PIL Cases

1.
Ichong vs Fernandez
1.
Ichong, etc., et al. vs. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento 101 Phil. 1155
, May 31, 1957
Case Title : LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other
alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by
Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of
Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila,
respondents. Case Nature : ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Injunction and Mandamus.
Syllabi Class : CONSTITUTIONAL LAW|POLICE
POWER|GUARANTEES IN SECTION I|ARTICLE III OF THE
CONSTITUTION|LAW DEPRIVATION OF LIFE|LIBERTY OR
PROPERTY|EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW CLAUSE
|LEGISLATIVE POWER TO MAKE DISTINCTION AND
CLASSIFICATION AMONG PERSONS|NATIONALIZATION OF RETAIL
TRADE|LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT|TITLES OF BILLS;
PROHIBITION AGAINST DUPLICITY
Syllabi:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POLICE POWER; NATURE AND
SCOPE.-
Police power is far-reaching in scope, and it is almost impossible to limit
its sweep. It derives its existence from the very existence of the State
itself, and does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope. It is
said to be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is
the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most
essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern
democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations
have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope
of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public
interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have
transcended human foresight.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; GUARANTEES IN SECTION I, ARTICLE
III OF THE CONSTITUTION; UNIVERSALITY OF APPLICATION.-
The constitutional guarantees in Section I, Article III, of the Constitution,
which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in
democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly
universal in their application, without regard to any differences of race, of
color, or of nationality (Yiek Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed., 220, 226).
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LAW DEPRIVATION OF LIFE, LIBERTY
OR PROPERTY; TEST OR STANDARD.-
The conflict between police power and the guarantees of due process
and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly
related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The
balancing is the essence, or the indispensable means for the" attainment
of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no
absolute power, whoever exercises it, for that would be tyranny. Yet
there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and
anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty or property,
provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into
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classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of
the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a
reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if
disctinction or classification has been made, there must be a reasonable
basis for said distinction.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
CLAUSE; WHEN NOT DEEMED INFRINGED BY LEGISLATION.-
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality.It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-
825).
CLAUSE; LEGISLATIVE POWER TO MAKE DISTINCTION AND
CLASSIFICATION AMONG PERSONS; CITIZENSHIP AS GROUND
FOR CLASSIFICATION.-
The power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications
among persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the
laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion,
and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the
classification is without reasonable basis. Citizenship is a legal and valid
ground for classification.
CLAUSE; NATIONALIZATION OF RETAIL TRADE; CLASSIFICATION
IN REPUBLIC ACT No. 1180 ACTUAL, REAL AND REASONABLE.-
The classification in the law of retail traders into nationals and aliens is
actual, real and reasonable. All persons of one class are treated alike,
and it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and
unfounded. Hence, it is the duty of this Court to declare that the
legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it cannot declare
that the act transcends the limits of equal protection established by the
Constitution.
CLAUSE; NATIONALIZATION OF RETAIL TRADE; TEST OF
REASONABLENESS.-
The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the
desired legislative objective, i.e., to free the national economy from alien
control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it
affects private rights and privileges (II Am. Jur., pp. 1080-1081). The test
of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all
circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect.
Judged by this test, the disputed legislation, which is not merely
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reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have
infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
CLAUSE; NATIONALIZATION OF RETAIL TRADE; REPUBLIC ACT
No. 1180 TOLERANT AND REASONABLE.-
A cursory study of the provisions of the law
CLAUSE; NATIONALIZATION OF RETAIL TRADE; ATTAINMENT OF
LEGISLATIVE ASPIRATIONS OF A PEOPLE NOT BEYOND THE
LIMITS OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY.-
If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then
economic independence is none of less legitimate. Freedom and liberty
are not real and positive, if the people are subject to the economic
control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or
country. The removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign
economic control and domination is one of the noblest motives that a
national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that
legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the constitutional
limitation of due process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a
people can never be beyond the limits of legislative authority.
CLAUSE; NATIONALIZATION OF RETAIL TRADE; NATIONALISTIC
TENDENCY MANIFESTED IN THE CONSTITUTION.-
Nationalistic tendency is manifested in various provisions of the
Constitution. The nationalization of the retail trade is only a continuance
of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective of
the Constitution, It cannot therefore be said that a law imbued with the
same purpose and spirit underlying many of the provisions of the
Constitution is unreasonable, invalid or unconstitutional.
11. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT;
EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION NOT SUBJECT TO
JUDICIAL REVIEW.-
The exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review. The
Court will not inquire into the motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon
general matters of legislative judgment. The Legislature is primarily the
judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and
every presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the Court may
hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the
legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative power.
12. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; TITLES OF BILLS; PROHIBITION
AGAINST DUPLICITY; PRESENCE OF DUPLICITY NOT SHOWN IN
TlTLE OR PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT No. 1180.-
What Section 21(1) of Article VI of the Constitution prohibits is duplicity,
that is, if its title completely fails to apprise the legislators or the public of
the nature.
AGAINST DUPLICITY; USE OF GENERAL TERMS IN TITLE OF BILL.-
The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; the
title need not be an index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, Sec. 4803, p. 345). The above rule was followed
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when the title of the Act in question adopted the more general term
"regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit".
AGAINST DUPLICITY; PURPOSE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DIRECTIVE
REGARDING SUBJECT OF A BILL.-
One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill
should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the
purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the
enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action
and study of the legislators or of the public. In case at bar it cannot be
claimed that the legislators have not been apprised of the nature of the
law, especially the nationalization and prohibition provisions. The
legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law, and a great
many of the persons affected by the prohibition in the law conducted a
campaign against its approval. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the
reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed.
15. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND
OBLIGATIONS NOT VIOLATED BY REPUBLIC ACT No. 1180;
TREATIES SUBJECT TO QUALIFICATION OR AMENDMENT BY
SUBSEQUENT LAW.-
The law does not violate international treaties and obligations. The
United Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding
the rights and freedom of their subjects (Jans Kelsen, The Law of the
United Nations, 1951 ed., pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human
Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations. The
Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic
of China of April 18, 1947 guarantees equality of treatment to the
Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any
othercountry". But the nationals of China are not discriminated against
because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United
States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all
prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the
law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to
qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U.S. vs. Thompson,
258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope
of the police power of the State (Palston vs. Pennsylvania 58 L. ed.,
539).
Docket Number: No. L-7995
Counsel: Ozaeta, Lichauco & Picazo, Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar &

