morning---Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the
Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel--- Senen Gavino was
assigned by the Manila Pilots' Association to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe
berthing of the vessel.

Gavino boarded the vessel with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him.
After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the
vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila
International Port. When the vessel reached the landmark , Gavino ordered the engine
stopped. Later, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Upon such order Kavankov
orders the crew, so The left anchor, with two (2) shackles, were dropped. However, the
anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A
commotion ensued between the crew members. A brief conference ensued between
Kavankov and the crew members. When Gavino inquired what was all the commotion
about, Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to it.

After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-
astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was
approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take
hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and
additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of
the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. The vessel sustained damage too,

On January 10, 1983, the Philippine Ports Authority (pier), through the Solicitor General,
filed a complaint for a sum of money against Far Eastern Shipping Co., Capt. Senen C.
Gavino and the Manila Pilots' Association praying that the defendants therein be held
jointly and severally liable to pay the plaintiff actual and exemplary damages plus costs
of suit.

FAR EASTERN’S CONTENTION: Petitioner asserts that since the MV PAVLODAR was under
compulsory pilotage at the time of the incident, it was the compulsory pilot, Capt.
Gavino, who was in command and had complete control in the navigation and
docking of the vessel---- Consequently, he was solely responsible for the damage
caused upon the pier apron, and not the owners of the vessel. It claims that the master
of the boat did not commit any act of negligence when he failed to countermand or
overrule the orders of the pilot because he did not see any justifiable reason to do so.

MPA’S CONTENTION:MPA asseverates that it should not be held solidarily liable with
Capt. Gavino who, as held by respondent court is only a member, not an employee,
thereof.

ISSUE: W/N GAVIANO, KAVANCOV, FAR EAST, AND MPA ARE LIABLE? YES

RULING: YES THEY ARE CONSIDERED JOINT TORTFEASORS AND THUS JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGES

AS TO CAPT GAVINO: liable: Pursuant thereto, Capt. Gavino was assigned to pilot MV
Pavlodar into Berth 4 of the Manila International Port. Upon assuming such office as
compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the universally accepted high standards of
care and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and
knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular waters over which his license
extends superior to and more to be trusted than that of the master. ----A pilot should
have a thorough knowledge of general and local regulations and physical conditions
affecting the vessel in his charge and the waters for which he is licensed, such as a
particular harbor or river.----He is not held to the highest possible degree of skill and
care, but must have and exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded by the
circumstances, and usually shown by an expert in his profession. Under extraordinary
circumstances, a pilot must exercise extraordinary care.

AS TO CAPT KABANKOV AND FAR EASTERN : liable: The negligence on the part of Capt.
Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabankov is no less responsible for the allision. His
unconcerned lethargy as master of the ship in the face of troublous exigence
constitutes negligence.

Here, while it is true that pilot Gavino may indeed have been charged with the task of
docking the vessel in the berthing space, it is undisputed that the master of the vessel
had the corresponding duty to countermand any of the orders made by the pilot, and
even maneuver the vessel himself, in case of imminent danger to the vessel and the
port.

In sum, where a compulsory pilot is in charge of a ship, the master being required to
permit him to navigate it, if the master observes that the pilot is incompetent or
physically incapable, then it is the duty of the master to refuse to permit the pilot to act.
But if no such reasons are present, then the master is justified in relying upon the pilot,
but not blindly. Under the circumstances of this case, if a situation arose where the
master, exercising that reasonable vigilance which the master of a ship should exercise,
observed, or should have observed, that the pilot was so navigating the vessel that she
was going, or was likely to go, into danger, and there was in the exercise of reasonable
care and vigilance an opportunity for the master to intervene so as to save the ship
from danger, the master should have acted accordingly.

In general, a pilot is personally liable for damages caused by his own negligence or
default to the owners of the vessel, and to third parties for damages sustained in a
collision. Such negligence of the pilot in the performance of duty constitutes a maritime
tort. At common law, a shipowner is not liable for injuries inflicted exclusively by the
negligence of a pilot accepted by a vessel compulsorily----The exemption from liability
for such negligence shall apply if the pilot is actually in charge and solely in fault. Since,
a pilot is responsible only for his own personal negligence, he cannot be held
accountable for damages proximately caused by the default of others, or, if there be
anything which concurred with the fault of the pilot in producing the accident, the
vessel master and owners are liable.----In here, as held by CA affirmed by SC There was
thus a need for the vessel to move "full-astern" and to drop the other anchor with
another shackle or two '(2), for the vessel to avoid hitting the pier. Kavankov refused to
act even as Gavino failed to act. Even as Gavino gave mere "half-astern" order,
Kavankov supinely stood by. The vessel was already about twenty (20) meters away
from the pier when Gavino gave the 'full-astern" order. Even then, Kavankov did
nothing to prevent the vessel from hitting the pier simply because he relied on the
competence and plan of Gavino. While the "full-astern" maneuver momentarily
arrested the momentum of the vessel, it was, by then, too late. All along, Kavankov
stood supinely beside Gavino, doing nothing but relay the commands of
Gavino. Inscrutably, then, Kavankov was negligent.

AS REGARDS THE LIABILITY OF MPa: There being no employer-employee relationship,

clearly Article 2180 of the Civil Code is inapplicable since there is no vicarious liability of
an employer to speak of. It is so stated in American law, as follows:-----The well
established rule is that pilot associations are immune to vicarious liability for the tort of
their members. They are not the employer of their members and exercise no control
over them once they take the helm of the vessel. They are also not partnerships
because the members do not function as agents for the association or for each other.
Pilots' associations are also not liable for negligently assuring the competence of their
members because as professional associations they made no guarantee of the
professional conduct of their members to the general public.----- Nevertheless, a careful
reading and proper analysis of the provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65.
lead to the conclusion that MPA is solidarily liable for the negligence of its member
pilots, without prejudice to subsequent reimbursement from the pilot at fault.----Art. 1207
of the Civil Code provides that there is solidary liability only when the obligation
expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.
Plainly, Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65, which as an implementing rule has the
force and effect of law, can validly provide for solidary liability.
66. PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL, petitionersvs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, DAVID UY and TERESITA UY, respondents. (SC LIABLE UNG POSSESSOR NG DOG,
EVEN THO ND TLGA SYA MAYARI)

FACTS:On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child
of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil,----
She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple
lacerated wounds on the forehead" 1 and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr.
Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week later
due to "vomiting of saliva." 2 The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The
cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia. ------Seven months later, the Uys
sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of
"Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the
charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was
a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness.
ISSUE:In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of
the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and
there are other heirs to the property., hence she is not liable, it this correct? No.

RULING: What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was
staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house.
Article 2183 reads as follows:The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of
the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or
be lost.----'This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should come
from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, 6 a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to death
and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The complaint was
dismissed on the ground that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from
causing injury to any one, including himself. (hence, caretaker liable being in possession
and not the owner)

In this case, While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, there is no doubt
that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. She
was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the
property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. 13 Moreover, there is
evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice
weekly, according to at least one witness, 14 and used it virtually as a second house.
Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the house with Theness when the little girl
was bitten by the dog. 15 The dog itself remained in the house even after the death of
Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is also
noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization
expenses although Purita said she knew them only casually. 16
The petitioner's contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control
of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor
liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control.
And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame
and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of
vicious (ulol) animals but covers even tame (trained) ones as long as they cause
injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three
years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she
might have done to the animal.---According to Manresa the obligation imposed
by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed
lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based
on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals
for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may
cause

67. 85 Phil 67 – Alfiada vs Hisole – Liability of possessors or users of animals –

Assumption of Risk
(SC: CARETAKER IS A POSSESSOR LIABLE FOR DMGES OF ANIMAL EVEN TO HIMSELF)
Loreto Afialda was a caretaker of the carabaos owned by Basilio Hisole. In March 1947,
without any fault from Afialda or any force majeure, one of the carabaos gored him
thereby causing his death. Afialda‘s sister, Margarita Afialda, sued Hisole arguing that
under the Civil Code, “The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is
liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or
stray away. This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise fromforce
majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Hisole is liable in the case at bar as owner of the carabao which
killed Afialda.
HELD: No. The law uses the term ―possessor and user of the animal‖. Afialda was the
caretaker of the animal and he was tasked and paid to tend for the carabaos. He, at
the time of the goring, is the possessor and the user of the carabao and therefore he is
the one who had custody and control of the animal and was in a position to prevent
the animal from causing damage. It would have been different had Afialda been a
stranger. Under Article 1905 of the old Civil Code, the owner of an animal is answerable
only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker
of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under
Article 1902 of the same code
Obviously, it was the caretaker‘s business to try to prevent the animal from causing
injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under
those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily
assumed and for which he must take the consequences.
68. TRINIDAD DE AYALA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.ANTONIO M. BARRETTO, ET
AL., defendants-appellees. (ESTABLISHMENT OF BREWERY IN A CERTAIN STREET,
RESIDENTS OPPOSE, SAYING NUISANCE: SC: IN THIS CASE, NOT PURELY RESIDENTIAL
RATHER DEVELOPING NA UNG STREET; SO OK LANG UN DEVELOPMENT NG
ESTABLISHMENT LIKE BREWERY IN THIS CASE)

This is a suit for a permanent injunction against the erection and operation of a
combined brewery and ice plant on a certain street in Manila, on the ground that it will
be a nuisance. The twenty-two plaintiffs are either residents of property owners on such
street.

