1) FELIX MARQUEZ vs.

THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS and THE SECRETARY-

TREASURER OF THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS

FACTS: Petitioner is a graduate of the Chicago Medical College, having received the degree of M.D.
from said institution on June 8, of the year 1922. No question appears to have been made by the
respondents with respect to the petitioner's qualifications of the physician's examinations in other
respects, but they have denied him admission to the examinations on the grounds that the Chicago
Medical College, where the petitioner was graduated, has been classified as a Class C medical college by
the National Medical State Board of the United States. For this reason the respondents, in accordance with
the regulations of the board now in effect, have denied the requisite standing to said institution and
excluded petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has a right to be admitted for medical examinations

HELD: NO.

In the argument for the petitioner it is admitted that under Act No. 3111, and the regulations now in force,
the petitioner is disqualified to take the examinations; but it is pointed out that at the time he began and
even when he conducted his course in the Chicago Medical School, said institution was still recognized as
a reputable medical institution; and the question submitted is whether the petitioner's case should be
governed by the law and regulations in force at the time of his enrollment in and graduation from the
Chicago Medical School, or by those in force at the time he filed his application for admission, on or
about September 26, 1924. It is submitted for the petitioner that his case should be governed by the law
and regulations at the time of his graduation. To hold otherwise, it is insisted, is to make the law
retroactive in effect and to do irreparable damage to the petitioner, who has pursued his work in the
institution referred to in good faith, believing that said school had the status necessary to qualify him from
examination. The position taken by the petitioner is, we think, untenable. The question whether a medical
institution is "a reputable medical school," in the sense intended by the law, is vested in the Board of
Medical Examiners, and although the action taken by them may conceivably, in isolated cases, result in
hardship, nevertheless the interests of the public require that the board should be free to exercise its
judgment and discretion without reference to the effect of the determination of the question in particular
instances. There can in the nature of things be no vested right in an existing law, which would preclude its
change or repeal. No one who has commenced preparation in a particular institution has any inchoate
right on account of that fact. If the law were otherwise upon this point, it would be impossible for the
Board of Medical Examiners to give effect to the knowledge which they from time to time acquire as to
the standing of medical schools; and an intending physician, upon matriculating in a particular college,
takes upon himself the risk of changes that may be made in the standing of the institution by the board.

2) GOMEZ VS. VENTURA, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR OF THE GOVERNMENT OF

THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, AND THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS

FACTS: Plaintiff, in this cause, prays for the annulment and setting aside of the investigation proceedings
particularly that of the Board of Medical Examiners’ Decision which forever revokes the plaintiff's license
to practice medicine and surgery. Plaintiff also prays that his status before the investigation be restored
and a medical license the same as what he had prior to the investigation be issued. The defendants
answered with a general denial and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. The Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Manila dismissed the complaint. The counsel for the plaintiff now contends the following: (a) the
charges against the plaintiff is not valid as the same was preferred by Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the
City of Manila, who, according to the plaintiff is not authorized by law to file charges with the Board of
Medical Examiners, which therefore acquired no jurisdiction over the matter; (b) section 9 of Act No.
2381 is null and void on the ground of unconstitutionality, since said section is foreign to the subject of
said Act, in violation of section 3 of the Jones Law prohibiting the enactment of any bill embracing more
than one subject and providing that the subject be expressed in the title of the bill; (c) even granting that
section 9 of Act No. 2381 is valid, it was repealed by Act No. 2493 and later by section 780 of the
Administrative Code; (d) the judgment appealed from and the denial of the motion for avoidance and new
trial was not correctly rendered.

ISSUE #1: WON the charges against the plaintiff is not valid as the same was preferred by the Assistant
Fiscal, who, according to the plaintiff is not authorized by law to file charges with the Board of Medical
Examiners (NO)

ISSUE #2: WON section 9 of Act No. 2381 is null and void since said section is foreign to the subject of
said Act, in violation of section 3 of the Jones Law (NO)

ISSUE #3: Even granting that section 9 of Act No. 2381 is valid, WON it was repealed by Act No. 2493
and later by section 780 of the Administrative Code (NO)

ISSUE #4: WON the judgment appealed from and the denial of the motion for avoidance and new trial
was correctly rendered. (YES)

HELD #1: NO.