Associates, Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Solicitor Pacifico P. de
Castro, City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles, Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S.
Serrano, Dionisio Reyes, Marcial G. Mendiola, Emiliano R. Navarro
Ponente: LABRADOR
Dispositive Portion:
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
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2. Gonzales vs Hechanova 9 Scra 230
1.
Gonzales vs. Hechanova 9 SCRA 230 , October 22, 1963
Case Title : RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. RUFINO G.
HECHANOVA, as Executive Secretary, MACARIO PERALTA,JR., as
Secretary of Defense, PEDRO GIMENEZ, as Auditor General,
CORNELIO BALMACEDA, as Secretary of Commerce and Industry, and
SALVADOR MARINO, as Secretary of Justice, respondents. Case
Nature : ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition with
preliminary injunction.
Syllabi Class : Parties|Administrative Law|Rice and Corn Importation
Laws|Constitutional Law|Courts|Rice Importation|Real party in
interest|Exhaustion of administrative remedies|Executive
Powers|Jurisdiction|Injunction not granted despite illegality of importation
where arrangements already concluded with foreign
governments|Supremacy of civil authority|National Security Council
Syllabi:
1. Parties; Real party in interest; Sufficiency of petitioner’s interest as
rice planter and taxpayer to seek restraint of allegedly illegal rice
importation.-
The status of petitioner, as a planter with a rice land of substantial
proportion, entitled him to a chance to sell to the Government the rice it
now seeks to buy abroad and, as a taxpayer affected by the purchase of
the commodity effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation, gives
said petitioner sufficient interest to file the instant petition seeking to
restrain the allegedly unlawful disbursement of public funds to import rice
from abroad.
2. Administrative Law; Exhaustion of administrative remedies;
Exceptions applicable to case at bar.-
The principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not applicable: (1) where the question in dispute is purely a
legal one, or (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was
performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; or (3) where
the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of
the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless
actually disapproved by him, or (4) where there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. The case at bar falls under
each one of the foregoing exceptions to the general rule.
3. Rice and Corn Importation Laws; Illegal importation where
conditions for importation not complied with.-
Since the Rice and Corn Importation Laws (Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and
3452) set conditions for the importation of rice, and in the case at bar
conditions have not been complied with, it is held that the proposed
importations are illegal.
4. Rice and Corn Importation Laws; Importations “made by the
government itself.-
The provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, prohibiting the
importation of rice and corn by any “government agency”, apply likewise
to importations “made by the Government itself”, because each and
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every officer and employee of our Government, is a government agency
and/or agent.
5. Rice and Corn Importation Laws; Protection of local planters of rice
and corn to foster self-sufficiency in local production.-
The protection of local planters of rice and corn in a manner that would
foster and accelerate self-sufficiency in the local production of said
commodities constitutes a factor that is vital to our ability to meet a
possible national emergency.
6. Constitutional Law; Executive Powers; An executive officer cannot
disregard the law even if he believes that compliance mill not benefit the
people.-
Respondents’ trend of thought, that, if an executive officer believes that
compliance with a certain statute will not benefit the people, he is at
liberty to disregard it, must be rejected—we still live under a rule of law.
7. Constitutional Law; Executive Powers; President may not, by
executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by
statutes enacted prior thereto.-
Although the President may, under the American constitutional system,
enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he
may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is
prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.
8. Constitutional Law; Executive Powers; Main function of Executive
is to enforce laws enacted by Congress, not to defeat same.-
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce
laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the
performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise
of the veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have
acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an
executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act
prohibited by said laws. Statutory Construction; Theory that in a conflict
between treaty and statute the latest in point of time shall prevail, not
applicable to executive agreements; Case at Bar.—The American theory
that in the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which
is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar,
for respondents not only admit, but, also, insist that the contracts in
question are not treaties. Said theory may be justified upon the ground
that treaties to which the United States is a signatory require the advice
and consent of the Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative
department. No such justification can be given as regards executive
agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely
upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks
and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up and that
of the United States.
9. Courts; Jurisdiction; Power to invalidate treaties.-
The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled the question of
whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts in
the affirmative, by providing in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof that the
Supreme Court may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review, revise,
reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law
or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts in (1) all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
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treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question.” In
other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not
only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs
counter to an act of Congress.
10. Rice Importation; Injunction not granted despite illegality of
importation where arrangements already concluded with foreign
governments; Reasons.-
Respondents, despite their lack of compliance with the Rice Importation
Law, should not be enjoined from carrying out the importation of the rice
which according to the record has been authorized to be imported on
government to government level, it appearing that the arrangement to
this effect has already been concluded, the only thing lacking being its
implementation. Had the writ been issued, our government would have
been placed in a predicament where, as a necessary consequence, it
would have to repudiate a duly formalized agreement to its great
embarrassment and loss of face.
11. Constitutional Law; Executive Powers; Civil authority supreme
over the military.-
The injunction embodied in the National Defense Act (Sec. 2, Com. Act
No. 1) that the civil authority shall always be supreme, can only mean
that while all precautions should be taken to in-sure the security and
preservation of the State and to this effect the employment of all
resources may be resorted to, the action must always be taken within the
framework of the civil authority.
12. Constitutional Law; Supremacy of civil authority; Theory that the
military may disregard rice importation laws is dangerous.-
The theory that rice can be legally imported by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines avowedly for its future use, notwithstanding the prohibitory
provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, is a dangerous trend.
To adopt this theory, is to proclaim the existence in the Philippines of
three economic groups or classes: the producers, the consumers, and
the Armed Forces of the Philippines. What is more portentous is the
effort to equate the army with the Government itself.
13. Constitutional Law; Executive Powers; National Security
Council; Function to deliberate on existence of emergency.-
It is not for the Department of National Defense to unilaterally determine
the existence of a threat of emergency, but for the National Security
Council to do so. Otherwise, any change in the political climate in any
region of the world is apt to be taken as an excuse for the military to
conjure up a crisis or emergency and, thereupon, attempt to override our
laws and legal processes, and imperceptibly institute some kind of
martial law on the pretext of precautionary mobilization measure
avowedly in the interest of the security of the state.
14. Constitutional Law; Executive Powers; Theory of “the end justifies
the means” rejected.-
Adoption as a government policy of the theory of “the end justifies the
means” brushing aside constitutional and legal restraints, must be
rejected, lest we end up with the end of freedom.
Docket Number: No. L-21897
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Counsel: Ramon A. Gonzales, Solicitor General, Estanislao Fernandez
Ponente: CONCEPCION
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that respondent
Executive Secretary had and has no power to authorize the importation
in question; that he exceeded his jurisdiction in granting said authority;
that said importation is not sanctioned by law and is contrary to its
provisions; and that, for lack of the requisite majority, the injunction
prayed for must be and is, accordingly, denied. It is so ordered.
3. Tanada vs Angara GR no. 118295
1.
Tañada vs. Angara 272 SCRA 18 , May 02, 1997
Case Title : WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE
COSETENG, as members of the Philippine Senate and as taxpayers;
GREGORIO ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as members of the
House of Representatives and as taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS and
HORACIO R. MORALES, both as taxpayers; CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION, CENTER
FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, LIKAS-KAYANG
KAUNLARAN FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL
RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT, DEMOKRATIKONG KILUSAN NG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC., and PHILIPPINE PEASANT
INSTITUTE, in representation of various taxpayers and as non-
governmental organizations, petitioners, vs. EDGARDO ANGARA,
ALBERTO ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI, HEHERSON
ALVAREZ, AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO BIAZON, NEPTALI,
GONZALES, ERNESTO HERRERA, JOSE LINA, GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ORLANDO MERCADO, BLAS OPLE, JOHN
OSMEÑA, SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA, RAUL ROCO,
FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE WEBB, in their respective
capacities as members of the Philippine Senate who concurred in the
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization; SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in
his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management; CARIDAD
VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National Treasurer; RIZALINO
NAVARRO, in his capacity as Secretary of Trade and Industry;
ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture;
ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance;
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ROBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs;
and TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
respondents. Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme
Court. Certiorari.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|World Trade Organization|Judicial
Review|Separation of Powers|Actions|Special Civil Actions|Constitutional
Principles and State Policies|Trade Liberalization|“Filipino First”
Policy|World Trade Organization (WTO)|Political Questions|International
Law|Doctrine of I ncorporation|Words and Phrases|Treaties|Pleadings
and Practice|Patents|Evidence|Burden of Proof|Burden of
Evidence|Certiorari
Syllabi:
1. Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Separation of Powers;
Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becom es not only the right but in fact the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.-
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt rais es a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Cons titution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. “The question
thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate)
remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.”
Once a “controvers y as to the application or interpretation of a
constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant
case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by
constitutional mandate to decide.”
2. Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Actions; Special Civil
Actions; Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies
to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when
proper, acts of legislative and executive officials.-
As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other
pl ain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, we
have no hesitation at all in holding that this petition should be given due
course and the vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials.
On this, we have no equivocation.
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3. Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Actions; Special Civil
Actions; In deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, the Supreme
Court does not review the wisdom of the decision of the President and
the Senate in enlisting the country in the WTO, or pass upon the merits
of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said international body,
rather, it only exercises its constitutional duty “to determine whether or
not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction” on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO
Agreement and its three annexes.-
We should stres s that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition,
this Court will not review the wisdom of the decision of the President and
the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the m
erits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said international
body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the government’s economic
policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative
restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise
its constitutional duty “to determine whether or not there had been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on
the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three
annexes.
4. Constitutional Law; Constitutional Principles and State Policies;
The principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some
sections of Article XII are not self-executing provisions, the disregard of
which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts.-
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration of principles
and state policies.” The counterpart of this article in the 1935
Constitution is called the “bas ic political creed of the nation” by Dean
Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-
executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are
used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of
judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in
the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles
and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article
XII are not “self-executing provis ions, the disregard of which can give
rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.”
Separation of Powers; Due Process.-
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The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of
broad constitutional principles are sourced from basic considerations of
due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade “into the uncharted
ocean of social and economic policy making.”
Trade Liberalization; “Filipino First” Policy; While the Constitution
indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business
exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against
foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair—the Constitution
did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy.-
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino
goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes
the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases
of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises
only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In
other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not
encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it
allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning
only on foreign competition that is unfair.
Trade Liberalization; “Filipino First” Policy; World Trade
Organization (WTO); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT);
There is hardly any basis for the statement that under the WTO, local
industries and enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be
deprived of control of the economy, for, quite to the contrary, the weaker
situations of developing nations like the Philippines have been taken into
account.-
Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection from unfair foreign
competition and trade practices including anti-dumping measures,
countervailing measures and safeguards against import surges. Where
local business are jeopardized by unfair foreign competition, the
Philippines can avail of these measures. There is hardly therefore any
basis for the statement that under the WTO, local industries and
enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be deprived of
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control of the economy. Quite the contrary, the weaker situations of
developin g na ti on s like the Philippines have been taken into account;
thus, there would be no basis to say that in joining the WTO, the
respondents have gravely abused their discretion. True, they have made
a bold decision to steer the ship of state into the yet uncharted sea of
economic liberalization. But such decision cannot be set aside on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion, simply because we disagree with it
or simply because we believe only in other economic policies. As earlier
stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction of this case will not pass upon the
advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economic
policy. It will only perform its constitutional duty of determining whether
the Senate committed grave abuse of discretion.
Organization (WTO); The fundamental law encourages industries that
are “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby
demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the gradual developm ent of robust
industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets.-
The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and
“trade without discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional
as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO
members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on “equality and
reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries that are
“competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby
demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust
industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed,
Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and
tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment,
Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated
the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered
under a policy of laissez faire.
Organization (WTO); Political Questions; The responses to questions
on whether WTO/GATT will favor the general welfare of the public at
large involve “judgment calls” by our policy makers, for which they are
answerable to our people during appropriate electoral exercises—such
Page 12 of 49
questions and the answers thereto are not subject to judicial
pronouncements based on grave abuse of discretion.-
Consequently, the question boils down to whether WTO/GATT will favor
the general welfare of the public at large. Will adherence to the W TO
treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the general welfare) to reality? Will
WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos’ general welfare because
it will—as promised by its promoters—expand the country’s exports and
generate more employment? Will it bring more prosperity, employment,
purchasing power and quality products at the most reasonable rates to
the Filipino public? The responses to these questions involve “judgment
calls” by our policy makers, for which they are answerable to our people
during appropriate electoral exercises. Such questions and the answers
thereto are not subject to judicial pronouncements based on grave abuse
of discretion.
10. Constitutional Law; It is to the credit of its drafters that the
Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the
same time bend with the refreshing winds of change necessitated by
unfolding events.-
It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are designed to
meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events. They should be
interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances. It is to the
credit of its drafters that a Constitution can withstand the assaults of
bigots and infidels but at the same time bend with the refreshing winds of
change necessitated by unfolding events. As one eminent political law
writer and respected jurist explains: “The Constitution must be
quintessential rather than superficial, the root and not the blossom, the
base and framework only of the edifice that is yet to rise. It is but the
core of the dream that must take shape, not in a twinkling by mandate of
our delegates, but slowly ‘in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts,’
where it will in time develop its sinews and gradually gather its strength
and finally achieve its substance. In fine, the Constitution cannot, like the
goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the brow of the Constitutional
Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must
grow with the society it seeks to re-structure and march apace with the
progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the
dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far from becoming a petrified rule,
a pulsing, living law attuned to the heartbeat of the nation.”
11. Constitutional Law; International Law; While sovereignty has
traditionally been deemed absolute and all—encompassing on the
Page 13 of 49
domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limi tation s vol un
tari ly agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a mem ber
of the family of nations.-
This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which
petitioners stressed their arguments on this issue. However, while
sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-
encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions
and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or
impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the
Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from
the rest of the world.
12. Constitutional Law; International Law; Doctrine of I
ncorporation; Words and Phrases; By the doctrine of incorporation,
the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international
law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws.-
In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution
“adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations.” By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered to be autom atically part of our
own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international
law is pacta sunt servanda—international agreements must be
performed in good faith. “A treaty engagement is not a mere moral
obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties x x x. A
state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to
make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to
ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.”
13. Constitutional Law; International Law; Treaties; By their voluntary
act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in
exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or
pact.-
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness
of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some
aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by
or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live
with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and
benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their
otherwise absolute rights.
Page 14 of 49
14. Constitutional Law; International Law; Treaties; World Trade
Organization; Pleadings and Practice; Article 34 of the General
Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) does not contain an
unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the
concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in Philippine judicial
system.-
Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions
and Basic Principles of the Agreement on T ra de-Rel a ted A s pects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) intrudes on the power of the
Supreme Court to prom ulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
proce- dures. x x x By and large, the arguments adduced in connection
with our dis position of the third issue—derogation of legislative power—
will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity
clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides,
Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is
with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement
inherent in our judicial system. So too, since the Philippines is a
signatory to most international conventions on patents, trademarks and
copyrights, the adjus tment in legislation and rules of procedure will not
be substantial.
Organization; Pleadings and Practice; Patents; Evidence; Words
and Phrases; Burden of Proof; Burden of Evidence; The “burden of
proof” contemplated by Article 34 should actually and properly be
understood as referring to the “burden of evidence” (burden of going
forward) placed on the producer of identical (or fake) product to show
that his product was produced without the use of the patented process—
the patent owner still has the “burden of proof” since he still has to
introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged identical product, the
fact that it is “identical” to the genuine one produced by the patented
process and the fact of “newness” of the genuine product or the fact of
“substantial likelihood” that the identical product was made by the
patented process.-
From the above, a WTO Member is required to provide a rule of dis
putable (note the words “in the absence of proof to the contrary”)
presumption that a product shown to be identical to one produced with
the use of a patented process shall be deemed to have been obtained by
the (illegal) use of the said patented process, (1) where such product
Page 15 of 49
obtained by the patented product is new, or (2) where there is
“substantial likelihood” that the identical product was made with the use
of the said patented process but the owner of the patent could not
determine the exact process used in obtaining such identical product.
Hence, the “burden of proof” contemplated by Article 34 should actually
be understood as the duty of the alleged patent infringer to overthrow
such presumption. Such burden, properly understood, actually refers to
the “burden of evidence” (burden of going forward) placed on the
producer of the identical (or fake) product to show that his product was
