TRANSPO CONSOLIDATED Q&A + CASES

from Aquino’s Book

Respective Assignment:
Section B: Pages
9-10
24-27
29-30
32

Section A: Pages
54-55
66
70
77
83-86

Section C: Pages
97-104
128

Section JD: Pages

140
155-159
170-171

91-94 (Sections A, C, JD)

P9-10
PROBLEMS:
1. X brought seven (7) sacks of palay to the PNR. He paid its freight charges and was issued
Way Bill no. 1. The cargo was loaded on the freight wagon of the train. Without any
permission, X boarded the freight wagon and not the passenger coach. Shortly after the train
started, it was derailed. The freight wagon fell on its side, killing X. There is no evidence that
X brought a ticket or paid his fare at the same time that he paid the freight charges for his
cargo. Is X a passenger of PNR?
ANS:
No, X was not a “passenger."
A passenger is one who travels in a public conveyance by virtue of a contract, express or
implied, with a carrier subject to payment of fare or an equivalent thereof.
In the case at bar, X was a “stowaway,” or was a mere trespasser. Hence, the carrier
assumes no duty of care in favor of X.
2. City Railways, Inc. (CRI) provides train service, for a fee, to commuters from Manila to
Calamba, Laguna. Commuters are required to purchase tickets and then proceed to the
designated loading and unloading facilities to board the train. Ricardo Santos purchased a
ticket for Calamba and entered the station. While waiting, he had an altercation with the
security guards of CRI leading to a fistfight. Ricardo Santos fell on the railway just as a train
was entering the station. Ricardo Santos was run over by the train. He died. In the action for
damages filed by the heirs of Ricardo Santos, CRI interposed lack of cause of action,
contending that the mishap occurred before Ricardo Santos boarded the train and that it was
not guilty of negligence. Decide.
ANS:
The contention of CRI that the heirs have no cause of action is untenable.
A contract to carry is consensual and thus perfected by mere consent.
In the case at bar, there was already a perfected contract to carry Ricardo Santos and the
carrier already owed him extraordinary diligence. The obligation of the carrier to carry
Ricardo Santos to his destination was breached. Hence, CRI is liable for culpa-contractual.
(2008)
P24-27
CASES:
1. AM Trucking, a small company, operates two trucks for hire on selective basis. It caters to only a
few customers, and its trucks do not make regular or scheduled trips. It does not even have a
certificate of public convenience. On one occasion, Reynaldo contracted AM to transport, for a fee,
100 sacks of rice from Manila to Tarlac. However, AM failed to deliver the cargo, because its truck
was hijacked when the driver stopped in Bulacan to visit his girlfriend. May Reynaldo hold AM as a
common carrier?
ANS:
Yes. Reynaldo may be held liable as common carrier.
Article 1732 of the Civil Code makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity
is the carrying of persons or goods or both and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary
activity.
Article 1732 does not make any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation
service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or
unscheduled basis.
Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the general public,
i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only
from a narrow segment of the general population.

2. Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a 1982 model Mazda minibus. They
used the bus principally in connection with a bus service for school children which they operated in
Manila. The couple had a driver, Porfirio J. Cabil, whom they hired in 1981, after trying him
out for two weeks. His job was to take school children to and from the St. Scholastica's College in
Malate, Manila. On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship
Inc. (WWCF) arranged with petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults
Ministry from Manila to La Union and back in consideration of which private respondent paid
petitioners the amount of ₱3,000.00 through the petitioner’s minibus. The group was scheduled to
leave on November 2, 1984, at 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon. However, as several members of the
party were late, the bus did not leave the Tropical Hut at the corner of Ortigas Avenue and EDSA until
8:00 o’clock in the evening. Petitioner Porfirio Cabil drove the minibus. The usual route to Caba, La
Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge at Carmen was under repair, so that
petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it being his first trip to La Union), was forced to
take a detour through the town of Baay in Lingayen, Pangasinan. At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil
came upon a sharp curve on the highway, running on a south to east direction, which he described as
“siete.” The road was slippery because it was raining, causing the bus, which was running at the speed
of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road shoulder. The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and
sign along the road and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on its left
side, coming to a full stop only after a series of impacts. The bus came to rest off the road. A coconut
tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed its front portion.
Several passengers were injured. Private respondent Amyline Antonio was thrown on the floor of the
bus and pinned down by a wooden seat which came off after being unscrewed. It took three persons to
safely remove her from this portion. She was in great pain and could not move.
The driver, petitioner Cabil, claimed he did not see the curve until it was too late. He said he was not
familiar with the area and he could not have seen the curve despite the care he took in driving the bus,
because it was dark and there was no sign on the road. He said that he saw the curve when he was
already within 15 to 30 meters of it. He allegedly slowed down to 30 kilometers per hour, but it was
too late.
Q: Are the petitioners operating as common carriers during the time of the accident?
ANS:
Yes. It does not matter that the bus carried the passengers based on a special agreement and that
the passengers are limited to a certain group.
Article 1732 of the NCC makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is
the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary
activity (in local idiom, as “a sideline”).
Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering
transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis.
Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the “general
public,” i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business
only from a narrow segment of the general population.