According to Section 780 of Administrative Code, as amended by Section 12 of Act No. 3111, the law
does not require that the charges be preferred by a public officer or by any specified person; it even
permits the Board of Medical Examiners itself to require its executive officer to prefer said charges. From
the wording of the law we infer that any person, including a public officer, may prefer the charges
referred to in the above-quoted provision. Wherefore, the fact that the charges were filed by Assistant
Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the City of Manila, does not deprive the Board of Medical Examiners of
jurisdiction to hear said charges and to take the proper action according to law.

HELD #2: NO.

Court ruled that the matter contained in section 9 of Act No. 2381 is not foreign to the end pursued in said
Act, and that in view in the provision of said section it cannot be maintained that Act No. 2381 includes
more than one subject. The penalty provided in said section for the physician or dentist who prescribes
opium for a patient whose physical condition does not require the use of said drug, is one of the means
employed by the Legislature to attain the purpose of Act No. 2381, which is, to prohibit unnecessary use
of opium; it is one of the details subordinate to the purpose in view. Such punishment is not the end
contemplated in Act No. 2381, but, as we have just said, it is a means employed to regulate the use of
opium.
The constitutional requirement is addressed to the subject, not to the details of the act. The subject must
be single; the provisions, to accomplished the object involved in that subject, may be multifarious. . . .
None of the provisions of a statute will be held unconstitutional when they all relate, directly or indirectly,
to the same subject, have natural connection, and are not foreign to the subject expressed in the title. As
very frequently expressed by the courts, any provisions that are germane to the subject expressed in the
title may properly be included in the act.

In order to hold that section 9 of Act No. 2381 is unconstitutional on the ground alleged by the plaintiff,
the violation of the constitutional provision must be substantial and manifest. It is not so in the case at bar.

HELD #3: NO.

Act No. 310 provided that the Board of medical Examiners could revoke licenses for "unprofessional
conduct," without defining the term. Act No. 1761 (the Opium Law) provided that illegally prescribing
opium should be cause for revocation of medical licenses. Clearly, the Opium Law did not repeal Act No.
310. Act No. 2381 — also an Opium Law — in its section 9, repeated the provision as to doctors and
dentists. The repetition did not repeal Act No. 310. Act No. 2493, section 11, provided that certificates of
physicians are revocable for "unprofessional conduct," without defining the phrase. In other words, so far
as revocation of licenses is concerned, Act No. 2493 is mere re-enactment of Act No. 310. The re-
enactment of the said portion of Act No. 310 did not repeal section 9 of the Opium Law. If said section 9
has been repealed, it must be by Act No. 3111, which amends Act No. 2493 (Ad. Code, sec. 780), by an
addition after the words "unprofessional conduct" of the following:

"The words "unprofessional conduct, immoral, or dishonorable conduct" as used in this chapter shall be
construed to include the following acts: (1) Procuring, aiding or abetting a criminal abortion; (2)
advertising, either in his own name or in the name of any other person, firm, association, or corporation,
in any written or printed paper, or document, of medical business in which untruthful or improbable
promises are made, or being employed by, or in the service of any person, firm, association or corporation
so advertising, or advertising in any obscene manner derogatory to good morals; (3) habitual
intemperance or addition to the use of morphine, opium, cocaine or other drugs having a similar effect;
(4) conviction of a crime or misdemeanor involving dishonorable conduct; and (5) wilfully betraying a
professional secret."

It cannot be seriously contended that aside from the five examples specified there can be no other conduct
of a physician deemed "unprofessional" conduct theretofore deemed grounds for revocation licenses. The
maxim expressio unius est exclussio alterius should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative
intent and should not be permitted to defeat the plain indicated purpose of the Legislature. It does not
apply when words are mentioned by way of example, or to remove doubts. If, therefore, there exists,
"unprofessional conduct" not specified in the laws, with more reason does the criminal use of opium
remain a specific cause for revocation of license.

HELD #4: YES.

As the Attorney-General correctly observes, the powers vested in the Board of Medical Examiners to
suspend or revoke a physician's certificate of registration and the authority granted the Secretary of the
Interior of confirming or reversing the decision of said board of examiners, partake of a quasi-judicial
character, that is, involve the use of discretion. For this reason, the exercise thereof cannot be reviewed by
mandamus, which is the nature of this cause on its merits.