produced without the use of the patented process. The foregoing
notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the “burden of proof” since,
regardles s of the presumption provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34,
such owner still has to introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged
identical product, the fact that it is “identical” to the genuine one
produced by the patented process and the fact of “newness ” of the
genuine product or the fact of “substantial likelihood” that the identical
product was made by the patented process.
Organization; Words and Phrases; “Final Act,” Explained.-
“A final act, sometimes called protocol de clÔture, is an instrument which
records the winding up of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference
and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties, conventions,
recommendations and other acts agreed upon and s igned by the
plenipotentiaries attending the conference.” It is not the treaty itself. It is
rather a summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference which
may have taken place over several years .
17. Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Words and Phrases;
Certiorari; By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction,
and mere abuse of discretion is not enough—it must be grave.-
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse
of discretion is not enough. It mus t be grave abuse of discretion as
when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Failure on the part of the petitioner to show grave abus e of discretion
will result in the dismissal of the petition.
Page 16 of 49
18. Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Separation of Powers; In
rendering this Decision, the Supreme Court never forgets that the
Senate, whose act is under review, is one of two sovereign houses of
Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its actions.-
In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate,
whose act is under review, is one of two sovereign houses of Congress
and is thus entitled to great respect in its actions. It is itself a
constitutional body independent and coordinate, and thus its actions are
presumed regular and done in good faith. Unless convincing proof and
persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow such presumptions,
this Court will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the foregoing well-
accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of
regularity in the Senate’s processes, this Court cannot find any cogent
reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate’s exercise of its
power of concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of
Article VII of the Constitution.
19. Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Separation of Powers;
Treaties; World Trade Organization; The Senate Act, after deliberation
and voting, of voluntarily and overwhelmingly giving its consent to the
WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of the land,” is a
legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power.-
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and
overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making
it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign
duty and power. W e find no “patent and gross” arbitrariness or des
potism “by reas on of passion or personal hostility” in such exercise. It is
not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its
members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous
to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that
is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of dis cretion to the Senate
and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the
exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludably, what the Senate
did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was
wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and
review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the
people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward
trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our
people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the
Page 17 of 49
WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the
political desire of a member.
20. World Trade Organization; Trade Liberalization; I nternational
Law; Notwithstanding objections against possible limitations on national
sovereignty, the WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral
trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade
law.-
The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best seller Megatrends,
predicts an Asian Renaissance where “the East will become the
dominant region of the world economically, politically and culturally in the
next century.” He refers to the “free market” espoused by WTO as the
“catalyst” in this coming Asian ascendancy. There are at present about
31 countries including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia negotiating for
membership in the WTO. Notwithstanding objections against possible
limitations on national sovereignty, the WTO remains as the only viable
structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the
development of international trade law. The alternative to WTO is
isolation, stagnation, if not economic self-destruction. Duly enriched with
original membership, keenly aware of the advantages and
disadvantages of globalization with its on-line experience, and endowed
with a vision of the future, the Philippines now straddles the crossroads
of an international strategy for economic prosperity and stability in the
new millennium. Let the people, through their duly authorized elected
officers , make their free choice.
Docket Number: G.R. No. 118295
Counsel: Abelardo F. Domondon, The Solicitor General
Ponente: PANGANIBAN
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
4. Pimentel vs OESEC GR no. 158088
1.
Pimentel, Jr. vs. Office of the Executive Secretary 462 SCRA 622 ,
July 06, 2005
Page 18 of 49
Case Title : SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., REP. ETTA
ROSALES, PHILIPPINE COALITION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, TASK FORCE DETAINEES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, FAMILIES OF VICTIMS OF INVOLUNTARY
DISAPPEARANCES, BIANCA HACINTHA R. ROQUE, HARRISON
JACOB R. ROQUE, AHMED PAGLINAWAN, RON P. SALO, LEAVIDES
G. DOMINGO, EDGARDO CARLO VISTAN, NOEL VILLAROMAN,
CELESTE CEMBRANO, LIZA ABIERA, JAIME ARROYO, MARWIL
LLASOS, CRISTINA ATENDIDO, ISRAFEL FAGELA, and ROMEL
BAGARES,, petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, represented by HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, and the
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, represented by HON. BLAS
OPLE, respondents. Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the
Supreme Court. Mandamus.
Syllabi Class : Actions|International Law|Judicial Review|Parties|Locus
Standi|Mandamus|International Law|Treaties|Presidency
Syllabi:
1. Actions; Judicial Review; Parties; Locus Standi; Mandamus; To
be given due course, a petition for mandamus must have been instituted
by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation,
board or person which unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment
of a legal right; The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if
the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to
raise the constitutional or legal questions; “Legal standing” means a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act
that is being challenged.-
A petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station. We have held that to be given due course, a petition for
mandamus must have been instituted by a party aggrieved by the
alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which
unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right. The
petitioner in every case must therefore be an aggrieved party in the
sense that he possesses a clear legal right to be enforced and a direct
interest in the duty or act to be performed. The Court will exercise its
power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party
who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question.
“Legal standing” means a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the government act that is being challenged. The term “interest” is
material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest.
2. Actions; Judicial Review; Parties; Locus Standi; Mandamus;
International Law; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;
Only Senator Pimentel has the legal standing to file the instant suit since
the other petitioners, even as they maintain their standing as advocates
and defenders of human rights, and as citizens of the country, have not
shown that they have sustained or will sustain a direct injury from the
Page 19 of 49
non-transmittal of the signed text of the Rome Statute to the Senate—the
Rome Statute is intended to complement national criminal laws and
courts and sufficient remedies are available under our national laws to
protect our citizens against human rights violations and petitioners can
always seek redress for any abuse in our domestic courts.-
The question in standing is whether a party has alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. We find that among the petitioners, only Senator Pimentel has
the legal standing to file the instant suit. The other petitioners maintain
their standing as advocates and defenders of human rights, and as
citizens of the country. They have not shown, however, that they have
sustained or will sustain a direct injury from the non-transmittal of the
signed text of the Rome Statute to the Senate. Their contention that they
will be deprived of their remedies for the protection and enforcement of
their rights does not persuade. The Rome Statute is intended to
complement national criminal laws and courts. Sufficient remedies are
available under our national laws to protect our citizens against human
rights violations and petitioners can always seek redress for any abuse
in our domestic courts.
3. Actions; Judicial Review; Parties; Locus Standi; Mandamus;
International Law; Legislators have the standing to maintain inviolate
the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in
their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official
action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.-
As regards Senator Pimentel, it has been held that “to the extent the
powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of
the powers of that institution.” Thus, legislators have the standing to
maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity
of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as
legislators. The petition at bar invokes the power of the Senate to grant
or withhold its concurrence to a treaty entered into by the executive
branch, in this case, the Rome Statute. The petition seeks to order the
executive branch to transmit the copy of the treaty to the Senate to allow
it to exercise such authority. Senator Pimentel, as member of the
institution, certainly has the legal standing to assert such authority of the
Senate.
4. International Law; Treaties; Presidency; In our system of
government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the
sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country’s sole
representative with foreign nations.-
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is
regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the
country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect
of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with
respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the
authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold
recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and
Page 20 of 49
otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of
treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with
other states. Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to
negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to
his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the
Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “no treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in
by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.”
5. International Law; Treaties; Presidency; The participation of the
legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to
provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations.-
The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process
was deemed essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of
foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence of the legislature in the
treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy
system of checks and balance necessary in the nation’s pursuit of
political maturity and growth.
6. International Law; Treaties; Presidency; The signing of the treaty
and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-
making process—the signature is primarily intended as a means of
authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the
parties, usually performed by the state’s authorized representative, while
ratification is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the
provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative, and is generally
held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the
government.-
Petitioners’ arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine
representative with ratification. It should be underscored that the signing
of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the
treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily
intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of
the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the state’s
authorized representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the
other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the
provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is generally held
to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the
government. Thus, Executive Order No. 459 issued by President Fidel V.
Ramos on November 25, 1997 provides the guidelines in the negotiation
of international agreements and its ratification. It mandates that after the
treaty has been signed by the Philippine representative, the same shall
be transmitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs. The Department of
Foreign Affairs shall then prepare the ratification papers and forward the
signed copy of the treaty to the President for ratification. After the
President has ratified the treaty, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall
submit the same to the Senate for concurrence. Upon receipt of the
concurrence of the Senate, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall
comply with the provisions of the treaty to render it effective.
7. International Law; Treaties; Presidency; Petitioners’ submission
that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and international law to
ratify the treaty which it has signed is without basis—it is the ratification
Page 21 of 49
that binds the state to the provisions thereof; There is no legal obligation
to ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying that the refusal must be
based on substantial grounds and not on superficial or whimsical
reasons; The President has the discretion even after the signing of the
treaty by the Philippine representative whether or not to ratify the same.-
Petitioners’ submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law
and international law to ratify the treaty which it has signed is without
basis. The signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the
treaty. It is the ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. In
fact, the Rome Statute itself requires that the signature of the
representatives of the states be subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval of the signatory states. Ratification is the act by which the
provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by a State.
By ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness
to be bound by the provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is signed by
the state’s representative, the President, being accountable to the
people, is burdened with the responsibility and the duty to carefully study
the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not inimical to the
interest of the state and its people. Thus, the President has the
discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine
representative whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties does not contemplate to defeat or even restrain
this power of the head of states. If that were so, the requirement of
ratification of treaties would be pointless and futile. It has been held that
a state has no legal or even moral duty to ratify a treaty which has been
signed by its plenipotentiaries. There is no legal obligation to ratify a
treaty, but it goes without saying that the refusal must be based on
substantial grounds and not on superficial or whimsical reasons.
Otherwise, the other state would be justified in taking offense.
8. International Law; Treaties; Presidency; It is within the authority of
the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having
secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it.-
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify
is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The
role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its
consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the
authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or,
having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although
the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf
is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within
the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by
this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over
actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official
duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed
for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the
executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome
Statute to the Senate.
Division: EN BANC
Docket Number: G.R. No. 158088
Page 22 of 49
Counsel: H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., Joel Ruiz Butuyan, The Solicitor
General
Ponente: PUNO
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED.
5. Bayan vs Zamora GR no. 138570
1.
Bayan (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) vs. Zamora 342 SCRA 449 ,
October 10, 2000
Case Title : BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), JUNK VFA
MOVEMENT, BISHOP TOMAS MILLAMENA (Iglesia Filipina Inde-
pendiente), BISHOP ELMER BOLOCAN (United Church of Christ of the
Phil.), DR. REYNALDO LEGASCA, MD, KILUSANG MAMBUBUKID NG
PILIPINAS, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, GABRIELA, PROLABOR, and the
PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER, petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY
DOMINGO SIAZON, DEFENSE SECRETARY ORLANDO MERCADO,
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, SENATE PRESIDENT
MARCELO FERNAN, SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, SENATOR BLAS
OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO BIAZON, and SENATOR FRANCISCO
TATAD, respondents., PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION,
INC. (PHILCONSA), EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA, AMADO GAT INCIONG,
CAMILO L. SABIO, AND RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioners, vs. HON.
RONALDO B. ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary, HON. ORLANDO
MERCADO, as Secretary of National Defense, and HON. DOMINGO L.
SIAZON, JR., as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, respondents., TEOFISTO
T. GUINGONA, JR, RAUL S. ROCO, and SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III,
petitioners, vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, RONALDO B. ZAMORA,
DOMINGO L. SIAZON, JR, ORLANDO B. MERCADO, MARCELO B.
FERNAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, BLAS F. OPLE and RODOLFO G.
BLAZON, respondents., INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Represented by its National President, Jose Aguila Grapilon, petitioner,
vs. JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, in his capacity as President,
Republic of the Philippines, and HON. DOMINGO SIAZON, in his
capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, respondents., JOVITO R.
SALONGA, WIGBERTO TAÑADA, ZENAIDA QUEZON-AVANCEÑA,
Page 23 of 49
ROLANDO SIMBULAN, PABLITO V. SANIDAD, MA. SOCORRO I.
DIOKNO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, JOKER P. ARROYO, FRANCISCO C.
RIVERA, JR, RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, KILOSBAYAN, MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM,
INC. (MABINI), petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, SENATE PRESIDENT MARCELO B. FERNAN,
SENATOR BLAS F. OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO G. BIAZON, AND
ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR CONTROL,
SUPERVISION, DIRECTION, AND INSTRUCTION IN RELATION TO
THE VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT (VFA), respondents. Case
Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and
Prohibition.
Syllabi Class : Judicial Review|Constitutional Law|International
Law|Actions|Presidency|Treaties|Parties|Locus Standi|Taxpayer’s Suits;
Statutes|Congress|Integrated Bar of the Philippines|Treaties|Visiting
Forces Agreement|Statutory Construction|International Law|Executive
Agreements|Words and Phrases|Pacta Sunt Servanda|Judicial
Review|Certiorari|Diplomatic Power|Separation of
Powers|Senate|Political Questions|In ascertaining the VFA’s compliance
with the constitutional requirement|the yardstick should be U.S.
constitutional law
Syllabi:
1. Judicial Review; Parties; Locus Standi; Taxpayer’s Suits;
Statutes; A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of a
law, act, or statute must show “not only that the law is invalid, but also
that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way”-
A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or
statute must show “not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has
sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers
thereby in some indefinite way.” He must show that he has been, or is
about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties
by reason of the statute complained of.
2. Judicial Review; Parties; Locus Standi; Taxpayer’s Suits;
Statutes; It bears stressing that a taxpayer’s suit refers to a case where
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the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public
funds derived from taxation.-
In the case before us, petitioners failed to show, to the satisfaction of this
Court, that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers,
petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending powers. On this point, it bears
stressing that a taxpayer’s suit refers to a case where the act complained
of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from
taxation. Thus, in Bugnay Const. Development Corp. vs. Laron, we held:
“x x x it is exigent that the taxpayer-plaintiff sufficiently show that he
would be benefited or injured by the judgment or entitled to the avails of
the suit as a real party in interest. Before he can invoke the power of
judicial review, he must spe cifically prove that he has sufficient interest
in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that
he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the
questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a
general interest common to all members of the public.”
3. Judicial Review; Parties; Locus Standi; Congress; The standing of
members of Congress as proper party cannot be upheld in the absence
of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to the institution
to which they belong.-
Similarly, Representatives Wigberto Tañada, Agapito Aquino and Joker
Arroyo, as petitioners-legislators, do not possess the requisite locus
standi to maintain the present suit. While this Court, in Phil. Constitution
Association vs. Hon. Salvador Enriquez, sustained the legal standing of
a member of the Senate and the House of Representatives to question
the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an
appropriation bill, we cannot, at this instance, similarly uphold petitioners’
standing as members of Congress, in the absence of a clear showing of
any direct injury to their person or to the institution to which they belong.
4. Judicial Review; Parties; Locus Standi; Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; The IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring the instant suit in
the absence of a resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its
National President to commence the present action.-
In the same vein, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is
stripped of standing in these cases. As aptly observed by the Solicitor
General, the IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit in the absence
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of a board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its National
President to commence the present action.
5. Judicial Review; Parties; Locus Standi; The Supreme Court may, in
the exercise of its sound discretion, brush aside procedural barrier and
take cognizance of petitions raising issues of paramount importance and
constitutional significance.-
Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the
constitutional significance of the issues raised in the petitions, this Court,
in the exercise of its sound discretion, brushes aside the procedural
barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions, as we have done in the
early Emergency Powers Cases, where we had occasion to rule: “x x x
ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the
constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino
although they were involving only an indirect and general interest shared
in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they
were not proper parties and ruled that ‘transcendental importance to the
public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and
definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.’ We
have since then applied the exception in many other cases. (Association
of Small Landowners in the Philip-pines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform,
175 SCRA 343).” (Italics Supplied)
6. Constitutional Law; Treaties; Section 21, Article VII of the
Constitution deals with treaties or international agreements in general,
while Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to
treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or
facilities in the Philippines.-
Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in
general, in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all
the Members of the Senate is required to make the subject treaty, or
international agreement, valid and binding on the part of the Philippines.
This provision lays down the general rule on treaties or international
agreements and applies to any form of treaty with a wide variety of
subject matter, such as, but not limited to, extradition or tax treaties or
those economic in nature. All treaties or international agreements
entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage,
or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the
Senate to be valid and effective. In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a
special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of
foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this
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provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to
render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider
the agreement binding on the Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII fur-
ther requires that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may be
allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by
the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and
recognized as such by the other contracting state.
7. Constitutional Law; Treaties; Visiting Forces Agreement; Section
25, Article XVIII of the Constitution should apply to the Visiting Forces
Agreement.-
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with
treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply
in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however,
the provisions of Section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard
to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes
required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate, as will be further
discussed hereunder.
8. Constitutional Law; Treaties; Statutory Construction; It is a finely-
imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special provision or
law prevails over a general one.-
It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special
provision or law prevails over a general one. Lex specialis derogant
generali. Thus, where there is in the same statute a particular enactment
and also a general one which, in its most comprehensive sense, would
include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be
operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such
cases within its general language which are not within the provision of
the particular enactment.
9. Constitutional Law; Treaties; Statutory Construction; There is
nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or
facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines—when
no distinction is made by law, the Court should not distinguish.-
Moreover, it is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is
inapplicable to mere transient agreements for the reason that there is no
permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a military base.
On this score, the Constitution makes no distinction between “transient”
and “permanent.” Certainly, we find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII
that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or
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placedpermanently in the Philippines. It is a rudiment in legal
hermeneutics that when no distinction is made by law, the Court should
not distinguish—Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos.
10. Constitutional Law; Treaties; Statutory Construction; The use of
comma and the disjunctive word “or” clearly signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from the others included in the enumeration.-
In like manner, we do not subscribe to the argument that Section 25,
Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely
foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. Notably, a perusal
of said constitutional provision reveals that the proscription covers
“foreign military bases, troops, or facilities.” Stated differently, this
prohibition is not limited to the entry of troops and facilities without any
foreign bases being established. The clause does not refer to “foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities” collectively but treats them as
separate and independent subjects. The use of comma and the
disjunctive word “or” clearly signifies disassociation and independence of
one thing from the others included in the enumeration, such that, the
provision contemplates three different situations—a military treaty the
subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or
(c) foreign facilities—any of the three standing alone places it under the
coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII.
11. Constitutional Law; Treaties; Conditions Before Military Bases,
Troops or Facilities May Be Allowed.-
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently
met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by Congress, ratified
by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum;
and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
12. Constitutional Law; Treaties; International Law; Executive
Agreements; Words and Phrases; The phrase “recognized as a treaty”
means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the
agreement as a treaty.-
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty”
means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the
agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United
States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States
Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict
meaning to the phrase.
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13. Constitutional Law; Treaties; Statutory Construction; Well-
entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to
be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.-
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution
are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.
Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common
use.
14. International Law; Treaties; Executive Agreements; Visiting
Forces Agreement; As long as the VFA possesses the elements of an
agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken
equally as a treaty.-
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA
only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an
executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the
VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law,
the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
15. International Law; Treaties; Executive Agreements; Words and
Phrases; A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, is “an international instrument concluded between States in
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a
single instrument or in two or more related instruments, and whatever its
particular designation.”-
A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is
“an international instrument concluded between States in written form
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single
instrument or in two or more related instruments, and whatever its
particular designation.” There are many other terms used for a treaty or
international agreement, some of which are: act, protocol, agreement,
compromis d’ arbitrage, concordat, convention, declaration, exchange of
notes, pact, statute, charter and modus vivendi. All writers, from Hugo
Grotius onward, have pointed out that the names or titles of international
agreements included under the general term treaty have little or no legal
significance. Certain terms are useful, but they furnish little more than
mere description.
16. International Law; Treaties; Executive Agreements; In
international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive
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agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the
negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers.-
Thus, in international law, there is no difference between treaties and
executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as
long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers.
International law continues to make no distinction between treaties and
executive agreements: they are equally binding obligations upon nations.
17. International Law; Treaties; Executive Agreements; In this
jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive
agreements even without the concurrence of the Senate or Congress.-
In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive
agreements even without the concurrence of the Senate or Congress. In
Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading, we had occasion to
pronounce: “x x x the right of the Executive to enter into binding
agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval
has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history
we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as
commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent
rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation
arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has
never been seriously questioned by our courts, “x x x x x x x x x
“Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has expressly
recognized the validity and constitutionality of executive agreements
entered into without Senate approval.
Forces Agreement; For as long as the United States of America
accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to
comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked
compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.-
The records reveal that the United States Government, through
Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States
government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For
as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the
VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations
under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of
the Constitution.
Forces Agreement; Words and Phrases; Ratification is generally held
to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the
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government, as the case may be, through which the formal acceptance
of the treaty is proclaimed.-
Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the
head of the state or of the government, as the case may be, through
which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A State may
provide in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty.
The consent of the State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by
ratification when: (a) the treaty provides for such ratification, (b) it is
otherwise established that the negotiating States agreed that ratification
should be required, (e) the representative of the State has signed the
treaty subject to ratification, or (d) the intention of the State to sign the
treaty subject to ratification appears from the full powers of its
representative, or was expressed during the negotiation. In our
jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as
commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited
only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification.
Forces Agreement; With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent
to final acceptance, and with the exchange of notes between the
Philippines and the United States of America, it now becomes obligatory
and incumbent on our part, under the principles of international law, to
be bound by the terms of the agreement.-
With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance,
and with the exchange of notes between the Philippines and the United
States of America, it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part,
under the principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of the
agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II of the Constitution,
declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy
of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
nations.
Forces Agreement; Pacta Sunt Servanda; As an integral part of the
community of nations, we are responsible to assure that our government,
Constitution and laws will carry out our international obligation—we
cannot readily plead the Constitution as a convenient excuse for
noncompliance with our obligations, duties and responsibilities under
international law.-
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As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to be bound
by generally accepted rules for the conduct of its international relations.
While the international obligation devolves upon the state and not upon
any particular branch, institution, or individual member of its government,
the Philippines is nonetheless responsible for violations committed by
any branch or subdivision of its government or any official thereof. As an
integral part of the community of nations, we are responsible to assure
that our government, Constitution and laws will carry out our international
obligation. Hence, we cannot readily plead the Constitution as a
convenient excuse for non-compliance with our obligations, duties and
responsibilities under international law.
Forces Agreement; Pacta Sunt Servanda; Words and Phrases;
Under the principle of pacta sunt servanda, every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith.-
Beyond this, Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States
adopted by the International Law Commission in 1949 provides: “Every
State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from
treaties and other sources of international law, and it may not invoke
provisions in its constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to
perform this duty.” Equally important is Article 26 of the Convention
which provides that “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith,” This is known as the
principle of pacta sunt servanda which preserves the sanctity of treaties
and have been one of the most fundamental principles of positive
international law, supported by the jurisprudence of international
tribunals.
23. Actions; Judicial Review; Certiorari; “Grave Abuse of Discretion,”
Explained.-
On this particular matter, grave abuse of discretion implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or
to act at all in contemplation of law.
24. Presidency; Diplomatic Power; Separation of Powers; By
constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President,
as head of State, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of
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the countiy—the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification
of the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the
President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic
powers granted him no less than by the fundamental law itself.-
By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the
President, as head of State, is the sole organ and authority in the
external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is the chief
architect of the nation’s foreign policy; his “dominance in the field of
foreign relations is (then) conceded.” Wielding vast powers and
influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as Jefferson
describes, is “executive altogether.” As regards the power to enter into
treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests the same in
the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds vote
of all the members of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA
and the subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts
which pertain solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast
executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the
fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot
intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. Consequently, the
acts or judgment calls of the President involving the VFA—specifically
the acts of ratification and entering into a treaty and those necessary or
incidental to the exercise of such principal acts—squarely fall within the
sphere of his constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly struck
down, much less calibrated by this Court, in the absence of clear
showing of grave abuse of power or discretion.
25. Presidency; Diplomatic Power; Separation of Powers; Judicial
Review; Political Questions; While it is conceded that Article VIII,
Section 1, of the Constitution has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry
into areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such as
those relating to national security, it has not altogether done away with
political questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign
relations.-
For while it is conceded that Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution
has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the
political departments to decide, such as those relating to national
security, it has not altogether done away with political questions such as
those which arise in the field of foreign relations. The High Tribunal’s
function, as sanctioned by Article VIII, Section 1, “is merely (to) check
whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
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constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different
view. In the absence of a showing. . . (of) grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to
exercise its corrective power . . . It has no power to look into what it
thinks is apparent error.”
26. Treaties; Separation of Powers; Senate; Judicial Review;
Political Questions; Once the Senate performs the power to concur
with treaties, or exercises its prerogative within the boundaries
prescribed by the Constitution, the concurrence cannot be viewed to
constitute an abuse of power, much less grave abuse thereof.-
As to the power to concur with treaties, the Constitution lodges the same
with the Senate alone. Thus, once the Senate performs that power, or
exercises its prerogative within the boundaries prescribed by the
Constitution, the concurrence cannot, in like manner, be viewed to
constitute an abuse of power, much less grave abuse thereof. Corollarily,
the Senate, in the exercise of its discretion and acting within the limits of
such power, may not be similarly faulted for having simply performed a
task conferred and sanctioned by no less than the fundamental law.
27. Treaties; Separation of Powers; Senate; Judicial Review;
Political Questions; Checks and Balances; The role of the Senate in
relation to treaties is essentially legislative in character—the Senate, as
an independent body possessed of its own erudite mind, has the
prerogative to either accept or reject the proposed agreement, and
whatever action it takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion,
pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act, and in this
sense, the Senate partakes a principal, yet delicate, role in keeping the
principles of separation of powers and of checks and balances alive and
vigilantly ensures that these cherished rudiments remain true to their
form in a democratic government.-
For the role of the Senate in relation to treaties is essentially legislative in
character; the Senate, as an independent body possessed of its own
erudite mind, has the prerogative to either accept or reject the proposed
agreement, and whatever action it takes in the exercise of its wide
latitude of discretion, pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of
the act. In this sense, the Senate partakes a principal, yet delicate, role
in keeping the principles of separation of powers and of checks and
balances alive and vigilantly ensures that these cherished rudiments
remain true to their form in a democratic government such as ours. The
Constitu- tion thus animates, through this treaty-concurring power of the
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Senate, a healthy system of checks and balances indispensable toward
our nation’s pursuit of political maturity and growth. True enough,
rudimentary is the principle that matters pertaining to the wisdom of a
legislative act are beyond the ambit and province of the courts to inquire.
28. Treaties; Separation of Powers; Judicial Review; Absent any
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court—as the
final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch sentinel of the rights of
the people—its without power to conduct an incursion and meddle with
such affairs purely executive and legislative in character and nature.-
In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of respondents, this Court—as the final arbiter of legal controversies and
staunch sentinel of the rights of the people—is then without power to
conduct an incursion and meddle with such affairs purely executive and
legislative in character and nature. For the Constitution no less, maps
out the distinct boundaries and limits the metes and bounds within which
each of the three political branches of government may exercise the
powers exclusively and essentially conferred to it by law.
29. Treaties; Visiting Forces Agreement; The absence in the VFA of
the slightest suggestion as to the duration of visits of U.S. troops in
Philippine territory, coupled with the lack of a limited term of effectivity of
the VFA itself justify the interpretation that the VFA allows permanent,
not merely temporary, presence of U.S. troops on Philippine soil.-
It is against this tapestry woven from the realities of the past and a vision
of the future joint military exercises that the Court must draw a line
between temporary visits and permanent stay of U.S. troops. The
absence in the VFA of the slightest suggestion as to the duration of visits
of U.S. troops in Philippine territory, coupled with the lack of a limited
term of effectivity of the VFA itself justify the interpretation that the VFA
allows permanent, not merely temporary, presence of U.S. troops on
Philippine soil. Following Secretary Siazon’s testimony, if the visits of
U.S. troops could last for four weeks at the most and at the maximum of
twelve times a year for an indefinite number of years, then by no stretch
of logic can these visits be characterized as temporary because in fact,
the U.S. troops could be in Philippine territory 365 days a year for 50
years—longer than the duration of the 1947 RP-US Military Bases
Agreement which expired in 1991 and which, without question,
contemplated permanent presence of U.S. bases, facilities, and troops.
Page 35 of 49
30. Treaties; Visiting Forces Agreement; Recognition of the United
States as the other contracting party of the VFA should be by the U.S.
President with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate.-
To determine compliance of the VFA with the requirements of Sec. 25,
Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is necessary to ascertain the intent of the
framers of the Constitution as well as the will of the Filipino people who
ratified the fundamental law. This exercise would inevitably take us back
to the period in our history when U.S. military presence was entrenched
in Philippine territory with the establishment and operation of U.S.
Military Bases in several parts of the archipelago under the 1947 R.P.-
U.S. Military Bases Agreement. As articulated by Constitutional
Commissioner Blas F. Ople in the 1986 Constitutional Commission
deliberations on this provision, the 1947 RP-US Military Bases
Agreement was ratified by the Philippine Senate, but not by the United
States Senate. In the eyes of Philippine law, therefore, the Military Bases
Agreement was a treaty, but by the laws of the United States, it was a
mere executive agreement. This asymmetry in the legal treatment of the
Military Bases Agreement by the two countries was believed to be a slur
to our sovereignty. Thus, in the debate among the Constitutional
Commissioners, the unmistakable intention of the commission emerged
that this anomalous asymmetry must never be repeated. To correct this
historical aberration, Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the Constitution requires that
the treaty allowing the presence of foreign military bases, troops, and
facilities should also be “recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
party.” In plain language, recognition of the United States as the other
contracting party of the VFA should be by the U.S. President with the
advice and consent of the U.S. Senate.
31. Treaties; Visiting Forces Agreement; In ascertaining the VFA’s
compliance with the constitutional requirement, the yardstick
should be U.S. constitutional law; In U.S. practice, a “treaty” is only
one of four types of international agreements, namely, Article II treaties,
executive agreements pursuant to a treaty, congressional-executive
agreements, and sole executive agreements.-
In ascertaining the VFA’s compliance with the constitutional requirement
that it be “recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state,” it is
crystal clear from the above exchanges of the Constitutional
Commissioners that the yardstick should be U.S. constitutional law. It is
therefore apropos to make a more in depth study of the U.S. President’s
power to enter into executive agreements under U.S. constitutional law.
Page 36 of 49
Sec. 2, Art. II, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides that the
President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur.” The U.S. Constitution does not define “treaties.” Nevertheless,
the accepted definition of a “treaty” is that of “an agreement between two
or more states or international organizations that is intended to be
legally binding and is governed by international law.” Although the United
States did not formally ratify the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, its definition of a treaty has been applied by U.S. courts and the
State Department has stated that the Vienna Convention represents
customary international law. The Vienna Convention defines a treaty as
“an international agreement concluded between States in written form
and governed by international law.” It has been observed that this
definition is broader than the sense in which “treaty” is used in the U.S.
Constitution. In U.S. practice, a “treaty” is only one of four types of
international agreements, namely: Article II treaties, executive
agreements pursuant to a treaty, congressional-executive agreements,
and sole executive agreements.
32. Treaties; Visiting Forces Agreement; Classifications of U.S.
Executive Agreements.-
These executive agreements which have grown to be the primary
instrument of U.S. foreign policy may be classified into three types,
namely: (1) Treaty-authorized executive agreements, i.e., agreements
made by the President pursuant to authority conferred in a prior treaty;
(2) Congressionalexecutive agreements, i.e., agreements either (a)
negotiated by the President with prior Congressional authorization or
enactment or (b) confirmed by both Houses of Congress after the fact of
negotiation; and (3) Presidential or sole executive agreements, i.e.,
agreements made by the President based on his exclusive presidential
powers, such as the power as commander-in-chief of the armed forces
pursuant to which he conducts military operations with U.S. allies, or his
power to receive ambassadors and recognize foreign governments.
33. Treaties; Visiting Forces Agreement; The Court will be standing
on unstable ground if it places a sole executive agreement like the VFA
on the same constitutional plateau as a treaty.-
In conclusion, after a macro view of the landscape of U.S. foreign
relations vis-a-vis U.S. constitutional law, with special attention on the
legal status of sole executive agreements, I respectfully submit that the
Court will be standing on unstable ground if it places a sole executive
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agreement like the VFA on the same constitutional plateau as a treaty.
Questions remain and the debate continues on the constitutional basis
as well as the legal effects of sole executive agreements under U.S. law.
The observation of Louis Henkin, a noted international and U.S.
constitutional law scholar, captures the sentiments of the framers of the
Philippine Constitution and of the Filipinos in crafting Sec 25, Art. XVIII of
the 1987 Constitution—“(o)ften the treaty process will be used at the
insistence of other parties to an agreement because they believe that a
treaty has greater ‘dignity’ than an executive agreement, because its
constitutional effectiveness is beyond doubt, because a treaty will
‘commit’ the Senate and the people of the United States and make its
subsequent abrogation or violation less likely.”
34. Treaties; Visiting Forces Agreement; However we may wish it, the
VFA, as a sole executive agreement, cannot climb to the same lofty
height that the dignity of a treaty can reach—it falls short of the
requirement set by Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution that the
agreement allowing the presence of foreign military troops on Philippine
soil must be “recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.”-
With the cloud of uncertainty still hanging on the exact legal force of sole
executive agreements under U.S. constitutional law, this Court must
strike a blow for the sovereignty of our country by drawing a bright line
between the dignity and status of a treaty in contrast with a sole
executive agreement. However we may wish it, the VFA, as a sole
executive agreement, cannot climb to the same lofty height that the
dignity of a treaty can reach. Consequently, it falls short of the
requirement set by Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution that the
agreement allowing the presence of foreign military troops on Philippine
soil must be “recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.”
Division: EN BANC
Docket Number: G.R. No. 138570, G.R. No. 138572, G.R. No. 138587,
G.R. No. 138680, G.R. No. 138698
Counsel: Romeo B. Igot and Victoria G. delos Reyes, Eulogia M. Cueva,