3. On November 12, 1984, Cebu Salvage Corporation (CSC) and Maria Cristina Chemicals
Industries, Inc. [MCCII] (as charterer) entered into a voyage charter wherein petitioner was to load
800 to 1,100 metric tons of silica quartz on board the M/T Espiritu Santo at Ayungon, Negros
Occidental for transport to and discharge at Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental to consignee Ferrochrome
Phils., Inc. Pursuant to the contract, on December 23, 1984, petitioner received and loaded 1,100
metric tons of silica quartz on board the M/T Espiritu Santo which left Ayungon for Tagoloan the next
day. The shipment never reached its destination, however, because the M/T Espiritu Santa sank in the
afternoon of December 24, 1984 off the beach of Opol, Misamis Oriental, resulting in the total loss of
the cargo. MCCII filed a claim for the loss of the shipment with its insurer, respondent Philippine
Home Assurance Corporation. Respondent paid the claim in the amount of ₱211,500 and was
subrogated to the rights of MCCII. Thereafter, it filed a case in the RTC against CSC for
reimbursement of the amount it paid MCCII. CSC claims that it is not liable insisting that the
agreement was merely a contract of hire wherein MCCII hired the vessel from its owner, ALS Timber
Enterprises (ALS). Not being the owner of the M/T Espiritu Santo, petitioner did not have control and
supervision over the vessel, its master and crew. Thus it could not allegedly be held liable for the loss
of the shipment caused by the sinking of a ship it did not own. Will the action prosper?
ANS:
Yes, the action will prosper.
The law provides that a voyage charter, being a contract of affreightment, makes the carrier
answerable for the loss of the goods received for transportation.
In the case at bar, CSC had control over what vessel it would use. All throughout its dealings with
MCCII, it represented itself as a common carrier. There is no doubt that there is a contract of
carriage of goods between CSC and MCCII was breached;
1) the cargo was loaded on board the vessel;
2) loss or non-delivery of the cargo was proven;
3) and petitioner failed to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent such loss
or that it was due to some casualty or force majeure.
The fact that it did not own the vessel it decided to use to consummate the contract of carriage did
not negate its character and duties as a common carrier. Because MCCII is not expected to inquire
as to the ownership of the vessel used.
Hence, while it is true that a bill of lading may serve as the contract of carriage between the
parties, it cannot prevail over the express provision of the voyage charter that MCCII and
petitioner executed.
P29-30
PROBLEMS:
1. Tirso Molina charters a vessel owned and operated by Star Shipping Co., a common carrier, for the
purpose of transporting two tractors to his logging concession. The crane Operator of the shipping
company somehow negligently puts the tractors in a place where they would tilt each other. During
the trip, a strong wind hits the vessel, causing severe damage to the tractors. Tirso Molina sues the
shipping company for damages. The latter cites a stipulation in the charter agreement exempting the
company from liability for loss or damage arising from the negligence of its agents. Tirso Molina
countered by stating that the aforementioned stipulation is against public policy and therefore, null
and void. Is the stipulation valid? Would you hold the shipping company liable?
ANS:
Yes. The stipulation is valid if there was bareboat charter.
The law provides that a common carrier that undertakes to carry a special cargo or charter to a
special person only, becomes a private carrier. As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the
owner from liability for the negligence of its agent is valid, being not against public policy.
Hence, Star Shipping Company is not liable.
2. During the elections last May, AB, a congressional candidate in Marinduque, chartered the
helicopter owned by Lobe Mining Corporation (LMC) for use in the election campaign. AB paid
LMC the same rate normally charged by companies regularly engaged in the plane chartering
business. In the charter agreement between LMC and AB, LMC expressly disclaimed any
responsibility for the acts or omissions of its pilot or for the defective condition of the plane’s engine.
The helicopter crashed killing AB. Investigations disclose that the pilot’s error was the cause of the
accident. LMC now consults you on its possible liability for AB’s death in the light of the above
findings. How would you reply to LMC’s query?
ANS:
I would reply to LMC that it may not be held liable for the death of AB.
The law provides that a stipulation with private carrier that would disclaim responsibility for
simple negligence of the carrier’s employees is a valid stipulation. Such stipulation, however, will
not hold in case of liability for gross negligence or bad faith.
In the case at bar, LMC cannot be held liable for the simple negligence of its pilot.
3. C Co. shipped 20, 000 bags of soy beans through S/S Melon, owned and operated by X
Shipping Lines, consigned to the Toyo Factory and insured by the Surety Insurance Co., against all
risks. C Co. hired the entire vessel, with the option to go north or south, loading, stowing and
discharging at its risks and expense. The owner and the shipper agree on a stipulation exempting the
owner from liability for the negligence of its agents.
When the cargo as delivered to the consignee, there were shortages amounting to ₱10,500.00. The
insurance company paid for the damage and sought reimbursement from the X Shipping Lines as
carrier. Is the carrier liable?
ANS:
X Shipping Lines is not liable if there was bareboat charter.
The law provides that a common carrier that undertakes to carry a special cargo or charter to a
special person only, becomes a private carrier. As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the
owner from liability for the negligence of its agent is valid, being not against public policy.
X Shipping Lines agreed to carry a special cargo or chartered to a special person only, becomes a
private carrier. As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the ship owner from liability for the
negligence of its agents is not against policy and is deemed valid.
P32
PROBLEM:
1. While at sea, the captain of vessel A received distress signals from vessel B, and vessel A
responded and found vessel B with engine failure and drifting off course. Upon acceptance by vessel
B of vessel A’s offer, vessel A connected two lines to vessel B and towed it safely to port. There was
no grave marine peril because the sea was smooth and vessel B was far from the rocks. In a suit for
compensation for towage, who are entitled to recover, the owner, the crew, or both? Give brief
reasons. (1979 Bar)
ANS:
The shipowner of the towing vessel is entitled to compensation.
What is involved in the present case is towage and not salvage. Hence, contract is between the
owner of the towing vessel and the shipowner of the vessel that is being towed.
Services are rendered by the towing vessel for which it is entitled to compensation.

P54-55
PROBLEMS:
1. A is the registered owner of a truck for hire. He sold the truck to B and possession was
immediately delivered to B who operated the same. The truck however, remained registered in
the name of A. While operating the truck, B's driver ran over a child who died thereafter. The
heirs of the child sued A for damages. A's defense is that he cannot be held liable as he had
already sold the truck to B and it was B's driver who was responsible for the accident. Decide
with reasons.
ANS:

A is liable to the heirs of the victim.

Under the registered owner rule, the registered owner remains to be liable to third persons
without knowledge of the transfer. As to third persons, the registered owner of a motor vehicle
is its true owner regardless of any unregistered sale of the vehicle.
Hence, A, being the registered owner, continues to be the owner of the vehicle as regards the
public and third persons.

2. A was driving a jeepney registered in the name of B. The jeepney, while being driven
negligently by A, hit and injured X, so X sued B for damages. The defense of B was that he
sold the jeepney to C and that X should sue C. Rule on B's defense, with reasons.

ANS:

The defense of B is untenable and he is liable to X.

Under the registered owner rule, the registered owner remains to be liable to third persons
without knowledge of the transfer. As to third persons, the registered owner of a motor
vehicle is its true owner regardless of any unregistered sale of the vehicle.
Hence, B, being the registered owner, continues to be the owner of the vehicle as regards the
public and third persons.
3. Mr. Villa, a franchise holder and registered owner of a truck for hire, entered into a lease
contract with Mrs. Santos for the lease by the latter of said truck. The lease contract was not
brought to the knowledge of the LTFRB and was therefore not approved by the Land LTFRB.
One stormy night, the said truck was speeding along EDSA, skidded and ran over X who died
on the spot. The parents of X brought an action for damages against Mr. Villa for the death of
their son.

a.) Will the action against Mr. Villa prosper? Reasons.

b.) What recourse, if any, does X have?
ANS:
a) Yes, the action against Mr. Villa will prosper.
Under the registered owner rule, the registered owner remains to be liable to third
persons without knowledge of the transfer. As to third persons, the registered owner of a motor
vehicle is its true owner regardless of any unregistered sale of the vehicle.
This is especially true in cases involving holders of franchises.
The holders of franchises are liable to the public even if their vehicles are leased to another
without prior approval of the appropriate government agency.

b.) An action for quasi-delict can also be maintained by the heirs of X against Mrs. Santos
and/or the driver of the vehicle. The driver may also be charged criminally liable for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.

