North American Philosophical Publications

Hume's Theories of Dispositional Properties

Author(s): John Bricke
Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Jan., 1973), pp. 15-23
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical
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American Philosophical Quarterly
Volume io, Number I, January 1973

II. HUME'S THEORIES OF DISPOSITIONAL

PROPERTIES
JOHN BRIGKE

TN this paper I argue that, in A Treatise of Human makes several remarks which suggest a reductionist
* Nature, Hume endorses two apparently incon? theory of dispositions. He denies that such terms as
sistent theories of dispositional properties: a "faculty" and "occult quality" have a "secret
reductionist theory and a non-reductionist theory. meaning, which we might discover by reflection"
I begin by defending the ascription of each theory (224), i.e., that they designate non-empirical or
to Hume. I then canvass the reasons Hume had for non-observable properties. At one point he even
adopting each theory and try to show that his claims that these expressions are "wholly insignifi?
reasons for being a reductionist were not compelling cant and unintelligible" (224), though I doubt that
ones. In the last section of the paper, I consider one he intends this literally. Presumably Hume would
possible source of the continuing controversy say of "faculty" and "occult quality," as he earlier
between reductionist and non-reductionist on the said of "power," "force," and "necessary con?
question of dispositions, and I suggest a direction in nexion," that " 'tis more probable, that these
which the argument might profitably continue. expressions do here [i.e., in certain philosophical
Before turning to Hume, however, I must theories] lose their true meaning by being wrong
explain my terminology. I use "dispositional term" apply'd, than that they never have any meaning"
to designate those terms which stand for capacities, (162). The problem, then, is to give an account of
abilities, habits, traits of character, qualities of their meaning in terms of what is observable.
intellect, tendencies, dispositions (in the ordinary Hume objects, as well, to using the concepts of
sense), powers, skills, and so on. "Mental dis? faculties, occult qualities, and powers in allegedly
positional term" designates terms standing for scientific explanations. Part of his point is that
dispositions which are proper only to beings with terms like "faculty" and "power" do not designate
minds. By "reductionist theory of dispositions" I causal conditions, mention of which serves to
mean the theory that any apparently categorical explain what is to be explained. But his more
sentence containing a dispositional term (e.g., general point is that such attempted explanations
"This is water-soluble") can be exhaustively are vacuous. Speaking ironically of the "antient
analyzed into another sentence, hypothetical in philosophers" he says: "They need only say, that
form (e.g., "If this is immersed in water, it will any phaenomenon, which puzzles them, arises
dissolve"). By "non-reductionist theory of disposi? from a faculty or occult quality, and there is an
tions" I mean, minimally, any theory which insists end to all dispute and enquiry upon the matter"
that such an exhaustive analysis into overt hypo (224). Talk of its dormitive power does nothing to
theticals is not possible. As I am using these explain the effects of opium.
expressions, a reductionist theory of mental Hume is most explicitly reductionist in his
dispositions need not be a behaviorist theory. account of powers. "The distinction," he writes,
Surely Hume, if he is a reductionist about mental "which we often make betwixt power and the
dispositions, is not a behaviorist. exercise of it, is ... without foundation" (171),
"frivolous" (311), and an "error" (312). "Power
I. Hume's Reductionist Theory of consists in the possibility or probability of any
Dispositional Properties action, as discover'd by experience and the
practice of the world" (313). "The only known
In the course of his comments on certain difference" between two cases, in one of which we
"fictions of the antient philosophy" (219),1 Hume say that x cannot perform some action, and in the
1 All page references in parentheses are to Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1964).
Unless otherwise indicated, all italics are Hume's.
15

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 l6 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