Ramon A. Gonzales, Wigberto E. Tañada and Lorenzo Tañada III,
Theodore O.
Ponente: BUENA, PUNO
Page 38 of 49
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petitions
are hereby DISMISSED.
6. Nicolas vs Romulo GR no. 175888
International Law; Treaties; Visiting Forces Agreement; Military Bases;

National Territory; Clark and Subic and the other places in the
Philippines covered by the RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947
were not Philippine Territory, as they were excluded from the cession
and retained by the U.S.—The provision of the Constitution is Art. XVIII,
Sec. 25 which states: Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the
Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America
concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified
by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum
held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State. The reason for this provision lies in history and the Philippine
experience in regard to the United States military bases in the country. It
will be recalled that under the Philippine Bill of 1902, which laid the basis
for the Philippine Commonwealth and, eventually, for the recognition of
independence, the United States agreed to cede to the Philippines all the
territory it acquired from Spain under the Treaty of Paris, plus a few
islands later added to its realm, except certain naval ports and/or military
bases and facilities, which the United States retained for itself. This is
noteworthy, because what this means is that Clark and Subic and the
other places in the Philippines covered by the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement of 1947 were not Philippine territory, as they were excluded
from the cession and retained by the US. Accordingly, the Philippines
had no jurisdiction over these bases except to the extent allowed by the
United States. Furthermore, the RP-US Military Bases Agreement was
never advised for ratification by the United States Senate, a disparity in
treatment, because the Philippines regarded it as a treaty and had it
concurred in by our Senate. Subsequently, the United States agreed to
turn over these bases to the Philippines; and with the expiration of the
RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the territory covered by these
bases were finally ceded to the Philippines.440440SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATEDNicolas vs. Romulo
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Article XVIII, Sec. 25 of the