This street connects Echague and Aviles Streets. All three parallel the Pasig River.
Echague is almost wholly given over to industrial enterprises, and Aviles also has some
factories, etc., upon it, including the San Miguel Brewery. This latter brewery is a long
established business, is adjacent to many residences, and is, in fact, closer to some of
the plaintiffs than is the proposed brewery. Such street has long been a fashionable
residence street and the dwellings located upon it are large and expensive. At the
present day, however, some of these residence are being used for other purposes. In
fact, There was testimony by one of the plaintiffs' witnesses, a real estate expert, that in
his opinion the whole of this space would eventually be devoted to manufacturing and
other business use. It is attractive for such purposes by reason of its transportation
facilities by both land and water.

ISSUE: W/N the plaintiff living in such street can validly file an injunction for the
establishment of the subject brewery with plant? No.: INJUNCTION DENIED.

SC: It appears that the locality in question is gradually being transformed from a
fashionable residence district into an industrial center. In Eller vs. Koehler (68 Ohio, 51), it
was said:

All that can be required of men who engage in lawful business is that they shall regard
the fitness of locality. In the residence sections of city, business of no kind is desirable or
welcome. ----On the other hand, one who becomes a resident of a trading or
manufacturing neighborhood, or who remains, while in the march of events a residence
district gradually becomes a trading or manufacturing neighborhood, should be held
bound to submit to the ordinary annoyances, discomforts and injuries which are fairly
incidental to the reasonable and general conduct of such business in his chosen
neighborhood. The true rule would be that any discomfort or injury beyond this would
be actionable; anything up to that point would not be actionable.
In Stevens vs. Rockport Granite Co. (216 Mass., 486) it was said:The law of nuisance
affords no rigid rule to be applied in all instances. It is elastic. It undertakes to require
only that which is fair and reasonable under all circumstances.---- In a commonwealth
like this, which depends for its material prosperity so largely on the continued growth
and enlargement of manufacturing of diverse varieties, "extreme rights" cannot be
enforced. One who settles in a district, which possesses natural resources of a special
kind, cannot prohibit the development of those resources merely because it may
interfere in some degree with personal satisfaction or aesthetic enjoyment. No one can
move into a quarter given over to foundries and boiler shops and demand the quiet of
a farm. On the other hand, the noisy or noisome factory cannot with immunity invade
territory stamped by use for residence.

In this case, The neighborhood in question is of a mixed character. After a careful

consideration of all the evidence of record, we have come to the conclusion that the
locality surrounding the site of the proposed plant has not sufficiently the impress of a
residential district as to justify us in holding that the plant will be incongruous with its
surroundings. This conclusion is made easier in view of the fact that another brewery is in
fact closer to several of the plaintiffs than that of the defendants will be. The fact that
this latter brewery is not on the same street is immaterial. Distance is what counts in a
matter of this kind. Noise, smells, and smoke are no respecters of streets.-----Is there
evidence of record that the proposed plant will be operated so carelessly as to
materially increase the noise, smells, and smoke emanating therefrom? We think not.
On the contrary, the evidence is that a brewery, properly run, is not an unbearable
neighbor and that the defendants are installing modern machinery in every respect.

69. Velasco vs Manila Electric Co (PET OWNS PROP NEAR SUBSTATION OF MERALCO
PRODUCING NOICE: SC: NUISANCE)

FACTS: Pedro J. Velasco, the appellant, complained that MERALCO, the appellee
company, created a nuisance, as defined in Art. 694 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, in form of noise from their substation which was in the same street, next to
Velasco‘s property/residence, which the appellant also uses for his Medical Practice as
a physician. The claim cannot be proven solely by testimony however, as the
testimonies given by the locals do not corroborate with each other, or were subjective.
To get a more accurate proof, under instructions from the Director of Health, Dr. Jesus
Almonte, noted as an impartial party, used a sound level meter and other instruments
within the compound of the plaintiff-appellant to get a reading on the decibels or
sound meter. It was observed that the readings range from 46-80 decibels, depending
on the time and place. The appellee company also took sound level samplings, with
Mamerto Buenafe conducting the reading within and near the vicinity of the
substation, whose readings range from 42-76 decibels. The readings were compared to
Technical charts, which listed the decibels of areas from an average home: 40, to the
noisiest spot of Niagara Falls: 92. Thus, the readings from the impartial party appeared
more reliable. The court concluded that the evidence pointed the noise levels to be of
actionable nuisance, and that the appellant is entitled to relief, as there was a
possibility that it had effect on the appellant‘s health. Appellee company contended
that the appellant should not have a ground to complain because of: 1) the intensity
inside Velasco‘s house was on 46 to 47 decibels; 2) the sound level at the North General
Hospital, where silence was observed, was higher that his residence and did not take
action; 3) MERALCO had received no complaint in its 50 years of operations until the
case.

ISSUES: Whether or not the substation constituted a public nuisance. Whether or not
Velasco had the right to claim for damages.

HELD:Yes. Several American decisions are cited showing that noise is an actionable
nuisance. In fact, Kentucky v. Anderson dealt with noise emanating from electrical
machinery and appliances. The determining factor, however, is not just intensity or
volume. It must be of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and
annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities.

However, appellant‘s testimony is too plainly biased. Nor are the witnesses‘ testimonies
revealing on account of different perceptions. Consequently, sound level meters were
used. As stated above, the sound exceeds average residential decibels. Also, the
testimonies of appellant‘s physicians (which were more reliable since they actually
treated him, unlike the appellee‘s) point to the noise as having caused appellant loss of
sleep, irritation and tension weakening his constitution. Notable lastly is the fact that in
the Kentucky case, where the nuisance was ordered abated, the average reading was
44 decibels while in the instant, the readings include 52, 54, and 55. The decision goes
on to discuss the proper award of damages. But Meralco was ordered either to transfer
the facilities or reduce the produced sound to around.
70 . ILOILO COLD STORAGE CO. vs. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL- Nuisance (City Council
cannot, by a mere resolution or motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance which
has not theretofore been pronounced to be such by law, or so adjudged by judicial
determination.)

FACTS:

Plaintiff is the owner of an ice and cold storage plant. Nearby residents made
complaints regarding the smoke that the plant emits saying that it was very injurious to
their health and comfort. The defendant made investigations and later on passed a
resolution which demands that the smokestacks of the said factory be elevated or else
the factory operations will be closed or suspended. Plaintiff opposed by filing for
injunction.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the resolution alone issued by the municipal council is sufficient to label
and abate the supposed nuisance in this case?

RULING: NO.

There are two kinds of nuisances: nuisances per se and per accidens. The former are
recognized as nuisances under any and all circumstances. The latter are such only
because of the special circumstances and conditions surrounding them. The former
may be abated even by private individuals however the latter is different; it needs a
determination of the facts which is a judicial function.

The question of nuisance can conclusively be decided, for all legal uses, by the
established courts of law or equity alone, and that the resolution of officers, or of boards
organized by force of municipal charters, cannot, to any degree, control such decision.
City Council cannot, by a mere resolution or motion, declare any particular thing a
nuisance which has not theretofore been pronounced to be such by law, or so
adjudged by judicial determination.

In the present case it is certain that the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per
se. It is a legitimate industry, beneficial to the people, and conducive to their health
and comfort. If it be in fact a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question
cannot de determined by a mere resolution of the board. The petitioner is entitled to a
fair and impartial hearing before a judicial tribunal
It is a doctrine not to be tolerated in this country, that a municipal corporation, without
any general laws either of the city or of the State, within which a given structure can be
shown to be a nuisance, can, by its mere declaration that it is one, subject it to removal
by any person supposed to be aggrieved, or even by the city itself. This would place
every house, every business, and all the property of the city at the uncontrolled will of
the temporary local authorities. Yet this seems to have been the view taken by counsel
who defended this case in the circuit court; for that single ordinance of the city,
declaring the wharf of Yates a nuisance, and ordering its abatement, is the only
evidence in the record that it is a nuisance or an obstruction to navigation, or in any
manner injurious to the public.
By this provision of the charter the city is clothed with authority to declare by general
ordinance under what circumstances and conditions certain specified acts or things
injurious to the health or dangerous to the public are to constitute and be deemed
nuisances, leaving the question of fact open for judicial determination as to whether
the particular act or thing complained of comes within the prohibited class; but it
cannot by ordinance arbitrarily declare any particular thing a nuisance which has not
heretofore been so declared by law, or judicially determined to be such

71 TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC v. CA/G.R. No. 94759, Jan. 21, 1991, 201 SCRA (PET
TECH DEV CHARCOAL BUS-MAYOR ORDERED ITS STOPPAGE: MAYOR‘S POWER? SC: YES)

FACTS:Technology Developers, a corporation engaged in the manufacture and export

of charcoal briquette, received a letter from acting mayor Pablo Cruz: 1) ordering the
full cessation of its plant in Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan until further order, and 2)
requesting its Plant Manager to bring before the office of the mayor its building permit,
mayor's permit, and Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti--
Pollution Permit.
Technology Developers undertook to comply with the request to produce the required
documents. It sought to secure the Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural
Resources Anti-Pollution Permit although prior to the operation of the plant, a
Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installation was issued to it. Petitioners also
sent its representatives to the office of the mayor to secure a mayor‘s permit but were
not entertained.

