MARYLOU CABRERA vs.

FELIX NG
G.R. No. 201601 March 12, 2014

Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court

FACTS:

On February 14, 2004, Felix Ng (respondent) filed a complaint for sum of money with the
RTC against the petitioner and her husband Marionilo Cabrera (spouses Cabrera) alleging the
respondent issued 3 Metrobank checks as payment. The respondent admitted issuing 2 out of the 3
checks through their son Richard Ng. All of the checks were dishonored for the reason that the
accounts where the checks were to be drawn were already closed which was later admitted. The
respondent denied the issuing the 3 rd Metrobank Check with No. 0244745 and alleged that 3 rd check
was forcibly taken from them by their son Richard Ng.

On August 7, 2007, the RTC ordered the spouses Cabrera to pay the respondent the amount
of the 3rd check plus legal interest from inception of the obligation until fully paid, moral damages in
the amount of P50,000.00, attorney’s fees of P20,000.00 and litigation expenses in the amount of
P10,000.00.

On August 14, 2007, the spouses Cabrera filed with the RTC a motion for reconsideration,
which they set for hearing on August 17, 2007. On the same date, the spouses Cabrera sent a copy of
their motion for reconsideration to the respondent thru registered mail which eventually received
by the respondent on August 21, 2007.The motion was not heard on the following dates August 17,
2007, August 28, 2007, and September 25, 2007.

On October 26, 2007, the RTC issued an Order, which directed the parties to file their
additional pleadings, after which the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera would
be deemed submitted for resolution. On December 19, 2007, the RTC issued an Order denying the
motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera. The RTC stated that the spouses Cabrera
violated Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that every motion required to
be heard should be served by the movant in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other
party at least three days before the date of hearing thus, exceeding the 3 day period on notice and
hearing as required by law. The record reveals that the instant motion was mailed to the plaintiff’s
counsel on August 14, 2007and the hearing was set on August 17, 2007. The copy of the said motion
had reached plaintiff and his counsel only on August 17, 2007, 4 days after it was supposed to
be heard. The RTC opined a motion as a mere scrap of paper not entitled to judicial cognizance
having not met the required period for filing the requisite pleadings. The RTC held, its Decision
dated August 7, 2007 had already become final for failure of the spouses Cabrera to comply with the
three-day notice requirement.

The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, alleging that the RTC gravely
abused its discretion in denying her motion for reconsideration. The petitioner pointed out that the
RTC did not actually conduct a hearing on her motion for reconsideration on August 17,2007;that
her motion for reconsideration was actually heard on October 26, 2007, after the respondent had
already filed his opposition. Thus, the petitioner claimed, the issue of her failure to comply with the
three-day notice requirement had already been rendered moot. In any case, the petitioner asserted,
the RTC should have resolved her motion for reconsideration on its merits rather than simply
denying it on mere technicality. On October 21, 2009, the CA, denied the petition for certiorari filed
by the petitioner. According to the CA the RTC did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera, that it merely applied the three-day notice
requirement under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Thus: On record It appears that
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was set for hearing on 17 August 2007. The copy thereof
was mailed to private respondent on 14 August 2007, and that the private respondent actually
received his copy only on 21 August 2007 or four (4) days after the set date of hearing thus,
depriving him of the opportunity to oppose the motion. Respondent court, therefore, correctly held
that such motion violated the three (3)-day notice rule; the essence of due process. Respondent
court had applied said rule to the given situation and of no doubt, mere adherence to the rules
cannot be considered grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent court. The petitioner
sought a reconsideration of the Decision dated October 21, 2009 but was denied by the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the CA erred in affirming the RTC order dated December 19, 2007, denying the
motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera in applying the three-day notice
requirement under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court..

RULING:
: The petition is meritorious. The Court has indeed held, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court, mandatory is the requirement in a motion, which is rendered defective by
failure to comply with the requirement. As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered
pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite
pleading. Asan integral component of the procedural due process, the three-day notice required by
the Rules is not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather the requirement is for the purpose of
avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and
meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution of the court. Principles of natural justice
demand that the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.
The test is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and
meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. It is undisputed that the
hearing on the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera was reset by the RTC twice
with due notice to the parties that it was only on October 26, 2007 that the motion was actually
heard by the RTC. More than two months had passed since the respondent received a copy of the
said motion for reconsideration on August 21, 2007. The respondent was thus given sufficient time
to study the motion and to enable him to meet the arguments interposed therein. Indeed, the
respondent was able to file his opposition thereto on September 20, 2007.Notwithstanding that the
respondent received a copy of the said motion for reconsideration four days after the date set by the
spouses Cabrera for the hearing thereof, his right to due process was not impinged as he was
afforded the chance to argue his position. Thus, the RTC erred in denying the spouses Cabrera's
motion for reconsideration based merely on their failure to comply with the three-day notice
requirement. The petition was granted by the Supreme Court thus reversing and setting aside the
CA resolutions dated October 21, 2009 and March 26, 2012. The SC remanded the case to the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the spouses
Cabrera on the merits within five (5) days from the finality of this Decision.
PILIPINAS SHELL FOUNDATION, INC. AND SHELL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION
B.V., Petitioners, v. TOMAS M. FREDELUCES, MARCOS B. CORPUZ, JR., REYNALDO M. SAMONTE,
NORMA M. SAMONTE, AMBROCIO VILLANUEVA, SALVACION A. BON, RAMIRO A. BON,
LUZVIMINDA B. ANDILLO, LUDIVICO F. BON, ELMO AREGLO, ROSE A. SAN PEDRO, DANTE U.
SANTOS, SR., MIGUEL SANTOS, EFREN U. SANTOS, RIC U. SANTOS, SIMON MARCE, JR., JOEL F.
SALINEL, BEBIANA SAN PEDRO, AND MARINA SANTOS, Respondents.

G.R. No. 174333, April 20, 2016

Rule 16, Section 1 (e) & (g) of the Rules of Court

FACTS:

Pursuant to PD 87, the Rep. of the Philippines entered into a service contract with Shell for
the exploration, development, and production of petroleum. The service contractors eventually
discovered 2.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas deposit in Palawan. Concrete structures needed to
be made which was to be constructed in Subic. After a socio-economic survey, it was found that
there were about 200 households that lived near or on the site proposed, and it was determined
that at least 80 of them needed to be relocated.

Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority and Shell Philippines entered into an agreement for the
construction of the concrete structure. Subic undertook to relocate the households while Shell
gave them financial assistance. In exchange for the financial assistance, some of the claimants
voluntarily dismantled their houses and relocated. Other claimants were denied however for
failure to show that they were affected by said project.

A complaint was then filed against Shell before the RTC of Olangapo City. Fredeluces, et al.
alleged that they resided in the construction site and allegedly constructed houses and
improvements such as fruit trees. Some admitted having received financial assistance but alleged
that the amounts given were insufficient to compensate the damages suffered. It was also alleged
that Shell acted in bad faith in arbitrarily and unlawfully evicting the complainants, thus they should
pay actual damages. The complainants moved that they be allowed to litigate as pauper litigants.

Shell did not answer, but filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of litis pendentia, failure
to state cause of action, and lack of cause of action. Shell alleged that 5 of the plaintiffs earlier filed a
complaint for sum of money. Shell argued that the complaint for damages and complaint for sum of
money had substantially similar causes of action and relief sought thus, litis pendentia. According to
Shell, Fredeluces et al. were praying for payment of damages corresponding to the value of the land
they occupied, a right they do not have because they do not even own the land. In addition, Shell
alleged that the improvements they made had been compensated. Consequently, the complaint
failed to state a cause of action.

With respect to 2 of the plaintiffs including Fredeluces, Shell alleged that they were not
entitled to any compensation as they did not even reside in the construction site.
 Fredeluces, et al. opposed the Motion to Dismiss and prayed for its denial. In their
Opposition, Fredeluces, et al. argued that Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Pilipinas Shell
Foundation, Inc., in filing their Motion to Dismiss, hypothetically admitted the factual allegations in
their Complaint. Corollary, the trial court may not inquire into the truth of the allegations and may
only resolve the Motion to Dismiss based on the facts as alleged in the Complaint.

Countering the first ground, the 5 plaintiffs that had filed an earlier complaint for sum of
money claimed that they were not aware of their inclusion as plaintiffs in that complaint. In any
case, they had allegedly revoked the SPA that they executed in favor of Atty. Collado before the
lawyer filed the complaint. Litispendentia, therefore, should not apply. Fredeluces et al. expressly
admitted that they did not own the land, but they were asking for damages due to the unlawful
eviction, not their ownership. Lastly, they said that although they were indeed compensated for the
improvements, they claimed that they were pressured, coerced, or sweet-talked into signing
quitclaims.

RTC granted the motion to dismiss. RTC found that in the earlier complaint for sum of
money and in this complaint for damages, there indeed was an identity of parties. RTC likewise held
that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. Fredeluces et al. based the amount of damages on
the fair market value of the land, which they cannot claim since they did not own such land. As for
the quitclaims, the RTC held that they were valid since it was voluntarily executed.

Fredeluces, et al. filed an appeal before the CA, which the CA granted, except with respect to
appellant Fredeluces who was not a resident therein. CA denied the MR of Shell.

ISSUE: WON complaint for damages should be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia and WON
the complaint for damages should be dismissed on the ground of failure to state a cause of action

RULING: Petition granted. The complaint for damages should have been dismissed as to one of
the plaintiffs on the ground of litis pendentia. As for the rest of the respondents, their complaint
failed to state a cause of action.

Only one suit may be instituted for a single cause of action. Hence, any suit subsequently
filed for the same cause of action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. When there is more than
one suit pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, litispendentia exists and a
motion to dismiss may be filed on this ground.

Rule 16, Section 1 (e) of theRules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the
answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss
may be made on any of the following grounds:

1. That there is another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause[.]
Litispendentia in Latin means "a pending suit." Occasionally referred to as lispendens or auter action
pendant,litispendentia has the following elements: first, "[i]dentity of parties, or at least such parties
as those representing the same interests in both actions;" second, "[i]dentity of rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts;"and third, "[i]dentity with respect to
the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other
case."
 The SC held that the elements were only present with respect to Bebiana San Pedro, thus, as
to her, dismissed on the ground of litispendentia.

Respondent Bebiana San Pedro was a party plaintiff both in the Complaint for sum of money
and in the Complaint for damages. Unlike respondents Dante U. Santos, Efren U. Santos, Miguel
Santos, and Ric U. Santos, respondent Bebiana San Pedro did not sign any document similar to the
Revocation and Cancellation of Special Power of Attorney. Thus, she did not revoke the authority of
Atty. Renato H. Collado to file the Complaint for sum of money on her behalf. The Complaint for sum
of money was filed with her authority and was pending when the Complaint for damages was
subsequently filed before the same trial court.

As to second issue:

The trial court and the Court of Appeals differed as to whether the Complaint for damages
should be dismissed. The Complaint for damages was initially dismissed on the ground of failure
to state a cause of action, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the Complaint to the
trial court for further proceedings. The ground of failure to state a cause of action is based on
Rule 16, Section 1 (g) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the
answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss
may be made on any of the following grounds:

1 That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action[.]

Failure to state a cause of action goes into the sufficiency of the allegation of the cause of
action in the complaint. "When the facts alleged in the complaint show that the defendant has
committed acts constituting a delict or wrong by which he violates the rights of the plaintiff, causing
[the plaintiff] loss or injury, there is sufficient allegation of a cause of action. Otherwise, there is
none."

In this respect, a pleading sufficiently states a cause of action if it "contain[s] in a methodical

and logical form, a plain, concise[,] and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party
pleading relies for his [or her] claim[.]" Ultimate facts are the "important and substantial facts
which either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which directly make up the
wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant." Allegations of evidentiary facts and conclusions of law
in a pleading are omitted for they are unnecessary in determining whether the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action.

In filing a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, a defendant
"hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint." Since allegations of
evidentiary facts and conclusions of law are omitted in pleadings, "[t]he hypothetical admission is . .
. limited to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly
deducible therefrom." However, it is mandatory that courts "consider other facts within the range of
judicial notice, as well as relevant laws and jurisprudence" in resolving motions to dismiss.

Even assuming the truth of the ultimate facts alleged in the Complaint for damages, the
Complaint states no cause of action. Respondents may have resided in Sitio Agusuhin, constructed
their houses, and planted fruit trees in the area. However, they failed to allege any circumstance
showing that they had occupied Sitio Agusuhin under claim of ownership for the required number
of years.
 It follows that respondents may not ask compensation equivalent to the value of the parcels
of land they previously occupied in Sitio Agusuhin. The right to demand compensation for
deprivation of property belongs to the owner.

Respondents nevertheless argue that they are entitled to damages because of their
unlawful and summary eviction from Sitio Agusuhin. Their own allegations, however, belie their
claim that they were unlawfully and summarily evicted. As alleged in their Complaint, petitioners
"tried to work out an acceptable compensation package for the [respondents.]" Also alleged in the
Complaint and as evidenced by quitclaims and the Final Report on the Compensation Claims,
some of the respondents received certain amounts as compensation.

In receiving the compensation, respondents declared in their respective quitclaims that

they waived, released, and abandoned any claims that they might have had over the parcels of
land they occupied in Sitio Agusuhin as well as the improvements they introduced in the property.

All told, the Motion to Dismiss was correctly granted on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action.

DENNIS Q. MORTEL, Petitioner, vs. SALVADOR E. KERR, Respondent.

GR NO. 156296 NOVEMBER 12, 2012

Excusable Negligence in Rule 38

FACTS:
Respondent Salvador Kerr instituted a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against Dennis
Mortel. Mortel’s counsel is Atty Mas from Public Attorney’s Office. The pre trial was re-set four
times for various reasons but on the fifth setting, Mortel and his lawyer were not around when the
case was called. On motion of Kerr’s counsel, RTC declared Mortel in default and allowed Kerr to
present evidence ex parte.

RTC immediately rendered judgment in favour of Kerr. Mortel, opposing the decision, filed a
motion for new trial through another lawyer in the person of Atty Lacambra. It was subsequently
dismissed for the reason that said motion was filed out of time because record shows that the
decision was received by his previous counsel, Atty Mas.

Another lawyer, Atty Tumulak, who filed notice of appearance in behalf of Mortel and duly
recognized by the court as the only counsel of the petitioner, filed a petition for relief of judgment.
Again, said motion was denied for it was filed beyond the reglementary period of 60 days to be
reckoned from the date when Atty Mas received the notice and copy of the order. Mortel moved for
reconsideration but it was still denied.

RTC on the other hand, granted Kerr’s ex parte motion for issuance of a writ of possession.
Mortel, through Atty Tumulak, filed a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for issuance of
restraining order. Nevertheless, it was denied by CA for failure of Mortel’s party to state specific
material dates which is violative to Section 6 (d) of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and for resorting to
wrong remedy considering that he was assailing the propriety of the RTC’s order declaring him in
default, against which the proper remedy was a petition for certiorari.
 Mortel filed a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CAs dismissal of his petition for
review on certiorari and he further prays that Rules of Court be liberally interpreted in his favour to
allow his petition despite the various lapses of his counsels resulting in the loss of his opportunity
to assail the resolutions of the RTC.

Kerr, in his opposition insisted that Mortel is bound by his counsel’s negligence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the negligence of Mortel’s previous counsels should bind him.

RULING: In general, a client is bound by his counsel’s conduct, negligence and mistake in handling a
case. To allow a client to disown his counsel’s conduct would render proceedings indefinite,
tentative and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel.

However, in this case at bar, Supreme Court admits exception to the general rule. Court
held that when the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so great and resulting
error is so serious that the client, who otherwise has a just cause, is prejudiced and denied his day
in court, the client deserves another chance to present his case.