other of which we say x can, is that "in the former in question can be brought out by considering two
we conclude from past experience, that the person formulas :
never will perform that action, and in the latter, (0 A,
that he possibly or probably will perform it" (312). (2) 0.-?.
Several things need to be said about the theory
(i) represents an apparently categorical disposi
expressed in these passages. First, it is not at all tional statement, such as "Smith can swim."
clear what Hume intends when he says that
(2) represents an overtly hypothetical statement
"power consists in the possibility or probability of to the effect that if certain conditions 0 are
any action" (313, my italics). I shall assume, for
satisfied, a will (or it is likely that a will, or it is
the purposes of this paper, that this is roughly
possible that a will) respond in a certain way R.
equivalent to: "to ascribe a power to some entity
The "->" represents causal implication. On the
is to say nothing more than that the entity will possibly
account of powers which I am here ascribing to
or probably act in a certain way."
Hume, he would be saying that (1) entails (2), and
Secondly, though Hume is not very explicit about
that (2) is an exhaustive analysis of the meaning
this, it is reasonably clear that the possibility or
of (1). This, of course, is the reductionist theory of
probability he talks about is one which is conditional
dispositions described at the start.
on the satisfaction of certain conditions. Thus, I
If apparently categorical dispositional statements
say that my enemy has the power to injure me if it
are in fact disguised hypotheticals,2 one can see one
is probable or possible that, given the opportunity
role they might play in explanations, that of
to do so, and the lack of countervailing motives, he
providing what Ryle has called "inference tickets."
will do so (312). Power, then, consists in the On such a view, to ascribe a dispositional property
possibility or probability of an action, if certain
conditions are satisfied. to some entity, or to all the members of some class
of entities, is to express a lawlike statement, or a
Thirdly, I do not think one should attach much law of nature, in terms of which one can both
weight to Hume's failure to include "certainty" in
explain and (in principle, at least) predict the
the formula which expresses his theory of powers.
behavior of that entity, or of the members of that
Hume's reason for not doing so, in the section from
class of entities. The point to stress, however, is
which the passage is quoted, is that there is usually
that the explanatory role of the dispositional
an "uncertainty of our judgment" (313) about all statement would be or be like that of a law, and
the factors which govern a man's behavior, and
not that of stating that certain causal conditions
thus our expectations about his behavior are, in an obtain.
expression Hume uses elsewhere, "attended with Construed as disguised expressions of causal
uncertainty" (124). But if there were not this connection, dispositional statements are open to
uncertainty about all the factors which govern a
the epistemological analysis which Hume applies
man's behavior, one's expectations would be to any causal statement. Their truth can only be
"entirely free from doubt and uncertainty" (124).
"discover'd by experience and the practice of the
To talk of certainty in such matters is not, of course,
world" (313), and not by "reflection" (224). They
to say that it is "inconceivable" that the person
go beyond the evidence, or the observations which
not do what we expect him to do. That is, the
support them, but only in the sense in which any
certainty in question is not the certainty of what
causal statement goes beyond the evidence. They
Hume calls "knowledge," but that connected with
do not go beyond the evidence in the sense of
what he calls "proof" (124). designating some unobserved or unobservable,
Granted the interpretations and emendations some secret, property, which is the faculty or power,
suggested, Hume's reductionist theory of powers as the "antient philosophers" claimed. They do
is as follows : to ascribe to x the power to perform
not designate any unobservable properties which
some action is to say no more than that it is
cause an entity to behave as it does.
possible or probable or certain that x will perform
that action, if certain conditions are satisfied. The II. Elements of a Non-reductionist Theory
crucial point is that the power is reduced, in some
sense, to the actions or responses of x in the Before defending my ascription of a non
appropriate conditions. The sense of "reduction" reductionist theory of dispositions to Hume, I must
2 Throughout this section, I am assuming that one can so generalize Hume's remarks about "faculty," "occult quality," and
"power," as to cover the other dispositional terms mentioned earlier.

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 hume's theories of dispositional properties 17