4. Johnny owns a Sarao jeepney. He asked his neighbor Van if he could operate the said jeep
under Van's certificate of public convenience. Van agreed and, accordingly, Johnny registered
his jeep in Van's name.
On June 10, 1990, one of the passenger jeepneys operated by Van bumped Tomas.
Tomas was injured and in due time, he filed a complaint for damages against Van and his
driver for the injuries he suffered. The court rendered judgment in favor of Tomas and ordered
Van and his driver, jointly and severally liable, to pay Tomas actual and moral damages,
attorney's fees and costs.
The sheriff levied on the jeepney belonging to Johnny but registered in the name of
Van. Johnny filed a third-party claim with the sheriff alleging ownership of the jeepney levied
upon and stating that the jeepney was registered in the name of Van merely to enable Johnny
to make use of Van's certificate of public convenience. May the sheriff proceed with the public
auction of Johnny's jeepney?
ANS:
Yes, the sheriff may proceed with the auction sale of the jeepney.
The vehicle remains to be the property of the registered owner despite the alleged transfer to
another. As regards the public and third persons, the vehicle is considered the property of the
registered operator.
P66
PROBLEM:
1. A, in Manila, shipped on board a vessel of B, chairs to be used in the movie house of
consignee C in Cebu. No date for delivery or indemnity for delay was stipulated. The chairs,
however, were not claimed promptly by C and were shipped by mistake back to Manila, where
it was discovered and re-shipped to Cebu. By the time the chairs arrived, the date of
inauguration of the movie house passed by and it had to be postponed. C brings an action for
damages against B claiming loss of profits during the Christmas season when he expected the
movie house to be opened. Decide the case with reasons.
ANS:
C may sue B for the loss of his profits provided that ample proof thereof is presented in court.
The carrier is obligated to transport the goods without delay. In case there is inexcusable delay,
the carrier shall be liable for the damages caused by the delay.
In the case at bar, the carrier is liable if he is guilty of delay in the shipment of cargo, causing
damages to the consignee.
P70
PROBLEM:
1. If a shipper, without changing the place of delivery changes the consignment of consignee of
the goods (after said goods had been delivered to the carrier), under what condition will the
carrier be required to comply with the new orders of the shipper?
ANS:
Article 360 provides that if the shipper should change the consignee of the goods without
changing their destination, the carrier shall comply with the new order.
Provided the shipper returns to the carrier the bill of lading and a new one is issued showing
the novation of the contract.
However, the shipper must pay all expenses for the change.
P77
PROBLEMS:
1. Maria boarded a passenger truck owned by Metro Transit and driven by Juan. While the truck
was proceeding to its destination, it fell into a ravine and several passengers, including Maria
were killed. The truck was insured under a Common Carrier's policy with Island Insurance
Company. State the liabilities, if any, of Metro Transit to the heirs of Maria.

ANS:

Metro Transit is liable to the heirs of Maria for breach of contract of carriage.
The law provides that in case of death or injury to passengers, common carriers are
presumed at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that the exercised
extraordinary negligence.
In the case at bar, it is clear that there was breach of contract of carriage because the
passenger died while riding the carrier. The fact that death or injury was caused gives rise
to the presumption of negligence.

2. A shipped 100 pieces of plywood from Davao City to Manila. He took a marine insurance
policy to insure the shipment against loss or damage due to "perils of the sea, barratry, fire,
jettison, pirates and other such perils." When the ship left the port of Davao, the shipman in
charge forgot to secure one of the portholes, through which sea water seeped during the
voyage, damaging the plywood. A filed a claim against the insurance company which refused
to pay on the ground that the loss or damage was due to a peril of the sea or any of the risks
covered by the policy. It was admitted that the sea was reasonably calm during the voyage and
that no strong winds or waves were encountered by the vessel. How would you decide the
case? Explain.

ANS:

The insurer validly refused to pay because the proximate cause of the damage to the
plywood was not the perils or risks insured against but rather the negligence of the
shipman in charge in forgetting to secure one of the portholes of the ship.

However, A can recover his damages from the shipowner or ship agent of said vessel for
not having exercised extraordinary diligence on vigilance over goods.
The law provides that if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are
presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they proved that they observed
extraordinary diligence.
Page 83-86.
PROBLEMS AND CASES:
1. Peter hailed a taxicab owned and operated by Jimmy Cheng and driven by Hemie Cortez.
Peter asked Cortez to take him to his office in Malate. On the way to Malate, the taxicab
collided with a passenger jeepney, as a result of which Peter was injured, i.e., he fractured his
left leg. Peter sued Jimmy for damages, based upon a contract of carriage, and Peter won.
Jimmy wanted to challenge the decision before the Supreme Court on the ground that the trial
court erred in not making an express finding as to whether or not Jimmy was responsible for
the collision and, hence, civilly liable to Peter. He went to see you for advice. What will you
tell him? Explain your answer.

ANS:

I will counsel Jimmy to desist from challenging the decision. The cause of action of Peter
is culpa contractual, hence, the carrier's negligence is presumed.
The law provides that in case of death or injury to passengers, common carriers are
presumed at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they exercised
extraordinary negligence.
The presumption arises because there is no question that Peter was injured while under the
care of the said carrier. Hence, the burden of proof rests on Jimmy to establish that despite
an exercise of utmost diligence the collision could not have been avoided.
2. In an action grounded on the contract of carriage, is there a need for the court to make an
express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it liable for
claims in behalf of the injured or deceased passengers? Explain.
ANS:

No. The law provides that in case of death or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. The burden is upon the carrier
to prove that he observed the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard
for all circumstances. (1982)
3. In a court case involving claims for damages arising from death and injury of bus passengers,
counsel for the bus operator files a demurrer to evidence arguing that the complaint should be
dismissed because the plaintiffs did not submit any evidence that the operator or its employees
were negligent. If you were the judge, would you dismiss the complaint?

ANS:
No, I will not dismiss the complaint provided that there was proof of the death of and/or
injury to passengers.
The law provides that in case of death or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. The burden is upon the carrier
to prove that he observed the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard
for all circumstances.
4. Plaintiff alleges that he is the owner and consignee of two cases of books, shipped in good
order and condition at New York, U.S.A., on board the defendant's steamship President
Garfield, for transport and delivery to the plaintiff in the City of Manila, all freight charges
paid. The two cases arrived in Manila on September 1, 1927, in bad order and damaged
 condition, resulting in the total loss of one case and a partial loss of the other. The loss in one
case is Php. 1,630.00, and the other Php. 700.00, for which he filed his claims, and defendant
has refused and neglected to pay, giving as its reason that the damage in question "was caused
by sea water". Is the defendant liable to the plaintiff?