Eventually, the acting mayor ordered that the plant premises be padlocked, effectively
causing the stoppage of operation. This was done without previous and reasonable
notice.

Technology Developers then instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition and

mandamus with preliminary injunction against the acting mayor with Bulacan RTC,
alleging that the closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion.

The RTC found that the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was
proper, ordering the acting mayor to immediately revoke his closure order and allow
Technology Developers to resume its normal business operations until the case has
been adjudicated on the merits. Upon MR, the Provincial Prosecutor presented
evidence as to the allegation that "Due to the manufacturing process and nature of
raw materials used, the fumes coming from the factory may contain particulate matters
which are hazardous to the health of the people. As such, the company should cease
operating until such a time that the proper air pollution device is installed and
operational. Reassessing the evidence, the RTC set aside its order granted the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction.

ISSUE:W/N the acting mayor had a legal ground for ordering the stoppage of
Technology Developer

HELD:YES. The following circumstances militate against the maintenance of the writ of
preliminary injunction sought by petitioner:

1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining
whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of
the operation of a business is essentially addressed to theEnvironmental
Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must
be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its
inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny
the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless
appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the
residents of the community from the emissions in the operation of the business.

2. The Acting Mayor called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the
fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also
affect the health of the residents in the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its
operation until further orders.
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of
Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor
through channels.

4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was
made by Marivic Guina who in her report observed that the fumes emitted by the
plant goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollutiondevice has
been installed.

6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then
National Pollution Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was good only
up to May 25, 1988. Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit
much less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the
health of the residents of the community.

Court takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in this dollar-
earning industry. It must be stressed however, that concomitant with the need to
promote investment and contribute to the growth of the economy is the equally
essential imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the people, from the
deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.

72 RAMCAR, INC., petitioner, vs.EUSEBIO S. MILLAR, ET AL., respondents. FACTS:

(Petitioner Ramcar Inc., operates and maintains an auto repair and body building shop
while the seven private respondents reside near or around the shop. Respondents
brought an action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to abate the said
establishment as a nuisance. )

CA RULED AGAINST RAMCAR: As found by the Appeals Court, the nature of the
corporation's activities, actually engaged in, consists in repairing and building bodies of
motor vehicles, and involves the use of tools and machinery that give rise to much noise
and annoyance during all hours of the day up to nighttime; and its employees
oftentimes work on Sundays and holidays. That respondent Eusebio S. Millar and his
family were already residing on his own land adjacent to that of Ramcar, when the
latter transferred thereto.

Thus it ruled that: the operation and maintenance of the establishment of the RAMCAR
is a public nuisance and violates the provisions of Zonification Ordinance No. 2830, as
amended by Ordinance No. 2906, of the City of Manila; ordering the defendants-
appellees to remove the said establishment and all buildings and structures built therein
within 30 days from the finality of this judgment,
Whereupon, Ramcar, Inc. petitioned this Court for a review on certiorari.

ISSUE: IS RULING OF CA CORRECT? NO. SC MODIFIED

HELD:The business of the petitioner is not a nuisance per se. It is only on account of its
location that it is a public nuisance. To abate it, it is not necessary, as the appealed
decision decrees, to remove all building an structures built in the place where it is
presently located as these, or parts thereof, may be utilized for pursuit that are not
forbidden by law or ordinance.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified by permanently enjoining the

petitioner only from operating its body building operations or activities in its present
location, without requiring the demolition of the existing building in all other respects,
the judgment below is affirmed. Costs in this instance against petitioner Ramcar, Inc.

Ramcar, Inc. contends that they are granted a license and permit to operate a
garage; and it claims that such license entitles it to conduct its body building business,
and that Section 5 of Ordinance No. 2830, as amended by Ordinance No. 2906 of the
City of Manila, allows it to conduct its business at the present site. The said ordinance
restricts the kinds of business, buildings and establishments that may be built on
commercial zones and the enumeration of permitted activities includes "6. Garage and
gasoline service stations".

A body building shop is not within the purview of "garage", which designates a shop for
storing, repairing and servicing motor vehicles, being merely a modern substitute for the
ancient livery stable (Legum vs. Carlin, 99 ALR, 536) The Court of Appeals correctly held
on this point:It is clear that the business of Ramcar, Inc. is not a mere garage or
automobile repair and painting shop, much less, a gasoline service station, within the
contemplation of Section 5 of the City Ordinances. Besides the usual services of vehicle
storage, of supplying gas, and of making repairs, the shop also assembles and rebuilds
car and truck bodies which require more than ordinary labor and skill and involves the
use of tools and machinery with the concomitant noise created by the use of those
tools and machines. While repair work may be considered as a necessary incident of a
garage or gasoline service station for purposes of goodwill when they involve minor
repairs, body assembling or rebuilding certainly makes such kind of business more than
a mere garage and gas service station and, for zonification purposes, should not be
confused with and must be separated from a garage or gas service business.

G.R. No. L-26053 February 21, 1967

CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GERARDO GARCIA, et al, defendants-appellants.
FACTS:

Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of certain parcels of land. Shortly after liberation from
1945 to 1947, defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge
and consent. They built houses of second-class materials, again without plaintiff's
knowledge and consent, and without the necessary building permits from the city.
There they lived thru the years to the present.

In November, 1947, the presence of defendants having previously been discovered,

other defendants were given by Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso written permits — each
labeled "lease contract" — to occupy specific areas in the property upon conditions
therein set forth. Defendants Isabelo Obaob and Gerardo Garcia (in the name of
Marta A. Villanueva) received their permits from Mayor Manuel de la Fuente on
January 29 and March 18, respectively, both of 1948. The rest of the 23 defendants
exhibited none.

Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to the
property. Came the need for this school's expansion; it became pressing. On
September 14, 1961, plaintiff's City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear
squatters' houses on city property, gave each of defendants thirty (30) days to vacate
and remove his construction or improvement on the premises. This was followed by the
City Treasurer's demand on each defendant, made in February and March, 1962, for
the payment of the amount due by reason of the occupancy and to vacate in fifteen
(15) days. Defendants refused. Hence, this suit to recover possession.

ISSUE: W/N the defendants acquired the legal status of tenants

RULING:

NO. They entered the land, built houses of second-class materials thereon without the
knowledge and consent of the city. Their homes were erected without city
permits.These constructions are illegal. In a language familiar to all, defendants are
squatters:

The said permits, erroneously labeled "lease" contracts, were issued by the mayors in
1947 and 1948 when the effects of the war had simmered down and when these
defendants could have very well adjusted themselves. Two decades have now
elapsed since the unlawful entry. Defendants could have, if they wanted to, located
permanent premises for their abode. And yet, usurpers that they are, they preferred to
remain on city property.

Defendants' entry as aforesaid was illegal. Their constructions are as illegal, without
permits.8 The city charter enjoins the mayor to "safeguard all the lands" of the City of
Manila.9
The courts thus accordingly, rule that the Manila mayors did not have authority to give
permits, written or oral, to defendants, and that the permits herein granted are null and
void.

ESTATE OF GREGORIA FRANCISCO v. CA

FACTS:
The quonset was constructed by the American Liberation Forces in 1944.
It was purchased in 1946 by Gregoria Francisco, who died in 1976. It stands on a lot
owned by the Philippine Ports Authority and faces the municipal wharf. By virtue of
Proclamation No. 83 issued by President Elpidio Quirino, said land was declared for the
exclusive use of port facilities.
The Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) issued to Tan Gin San, surviving,
spouse of Gregoria Francisco, a permit to occupy the lot where the building stands for
a period of one (1) year. The permittee was using the quonset for the storage of copra.
Respondent Mayor, through respondent Municipal Action Officer, notified Tan Gin San
by mail to remove or relocate its quonset building, citing Zoning Ordinance No. 147 of
the municipality; noting its antiquated and dilapidated structure; and stressing the
"clean-up campaign on illegal squatters and unsanitary surroundings along Strong
Boulevard." This was followed by another letter of the same tenor.
Since the notifications remained unheeded by petitioner, Respondent Mayor ordered
the demolition.
The Trial Court upheld the power of respondent Mayor to order the demolition without
judicial authority, adverting to Zoning Ordinance No. 147 of the Municipality of Isabela,
Basilan. Petitioner duly interposed an appeal. Petitioner‘s quonset building was
completely demolished
Upon initially reversing the Trial Court‘s decision, the CA reversed itself stating that
"although Municipal Mayor Valencia initially issued an order of demolition
without judicial process, the deficiency was remedied when appellant (petitioner
herein) filed a petition for prohibition and injunction and was heard on oral argument
after appellees (respondent officials) filed their answer.

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Mayor could summarily, without judicial process,
order the demolition of petitioner's quonset building.