describe the principal elements of that theory. The independent of both stimuli and response, and,
non-reductionist is committed to the claim that together with the stimuli, to cause the response.
whenever a dispositional statement of form (i), They are not themselves conscious states, but rather
above, is true, another statement is true, and has partial causes of certain conscious events. Though
the form: the term "custom" is perhaps misleading, it refers
not to the conditioning process whereby the person
(3) W) [<f>a & (V*) ([*. & 0 J - A,)].? acquired the ability in question, but to an enduring
<? stands for an unspecified non-dispositional state of the individual which results from the
property which is attributed to a, and which is also conditioning process. Significantly, Hume is a bit
mentioned in the law of nature which begins with puzzled by the "customs" and "habits" he invokes
the universal quantifier. The formula as a whole here, and expresses this when he talks of "those
contains a "categorical" element, viz., <f>a. As very ideas, that are thus collected by a kind of
remarked earlier, a non-reductionist theory denies magical faculty in the soul" (24, my italics).
the possibility of exhaustively analyzing apparently Hume gives an analogous account of moral
categorical dispositional statements into overtly virtues and character. He distinguishes moral
hypothetical ones. This crucial feature of the non virtues from "the actions that proceed from them"
reductionist theory is conveyed, in the above (609), and a man's character from those of his
formula, by the undissolved categorical element. actions which are "sign(s)" or "indications" of it
In more detail, the reductionist theory which I (575). In morality, he claims, we should consider
shall ascribe to Hume comprises at least the "only the quality or character from which the
following claims: (a) If an entity possesses a action proceeded," because "these alone are
dispositional property, it possesses as well some durable enough to affect our sentiments concerning
the person" (575). These "durable principles of
more or less enduring non-dispositional property (f>.
(b) By virtue of having this non-dispositional the mind" are explicitly described as causes, and
property <f>, the entity is enabled or inclined to they may exist without having their usual effects,
respond in a particular way R, in certain circum? if the other necessary conditions are lacking. Thus,
stances 0. (c) This non-dispositional property <f> is a man may have a certain "character, even tho'
a causal condition which, in conjunction with particular accidents prevent its operation" (584) ;
certain circumstances 0, explains the entity's his character may fail of its usual effects, if there
response R. (d) One may need to postulate the are "some circumstances wanting to render the
existence of <j), even if one cannot identify <j>. cause a compleat one" (585). "Where it [i.e.,
(e) In the case of mental dispositions, (/> need not virtue] fails of its end," Hume writes, " 'tis only an
itself be a mental, i.e., conscious, state. imperfect means" (584). In his discussion of the
Hume's non-reductionism is apparent in his free-will problem, Hume criticizes the libertarian
discussion of abstract ideas. A person who knows for not recognizing that actions cannot be blamed
the meaning of a general term is said to have if "they proceed not from some cause in the
acquired a certain "custom" (20) or "habit" (21), character and disposition of the person, who
to have "collected" together those resembling perform'd them" (411). A man is not responsible
"ideas," each of which is a possible referent of for an action if it "proceeded from nothing in him
the general term in question (20). These ideas "are that is durable and constant" (411). Even when a
not really and in fact present to the mind, but only spectator fails to grasp the connection between our
in power" (20). Given the acquisition of the character and our actions, he judges (and rightly)
custom or habit, the appropriate stimulus (e.g., that there is such a connection, and that it would
hearing the word) "raises up an individual idea" be discoverable "were he perfectly acquainted with
(21), and it is this idea "upon which we reason" every circumstance of our situation and temper,
(21). The same stimulus is said to "revive" (21) and the most secret springs of our complexion and
the custom or habit, which in turn "produces" or disposition" (408-409). Thus, even if no explana?
"suggests" those other ideas "for which we may tion of a man's actions in terms of his character is
have occasion" (21). Clearly, these "customs" or now available, it is to be looked for: the lack is in
"habits" are thought to be enduring states of the our knowledge, not in the world.
person to whom they are ascribed, to be logically Hume's account of abstract ideas, virtues, and
8 This formula is adapted from one introduced by Leslie Stevenson, "Are Dispositions Causes?", Analysis, vol. 29 (1968-69),
p. 197. I am assuming it is legitimate to "quantify over predicates," while recognizing that the assumption is controversial.
B

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 l8 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

character clearly involves a non-reductionist vation (including introspection), but only by a