As in the case of courts and judicial officers, it is a rule of general application that mandamus will not lie
to review or control the acts of executive officers and boards of state and federal governments in respect
of matters as to which they are vested with discretion. In other words, they cannot be compelled to act or
render a decision in any particular way, and this is so, even though the exercise of this discretion requires
the construction and interpretation of statutes. Where public officials exercise their discretion, it is said
that their conclusions, although disputable, are impregnable to mandamus.

3) DECS and Dir. of Educational Measurement vs. Roberto Rey San Diego and Judge Dizon-
Capulong

Doctrine: While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to
be a doctor.

FACTS: Private respondent Roberto Rey San Diego, is a graduate of the University of the East with a
degree of B.S. Zoology. He claimed to have taken and flunked the National Medical Admission Tests
(NMAT) three times. Although a check with DECS showed that he actually taken and flunked four exams
and applying for the fifth, which he also subsequently failed. NMAT Rule provides that - “A student shall
be allowed only three (3) chances to take the test. After three successive failures, a student shall not be
allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.” This is also known as the Three Flunk Rule. Private
petitioner has applied to retake the exam and was rejected, thus this issue. The Regional Trial Court held
that the San Diego had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary
exercise of the police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NMAT’s “three flunk rule” order is valid and constitutional.

HELD: YES.

It is the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents
to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. NMAT is a measure intended to limit the
admission to medical schools to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a
medical education. The regulation of practice of medicine is a reasonable method of protecting the health
and safety of the public. This regulation includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those
authorized to practice medicine. NMAT is a means of achieving the country’s objective of “upgrading the
selection of applicants into medical schools” and of “improving the quality of medical education in the
country.” The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution provides that every citizen has
the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and
academic requirement. While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a
constitutional right to be a doctor. The petition has been granted and the decision of the respondent court
has been reversed.

4) PRC V. DE GUZMAN

FACTS: The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine. They passed the Physician
Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board). Thereafter,
petitioner Professional Regulations Commission (PRC) the released their names as successful examinees
in the medical licensure examination. Shortly, however, the Board observe that the grades of the seventy-
nine (79) successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical
licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually
high. Eleven Fatima examinees score 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven
got 99% in Bio-Chem. The Board also observed that many of those who passed from Fatima got marks of
95% or better in both subjects, and no one got a mark lower than 90%. A comparison of the performance
of the candidates from other schools was made. The Board observed that strangely, the unusually high
ratings were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a record-breaking phenomenon in the history
of the Physician Licensure Examination. For its part, the NBI found that “the questionable passing rate of
Fatima examinees in the (1993) Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees
gained early access to the test questions.”

The Board issued Resolution No. 26, charging respondents with “immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud,
and deceit” in connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne examinations. It recommended that the test
results of the Fatima examinees be nullified. Trial court’s judgment is rendered ordering the respondents
to allow the petitioners and intervenors to take the physician’s oath and to register them as physicians
without prejudice to any administrative disciplinary action which may be taken against any of the
petitioners for such causes and in the manner provided by law and consistent with the requirements of the
Constitution as any other professionals

ISSUE: Whether or not the act pursuant to R.A. 2382 (Medical Act of 1959), prescribing that a person
who aspires to practice medicine in the Philippines, must have “satisfactorily passed the corresponding
examination valid.

HELD: YES.

It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course
of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police
power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the
people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical
knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite in their chosen careers. This
regulation takes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from potentially
deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine.
“satisfactorily – defined as “sufficient to meet a condition or obligation” or “capable of dispelling doubt
or ignorance”

It must be stressed, nevertheless, that that power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an
occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A
political body that regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant
such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not, however, require giving up
ones constitutional right as a condition to acquiring license.