RULING: NO. Violation of a municipal ordinance neither empowers the Municipal Mayor
to avail of extra-judicial remedies. On the contrary, the Local Government Code
imposes upon him the duty "to cause to be instituted judicial proceedings in connection
with the violation of ordinances" (Local Government Code, Sec. 141 [2] [t]).
Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the
abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings.That tenet applies to a
nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property
and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v.
Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1928]). The storage of copra in the quonset building is a
legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be injurious to rights of property,
of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so
proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting
its summary abatement without judicial intervention.
While the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement of a nuisance (Local
Government Code, Sec. 149 [ee]), it can not declare a particular thing as a
nuisance per se and order its condemnation. The nuisance can only be so adjudged by
judicial determination.

GUILLERMO TELMO vs LUCIANO BUSTAMANTE

FACTS:
The complaint alleged that respondent is a co-owner of a real property of 616 square
meters in Brgy. Halang, Naic, Cavite, known as Lot 952-A and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-957643 of the Register of Deeds of Cavite. Petitioner and
Elizalde Telmo are the owners of the two (2) parcels of land denominated as Lot 952-B
and 952-C, respectively, located at the back of respondents lot. When his lot was
transgressed by the construction of the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road, respondent
offered for sale the remaining lot to the Telmos. The latter refused because they said
they would have no use for it, the remaining portion being covered by the roads 10-
meter easement.

The complaint further alleged that, respondent caused the resurvey of Lot 952-A in the
presence of the Telmos. The resurvey showed that the Telmos encroached upon
respondents lot. Petitioner then uttered, Hanggat ako ang municipal engineer ng
Naic, Cavite, hindi kayo makakapagtayo ng anuman sa lupa nyo; hindi ko kayo
bibigyan ng building permit.

Respondent put up concrete poles on his lot. However, around 7:00 p.m. of the same
day, the Telmos and their men allegedly destroyed the concrete poles. The following
day, respondents relatives went to Brgy. Chairman Consumo to report the destruction
of the concrete poles. Consumo told them that he would not record the same,
because he was present when the incident occurred. Consumo never recorded the
incident in the barangay blotter.

Respondent complained that he and his co-owners did not receive any
just compensation from the government when it took a portion of their
property for the construction of the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road. Worse, they could
not enjoy the use of the remaining part of their lot due to the abusive, Illegal, and unjust
acts of the Telmos and Consumo.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found petitioner and Danilo Consumo
administratively liable for summarily removing the concrete posts of the respondents

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, wherein he elaborated that he just

performed his official duties when he summarily removed the concrete posts erected
by respondent to enclose the property. Such was denied for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent‘s concrete posts were in the nature of a nuisance per
se thus may be subject of summary abatement without judicial proceedings

RULING: NO

A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property
and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. Evidently, the
concrete posts summarily removed by petitioner did not at all pose a hazard to the
safety of persons and properties, which would have necessitated immediate and
summary abatement. What they did, at most, was to pose an inconvenience to the
public by blocking the free passage of people to and from the national road.

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. v. JAC LINER, INC. 452 SCRA 174 (2005)

FACTS:

Two ordinances were enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena with the
objective of alleviating the traffic congestion said to have been caused by the
existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city. City Ordinance 1631
grants franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. to construct, finance,
establish, operate and maintain common bus- jeepney terminal facility in the City of
Lucena.

City Ordinance 1778, on the other hand, strips out all the temporary terminals in the City
of Lucena the right to operate which as a result favors only the Lucena Grand Central
Terminal, Inc.

The Regional Trial Court of Lucena declared City Ordinance 1631 as a valid excercise of
police power while declaring City Ordinance 1778 as null and void for being invalid.

Petitioner Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. filed its Motion for Reconsideration which
was denied. Lucena then elevated it via petition for review under Rule 45 before the
Court. The Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) with which it
has concurrent jurisdiction.

The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged orders of the trial court. Its
motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, Lucena now comes to the
Court via petition for review to assail the Decision and Resolution of the CA.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the means employed by the Lucena Sannguniang Panlungsod to attain
its professed objective were reasonably necessary and not duly oppressive upon
individuals.

HELD:

With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to a single location,
the subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within
Lucena, including those already existing, and allow the operation of only one common
terminal located outside the city proper, the franchise for which was granted to
Lucena.

The common carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close
down their existing terminals and use the facilities of Lucena. The true role
of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that
rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due
deference to rights. A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a
more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems.

From the memorandum filed before the Court by Lucena, it is gathered that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic congestion to be the
indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the streets of the city
proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation of
buses obstructing traffic on the city streets. Bus terminals per se do not, however,
impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the
existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to Lucena, can be considered as
reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, the Court has not been enlightened.
If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and
unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable
specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the
same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications.

In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the
maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide
facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all. The Court
is not unaware of the resolutions of various barangays in Lucena City supporting the
establishment of a common terminal, and similar expressions of support from the private
sector, copies of which were submitted to this Court by Lucena Grand Central Terminal,
Inc. The weight of popular opinion, however, must be balanced with that of an
individual‗s rights.

NATIVIDAD C. CRUZ v. PANDACAN HIKER'S CLUB

FACTS:
Petitioner Natividad C. Cruz (Cruz) was Punong Barangay or Chairperson of Barangay
848, Zone 92, City of Manila. On November 10, 2006, around five o'clock in the
afternoon, and along Central Street, Pandacan, Manila, within the vicinity of her
barangay, she allegedly confronted persons playing basketball with the following
statements:

Bakit nakabukas ang (basketball) court? Wala kayong karapatang maglaro sa court
na 'to, barangay namin ito! xxx xxx xxx Wala kayong magagawa. Ako ang chairman
dito. Mga walanghiya kayo, patay gutom! Hindi ako natatakot! Kaya kong panagutan
lahat![3]

Then, she allegedly gave an order to the other petitioner, Barangay Tanod Benjamin
dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), to destroy the basketball ring by cutting it up with a hacksaw
which Dela Cruz promptly complied with, thus, rendering the said basketball court
unusable.[4]

The acts of petitioners prompted the filing of a Complaint (for Malicious Mischief, Grave
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Abuse o.f
Authority)[5] before the Prosecutor's Office and the Office of the Ombudsman by the
group that claims to be the basketball court's owners, herein respondents Pandacan
Hiker's Club, Inc. (PHC) and its president Priscila Ilao (Ilao). In the complaint, they
alleged that PHC, a non-stock, non-profit civic organization engaged in "health,
infrastructure, sports and other so-called poverty alleviation activities" in the Pandacan
area of Manila, is the group that had donated, administered and operated the subject
basketball court for the Pandacan community until its alleged destruction by
petitioners.[6]

In answer to the complaint, Cruz alleged that the basketball court affected the peace
in the barangay and was the subject of many complaints from residents asking for its
closure. She alleged that the playing court blocked jeepneys from passing through and
was the site of rampant bettings and fights involving persons from within and outside
the barangay. She claimed that innocent persons have been hurt and property had
been damaged by such armed confrontations, which often involved the throwing of
rocks and improvised "molotov" bombs. She also averred that noise from the games
caused lack of sleep among some residents and that the place's frequent visitors used
the community's fences as places to urinate. Cruz maintained that the court's users
never heeded the barangay officials' efforts to pacify them and when the basketball
ring was once padlocked, such was just removed at will while members of the
complainants' club continued playing. When Cruz asked for the PHC to return the steel
bar and padlock, the request was simply ignored, thus, prompting her to order Dela
Cruz to destroy the basketball ring. The destruction was allegedly also a response to the
ongoing clamor of residents to stop the basketball games.Cruz denied allegations that
she shouted invectives at the PHC members. In support of her answer, Cruz attached
copies of the complaints, a "certification" and letters of barangay residents asking for a
solution to the problems arising from the disruptive activities on the said playing venue.
The Office of the Ombudsman rendered its decision dismissing the complaint filed by
Ilao, et al. The Ombudsman found that the act of destroying the basketball ring was
only motivated by Cruz and Dela Cruz performing their sworn duty, as defined in the
Local Government Code.

A petition for review was filed before the Court of Appeals praying for the latter court
to nullify the Ombudsman's decision. The petition's thesis was that any actions in
furtherance of the community's welfare must be approved by ordinance and that
unless a thing is a nuisance per se, such a thing may not be abated via an ordinance
and extrajudicially.

The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

ISSUE: Whether or not the basketball ring is a nuisance per se and thus may be abated
via an ordinance without judicial declaration

RULING: NO.

Prevailing jurisprudence holds that unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it may not be
summarily abated.[32]

There is a nuisance when there is "any act, omission, establishment, business, condition
of property, or anything else which: (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of
others; or (2) annoys or offends the senses; or (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or
morality; or (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or
street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of property."[33] But other
than the statutory definition, jurisprudence recognizes that the term "nuisance" is so
comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways which have interfered with
the rights of the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of his property, or his
comfort

A nuisance is classified in two ways: (1) according to the object it affects; or (2)
according to its susceptibility to summary abatement.