theory of dispositions. But as we have seen, Hume special process called "reflection." In rejecting
is also, at times, a reductionist. It is tempting to this "secret-meaning" analysis, Hume seems com?
try to eliminate the inconsistency. In what follows, mitted to saying that the meaning of dispositional
however, I shall not try to do this. What I shall do terms can be explicated without reference to
is attempt to determine more accurately the nature unobservable properties. There is no place, then,
and extent of the inconsistency, by considering for <f> in formula (3), since it is construed as
some, at least, of the reasons which Hume had for designating an enduring, but not necessarily
adopting each theory. I shall try to show that observable, non-dispositional property. Rejecting
Hume could, consistent with his empiricist <f>, one is left with reductionist formula (2).
premisses, have been a non-reductionist. His A second reason for Hume's reductionism is his
reductionism seems to result from occasionally theory of causation and explanation. To say that
misconstruing the character of his own premisses.4 A9s cause B9s is to say, in part, that there is a
constant conjunction between ^4's and B9s. It
would seem, then, that one's only grounds for
III. Some Considerations in Support saying that A9s cause B9s would be an observed
of Each Theory constant conjunction of ^4's and B9s. Further, if
explanation is causal explanation, to explain a B
I shall consider three reasons Hume had for one would need to refer to an A (together with the
being a reductionist: his empiricist theory of appropriate causal law). Given this, how can one
meaning; his theory of causation and explanation; ever be in a position to assert a causal law of the
and his theory of the mind as a bundle of impres? kind contained in formula (3) ? One could not
sions and ideas. observe the constant conjunction expressed by
In the first chapter of the Treatise Hume lays "(V*) (<f>x &> 0X -* Rx)", because, by hypothesis,
down his rule about the priority of "impressions" one would not observe the property designated by
over "ideas" : there can be no simple idea without <f>. Moreover, to explain an entity's responses by
a corresponding, and prior, simple impression; reference to the property designated by <j> would
nor can there be a complex idea the simple be to explain an observable by something unobserv?
components of which do not satisfy the rule for able, and thus give no explanation at all. Once
simple ideas. Given Hume's views about the again, rejecting <j>, one is left with reductionist
relationship between "ideas" and the words in a formula (2).
language, the meaning of a term is ultimately a A third reason for Hume's reductionism, at least
function of the "impressions" from which one in the case of mental dispositions, is this. If one
derives the "ideas" designated by that term. On assumes that a non-reductionist theory of mental
this analysis, to give an account of the meaning of dispositions requires enduring states or properties
a dispositional term would be to indicate those of consciousness, then no candidates are forth?
"impressions" from which the "idea" of the coming. Certainly there are no such candidates in
disposition in question is derived. The meaning of the case of knowing the meaning of a general term,
such a term, one might say, is exhausted by a being of a certain character, or being intelligent.
description of the observations which determine its The mind is, according to Hume, "nothing but a
application. The mistake of the "antient philoso? bundle or collection of different perceptions"
phers," on Hume's account, was precisely that they (252) ; it is "the successive perceptions, only, that
took dispositional terms such as "faculty" or constitute the mind" (253). It would seem, then,
"power" to designate secret properties, properties to make no sense to speak of an enduring state of
whose presence could be detected not by obser consciousness, designated by <j> in formula (3),
4 Throughout this paper I argue for the strong thesis that Hume, at least at times, endorsed a non-reductionist theory of
dispositions. It might be argued, however, that the evidence adduced for this claim in fact supports only a weaker thesis, viz.,
that Hume's non-reductionist practice is inconsistent with his reductionist theory. I am inclined to the stronger thesis for two
reasons. First, it is difficult to imagine that a philosopher such as Hume, one of whose principal contributions to philosophy was
a very distinctive theory of causation, would have so often used, in a careless or non-committal way, expressions such as "cause"
and "effect," which would for him be so heavily theory-laden. Secondly, as I argue in the third and fourth parts of this paper,
Hume had at least one very strong reason for endorsing a non-reductionist theory, properly understood, and no very compelling
reasons for not holding such a theory. Nevertheless, if only the weaker thesis is accepted, only minimal changes need be made in
the remainder of the paper.

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 hume's theories of dispositional properties 19