Accordingly, the negligence and mistakes committed by several counsels of Mortel were so
gross and palpable that they denied due process to the herein petitioner and could have cost him
his valuable asset. They thereby prevented him from presenting his side, which was potentially
highly unfair and unjust to him on account of his defenses which is plausible and seemingly
meritorious.
In view of the foregoing, petition was granted.
SHIMIZU PHILIPPINES VS MAGSALIN
GR NO. 170026 JUNE 20, 2013

SECTION 1, RULE 36 and SECTION 3, RULE 17

FACTS:
Petitioner Shimizu filed a case against Magsalin along with FGU Insurance as surety due to
Magsalin’s breach of their subcontract agreement. FGU Insurance filed a motion to dismiss but it
was denied. FGU Insurance filed a motion for leave of court to file a third-party complaint which
was admitted naming the other three respondents as third-party defendants. The RTC issued a
notice setting the case for hearing but the FGU Insurance filed a motion to cancel the hearing on the
ground that the third-party defendants had not yet filed their answer and it was granted. Only one
of the third-party defendants filed an answer. Petitioner was, however, not served with a copy of
such answer. The RTC issued an order of dismissal of the complaint for failure of petitioner to
prosecute. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, it elevated the case before the
CA but it affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint is proper.
RULING: The Court ruled in the negative.
The dismissal order of the RTC is void. It simply states its conclusion that the case should be
dismissed for non prosequitur, a legal conclusion, but does not state the facts on which this
conclusion is based. Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is authorized under
Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. A plain examination of the dismissal order shows that
it is an unqualified order and, as such, is deemed to be a dismissal with prejudice. As a prejudicial
dismissal, the dismissal order is also deemed to be a judgment on the merits so that the petitioner’s
complaint can no longer be refiled on the principle of res judicata. Procedurally, when a complaint is
dismissed for failure to prosecute and the dismissal is unqualified, the dismissal has the effect of
adjudication on the merits. Hence, it is imperative that the dismissal order conform with Section 1,
Rule 36 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment or final order determining the merits of
the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the
court.
The dismissal of the complaint is likewise not warranted as the dismissal was not in
accordance with the grounds specified by Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court for the motu
proprio dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute. The fundamental test for non prosequitur is
whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to
proceed with reasonable promptitude. There must be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to
prosecute.In this case, the parties’ own narrations of facts demonstrate the petitioner’s willingness
to prosecute its complaint. Indeed, neither respondents FGU Insurance nor the third-party
defendant was able to point to any specific act committed by the petitioner to justify the dismissal
of their case.
The petition is granted.

Julio B. Purcon, Jr. Petitioner vs

MRM Philippines and Miguel Rivera/Maritime, Respondent
GR No. 182718

Rule 38 of the Rules of Court

Facts:

This case began with the complaint filed by petitioner for reimbursement of medical
expenses, sickness allowance and permanent disability benefits with prayer for compensatory,
moral, exemplary and attorneys’ fees before the Arbitration branch of the NLRC.

Respondent MRM Philippines hired Julio Purcon, Jr. on January 28, 2002, as a seaman on
board the vessel M/T SARABELLE 2. He signed a three-month contract with a monthly salary of
$584. His work involved a day to day activity that required exertion of strenuous effort and that he
often worked overtime due to the pressure of his work .His contract was extended for another three
months. On the 2nd week of June 2002, he felt an excruciating pain in his left testicle and was
diagnosed by the doctor at the port of France with hernia. He was repatriated due to his ailment

Upon petitioners return to the Philippines, he was examined by Dr. Alegre, the company
physician, who prescribed certain medication. On July 24, 2002, Dr. Alegre declared he was fit to
resume work. When he reported to MRM Philippines, he was not re-hired because he was told that
there was no vacancy.

Respondents countered that since hernia is not work-related ailment, Purcon is not entitled
to disability benefit and related claims.

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit in the NLRC, also with the CA.

Issue: WON the petitioner can avail of petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules
of the Civil Procedure.

Ruling:

A petition for relief from judgment is not available remedy in the Supreme Court. There are
three reasons:

1) Rule 38 must be interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which enumerates the original
cases cognizable with the Supreme Court. It states that, Section 1. Original cases cognizable. Only
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, disciplinary
proceedings against members of the judiciary and attorneys, and cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls may be filed originally in court;

2) Rule 38 refers uses the phrase any court, refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and
Regional Trial Courts.

3) The procedure in the CA and Supreme Court are governed by separate provisions of the
Rules of Court. It may, from time to time, be supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court through resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the
Revised Internal Rules of the CA allows the remedy of petition for relief in the CA.

This Court only entertains only questions of law. A petition for relief raises questions of
facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, which are beyond the concerns of this
court. Nevertheless, even if we delve into the merits of the petition, the same must still be dismissed
due to the late filing of the petition for review does not amount to excusable negligence. Petitioners
lack of devotion in discharging his duty, without demonstrating fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, cannot be basis for judicial relief.

SMART COMMUNICATIONS INC. VS. ARSENIO ET AL

G.R. No. 166330
September 11, 2013

Rule 35 of the Rules of Court

FACTS:

The petitioner constructed and installed cellular base station in the Brgy. Vira, Roxas on a
leased lot owned by Sebastian. That said station has a communications tower alleged by
respondents to cause danger to their lives. Hence, a case for abatement of nuisance and injunction
was filed before the RTC. In support of their action, respondents alleged that the tower was poorly
constructed susceptible to collapse during a typhoon like the Mobiline tower which fell during a
typhoon; that the generator emits fumes and noise endangering the health of the residents
especially the children; that the construction of the tower was without prior consent of the
residents as well as Compliance certificate from the DENR.

The petitioner denied all the allegations of respondents and asserted that it has complied
with all the requirements prescribed by law.

SMART filed its pre-trial brief along with a Motion for Summary Judgment that read:

1. There is no need for a full-blown trial as the causes of action and issues have already been
identified in all the pleadings submitted to this Honorable court by both respondents and petitioner
2. There is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact or cause in the action.
3. There is no extreme urgency to issue a Preliminary Mandatory Injunction as stated in an affidavit
executed by SMART Senior Supervisor Andres V. Romero in an affidavit
4. Petitioner seeks immediate declaratory relief from respondents’ contrived allegations as set forth
in their complaint;

Respondents likewise filed their Opposition to petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
maintaining that there were several genuine issues relating to the cause of action and material facts
of their Complaint. They asserted that there was a need for a full blown trial to prove the allegations
in their Complaint, as well as the defenses put up by petitioner.

Aldecoa et al opposed the motion for summary judgment stating that there are several
genuine issues relation to the cause of action and material facts in their complaint. They asserted
that there was a need for a full blown trial to prove the allegations in their complaint as well as the
defenses put up by Smart.

RTC judge postponed the proceedings until the Motion for Summary Judgment be resolved.
Both parties were required to submit their respective memorandums. Aldecoa et al, in their
memorandum, alleged that: DENR conducted a noise emission test of the power generator of
SMART. The test results show that Smart’s power generator failed the noise emission test, day and
night time. With these findings, the generator is also a nuisance that must be abated.

Subsequently, RTC issued its Order granting the Motion for Summary Judgment and
dismissing the complaint. Dispositive portion of the Order reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby renders judgment
dismissing the complaint as the allegations therein are purely speculative and hence no basis in fact
to warrant further proceedings of this case.

The Court of Appeals rendered its decision and declared that the cellular base station is a
nuisance that endangered the health and safety of the residents of Isabela because: (1) the
locational clearance granted to petitioner was a nullity due to the lack of approval by majority of the
actual residents of the barangay and a barangay resolution endorsing the construction of the
cellular base station; and (2) the sound emission of the generator at the cellular base station
exceeded the DENR standards. Dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A new one is
entered declaring the communications tower of Smart Communications a nuisance. Smart is
ordered to cease and desist from operating said tower or station.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC erred in issuing a summary judgment.

RULING:
YES. A reading of the RTC order shows that the trial court did not take into account any of
the considerations or tests before summarily dismissing the case. The reasoning of the RTC was
flawed.

At the outset, the RTC erred in granting petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment and
ordering the dismissal of respondents’ Complaint in Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000. Summary
judgments are governed by Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, pertinent provisions of which state:

SEC. 2. Summary judgment for defending party. – A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting
affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part
thereof.

SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. – The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days
before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits,
depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions,
and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Summary judgment cannot be rendered in this case as there are clearly factual issues
disputed or contested by the parties. As respondents correctly argued in their Opposition to
petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment:

Contrary to the claim of petitioner, there are several genuine issues as to the cause of action
and material facts related to the complaint. For one there is an issue on the structural integrity of
the tower, the ultra-high frequency (UHF) radio wave emission radiated by the communications
tower affecting the life, health and well-being of the[respondents] and the barangay residents,
especially their children. Also, the noxious/deleterious fumes and the noise produce[d] by the
standby generator and the danger posted by the tower if it collapses in regard to life and limb as
well as the property of the [respondents] particularly those whose houses abut, or are near/within
the periphery of the communications tower.

Likewise constituting real or genuine issues for trial, which arose from subsequent events,
are the following: whether the generator subject of respondents’ Complaint had been removed;
whether said generator had been replaced by another that produces as much or even more noise
and fumes; and whether the generator is a nuisance that can be abated separately from the rest of
the cellular base station.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and AYALA LAND, INC.
G.R. No. 190680 - September 13, 2012

Rule 38 of the Rules of Court

FACTS:

In 2005, private respondent Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) filed with the CTA a petition for review to
question the CIR’s assessment against it for deficiency value-added tax for the calendar year 2003.
Before the tax court, the CIR and ALI filed their Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues, which was cited
in the present petition to read in part:

Petitioner received respondent’s (herein petitioner) Final Assessment Notice dated 29

October 2004 whereby respondent was assessing petitioner alleged deficiency 10% value added tax
on its alleged income from cinema operations for the taxable year 2003 in the aggregate amount of
One Hundred Three Million Three Hundred Forty-Six Thousand Six Hundred Ninety-One and
40/100 Pesos (P 103,346,691.40) inclusive of 20% interest.

On 10 December 2004, petitioner filed its protest with the office of respondent contesting
the factual and legal bases of the VAT assessment.

On 28 April 2005, petitioner received respondent’s 25 April 2005 Decision denying

petitioner’s protest, with a notation that the same constitutes respondent’s Final Decision on the
matter.

Petitioner received on 23 November 2004, respondent’s 19 November 2004 Letter of

Authority for the examination of ALL INTERNAL REVENUE TAXES of petitioner from 1 January
2003 to 31 December 2003. In order to protect its right, petitioner filed the Petition for Review
pursuant to Section 228 of the Tax Code.

Proceedings ensued. On April 11, 2008, the CTA Second Division rendered its Decision
granting ALI’s petition for review. The assessment against ALI for deficiency VAT in the amount
of P 103,346,691.40 for the calendar year 2003 was ordered cancelled and set aside. The CIR’s
motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file an appeal to the CTA en banc.

In this case, petitioner seeks relief from judgment of the Court En Banc’s Resolution dated
March 25, 2009. Records show that petitioner learned of the Resolution dated March 25, 2009 when
he received on June 17, 2009, the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 10, 2009 ordering the
Entry of Judgment. This was in fact stated in petitioner’s "Manifestation with Motion to Reconsider
Resolution Ordering Entry of Judgment" which petitioner filed on July 2, 2009. Hence, the 60 days
should be counted from June 17, 2009 and the 60th day fell on August 16, 2009 which was a Sunday.
Hence, the last day for the filing of the petition for relief was on August 17, 2009. Even if the 60-day
period is counted from petitioner’s receipt of the Entry of Judgment on July 1, 2009, with the 60th
day falling on August 30, 2009, the petition for relief filed on October 2, 2009 will still be filed
beyond the 60-day period.

Without filing a motion for reconsideration with the CTA en banc, the CIR filed the present
petition for certiorari. The CIR argues that his 60-day period under Rule 38 should have been
counted from August 3, 2009, when he received a copy of the Resolution dated July 29, 2009 and
claimed to have first learned about the Resolution dated March 25, 2009 denying his motion for
reconsideration.11
ISSUE: Whether or not the CTA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling that the petition for relief of the CIR was filed beyond the 60-day reglementary
period under Rule 38.

RULING: No. Petition is dismissed.

At the outset, this Court holds that a dismissal of the petition is warranted in view of the
petitioner’s failure to file before the CTA en banc a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
resolution. The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the
filing of a petition for certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any
actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case. The rationale of the rule rests upon the presumption that the court or
administrative body which issued the assailed order or resolution may amend the same, if given the
chance to correct its mistake or error. The "plain speedy, and adequate remedy" referred to in
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a motion for reconsideration of the questioned order or
resolution. While the rule is not absolute and admits of settled exceptions, none of the exceptions
attend the present petition.

In resolving the substantive issue, it is crucial to determine the date when the petitioner
learned of the CTA en banc’s Resolution dated March 25, 2009, as Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules
of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. – A petition provided for in
either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than
six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and
must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence
relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or
defense, as the case may be.

By the CIR’s own evidence and admissions, particularly in the narration of facts in the
petition for relief, the OSG’s letter and the affidavit of merit attached thereto, it is evident that both
the CIR and the OSG had known of the CTA’s Resolution dated March 25, 2009 long before August
3,2009. Granting that we give credence to the CIR’s argument that he could not have known of the
Resolution dated March 25, 2009 by his receipt on June 17, 2009 of the Resolution dated June 10,
2009, the CIR’s petition for relief was still filed out of time.

The CIR’s claim that it was only on August 3, 2009 that he learned of the CTA’s denial of his
motion for reconsideration is belied by records showing that as of June 22, 2009, he already knew of
such fact. The information was relayed by the CTA to the CIR, when the latter inquired from the
court about the status of the case and the court’s action on his motion for reconsideration. It was
precisely because of such knowledge that he filed on July 2, 2009 the manifestation and motion
pertaining to the CTA’s order of entry of judgment.

The court finds no cogent reason to grant petitioner's plea for the issuance of a writ of
certiorari. An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of
discretion when the same is performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment, which is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a vi1iual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all
in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility. There was no such grave abuse of discretion in this case
because the CIR's petition for relief was indeed filed out of time.

JULIET VITUG MADARANG and ROMEO BARTOLOME vs. SPOUSES JESUS D. MORALES and
CAROLINA N. MORALES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 199283
June 9, 2014

Section 3, Rule 38

Facts:

On January 9, 2001, Spouses Jesus D. Morales and Carolina N. Morales filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint8 for judicial foreclosure of a house and lot located
in BagoBantay, Quezon City.

The Spouses Morales alleged that on March 23, 1993, Spouses Nicanor and Luciana
Bartolome loaned P500,000.00 from them. The Spouses Bartolome agreed to pay within two
months with interest of five percent (5%) per month. To secure their loan, the Spouses Bartolome
mortgaged9 the BagoBantay property to the Spouses Morales.

The period to pay lapsed without the Spouses Bartolome having paid their loan. After
demand, the Spouses Bartolome only paid part of the loaned amount. In the meantime, the Spouses
Bartolome died. The Spouses Morales, thus, filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure of the
BagoBantay property against Juliet VitugMadarang, Romeo Bartolome, and the Spouses Rodolfo and
Ruby Anne Bartolome. The Spouses Morales sued Madarang as the latter allegedly represented
herself as LitaBartolome and convinced the Spouses Morales to lend money to the Spouses
Bartolome. Romeo and Rodolfo Bartolome were sued in their capacities as legitimate heirs of the
Spouses Bartolome. Ruby Anne Bartolome is Rodolfo Bartolome’s wife.

Defendants assailed the authenticity of the deed of real estate mortgage covering the
BagoBantay property, specifically, the Spouses Bartolome’s signatures on the instrument. They
added that the complaint was already barred since it had been dismissed in another branch of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for failure to comply with an order of the trial court.

The trial court ordered defendants to pay the Spouses Morales P500,000.00 plus 7%
interest per month and costs of suit within 90 days but not more than 120 days from entry of
judgment. Should defendants fail to pay, the BagoBantay property shall be sold at public auction to
satisfy the judgment.

The defendants filed their motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision. According
to the trial court, the motion for reconsideration and its amendment were pro forma as defendants
failed to specify the findings and conclusions in the decision that were not supported by the
evidence or contrary to law. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, its amendment,
and the request for a handwriting expert.
 The defendants filed a notice of appeal but it was denied due course the notice of appeal for
having been filed out of time. They had 15 days from June 24, 2010, or until July 9, 2010, to appeal
the trial court’s decision. However, they filed their notice of appeal only on August 11, 2010, which
was beyond the 15-day period to appeal. They argued that Atty. Tugonon’s failure to appeal within
the reglementary period was a mistake and an excusable negligence due to their former lawyer’s old
age.

The trial court denied the petition for relief from judgment. The trial court held that the
petition for relief was filed beyond 60 days from the finality of the trial court’s decision, contrary to
Section 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Madarang, Romeo, and Rodolfo and Ruby Anne Bartolome filed the petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals but it was denied. The Court of Appeals found that petitioners did not file
a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from judgment, a
prerequisite for filing a petition for certiorari.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration that the Court of Appeals denied in its
resolution. Petitioners filed the petition for review on certiorari with this court. Petitioners add that
the trial court erred in denying their notice of appeal.

Respondents Spouses Morales argue that the trial court did not err in declaring pro forma
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision. They also contend that the
Court of Appeals did not err in denying the petition for certiorari since petitioners failed to file a
motion for reconsideration of the order denying their petition for relief from judgment.

Issue: Whether the failure of petitioners’ former counsel to file the notice of appeal within the
reglementary period is excusable negligence.

Ruling: The petition lacks merit. The court agrees that the petition or relief from judgment was
filed out of time. However, the trial court erred in counting the 60-day period to file a petition for
relief from the date of finality of the trial court’s decision. Rule 38, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is clear that the 60-day period must be counted after petitioner learns of the
judgment or final order. The period counted from the finality of judgment or final order is the six-
month period.