As for a nuisance classified according to the object or objects that it affects, a

nuisance may either be: (a) a public nuisance, i.e., one which "affects a community or
neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the
annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal"; or (b) a private
nuisance, or one "that is not included in the foregoing definition" which, in
jurisprudence, is one which "violates only private rights and produces damages to but
one or a few persons."[35]

A nuisance may also be classified as to whether it is susceptible to a legal summary

abatement, in which case, it may either be: (a) a nuisance per se, when it affects the
immediate safety of persons and property, which may be summarily abated under the
undefined law of necessity;[36] or, (b) a nuisance per accidens, which "depends upon
certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it
cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide
whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance;"[37] it may only be so proven in
a hearing conducted for that purpose and may not be summarily abated without
judicial intervention.[38]

In the case at bar, none of the tribunals below made a factual finding that the
basketball ring was a nuisance per se that is susceptible to a summary abatement. And
based on what appears in the records, it can be held, at most, as a mere nuisance per
accidens, for it does not pose an immediate effect upon the safety of persons and
property, the definition of a nuisance per se. Culling from examples cited in
jurisprudence, it is unlike a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed "on sight
because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people; nor is it
like pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs which are
inherently pernicious and which may be summarily destroyed; nor is it similar to a filthy
restaurant which may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health.[39] A
basketball ring, by itself, poses no immediate harm or danger to anyone but is merely
an object of recreation. Neither is it, by its nature, injurious to rights of property, of health
or of comfort of the community and, thus, it may not be abated as a nuisance without
the benefit of a judicial hearing.

LEONOR FARRALES, assisted by her husband, EMILIO FARRALES vs. THE CITY MAYOR OF
BAGUIO, THE CHIEF OF POLICE, THE MARKET SUPERINTENDENT AND THE CITY TREASURER

FACTS:

Plaintiff was the holder of a municipal license to sell liquor and sari-sari goods. When the
temporary building where she had her stall was demolished in order that the city might
construct a permanent building, Plaintiff was ordered to move her goods to another
temporary place until the permanent building was completed. Instead, Plaintiff built a
temporary shack at one end of the Rice Section, Baguio City Market without seeking
prior permit from any city official. When the police threatened to demolish the shack,
Plaintiff sought an injunction before the CFI which asked her that she present proper
permit. Upon failure of petitioner to comply with the order, the CFI denied the petition
for injunction, and the police then demolished the shack.

ISSUES: (1) WON the shack or temporary stall was a nuisance; (2) WON the police
officers are liable for damages in extrajudicially abating the nuisance.

RULING: Judgment Affirmed.

(1) The SC held that the shack was a nuisance. In the first place she had no permit to
put up the temporary stall in question in the precise place where she did so. In the
second place, its location on the cement passageway at the end of the Rice Section
building was such that it constituted an obstruction to the free movement of people.

(2) According to Article 707 of the CC, a public official extrajudicially abating a
nuisance shall be liable for damages in only two cases: (a) if he causes unnecessary
injury; or (b) if an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real
nuisance.

In the case at bar, no unnecessary injury was caused to the appellant, and not only
was there no judicial declaration that the alleged nuisance was not really so but the
trial court found that it was in fact a nuisance. Indeed it may be said that the
abatement thereof was not summary, but through a judicial proceeding. The denial of
petitioner‘s petition for injunction was in effect an authority for the police to carry out
the act which was sought to be enjoined.

G.R. No. L-41958 July 20, 1982

DONALD MEAD, petitioner, vs.HON. MANUEL A. ARGEL and the People of the Philippines,
respondents

FACTS:

On March 11, 1975, petitioner Donald Mead and a certain Isaac Arivas were charged
by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with a violation of Section 9, in relation to Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 3931, under an information reading as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of August, 1972, and for some time prior
and subsequent thereto, in the municipality of Malabon, province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then the president and the general manager,
respectively, of the Insular Oil Refinery Co. (INSOIL) a corporation duly
organized in accordance with existing laws, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drain or otherwise dispose into the
highway canal and/or cause, permit, suffer to be drained or allow to seep
into such waterway the industrial and other waste matters discharged
due to the operation of the said Insular Oil Refinery Co. so managed and
operated by them, thereby causing pollution of such waterway with the
resulting damage and/or destruction to the living plants in the vicinity and
providing hazard to health and property in the same vicinity.

On August 11, 1975, petitioner Donald Mead, one of the accused in the criminal case,
filed a motion to quash on the grounds that the trial court has no jurisdiction and that
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal has no legal personality to file the above-quoted
information.

It is the principal contention of the petitioner that the National Water and Air Pollution
Control Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission") as created under
Republic Act No. 3931 has the exclusive authority to determine the existence of
"pollution" before a criminal case can be filed for a violation of the said law; and that it
has the exclusive authority to prosecute violations of the same. Petitioner further avers
that the Commission not having finally ruled that the petitioner has violated Republic
Act No. 3931, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal lacks the authority to prosecute the petitioner
for a violation of said law.

The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that while Republic Act No. 3931 grants
the power and duty to the Commission to investigate and prosecute violations of
Republic Act No. 3931, such grant of power and authority is not exclusive, and does not
deprive fiscals and other public prosecutors of their authority to investigate and
prosecute violations of the said law committed within their respective jurisdictions.

ISSUE: W/N the provincial fiscal has legal authority concurrent with the NWAPCC to file a
case against petitioner

RULING:

NO. It is true that there is no provision expressly declaring that the authority vested in the
Commission to prosecute violations of Republic Act No. 3931 is exclusive. Using the
same logic, there is neither a provision declaring such authority to be concurrent or
may be exercised jointly with Fiscals. The absence of an explicit declaration as to the
exclusive authority of the Commission to prosecute violations of the subject law does
not detract from the clear intention to make it so, as gathered from the philosophy of
the law itself and as gleaned from several provisions of the same. It is clearly deducible
from the provision of Section 8 expressly declaring that no court action shall be initiated,
except those related to nuisance, until the Commission shall have finally ruled on the
alleged act of pollution; and also from Section 6(a), No. 5, which authorizes the
Commission to "initiate or cause to be instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction
legal proceedings to compel compliance with the provisions of this Act."

As may be seen from the law, the determination of the existence of pollution requires
investigation, public hearings and the collection of various information relating to water
and atmospheric pollution. (Sections 6, 7, and 8.) The definition of the term "pollution" in
itself connotes that the determination of its existence requires specialized knowledge of
technical and scientific matters which are not ordinarily within the competence of
Fiscals or of those sitting in a court of justice. It is undoubtedly in recognition of this fact
that in Section 4 of the law, it is provided that "the basic personnel necessary to carry
out the provisions of this Act shall be engineers, chemists, biochemists, physicists, and
other technicians"; and required in Section 3 that the Chairman of the Commission shall
be the Chairman of the National Science Development Board, one of the part-time
commissioners shall be a recommendee of the Philippine Council of Science and
Technology, and one of the two full-time commissioner shall be a sanitary engineer.
81. JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION, LEONARDO KONG, JOSE TIOPE and ELISA
PANELO, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CONRADO C. AGUILAR and
CRISELDA R. AGUILAR, respondents. [G.R. No. 129792. December 21, 1999]

ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE: One who maintains on his estate or premises an

attractive nuisance without exercising due care to prevent children from playing
therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby,
even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. Note: This doctrine was not
stated in this case.

FACTS: May 9 1983: Criselda and her 6 year-old daughter Zhieneth were at the 2nd
floor of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City. While Criselda was signing her credit
card slip at the counter, she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. As she
looked behind her, she saw Zhieneth's body pinned by the bulk of the store's gift-
wrapping counter/structure. Zhieneth was crying and screaming for help. Although
shocked, Criselda was quick to ask the assistance of the people around in lifting the
counter and retrieving Zhieneth from the floor. Zhieneth was quickly rushed to the
Makati Medical Center where she was operated on.

Next day: Zhieneth lost her speech and communicated by writing on a magic slate and
14 days after: She died on the hospital bed. The cause of her death was attributed to
the injuries she sustained. After the burial of their daughter, Criselda demanded upon
Jarco Marketing the reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills and wake and
funeral expenses which they had incurred. But, they refused to pay. Criselda filed a
complaint for damages.

Jarco Marketing: answered with counterclaim and denied any liability. They argued
that Criselda was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her daughter by
allowing her to freely roam around in a store filled with glassware and appliances.
Zhieneth too, was guilty of contributory negligence since she climbed the counter,
triggering its eventual collapse on her. Petitioners also emphasized that the counter was
made of sturdy wood with a strong support; it never fell nor collapsed for the past
fifteen years since its construction. They maintained that it observed the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection, supervision and control of its employees.

Trial court dismissed the complaint and counterclaim. The proximate cause of the fall of
the counter on Zhieneth was her act of clinging to it.

CA: favored Criselda judgment. It found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining
a structurally dangerous counter. The counter was shaped like an inverted "L" with a top
wider than the base. It was top heavy and the weight of the upper portion was neither
evenly distributed nor supported by its narrow base. Thus, the counter was defective,
unstable and dangerous; a downward pressure on the overhanging portion or a push
from the front could cause the counter to fall. Two former employees of petitioners had
already previously brought to the attention of the management the danger the
counter could cause. But the latter ignored their concern.

ISSUE: W/N Jarco marketing was negligent or it was an accident

HELD: YES. CA affirmed

Accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to

the defendant a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening an event happening
without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency,
an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to
whom it happens occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which
is not caused by fault of any person and which could not have been prevented by any
means suggested by common prudence negligence omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct
of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable
man would not do the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another
person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.

Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other

Under the circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for Zhieneth, a child of such
tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her
life. Without doubt, Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of the
danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to
remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees and patrons as a
reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted by the
situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good
father of a family.

Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that
favors children below 9 years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence.
In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have
acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The
same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a
person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted
with discernment.

Even if we attribute contributory negligence to Zhieneth and assume that she climbed
over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that
the counter was stable and sturdy.
Criselda too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Initially, Zhieneth
held on to CRISELDA's waist, and only momentarily released the child's hand from her
clutch when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable
and usual for her to let go of her child. Further, at the time Zhieneth was pinned down
by the counter, she was just a foot away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping
counter was just 4 meters away - time and distance were both significant.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED and the
challenged decision of the Court of Appeals of 17 June 1996 in C.A. G.R. No. CV 37937
is hereby AFFIRMED.

82. HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. GUILLERMO BALANDAN, ANSELMA ANILA
and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. [G.R. No. L-3422. June 13, 1952]

FACTS: Hidalgo Enterprises was the owner of an ice-plant factory in San Pablo, Laguna.
In the factory, there were two tanks full of water, both 9-ft deep, for cooling purposes of
its engine. There was no fence or top cover; the edges of the tanks were barely a foot
high from the surface of the ground. The factory itself was surrounded with a fence.
However, the wide gate entrance was continually open, and anyone could easily enter
the factory. There was no guard assigned on the gate.

Around noon on April 16, 1948, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 3 years old, was playing
with other boys his age when he entered the factory premises through the gate. Mario
Balandan then took a bath in one of the tanks of water and, later on, sank to the
bottom of the tank. He died of ―asphyxia secondary to drowning.‖ The CFI and CA
ruled that Hidalgo Enterprises maintained an attractive nuisance and neglected to
adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accident to person entering its premises.

ISSUE: W/N a water tank is an attractive nuisance.

HELD: No. Hidalgo Enterprises Inc.‘s water tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance.
Other issues such as whether it exercised reasonable precautions, and if the parents
were guilty of contributory negligence are immaterial. Appealed decision reversed.
Hidalgo Enterprises is absolved from liability.

One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a

character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to
prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender
years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises.
This is the doctrine of attractive nuisance. The principal reason for the doctrine is that
the condition or appliance in question although its danger is apparent to those of age,
is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to approach, get
on or use it, and this' attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children
The majority of American jurisprudence posits that the doctrine of attractive nuisance is
generally not applicable to bodies of water, whether artificial or natural. The exception
to this is if there is some unusual condition or artificial feature other than mere water and
its location. Furthermore, in Anderson v. Reith-Riley Const. Co., the Indiana Appellate
Court explained why bodies of water are not considered as attractive nuisance. It ruled
that children have been instructed early on to exercise caution around bodies of water
and are presumed to know the danger.

Dissent of J. Pablo: Children are naturally curious and do not have perfect knowledge
of things. They are amazed by the natural attraction of the waters and shall explore
where their curiosity leads them unless there is something that prevents them. As such,
petitioners should have placed fences around the ponds as an ordinary precaution.
(Note: translated and paraphrased from Spanish text)

83. JOSE "PEPITO" TIMONER, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IV DIVISION, respondents. [G.R. No. L-62050.
November 25, 1983]

FACTS: Petitioner is the mayor of the town of Daet in Camarines Norte. He ordered the
demolition of the stalls in Maharlika Highway, even showing himself up in those stalls
during the demolition, after these establishments had been recommended for closure
by the Municipal Health Officer, Dra. Alegre, for non-compliance with certain health
and sanitation requirements. Among the structures thus barricaded were the
barbershop of Pascual Dayaon, the complaining witness and the store belonging to
one Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte
against Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos and others for judicial abatement of their stalls. The
complaint alleged that these stalls constituted public nuisances as well as nuisances per
se. Dayaon was never able to reopen his barbershop business.

ISSUE: W/N Petitioner in sealing off of complainant Dayaon's barbershop was done in
abatement of a public nuisance and, therefore, under lawful authority.

HELD: Unquestionably, the barbershop in question did constitute a public nuisance as

defined under Article Nos. 694 and 695 of the Civil Code, to wit:

ART. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property,
or anything else which:

(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or

(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or

(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or

(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any
body of water;

(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.

ART. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or
neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the
annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance
is one that is not included in the foregoing definition.

The barbershop occupied a portion of the sidewalk of the poblacion's main

thoroughfare and had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer.
In fact, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, in its decision in Civil Case No.
2257, declared said barbershop as a nuisance per-se.

Thus, under the facts of the case, as well as the law in point, there is no semblance of
any legality or right that exists in favor of the defendants to build a stall and conduct
their business in a sidewalk, especially in a highway where it does not only constitute a
menace to the health of the general public passing through the street and also of the
unsanitary condition that is bred therein as well as the unsightly and ugly structures in
the said place. Moreover, even if it is claimed and pretended that there was a license,
permit or toleration of the defendants' makeshift store and living quarters for a number
of years does not lend legality to an act which is a nuisance per se. Such nuisance
affects the community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons and
the general public which posed a danger to the people in general passing and using
that place, for in addition, this is an annoyance to the public by the invasion of its rights
— the fact that it is in a public place and annoying to all who come within its sphere.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 19534-CR, is hereby set
aside and petitioner is acquitted of the crime charged. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.

84. NUTRIMIX FEEDS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES
EFREN AND MAURA EVANGELISTA, respondents. [G.R. No. 152219. October 25, 2004]

FACTS: Respondent spouses herein started to directly procure various kinds of animal
feeds from petitioner Nutrimix Feeds Corporation. Initially, the respondents were good
paying customers. In some instances, however, they failed to issue checks despite the
deliveries of animal feeds which were appropriately covered by sales invoices.
Consequently, the respondents incurred an aggregate unsettled account with the
petitioner. The petitioner made several demands for the respondents to settle their
unpaid obligation, but the latter failed and refused to pay their remaining balance with
the petitioner.
Petitioner filed with RTC a complaint, against the respondents for sum of money and
damages with a prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary attachment. In their answer
with counterclaim, the respondents admitted their unpaid obligation but impugned
their liability to the petitioner. They contended that inasmuch as the sudden and
massive death of their animals was caused by the contaminated products of the
petitioner, the nonpayment of their obligation was based on a just and legal ground.

The respondents also lodged a complaint for damages against the petitioner for the
untimely and unforeseen death of their animals supposedly effected by the
adulterated animal feeds the petitioner sold to them. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
respondents‘ complaint on the ground of litis pendentia. The trial court denied the
same and the petitioner alleged that the death of the respondents‘ animals was due to
the widespread pestilence in their farm. The petitioner, likewise, maintained that it
received information that the respondents were in an unstable financial condition and
even sold their animals to settle their obligations from other enraged and insistent
creditors. It, moreover, theorized that it was the respondents who mixed poison to its
feeds to make it appear that the feeds were contaminated.

ISSUE: Is the petitioner corporation guilty of breach of warranty due to hidden defects
despite a finding that there was a difference of approximately three months from
delivery of the animal feeds, to respondent spouses, to the time the animals died and
the animal feeds were examined?

HELD: A difference of approximately three months enfeebles the respondents‘ theory

that the petitioner is guilty of breach of warranty by virtue of hidden defects. In a span
of three months, the feeds could have already been contaminated by outside factors
and subjected to many conditions unquestionably beyond the control of the petitioner.

The provisions on warranty against hidden defects are found in Articles 1561 and 1566
of the New Civil Code of the Philippines. A hidden defect is one which is unknown or
could not have been known to the vendee. Under the law, the requisites to recover on
account of hidden defects are as follows:

(a) the defect must be hidden;

(b) the defect must exist at the time the sale was made;

(c) the defect must ordinarily have been excluded from the contract;

(d) the defect, must be important (renders thing UNFIT or considerably decreases
FITNESS);

(e) the action must be instituted within the statute of limitations.

In the sale of animal feeds, there is an implied warranty that it is reasonably fit and
suitable to be used for the purpose which both parties contemplated. To be able to
prove liability on the basis of breach of implied warranty, three things must be
established by the respondents. The first is that they sustained injury because of the
product; the second is that the injury occurred because the product was defective or
unreasonably unsafe; and finally, the defect existed when the product left the hands of
the petitioner. A manufacturer or seller of a product cannot be held liable for any
damage allegedly caused by the product in the absence of any proof that the
product in question was defective. The defect must be present upon the delivery or
manufacture of the product; or when the product left the seller‘s or manufacturer‘s
control; or when the product was sold to the purchaser; or the product must have
reached the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition it was sold.
Tracing the defect to the petitioner requires some evidence that there was no
tampering with, or changing of the animal feeds. The nature of the animal feeds
makes it necessarily difficult for the respondents to prove that the defect was existing
when the product left the premises of the petitioner.