ANS:
Yes, the defendant is liable.
The defendant having received the two boxes in good condition, its legal duty was to
deliver them to the plaintiff in the same condition in which it received them.
From the time of their delivery to the defendant in New York until they are delivered to the
plaintiff in Manila, the boxes were under the control and supervision of the defendant and
beyond the control of the plaintiff.
The defendant having admitted that the boxes were damaged while in transit and in its
possession, the burden of proof then shifted, and it devolved upon the defendant to both
allege and prove that the damage was caused by reason of some fact which exempted it
from liability.
5. It appears that sometime in the evening of March 10, 1995, at the Manila Domestic Airport,
the late Jose Marcial K. Ochoa boarded and rode a taxicab with Plate No. PKR-534, a
passenger vehicle for hire owned and operated by defendant corporation under the business
name "Avis Coupon Taxi" (Avis) and driven by its employee and authorized driver Bibiano
Padilla, Jr. on his way home to Teacher's Village, Diliman, Quezon City. At about 11:00 p.m.,
the taxicab was cruising along Epifanio delos Santos Avenue [EDSA], in front of Camp
Aguinaldo in Quezon City at high speed. While going up the Boni Serrano (Santolan) fly-over,
it overtook another cab driven by Pablo Clave and tried to pass another vehicle, a ten-wheeler
cargo truck. Because of the narrow space between the left side railing of the fly-over and the
ten-wheeler truck, the Avis cab was unable to pass and because of its speed, its driver (Padilla)
was unable to control it. To avoid colliding with the truck, Padilla turned the wheel to the left
causing his taxicab to ram the railing throwing itself off the fly-over and fell on the middle
surface of EDSA below. The forceful drop of the vehicle on the floor of the road broke and
split it into two parts. Both driver Padilla and passenger Jose Marcial K. Ochoa were injured
and rushed to the hospital. At the East Avenue Medical Center, Ochoa was not as lucky as
Padilla who was alive. He was declared dead on arrival from the accident. The death
certificate issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Quezon City cited the cause of his
death as vehicular accident. G&S argues that it is not liable because the collision was allegedly
unforeseen since its driver had every right to expect that the delivery van would just overtake
him and not hit the side of the taxi. Is G&S liable?
ANS:

Yes, G&S is liable to the heirs of Jose Marcial.

A common carrier is bound to carry a passenger safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier is at fault or is
negligent when a passenger dies or is injured.

There is no doubt that there exist a contract of carriage between G & S, as the owner and
operator of the Avis taxicab, and Jose Marcial, as the passenger of said vehicle. However, Jose
Marcial was not able to reach his destination safely as he died during the course of the travel.
Unfortunately, G&S miserably failed to overcome this presumption because it is clear that the
accident which led to Jose Marcial's death was due to the reckless driving and gross
negligence of G&S' driver, Padilla, thereby holding G&S liable to the heirs of Jose Marcial for
breach of contract of carriage.
P91-94
PROBLEMS AND CASES:
1. S shipped goods from Australia on board a foreign vessel owned and operated by X shipping
company, based in Australia and represented in the Philippines by R. The goods were
consigned to T of Manila and insured by U against all risks. Upon arrival in Manila Bay, the
goods were discharged from the vessel to a lighter owned by the Bay Brokerage Co. When
delivered to and received by T, the goods were found to have sustained losses or damages.
Evidence disclosed that the damage occurred while the goods were in the custody of the
carrier. The insurance company paid the amount of the loss but sought reimbursement from X
and/or R. R disclaimed any liability alleging that he is a mere agent of X, and having acted as
agent of a disclosed principal is, therefore, not liable. What is the liability, if any, of Bay
Brokerage Co.?

ANS:
Bay Brokerage Co. has no liability.
The law provides that the extraordinary duty of the carrier lasts from the time the goods are
unconditionally placed in the possession of, are received by the carrier for transportation until
the same is delivered to the consignee or by the person who has the right to receive them.
The facts indicate that the goods were not yet delivered to the brokerage company when they
were damaged. Even if the said company can be considered a common carrier, its duty starts
only upon delivery of the goods.

2. Star Shipping Lines accepted 100 cartons of sardines from Master to be delivered to 555
Company in Manila. Only 88 cartons were delivered, however, these were in bad condition.
555 Company claimed from Star Shipping Lines the value of the missing goods, as well as the
damaged goods. Star Shipping Lines refused because the former failed to present a bill of
lading. Resolve with reasons the claim of 555 Company.

ANS:
The claim of 555 Company must prosper.
The carrier breached its obligation to safely transport the goods to its destination. The fact that
the shipper was not able to present the bill of lading is not a bar to recovery. The contract of
carriage was already perfected and effective despite the absence of the bill of lading. (2005)

