Arnulfo v Jacaban presence of the petitioner and the three barangay tanods who all

voluntarily signed the inventory receipt. PO3 Sarte identified all the seized
Facts: Police filed an application for search warrant to search Arnulfo's
residence and seize several firearms. When the warrant was implemented,
Arnulfo became angry and denied having committed any legal activity.
When the search team continued to search the living room, they found a
calibre .45 placed in the ceiling. After an exhaustive search, other firearms
and ammunitions were recovered. Police Officer IV Dionisio V. Sultan, Chief
Clerk of the Firearms and Explosives Division of the Philippine National
Police-Visayas (FED PNP-Visayas), testified that he prepared a certification
dated April 29, 2002. Based on their office's master, Arnulfo is not licensed
to possess any kind of firearm or ammunition.
Issue: Is Arnulfo guilty of illegal possession of firearms
Ruling: Yes The essential elements in the prosecution for the crime of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions are: (1) the existence of subject
firearm; and, (2) the fact that the accused who possessed or owned the
same does not have the corresponding license for it.11 The unvarying rule is
that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition.12 What the law requires is merely possession, which
includes not only actual physical possession, but also constructive
possession or the subjection of the thing to one’s control and
management.13 Once the prosecution evidence indubitably points to
possession without the requisite authority or license, coupled with animus
possidendi or intent to possess on the part of the accused, conviction for
violation of the said law must follow. Animus possidendi is a state of mind,
the presence or determination of which is largely dependent on attendant
events in each case. It may be inferred from the prior or contemporaneous
acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances.14
items in open court.
It was convincingly proved that petitioner had constructive possession of
the gun and the ammunitions, coupled with the intent to possess the same.
Petitioner's act of immediately rushing from the living room to the room
where SPO2 Abellana found a calibre .45 and grappled with the latter for
the possession of the gun proved that the gun was under his control and
management. He also had the animus possidendi or intent to possess the
gun when he tried to wrest it from SPO2 Abellana. Even assuming that
petitioner is not the owner of the house where the items were recovered,
the ownership of the house is not an essential element of the crime under
PD 1866 as amended. While petitioner may not be the owner, he indeed
had control of the house as shown by the following circumstances: (1) When
the PAOCTF went to the house to serve the search warrant, petitioner was
very angry and restless and even denied having committed any illegal act,
but he was assured by P/SInsp. Dueñas that he has nothing to answer if they
would not find anything, thus, he consented to the search being conducted;
(2) while the search was ongoing, petitioner merely observed the conduct of
the search and did not make any protest at all; and (3) petitioner did not call
for the alleged owner of the house.