Section 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

Sec. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification.– A petition provided for in
either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than
six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and
must be accompanied with affidavits, showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
relied upon and the facts constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or
defense, as the case may be.

A petition for relief from judgment filed beyond the reglementary period is dismissed
outright. This is because a petition for relief from judgment is an exception to the public policy of
immutability of final judgments.
 In this case, petitioners, through counsel, received a copy of the trial court’s decision on
January 29, 2010. They filed a motion for reconsideration and an amended motion for
reconsideration, which similarly alleged the same issues. Petitioners cannot argue that the period to
appeal should be counted from August 11, 2011, the day petitioners personally received a copy of
the trial court’s decision. Notice of judgment on the counsel of record is notice to the client. Since
petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the decision on January 29, 2010, the period to appeal shall
be counted from that date.Thus, the decision became final 15 days after January 29, 2010, or on
February 13, 2010. Petitioners had six (6) months from February 13, 2010, or until August 12,
2010, to file a petition for relief from judgment.Since petitioners filed their petition for relief from
judgment on September 24, 2010, the petition for relief from judgment was filed beyond six (6)
months from finality of judgment. The trial court should have denied the petition for relief from
judgment on this ground.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. vs. Wesleyan University Philippines, Inc.

G.R. No. 207970. January 20, 2016

Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court

Facts:

From January 9, 2006 until February 2, 2007, the petitioner, a domestic corporation dealing
with medical equipment and supplies, delivered to and installed medical equipment and supplies at
the respondent's hospital. According to the petitioner, the respondent paid only P67,3 57,683.23 of
its total obligation of P123,901,650.00, leaving unpaid the sum of P54,654,195.54.

However, on February 11, 2009, the petitioner and the respondent entered into an
agreement whereby the former agreed to reduce its claim to only P50,400,000.00, and allowed the
latter to pay the adjusted obligation on installment basis within 36 months.

In the letter dated May 27, 2009, the respondent notified the petitioner that its new
administration had reviewed their contracts and had found the contracts defective and rescissible
due to economic prejudice or lesion; and that it was consequently declining to recognize the
February 11, 2009 agreement because of the lack of approval by its Board of Trustees and for
having been signed by Maglaya whose term of office had expired.

On June 24, 2009, the petitioner sent a demand letter to the respondent. Due to the
respondent's failure to pay as demanded, the petitioner filed its complaint for sum of money in the
RTC.

The respondent moved to dismiss the complaint upon the following grounds, namely: (a)
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; (b) improper venue; (c) litispendentia; and (d)
forum shopping. In support of the ground of litispendentia, it stated that it had earlier filed a
complaint for the rescission of the four contracts and of the February 11, 2009 agreement in the
RTC in Cabanatuan City; and that the resolution of that case would be determinative of the
petitioner's action for collection.
 After the RTC denied the motion to dismiss on July 19, 2009, the respondent filed its answer.
On September 28, 2011, the petitioner filed its Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, stating
that the respondent had admitted the material allegations of its complaint and thus did not tender
any issue as to such allegations. The respondent opposed the Motion for Judgment Based on the
Pleadings, arguing that it had specifically denied the material allegations in the complaint.

At the hearing, the court issued an Order denying the Motion for Judgment Based on the
Pleadings considering that the allegations stated on the Motion are evidentiary in nature. The Court,
instead of acting on the same, sets the case for pre-trial, considering that with the Answer and the
Reply, issues have been joined.

On July 2, 2013, the CA promulgated its decision. Although observing that the respondent
had admitted the contracts as well as the February 11, 2009 agreement, the CA ruled that a
judgment on the pleadings would be improper because the outstanding balance due to the
petitioner remained to be an issue in the face of the allegations of the respondent in its complaint
for rescission in the RTC in Cabanatuan City.

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in going outside of the respondent's answer by relying
on the allegations contained in the latter's complaint for rescission.

Ruling: Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in going outside of the respondent's answer by relying on
the allegations contained in the latter's complaint for rescission. In order to resolve the petitioner's
Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, the trial court could rely only on the answer of the
respondent filed in Civil Case No. 09-122116. Under Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, the
answer was the sole basis for ascertaining whether the complaint's material allegations were
admitted or properly denied. As such, the respondent's averment of payment of the total of
P78,401,650.00 to the petitioner made in its complaint for rescission had no relevance to the
resolution of the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings. The CA thus wrongly held that a
factual issue on the total liability of the respondent remained to be settled through trial on the
merits. It should have openly wondered why the respondent's answer in Civil Case No. 09-122116
did not allege the supposed payment of the P78,401,650.00, if the payment was true, if only to
buttress the specific denial of its alleged liability. The omission exposed the respondent's denial of
liability as insincere.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on July 2,
2013; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, in Manila to resume its proceedings in Civil Case
No. 09-122116 entitled Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. v. Wesleyan University-Philippines, and
to forthwith act on and grant the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings by rendering the
proper judgment on the pleadings; and ORDERS the respondent to pay the costs of suit.
Nation Petroleum V. RCBC
G.R. No. 183370, August 17, 2015

Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court

Sections 6 & 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court

Facts: Respondent filed a civil case from damages arising from estafa in relation to violation of the
Trust Receipts Law. Respondent’s prayer for writ of preliminary attachment was granted.
Thereafter, Sheriff Leodel N. Roxas served upon the petitioner a copy of the summons, complaint,
application for attachment, respondent’s affidavit and bond, and the order and writ of attachment.
The said documents were served to Claudia Abante (defendant’s liaison officer) as per instruction of
the defendant Melinda Ang (defendant corporation’s corporate Secretary). Copies were also served
to the petitioner’s address but they refused to acknowledge receipt. Petitioner now contends that
the court did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioner corporation for non compliance of Sec. 11,
Rule 14 which enumerates the people to be served of summons if the defendant is a corporation
and that the court did not also acquire jurisdiction over individual defendants by resorting to
substituted service of summons despite the absence of earnest effort on the part of the sheriff to
personally serve summons.

Issues:

1. WON there was a valid service of summons to defendant corporation?

2. WON there was a valid service of summons to the persons of the individual defendants?
Ruling: 1. Yes. There was valid service of summons.Summons is a writ by which the defendant is
notified of the action brought against him or her. Its purpose is two-fold: to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant and to notify the defendant that an action has been commenced so that
he may be given an opportunity to be heard on the claim against him.

Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much an issue of due
process as of jurisdiction. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity
to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense. It is elementary that
before a person can be deprived of his property, he should first be informed of the claim against
him and the theory on which such claim is premised.

Service of summons on domestic corporation, partnership or other juridical entity is governed by

Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules, which states:

SECTION 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a
juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.

2. No. There was no valid service of summons to the individual defendants

Section 7, in relation to Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules, provides for substituted service of summons:

Section 6. Service in person on defendant. – Whenever practicable, the summons shall be

served by handling a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and
sign for it, by tendering it to him.

Section 7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within
a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a)by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

The said provisions should not be construed as alternative modes of service of summons.
Substituted service is only resorted when personal service cannot be made and after stringent and
formal substantive requirements have been complied with. Substituted service cannot be made just
by mere convenience. Sheriffs upon relying on substituted service must show facts and
circumstances that would justify failure on his part to give personal service of summons within a
reasonable time and after several attempts.

Reasonable time as defined by jurisprudence,7 days for the plaintiff or 15-30 days for the
sheriff. Several attempts as defined by jurisprudence. Atleast 3 times preferably at different dates.
Evidently, sheriff failed to comply with this. Person of suitable age and discretion then residing
there in as defined as jurisprudence, Discretion" is defined as "the ability to make decisions which
represent a responsible choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may
be presupposed". Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read and
understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver
the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to
take appropriate action.

In the case at bar, although the househelpers to which the substituted service was given
were of the legal age, there was no proof of any showing that these persons are able to understand
the import of the service handed to them. Clearly, from the foregoing, sheriff failed to justify his
resort of substituted services.

On the other hand, the court still acquired jurisdiction over the individual defendants
when they asked for affirmative reliefs from the court namely:

1. Discharge of the writ of attachment

2. Denial of the motion to declare them in default
3. Filing of comment/opposition
4. Denial of respondent’s motion to
strike off from the records.

Tung Ho Steel Enterprises vs Ting Guan

G.R. No. 182153 April 7, 2014

SERVICE OF SUMMONS

Facts: Respondent Ting Guan(seller) is a domestic corporation who entered into a contract of sale
with petitioner Tung Ho(buyer) who is a foreign corporation for some metal scrap iron and steel.
Upon respondent’s failure to deliver the full quantity under the contract, petitioner filed a request
for arbitration before the International Court of Arbitration in Singapore wherein the ruling was in
favor of petitioner and respondent was ordered to pay damages.

Because respondent refused to comply with the ruling, petitioner filed before the RTC
Makati a case for the enforcement of the arbitral award upon which personal service of summons
was issued to Ms. Tejero who was alleged to be the corporate secretary of respondent. Respondent
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue but RTC denied such motion to dismiss.
Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration this time arguing that Ms. Tejero was not its
corporate secretary and thus, jurisdiction was not acquired by the court due to improper service
of summons. But RTC likewise denied such motion for reconsideration ruling that Ms. Tejero had
already voluntarily appeared in court when it raised other arguments apart from lack of jurisdiction
in its motion to dismiss.

Respondent appealed to CA wherein it ruled that jurisdiction over the person of respondent
was not acquired due to fact that petitioner failed to prove that Tejero was the corporate secretary
of respondent. BOTH petitioner and respondent filed separate motions for reconsideration wherein
petitioner insisted that there was proper service of summons and respondent sought to modify the
ruling.

Subsequent to the filling of MR, respondent went to SC to question the CA’s ruling in GR No.
176110 which was dismissed by SC and SC remanded the case to RTC which ruled that Tejero was
not the corporate secretary. CA then dismissed the MR of petitioner for lack of merit which
prompted petitioner to go to SC which is now the present petition GR No. 182153.

Petitioner argued that there was proper service of summons since Tejero is presumed to be
regularly performing its official duties when it issued the returns of service of summons while
respondent argued res judicata since RTC already ruled with finality that Tejero was not the
corporate secretary.

Issues: WON res judicata applies.

WON there was proper service of summons.

Ruling: No, res judicata does not apply.

Yes, there was proper service of summons.

Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive on the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on
all points and matters determined in the former suit. For res judicata to apply, the final judgment
must be on the merits of the case which means that the court has unequivocally determined the
parties' rights and obligations with respect to the causes of action and the subject matter of the
case. Our disposition in G.R. No. 176110 only dwelt on technical or collateral aspects of the case, and
not on its merits. Specifcally, we did not rule on whether Tung Ho may enforce the foreign arbitral
award against Ting Guan in that case.

The CA was not ousted of its jurisdiction with the promulgation of G.R. No. 176110. The
court's jurisdiction, once attached, cannot be ousted until it finally disposes of the case. When a
court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to
proceed to the final determination of the case is retained. Tung Ho's timely filing of a motion for
reconsideration before the CA and of a Rule 45 petition before this Court prevented the July 5, 2006
CA decision from attaining finality. For this Court to deny Tung Ho's petition would result in an
anomalous situation where a party litigant is penalized and deprived of his fair opportunity to
appeal the case by faithfully complying with the Rules of Court.

Nonetheless, we see no reason to disturb the lower courts' finding that Tejero was not a
corporate secretary and, therefore, was not the proper person to receive the summons under
Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. This Court is not a trier of facts; we cannot re-examine,
review or re-evaluate the evidence and the factual review made by the lower courts. In the absence
of compelling reasons, we will not deviate from the rule that factual findings of the lower courts are
final and binding on this Court.

However, we cannot agree with the legal conclusion that the appellate court reached, given
the established facts. To our mind, Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the trial court in view of
the procedural recourse that it took before that court. Its voluntary appearance is equivalent to
service of summons.

As a basic principle, courts look with disfavor on piecemeal arguments in motions filed by
the parties. Under the omnibus motion rule, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or
proceeding shall include all objections then available. The purpose of this rule is to obviate
multiplicity of motions and to discourage dilatory motions and pleadings. Party litigants should not
be allowed to reiterate identical motions, speculating on the possible change of opinion of the
courts or of the judges thereof. The trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss is not a license for
the defendant to file a Rule 65 petition before the CA. An order denying a motion to dismiss cannot
be the subject of a petition for certiorari as the defendant still has an adequate remedy before the
trial court— i.e., to file an answer and to subsequently appeal the case if he loses the case. As
exceptions, the defendant may avail of a petition for certiorari if the ground raised in the motion to
dismiss is lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or over the subject matter.

We cannot allow and simply passively look at Ting Guan's blatant disregard of the rules of
procedure in the present case. The Rules of Court only allows the filling of a motion to dismiss once.
Ting Guan's filling of successive motions to dismiss , under the guise of "supplemental motion to
dismiss" or "motion for reconsideration", is not only improper but also dilatory. Ting Guan's belated
reliance on the improper service of summons was a mere afterthought, if not a bad faith ploy to
avoid the foreign arbitral award's enforcement which is still at its preliminary stage after the lapse
of almost a decade since the fllling of the complaint.

Furthermore, Ting Guan's failure to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction over its person in
the first motion to dismiss is fatal to its cause. Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the RTC when
it filed a motion to dismiss and a "supplemental motion to dismiss" without raising the RTC's lack of
jurisdiction over its person. In Anunciacion v. Bocanegra , we categorically stated that the defendant
should raise the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person in the very first motion to
dismiss. Failure to raise the issue of improper service of summons in the first motion to dismiss is a
waiver of this defense and cannot be belatedly raised in succeeding motions and pleadings.

Even assuming that Ting Guan did not voluntarily appear before the RTC, the CA should
have ordered the RTC to issue an alias summons instead. In Lingner & Fisher GMBH vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, we enunciated the policy that the courts should not dismiss a case
simply because there was an improper service of summons. The lower courts should be cautious in
haphazardly dismissing complaints on this ground alone considering that the trial court can cure
this defect and order the issuance of alias summons on the proper person in the interest of
substantial justice and to expedite the proceedings.

EXPRESS PADALA (ITALIA) S.P.A., now BDO REMITTANCE (ITALIA) S.P.A., petitioner, vs. HELEN
M. OCAMPO, respondent.
G.R. No. 202505; September 6, 2017
SERVICE OF SUMMONS

FACTS:

BDO Remittance, a corp with principal office in Italy, hired Ocampo as a remittance
processor. She was dismissed for misappropriating the sum of 24,035 Euro. So colpaint was filed by
BDO before the Court of Turin, Italy. Ocampo pleaded guilty. Turin Court convicted and sentenced
her to suffer imprisonment of 6 months and a penalty of 300 euro, but granted her the benefit of
suspension of the enforcement of sentence on account of her guilty plea. (Turin Court
Decision)

Later, BDO filed a petition for recognition of foreign judgment with the RTC of Mandaluyong
City. Sheriff attempted to personaly serve the summons on Ocampo in her address in San Bernardo
Village, Darasa, Tanauan, Batangas. However, since the address was incomplete, the sheriff sought
the help of barangay oAcials, who pointed him to the house belonging to Ocampo's father, Nicasio
Ocampo. Victor P. Macahia (Macahia), uncle of Ocampo and present occupant, informed the sheriff
that Ocampo and her family were already in Italy, and that he was only a caretaker of the house. The
sheriff then proceeded to serve the summons upon Macahia. 9 After Ocampo failed to file an answer,
BDO Remittance filed a motion to declare Ocampo in default. The RTC granted the motion and
allowed BDO Remittance to present evidence ex parte.

The RTC recognized the Turin Court decision. Ocampo’s mother received a copy of the
decision and forwarded it to Ocampo. Later, after acquiring a counsel, filed 65 with the CA and
argued that RTC acted in grave abuse in recognizing the Turin Decision.

CA set aside the RTC decision. It opined that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
Ocampo because summons was improperly served. It held that since Ocampo's whereabouts were
unknown, summons should have been served in accordance with Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure. The sheriff however, erroneously effected the substituted service of summons
under Section 7 of Rule 14. Reconsideration was likewise denied, hence the petition.

ISSUE: Whether service of summons was validly effected upon respondent, who lives in Italy,
through substituted service.

RULING: PETITION DENIED

GEN RULE: summons must be served personally on the defendant. Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court For justifiable reasons, however, other modes of serving summons may be resorted to. When
the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time after efforts to locate him have
failed, the rules allow summons to be served by substituted service. Substituted service is effected
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.

When the defendant's whereabouts are unknown, the rules allow service of summons by
publication. As an exception to the preferred mode of service, service of summons by publication
may only be resorted to when the whereabouts of the defendant are not only unknown, but cannot
be ascertained by diligent inquiry. The diligence requirement means that there must be prior resort
to personal service under Section 7 and substituted service under Section 8, and proof that these
modes were ineffective before summons by publication may be allowed. This mode also requires
the plaintiff to file a written motion for leave of court to effect service of summons by publication,
supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf, setting forth the grounds for the
application.

SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS:

Presupposes that the place where the summons is being served is the defendant's current
residence or office/regular place of business. Thus, where the defendant neither resides nor
holds office in the address stated in the summons, substituted service cannot be resorted to.

How effected?

1) By leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's dwelling house or residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or
2) By leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

TN: Dwelling house or residence refer to the time of service, hence it is not sufficient to leave the
copy at defendant’s former house, residence, abode.

TN: Office of Regular place of business refer to the office or place of business of defendant at the
time of service. IN THIS CASE:

It was clear from the sheriff’s report that Ocampo no longer resides in San Bernardo Village, Darasa,
Tanauan, Batangas, as she and her family were already in Italy. Even BDO admitted that Ocampo’s
whereabouts in Italy are no longer certain. This, we note, is the reason why in alleging the two
addresses of Ocampo, one in Italy and one in the Philippines, BDO Remittance used the phrase "last
known [address]" instead of the usual "resident of." Not being a resident of the address where the
summons was served, the substituted service of summons is ineffective. Accordingly, the RTC did
not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Ocampo.

Modes of service of summons must be strictly followed in order that the court may acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The purpose of this is to afford the defendant an
opportunity to be heard on the claim against him. BDO Remittance is not totally without recourse,
as the rules allow summons by publication and extraterritorial service. Unlike substituted service,
however, these are extraordinary modes which require leave of court.

As a rule, if a defendant has not been validly summoned, the court acquires no
jurisdiction over his person, and a judgment rendered against him is void. Since the RTC never
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Ocampo, the judgment rendered by the court could not be
considered binding upon her.
ANG VS CHINATRUST
G.R. No. 200693, April 18, 2016

SERVICE OF SUMMONS

FACTS: This is a collection case ($458,614.84) filed by Chinatrust Banking Corporation vs. Nation
Petroleum Corporation and the Angs.

The Branch Clerk issued summonses indicating the address of the corporation and the Angs
(both in Ayala Avenue). The process server executed an Officer’s return reporting that:

1.) As to Ricky Ang, he acknowledged receipt thereof, but refused to sign in the original copy of the
summons

2.) As to the NPC, it was served through their Corporate Secretary but was received by Ms.
Charlotte Magpayo, the Administrative Assistant/mere property supply custodian

3.) As to the other Angs, despite diligent efforts to find them, wa daw na-serve, hence substituted
service was made by leaving their respective court processes at their office or regular place of
business through the same Ms. Charlotte Magpayo

CONTENTIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS: They filed motion to dismiss since RTC failed to acquire
jurisdiction since the service is improper. RTC: Denied the Motion to Dismiss.

CA: Dismissed the case against NPC since Magpayo was merely a property custodian and the list of
corporate officers authorized to receive summons for a corporation is exclusive. However, the CA
upheld the process server's resort to substituted service with respect to the individual defendant
since the process server exerted efforts to personally serve the summons.

ISSUE: Whether or not the summonses were properly served?

RULING: Partly granted. It was properly served only to Ricky Ang.

In an action strictly in personam, summons shall be served personally on the defendant

whenever practicable. 29 Personal service is made by personally handing a copy of the summons to
the defendant or by tendering it to him if he refuses to receive and sign for it.

While personal service is the preferred method of serving summons, the Rules of Court are
also mindful that this is sometimes impracticable or even impossible. Thus, Rule 14 also allows the
sheriff (or other proper court officer) to resort to substituted service.

In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 33 we dissected Rule 14, Section 8 and distilled the
following elements of a valid substituted service:

First, the party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must establish the impossibility
of prompt personal service. The sheriff must have made several attempts to personally serve the
summons within a reasonable period of one month. And by "several attempts," the sheriff is
expected to have tried at least thrice on at least two different dates. 35 Second, the sheriff must
describe the efforts he took and the circumstances behind the failure of his attempts. Nevertheless,
the sheriff's failure to make such a disclosure in the return does not conclusively prove that the
service is invalid. The plaintiff may still establish the impossibility of service during the hearing.
Further, if there is a defect in the service of summons that is apparent on the face of the return, the
trial court must immediately determine whether the defect is real or not. 38 If the defect is real, the
court is obliged to issue new summonses and cause their service on the defendants.

Third, if substituted service is made at the defendant's house or residence, the sheriff must
leave a copy of the summons with a person of "suitable age and discretion residing therein." 39 This
refers to a person who has reached the age of full legal capacity and has sufficient discernment to
comprehend the importance of a summons and his duty to deliver it immediately to the defendant.

Finally, if substituted service is made at the defendant's office or regular place of business,
the sheriff must instead leave a copy of the summons with a "competent person in charge thereof."
This refers to the person managing the office or the business of the defendant, such as the president
or the manager.

IN THE CASE AT BAR, The process server only made two attempts at Nation's office and
both attempts were made on the same date. He did not even attempt to serve the defendants at
their homes. This only shows a half-hearted attempt that hardly satisfies the diligence and best
efforts required from a serving officer.

Moreover, even assuming that Chinatrust were able to establish the impossibility of
personal service, the substituted service through Charlotte Magpayo was invalid. A "competent
person in charge" refers to one managing the office or the business, such as the president, manager,
or the officer-in-charge. However, with respect to petitioner Ricky Ang, we sustain the lower courts'
conclusion that he was personally served summons. Hence, dismissed tanan except as to Ricky. But
naluoy ang SC, hence dismissed without prejudice to refiling the case against the petitioners.
Yu v Yu
G.R. No. 200072, June 20, 2016
Section 15 of Rule 14

FACTS: Petitioner Philip Yu and respondent Viveca Lim Yu were married on November 18, 1984.
They had 4 children and maintained their conjugal home at Horizon Condominium, Pasig, Metro
Manila.

In 1993, however, Viveca left the conjugal home with their four children and filed a Petition
for Legal Separation against Philip before the RTC of Pasig City for repeated physical violence,
sexual abuse, etc.

Philip denied the accusations against him. He narrated that his marriage to Viveca was
arranged according to the Chinese tradition and that it was much later when he discovered Viveca's
excessively jealous, cynical, and insecure behaviour. He countered that since she abandoned the
family home, taking their four children away, she was not entitled to support.

Thus, Philip prayed in his Counterclaim for the declaration of nullity of their marriage due to
Viveca's psychological incapacity, rendering her incapable of complying with her marital
obligations. RTC of Pasig City rendered a Decision dismissing the Petition for Legal Separation in the
following wise:

“From the facts obtaining in this case, the Court finds that the parties are in pari delicto
warranting a denial of this petition xxx the same becomes moot with the declaration of nullity of the
marriage of the parties, on the ground of the psychological incapacity of petitioner, Viveca Yu,
pursuant to the Decision of RTC of Balayan, Batangas, which attained its finality.”

Claiming to be completely unaware of the proceedings before the RTC of Balayan, Batangas,
nullifying her marriage with Philip on the ground of her psychological incapacity, Viveca filed a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment.

According to Viveca, jurisdiction over her person did not properly vest since she was not
duly served with Summons. She alleged that she was deprived of her right to due process when
Philip fraudulently declared that her address upon which she may be duly summoned was still at
their conjugal home, when he clearly knew that she had long left said address for the United States
of America.
RULING OF THE CA: The Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage affecting the personal status
of private respondent is in the nature of an action in rem. With this premise in mind, it is beyond
cavil that the court a quo was justified in resorting to Summons by publication.

The court a quo validly acquired jurisdiction to hear and decide the case given that as
adumbrated, in a proceeding in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over
the res.

Husband’S Contention: Philip questions the CA’s judgment of setting aside the decision of the
Batangas RTC despite its own finding that said court validly acquired jurisdiction when Summons
was duly served on Viveca by publication.

ISSUE: WON the CA correctly annulled the decision of the RTC.

RULING: Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional

cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules
provides that judgments may be annulled only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction
or denial of due process.

Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party
outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his
side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party; prevailing litigant
prevented a party from having his day in court.

In the present case, We find that Viveca was completely prevented from participating in the
Declaration of Nullity case because of the fraudulent scheme employed by Philip insofar as the
service of summons is concerned.

Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him.
Through its service, the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. As a rule, Philippine courts
cannot try any case against a defendant who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines
because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears
in court.

Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, however, enumerates the actions in remor quasi
in rem when Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because they have
jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not
essential.

Thus, under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the
country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: (1) when the
action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of
which is property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest,
actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; or (4) when the property of the
defendant has been attached within the Philippines.

In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any of three
modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and
sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by registered mail to the defendant's last
known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider
sufficient.

In the present case, it is undisputed that when Philip filed the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, an action which affects his personal status, Viveca was already residing in the
United States of America. Thus, extraterritorial service of summons is the proper mode by which
summons may be served on Viveca, a non-resident defendant who is not found in the Philippines.

The Court finds that the service of summons on their conjugal home address cannot be
deemed compliant with the requirements of the rules and is even tantamount to deception
warranting the annulment of the Batangas court's judgment.

It is clear, therefore, that because of the service of summons at the erroneous address,
Viveca was effectively prevented from participating in the proceedings thereon. Annulment of
judgment of the Batangas RTC is proper.

Sulpicio Lines v. Napoleon Sesante

G.R. No. 172682, July 27, 2016

Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court

FACTS: September 18 1998, the M/V Princess of the Orient, a passenger vessel owned by petitioner,
sank near Fortune Island in Batangas. Of the 388 recorded passengers, 150 were lost. Napoleon
Sesante, then a member of PNP and a lawyer, was one of the passengers who survived the sinking.
He sued petitioner for breach of contract and damages.

Sesante alleged in his complaint that the boat left the port of Manila while Manila was
experiencing stormy weather causing strong winds and big waves to rock the boat back and forth,
and that eventually it sunk, but he managed to stay afloat and was washed ashore to Cavite and
Batangas, and that he had been traumatized, and he lost a lot of his important documents and
precious belongings, and that petitioners had committed bad faith in allowing the vessel to still sail
despite the storm.

In its defense, the petitioner insisted the seaworthiness of the M/V Princess of the Orient
due to its having been cleared to sail from the Port of Manila by the proper authorities, and that the
sinking had been caused by force majeure and that they had not been negligent since the crew made
preparations to abandon vessel.

RTC favored the respondent, awarding him damages. Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to the
CA. Pending appeal, Sesante passed away, and was substituted by his heirs. The CA affirmed the RTC
ruling but lowered the amount of damages and held that despite the seaworthiness of the boat, they
still remained civilly liable for being negligent.
ISSUE: WON a complaint for breach of contract and damages survives the death of the plaintiff.

RULING: An action for breach of contract of carriage survives the death of the plaintiff.

The petitioner urges that Sesante's complaint for damages was purely personal and
cannot be transferred to his heirs upon his death. Hence, the complaint should be dismissed
because the death of the plaintiff abates a personal action.

The petitioner's urging is unwarranted.

Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court lays down the proper procedure in the event of
the death of a litigant, viz.:

Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. — Whenever a party to a

pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be
the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty

3. days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of
his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his
duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the

deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator
and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

Substitution by the heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due

process. It protects the right of due process belonging to any party, that in the event of death the
deceased litigant continues to be protected and properly represented in the suit through the
duly appointed legal representative of his estate.

The application of the rule on substitution depends on whether or not the action
survives the death of the litigant. Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court enumerates the
following actions that survive the death of a party, namely: (1) recovery of real or personal
property, or an interest from the estate; (2) enforcement of liens on the estate; and (3)
recovery of damages for an injury to person or property. On the one hand, Section 5, Rule
86 of the Rules of Court lists the actions abated by death as including: (1) claims for funeral
expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2) judgments for money; and (3) all
claims for money against the deceased, arising from contract, express or implied.

A contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty, neglect or

malfeasance of the carrier's employees and gives ground for an action for damages. Sesante's
claim against the petitioner involved his personal injury caused by the breach of the contract of
carriage. Pursuant to the aforecited rules, the complaint survived his death, and could be
continued by his heirs following the rule on substitution.
PNB vs. Rivera
G.R. No. 189577, April 20, 2016

Section 1, Rule 16

Facts: Spouses Rivera executed a real estate mortgage in favor of PNB to secure the payment of the
loans. The mortgage was eventually foreclosed and the land was sold to Sosito at public auction.

Spouses Rivera filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale with Damages alleging that the
Spouses Rivera did not receive the notice of the auction sale as it was sent to the wrong address;
and had the Spouses been informed of the auction sale, they would have informed Sosito that they
had already paid their obligation to PNB.

PNB filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that the Spouses Rivera had no cause of action since
Act No. 3135 does not require personal notice to the mortgagor in case of auction sale and the
Spouses Rivera failed to attach the official receipts to show their substantial payments of the
amortizations.

Ruling of the RTC – in favor of PNB

“the same failed to state a cause of action. There being a proper notice to plaintiffs of the auction
sale of their mortgaged property, defendants had not violated any rights of plaintiffs from which a
cause of action had arisen.”

Ruling of the CA – reversed; remanded to the case back to RTC

“allegations in the Complaint sufficiently made out a cause of action against PNB.”

Issue: WON there is failure to state a cause of action

Ruling: No, there was cause of action.

Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action distinguished

Lack of cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. Dismissal due
to lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on
the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff. It is a proper ground for
a demurrer to evidence.

In this case, the RTC could not have dismissed the Complaint due to lack of cause of action for as
stated above, such ground may only be raised after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of
his evidence. If the allegations of the complaint do not state the concurrence of the above elements,
the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action which is the proper remedy under Section 1 (g) of Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides:

Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:

(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
Dom: Lack of cause of action – may be raised only after presentation of evidence; Failure to state a
cause of action – may be raised only before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading.
 In the present case, since PNB contested that there was lack of cause of action, the SC ruled that
the RTC could not have dismissed the case simply because there has been no presentation of
evidence, yet. To reiterate, lack of cause of action, as a ground, may only be raised after the
presentation of evidence.

Spouses Rivera sufficiently stated a cause of action

“By filing a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a cause of action,
defendant-appellee PNB hypothetically admits the material allegations in the complaint:

*long list of allegations made by PNB (basically admitting that they sent the notice to the wrong
address)

The foregoing allegations of non-receipt by plaintiffs-appellants of any notice of the auction sale and
their full payment of their obligation to defendant-appellee PNB are hypothetically admitted by the
latter and sufficiently make out a cause of action against defendants-appellees. Whether said
allegations are true or not are inconsequential to a determination of the sufficiency of the
allegations in the complaint.
REPUBLIC VS SANDIGANBAYAN, TANTOCO, SANTIAGO, MARCOS
G.R. No. 188881 April 21, 2014

Discovery Procedures
Rules 27 & 28

FACTS: The PCGG, in behalf of the Republic, commenced a civil case against private respondents
(Tantoco & Santiago) for "for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages”pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 of President Corazon C. Aquino.

Tantoco et al filed the following pleadings: (1) Motion to Strike Out Some Portions of The
Complaint and Bill Of Particulars Of Other Portions, (2)Motion for Leave to File Interrogatories and
(3) Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents.

The Interrogatories, in essence, asked the following questions: What specific properties
does the plaintiff claim it has the right to recover? What specific acts were committed by defendants
in concert with Marcos, and what acts were in furtherance of the Marcos’ plans?

The Motion for Production of Documents asked for the following: (1) “official records and
other evidence on the basis of which the verification of the Amended Complaint asserted that the
allegations thereof are true and correct”, (2) documents in the PCGG’s pre-trial brief intended to be
marked as exhibits, (3) PCGG’s minutes of the meeting on the decision to file complaint.

Sandiganbayan admitted these Interrogatories and granted the Motion for Production of
Documents. It however denied the Motion for Bill of Particulars. PCGG filed a motion for
reconsideration arguing that: the motion for production is purposeless since the documents are to
be marked during the pre-trial, defendants already know these documents since these are clearly
described in the pre-trial brief, and some of the documents are privileged in character. It also argues
that the interrogatories are not specific enough.

The Sandiganbayan resolved in favour of the defendants by denying the motion for recon of
PCGG and permitting the admission of the interrogatories.

ISSUE: WON Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion by denying their motion for recon?

CONTENTIONS OF PCGG:

(1) The interrogatories ask for factual matters which are the subject matters of a motion for bill of
particulars.
(2)The interrogatories were not specific enough, and were not addressed to specific persons of the
PCGG.
(3) The documents are privileged, and were marked preliminarily during pre-trial.

RULING: NO. Sandiganbayan is correct. Involved in the present proceedings are two of the
modes of discovery provided in the Rules of Court: interrogatories to parties, and production
and inspection of documents and things.