Constitution is designed to ensure that any agreement allowing the
presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in Philippine
territory shall be equally binding on the Philippines and the foreign
sovereign State involved, the idea being to prevent a recurrence of what
happened in the past.—To prevent a recurrence of this experience, the
provision in question was adopted in the 1987 Constitution. The
provision is thus designed to ensure that any agreement allowing the
presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in Philippine
Page 39 of 49
territory shall be equally binding on the Philippines and the foreign
sovereign State involved. The idea is to prevent a recurrence of the
situation in which the terms and conditions governing the presence of
foreign armed forces in our territory were binding upon us but not upon
the foreign State.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial Notice; The presence of US

Armed Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) is allowed “under a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate x x x and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State”;
Notice can be taken of the internationally known practice by the United
States of submitting to its Senate for advice and consent agreements
that are policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry out or further
implement these policymaking agreements are merely submitted to
Congress, under the provisions of the so-called Case-Zablocki Act,
within 60 days from ratification.—Applying the provision to the situation
involved in these cases, the question is whether or not the presence of
US Armed Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the VFA is allowed
“under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate x x x and recognized as
a treaty by the other contracting State.” This Court finds that it is, for two
reasons. First, as held in Bayan v. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449 (2000), the
VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been
recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by
the duly authorized representative of the United States government. The
fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United
States Senate does not detract from its status as a binding international
agreement or treaty recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of
internal United States law. Notice can be taken of the internationally
known practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate for
advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in nature,
whereas those that carry out or further implement these 441VOL. 578,
FEBRUARY 11, 2009441Nicolas vs. Romulopolicymaking agreements
are merely submitted to Congress, under the provisions of the so-called
Case-Zablocki Act, within sixty days from ratification. The second reason
has to do with the relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed
and duly ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and
the United States Senate.
Same; Same; Same; Same; As an implementing agreement of the RP-