which is the part-cause of those responses which causal conditions. The form of the law would be :
reveal a man's mental dispositions. (4) (V*) (tf. & Ox] - R?),
Hume had, so far as I can see, only one reason
where <j> designates the unobservable ability or
for being a non-reductionist, and that is that he
trait of character in question.
was committed to a version of the principle of
But even if one grants that <f> must appear in the
sufficient reason. As is clear from many places in
law, why must it designate one of those seemingly
the Treatise, especially the chapters on determinism,
mysterious, unobservable properties which I have
Hume subscribed to the principle that every event
been invoking, in Hume's behalf, thus far?
has a cause, and, as a consequence of this, that every
Granting the necessity of <f>, one might insist that it
event is in principle explicable. For Hume, to say
stands for some known kind-property, e.g., being
that every event is in principle explicable is to say
sugar, or being a man. Thus, in a law governing
that for every event it is in principle possible both
the dissolving of sugar, </>x would be replaced by
to formulate the empirical law which governs its
"x is sugar," not by "* has some unknown
occurrence, and to locate that logically independent
set of conditions which would be mentioned in the property." There are special difficulties in this
suggestion which I shall consider later, but for the
protasis of the law.
present it is enough to notice that this will clearly
He is committed to saying that even if there is
not do for Hume's case of knowing the meaning of
no known explanation of an event's occurrence, there
a general term. In this case, what kind-property
is an explanation.
We can see how this bears on Hume's account of would one mention? Not the kind-property of
being a man, since one can be a man without
dispositional properties by considering, again, a
having the ability in question. Certainly Hume
man's ability to use some general term correctly.
We should not feel that a man's correct use of himself mentions no kind-property in the course
of his analysis, and he certainly seems to say that
some term is to be explained solely by an account
even if we cannot identify the requisite intrinsic
of those conditions which prompted him to use
property of the responding subject, we must assume
that term in a given situation. In terms of the
it to be present. If we do not, we admit that the
formulas introduced earlier, the man's response R
responses are inexplicable in theory as well as in
is not explicable solely in terms of the stimulus
practice. And this Hume does not want to do.
conditions 0, even in conjunction with a law or
lawlike statement of the form: 0a -+ Ra. Nor But can we not construct an adequate explan?
atory law for the case in question by referring both
would we say that a man's characteristic action is
to some kind-property and to the conditioning or
fully explicable in terms of those particular
training undergone by the subject? Such a law
conditions which prompted this action, or even by would have the form:
the fact that the action is, indeed, characteristic of
him. (5) (V*) {{Kx & Tx & OJ - Rx),
We find it natural to explain his correct usage where K designates the kind-property, perhaps
now by the fact that he has the appropriate lingu? being a man, and T the training process. But even
this will not do, since two persons might receive
istic ability, and to explain his particular (charac?
teristic) action by the fact that he does, indeed, the same training, and be subjected to the same
have that character trait. In most contexts, of stimuli, yet differ in their response. The law must
course, such "explanations" would be vacuous, like be able to account for this difference. Reference to
those of Hume's "antient philosophers." Yet Hume the conditioning of the subject may be necessary
himself feels the pressure to "explain" a man's for explaining the response, but it is not sufficient,
behavior in just such ways, as when he talks of in the way envisaged in (5). Moreover, we seem to
"customs," "habits," "magical faculties," and the think that the precise way in which it would help
rest. Since the stimulus-conditions are not sufficient, explain the response is by explaining how the
alone, to explain the man's behavior, but never? person came to have the ability he is now exercising.
theless the man's behavior must be explicable, The same conclusion results if we amend the law to
there is an irresistible pressure to say that the include reference to other features of the normally
custom or habit, the ability or trait of character, observable history of the individual. At each
must enter into the explanation. That is, the point, one seems required to postulate some
empirical law must, if it is to be complete, mention intrinsic, perhaps unobservable, property of the
the ability or trait of character, as well as the other entity to whom the disposition is ascribed.

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 20 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

But if ordinary kind-properties will not do, nor and he does talk of causes that are "hid, by reason
reference to the conditioning, or to the normally of their minuteness or remoteness' '(132). Moreover,
observable history of the individual, what sort of he was well aware that the object of science is to
thing is designated by </> in the non-reductionist discover extensive systems of laws, the less general
formula? Is Hume in fact committing himself to members of which are deductively related to the
the secret properties of the "antient philosophers" ? more general. In the first Enquiry he remarks that
To answer this, let us consider the case of the "it is probable, that one operation and principle of
the mind depends upon another; which, again,
solubility of sugar. Why are we disinclined to admit
that having the kind-property of being sugar may be resolved into one more general and
(defined in terms of certain macro-properties such universal," and that "the utmost effort of human
as color, smell, and taste) is sufficient, together reason is to reduce the principles, productive of
with immersion in water, to explain an object's natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to
dissolving? The reason is a compelling one, viz., a resolve the many particular effects into a few
presumptive law stated only in terms of macro general causes."6 In the Treatise he writes: "We
properties does not have a place in any reasonably find in the course of nature, that tho' the effects be
extensive system of empirical laws, within which many, the principles, from which they arise, are
system possession of just those macro-properties commonly but few and simple, and that 'tis the
provides a way of deriving that law from some sign of an unskilful naturalist to have recourse to a
higher-level law in the system. Consider the different quality, in order to explain every different
common assumption among natural scientists that operation" (282). Again: "To invent without
the dispositional properties of objects are in some scruple a new principle to every new phaenomenon,
sense to be cashed in terms of the micro-properties instead of adapting it to the old ; to overload our
of those objects. Thus, the behavior of gases is to hypotheses with a variety of this kind ; are certain
be explained by the micro-properties referred to in proofs, that none of these principles is the just one,
kinetic-theory. In just this way, we may assume and that we only desire, by a number of falsehoods,
that sugar dissolves in water because it has certain
to cover our ignorance of the truth" (282). Hume
structural micro-properties.5 Perhaps, then, <f> inmade little effort to work out the logic of such
the non-reductionist formula which I am attribut? deductive systems of empirical laws. But he does
ing to Hume refers to empirical, but not normally seem to have recognized the importance of such
observable properties of objects. systems, and that membership in such a system
In the next section I shall defend the claim that provides one criterion, at least, for an acceptable
something of this sort was in Hume's mind when law of nature.
he gave his non-reductionist account of many
mental dispositions. Before arguing this point, IV. A Reconciling Project
however, it would be well to consider two general
objections to ascribing such a view to Hume. It I wish now to argue that Hume need not have
might be objected, first, that Hume offers a very been a reductionist, that there is, in fact, no
simple-minded account of causation in terms of inconsistency between his empiricist premisses and
ordinarily observable constant conjunction, and, his sometime non-reductionism.
second, that he says nothing about the requirement As we have seen, Hume's reason for being a non
that, for a putative natural law to be an acceptable reductionist is a version of the principle of sufficient
one, it must have a place in some reasonably reason, while one of his principal reasons for being
extensive system of laws. But it seems clear that a reductionist is his theory of causation and
Hume did distinguish those regularities which explanation. Given the former, every event has a
justify one in formulating empirical laws, and those cause and is in principle explicable. Given the
which do not, as in the Treatise section entitled latter, one is only justified in asserting a causal
"Rules by which to judge of causes and effects," connection if one is justified in saying that the
5 Compare: "It is plausible to assume that in making an assertion such as 'All sugar is water-soluble' we are not just general?
izing the observed regularity that things with the secondary qualities of sugar dissolve when immersed in a liquid with the
secondary qualities of water, but express our belief that this empirical law admits of theoretical explanation in terms of the
microstructures of sugar and water and indirectly confirmable postulates about the interactions of their constituent particles."
Arthur Pap, Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (London, 1963), p. 283.
David Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge
(Oxford, 1961), pp. 14-15, 30