PURPOSE OF MODES OF DISCOVERY

The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along
with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the
parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident
purpose is, to repeat, to enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the
fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said trials
are carried on in the dark.To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or
interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated party is called as a witness to testify orally at
trial. The inquiry extends to all facts which are relevant, whether they be ultimate or
evidentiary, excepting only those matters which are privileged. The objective is as much to give
every party the fullest possible information of all the relevant facts before the trial.
What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may be useful in the
preparation for trial, hence, "the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and
liberal treatment.To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has
in his possession.In line with this principle of according liberal treatment to the deposition-
discovery mechanism,such modes of discoverymay be availed of without leave of court and
generally without court intervention.The Rules of Court explicitly provide that leave of court is
not necessary to avail of said modes of discovery after answer to the complaint has been
served. It is only when an answer has not yet been filed (but after jurisdiction has been obtained
over the defendant or property subject of the action) that prior leave of court is needed to avail of
these modes of discovery, the reason being that at that time the issues are not yet joined and
the disputed facts are not clear. On the other hand, leave of court is required as regards discovery
by (a) production or inspection of documents or things in accordance with Rule 27, or (b) physical
and mental examination of persons under Rule 28, which may be granted upon due application and
a showing of due cause.

LIMITATION OF MODES OF DISCOVERY

Of course, there are limitations to discovery. Limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that
the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or
oppress the person subject to the inquiry and when it touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches
upon the recognized domains of privilege. In sum, the liberty of a party to make discovery is well
nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the
inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law.
IN THE CASE AT BAR – AS TO INTERROGATORIES:
1.) The PCGG was wrong in contending that the factual matters asked are supposedly subjects of a
bill of particulars. A bill of particulars may elicit only ultimate, not so-called evidentiary facts.
The latter are without doubt proper subject of discovery.As already pointed out, it is the PRECISE
PURPOSE of discovery to ensure mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts on the part of all
parties even before trial, this being deemed essential to proper litigation.
2.) Neither is PCGG’s contention that the interrogatories are defective since they are not specific
enough. What the PCGG may properly do is to object to specific items of the interrogatories, on the
ground of lack of relevancy, or privilege, or that the inquiries are being made in bad faith, or simply
to embarass or oppress it. But until such an objection is presented and sustained, the
obligation to answer subsists. And as to the specificity as to whom the interrogatories are
propounded, the Supreme Court ruled that such argument of PCGG cannot be invoked since Rule 25
of the Rules of Court (old rules) state that when it is addressed to a juridical entity, it shall be
answered any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf.
IN THE CASE AT BAR – AS TO THE PRODUCTION OF DOCS:
The documents are not privileged in character (wala gi-discuss sa SC nganu dili privileged). The
Court finds that, contrary to the petitioner's theory, there is good cause for the production and
inspection of the documents. Some of the documents are, according to the verification of the
amended complaint, the basis of several of the material allegations of said complaint. Others,
admittedly, are to be used in evidence by the plaintiff. It is matters such as these into which inquiry
is precisely allowed by the rules of discovery, to the end that the parties may ADEQUATELY
PREPARE for pre-trial and trial. Hence, the SC ruled in favour of the defendants and denied the
petition of the Republic.
SPOUSES AFULUGENCIA VS METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO.
G.R. No. 185145 February 5, 2014
FACTS:
Spouses Afulugencia filed a complaint for nullification of mortgage, foreclosure, auction sale,
and other documents against MBTC. Spouses filed a motion to issue a Subpoena
ducestecumadtestificandum to require MBTS’s officer to appear and testify as their witnesses, and
to bring the documents relative to their loan with MBTC.

MBTC countered that there was no notice and that their officers cannot be compelled
because they were not initially served with written interrogatories. the RTC denied the motion
of the spouses. Motion for recon of Spouses prayed the lenient application of the rules. MBTC
countered that notice of hearing is mandatory and that the officers cannot be compelled to testify
absent any written interrogatories. Nevertheless, it was likewise denied by the RTC, coz the rule
requiring the service of written interrogatories cannot be relaxed.

On appeal to CA, it declared that since the officers represent MBTC, there should have been a
proper notice of hearing. Moreover, without service of written interrogatories, the officers could not
be summoned to testify. By failing to serve written interrogatories uponMetrobank, petitioners
foreclosed their right to present the bank's officers as theirwitnesses.

Hence, the petition.

ISSUES:
WON a valid notice and hearing should be served to MBTC officers
WON there must first be service of written interrogatories.

RULING:

SPS ARGUMENTS:
They argue what their motion is not subject to the requirement of notice and hearing because in
essence, there is no relief sought but just the process of subpoena because the motion required with
notice and hearing are those which involves an application for relief according to Sec. 4 and 5 Rule
15. They also argued that the officers do not comprise MBTC, but are mere employees of the bank,
hence can be called to testify without service of written interrogatories.

MBTC ARGUMENTS:
Notice of hearing is required coz the motion for subpoena is a litigated motion directed towards its
officers, whose testimony and documentary evidence would affect its case. The absence of prior
written interrogatories prevents the officers from being compelled to testify.

SC DECISION:
The lack of notice of hearing was cured by the filing of MBTC’s timely opposition – which signified
that it was notified of the motion of issuance of subpoena. HOWEVER, WRITTEN
INTERROGATORIES SHOULD BE SERVED. As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the
adverse party to the witness stand is not allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served
upon the latter. The purpose for the rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is
there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumedthat a party who does
not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party beforehandwill most likely be unable to elicit
facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverseparty to the witness stand as its witness. If a
party cannot elicit facts or information useful to its case through the facility of written
interrogatories or other mode of discovery,then the calling of the adverse party to the witness stand
could only serve to weaken its own case as a result of the calling party's being bound by the adverse
party's testimony,which may only be worthless and instead detrimental to the calling party's cause.
Another purpose is for the court may limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent the
calling party from straying or harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand.
IN THIS CASE:
The officers are in fact considered adverse parties based on the principle that corporations act
only through their officers and duly authorized agents. They cannot therefore call them as their
initial and main witnesses, nor may they be allowed to gain access to MBTC’s documents.
This is tantamount to building their whole case from the evidence of MBTC. As complainants, they
have the burden of proof. They cannot be allowed to, in a nutshell, ask MBTC to provide the
evidence upon which they will build their case.
DENIED.
Metro v Toledo
G.R. No. 190818 November 10, 2014

Sections 1 & 2, Rule 26

Facts: Respondent was the treasurer of Manila City who assessed petitioners with taxes pursuant to
a Revenue Code enacted by the city of Manila. Petitioner filed a protest against such assessment
assailing therein the constitutionality of such Revenue measure which was denied the office of the
city treasurer.

With this, petitioners filed such protest in RTC and sought a refund for the taxes already
paid. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss and later, an answer to petitioner’s complaint alleging
that petitioners never made any payment and as such there is no basis for any refund.
Petitioners then later sent a request for admissions and interrogatories to clarify the factual issues
but respondent did not respond to such request. RTC ruled that the revenue measure was null and
void and ordered a refund but the CTA reversed it denying the refund.

Issue: WON respondent are deemed to have admitted the facts alleged by petitioner’s due to its
failure to respond to the request for admission.

Ruling: No, there is no deemed admission of the facts.

Records disclose that while the case or proceeding for refund was filed by petitioners within
two (2) years from the time of payment,they, however, failed to prove that they have filed a written
claim for refund with the local treasurer considering that such fact — although subject of their
Request for Admission which respondents did not reply to — had already been controverted by the
latter in their Motion to Dismiss and Answer.

To elucidate, the scope of a request for admission filed pursuant to Rule 26 of the Rules of
Court and a party's failure to comply with the same are respectively detailed in Sections 1 and 2
thereof, to wit:

SEC. 1. Request for admission. — At any time after issues have been joined, aparty may file
and serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness
of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of
any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall be
delivered with the request unless copies have already been furnished.

SEC. 2. Implied admission. — Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall
be deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall not be less than
fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion,
the party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the admission
a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or
setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters.
Objections to any request for admission shall be submitted to the court by theparty requested
within the period for and prior to the filing of his sworn statement as contemplated in the preceding
paragraph and his compliance therewith shall be deferred until such objections are resolved, which
resolution shall be made as early as practicable. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Based on the foregoing, once a party serves a request for admission regarding the truth of
any material and relevant matter of fact, the party to whom such request is served is given a period
of fifteen (15) days within which to file a sworn statement answering the same. Should the latter fail
to file and serve such answer, each of the matters of which admission is requested shall be deemed
admitted.
 The exception to this rule is when the party to whom such request for admission is
served had already controverted the matters subject of such request in an earlier pleading.
Records show that petitioners filed their Request for Admission with the RTC and also served the
same on respondents, requesting that the fact that they filed a written claim for refund with the City
Treasurer of Manila be admitted.Respondents, however, did not — and in fact, need not — reply to
the same considering that they have already stated in their Motion to Dismiss and Answer that
petitioners failed to file any written claim for tax refund or credit. In this regard, respondents are
not deemed to have admitted the truth and veracity of petitioners' requested fact.
Ongco v Dalisay
G.R. No. 190810 July 18, 2012

Rule 19- Intervention

Facts: Respondent Dalisay applied for registration of a parcel of land. The court found respondent
Dalisay to have clearly shown a registrable right over the subject property and ordered that a
decree of registration be issued.

The Republic filed an appeal with the CA. While the case was pending appeal, petitioner
Ongco filed a "Motion for Leave to Intervene".
The Answer-in-Intervention sought the dismissal of respondent Dalisay's Application for Land
Registration on the ground that, contrary to the allegations of Dalisay, the subject property was not
free from any adverse claim. In fact, petitioner Ongco had allegedly been previously found to be in
actual possession of the subject land.

The CA denied the Motion for Intervention for having been filed beyond the period allowed by law.

Issues:WON Intervention should be granted

Ruling: No.

What qualifies a person to intervene is his possession of a legal interest in the matter in
litigation or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both; or when he is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody
of the court or an officer thereof.

No Legal Interest

Petitioner has not shown any legal interest of such nature that she "will either gain or lose
by the direct legal operation of the judgment." On the contrary, her interest is indirect and
contingent. She has not been granted a free patent over the subject land, as she in fact admits being
only in the process of applying for one. Her interest is at best inchoate.
Intervention was filed only after rendition of judgment
In any event, the Motion for Intervention was filed only with the CA after the MTC had rendered
judgment. By itself, this inexcusable delay is a sufficient ground for denying the motion. To recall,
the motion should be filed "any time before rendition of judgment." After the lapse of this period, it
will not be warranted anymore. This is because, basically, intervention is not an independent action
but is ancillary and supplemental to an existing litigation.

Petitioner cited cases in which intervention on appeal was allowed. But, the Court clarified that those
were only allowed because those parties were indispensable parties. As such, no final determination of
the case can be had without impleading them.
Capitol Hills & Golf Country Club V. Sanchez
G.R. No. 182738, February 24, 2014
Facts: On July 1, 2002, respondent Manuel O. Sanchez (respondent), a stockholder of petitioner
Capitol Hills Golf & Country Club, Inc. (Corporation) filed a petition for the nullification of the
annual meeting of stockholders of May 21, 2002 and the special meeting of stockholders of April 23,
2002.
On August 12, 2002, respondent filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents, which
the court granted in an Order dated September 10, 2002 directing to produce the following:
1. The list of stockholders of record as of March 2002;
2. All proxies, whether validated or not, which have been received by the defendants;
3. The specimen signatures of all stockholders as contained in the Stock and Transfer Book or on
the stub of the stock certificate; and
4. The tape recording of the stockholders’ meeting on April 23, 2002 and May 21, 2002.
Petitioners filed for a motion for reconsideration of the order until it reached the Supreme Court to
which such was still denied. Subsequently, petitioner agreed that pre-trial conference be deferred
until inspection and compliance of such order.
On January 11, 2007, upon inspection, only the
Stock and Transfer Book of the Corporation was presented.
The RTC issued on order reiterating the same order. At the same time, the trial court warned the
petitioners that failure to comply with such order will cause the petitioners to be cited in
contempt and subjected to payment of fine for every day of delay amounting to P10,000.
Fernando Medical Enterprises v Wesleyan University Corp
G.R. No. 207970, January 20, 2016

Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court

FACTS: Petitioner, a domestic corporation dealing with medical equipment and supplies, delivered
to and installed medical equipment and supplies at the respondent's hospital.
Due to the respondent's failure to pay as the total amount it owe to the petitioner, the petitioner
filed its complaint for sum of money in the RTC, averring as follows:
xxx xxxxxx
2. On January 9, 2006, plaintiff supplied defendant with hospital medical equipment for an
in consideration of P18,625,000.00 payable in the following manner: initial cash payment of
P6,392,500.00 with the remaining balance payable in 24 equal monthly installments, copy of
memorandum is hereto attached as Annex "A";
3. On July 5, 2006, plaintiff installed defendants medical gas pipeline system … for and in
consideration of P8,500,000.00 payable upon installation thereof under a Deed of Undertaking,
copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "B";
4. On July 27, 2006, plaintiff supplied defendant one (1) unit Diamond Select Slice CT and
one (1) unit Diamond Select CV-9 for and in consideration of P65,000,000.00 thirty percent (30%)
of which shall be paid as down payment and the balance in 30 equal monthly instalments as
provided in that Deed of Undertaking, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "C";
5. On February 2, 2007, plaintiff supplied defendants hospital furnishings and equipment
for an in consideration of P32,926,650.00 twenty percent (20%) of which was to be paid as
downpayment and the balance in 30 months under a Deed of Undertaking, copy of which is hereto
attached as Annex "D";
6. Defendant's total obligation to plaintiff was P123,901,650.00 as of February 15, 2009, but
defendant was able to pay plaintiff the sum of P67,357,683.23 thus leaving a balance
P54,654,195.54 which has become overdue and demandable;
7. On February 11, 2009, plaintiff agreed to reduce its claim to only P50,400,000.00 and extended
its payment for 36 months provided defendants shall pay the same within 36 months and to issue
36 postdated checks therefor in the amount of P1,400,000.00 each to which defendant agreed
under an Agreement, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "E";
8. Accordingly, defendant issued in favor of plaintiff 36 postdated checks each in the [a]mount of
P1,400,000.00 but after four (4) of the said checks in the sum of P5,600,000.00 were honored
defendant stopped their payment thus making the entire obligation of defendant due and
demandable under the February 11, 2009 agreement;
9. In a letter dated May 27, 2009, defendant claimed that all of the first four (4) agreements may be
rescissible and one of them is unenforceable while the Agreement dated February 11, 2009 was
without the requisite board approval as it was signed by an agent whose term of office already
expired, copy of which letter is hereto attached as Annex "F".
10. Consequently, plaintiff told defendant that if it does not want to honor the February 11, 2009
contract then plaintiff will insists [sic] on its original claim which is P54,654,195.54 and made a
demand for the payment thereof within 10 days from receipt of its letter copy of which is hereto
attached as Annex "G";
11. Defendant received the aforesaid letter on July 6, 2009 but to date it has not paid plaintiff any
amount, either in the first four contracts nor in the February 11, 2009 agreement, hence, the latter
was constrained to institute the instant suit and thus incurred attorney's fee equivalent to 10% of
the overdue account but only after endeavouring to resolve the dispute amicable and in a spirit of
friendship[;] IDSEAH
12. Under the February 11, 2009 agreement the parties agreed to bring all actions or proceedings
thereunder or characterized therewith in the City of Manila to the exclusion of other courts and for
defendant to pay plaintiff 3% per months of delay without need of demand;
xxx xxxxxx
RESPONDENT: Motion to dismiss and Answer
 The respondent moved to dismiss the complaint upon the following grounds, namely: (a)
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; (b) improper venue; (c) litispendentia; and (d)
forum shopping. In support of the ground of litispendentia, it stated that it (respondent) had earlier
filed a complaint for the rescission of the four contracts and of the February 11, 2009 agreement in
the RTC in Cabanatuan City; and that the resolution of that case would be determinative of the
petitioner's action for collection.

After the RTC denied the motion to dismiss on July 19, 2009, the respondent filed its answer
(ad cautelam), averring thusly:

xxx xxxxxx
2. The allegations in Paragraphs Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the complaint are ADMITTED subject
to the special and affirmative defenses hereafter pleaded;
3. The allegations in Paragraphs Nos. 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint are DENIED for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof, inasmuch as
the alleged transactions were undertaken during the term of office of the past officers of defendant
Wesleyan University-Philippines. At any rate, these allegations are subject to the special and
affirmative defenses hereafter pleaded;
4. The allegations in Paragraphs Nos. 9 and 10 of the complaint are ADMITTED subject to
the special and affirmative defenses hereafter pleaded;
5. The allegations in Paragraphs Nos. 11 and 12 of the complaint are DENIED for being
conclusions of law.
xxx xxxxxx

On September 28, 2011, the petitioner filed its Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings,
stating that the respondent had admitted the material allegations of its complaint and thus did not
tender any issue as to such allegations.