US Mutual Defense Treaty, it was not necessary to submit the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA) to the US Senate for advice and consent, but
merely to the US Congress under the Case-Zablocki Act within 60 days
of its ratification; The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution,
is complied with by virtue of the fact that the presence of the US Armed
Forces through the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) is a presence
“allowed under” the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty.—As an
implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, it was
not necessary to submit the VFA to the US Senate for advice and
consent, but merely to the US Congress under the Case-Zablocki Act
within 60 days of its ratification. It is for this reason that the US has
Page 40 of 49
certified that it recognizes the VFA as a binding international agreement,
i.e., a treaty, and this substantially complies with the requirements of Art.
XVIII, Sec. 25 of our Constitution. The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of
the Constitution, is complied with by virtue of the fact that the presence
of the US Armed Forces through the VFA is a presence “allowed under”
the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty itself has been ratified and concurred in by both the Philippine
Senate and the US Senate, there is no violation of the Constitutional
provision resulting from such presence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection Clause; There is a

substantial basis for a different treatment of a member of a foreign
military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all the other
accused—the rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces
allowed to enter one’s territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except
to the extent agreed upon.—The equal protection clause is not violated,
because there is a substantial basis for a different treatment of a
member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our territory
and all other accused. The rule in international law is that a foreign
armed forces allowed to enter one’s territory is im-442442SUPREME
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDNicolas vs. Romulomune from local
jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of Forces
Agreements involving foreign military units around the world vary in
terms and conditions, according to the situation of the parties involved,
and reflect their bargaining power. But the principle remains, i.e., the
receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the sending
State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties. As a result, the
situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt
rules of procedure is curtailed or violated, but rather one in which, as is
normally encountered around the world, the laws (including rules of
procedure) of one State do not extend or apply—except to the extent
agreed upon—to subjects of another State due to the recognition of
extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as visiting foreign armed
forces.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The parties to the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) recognized the difference between
custody during the trial and detention after conviction, because they
provided for a specific arrangement to cover detention, and this specific
arrangement clearly states not only that the detention shall be carried out
in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also that the
detention shall be “by Philippine authorities.”—It is clear that the parties
to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during the trial
and detention after conviction, because they provided for a specific
arrangement to cover detention. And this specific arrangement clearly
states not only that the detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed
on by authorities of both parties, but also that the detention shall be “by
Philippine authorities.” Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of
December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of
the accused in the United States Embassy, are not in accord with the
VFA itself because such detention is not “by Philippine authorities.”
Page 41 of 49
Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; Judgments; The Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) is a self-executing Agreement, as that term is defined
in Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. [not yet numbered for citation purposes]
(2008), the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) is covered by implementing
legislation, namely, the Case-Zablocki Act, USC Sec. 112(b), and, the
RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was advised and consented to by the US
Senate on March 20, 1952.—After deliberation, the Court holds, on
these points, as follows: First, the VFA is a self-executing Agreement, as
that term is defined in Medellin itself, because the parties intend its
provisions to be enforceable, precisely 443VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11,
2009443Nicolas vs. Romulobecause the Agreement is intended to carry
out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and
executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to produce
L/CPL Smith before the court during the trial. Secondly, the VFA is
covered by implementing legislation, namely, the Case-Zablocki Act,
USC Sec. 112(b), inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the
US Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within
60 days from their ratification be immediately implemented. The parties
to these present cases do not question the fact that the VFA has been
registered under the Case-Zablocki Act. In sum, therefore, the VFA
differs from the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the Avena
decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), subject matter of the
Medellin decision. The Convention and the ICJ decision are not self-
executing and are not registrable under the Case-Zablocki Act, and thus
lack legislative implementing authority. Finally, the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty was advised and consented to by the US Senate on
March 20, 1952, as reflected in the US Congressional Record, 82nd
Congress, Second Session, Vol. 98–Part 2, pp. 2594-2595.
Same; Same; Same; The framers of the Constitution were aware that the
application of international law in domestic courts varies from country to
country—it was not the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution,
in adopting Article XVIII, Sec. 25, to require the other contracting State to
convert their system to achieve alignment and parity with ours.—The
framers of the Constitution were aware that the application of
international law in domestic courts varies from country to country. As
Ward N. Ferdinandusse states in his Treatise, DIRECT APPLICATION
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS, some
countries require legislation whereas others do not. It was not the
intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting Article XVIII,
Sec. 25, to require the other contracting State to convert their system to
achieve alignment and parity with ours. It was simply required that the
treaty be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. With that,
it becomes for both parties a binding international obligation and the
enforcement of that obligation is left to the normal recourse and
processes under international law.444444SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATEDNicolas vs. Romulo
Page 42 of 49
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Three Types of Treaties in the
American System; An executive agreement is a “treaty” within the
meaning of that word in international law and constitutes enforceable
domestic law vis-à-vis the United States.—As held by the US Supreme
Court in Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982), an executive
agreement is a “treaty” within the meaning of that word in international
law and constitutes enforceable domestic law vis-à-vis the United States.
Thus, the US Supreme Court in Weinberger enforced the provisions of
the executive agreement granting preferential employment to Filipinos in
the US Bases here. Accordingly, there are three types of treaties in the
American system: 1. Art. II, Sec. 2 treaties—These are advised and
consented to by the US Senate in accordance with Art. II, Sec. 2 of the
US Constitution. 2. Executive–Congressional Agreements: These are
joint agreements of the President and Congress and need not be
submitted to the Senate. 3. Sole Executive Agreements.—These are
agreements entered into by the President. They are to be submitted to
Congress within sixty (60) days of ratification under the provisions of the
Case-Zablocki Act, after which they are recognized by the Congress and
may be implemented.PUNO, C.J., Dissenting Opinion:International
Law; Treaties; Visiting Forces Agreement; Constitutional Law; An
examination of Bayan v. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449 (2000), which upheld
the validity of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) is necessary in light
of a recent change in U.S. policy on treaty enforcement.—An
examination of Bayan v. Zamora, which upheld the validity of the VFA, is
necessary in light of a recent change in U.S. policy on treaty
enforcement. Of significance is the case of Medellin v. Texas, 522 U.S.
__ (2008) where it was held by the U.S. Supreme Court that while
treaties entered into by the President with the concurrence of the Senate
are binding international commitments, they are not domestic law unless
Congress enacts implementing legislation or unless the treaty itself is
“self-executing.”
Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; The U.S. President’s authority to

enter into treaties that are enforceable within its domestic sphere was
severely limited by Medellin, id.—In fine, the U.S. President’s authority to
enter into treaties that are enforceable within its domestic sphere was
severely limited by Medellin. In Medellin, the United States posited the
theory that the President’s constitutional 445VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11,
2009445Nicolas vs. Romulorole uniquely qualifies him to resolve the
sensitive foreign policy decisions that bear on compliance with an ICJ
decision. In said case, the U.S. President, through the issuance of the
Memorandum, sought to vindicate the United States interest in ensuring
the reciprocal observance of the Vienna Convention, protecting relations
with foreign governments, and demonstrating commitment to the role of
international law. Though these interests were compelling, the Supreme
Court held that “the president’s authority to act, as with the exercise of
any governmental power, must stem from an act of Congress or from the
Constitution itself.”
Page 43 of 49
Same; Same; Same; With Medelllin, the case law is now settled that
acknowledgment by the U.S. President that an agreement is a treaty,
even with the concurrence of the U.S. Senate, is not sufficient to make a
treaty enforceable in its domestic sphere, unless the words of the treaty
itself clearly express the intention to make the treaty self-executory, or
unless there is corresponding legislative enactment providing for its
domestic enforceability—Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) failed to meet
the constitutional requirement of recognition by the U.S. as a treaty.—
With Medellin, the case law is now settled that acknowledgement by the
U.S. President that an agreement is a treaty, even with the concurrence
of the U.S. Senate, is not sufficient to make a treaty enforceable in its
domestic sphere, unless the words of the treaty itself clearly express the
intention to make the treaty self-executory, or unless there is
corresponding legislative enactment providing for its domestic
enforceability. The VFA does not satisfy either of these requirements and
cannot thus be enforced within the U.S. I reiterate my dissent in Bayan v.
Zamora that the VFA failed to meet the constitutional requirement of
recognition by the U.S. as a treaty.
Same; Same; Same; The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) is an

executive agreement that does not derive any support from a treaty, or
prior Congressional authorization or enactment.—Medellin, citing the
Youngstown Framework, affirmed the tripartite scheme for evaluating
executive action in this area: First, “[w]hen the President acts pursuant to
an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its
maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all
that Congress can delegate.” Second, “[w]hen the President acts in
absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can
only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of
twilight in which he and Congress may have 446446SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATEDNicolas vs. Romuloconcurrent authority, or in
which its distribution is uncertain.” In this circumstance, Presidential
authority can derive support from “congressional inertia, indifference or
acquiescence.” Finally, “[w]hen the President takes measures
incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress, his power is at
its lowest ebb,” and the Court can sustain his actions “only by disabling
the Congress from acting upon the subject.” The VFA is an executive
agreement that does not derive any support from a treaty, or prior
Congressional authorization or enactment. The VFA falls within the third
category of the Youngstown Framework and, thus, Presidential power is
at its lowest ebb. The President’s actions cannot be sustained and
enforced in the domestic sphere without congressional enactment or in
the light of contrary legislation.
Same; Same; Same; At best, the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) can
be considered as an international commitment by the U.S., but “the
responsibility of transforming an international obligation arising from a
non-self-executing treaty into domestic law falls to Congress.”—The VFA
can be considered as an international commitment by the U.S., but “the
responsibility of transforming an international obligation arising from a
Page 44 of 49
non-self-executing treaty into domestic law falls to Congress.” It is
therefore an error to perpetuate the ruling of the majority of this Court in
Bayan that it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA
only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an
executive agreement is binding as a treaty. Medellin has held that the
binding effect of a treaty as an international obligation does not
automatically mean that the treaty is enforceable in the domestic sphere.
Medellin tells us that the binding effect of the treaty is mutually exclusive
from the actual enforcement of the rights and obligations sourced from it.
Though the VFA attaches international obligations to the parties to the
agreement, it is irrelevant in the enforcement of a non-self-executory
treaty in the domestic courts of the U.S. As long as the text of the VFA
does not clearly show that it is self-executory and as long as U.S.
Congress has not made it enforceable in the domestic sphere, it does
not have obligatory force in U.S. domestic courts.
Same; Same; Same; Even assuming there is a Senate concurrence in