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 hume's theories of dispositional properties 21

alleged cause and effect are constantly conjoined. principle is a "maxim" (132) with a heuristic
Moreover, for something to be the cause of some? function: it prompts scientists to look for the
thing else, it must be identifiable independently of explanation of apparently inexplicable events. Did
that of which it is supposed to be the cause. There they not subscribe to this maxim they would,
is a difference, however, between saying that ^4's perhaps, be less determined in their search for the
cause B's, and saying that B's are caused, though unknown causes of things. But given this maxim,
one does not know what their causes are. In saying together with an inability to explain some event
the former, one gives the causal law which governs in terms of known conditions, one is justified in
asserting that the event has some secret, i.e.,
the occurrence of B's. In saying the latter, one does
not give a causal law (by hypothesis this is un? unknown, cause. As I have argued earlier, Hume's
known), but rather insists that such a law obtains, "magical faculties," "customs," "habits," and the
though it is not now known. The law could be rest are designed to mark a place for the requisite,
given only when one did discover, if one ever did, a but unknown, properties of an entity which must be
constant conjunction between B's and some other discovered if its behavior is to be explained. It is
events. precisely because an entity's behavior is not other?
In the case of dispositional properties, one can wise explicable that one must postulate the <f) of
consistently insist that an entity has some enduring, formula (3), though postulating the <f> is not yet to
non-dispositional property, the possession of which give the explanation.
is, along with the satisfaction of the other conditions We are now in a position to see that Hume's non
mentioned in the appropriate law, the explanation reductionism need not conflict with his empiricist
of its responses, even when one does not know what theory of meaning. If an expression such as "some
that property is. One's justification for so insisting presently unspecified property," or the sentence
would be that, in default of such a property, the "Every event has a cause," is meaningful, then the
entity's responses are not fully explicable. What the sentence "Sugar's dissolving in water is caused by
property is can, of course, only be discovered by its possession of some presently unspecified
the ordinary ways in which one discovers the property" is also meaningful. And the same is true
properties of things. of similar statements made in connection with
To say that some entity must have a property, linguistic abilities, traits of character, and other
at present unknown, because its behavior would mental dispositions. In each case, one may
otherwise be inexplicable, is not to offer a vacuous meaningfully speak, as Hume does, of "springs and
explanation of its behavior, for it is not to offer any principles, which are hid" (132), or of the "secret
explanation at all. To say that something is explain? operation of. . . causes" (132). In none of these
able, because it is caused, is not to give an explana? cases does talk of unspecified properties commit
tion, but rather to mark aplace for that factor which, one to a "secret-meaning" theory of dispositional
were it known, would provide the explanation. In terms in any sense Hume need find objectionable.
formula (3), <j> functions as such a place-marker. Hume would, I should think, insert the condition
Its presence indicates that a full explanation is not that the postulated property be in principle observ?
now available, though it is in principle available, able. But inserting this condition would not affect
and, given the interpretation provided when it the claim that Hume is, at times, a non-reductionist,
was introduced, it suggests something about the nor the claim that non-reductionism is consistent
character which the unknown property must have. with his empiricist premisses.
In particular, it suggests that the property must be What of the difficulties raised for a non-reduc?
an enduring property of the entity itself, rather than tionist theory of mental dispositions by Hume's
a property of its environment. view that the mind is nothing but a bundle of
Here it is useful to notice the account Hume gives perceptions ? As we have seen, no mental candidate,
of the principle of causality. This principle is, he i.e., no perception, is forthcoming as the referent
says, neither "intuitively nor demonstratively of <f> in formula (3). Nor, I would add, could such a
certain" (82). It is true nonetheless, or at least mental referent be provided, if <f> is taken to desig?
Hume takes it to be true, as in his defense of nate some presently unknown property, since this
determinism. He suggests, in fact, that one cannot would commit Hume to presently unperceived
not take it to be true, at least if one is a scientist, perceptions. It could, however, be the case that <f>
though the "cannot" here is a psychological, not a designates not some conscious, but some physio?
logical one. More interestingly, he suggests that the logical state. It could be that the unspecified,