Here, the prosecution had proved the essential elements of the crime
charged under PD 1866 as amended by RA 8294. The existence of the seized
firearm and the ammunitions was established through the testimony of PO3
Sarte. There was an inventory of the items seized which was made in the
Gelig vs. People GR No. 173150 July 28, 2010
Facts: Lydia was charged with direct assault with unintentional abortion.
Lydia and Complainant Gemma were public school teachers. Lydia’s son,
Roseller, was a stuent of Gemma. On July, 17, 1981, Lydia confronted
Gemma after learning from Roseller that Gemma called him a “sissy” while
in class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed her, causing her to
fall and hit a wall divider. Gemma suffered a contusion and later suffered
an incomplete abortion. The RTC convicted Lydia of the complex crime of
direct assault with unintentional abortion. Lydia appealed. The CA vacated
the RTC judgment and ruled that Lydia cannot be liable for direct assault
since Gemma since Gemma descended from being a person in authority to a
private individual when, instead of pacifying Lydia or informing the principal
on the matter, she engaged in a fight with Lydia and that Lydia’s purpose
was not to defy the authorities but to confront Gemma on the name calling
of her son. The CA also ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for the
unintentional abortion since there was no evidence that she was aware of
Gemma’s pregnancy at the time of the incident. The CA declared that Lydia
can be held guilty only of slight physical injuries.
Issue: What is the crime committed by Lydia?
Ruling: Direct Assault. The Information charged Lydia with committing the
complex crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion. Direct assault is
defined and penalized under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The
provision reads as follows:
Art. 148. Direct assaults. - Any person or persons who,
without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation
for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in
defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition, or shall attack,
employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in
authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance. Xxx
Direct assault is an offense against public order that may be committed in
two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising,
shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes
enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by
any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ
force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his
agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion
of such performance.
The case of Lydia falls under the second mode, which is the more common
form of assault. Its elements are:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a
serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is
engaged in the actual performance of official duties, or [b] that he is
assaulted by reason of the past performance of official duties.
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in
authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties.
5. That there is no public uprising.
Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in
authority expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code.
Art. 152. Persons in Authority and Agents of Persons in
Authority – Who shall be deemed as such. –
In applying the provisions of articles 148 and 151 of this
Code, teachers, professors, and persons charged with the
supervision of public or duly recognized private schools,
colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual
performance of their professional duties or on the occasion
of such performance shall be deemed persons in authority.
That the prosecution succeeded in proving that Lydia committed the crime
of direct assault does not necessarily mean that the same physical force she
employed on Gemma also resulted in the crime of unintentional abortion.
There is no evidence on record to prove that the slapping and pushing of
Gemma by Lydia that occurred on July 17, 1981 was the proximate cause of
the abortion. Gemma was admitted and confined in a hospital for
incomplete abortion on August 28, 1981, which was 42 days after the July
17, 1981 incident. This interval of time is too lengthy to prove that the
discharge of the fetus from the womb of Gemma was a direct outcome of
the assault. Her bleeding and abdominal pain two days after the said
incident were not substantiated by proof other than her testimony. Thus, it
is not unlikely that the abortion may have been the result of other factors.
PEOPLE v. JULIO RECTO
• The trial court convicted appellant of four (4) crimes: two counts of
the complex crime of qualified direct assault with frustrated homicide (for a
barangay chief tanod and barangay captain), one count of the complex
crime of qualified direct assault with murder (for a barangay kagawad), and
one count of homicide
• On April 18, 1994, Barangay Captain Percival Orbe was in his
residence with Barangay Kagawad Antonio Macalipay and Barangay Tanod
Melchor Recto appellant’s cousin, to settle a land dispute.
• There, they noticed that the padlock of the bodega was destroyed,
and the pala stored therein, stolen.
• Melchor Recto passed by the bodega to inquire what was
happening. Orbe asked Melchor Recto to stay in case he is needed there.
• Julio Recto then arrived along with others and Orbe advised them
not to create trouble but one pulled a piece of wood and threw towards
them.
• Appellant had a balisong and Orbe asked to put it down. However,
the former stepped backward and pulled a gun. Hence, the latter retrieved.
• Macalipay asked the appellant to settle things instead. But the latter
pulled the trigger and hit the former.
• Melchor Recto saw the shooting so he, along with Orbe, hid inside
the bathroom. From there, they witnessed appellant fire his gun at Emilio
Santos. Santos also fired his revolver at appellant and later, turned around
and crawled. While crawling, Santos fired another shot towards Regis, Jr[.],
but, the latter was able to reach and hack the former with a bolo.
• When Orbe and Melchor Recto heard appellant saying: Where is
that kapitan When Melchor could no longer see Julio Recto, he jumped out
of the bathroom window and ran.
• While running, Julio Recto shot him hitting the latter’s thigh.
• Orbe also got out of the bathroom and before he could take a step,
he was also shot by appellant at his right elbow, but was still able to
continue running and cross the southern portion of the ricefield. He caught
up with the wounded Melchor Recto and both went their separate ways.
• On the other hand, both Barangay Kagawad Antonio Macalipay and
Emilian Renato Santos died due to multiple wounds inflicted on them by
herein appellant.
Issues & Rulings:
1. WON accused was guilty of direct assault for the frustrated
homicide of Barangay Chief Tanod Recto? – NO.
There was no direct assault with regard to the victim, Melchor Recto
– being the barangay chief tanod of Ambulong, Magdiwang, Romblon -- was
clearly an agent of a person in authority. However, he was not “engaged in
the performance of his official duties” at the time he was shot. Neither was
he attacked “on the occasion of such performance.” It must be emphasized
that Melchor Recto was on his way home when he happened to pass by the
bodega of the Rance couple where an investigation by the other barangay
officials was ongoing. Orbe requested Melchor Recto to stay as he might
be needed.
With regard to Melchor Recto, for reasons other than his own
desistance, the accused was not able to perform all the acts of
execution necessary to consummate the killing, since the wounds he
inflicted were not mortal. If the wounds would not normally cause death,
then the last act necessary to produce homicide has not been performed by
the offender. Thus, accused’s liability amounted only to attempted, not
frustrated, homicide.
kagawad who was in the actual performance of his duties when he was
shot, the attack on him constituted direct assault. In this case, the accused
was out in the open during the entire span of time from the heated
discussion, to the brewing of the violence, and up to the shooting of
Macalipay. At the time, his every action, which indicated the imminence of
more violence, was visible to them -- to the victim and the latter’s
companions. The accused was actually vulnerable to any attack that they
could have made at the time, had they chosen to. His mode of attack was
therefore not without risk to himself. Absent treachery, the killing is
homicide, not murder.

2. WON accussed was guilty of direct assault for the frustrated

homicide of Barangay Captain Orbe? – NO.

The attack on Percival Orbe – then a barangay captain, a person in

authority-- amounted to qualified direct assault, because he was attacked
on the occasion of the performance of his duty of maintaining public order.
At the time, he was attempting to pacify accused and to keep the peace
between the two groups.

With regard to Orbe, the nature of the weapon used by the accused
unmistakably shows that he intended to kill Orbe. However, like the wounds
inflicted by the accused on Melchor Recto, those on Orbe were not fatal.
Evidently, accused had not yet been able to perform all the acts of
execution necessary to bring about the death of Orbe, because the latter
was able to run away after being fired at. Although accused had already
directly commenced the commission of a felony by overt acts (shooting
Orbe with a de sabog), he was not able to consummate that felony for some
reason other than his spontaneous desistance. Thus, he committed
attempted homicide.

3. WON the accused is guilty of qualified direct assault with murder of

Antonio Macalipay? – NO.

The accused should be held liable for the complex crime of qualified
direct assault with homicide. Considering that Antonio Macalipay was a