the RP-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA) still cannot be given domestic effect in the United States—it is up
to the Court to decide whether the terms of a treaty reflect a
determination by the President who negotiated it and the 447VOL. 578,
FEBRUARY 11, 2009447Nicolas vs. RomuloSenate that confirmed it if
the treaty has domestic effect; The dichotomy where the Philippine
government has considered the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) to be
fully enforceable within our jurisdiction yet the U.S. does not look at the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) as enforceable within its domestic
jurisdiction is evidently proscribed by the Constitution.—Regardless of
whether there is concurrence by the U.S. Senate in the RP-U.S. Mutual
Defense Treaty, the disparity in the legal treatment of the VFA by the
U.S. is clear, considering the Medellin ruling. Indeed, even assuming
there is a Senate concurrence in the RP-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty,
the VFA still cannot be given domestic effect in the United States. It is up
to the Court to decide whether the terms of a treaty reflect a
determination by the President who negotiated it and the Senate that
confirmed it if the treaty has domestic effect. To repeat, any treaty
becomes enforceable within the U.S. only when the Court has
determined it to be so, based on the clear terms of the treaty or through
Congressional enactment to implement the provisions of the treaty. It
bears stressing that the RP government has already enforced the
provisions of the VFA and has transferred custody of Lance Corporal
Daniel Smith to U.S. authorities. The Philippine government has
considered the VFA to be fully enforceable within our jurisdiction; yet, the
U.S. does not look at the VFA as enforceable within its domestic
jurisdiction. This dichotomy is evidently proscribed by the Constitution,
for such dichotomy would render our sovereignty in tatters.CARPIO, J.,
Dissenting Opinion:International Law; Treaties; Visiting Forces
Agreement; The Philippine Constitution bars the efficacy of a treaty that
is enforceable as domestic law only in the Philippines but unenforceable
as domestic law in the other contracting State.—Under Medellin, 552
U.S. ___ (2008), the VFA is indisputably not enforceable as domestic
federal law in the United States. On the other hand, since the Philippine
Page 45 of 49
Senate ratified the VFA, the VFA constitutes domestic law in the
Philippines. This unequal legal status of the VFA violates Section 25,
Article XVIII of the Philippine Constitution, which specifically requires that
a treaty involving the presence of foreign troops in the Philippines must
be equally binding on the Philippines and on the other contracting State.
In short, the Philippine Constitution bars the efficacy of such a treaty that
is enforceable as domestic law only in the Philippines but unenforceable
as domestic law in the other contracting State. The Philippines is a
sovereign and inde-448448SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDNicolas vs. Romulopendent State. It is no longer a colony
of the United States. This Court should not countenance an unequal
treaty that is not only contrary to the express mandate of the Philippine
Constitution, but also an affront to the sovereignty, dignity and
independence of the Philippine State.
Same; Same; Same; The clear intent of the phrase “recognized as a

treaty by the other contracting State” in Sec. 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution is to insure that the treaty has the same legal effect on the
Philippines as on the other contracting State.—There is no dispute that
Section 25, Article XVIII of the Philippine Constitution governs the
constitutionality of the VFA. Section 25 states: Section 25. After the
expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases,
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and,
when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by
the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. (Emphasis
supplied) The clear intent of the phrase “recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting State” is to insure that the treaty has the same legal
effect on the Philippines as on the other contracting State. This
requirement is unique to agreements involving the presence of foreign
troops in the Philippines, along with the requirement, if Congress is so
minded, to hold a national referendum for the ratification of such a treaty.
Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. ___
(2008), has stunned legal scholars in the United States and there is no
escaping its legal effect on the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) here in
the Philippines.—Medellin has stunned legal scholars in the United
States and there is no escaping its legal effect on the VFA here in the
Philippines. Even U.S. President George W. Bush had to bow to the
ruling that he had no authority to enforce the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations in the United States in the absence of any
implementing legislation by the U.S. Congress, despite the fact that the
U.S. Senate had ratified the Convention. Medellin tersely states: In sum,
while treaties “may comprise international commitments…they are not
domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes
or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be ‘self-449VOL. 578,
FEBRUARY 11, 2009449Nicolas vs. Romuloexecuting’ and is ratified on
Page 46 of 49
these terms. (Emphasis supplied) To drive home the point that the U.S.
President cannot enforce the Convention in the United States, Medellin
states that the “President’s authority to act, as with the exercise of any
governmental power, ‘must stem either from an act of Congress or from
the Constitution itself.”Same;
Same; Same; It would be naïve and foolish for the Philippines, or for any
other State for that matter, to implement as part of its domestic law a
treaty that the United States does not recognize as part of its own
domestic law; The wisdom of the framers in crafting Section 25, Article
XVIII of the Philippine Constitution is now apparent.—The Philippines
cannot take comfort that the VFA can still give rise to an obligation under
international law on the part of the United States, even as the VFA does
not constitute domestic law in the United States. Assuming that the
United States will submit to the jurisdiction of the ICJ, the futility of
relying on the Security Council to enforce the ICJ decision is apparent. In
the chilling words of Medellin, “the United States retained the unqualified
right to exercise its veto of any Security Council resolution.” The only
way to avoid this veto of the United States is to make the treaty part of
U.S. domestic law. It would be naïve and foolish for the Philippines, or
for any other State for that matter, to implement as part of its domestic
law a treaty that the United States does not recognize as part of its own
domestic law. That would only give the United States the “unqualified
right” to free itself from liability for any breach of its own obligation under
the treaty, despite an adverse ruling from the ICJ. The wisdom of the
framers in crafting Section 25, Article XVIII of the Philippine Constitution
is now apparent. The other contracting State must “recognize as a
treaty” any agreement on the presence of foreign troops in the
Philippines, and such treaty must be equally binding on the Philippines
and on the other contracting State. In short, if the treaty is part of
domestic law of the Philippines, it must also be part of domestic law of
the other contracting State. Otherwise, the treaty cannot take effect in
the Philippines.
Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; Notification under the Case-

Zablocki Act does not enact the executive agreement into domestic law
of the United States.—Executive agreements are not ratified by the U.S.
Senate but merely notified to the U.S. Congress under the Case-
Zablocki Act, which does not apply to treaties. Notification under the
Case-Zablocki Act does not enact the executive agreement
450450SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDNicolas vs.
Romulointo domestic law of the United States. On the other hand, “the
failure to transmit to Congress under the Case-Zablocki Act x x x does
not alter the legal effect of an (executive) agreement.” The Case-
Zablocki Act operates merely as a timely notification to the U.S.
Congress of the executive agreements, “other than a treaty,” that the
U.S. President has entered into with foreign States. This is clear from the
provisions of the Case-Zablocki Act: x x x
Page 47 of 49
Same; Same; Same; Same; The purpose of the Case-Zablocki Act is “to
address the lack of legal constraints over the President’s choice of the
form of an agreement,” whether an executive agreement or a treaty—it
allows the U.S. Congress to timely monitor if an agreement is mislabeled
as an executive agreement when it should be a treaty subject to U.S.
Senate ratification.—The Case-Zablocki Act mandates the notification to
the U.S. Congress of executive agreements “other than a treaty.” The
purpose of the Case-Zablocki Act is “to address the lack of legal
constraints over the President’s choice of the form of an agreement,”
whether an executive agreement or a treaty. It allows the U.S. Congress
to timely monitor if an agreement is mislabeled as an executive
agreement when it should be a treaty subject to U.S. Senate ratification.
As one commentator explained: If Congress is dissatisfied with the
character or lack of consultation on the form of an agreement, or with the
content of the agreement itself, it has other means of making its
displeasure known. In the exercise of its oversight power, Congress
could hold hearings, as it did in 1976 on the United States-Turkish
Defense Cooperation Agreement, to consider the merits of concluding
such an agreement at a time of tension involving one or more nations
relevant to the agreement. At any time Congress can also modify an
executive agreement, as it can a treaty, by enacting subsequent contrary
legislation. Congress has taken such action in the past, regrettably
placing the United States in the position of breaching the agreement
under international law. Finally, Congress could withhold funding for an
executive agreement. To date, Congress has not exercised its “spending
power” in this manner, except as to isolated issues. “Spending power” is
likely to be used by Congress only as a last resort.
Same; Same; Same; For the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) to be

constitutional under Section 25, Article XVIII of the Philippine
Constitution, the United States must first recognize the VFA as a treaty,
and then ratify the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) to form part of its
domestic law.—The United States Government does not 451VOL. 578,
FEBRUARY 11, 2009451Nicolas vs. Romulorecognize the VFA as a
treaty but merely as an executive agreement. For the VFA to be
constitutional under Section 25, Article XVIII of the Philippine
Constitution, the United States must first recognize the VFA as a treaty,
and then ratify the VFA to form part of its domestic law. In the words of
Father Bernas, the United States must “[c]omplete the process by
accepting [the VFA] as a treaty through ratification by [the U.S.] Senate
as the United States Constitution requires.” Medellin has now added the
further requirement that the U.S. Congress must adopt an implementing
legislation to the VFA, or the VFA must be renegotiated to make it self-
executory and ratified as such by the U.S. Senate. Unless and until this
is done, the VFA is not “recognized as a treaty” by the United States,
and thus it cannot be given effect in the Philippines.
Same; Same; Same; Under Medellin, the 1952 RP-U.S. Mutual Defense
Treaty (MDT) is not part of the domestic law of the United States and the
U.S. President has no power to enforce the MDT under U.S. domestic
law—the MDT does not contain any provision making it self-executory
Page 48 of 49
once ratified by the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. Congress has also not
adopted any implementing legislation for the MDT.—Under Medellin, the
1952 RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) is not part of the domestic
law of the United States and the U.S. President has no power to enforce
the MDT under U.S. domestic law. Based on the Medellin requirements
for a treaty to be binding and enforceable under U.S. domestic law, the
MDT suffers the same fate as the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations. Both the MDT and the Convention were ratified by the U.S.
Senate. However, both the MDT and the Convention contain only the
usual ratification and entry into force provisions found in treaties. Both
the MDT and the Convention do not contain any provision making them
self-executory once ratified by the U.S. Senate. The U.S. Congress has
also not adopted any implementing legislation for the MDT or the
Convention. Consequently, the VFA, as an executive agreement, cannot
depend for its legal efficacy on the MDT because the MDT itself, under
Medellin, is not binding and enforceable under U.S. domestic law, just
like the Convention. Nicolas vs. Romulo, 578 SCRA 438, G.R. No.
175888 February 11, 2009
Page 49 of 49

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1.

Docket Number: No. L-7995

Counsel: Ozaeta, Lichauco & Picazo, Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar &

Docket Number: No. L-21897

3. Tanada vs Angara GR no. 118295

Docket Number: G.R. No. 118295

Counsel: Abelardo F. Domondon, The Solicitor General

4. Pimentel vs OESEC GR no. 158088

Docket Number: G.R. No. 158088

5. Bayan vs Zamora GR no. 138570

Counsel: Romeo B. Igot and Victoria G. delos Reyes, Eulogia M. Cueva,

Ponente: BUENA, PUNO

6. Nicolas vs Romulo GR no. 175888

International Law; Treaties; Visiting Forces Agreement; Military Bases;

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Article XVIII, Sec. 25 of the

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial Notice; The presence of US

Same; Same; Same; Same; As an implementing agreement of the RP-

Same; Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection Clause; There is a

Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; The U.S. President’s authority to

Same; Same; Same; The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) is an

Same; Same; Same; Even assuming there is a Senate concurrence in

Same; Same; Same; The clear intent of the phrase “recognized as a

Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; Notification under the Case-

Same; Same; Same; For the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) to be

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