3. Delsan received on board MT Larusan a shipment consisting of 1,986.627 k/l Automotive

Diesel Oil (diesel oil) at the Bataan Refinery Corporation for transportation and delivery to the
bulk depot in Bacolod City of Caltex Phils., Inc. (Caltex). On August 7, 1984, the shipment
arrived in Bacolod City. Immediately thereafter, unloading operations commenced. The
discharging of the diesel oil started at about 1:30 PM of the same day. However, at about
10:30 PM, the discharging had to be stopped on account of the discovery that the port bow
mooring of the vessel was intentionally cut or stolen by unknown persons. Because there was
nothing holding it, the vessel drifted westward, dragged and stretched the flexible rubber hose
attached to the riser, broke the elbow into pieces, severed completely the rubber hose
connected to the tanker from the main delivery line at sea bed level and ultimately caused the
diesel oil to spill into the sea. To avoid further spillage, the vessel’s crew tried water flushing
to clear the line of the diesel oil but to no avail. In the meantime, the shore tender, who was
waiting for the completion of the water flushing, was surprised when the tanker signaled a
“red light” which meant stop pumping. Unaware of what happened, the shore tender, thinking
that the vessel would, at any time, resume pumping, did not shut the storage tank gate valve.
As all the gate valves remained open, the diesel oil that was earlier discharged from the vessel
into the shore tank backflowed. Due to non-availability of a pump boat, the vessel could not
send somebody ashore to inform the people at the depot about what happened. After almost an
hour, a gauger and an assistant surveyor from the Caltex’s Bulk Depot Office boarded the
vessel. It was only then that they found out what had happened. Thereafter, the due
immediately went ashore to see to it that the shore tank gate valve was closed. The loss of
diesel oil due to spillage was placed at 113.788 k/l while some 435,081 k/l thereof backflowed
from the shore tank. As a result of spillage and backflow of diesel oil, Caltex sought recovery
of the loss from Delsan, but the latter refused to pay. Delsan argued that it should not be held
liable for the loss of diesel oil due to backflow because the same had already been actually and
legally delivered to Caltex at the time it entered the shore tank. Is the argument tenable?
ANS:
No. Delsan’s argument holds no water.
The law provides that extraordinary responsibility of common carrier lasts from the time the
goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for
transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the
consignee, or to a person who has the right to receive them.
It had been settled that the subject cargo was still in the custody of Delsan because the
discharging thereof has not yet been finished when the backflow occurred. Thus, there is no
reason to imply that there was actual delivery of the cargo to the consignee. Delsan still has
the duty to guard and to preserve the cargo.
4. On April 4, 1989, BM shipped on board the vessel Nen Jiang, owned and operated by CO.
Shipping Co. Represented by its agent WALLEM. 3,500 boxes of watermelon valued at US
$5,950.00 covered by Bill of Lading No. HKG 99012 and exported through Letter of Credit
No. HK 1031/30 issued by National Bank of Pakistan and 1,611 boxes of fresh mangoes with
a value of US$14,273.46 covered by Bill of Lading No. HKG 99013 and exported through the
Letter of Credit No. HK 1032/30 also issued by PAKISTAN BANK. The Bills of Lading
contained the following pertinent provision: “One of the Bills of Lading must be surrendered
duly endorsed in exchange for the goods or delivery order. The shipment was bound for
Hongkong with PAKISTAN BANK as consignee and Great Prospect Company of Kowloon,
Hong Kong (hereinafter GPC) as notify party.” The goods were delivered to GPC without the
bills of lading.
a) Can carrier validly deliver the goods to GPC?
b) Did the common carrier validly deliver the goods without the bill of lading or bank
guarantee?
ANS:
a) Yes, the goods can be validly delivered to GPC.
The extraordinary responsibility of the common carriers lasts until actual or constructive
delivery of the cargoes to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them.
In the export invoices GPC,besides being named a notify party, was also named as
buyer/importer. This premise draws us to conclude that the delivery of the cargoes to GPC
as buyer/importer which, conformably with Article 1736 had, other than the consignee,
the right to receive them was proper.
b) Yes. The carrier submitted in evidence a telex dated April 5, 1989 as basis for
delivering the cargoes to GPC without the bills of lading and bank guarantee. The telex
instructed the delivery of various shipments to the respective consignees without need of
presenting the bill of lading and bank guarantee per the respective shipper’s request since
“for prepaid shipt ofrt charges already fully paid.” Petitioner was named therein as shipper
and GPC as consignee with respect to Bill of Lading Nos. HKG 99012 and HKG 99013.
To implement the said telex instruction, the delivery of the shipment must be to GPC, the
notify party or real importer/buyer of the goods and not the Pakistani Bank since the latter
can very well present the original Bills of Lading in its possession. Likewise, if it were the
Pakistani Bank to whom the cargoes were to be strictly delivered, it will no longer be
proper to require a bank guarantee as a substitute for the Bill of Lading. To construe
otherwise will render meaningless the telex instruction. After all, the cargoes consist of
perishable fresh fruits and immediate delivery thereof to the buyer/importer is essentially
a factor to reckon with. Besides, GPC is listed as one among the several consignees in the
telex (Exhibit 5-B) and the instruction in the telex was to arrange delivery of A/M
shipment (not any party) to respective consignees without presentation of OB/L and bank
guarantee. (Benito Macam v. Court of Appeals, et al,. G.R. No. 125524, August 25,1999)
P97-104
PROBLEMS AND CASES:
1. X, an 80-year old epileptic, boarded the S/S Tamaraw in Manila going to Mindoro. To
disembark, the passengers have to walk through a gangplank. While negotiating the
gangplank, X slipped and fell into the waters. X was saved from drowning and was brought to
a hospital but after a month died from pneumonia. Except for X, all passengers were able to
walk through the gangplank. What is the liability of the owner of S/S Tamaraw?
ANS:
The owner of S/S Tamaraw is liable for the death of X.
Failure to exercise utmost diligence in the safety of passengers is presumed the
moment the passenger did not reach his destination.
In the present case, X was still a passenger when he fell into the waters because he was
only disembarking from the vessel. Hence, the presumption against the carrier is operative. It
is up to the carrier to prove its exercise of utmost diligence.
Moreover, it is well-settled that if, in the use of a gangplank, a passenger falls off and
is injured, the carrier is liable for the injuries sustained irrespective of the cause of the fall if a
sufficient gangplank would have prevented the injury. (1989)
2. A bus of GL Transit on its way to Davao stopped to enable a passenger to alight. At that
moment, Santiago, who had been waiting for a ride, boarded the bus. However, the bus driver
failed to notice Santiago who was still standing on the bus platform, and stepped on the
accelerator. Because of the sudden motion, Santiago slipped and fell down, suffering serious
injuries. May Santiago hold GL Transmit liable for breach of contract of carriage?
ANS:
Yes. Santiago may hold GL Transit liable for breach of contract.
It is well-settled that, motor vehicles like passenger jeepneys and buses are duty bound
to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to give passengers an
opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding
passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while
they do so.
In the case at bar, the driver of the bus did not exercise utmost diligence in affording
Santiago reasonable opportunity to board the bus. (1996).
3. On October 14, 1993, about half an hour past seven o’clock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad,
then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station (operated by LRTA) after purchasing a “token”
(representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT
tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area (who was an employee of
Prudent Security Agency) approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between
the two apparently ensued that led to a fisttfight. No evidence, however, was adduced to
indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how
Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train,
operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. The moving train struck Natividad,
and he was killed instantaneously. Are LRTA and Prudent liable?
 ANS:
Yes, LRTA is liable but Prudent is NOT liable.
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to
provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so
long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the
contract of carriage.
In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which
petitioners have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault, an
exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved.
With respect to Prudent, if at all, that liability could only be for tort under the
provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, of the
Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the
part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on
the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi
patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and
can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee. Unfortunately, there is nothing to link Prudent to the death of Nicanor (Navidad),
for the reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven. Hence,
Prudent cannot be made liable. (Light Railway Transit Authority vs. Marjorie Navidad, GR.
No. 145804, February 6, 2003)
4. On May 13, 1985, private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for the
death of Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident which occurred on at Marivic,
Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet. It was alleged that on March 25, 1985, while petitioner Theodore
M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to petitioner corporation in a reckless
and imprudent manner and without due regard to traffic rules and regulations and safety to
persons and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. However, instead of bringing
Pedrito immediately to the nearest hospital, the said driver, in utter bad faith and without
regard to the welfare of the victim, first brought his other passengers and cargo to their
respective destinations before bringing said victim to the Lepanto Hospital where he expired.
The place of the accident and the place where one of the passengers alighted were both
between Bunkhouses 53 and 54, hence the bus was at full stop when the victim boarded the
same. The victim fell from the platform of the bus when it suddenly accelerated forward and
was run over by the rear right tires of the vehicle, as shown by the physical evidence on where
he was thereafter found in relation to the bus when it stopped.
The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge that
the victim would ride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not manifested his intention
to board the same. Is the argument tenable? Is the carrier liable?
ANS:
The carrier is liable.
The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge that the
victim would ride on the bus is not tenable. When the bus is not in motion there is no necessity
for a person who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to board. A public utility bus,
once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders.
 Hence, it becomes the duty of the driver and the conductor, every time the bus stops, to
do no act that would have the effect of increasing the peril to a passenger while he was
attempting to board the same. The premature acceleration of the bus in this case was a breach
of such duty.
It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by railroad
train, streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to
afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by
boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances
while they are doing so.
Further, even assuming that the bus was moving, the act of the victim in boarding the
same cannot be considered negligent under the circumstances.
In this case, the bus had “just started” and “was still in slow motion” at the point where
the victim had boarded and was on its platform.
It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one to attempt to board a train or
streetcar which is moving slowly. An ordinarily prudent person would have made the attempt
to board the moving conveyance under the same or similar circumstances. The fact that
passengers board and slight from a slowly moving vehicle is a matter of common experience
and both the driver and conductor in this case could not have been unaware of such an
ordinary practice
The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already
considered a passenger and is entitled to all the rights and protection pertaining to such a
contractual relation. Hence. it has been held that the duty which the carrier of passengers owes
to its patrons extends to persons boarding the cars as well as to those alighting therefrom.
Moreover, the circumstances under which the driver and the conductor failed to bring
the gravely injured victim immediately to the hospital for medical treatment is a patent and
incontrovertible proof of their negligence. It defies understanding and can even be stigmatized
as callous indifference. (Dangwa Transportation Co. vs. Court of Appeals, GR. No. 95582,
October 7, 1991)
5. On December 20, 1953, at about noontime, plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their
minor daughters, namely, Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, about 4 years old, and Fe, over 2
years old, boarded the Pambusco Bus No. 352, bearing plate TPU No. 757 (1953 Pampanga),
owned and operated by the defendant, at San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico,
Pampanga. At the time, they were carrying with them four pieces of baggage containing their
personal belongings. The conductor of the bus, who happened to be a half-brother of plaintiff
Mariano Beltran, issued three tickets covering the full fares of the plaintiff and their eldest
child, Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below the height at
which fare is charged in accordance with the appellant’s rules and regulations.
After about an hour’s trip, the bus reached Anao whereat it stopped to allow the
passengers bound therefor, among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off. With
respect to the group of the plaintiffs, Mariano Beltran, then carrying some of their baggage,
was the first to get down the bus, followed by his wife and his children. Mariano led his
companions to a shaded spot on the left pedestrian side of the road about four or five meters
away from the vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his other
bayong, which he had left behind, but in so doing, his daughter Raquel followed him,
unnoticed by her father. While said Mariano Beltran was on the running board of the bus
waiting for the conductor to hand him his bayong which he left under one of its seats near the
door, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading, suddenly Started moving
 forward, evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has not given
the driver the customary Signal to start, since said conductor was still attending to the baggage
left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was again placed into a complete
stop, it had travelled about ten meters from the point where the plaintiffs had gotten off.
Sensing that the bus was again in motion. Mariano Beltran Immediately jumped from
the running board without getting his bayong from the conductor. He landed on the side of the
road almost in front of the shaded place where he left his wife and children. At that precise
time, he saw people beginning to gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on the
ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child was none other than his daughter
Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together with her parents.
Is the carrier liable?
ANS:
Yes, the carrier is liable for damages for the death of the child, Raquel Beltran.
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the
moment the passenger alights from the carrier’s vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the
point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a
reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises
In the present case, it cannot be claimed that the carrier’s agent had exercised the
“utmost diligence” of a “very cautions person” required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to
be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its
passengers. In the first place, the driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off
the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the
signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers
Mariano Beltran and family. The presence of said passengers near the bus was not
unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled
to the protection under their contract of carriage.
The presentation of proof of the negligence of its employee gave rise to the
presumption that the defendant employer did not exercise the diligence of a good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of its employees. And this presumption, as the Court of
Appeals found, petitioner had failed to overcome. Consequently, petitioner must be adjudged
pecuniarily liable for the death of the child Raquel Beltran. (La Mallorca v. Court appeals,
GR. No. L-20761, July 27, 1966, 17 SCRA 739)
6. The evidence disclosed that on May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V
Antonia, owned by defendant, at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila,
having purchased a ticket (No. 117392) in the sum of P23.10 (Exh. ‘B’). On May 12, 1975,
said vessel arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila, and the passengers therein disembarked, a
gangplank having been provided connecting the side of the vessel to the pier. Instead of using
said gangplank, Anacleto Viana disembarked on the third deck which was on the level with the
pier. After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive
control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement dated
July 26, 1975 (Exh. ‘2') between the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation
and defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation.
The crane owned by the third party defendant and operated by its crane operator Alejo
Figueroa was placed alongside the vessel and one hour after the passengers of said vessel had
disembarked, it started operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel. While the crane
Was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked from said vessel obviously
remembering that some of his cargoes were Still loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel,
and it was while he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes
were loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane.
He was thereafter brought to the hospital where he later expired three days thereafter, on May
15, 1976. the cause of his death according to the Death Certificate being “hypostatic
pneumonia secondary to traumatic fracture of the pubic bone lacerating the urinary bladder."
Is the carrier liable? Was Viana still a passenger at the time of the accident?
ANS:
Yes. The carrier is liable for the death of the victim. The victim was still a passenger at that
time.
The rule is that once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger
has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier’s conveyance or had a
reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises. The carrier-passenger relationship is not
terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if,
for example, such person remains in the carrier’s premises to claim his baggage.
The victim Anacleto Viana was still a passenger at the time of the incident. When the
accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right
to do, from petitioner’s vessel.
There is no showing that petitioner exercised the “utmost diligence of very cautious
persons” to be exercised “as far as human care and foresight can provide” which is required by
law of common carriers with respect to their passengers.
P128
PROBLEMS:
1. JRT, Inc. Entered into a contract with C Company of Japan to export anahaw fans valued at
$23,000.00. As payment thereof, a letter of credit was issued to JRT, Inc. by the buyer. The letter of
credit required the issuance of an on-board bill of lading and prohibited transshipment. The President
of JRT, Inc. Then contracted a shipping agent o ship the anahaw fans through O Container Lines,
specifying the requirements of the letter of credit. However, the bill of lading issued by the shipping
lines bore the notation “received for shipment” and contained an entry indicating transshipment to
Hong Kong. The President of JRT, Inc. Personally received and signed the bill of lading and despite
the entries, he delivered the corresponding check in payment of the freight.
The shipment was delivered at the port of discharge but the buyer refused to accept the anahaw
fans because there was no on-board bill of lading, and there was transshipment since the goods were
transferred in Hong Kong from MV Pacific, the feeder vessel to MV Oriental, a mother vessel. JRT
argued that the same cannot be considered transshipment because both vessels belong to the same
shipping company. a) Was there transshipment? b) JRT, Inc. Further argued that assuming there was
transshipment, it cannot be deemed to have agreed thereto even if it signed the bill of lading
containing such entry because it has made known to the shipping lines from the start that
transshipment was prohibited under the letter of credit and that, it had no intention to allow
transshipment of the subject cargo. Is the argument tenable? Reason.