ISSUE:
WON the answer of respondents failed to dispute the ultimate facts alleged in the complaint.

RULING:
NO. Motion for judgment based on the pleading is granted.

[MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS]

The rule on judgment based on the pleadings is Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court,
which provides thus:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion
of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. . . .
The essential query in resolving a motion for judgment on the pleadings is whether or not there are
issues of fact generated by the pleadings. Whether issues of fact exist in a case or not depends on
how the defending party's answer has dealt with the ultimate facts alleged in the complaint. The
defending party's answer either admits or denies the allegations of ultimate facts in the complaint
or other initiatory pleading. The allegations of ultimate facts the answer admit, being undisputed,
will not require evidence to establish the truth of such facts, but the allegations of ultimate facts the
answer properly denies, being disputed, will require evidence.

[SPECIFIC DENIAL]
The ANSWER ADMITS THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF ULTIMATE FACTS OF THE ADVERSE
PARTY'S PLEADINGS not only when it expressly confesses the truth of such allegations but
also when it omits to deal with them at all. THE CONTROVERSION OF THE ULTIMATE FACTS
MUST ONLY BE BY SPECIFIC DENIAL.
Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court recognizes only three modes by which the denial in the
answer raises an issue of fact.
 The first is by the defending party specifying each material allegation of fact the truth of which he
does not admit and, whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters upon which he
relies to support his denial.
 The second applies to the defending party who desires to deny only a part of an averment, and the
denial is done by the defending party specifying so much of the material allegation of ultimate facts
as is true and material and denying only the remainder.
 The third is done by the defending party who is without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint by stating so in the
answer.

Any material averment in the complaint not so specifically denied are deemed admitted
except an averment of the amount of unliquidated damages.
In the case of a written instrument or document upon which an action or defense is based, which is
also known as the ACTIONABLE DOCUMENT, the pleader of such document is requiredeither:to
set forth the substance of such instrument or document in the pleading, and to attach the original or
a copy thereof to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall then be deemed to be a part of the pleading,
orto set forth a copy in the pleading. THE ADVERSE PARTY IS DEEMED TO ADMIT THE
GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE ACTIONABLE DOCUMENTunlesshe specifically
denies them under oath, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts, but the requirement of
an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the
instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is
refused.

[RE: MOTION TO DISMISS]

That the respondent qualified its admissions and denials by subjecting them to its special
and affirmative defenses of lack of jurisdiction over its person, improper venue, litispendentia and
forum shopping was of no consequence because the affirmative defenses, by their nature, involved
matters extrinsic to the merits of the petitioner's claim, and thus did not negate the material
averments of the complaint. NO. 6, 7 AND 8 OF THE COMPLAINT]
Not effective denial as it cannot be considered a specific denialConsidering that paragraphs no. 6,
7 and 8 of the complaint averred matters that the respondent ought to know or could have
easily known, the answer did not specifically deny such material averments. It is settled that
denials based on lack of knowledge or information of matters clearly known to the pleader, or ought
to be known to it, or could have easily been known by it are insufficient, and constitute ineffective
36 or sham denials.

[BASIS IN RESOLVING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT BASED ON THE PLEADINGS]

Court could rely only on the answer of the respondent. As such, the respondent's averment
of payment of the total of P78,401,650.00 to the petitioner made in its complaint for rescission (a
separate case) had no relevance to the resolution of the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings.
RAUL SESBREÑO, Petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., Respondents.
G.R. NO. 160689 MARCH 26, 2014

FACTS:

Raul Sesbrenñ o filed a case for damages against the Visayan Electric Company (VECO) on the ground
ofabuse of right. Sesbrenñ o accused the violation of contract (VOC) inspection team dispatched by the VECO to
check his electric meter with conducting an unreasonable search in his residential premises. However, the RTC
dismissed his claim, and the CA affirmed the dismissal – hence, this appeal. The RTC and the CA unanimously
found the testimonies of Sesbrenñ o’s witnesses implausible because of inconsistencies on material points. Before
the SC, Sesbrenñ o asserts otherwise.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the SC review and undo the findings of the RTC and the CA as to the credibility of
Sesbrenñ o’s witnesses and their testimonies.

RULING:

No. Considering that such findings [by the RTC and CA now contested by Sesbrenñ o are] related to
thecredibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, the Court cannot review and undo them now because it
is not a trier of facts, and is not also tasked to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. Verily, a review that
may tend to supplant the findings of the trial court that had the first-hand opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses themselves should be undertaken by the Court with prudent hesitation. Only
when Sesbrenñ o could make a clear showing of abuse in their appreciation of the evidence and records by the
trial and the appellate courts should the Court do the unusual review of the factual findings of the trial and
appellate courts. Alas, that showing was not made here.
 RUFA RUBIO et.al., Petitioners vs. LOURDES ALABATA, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 203947 FEBRUARY 26, 2014

Section 6, Rule 39
FACTS:

Petitioners Rufa A. Rubio, Bartolome Bantoto, Leon Alagadmo, Rodrigo Delicta, and Adriano Alabata and
respondent Lourdes Alabata were protagonists in an earlier case for annulment of declaration of heirship and
sale, reconveyance and damages before the RTC of Dumaguete The case was decided in favor of
petitioner. Initially Lourdes appealed the decision of the RTC, however, she later withdrew the appeal,
which in turn turned the decision final and executory. It was on August 20, 1997, the Entry of Judgment was
issued and recorded in the CA Book of Entries of Judgments. However despite the finality of the decision it
was never executed. Petitioners claim that their counsel at the Public Attorney’s Office, Dumaguete City,
was never informed that the entry of judgment had already been issued. They explained that although a
copy of the Entry of Judgment was sent to Atty. Ma. Lourdes Naz, the SAC-PAO lawyer in charge of their
case, she failed to inform petitioners of the issued entry of judgment before she resigned from PAO
sometime in November 1997. She also failed to inform PAO-Dumaguete of the said development. When
petitioners followed up with PAO-Dumaguete, it was of the belief that the appeal of respondent was still
pending. In November 2007, or more than ten (10) years from the date when the RTC-43 decision was
entered in the CA Book of Entries of Judgments, petitioners found out that the said decision had become
final and executory when their nephew secured a copy of the Entry of Judgment. On December 5, 2007,
petitioners, through PAO-Dumaguete, filed an action for revival of judgment which was raffled to RTC-
42. On February 28, 2008, after respondent filed her Answer with Affirmative Defenses, RTC-42 granted
her Motion to Dismiss and ordered petitioners’ case for revival of judgment dismissed on the ground
of prescription.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision can be subject of revival under the rules of court

RULING:
Yes. While generally, as provided by Rule 39 Section 6, once a judgment becomes final and
executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five (5)
years from the date of entry of judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a
motion after the lapse of five (5) years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be
enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within ten (10) years from the time the
judgment becomes final. However, due to the events that transpired, the Court find it proper to relax the
rules and allow the revival of judgment. To allow a strict application of the rules, however, would result
in an injustice to petitioners considering (1) that respondent decided not to contest the RTC-43 decision
and withdrew her appeal and (2) that no fault could be attributed to petitioners.
PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC.vs. FELIX PARAS AND INLAND TRAILWAYS, INC.,
G.R. NO. 161909 APRIL 25, 2012

Section 16, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court

FACTS:

Respondent Felix Paras is one of the passengers injured from an accident met by the bus operated by
Inland Trailways and a bus operated by petitioner Philtranco Service. Felix went through number operations and was
unable to obtain sufficient financial assistance from Inland for the costs of his operations, hospitalization,
doctors’ fees and other miscellaneous expenses, thus, on 31 July 1989, Paras filed a complaint for damages based on
breach of contract of carriage against Inland. On 02 March 1990, upon leave of court, Inland filed a third-party
complaint against Philtranco and Apolinar Miralles. In this third-party complaint, Inland, sought for exoneration of its
liabilities to Paras, asserting that the latter’s cause of action should be directed against Philtranco considering
that the accident was caused by Miralles’ lack of care, negligence and reckless imprudence. The RTC then rendered a
decision declaring Philtranco and Apolinar liable for moral and actual damages. The said award of damages was also
affirmed by the CA. Ultimately, Philtranco questions the validity of awarding moral damages on the ground that
the basis of such award is based on a breach of contract of carriage, which is not one of the enumeration
provided by the Civil Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the award of damages is proper.

RULING:
Yes. Section 16, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court defines a third party complaint as a "claim
that adefending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called the
thirdparty defendant, for contribution, indemnification, subrogation, or any other relief, in respect of his
opponent’s claim." Under this Rule, a person not a party to an action may be impleaded by the defendant
either (a) on an allegation of liability to the latter; (b) on the ground of direct liability to the plaintiff-; or, (c)
both (a) and (b). The situation in (a) is covered by the phrase "for contribution, indemnity or subrogation;"
while (b) and (c) are subsumed under the catch all "or any other relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim."
The case at bar is one in which the third party defendants are brought into the action as directly liable to the
plaintiffs upon the allegation that "the primary and immediate cause as shown by the police investigation of
said vehicular collision between the above-mentioned three vehicles was the recklessness and negligence
and lack of imprudence of the third-party defendant Virgilio Esguerra y Ledesma then driver of the
passenger bus." The effects are that "plaintiff and third party are at issue as to their rights respecting the
claim" and "the third party is bound by the adjudication as between him and plaintiff." It is not indispensable
in the premises that the defendant be first adjudged liable to plaintiff before the third-party defendant may
be held liable to the plaintiff, as precisely, the theory of defendant is that it is the third party defendant, and
not he, who isdirectly liable to plaintiff. The situation contemplated by appellants would properly pertain to
situation (a) above wherein the third party defendant is being sued for contribution, indemnity or
subrogation, or simply stated, for a defendant's "remedy over".
 G.R. NO. 171750 JANUARY 25, 2012
UNITED PULP AND PAPER INC., Petitioner vs. ACROPOLIS CENTRAL GUARANTY CORP., Respondent.

FACTS:

On May 14, 2002, United Pulp and Paper Co., Inc. (UPPC) filed a civil case for collection of the
amount of P42,844,353.14 against Unibox Packaging Corporation (Unibox) and Vicente Ortega (Ortega)
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 148 (RTC). UPPC also prayed for a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment against the properties of Unibox and Ortega for the reason that the latter were on the verge
of insolvency and were transferring assets in fraud of creditors. On August 29, 2002, the RTC issued the
Writ of Attachment after UPPC

posted a bond in the same amount of its claim. By virtue of the said writ, several properties and
assets of Unibox and Ortega were attached. On October 10, 2002, Unibox and Ortega filed their
Motion for the Discharge of Attachment, praying that they be allowed to file a counter-bond in the
amount of P42,844,353.14 and that the writ of preliminary attachment be discharged after the filing
of such bond. Although this was opposed by UPPC, the RTC, in its Order dated October 25, 2002,
granted the said motion for the discharge of the writ of attachment subject to the condition that
Unibox and Ortega file a counter-bond. Thus, on November 21, 2002, respondent Acropolis Central
Guaranty Corporation (Acropolis) issued the Defendant’s Bond for Dissolution of Attachment in the
amount of P42,844,353.14 in favor of Unibox.

On September 29, 2003, Unibox, Ortega and UPPC executed a compromise agreement, wherein
Unibox and Ortega acknowledged their obligation to UPPC in the amount of P35,089,544.00 as of
August 31, 2003, inclusive of the principal and the accrued interest, and bound themselves to pay
the said amount in accordance with a schedule of payments agreed upon by the parties. Consequently,
the RTC promulgated its Judgment dated October 2, 2003 approving the compromise agreement. For
failure of Unibox and Ortega to pay the required amounts for the months of May and June 2004
despite demand by UPPC, the latter filed its Motion for Execution to satisfy the remaining unpaid
balance. In the July 30, 2004 Order, the RTC acted favorably on the said motion and, on August 4,
2004, it issued the requested Writ of Execution. The sheriff then proceeded to enforce the Writ of
Execution. It was discovered, however, that Unibox had already ceased its business operation and all
of its assets had been foreclosed by its creditor bank. Moreover, the responses of the selected banks
which were served with notices of garnishment indicated that Unibox and Ortega no longer had funds
available for garnishment. The sheriff also proceeded to the residence of Ortega to serve the writ but
he was denied entry to the premises.

Despite his efforts, the sheriff reported in his November 4, 2008 Partial Return that there
was no satisfaction of the remaining unpaid balance by Unibox and Ortega. On the basis of the said
return, UPPC filed its Motion to Order Surety to Pay Amount of Counter-Bond directed at Acropolis.
On November 30, 2004, the RTC issued its Order granting the motion and ordering Acropolis to
comply with the terms of its counter-bond and pay UPPC the unpaid balance of the judgment in the
amount of P27,048,568.78 with interest of 12% per annum from default. Thereafter, on December
13, 2004, Acropolis filed its Manifestation and Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that
it could not be made to pay the amount of the counter-bond because it did not receive a demand for
payment from UPPC. Furthermore, it reasoned that its obligation had been discharged by virtue of
the novation of its obligation pursuant to the compromise agreement executed by UPPC, Unibox and
Ortega. The motion, which was set for hearing on December 17, 2004, was received by the RTC and UPPC
only on December 20, 2004. In the Order dated February 22, 2005, the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit and for having been filed three days after the date set for the
hearing on the said motion. Aggrieved, Acropolis filed a petition for certiorari before the CA with a
prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. On
November 17, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision granting the petition, reversing the February 22,
2005 Order of the RTC, and absolving and relieving Acropolis of its liability to honor and pay the
amount of its counter-attachment bond.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not UPPC failed to make the required demand and notice upon Acropolis; and
2. Whether or not the execution of the compromise agreement between UPPC and Unibox
and Ortega was tantamount to a novation which had the effect of releasing Acropolis from
its obligation under the counter-attachment bond.
HELD:
Petition is granted.

1. No. UPPC complied with the twin requirements of notice and demand. On the
recovery upon the counter-bond, the Court finds merit in the arguments of the
petitioner. UPPC argues that it complied with the requirement of demanding payment
from Acropolis by notifying it, in writing and by personal service, of the hearing held on
UPPC’s Motion to Order Respondent-Surety to Pay the Bond. Moreover, it points out that
the terms of the counter-attachment bond are clear in that Acropolis, as surety, shall
jointly and solidarily bind itself with Unibox and Ortega to secure the payment of any
judgment that UPPC may recover in the action.

It is evident that a surety on a counter-bond given to secure the payment of a

judgment becomes liable for the payment of the amount due upon: (1) demand made
upon the surety; and (2) notice and summary hearing on the same action. After a
careful scrutiny of the records of the case, the Court is of the view that UPPC indeed
complied with these twin requirements.

This Court has consistently held that the filing of a complaint constitutes a judicial
demand. Accordingly, the filing by UPPC of the Motion to Order Surety to Pay Amount
of Counter-Bond was already a demand upon Acropolis, as surety, for the payment of
the amount due, pursuant to the terms of the bond. In said bond, Acropolis bound
itself in the sum of P 42,844,353.14 to secure the payment of any judgment that UPPC
might recover against Unibox and Ortega. Furthermore, an examination of the records
reveals that the motion was filed by UPPC on November 11, 2004 and was set for hearing
on November 19, 2004. Acropolis was duly notified of the hearing and it was
personally served a copy of the motion on November 11, 2004, contrary to its claim
that it did not receive a copy of the motion. Acropolis was given the opportunity to
defend itself. That it chose to ignore its day in court is no longer the fault of the RTC
and of UPPC. It cannot now invoke the alleged lack of notice and hearing when,
undeniably, both requirements were met by UPPC.

2. No. There was no novation despite compromise agreement; Acropolis still liable
under the terms of the counter-bond. The terms of the Bond for Dissolution of
Attachment issued by Unibox and Acropolis in favor of UPPC are clear and leave no
room for ambiguity. Acropolis voluntarily bound itself with Unibox to be solidarily
liable to answer for ANY judgment which UPPC may recover from Unibox in its civil
case for collection. Its counter-bond was issued in consideration of the dissolution of
the writ of attachment on the properties of Unibox and Ortega. The counter-bond
then replaced the properties to ensure recovery by UPPC from Unibox and Ortega. It
would be the height of injustice to allow Acropolis to evade its obligation to UPPC,
especially after the latter has already secured a favorable judgment. Both questions
can be solved by bearing in mind that we are dealing with a counterbond filed to
discharge a levy on attachment. Rule 57, section 12, specifies that an attachment may
be discharged upon the making of a cash deposit or filing a counterbond "in an
amount equal to the value of the property attached as determined by the judge"; that
upon the filing of the counterbond "the property attached ... shall be delivered to the
party making the deposit or giving the counterbond, or the person appearing on his
behalf, the deposit or counterbond aforesaid standing in place of the property so
released."