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 22 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

enduring, and non-dispositional properties postu? perceptions. To this I would reply that the theory
lated in Hume's non-reductionist analysis of mentalI am attributing to Hume is not inconsistent with a
dispositions are physiological properties or condi? dualism of events, though it may be inconsistent
tions. Hume can have no logical objection to this, with a dualism of substance. But this, surely,
since he explicitly argues that there can be no a cannot be a reason for not ascribing the theory to
priori objections to causal connections between Hume. Further, it should be noted that, in the
brain states and mental phenomena (247). He says important chapter on personal identity, Hume
of some impressions, at least, that they "depend distinguishes, somewhat as Locke does, the
upon natural and physical causes" (275), and on identity of a mind from the identity of a man, as
at least one occasion indulges in a bit of armchair when he writes that "an infant becomes a man, and
theorizing about the physiological basis of thinking is sometimes fat, sometimes lean, without any
(60). I suspect, though I cannot prove, that in his change in his identity" (257). He distinguishes, too,
non-reductionist theory of mental dispositions, those perceptions which somehow constitute the
Hume assumed that a physiological account could mind of a person and that same person's "character
be given of those seemingly mysterious, unknown and disposition" (261). A man's body, and his
properties, which the principle of sufficient character, are enduring in a way in which his
reason required him to assume. Reading Hume in mind, i.e., the series of his perceptions, is not. I am
this way does much to eliminate the air of mystery inclined to think that, for Hume, it is that enduring
surrounding his non-reductionist account of mental thing we call a man's body which is ultimately the
dispositions, and satisfies the condition that the source of his identity, and which is the carrier, as it
property designated by <f>, though presently were, of those enduring properties, including his
unknown, be not unknowable. character, which are necessary to explain his
I earlier attributed to Hume the view that an behavior. To fail to find an enduring self within
adequate scientific law may well need to be stated the series of one's perceptions does not mean that
in terms of properties that are not normally there is not some enduring thing, namely one's
observable, and should be capable of inclusion in body, which continues through time, and which is,
an extensive system of empirical laws. Both in some sense, the subject of one's separate
experiences. A third objection, and the most
conditions can, I think, be met, if the <f> in a non
reductionist law governing mental phenomena radical one, would allege an inconsistency between
refers to physiological states. This provides a further my account of Hume, which requires the continuing
reason for interpreting Hume as I do. existence of physical bodies, and Hume's phenom
Several objections need to be considered here, enalist theory of perception. I do not think this
though an adequate reply to them would take me objection can be sustained, but I shall not attempt
much beyond the scope of the present paper. It may to show this here.
be objected, first, that in his "science of human
nature" Hume intended to provide only psycho? V. Conclusion
logical laws, such as the laws of association, and
I have argued that Hume is at times a non
not psychophysical laws of the kind envisaged in the
present account. To this I would reply that, reductionist with respect to dispositions, and that
though Hume restricts his own scientific interests there is no inconsistency between his empiricist
to the formulating of strictly psychological laws, in premisses and his non-reductionism. But in the
which both causes and effects are mental phen? course of this argument I have deliberately avoided
omena, he nevertheless grants that physiological an important issue which must now be raised.
explanations can be had for at least some mental Consider again the first three formulas used above :
phenomena. His reason for not giving them (0 Da
himself is simply that to do so "wou'd lead me too (2) 0.-+?.
far from my present subject, into the sciences of (3) W) ft. & (V*) ([*? & 0J -* Rx)]
anatomy and natural philosophy" (276). Secondly,
it may be objected that on the present account a In defending the claim that Hume is at times a non
man's body becomes the subject of his conscious reductionist, I have argued that he is at times
states, and that this fits ill with Hume's dualism, committed to the view that when a dispositional
and with his ironically unsuccessful search for a statement of form (1) is true, a corresponding
self or subject of experience within the flux of his statement of form (3) is true. But this is not, in fact,