ANS:
A) Yes there was a transhipment.
Transhipment is the act of taking a cargo out of one ship and loading it in another. In its
definition, it doesn’t matter whether both vessels belong to one and the same person.
B) No. The argument is not tenable.
JRT Inc, accepted the bill of lading, hence it is bound by the terms and conditions thereof.
Since, the bill of lading allows transshipment, JRT can no longer complain that such
transhipment occurred.
P140
1. Marino was a passenger on a train. Another passenger, Juancho, had taken a gallon of
gasoline placed in a plastic bag into the same coach where Marino was riding. The
gasoline ignited and exploded causing injury to Marino who filed a civil suit for damages
against the railway company claiming that Juancho should have been subjected to
inspection by its conductor. The railway company disclaimed liability resulting from the
explosion contending that it was unaware of the contents of the plastic bag and invoke the
right of Juancho to privacy. a) Should the railway company be held liable for damages? b)
If it were an airline company involved, would your answer be the same? Explain your
answer briefly.
ANS:
a) No. The railway company is not liable for damages.
This is subject to the qualification that the company should prove that it, through the exercise
of ordinary diligence, cannot detect the presence of gasoline. It should be noted that in
overland transportation, the common carrier is not bound nor empowered to make an
examination on the contents of packages or bags, particularly those handcarried by passengers.
b. No, my answer would not be the same. If an airline company was involved, it is duty bound
to inspect each and every cargo that is brought into the aircraft. (RA 6235, infra). Exercise of
extraordinary diligence would therefore result in the discovery of the gasoline. (1992)
2. A, as a paying passenger, boarded a plane of X & Co., a duly authorized air carrier bound from
Manila to Cebu. On the way, the plane exploded in mid-air, and crashed, causing the death of all
persons on board. It was determined that the mid-air explosion was due to the explosive device
contained in the suitcase by another passenger in the ill-fated aircraft. If you are the judge, how will
you rule?
ANS:
I will make the carrier liable.
The carrier is bound to exercise extraordinary diligence in carrying its passengers. It is presumed
to be negligent when its passengers died when the aircraft exploded. Under R.A. 6235, the carrier is
bound to inspect and investigate suspicious packages that are being brought into the aircraft.
Moreover, the negligence of the carrier is apparent because an explosive device was brought into the
carrier without being detected by the employees.
P155-159
CASES:
1. On the night of October 5,1963, plaintiffs-appellees attended a birthday party inside the United
Housing Subdivision in Paranaque, Rizal. After the party which broke up at about 11 o’clock that
evening, the plaintiffs-appellees proceeded home in their Vauxhall car with Victorino Cusi at the
wheel. Upon reaching the railroad tracks, finding that the level crossing bar was raised and seeing that
there was no flashing red light, and hearing no whistle from any coming train, Cusi merely slackened
his speed and proceeded to cross the tracks. At the same time, a train bound for Lucena traversed the
crossing, resulting in a collision between the two. The impact threw plaintiffs-appellees out of their
car which was smashed. One Benjamin Franco, who came from the same party and was driving a
vehicle right behind them, rushed to their aid and brought them to San Juan de Dios Hospital for
emergency treatment. Later, the plaintiffs-appellees were transferred to the Philippine General
Hospital. A week later, Mrs. Cusi transferred to the Manila Doctors Hospital where Dr. Manuel
Rivera, head of the Orthopedic and Fracture Service of the Philippine General Hospital performed on
her a second operation and continued to treat her until her discharge from the hospital on November 2,
1963. Thereafter, Dr. Rivera treated her as an out-patient until the end of February, 1964, although by
that time the fractured bones had not yet healed. Mrs. Cusi was also operated on by Dr. Francisco
Aguilar, Director of the National Orthopedic Hospital, in May, 1964 and in August, 1965, after
another operation in her upper body from the chest to her abdomen, she was placed in cast for some
three months and her right arm immobilized. Is the railway company liable?
ANS:
The railway company is liable because the circumstances attendant to the collision shows negligence
on its part.
Jurisprudence recognizes that if the warning devices are installed in railroad crossings, the travelling
public has the right to rely on such warning devices to put them on their guard and take the necessary
precautions before crossing the tracks. A need, therefore, exists for the railroad company to use
reasonable care to keep such devices in good condition. Failure of the device to operate is generally
held to be evidence of negligence, which maybe considered with all the circumstances of the case in
determining whether the railroad company was negligent as a matter of fact.
We cannot in all reason justify or condone the act of the defendant-appellant allowing the subject
locomotive to travel through the unattended crossing with inoperative signal devices, but without
sending any of its employees to operate said signal devices, so as to warn oncoming motorists of the
approach of one of its locomotives. It is not surprising therefore that the inoperation of the warning
devices created a situation which was misunderstood by the riding public to mean safe passage.