Whether the judgment be rendered after trial on the merits or upon compromise,
such judgment undoubtedly may be made effective upon the property released; and
since the counterbond merely
Laude v. Judge Ginez-Jabalde, et al. G.R. No. 217456, 24 November 2015.

Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court

FACTS:

This involves the celebrated case of Jeffrey “Jennifer” Laude (Jennifer) killed at the Celzone
Lodge on Ramon Magsaysay Drive in Olongapo City allegedly by 19-year-old US Marine L/CPL
Joseph Scott Pemberton (Pemberton). A Complaint for murder was filed by Jennifer’s sibling,
Marilou S. Laude, against Pemberton before the Office of the City Prosecutor which Information was
later filed with the RTC in Olongapo City.

On 19 December 2014, Pemberton surrendered personally to the RTC Judge and was later
arraigned. On the same day of Arraignment petitioner Laude filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender the Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and a
Motion to Allow Media Coverage. The motion was scheduled on 22 December 2014, 2PM. According
to petitioners, they were only able to serve the Motion on Pemberton’s counsel through registered
mail. In any case, they claim to have also “furnished a copy of the [M]otion personally … at the
hearing of the [M]otion. On 23 December 2014, the Urgent Motion was denied, as well as its motion
for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Are the averments of the petitioner, that the 3-day notice rule should be should be liberally
applied due to the timing of the arrest and arraignment, tenable?

RULING:

NO. Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the
adverse party be given notice of hearing on the motion at least three days prior. Failure to comply
with this notice requirement renders the motion defective consistent with protecting the adverse
party’s right to procedural due process.

While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15
is a mere scrap of paper, an exception may be made and the motion may still be acted upon by the
court, provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor violate his or her due
process rights. The adverse party must be given time to study the motion in order to enable him or
her to prepare properly and engage the arguments of the movant. In this case, the general rule must
apply because Pemberton was not given sufficient time to study petitioners’ Motion, thereby
depriving him of his right to procedural due process.

Petitioners admit that they personally furnished Pemberton a copy of the Urgent Motion to
Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City
Jail only during the hearing. They attempt to elude the consequences of this belated notice by
arguing that they also served a copy of the Motion by registered mail on Pemberton’s counsel. They
also attempt to underscore the urgency of the Motion by making a reference to the Christmas
season and the “series of legal holidays” where courts would be closed. To compound their
obfuscation, petitioners claim that the hearing held on December 22, 2014, attended by
Pemberton’s counsel sufficiently satisfied the rationale of the three-day notice rule. These
circumstances taken together do not cure the Motion’s deficiencies. Even granting that Pemberton’s
counsel was able to comment on the motion orally during the hearing, which incidentally was set
for another incident, it cannot be said that Pemberton was able to study and prepare for his
counterarguments to the issues raised in the Motion. Judge Ginez-J abalde was correct to deny the
Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to
the Olongapo City Jail based on noncompliance of procedural rules. To rule otherwise would be to
prejudice Pemberton’s rights as an accused.
Reyno C. Dimson vs. Gerry T. Chua
G.R. No. 192318. December 5, 2016

Service of Summons

Facts:

The instant case filed by the petitioner, representing the other 14 complainants, against the
respondent, is an offshoot of the labor case entitled "Reyno Dimson, et al. v. SEASUMCO, MAC,
United Coconut Planters Bank (UPCB), and Cotabato Sugar Central Co., Inc. (COSUCECO)." On
September 22, 2003, the said labor case for illegal dismissal with monetary claims was decided in
favor of the complainants. Hence, SEASUMCO and MAC, as well as the members of their board of
directors, were ordered to pay jointly and severally the sum of Three Million Eight Hundred Twenty-
Seven Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos and Fifty-One Centavos (P3,827,470.51).

The LA's decision became final and executory but the judgment remained unsatisfied.
Consequently, the petitioner filed an Ex-parte Motion for the issuance of an amended alias writ of
execution asking for the inclusion of the board of directors arid corporate officers of SEASUMCO and
MAC to hold them liable for satisfaction of the said decision.

In an Order dated August 16, 2007, the LA granted the motion; hence, an amended alias writ
of execution was issued which now included the respondent. Aggrieved, the respondent elevated
the matter to the NLRC by filing a Memorandum of Appeal arguing that he was denied due process.

In a Resolution dated January 11, 2008, the NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and
sustained the findings of the LA. The respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the NLRC
Resolution dated July 31, 2008 denied his motion.

Hence, he filed a petition for certiorari with application for temporary restraining order
(TRO)/preliminary injunction before the CA. He maintained that the labor tribunals violated his
right to due process when the LA authorized the issuance of the amended alias writ of execution
against him for the corporation's judgment debt, although he has never been a party to the
underlying suit.

Issue:

Whether the respondent can be held solidarily liable with the corporation, of which he was
an officer and a stockholder, when he was not served with summons and was never impleaded as a
party to the case.

Ruling:

No. Following the explicit language of the NLRC Rules, notices or summons shall be served
on the parties to the case personally. The same rule allows under special circumstances, that service
of summons may be effected in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court. The service of
summons in cases before the LAs shall be served on the parties personally or by registered mail,
provided that in special circumstances, service of summons ,.nay be effected in accordance with the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court.

It is basic that the LA cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent without
the latter being served with summons. However, if there is no valid service of summons, court can
still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latter's voluntary
appearance. In this case, since the respondent is one of the officers of SEASUMCO, service of
summons must be made to him personally or by registered mail. However, as borne by the records,
it is evident that no service of summons and notices were served on the respondent and he was not
impleaded in NLRC RAB Case No. 12-01-00005-03. He was hauled to the case after he reacted to the
improper execution of his properties and was actually dragged to court by mere motion of the
petitioner with whom he has no privity of contract and after the decision in the main case had
already become final and executory.

The Court scanned the records but found nothing to indicate that summons with respect to
the said complaints were ever served upon the respondent. The petitioner in fact does not even
dispute· the respondent's claim that no summons or notices were ever issued and served on him
either personally or through registered mail. True to his claim, the respondent, indeed, was never
summoned by the LA. Besides, even assuming that the respondent has knowledge of a labor case
against SEASUMCO, this will not serve the same purpose as summons to him.

More so, the respondent did not voluntarily appear before the LA as to submit himself to its
jurisdiction. Contrary to the petitioner's position, the validity of a judgment or order of a court or
quasi-judicial tribunal which has become final and executory may be attacked when the records
show that it lacked jurisdiction to render the judgment. For a judgment rendered against one in a
case where jurisdiction over his person was not acquired is void, and a void judgment maybe
assailed or impugned at any time either directly or collaterally by means of a petition filed in the
same or separate case, or by resisting such judgment in any action or proceeding wherein it is
invoked.

Guided by the foregoing norms, the CA properly concluded that the proceedings before the
LA deprived the respondent of due process. Considering that the respondent was never impleaded
as a party respondent and was never validly served with summons, the LA never acquired
jurisdiction over his person. Perforce, the proceedings conducted and the decision rendered are
nugatory and without effect. This utter lack of jurisdiction voids any liability of the respondent for
any monetary award or judgment in favor of the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 13, 2009 and Resolution
dated April 14, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02575-MIN are AFFIRMED.
Heirs of Miranda vs. Pablo Miranda
G.R. No. 179638 July 8, 2013

Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court

FACTS:

Petitioners’ Complaint for Annulment of Titles and Specific Performance was decided by the
RTC against their favor on August 30, 1999. Without any appeal, the Decision became final and
executory. On December 11, 2001, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution but was not implemented. On
July 8, 2005, respondent filed an Ex-parte Motion praying that the RTC issue a “Break-Open and
Demolition Order” in order to compel the petitioners to vacate his property. But since more than
five years have elapsed from the time the Writ of Execution should have been enforced, the RTC
denied the Motion in its Order dated August 16, 2005. This prompted respondent to file with the
RTC a Petition for Revival of Judgment, which was granted.

On July 13, 2006, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal via LBC, which was opposed by
respondent on the ground that the Decision dated August 30, 1999 has long become final and
executory. Petitioners, in turn, moved for the transmittal of the original records of the case to the
CA, insisting that respondent’s opposition is without merit. Finding the appeal barred by
prescription, the RTC denied the Notice of Appeal in its Order dated October 10, 2006. Feeling
aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus with the CA praying that their Notice of Appeal
be given due course, but was denied on June 14, 2007 for being filed out of time. Petitioners assert
that an action to revive judgment is appealable, and that their appeal was perfected on time. They
insist that the Notice of Appeal, which they filed on the 15th day via LBC, was seasonably filed since
the law does not require a specific mode of service for filing a notice of appeal. Besides, even if their
appeal was belatedly filed, it should still be given due course in the interest of justice, considering
that their counsel had to brave the storm and the floods caused by typhoon “Florita” just to file their
Notice of Appeal on time.

ISSUE:

Was the Notice of Appeal filed on the 15th day via private courier like LBC considered to be
belatedly filed?

RULING: YES.

It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should be filed “within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court, pleadings may be filed in court either personally or by registered mail. In the first case, the
date of filing is the date of receipt. In the second case, the date of mailing is the date of receipt. In
this case, however, the counsel for petitioners filed the Notice of Appeal via a private courier, a mode
of filing not provided in the Rules. Though not prohibited by the Rules, we cannot consider the filing
of petitioners’ Notice of Appeal via LBC timely filed. It is established jurisprudence that “the date of
delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of
filing thereof in court;” instead, “the date of actual receipt by the court x x x is deemed the date of
filing of that pleading.” Records show that the Notice of Appeal was mailed on the 15th day and was
received by the court on the 16th day or one day beyond the reglementary period. Thus, the CA
correctly ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time.

Neither can petitioners use typhoon “Florita” as an excuse for the belated filing of the Notice of
Appeal because work in government offices in Metro Manila was not suspended on July 13, 2006,
the day petitioners’ Notice of Appeal was mailed via LBC. And even if we, in the interest of justice,
give due course to the appeal despite its late filing, the result would still be the same. The appeal
would still be denied for lack of merit. The Decision dated August 30, 1999 is already final and
executor.
 FRUMENCIO E. PULGAR
VS.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAUBAN, QUEZON, BRANCH 64, QUEZON POWER (PHILIPPINES)LIMITED,
CO., PROVINCE OF QUEZON, and DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
G.R. No. 157583 September 10, 2014

Rule 19, Intervention

FACTS:
The Municipality of Mauban, Quezon assessed the buildings and machinery of the Mauban
Plant, a coal-fired electricgeneration facility owned by the Quezon Power Limited (QPL), at a market
value of P29, 626,578,291,00 or an annual realestate tax of P500 Million, more or less.Quezon
Power Limited filed a sworn statement declaring that the properties had a value of only P15,
055,951,378.00 andtendered to the Municipal Assesor the amount of P60, 233,805.51 as
first quarter instalment payment of the real estatetaxes. The Municipal Assessor rejected it, hence
QPL filed a complaint for Consignation and Damages before the RTCagainst the province of Quezon,
the municipal assessor and treasurer, and the provincial assessor and treasurer ofQuezon,
tendering to the RTC the payment for the first quarter installment payment on real estate taxes.The
defendants asserted that QPL is estopped from questioning the authority of the municipal assessor
since it paidrealty taxes based on the former’s assessment. Flumencio, alleging himself as a taxpayer
and resident of QuezonProvince, filed his Motion for Leave to Admit Answer-in-Intervention, since
the power plant of QPL was responsible forthe mindless disturbance of the forest and marine
environment. His answer in intervention was admitted.The RTC later dismissed the complaint filed
by QPL for lack of jurisdiction in the absence of tax payment under protestwhich QPL tried to
skirt by alleging that it is the authority of the municipal assessor which it challenges. It ruled that
theLocal Board of Assessment Appeals that has jurisdiction to hear the case. It also dismissed
Frumencio’s motion forintervention since it had no leg to stand with the dismissal of the main case.
His motion for reconsideration denied,Frumencio filed a petition for review on certiorari before
the Supreme Court to challenge the dismissal of his motion forintervention.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing Pulgar’s motion for intervention as a consequence of the
dismissal of the main case.

RULING:

The petition lacks merit .Jurisdiction over an intervention is governed by jurisdiction over
the main action. Accordingly, an intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of
competent jurisdiction.

In this case, Pulgar does not contest the RTC’s dismissal of Civil Case No. 0587-M for lack
of jurisdiction, but oddly maintains his intervention by asking in this appeal a review of
the correctness of the subject realty tax assessment. Thisrecourse, the Court, however, finds to be
improper since the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over the main case necessarily resulted in the
dismissal of his intervention. In other words, the cessation of the principal litigation – on
jurisdictional grounds at that - means that Pulgar had, as a matter of course, lost his right to
intervene. Verily, it must be borne in mind that:

[I]ntervention is never an independent action, but is ancillary and supplemental to the

existing litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct nor x x x unnecessarily delay the placid operation of
the machinery of trial, but merely to afford one not an original party, yet having a certain right or
interest in the pending case, the opportunity to appear and be joined so he could assert or protect
such right or interests.
 Otherwise stated, the right of an intervenor should only be in aid of the right of the original
party. Where the right of the latter has ceased to exist, there is nothing to aid or fight for; hence, the
right of intervention ceases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

 DEUTSCHE BANK AG V. CA
GR NO. 1933065 FEBRUARY 27 2012

Consolidation

Facts:

Steel Corporation was in the process of corporate rehabilitation. Three of its creditors
[Deutsche bank, Investments 2234 and EPCIB] filed petitions for certiorari respectively before the
CA. Steel Corp filed a motion for consolidation of the three petitions for certiorari with the petition
for certiorari filed by Vitarich on the ground that the cases involved the same question of law :
whether creditors could be compelled to disclose the actual assignment price for credits in litigation
which were assigned by virtue of the corp rehab proceeding. The CA granted the consolidation of
Deutsche Bank and Vitarich petitions.

Deutsche bank filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA resolution, arguing that the
petitions were not related cases that merit consolidation. It stressed that consolidation requires the
petitions sought to be consolidated have a common question of law and are related.

Nonetheless the CA agreed with SteelCorp’s conclusion that when two cases involved the
same parties, or related questions of fact or related questions of law, these cases are considered
“related cases” for purposes of consolidation.

Issue:
Can the two petitions be consolidated?

Ruling:

No. The two petitions having no factual relationship with and no interconnected
transactions on the same subject matter, they cannot be deemed related cases. The necessity to
consolidate does not become imperative. The order of consolidation by CA is not in order.

1. for consolidation to be proper, the cases sought to be consolidated must be related.

a. when two or more cases involve the same parties and affect closely related subject
matters, they must be consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best interests of the
parties and to settle expeditiously the issues involved.

b. Consolidation is proper wherever the subject matter involved and relief demanded in the
different suits make it expedient for the court to determine all of the issues involved and adjudicate
the rights of the parties by hearing the suits together.

2. there is no sufficient justification to order the consolidation inasmuch as the Deutsche Bank AG
petition has no relation whatsoever to the Vitarich petition.
 a. To recall, the Deutsche Bank Petition is an appeal on certiorari from the order of RTC
Batangas in a special proceeding while the vitarich case is an appeal on certiorari and mandamus
from the order of RTC Bulacan in a civil case.

b. That Deutsche Bank AG is party to both cases does not make the proceedings intimately
related.
c. There is no factual relation between the two proceedings. SteelCorp proceedings
originated from SteelCorps rehab proceedings while vitarich came from Vitarich’s rehab
proceedings.

d. Neither are there interconnected transactions nor identical subject matter in Deutsche
bank and Vitarich petitions. The former involved an issue resulting from the assignment of credits
of RCBC to Deutsche Bank AG whereas in the latter, the issue arose from the assignment of
receivables of various creditors of Vitarich to several corporations and SPVs.

3. the rationale for consolidation is to have all cases intimately related acted upon by one
Court/Division to avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered. The purpose of the
rule on consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression and abuse; prevent
delays; clear congested dockets and simplify the work of the trial court. Consolidation aims to attain
justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties litigants.

a. the consolidation of Deutsche Bank AG petition with Vitarich’s does not appear a prudent
move ass it serves none of the purposes above. It will only complicate the resolution of cases as CA
would have to consider the different factual antecedents of the petitions.

b. The consolidation would unduly prejudice the banks and would lead to complications,
delay or restriction on the right of banks to immediate dismissal of Vitarich proceedings, since the
question of whether vitarich creditors have become law of the case.

c. The consolidation will only subject the parties to added expenses and unjust vexation.
The number of parties will substantially increase so as the cost of furnishing the parties with
pleadings thereby defeating the very rationale behind the consolidation.