5) BOARD OF MEDICINE VS. OTA

FACTS: Yasuyuki Ota, a Japanese national, married to a Filipina, who has continuously resided here in
the Philippines for more than 10 years. He finished his medical degree from Bicol Christian College of
Medicine. He completed a one-year post graduate internship training at
the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center, a government hospital. He filed an application to take the
medical board examinations, however, he was required by the Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC) to submit an affidavit of undertaking, stating among others that should he successfully pass the
same, he would not practice medicine until he submits proof that reciprocity exists between Japan and the
Philippines in admitting foreigners into the practice of medicine. He was allowed to take the Medical
Board Examinations. Then he passed the B.E. which was given on August 8, 1992 with a general average
of 81.83.

BOARD: In spite of all these, the Board of Medicine (Board) of the PRC denied respondent's request for
a license to practice medicine in the Philippines on the ground that the Board believes that no genuine
reciprocity can be found in the law of Japan as there is no Filipino or foreigner who can possibly practice
there.

RTC: He petitioned before the RTC because he believed he was deprived of his legitimate right to
practice his profession in the Philippines. The RTC rendered its Decision finding that respondent had
adequately proved that the medical laws of Japan allow foreigners like Filipinos to be granted license and
be admitted into the practice of medicine under the principle of reciprocity. Also, it decided that the Board
had a ministerial duty of issuing the Certificate of Registration and license to respondent, as it was shown
that he had substantially complied with the requirements under the law.

CA: The Board and the PRC (petitioners) appealed the case to the CA, stating that while respondent
submitted documents showing that foreigners are allowed to practice medicine in Japan, it was not shown
that the conditions for the practice of medicine there are PRACTICAL and ATTAINABLE by a foreign
applicant, hence, reciprocity was not established; also, the power of the PRC and the Board to regulate
and control the practice of medicine is discretionary and not ministerial, hence, not compellable by a writ
of mandamus. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

Hence, this Petition for Review for Certiorari assailing CA which affirmed decision of RTC.

ISSUE #1: Whether or not Mr. Ota can practice medicine in the Philippines.

ISSUE #2: Whether or not the power to issue license (to practice medicine) is compellable by mandamus.

HELD #1: YES.

The Court denies the petition for lack of merit. Nowhere in the statutes is it stated that the foreign
applicant must show that the conditions for the practice of medicine in said country
are practical and attainable by Filipinos. Neither is it stated that it must first be proven that a Filipino has
been granted license and allowed to practice his profession in said country before a foreign applicant may
be given license to practice in the Philippines. It is enough that the laws in the foreign country permit a
Filipino to get license and practice therein. Requiring respondent to prove first that a Filipino has already
been granted license and is actually practicing therein unduly expands the requirements provided for
under R.A. No. 2382 and P.D. No. 223.

HELD #2: YES.

Indeed, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications. It must also appear that he has fully complied with all the
conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing authority. The Court finds that the
factual circumstances of De Guzman are different from those of the case at bar; hence, the principle
applied therein should be viewed differently in this case. In this case, there is no doubt as to the
competence and qualifications of respondent. He finished his medical degree from Bicol Christian
College of Medicine. He completed a one-year post graduate internship training at the Jose Reyes
Memorial Medical Center, a government hospital. Then he passed the Medical Board Examinations.

6) People of the Philippines vs. Guillermo I. Ventura

FACTS: In 1949, Guillermo Ventura was convicted by the Court of First Instance of illegal practice of
medicine; In 1955, he again set up a clinic and by reason of certain complaints received by the National
Bureau of Investigation from the President of the Philippine Federation of Private Medical Practitioners
and from the Chairman of the Board of Medical Examiners, the NBI sent its morgue attendant Jose
Natayan to the clinic of Ventura, who was at that time suffering from pains in his back and asked Ventura
to see his sickness. Ventura attended to Natayan, told him that he was sick of ‘lumbago’, asked him to pay
P5.00 in exchange for an enema of hot water, exposure of his back to a big bulb for fifteen minutes and a
red colored bulb for another ten minutes. Afterwards, Ventura instructed Natayan to come back for six
consecutive days. The following day, Natayan returned to the clinic of Ventura with the NBI raiding party
and executed raid moments before Natayan was given treatment by Ventura. The lower court then
concluded that Guillermo Ventura was not a duly registered masseur or a physician qualified to practice
medicine.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ventura is guilty of illegal practice of medicine.

HELD: YES.