A review of the facts of the case would reveal that the petitioner delivered the animal
feeds, allegedly containing rat poison, on July 26, 1993; but it is astonishing that the
respondents had the animal feeds examined only on October 20, 1993, or barely three
months after their broilers and hogs had died. It bears stressing, too, that the chickens
brought for laboratory tests were healthy animals, and were not the ones that were
ostensibly poisoned. There was even no attempt to have the dead fowls examined.
Neither was there any analysis of the stomach of the dead chickens to determine
whether the petitioner‘s feeds really caused their sudden death. Mere sickness and
death of the chickens is not satisfactory evidence in itself to establish a prima facie
case of breach of warranty. Likewise, there was evidence tending to show that the
respondents combined different kinds of animal feeds and that the mixture was given
to the animals.

In essence, we hold that the respondents failed to prove that the petitioner is guilty of
breach of warranty due to hidden defects. It is, likewise, rudimentary that common law
places upon the buyer of the product the burden of proving that the seller of the
product breached its warranty. The bevy of expert evidence adduced by the
respondents is too shaky and utterly insufficient to prove that the Nutrimix feeds caused
the death of their animals. For these reasons, the expert testimonies lack probative
weight. The respondents‘ case of breach of implied warranty was fundamentally
based upon the circumstantial evidence that the chickens and hogs sickened, stunted,
and died after eating Nutrimix feeds; but this was not enough to raise a reasonable
supposition that the unwholesome feeds were the proximate cause of the death with
that degree of certainty and probability required.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals, dated February 12, 2002, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 9, dated January 12,
1998, is REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

85. CENTRAL SHIPPING COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH
AMERICA, respondent. [G.R. No. 150751. September 20, 2004]

FACTS: On July 25, 1990 at Puerto Princesa, Palawan, the petitioner received on board
its vessel, the M/V Central Bohol, 376 pieces of Round Logs and undertook to transport
said shipment to Manila for delivery to Alaska Lumber Co., Inc. The cargo is insured for
P3, 000, 000.00 against total lost under respondents Marine Cargo Policy.

After loading the logs, the vessel starts its voyage. After few hours of the trip, the ship tilts
10 degrees to its side, due to the shifting of the logs in the hold. It continues to tilt
causing the captain and the crew to abandon ship. The ship sank.

Respondent alleged that the loss is due to the negligence and fault of the captain.
While petitioner contends that the happening is due to monsoons which is unforeseen
or casa fortuito.

RTC: Central Shipping Liable. RTC was unconvinced that the sinking of M/V Central
Bohol had been caused by the weather or any other caso fortuito. It noted that
monsoons, which were common occurrences during the months of July to December,
could have been foreseen and provided for by an ocean-going vessel.

CA: affirmed RTC. Given the season of rains and monsoons, the ship captain and his
crew should have anticipated the perils of the sea. The CA found no merit in petitioner‘s
assertion of the vessel‘s seaworthiness. It held that the Certificates of Inspection and
Drydocking were not conclusive proofs thereof. In order to consider a vessel to be
seaworthy, it must be fit to meet the perils of the sea.

ISSUE:

1) W/N petitioner is liable for the loss of cargo?

2) W/N limited liability rule applies

HELD: 1) A common carrier is presumed to be at fault or negligent. It shall be liable for

the loss, destruction or deterioration of its cargo, unless it can prove that the sole and
proximate cause of such event is one of the causes enumerated in Article 1734 of the
Civil Code, or that it exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent or minimize the loss. In
the present case, the weather condition encountered by petitioner‘s vessel was not a
―storm‖ or a natural disaster comprehended in the law. Given the known weather
condition prevailing during the voyage, the manner of stowage employed by the
carrier was insufficient to secure the cargo from the rolling action of the sea. The carrier
took a calculated risk in improperly securing the cargo. Having lost that risk, it cannot
now disclaim any liability for the loss.

2. The doctrine of limited liability under Article 587 of the Code of Commerce is not
applicable to the present case. This rule does not apply to situations in which the loss or
the injury is due to the concurrent negligence of the shipowner and the captain. It has
already been established that the sinking of M/V Central Bohol had been caused by
the fault or negligence of the ship captain and the crew, as shown by the improper
stowage of the cargo of logs. "Closer supervision on the part of the shipowner could
have prevented this fatal miscalculation." As such, the shipowner was equally negligent.
It cannot escape liability by virtue of the limited liability rule.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitione

86. EDGAR COKALIONG SHIPPING LINES, INC., Petitioner, vs. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., Respondent. [G.R. No. 146018. June 25, 2003]

FACTS: December 11, 1991: Nestor Angelia (shipper and consignee) delivered to the
petitioner Edgar Cokaliong Shipping Lines, Inc. (now Cokaliong Shipping Lines), a cargo
consisting of one (1) carton of Christmas decor and two (2) sacks of plastic toys, to be
transported on board the M/V Tandag from Cebu City for Tandag, Surigao del Sur. This
cargo is under Bill of Lading No. 58, in the amount of P6,500.00.

Zosimo Mercado (another shipper and consignee) likewise delivered cargo to

petitioner consisting of two (2) cartons of plastic toys and Christmas decor, one (1) roll
of floor mat and one (1) bundle of various or assorted goods. This is under Bill of Lading
No. 59, valued in the amount of P14,000.00

Feliciana Legaspi (owner of the goods) insured the cargo, covered by BOL Nos. 59 and
No. 58, with the UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc., [respondent]. No. 59 was insured for
P100,000 while No. 58 for P50,000. [*Note that both amounts are far from the actual and
declared value in the BOLs issued by Cokaliong.

]After the vessel had passed by the Mandaue-Mactan Bridge, fire ensued in the engine
room, and, despite earnest efforts of the officers and crew of the vessel, the fire
engulfed and destroyed the entire vessel resulting in the loss of the vessel and the
cargoes therein.

Feliciana Legaspi filed a claim, with [respondent], for the value of the cargos insured.
The latter approved the claim. For Bill of Lading No. 59, Legaspi received from UCPB
P99,000.00 while for No. 58, P60,338.00.
UCPB as subrogee of Legaspi, filed a complaint anchored on torts against petitioner,
with the RTC of Makati City, for the collection of the total principal amount of
P148,500.00. Respondent alleged that the loss of the cargo was due to the negligence
of the petitioner

Petitioner alleged that: (a) It was cleared by the Board of Marine Inquiry of any
negligence in the burning of the vessel; and (b) it cannot be held liable for the loss of
the cargo beyond the value thereof declared in the Bill of Lading.

ISSUE: Is petitioner liable for the loss of the goods? YES If it is liable, what is the extent of
its liability? According to what was reflected in the Bill of Lading

HELD: It was respondent‘s contention that petitioner‘s liability should be based on the
actual insured value of the goods, subject of this case. But Petitioner argued that its
liability should be limited to the value declared by the shipper/consignee in the Bill of
Lading.

SC: Petitioner should not be held liable for more than what was declared by the
shippers/consignees as the value of the goods in the bills of lading. The records show
that the Bills of Lading covering the lost goods contain the stipulation that in case of
claim for loss or for damage to the shipped merchandise or property, [t]he liability of
the common carrier x x x shall not exceed the value of the goods as appearing in the
bill of lading.

A stipulation that limits liability is valid as long as it is not against public policy. Following
provisions apply in the present case:

Art. 1749. A stipulation that the common carriers liability is limited to the value of the
goods appearing in the bill of lading, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater
value, is binding.

Art. 1750. A contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or shipper for
the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just
under the circumstances, and has been freely and fairly agreed upon.

Pursuant to the afore-quoted provisions of law, it is required that the stipulation limiting
the common carriers liability for loss must be reasonable and just under the
circumstances, and has been freely and fairly agreed upon.

In the present case, the stipulation limiting petitioner‘s liability is not contrary to public
policy.

The shippers/consignees may recover the full value of the goods by the simple
expedient of declaring the true value of the shipment in the Bill of Lading. Other than
the payment of a higher freight, there was nothing to stop them (Legaspi, et.al) from
placing the actual value of the goods therein.

In fact, they committed fraud against the common carrier by deliberately undervaluing
the goods in their Bill of Lading, thus depriving the carrier of its proper and just transport
fare. Concededly, the purpose of the limiting stipulation in the Bill of Lading is to protect
the common carrier. Such stipulation obliges the shipper/consignee to notify the
common carrier of the amount that the latter may be liable for in case of loss of the
goods. The common carrier can then take appropriate measures -- getting insurance, if
needed, to cover or protect itself. This precaution on the part of the carrier is
reasonable and prudent.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision is

MODIFIED in the sense that petitioner is ORDERED to pay respondent the sums of
₱14,000 and ₱6,500, which represent the value of the goods stated in Bills of Lading Nos.
59 and 58, respectively. No cos

87. JOSE C. ZULUETA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NICANOR NICOLAS in his capacity as

Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, defendant-appellee. [G.R. No. 8252. January 31, 1958]

FACTS: This is an appeal taken by plaintiff from a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, dismissing his complaint for damages on the ground of lack of cause of
action. Plaintiff instituted the present action on May 19, 1954 against the defendant
provincial fiscal of Rizal to recover moral and pecuniary damages in the sum of P10,000.
The complaint in substance alleges that on May 6, 1954, the defendant fiscal
conducted an investigation of a complaint for libel filed by herein plaintiff against the
provincial governor of Rizal and the staff members of the Philippine Free Press; that after
said investigation the fiscal "rendered an opinion" that there was no prima facie case;
that the alleged libelous statements were made in good faith and for the sole purpose
of serving the best interests of the public; and that in consequence the fiscal absolved
the said governor and the Free Press staff from the crime of libel.