4. consolidation of actions is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and its action in
consolidating will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. The CA may
prescribe reasonable rules governing the assignment of cases with similar questions of law of facts
to one justice. In case of consolidation, it may be effected only if the said cases are related.
Assignment is different from consolidation.
 PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V EXCELSA INDUSTRIES
GR NO. 173820 APRIL 16 2012

Doctrine The effect of consolidation would greatly depend on the sense in which the consolidation
is made. Consolidation of cases may take place in any of the following ways:

1. Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment in
the one trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation but is referred to as
such. (quasi-consolidation)
2. Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become a single
action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where several
actions are pending between the same parties stating claims which might have been set out
originally in one complaint. (actual consolidation)
3. Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and
requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge the suits into a
single action, or cause the parties to one action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial).

Facts:
Excelsa Industries filed an action for the annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure with prayer
for preliminary injunction and damages against Producers and RD before RTC Rizal. Producers filed
a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession before the same court. RTC Rizal ordered the
consolidation of these cases and ruled on them in one judgment. However, Excelsa treated the cases
separately and availed of two remedies, namely an appeal on one [ re: the validity of the
foreclosure ] and a petition on certiorari on the other [ re: the issuance of a writ of possession].

Issue:
Did Excelsa commit an error in treating the consolidated cases separately and availing of
separate remedies?

Ruling:
Yes.

1. When the two cases were consolidated and a joint decision was rendered, the cases lost
their identities.
2. The effect of consolidation would greatly depend on the sense in which the consolidation
is made.
3. In this case, there was a joint hearing and the RTC eventually rendered a joint decision
disposing of the cases both as to the validity of the foreclosure and the propriety of the issuance of a
writ of possession. This being so, the two cases ceased to be separate and the parties are left with a
single remedy to elevate the issues to the appellate court.
a. this is bolstered by the fact that when the appeal was disposed of by the CA by reversing
the RTC decision, the appellate court not only declared the foreclosure of the mortgage invalid but
likewise annulled the issuance of the writ of possession
b. when the court finally settled the issues in Producers Bank v Excelsa GR No 152071 May 8
2009, it reversed and set aside the CA decision and reinstated that of the RTC thereby disposing of
the said two issues.
 Chu v. Mach Asia Trading Corporation,
G.R. 184333, 01 April 2013

Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court

FACTS:
Respondent Mach Asia Trading Corporation is a corporation engaged in importing dump
trucks and heavy equipments. Petitioner Sixto N. Chu purchased on installment one (1) Hitachi
Excavator, one (1) motorgrader and one (1) payloader. Petitioner made down payments with the
balance payable in 12 monthly installments through Land Bank postdated checks. However, upon
presentment of the checks for encashment, they were dishonored by the bank either by reason of
“closed account,” “drawn against insufficient funds,” or “payment stopped.” Respondent filed a
complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City for sum of money, replevin, attorney’s
fees and damages against the petitioner. The RTC issued an Order allowing the issuance of a writ of
replevin on the subject heavy equipments. Sheriff Cortes proceeded at petitioner’s given address for
the purpose of serving the summons, together with the complaint, writ of replevin and bond.
However, the Sheriff failed to serve the summons personally upon the petitioner, since the latter
was not there. The Sheriff then resorted to substituted service by having the summons and the
complaint received by a certain Rolando Bonayon, a security guard of the petitioner. Petitioner
failed to file any responsive pleading. Upon motion the RTC issued an Order declaring defendant in
default and, thereafter, allowed respondent to present its evidence ex parte. The RTC rendered a
decision against the petitioner. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision.

ISSUE:

Was the substituted service of summons to the security guard considered to be a valid as to
acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner Chu?

RULING:

NO.

As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only when summons
cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted service may be
resorted to. Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:

“SEC. 7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business
with some competent person in charge thereof.”

It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that
the person who received the summons in the defendant’s behalf was one with whom the defendant
had a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summon. Clearly, it
was not shown that the security guard who received the summons in behalf of the petitioner was
authorized and possessed a relation of confidence that petitioner would definitely receive the
summons. This is not the kind of service contemplated by law. Thus, service on the security guard
could not be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted service.
The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. As a rule, if
defendants have not been validly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over their person,
and a judgment rendered against them is null and void. Since the RTC never acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner, the judgment rendered by the court could not be considered
binding upon him for being null and void.
 Palileo vs. Planter’s Development Bank
G.R. No. 196650, 08 October 2014

Proper Mode of Service & Filing of Pleadings

FACTS:

In an action for specific performance/sum of money with damages and prayer for the
issuance of writs of preliminary attachment and preliminary injunction, the RTC rendered a
decision in favor of plaintiff-petitioner Palileo dated July 15, 2006 and received by Palileo on July 17,
2006. Defendant-respondent PDB filed by private courier service – specifically LBC – an Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial, arguing therein that the trial court’s Decision was
based on speculation and inadmissible and selfserving pieces of evidence; that it was declared in
default after its counsel failed to attend the pre-trial conference on account of the distance involved
and difficulty in booking a flight to General Santos City. Petitioners’ copy of the Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and for New Trial was likewise sent courier service through LBC, but in their
address of record – Tupi, South Cotabato – there was no LBC service at the time. On August 2, 2006,
PDB filed with the RTC another copy of the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial
via registered mail; another copy thereof was simultaneously sent to petitioners by registered mail
as well. Meanwhile, petitioners moved for the execution of the Decision pending appeal. In a
petition for certiorari, the CA affirms the trial court decision but reversed itself upon MR, relaxing
the Rules in favor of PDB.

ISSUE:

Was the CA correct in relaxing the Rules notwithstanding that PBD’s late filing and improper
service of its omnibus motion for reconsideration?

RULING: NO.

The proceedings in the instant case would have been greatly abbreviated if the court a quo
and the CA did not overlook the fact that PDB’s Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New
Trial was filed one day too late. The bank received a copy of the trial court’s June 15, 2006 Decision
on July 17, 2006; thus, it had 15 days – or up to August 1, 2006 – within which to file a notice of
appeal, motion for reconsideration, or a motion for new trial, pursuant to the Rules of Court. Yet, it
filed the omnibus motion for reconsideration and new trial only on August 2, 2006.

Indeed, its filing or service of a copy thereof to petitioners by courier service cannot be
trivialized. Service and filing of pleadings by courier service is a mode not provided in the Rules.
This is not to mention that PDB sent a copy of its omnibus motion to an address or area which was
not covered by LBC courier service at the time. Realizing its mistake, PDB re-filed and re-sent the
omnibus motion by registered mail, which is the proper mode of service under the circumstances.
By then, however, the 15-day period had expired.
 SPOUSES VILLUGA V. KELLY HARDWARE AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY INC.,
G.R. NO. 176570 July 18, 2012

Doctrine: For Rules 10, 26, and 35. “The Second Amended Complaint supersedes only its
Amended Complaint and nothing more; A request for admission that merely reiterates the
allegations in an earlier pleading is inappropriate under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court; For
summary judgment to be proper (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact,
except for the amount of damages and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary
judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

Facts:

Kelly Hardware filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against the petitioner
spouses before the RTC of Bacoor amounting to Php 259,809.50, which corresponds to various
construction materials that the spouses allegedly failed to pay for. The spouses claimed to have
made partial payments in their Answer. The respondent then filed an Amended Complaint, claiming
that the aggregate value of the unpaid materials amounted to Php 279,809.50, that only Php 20,000
of such amount had been paid, leaving a balance of Php 259,809.50. The respondent thereafter filed
a Request for Admission, asking petitioners to admit the genuineness and truth of various
documents which show that petitioners’ liability indeed amounted to Php 259,809.50. Respondent
filed their Comment to the Request for Admission out of time. Subsequently, however, a SECOND
Amended Complaint was filed by respondent, amending the period covered by complaint, and
alleging that although partial payment was made, such payment covered prior obligations of
petitioners not included contemplated in the present complaint. After petitioners filed their Answer,
respondent filed a Motion, praying that the Comment of the petitioners on their Request for
Admission be expunged for being filed out of time, that the petitioners be considered to have
admitted the matters covered by the Request, and to be granted summary judgment in that regard.
The Motion was granted.

Petitioners’ appeal and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration grounded upon the
abandonment of the earlier Request for Admission by virtue of the filing of the Second Amended

Complaints were unavailing, hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Issues:
WON the honorable court should have denied defendants-appellants' (petitioners)
comment and ruled that there was implied admission contained in the request.

WON there should have been a summary judgment against defendants-appellants

(petitioners).

Ruling:

The Second Amended Complaint supersedes only its Amended Complaint and nothing more.
The respondent’s Request for Admission is not deemed abandoned or withdrawn by the filing of the
Second Amended Complaint. Despite this, the petitioners cannot be said to have impliedly admitted
their liability in the amount of Php 259,809.50. This is because the Request for Admission merely
reiterated respondent’s main allegation in its Amended Complaint, against which the petitioners
had already set up the affirmative defense of partial payment. If the factual allegations in the
complaint are the very same allegations set forth in the request for admission and have already
been specifically denied, the required party cannot be compelled to deny them anew. A request for
admission that merely reiterates the allegations in an earlier pleading is inappropriate under Rule
26 of the Rules of Court.
 However, notwithstanding the defense of partial payment, summary judgment was still
proper. When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the
Rules of Court allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment. Conversely,
where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. A “genuine issue" is
such issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham,
fictitious, contrived or false claim. Since the petitioners failed to specifically deny the respondent’s
allegation in its Second Amended Complaint to the effect that the partial payments claimed to have
been made were applied to prior obligations not covered by the present complaint, petitioners’ the
Answer to Second Amended Complaint no longer raised genuine issues of fact.

,
 GSIS vs Cancino-Erum
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2182 September 5, 2012

Section 2, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court

Facts:

This administrative complaint emanated from the filing on July 18, 2008 by one Belinda
Martizano (Martizano) of a suit to restrain the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), Land Transportation Office (LTO), Stradcom Corporation (STRADCOM), Insurance
Commission, and Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from implementing DOTC Department
Order No. 2007-28 (DO 2007-28), an issuance that constituted the LTO the sole insurance provider of
compulsory third party liability (CTPL) that was required for the registration of motor vehicles. The suit,
docketed as Civil Case No. MC08-3660 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Mandaluyong City, claimed
that the implementation of DO 2007-28 would deprive Martizano of her livelihood as an insurance
agent.3 She applied for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). On July 21, 2008, Civil Case
No. MC08-3660 was raffled and assigned to Branch 213 of the RTC, presided by respondent Judge Carlos
A. Valenzuela. On October 2, 2008, GSIS charged respondent RTC Judge Maria A. CancinoErum, the
then Executive Judge of the RTC in Mandaluyong City, with grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the
law, and violation of the Rules of Court. On the same date, GSIS also charged Judge Valenzuela with
grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, violation of the Rules of Court, and knowingly rendering
an unjust order.6 The charges against the respondents were both based on the non-raffling of Civil
Case No.MC08-3660. Allegedly, Judge Erum violated Section 2, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court by
assigning Civil Case No. MC08-3660 to Branch 213 without the benefit of a raffle.

Issues:

Whether or not the filing of an administrative complaint is the proper remedy against erring
judges.

Whether or not respondent Judge violated the rule on raffling of cases.

Ruling:

No. Administrative case is improper for Judges – We have always regarded as a fundamental
precept that an administrative complaint against a judge is inappropriate as a remedy for the correction of
an act or omission complained of where the remedy of appeal or certiorari is a recourse available to an
aggrieved party. Two reasons underlie this fundamental precept, namely: (a) to hold otherwise is to render
judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or to interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment; and (b) to follow a different rule can mean a
deluge of complaints, legitimate or otherwise, and our judges will then be immersed in and be ceaselessly
occupied with answering charges brought against them instead of performing their judicial functions.

No. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has expressly made the raffle the exclusive method of
assigning cases among several branches of a court in a judicial station by providing in Section 2 of Rule
20, as follows:

Section 2. Assignment of Cases. – The assignment of cases to the different branches of a court
shall be done exclusively by raffle. The assignment shall be done in open session of which adequate
notice shall be given so as to afford interested parties the opportunity to be present.

The avowed purpose of instituting raffle as the exclusive method of assigning cases among
several branches of a court in the same station is two-fold: one, to equalize the distribution of the cases
among the several branches, and thereby foster the Court’s policy of promoting speedy and efficient
disposition of cases; and, two, to ensure the impartial adjudication of cases and thereby obviate any
suspicion regarding assignment of cases to predetermined judges.

Circular No. 7, supra, stated that only the maximum number of cases, according to their dates of
filing, as could be equally distributed to all the branches in the particular station or grouping should be
included in the raffle; and that cases in excess of the number sufficient for equal distribution should be
included in the next scheduled raffle.

Despite not strictly following the procedure under Circular No. 7 in assigning Civil Case No.
MC08-3660 to Branch 213, the respondents as members of the Raffle Committee could not be held to
have violated the rule on the exclusivity of raffle because there were obviously less TRO or injunction
cases available at anytime for raffling than the number of Branches of the RTC. Given the urgent nature
of TRO or injunction cases, each of them had to be immediately attended to. This peculiarity must have
led to the adoption of the practice of raffling such cases despite their number being less than the number
of the Branches in Mandaluyong City. The practice did not absolutely contravene Circular No. 7 in view
of the circular itself expressly excepting under its fourth paragraph, supra, any incidental or interlocutory
matter of such urgent nature (like a TRO application) that might not wait for the regular raffle.

The urgent nature of an injunction or TRO case demands prompt action and immediate attention,
thereby compelling the filing of the case in the proper court without delay.
 Heirs of Pacencia Racaza, namely, Virginia Racaza Coscos, et al.
Vs.
Spouses Florencio Abay-Abay and Eleuteria Abay-Abay
G.R. No. 198402. June 13, 2012

Rule 37

Facts:

The herein respondents Spouses Florencio and Eleuteria Abay-abay filed in July 1985 with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City, Bohol a complaint for quieting of title, recovery of
possession and damages against several defendants that included Alexander Miel (Alexander), the
husband of herein petitioner Angeles Racaza Miel (collectively, the Miels). Subject of the complaint,
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 3920, was the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 4501-
663 and situated in Poblacion Ubay, Bohol, more particularly described as follows:

A residential lot bounded on the North by Emelia Garces (part); East by Emelia
Garces; South by Rosario Garces, Esperanza Rosello, Matea de Japson; West by
Toribio Reyes St., with an area of 600 square meters, more or less.

Spouses Abay-abay alleged that they acquired the property from the estate of one Emilia
Garces by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 12, 1979, which was registered with the
Register of Deeds on October 10, 1984. In mid-1984, however, therein defendants began erecting
residential houses on the subject property without the knowledge and consent of Spouses Abay-
abay. The refusal of defendants therein to vacate the subject land despite herein respondents
demand prompted the latter to file the complaint with the RTC. Alexander failed to file his answer to
the complaint, and was then declared in default by the trial court.

On May 30, 1988, the RTC rendered its judgment in favor of Spouses Abay-abay, and then
ordered the defendants therein to vacate the disputed property. A writ of execution was later issued
by the trial court to effect the removal of the structures, including the house of the Miels, built on
the property. When the Miels failed to vacate the property despite their repeated promise to do so
not later than January 11, 1991, the RTC issued on January 14, 1991 an Order directing the sheriff to
immediately destroy and demolish the house of the Miels.

On January 23, 1991, the petitioners then filed before the RTC their own complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 4856, for quieting of title, recovery of possession and damages against
Spouses Abay-abay. As the surviving heirs of Pacencia Racaza (Pacencia), petitioners claimed to be
the co-owners of the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 45C1-313 under the name of Pacencia
and more particularly described as:

A parcel of land... bounded [on] the North by Seashore and Josefina Ruiz; on
the South by Burgos St. and M. Garces; on the East by Public Land and on the West
by Marciano Garces now Public Market... containing an area of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
square meters...
 Petitioners claimed to have had actual, peaceful, continuous and public possession of the
land, disturbed only in 1985 when Spouses Abay-abay instituted Civil Case No. 3920.They also
questioned the unjustified demolition of their ancestral house, arguing that only Alexander, who
had no interest in the property, was impleaded in the case.

In their answer to the complaint, Spouses Abay-abay invoked the valid judgment and writ of
execution already issued in Civil Case No. 3920. They also raised the issues of estoppel and laches in
view of the petitioners failure to intervene in Civil Case No. 3920.

As part of their petition, the petitioners also ask this Court to admit as newly discovered
evidence a Certification of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of
Bohol, and a cadastral map of Poblacion, Ubay, Bohol, purportedly to support their claim that the
subject property is a foreshore land which cannot be owned by herein respondents.

Issue:
WON the petitioners are correct in asking the court to admit as newly discovered evidence
the above-mentioned documents.

Ruling:
No.

The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and is not the proper forum for the ventilation and
substantiation of factual issues. While the Rules of Court allows the introduction by parties of
newly-discovered evidence, as in motions for new trial under Rule 37, these are not to be presented
for the first time during an appeal. In addition, the term “newly-discovered evidence” has a specific
definition under the law. Under the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered evidence are:
(a) the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the
judgment.