Under the police power, the State may prescribe such regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to
secure the general welfare of the people, to protect them against the consequences of ignorance and
incapacity as well as of deception and fraud. As one means to this end, it has been the practice of different
States, from time immemorial to exact in any pursuit, profession or trade, a certain degree of skill and
learning upon which the community may confidently rely, their possession being generally ascertained in
an examination of parties by competent persons, or inferred from a certificate to them in the form of a
diploma or license from an institution established for instruction on the subjects, scientific or otherwise,
with which such pursuits have to deal. Upon investigation, Ventura was found to be without certificate of
registration to practice such profession either from the Board of Medical Examiners or from the
Committee of Examiners of Masseurs. Furthermore, Ventura himseld, testifying on his behalf admitted
that for the past 35 years, he had been practicing as a naturopathic physician, "treating human ailments
without the use of drugs and medicines" and employing in his practice "electricity, water and hand"
without a license to practice medicine; that during this time he had treated 500,000 patients, more or less
about 90% of whom were healed, and that he had studied drugless healing in the American University,
Chicago, Illinois for about four years. Similarly, there is no such thing as implied license to practice
drugless healing by the mere fact that the Chairman of the Board of Medical Examiners had permitted
appellant to serve free in the Central Luzon Sanitarium in Tala, Caloocan, Rizal, or that countless people
persisted in engaging his services. For one thing, these people might have contracted his services on the
mistaken notion that he was duly licensed to practice his profession; for another, a repetition of illegal
acts can never make them legal.

7) THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION vs. HON. DANIEL ALFONSO

FACTS: Petitioners prayed for a writ of certiorari to nullify the order of herein Respondent Judge
Alfonso in Civil case No. 1385 restraining the enforcement of Petition Order of closure of Philippine
Muslim-Christian College of Medicine Foundation Inc.

The college was founded on 1981 for the purpose of producing physicians who will emancipate Muslim
citizens from age-old attitudes of health. However, because of the unstable peace and order situation in
Mindanao, the college was established in Antipolo, Rizal, given a temporary permit to operate instead of
the originally proposed location in Zamboanga City. Antipolo was adopted as its permanent site and the
name was changed to Rizal College of Medicine.

In 1985, DECS & BME authorized the Commission on Medical Education to conduct a study of all
Medical Schools in the Philippines. The report showed that the college fell very much short of the
minimum standards set for medical schools. Further, the team of inspectors cited the ff. Grounds among
others:

(a)the College was not fulfilling its purpose due inappropriate location
(b)lack of university affiliation for balance humanistic and scientific education
(c)absence of philosophy based hospitals for student’s training
(d)more than 60% of the college faculty did not teach full time

The school disputed these findings as biased and discriminatory and requested BME to send another team
of doctors for re-evaluation. 2nd team confirmed the previous findings and recommended the phase-out of
the school.

There were third and fourth evaluations but the college failed both and was rendered inadequate in all
aspects.
The DECS recommended the college for closure but somehow the college succeeded to have the Board
form yet another team of inspectors but although the findings show that there were major efforts to
improve the college, it is still rendered inadequate and recommended for closure w/ provisions to disperse
its students to other medical schools.

Mr. Victor Sumulong(chairman of BOT), upon learning the same proposed a gradual phase-out so as not
to dislocate the students and minimized financial losses – ALLOWED to operate until May 1989.

The college appealed the decision to the Office of the President , but the Executive Secretary found no
reason to disturb the contested decision.

The college filed civil case No. 1385 applying for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain its
implementation.

ISSUE #1: Whether or not Judge Alfonso acted with grave abuse of discretion in substituting his
judgment to for the members/evaluators.

ISSUE #2: Whether or not NMCS ORDER No. 5 has been violated.

ISSUE #3: Whether or not the college was denied due process of law?

HELD #1: YES.

It is well-settled doctrine that courts of justice should not generally interfere with purely administrative
and discretionary functions; that courts have no supervisory power over the proceedings and actions of
the administrative departments of the government; involving the exercise of judgment and findings of
facts, because by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their
jurisdiction, the latter are in a better position to pass judgment on such matters andn their findings of facts
in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts. 15 There are, to be sure,
exceptions to this general rule but none of them obtains in this case.

HELD #2: NO.