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 home's theories of dispositional properties 23
sufficient to show that Hume is a non-reductionist Armstrong, defending the entailment of (3) by (1),
in the sense defined at the start. For if the disagree? proposes what he calls an "a priori argument."11
ment between reductionist and non-reductionist is Stevenson, as we have seen, talks of a "plausible
one about the meaning of dispositional statements empirical hypothesis." Now it seems to me that
of form (i), then the reductionist could be right, Stevenson's account will not do, since it fails to
even if it is the case that whenever a statement of bring out the stubbornly indefeasible character of
form (i) is true, another of form (3) is true. This (3), and fails, too, to explain the reluctance so many
would be possible if the relationship between (1) philosophers have had to accept a reductionist
and (3) were not a meaning-relationship. analysis of dispositionals. Armstrong seems to be
Some contemporary examples may help here. on the right track in suggesting that an a priori
Ryle, in The Concept of Mind, argues that (2) argument is the kind needed to settle the con?
provides an exhaustive analysis of the meaning of troversy, though the specific argument he proposes
(1), and thus denies that (3) is entailed by (i).7 He appears to be fallacious.12 And Hume, since he
may also wish to deny that (3) is true whenever (1) appeals to the principle of sufficient reason at this
is. In A Materialist Theory of Mind, D. M. Armstrong point, seems in fact to agree with Armstrong about
denies the adequacy of (2) as an analysis of ( 1), and the a priori character of the non-reductionist
affirms that (1) in fact entails (3).8 An interesting thesis.
third possibility has been suggested by Leslie If it were plausible, as Stevenson claims, to deny
Stevenson, who argues that (1) is exhaustively that (1) entails (3), and yet assert that (3) is true
analyzed by (2), and does not entail (3), thus whenever (1) is, one would have a neat way of
siding with the reductionist, but who also claims itreconciling Hume's inconsistencies about disposi?
is a "plausible empirical hypothesis" that whenever tions. One could say, perhaps, that he is a reduc?
(1) is true, (3) is true.9 Curiously, however, he tionist about language, and a non-reductionist
claims that whereas this "empirical hypothesis" is about the world. But it would be more interesting
confirmable, it may not be conclusively falsi to take up the hint provided by the fact that Hume
fiable.10 defends non-reductionism, when he does, by appeal
The differences in these positions suggest that it to the principle of sufficient reason. Perhaps non
may be profitable to see the controversy between reductionism is an a priori thesis, and correctly so.
reductionist and non-reductionist in terms of the Perhaps, that is, the principle of sufficient reason
reasons one might give for saying that whenever plays such a very fundamental role in our concep?
(1) is true, (3) is true. Hume's reason is, I have tual scheme that (1) does in fact entail (3).
argued, the principle of sufficient reason.

University of Kansas Received December 16, igyi

7 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York, 1949), esp. pp. 117-125.
8 D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind (London, 1968), pp. 85-88.
9 Stevenson, op. cit., p. 198.
10 Ibid., p. 198.
11 Armstrong, op. cit., p. 86.
12 On this see Roger Squires, "Are Dispositions Causes?", Analysis, vol. 29 (1968-69), pp. 45-47. Also, David Coder, "Some
Misconceptions about Dispositions," ibid., vol. 29 (1968-69), pp. 200-202. Armstrong replies to Squires, ibid., vol. 30 (1969-70),
pp. 23-26.

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