2. The incident involved transpired on May 10, 1931. At about 7’o clock in the morning of the same
day, the plaintiff Aleko, his wife Sonja Maria Lilius, and his 4-year old daughter Brita Marianne
Lilius, left Manila in their Studebaker car driven by said plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius - for the
municipality of Pagsanjan, the Province of Laguna, on a sight-seeing trip. It was the first time that he
made said trip although he has already been to many places, driving his own car, in and outside the
Philippines. Prior thereto, he had made the trip as far as Calauan, but never from Calauan to
Pagsanjan via Dayap. He was entirely unacquainted with the conditions of the road at said points and
had no knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing at Dayap. Before reaching the crossing in
question, there was nothing to indicate its existence inasmuch as there were many houses, shrubs, and
trees along the road, it was impossible to see an approaching train. At about seven or eight meters
from the crossing, coming from Calauan, the plaintiff saw an autotruck parked on the left side of the
road. Several people, who seemed to have alighted from the truck, were walking on the opposite side.
He slowed down to about 12 miles an hour and sounded his horn for the people to get out of the way.
With his attention thus occupied, he did not see the crossing but he heard two short whistles.
Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge black mass fling itself upon him, which turned out to be
locomotive No. 713 of the defendant company’s train coming eastward from Bay to Dayap station.
The locomotive truck struck the plaintiff’s car right in the center. After dragging the car a distance of
about ten meters, the locomotive threw it upon siding. The force of the impact was so great that the
plaintiff’s wife and daughter were thrown from the car and were picked up from the ground
unconscious and seriously hurt. In spite of the efforts of engineer Andres Basilio, he was unable to
stop the locomotive until after it had gone about 70 meters from the crossing. Aleko, Sonja and Brita
Marianne suffered extensive injuries as a consequence of the incident. Is the train operator liable?