It was sought to be effected before the lapse of the three-year period therein snowed, which in this case is
sought to be counted from June 18, 1988, or the date of the last evaluation. The subsequent evaluations
are merely to confirm the facts of the 1st evaluation in 1985. Notwithstanding the absence of an explicit
grant of opportunity for the college to comply with certain requirements, the lapse of over three years
must be deemed as substantial compliance with the relied provision.

HELD #3: NO.

It holds no water, as the record clearly shows that the College was given every opportunity to so improve
itself as to come up to requirements, but remained sadly sub-standard after the inspections conducted by
the evaluating teams. It had, in fact, admitted its failure to have up to the desired standards when it
proposed its gradual phase-out in its letter dated June 27, 1988 to Secretary Quisumbing. It was also
precisely because of its complaints of bias and prejudice that the Board of Medical Education dispatched
new teams to survey and re-evaluate its performance. It had even gone all the way up to the Office of the
President to seek a reversal of the order of closure. There is thus no reason for it to complain of a lack of
opportunity to be heard and to explain its side as well as to seek reconsideration of the ruling complained
of. Having thus disposed of the issues raised by the facts of the case, the Court sees no useful purpose to
be served by remanding the case to the Trial Court for further proceedings. The, only acceptable reason
for such a remand would be so that the Trial Court may determine whether or not the petitioners' first
have acted within the scope of their powers or grossly abused them, a matter that this Court has already
passed upon here. Such a remand cannot be justified on the theory that the Trial Court will make its
philosophy independent determination of whether or not respondent medical institution has complied with
the minimum standards laid down for its continued operation, since, as here ruled, it has not that power.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby granted and the temporary restraining order
issued by the Court is made, permanent. The, questioned writ of preliminary injunction dated May 10,
1989 is set aside and respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 1385.

8) TERESITA TABLARIN, et.al. vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ,

et.al.

FACTS: Petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of
Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, and from requiring the taking and passing
of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with
accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled and in the
future. The trial court denied said petition and the NMAT was conducted and administered as previously
scheduled. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical
Act of 1959", provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical
education (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and
regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines.

The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education xxx which functions are specified
in Section 5 of the statute which include the following:

(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine,
xxx; and
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register
of those issued said certificate; xxx;

MECS Order No. 52, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical
schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: x x
x xxx xxx
8. No applicant shall be issued the requisite Certificate of Eligibility for Admission (CEA), or admitted for
enrollment as first year student in any medical college, beginning the school year, 1986-87, without the
required NMAT qualification as called for under this Order.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject statute and administrative regulation violate the Petitioners’
constitutional right.

HELD: NO.

The legislative and administrative provisions impugned by them (Petitioners) constitute, to the mind of
the Court, a valid exercise of the police power of the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning,
is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote an the
important interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the general community.6 An important
component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the
securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation.7

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between
the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on one hand, and the
securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other.

Legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and
pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental
power.

What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools.
The upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other
things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies
and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high
standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of
our social and economic development, are widely known.

We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for
achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of
"improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country."

Finally, Different cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated by differing conditions
obtaining during those years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be a function of such
factors as the number of students who have reached the cutoff score established the preceding year; the
number of places available in medical schools during the current year; the average score attained during
the current year; the level of difficulty of the test given during the current year, and so forth. To establish a
permanent and immutable cutoff score regardless of changes in circumstances from year to year, may wen
result in an unreasonable rigidity. The above language in MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or
capricious.
We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for
admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.

9) PEOPLE V. BUENVIAJE

FACTS: Buenviaje (defendant) was accused of the violation of the Medical Act for allegedly, without
having obtained from the Board of Medical Examiners the corresponding certificate of registration for the
practice of medicine voluntarily, illegally and criminally and for compensation, practiced medicine in the
City of Manila, assisting, treating and manipulating the head and body of Regino Noble for the purpose of
curing him of the ailments, diseases, pains and physical defects from which he pretended to suffer, and
advertising and offering her services as a physician. The trial court found the defendant guilty and he
appealed the same.

ISSUES #1: Whether or not chiropractic has nothing to do with medicine.

ISSUES #2: Whether or not the prohibition in Sec. 783 against the unauthorised use of the title “doctor”
must be understood to refer to “Doctor of Medicine” and has nothing to do with doctors of chiropractic.