ISSUE: W/N plaintiff‘s complaint states a cause of action.

HELD: No. The present action is based on article 27 of the new Civil Code, which
provides that "any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or
employee refuses or neglects without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an
action for damages and other relief against the latter." But as we said in Bagalay vs.
Ursal, this article "contemplates a refusal or neglect without just cause by a public
servant or employee to perform his official duty." Refusal of the fiscal to prosecute when
after an investigation he finds no sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case is
not a refusal, without just cause, to perform an official duty. The fiscal has for sure the
legal duty to prosecute crimes where there is enough evidence to justify such action.
But it is equally his duty not to prosecute when after an investigation he has become
convinced that the evidence available is not enough to establish a prima facie case.
The fiscal is not bound to accept the opinion of the complainant in a criminal case as
to whether or not a prima facie case exists. Vested with authority and discretion to
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the filing of the corresponding
information and, having control of the prosecution of a criminal case, the fiscal cannot
be subjected to dictation from the offended party. Having legal cause to refrain from
filing an information against the persons whom the herein plaintiff wants him to charge
with libel, the defendant fiscal cannot be said to have refused or neglected without just
cause to perform his official duty. On the contrary, it would appear that he performed
it.

It may not be amiss to state here that , as a general rule, a public prosecutor, being a
quasi-judicial officer empowered to exercise discretion or judgment, is not personally
liable for resulting injuries when acting within the scope of his authority, and in the line of
his official duty.

As was said in the case of Mendoza vs. De Leon. Nor are officers or agents of the
Government charged with the performance of governmental duties which are in their
nature legislative, or quasi judicial, liable for the consequences of their official acts,
unless it be shown that they act willfully and maliciously, and with the express purpose
of inflicting injury upon the plaintiff.

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the
appellant

88. ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES
ROMEO G. GUANZON and TERESITA REGALADO, respondents. [G.R. No. L-56180. October
16, 1986]

FACTS: In a letter-complaint dated December 13, 1967 addressed to Rev. William Welsh
S.J., Dean of Men, Dean of Resident Students, and Chairman of the Board of Discipline,
College of Arts and Sciences, Ateneo de Manila, Carmelita Mateo, a waitress in the
cafeteria of Cervini Hall inside the university campus charged Juan Ramon Guanzon,
son of private respondents Romeo Guanzon and Teresita Regalado, and a boarder
and first year student of the university with unbecoming conduct committed on
December 12, 1967 at about 5:15 in the evening at the Cervini Hall‘s cafeteria. that Mr.
Guanzon struck the complainant in the left temple. The university conducted an
investigation of the slapping incident. On the basis of the investigation results, Juan
Ramon was dismissed from the university. The dismissal of Juan Ramon triggered off the
filing of a complaint for damages by his parents against the university in the Court
stating that Juan Ramon was expelled from school without giving him a fair trial in
violation of his right to due process and that they are prominent and well known
residents of Bacolod City, with the unceremonious expulsion of their son causing them
actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorney‘s fees. After due trial, the
lower court found for the Guanzons and ordered the university to pay them P92.00 as
actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as attorney‘s fees and to
pay the costs of the suit. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by the university, the trial
court‘s decision was initially reversed and set aside. The complaint was dismissed.
However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the Guanzons, the appellate court
reversed its decision and set it aside through a special division of five. In the resolution
issued by the appellate court, the lower court‘s decision was reinstated. The motion for
reconsideration had to be referred to a special division of five in view of the failure to
reach unanimity on the resolution of the motion, the vote of the regular division having
become 2 to 1.

Issue: Whether the petitioner deprived the respondent due process in the administrative
proceeding?

Held: No, the respondent was accorded administrative due process in his dismissal
cases according to the minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the
demands of procedural due process are:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them;

(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel, if desired:

(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;

(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf and

(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

When the letter-complaint was read to respondent, he admitted the altercation with
the waitress and his slapping her on the face. Petitioner did not stop with the admission.
The Board of Discipline was made up of distinguished members of the faculty and there
is nothing in the records to cast any doubt on their competence and impartiality insofar
as this disciplinary investigation is concerned. Respondent himself appeared before the
Board of Discipline. He admitted incident, then begged to be excused so he could
catch the boat for Bacolod City. Juan Ramon, therefore, was given notice of the
proceedings; he actually appeared to present his side; the investigating board acted
fairly and objectively; and all requisites of administrative due process were met.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The appellate court's resolution
dated January 26, 1981 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The appellate court's decision
dated March 15, 1979 is REINSTATED.
89. EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE
CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE and FERNANDO O. CARRASCOSO JR., respondents. [G.R.
No. 119398. July 2, 1999]

Doctrine: To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages
and for attorney‘s fees for acts done in the performance of official functions, the
plaintiff must prove that these officers exhibited acts characterized by evident bad
faith, malice, or gross negligence. But even if their acts had not been so tainted, public
officers may still be held liable for nominal damages if they had violated the plaintiff‘s
constitutional rights.

FACTS: Petitioner Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
ROC seeking to set aside CA‘s decision, after it reversed a favorable decision of the
RTC that ordered the private respondents to pay him moral and exemplary damages,
attorney‘s fees and costs of the suit, and denied his Motion for Reconsideration.

Cojuangco, a known businessman-sportsman owned several racehorses which he

entered in sweepstakes races. Several of his horses won the races on various dates, and
won prizes together with the 30% due for trainer/grooms. He sent letters of demand for
the collection of the prizes due him but private respondents PCSO and its then
chairman Fernando Carrascoso Jr. consistently replied that the demanded prizes are
being withheld on advice of PCGG. Consequently, Cojuangco filed this case before
the Manila RTC but before the receipt summons, PCGG advised private respondents
that ―it poses no more objection to its remittance of the prized winnings‖. This was
immediately communicated to petitioner‘s counsel Estelito Mendoza by Carrascoso but
the former refused to accept the prizes at this point, reasoning that the matter had
already been brought to court.

The trial court ruled that the private respondents had no authority to withhold the
subject racehorse winnings since no writ of sequestration was issued by PCGG. Ordering
the private respondents to pay in solidum the claimed winnings, the trial court further
held that, by not paying the winnings, Carrascoso had acted in bad faith amounting to
the persecution and harassment of petitioner and his family. While the case was
pending with the CA, the petitioner moved for partial execution pending appeal to
which the private respondents posed no objection to.

CA reversed the trial court‘s finding of bad faith, holding that the former PCSO
chairman was merely carrying out the instruction of the PCGG. It likewise noted that
Carrascoso‘s acts of promptly replying to demands and not objecting to partial
execution negated bad faith.

ISSUE: W/N the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso is warranted by
evidence the law
HELD: Petitioner is only entitled to nominal damages. Carrascoso's decision to withhold
petitioner's winnings could not be characterized as arbitrary or whimsical, or even the
product of ill will or malice. He had particularly sought from PCGG a clarification of the
extent and coverage of the sequestration order issued against the properties of
petitioner. He had acted upon the PCGG's statement that the subject prizes were part
of those covered by the sequestration order and its instruction "to hold in a proper bank
deposits [sic] earning interest the amount due Mr. Cojuangco." Besides, EO 2 had just
been issued by then President Aquino," freez[ing] all assets and properties in the
Philippines [of] former President Marcos and/or his wife, . . . their close friends,
subordinates, business associates . . ."; and enjoining the "transfer, encumbrance,
concealment, or dissipation [thereof], under pain of such penalties as prescribed by
law." It cannot, therefore, be said that Respondent Carrascoso, who relied upon these
issuances, acted with malice or bad faith.

The extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary
damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear
showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. Attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation cannot be imposed either, in the absence of a clear showing of any of the
grounds provided therefor under the Civil Code. The trial court's award of these kinds of
damages must perforce be deleted, as ruled by the Court of Appeals.

Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the petitioner and the trial that Respondent
Carrascoso may still be held liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstruct, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

(6) The rights against deprivation of property without due process of law

In Aberca v. Ver, this Court explained the nature and the purpose of this article as
follows:

It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to
the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is
clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity.

Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice
or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional
rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the
performance of one's duties.

We hold that petitioner's right to the use of his property was unduly impeded. While
Respondent Carrascoso may have relied upon the PCGG's instructions, he could have
further sought the specific legal basis therefor. A little exercise of prudence would have
disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse
winnings of petitioner. There was apparently no record of any such writ covering his
racehorses either. The issuance of a sequestration order requires the showing of a prima
facie case and due regard for the requirements of due process. The withholding of the
prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke
of a violation of his property rights without due process of law.

Art. 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a plaintiff
whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of
vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered. The court may also award nominal damages in every case where a property
right has been invaded. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, with the relevant circumstances taken into account.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Decision, as herein
clarified, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Private Respondent Fernando O.
Carrascoso Jr. is ORDERED TO PAY petitioner nominal damages in the amount of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000). No pronouncement as to costs.