ANS:
Yes.
The Court concluded that the railway company was negligent explaining that “prior to the accident,
there had been no notice nor sign of the existence of the crossing, nor was there anybody to warn the
public of approaching trains. The flagman or switchman arrived after the collision, coming from the
station with a red flag in one hand and a green one in the other, both of which were wound on their
respective sticks. The said flagman and switchman had many times absented himself from his post at
the crossing upon arrival of a train. The train left Bay station a little late and therefore travelled at a
great speed.

Upon examination of the oral as well as of the documentary evidence which the parties presented at
the trial in support of their respective contentions, and after taking into consideration all the
circumstances of the case, this court is of the opinion that the accident was due to negligence on the
part of the defendant-appellant company, for not having had on that occasion any semaphore at the
crossing at Dayap, to serve as a warning to passers-by of its existence in order that they might take the
necessary precautions before crossing the railroad; and on the part of its employees – the flagman and
the switchman, for not having remained at his post at the crossing in question to warn passersby of the
approaching train; the stationmaster, for failure to send the said flagman and switchman to his post on
time; and the engineer, for not having taken the necessary precautions to avoid an accident, in view of
the absence of said flagman and switchman, by slackening his speed and continuously ringing the bell
and blowing the whistle before arriving at the crossing. Although it is probable that the defendant-
appellant entity employed the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting its aforesaid
employees, however it did not employ such diligence in supervising their work and the discharge of
their duties because, otherwise, it would have had a semaphore or sign at the crossing and, on
previous occasions as well as on the night in question, the flagman and switchman would have always
been at his post at the crossing upon the arrival of a train. The diligence of a good father of a family,
which the law requires in order to avoid damage, is not confined to the careful and prudent selection
of subordinates or employees but includes inspection of their work and supervision of the discharge of
their duties.” (Lilius v. The Manila Railroad Company, GR No. L-39587, March 24, 1934)

3. Rhonda Brunty, daughter of respondent Ethel Brunty and an American citizen, came to the
Philippines for a visit sometime in January 1980. Prior to her departure, she, together with her
Filipino host Juan Manuel M. Garcia, travelled to Baguio City on board a Mercedes Benz sedan with
plate number FU 799, driven by Rodolfo L. Mercelita. It was about 12:00 midnight, January 25, 1980.
By then, PNR Train No. T-71, driven by Alfonso Reyes, was on its way to Tutuban, Metro Manila, as
it had left the La Union station at 11:00 p.m., January 24, 1980. By 2:00 a.m., Rhonda Brunty, Garcia
and Mercelita were already approaching the railroad crossing at Barangay Rizal, Moncada, Tarlac.
Mercelita, driving at approximately 70 km/hr., drove past a vehicle, unaware of the railroad track up
ahead and that they were about to collide with PNR Train No. T-71. Mercelita was instantly killed
when the Mercedes Benz smashed into the train; the two other passengers suffered serious physical
injuries. A certain James Harrow brought Rhonda Brunty to the Central Luzon Doctor’s Hospital in
Tarlac, where she was pronounced dead after ten minutes from arrival. Garcia, who had suffered
severe head injuries, was brought via ambulance to the same hospital. He was transferred to the
Manila Doctor’s Hospital, and later to the Makati Medical Center for further treatment. Is PNR liable?
ANS:
Yes, PNR is liable.
The Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for its failure to put a cross
bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores. Such failure is evidence of negligence and
disregard of the safety of public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it because public safety
demands that said device or equipment be installed.
Considering the circumstances prevailing at the time of the fatal accident, the alleged safety measure
installed by the PNR at the railroad crossing is not only inadequate but does not satisfy the well-
settled safety standards in transportation.”
P170-171
1. X boarded an airconditioned Pantranco Bus bound for Baguio. X was given notice that the carrier is
not liable for baggage brought in by passengers. X kept in his custody his attaché case containing
$10,000.00. In Tarlac, all passengers, including X, were told to get off and take their lunch, he
discovered that his attaché case was missing. A vendor said that a man picked the lock of the door,
entered the bus and ran away with the attache case. What, if any, is the liability of the carrier?
ANS:
The carrier may be held liable.
Hand-carried luggage of passengers are governed by the rules on necessary deposits. Under Article
2000 of the Civil Code, the responsibility of the depositary shall among other cases, include the loss
of property of the guest cause(d) by strangers but not that which may proceed from force majeure.
Article 2001 of the same Code considers an act of a thief as not one of force majeure unless done with
the use of arms or through an irresistible force. (1989)
2. X took the Benguet Bus from Baguio going to Manila. He deposited his maleta in the baggage
compartment of the bus common to all passengers. He did not declare his baggage nor pay its charges
contrary to the regulations of the bus company. When X got off, he could not find his baggage, which
obviously was taken by another passenger. Determine the liability of the bus company.
ANS:
The bus company is liable for the loss of the maleta.
The carrier had the duty to exercise extraordinary diligence over the baggage that was turned over to
the carrier or placed in the baggage compartment of the bus. The fact that the maleta was not declared
nor the charges paid thereon would not be material so long as it was received by the carrier for
transportation (Article 1754, Civil Code). (1989)

3. Antonio, a paying passenger, boarded a bus bound for Batangas City. He chose to sit at the front
row near the bus driver and told the bus driver that he had valuable items in his hand carried bag
which he then placed beside the driver’s seat. Not having slept for 24 hours, he requested the driver to
keep an eye on the bag should he doze off during the trip. While Antonio was asleep, another
passenger took the bag away and alighted at Calamba, Laguna. Could the common carrier be held
liable by Antonio for the loss?

ANS:
Yes, the common carrier is liable to Antonio for the loss of his bag.
Hand-carried luggages of passengers are governed by the rules on necessary deposits. Under Article
2000 of the Civil Code, the responsibility of a depositary shall, among other cases, include the loss of
property of the guest caused by strangers but not that which may proceed from force majeure. Article
2001 of the same Code considers an act of a thief as not one of force majeure, unless done with the
use of arms or through irresistible force. (1986)