Thayer Consultancy Background Brief

ABN # 65 648 097 123

Australia: A U.S. Surrogate in
the Indo-Pacific Region?
January 16, 2019

Does Australia have or will it have its own policy documents on the South China Sea,
Freedom of Navigation, and Quad. Our impression is that Australia simply
follows/copies the U.S. and does not have its own independent policy on these issues.
We request your assessment of these issues.
ANSWER: Since 1951 Australia and the United States have been formal treaty allies,
although defence cooperation dates back to World War I and combat in World War II.
The United States is Australia’s biggest economic partner measured by investment and
two-way trade.
Australia and the United States bilateral relations are intimate. Australia has access to
the highest levels of the United States government through meetings between the
Australian prime minister and the American president, annual 2 plus 2 talks between
the minsters for foreign affairs and ministers of defence (AUSMIN). Australia is part of
the “five eyes” intelligence community with the U.S., United Kingdom, Canada and
New Zealand. Australia has regularly contributed military forces alongside the United
States to back resolutions of the United Nations (Korean Conflict, 1951-53), or other
conflicts with the aim of maintaining global/regional peace and security.
Both Australia and the United States are liberal democracies and share similar values
about a rule-based international order. Because the bilateral relationship is based on
common values and long-standing historical interaction based on mutual trust and
respect there is a marked congruence on international security issues between
Australia and the United States. There are also differences (President Trump’s anti-
globalization views).
Australia’s common cause with the United States is not a product of dependency or
subordination. For example, Australia adopted the term Indo-Pacific in four major
Australian White Papers before the Trump Administration branded this term in its
National Security Policy (2017) and National Defence Policy (2018). In another notable
difference, none of the Australian White Papers used the term Free and Open Indo-
Pacific, another Trump Administration brand name. The only reference to “free and
open” (in lower case) appears in the Defence White Paper 2016 and the 2017 Foreign
Policy White Paper but only in reference to trade.
Australia’s international policy, both foreign affairs and defence, is based on
Australia’s national interest. This was illustrated in the publication of Australia’s first
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Foreign Policy White Paper in 2003, entitled Advancing the National Interest:
Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper.
(http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan012801.pdf)
Australia’s independent foreign and defence policy has been articulated in four recent
major official documents:
 In 2012 the Labor Government issued Australia in the Asian Century White Paper
(http://asiancentury.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/white-paper/australia-in-
the-asian-century-white-paper.pdf).
 In 2013, the Australian Government issued a Foreign Policy White Paper.
https://www.fpwhitepaper.gov.au/foreign-policy-white-paper
 Also in 2013, Australia’s Department of Defence issued a White Paper 2013
(http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013/docs/WP_2013_web.pdf).
 The most recent exposition of Australia’s defence policy came in 2016 with the
release of the White Paper 2016
(http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/2016-defence-white-paper.pdf).
Australia’s four major White Papers emphasize five major themes:
 First, the Indo-Pacific is a vibrant region that offers major economic
opportunities for Australia.
 Second, the stability of the Indo-Pacific is vitally dependent on open markets
conducted on the basis of mutually agreed rules that protect the rights of all
states against coercive power.
 Third, continued engagement by the United States is critical for regional peace,
security and stability.
 Fourth, Australia must work with major democracies to maintain a peaceful
rules-based order.
 Fifth, it is in Australia’s interest to constructively engage with China.
Freedom of Navigation
It should be noted at the onset that there are two general meanings of freedom of
navigation. The first meaning arises from customary international law and refers to
the right of ships bearing their national flag to sail on the high seas without hindrance.
The second meaning is more restricted and refers to Freedom of Navigation
Operational Patrols (FONOPS) conducted by the U.S. Navy. U.S. FONOPS are
conducted as part of a multifaceted political-diplomatic strategy to challenge what the
U.S. views as excessive maritime claims. Some of the first U.S. FONOPS were
conducted in waters off Western Australia to challenge straight base lines enclosing
bays.
Australia exercises its right to freedom of navigation and over flight under
international law to sail through and fly over international waters and airspace.
Australia does not participate in U.S. FONOPS. When Australian military ships and
aircraft flying over the South China Sea are challenged by the Chinese military, they
respond that they are exercising traditional freedom of navigation and overflight.
Differences between Australia and the United States were evident in October 2018
when U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton stated that the US had "got to do
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more" to show it did not recognise the legitimacy of China’s artificial islands in the
South China Sea and suggested possible joint activities with Australia. When asked
about these remarks, then Defence Minister Marise Payne declined to comment.
South China Sea
Australia has a similar declaratory policy on the South China Sea as the United States.
Australia does not take sides on sovereignty disputes. Australia supports the
resolution of disputes through peaceful means and not through the threat or use of
force in accordance with international law. Australia supports the Award made by the
Arbitral Tribunal in the case brought by the Philippines against China.
Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper (pp. 46-47) set out Australia’s views on
the South China Sea as follows:
The South China Sea is a major fault line in the regional order. Australia is not a claimant
state and does not take sides in the competing claims. Like other non-claimant states,
however, we have a substantial interest in the stability of this crucial international
waterway, and in the norms and laws that govern it.
We have urged all claimants to refrain from actions that could increase tension and have
called for a halt to land reclamation and construction activities. Australia is particularly
concerned by the unprecedented pace and scale of China’s activities. Australia opposes the
use of disputed features and artificial structures in the South China Sea for military
purposes. We support the resolution of differences through negotiation based on
international law.
All claimants should clarify the full nature and extent of their claims according to the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Government reaffirms its
position that the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s [sic] ruling on the Philippines South
China Sea Arbitration is final and binding on both parties.
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue Forum
In 2007, as a result of an initiative by Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Australia
joined Japan, the United States and India in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
(Quad). Australia withdrew in April 2009 in deference to Beijing; the Quad went into
abeyance. In 2017, Australia rejoined the Quad as a result of growing strategic
convergence among Japan, the Trump Administration and India.
The Quad has held three meetings at senior official level, November 2017 in Manila,
with the second and third rounds held in Singapore in June 2018 and November 2018,
respectively.
The Quad was revived in November 2017 after the four Australian White Papers were
issued. So there is no mention of the Quad in these documents. Australia’s minister of
foreign affairs and trade and minister of defence have been circumspect in discussing
the Quad. A Google word search of recent statements and speeches turns up a nil
result.
For the present the Quad should be viewed as a talk shop – nothing more than a
security dialogue forum held by diplomats at senior official level. There are marked
differences among its four members. India has repeatedly excluded Australia from its
Malabar naval exercises. The Quad members obviously discuss Chinese assertiveness
in the Indo-Pacific and the implications of China’s continued militarization of its
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artificial islands in the South China Sea. But the Quad is not an anti-China coalition or
an anti-China alliance.
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Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Australia: A U.S. Surrogate in the Indo-Pacific

Region?” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, January 16, 2019. All background
briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself from the
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Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.