HELD #1: YES.

Section 770 of the Administrative Code clearly includes the manipulations employed in chiropractic. The
statutory definition necessarily prevails over the ordinary one.

HELD #2: NO.

Chiropractic is by statute made a form of the practice of medicine and it necessarily follows that a person
holding himself out as a doctor of chiropractic in legal effect represents himself as a doctor of medicine.

10) PEOPLE VS. HATANI

FACTS: On or about July 6, 1979, in Quezon City, Philippines the above named accused, knowing fully
well that he has not satisfactorily passed the corresponding board examination, neither is he a holder of a
valid certificate of registration duly issued by the board of medical examiners, as in fact he does not even
appear to have taken or completed the course leading to a medical degree, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously for compensation, fee and salary, paid to him directly, physically examined
Priscila Borja and Wilma Borja, diagnosed, treated and administer injections on their person in violation
of section 10 in relation to section 28 of RA 2382. On or about the same day, accused with lewd designs,
and while she was deprived of reason or unconscious after having been drugged or administered
medicine, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with Priscila
without her consent and against her will, to her damage and prejudice.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is liable for the crime charged.
HELD: YES.

The evidence is overwhelming that appellant actually treated and diagnosed Priscila and Wilma Borja.
The positive testimony of Agustina, Priscila, Wilma, and Josefina Borja; the medico-legal report, which
attests to the needle marks, the handwriting identification report; the photographs showing assorted drugs
and medical equipment in appellants room; and the chemistry reports proved that appellant was engaged
in the practice of medicine. And as to his allegation that there was no proof of payment, the law
specificallt punishes said act whether or not done for a fee. Suffice it to say, the medico-legal report
indicates swellings and lacerations and concludes that Priscila was no longer a virgin. Although the
records fail to show any sworn statement by Priscila, such is not fatal where the sworn affidavits of her
mother, her twi sisters and the medico-legal report are sufficient to show probable cause of rape. The
absence of injuries does not negate the commission of rape, for rape may be committed after rendering a
woman unconscious. It is settled jurisprudence that virginity is not an essential element of rape.

12) PEOPLE V. ANUNCIACION VDA. DE GOLEZ

GR. No. L-14160, June 30,1960

FACTS: On October 2, 1957, the provincial fiscal of Negros Occidental filed an information in the Court
of First Instance of that province charging Anunciacion Vda. de Golez with the crime of homicide through
reckless imprudence alleging that on or about the period comprised from December 12, 1956 to
December 24, 1956, in the municipality of San Carlos, province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, without being duly licensed to practice
medicine and with reckless negligence and without taking due precaution, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniosly diagnose, prescribe, and treat one Susana Tam, who had been suffering for
sometime with bodily ailment, knowing fully well that she is incompetent and not possessing the
necessary technical or scientific knowledge or skill, and as a consequence of such negligence and
carelessness and lack of medical skill, said Susana Tam died thereafter.
During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty.
When the case was called for trial the fiscal made a manifestation that the accused has been charged with
illegal practice of medicine before another sala of the same court. The court, ruling on the matter,
dismissed the case on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute the offense of homicide through
reckless imprudence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in dismissing the case on the ground that the fact alleged do not
constitute the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence.

HELD: YES.

We agree with appellant that the order of dismissal is erroneous, in that the crime of illegal practice of
medicine is a statutory offense wherein criminal intent is taken for granted, so that a person may be
convicted thereof irrespective of his intention and in spite of his having acted in good faith and without
malice. In fact, as defined by Section 2678 of the Revised Administrative Code (the law then in force), the
offense consists in the mere act of practicing medicine in violation of the Medical Law, even if no injury
to another, much less death, results from such malpractice.
The allegations in the information in this case that the accused acted with reckless negligence in
diagnosing, prescribing for, and treating the deceased Susana Tam, knowing that she did not possess the
necessary technical knowledge or skill to do so, thus causing her death, sufficiently charge the crime of
homicide through reckless imprudence. However, view of the error of the lower court in dismissing the
information, we cannot sustain this appeal for the reason that it would place the accused in double
jeopardy. Appeal is, therefore, dismissed.