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The Triple Helix as a universal innovation model can assist students, researchers,
managers, entrepreneurs, and policymakers to understand the roles of university,
industry, and government in forming and developing “an innovative region,”
which has self-renewal and sustainable innovative capacity.
Henry Etzkowitz is Visiting Lecturer of Science, Technology and Society,
Stanford University, USA; Visiting Professor, Birkbeck, University of London,
UK; CEO/President, International Triple Helix Institute (ITHI), Palo Alto,
California, USA; President, Triple Helix Association (THA), Rome, Italy; and
Distinguished Expert, Shandong Academy of Science, Jinan, China.
List of figures ix
List of tables x
Preface xi
Introduction 1
PART I
The triple helix concept 19
PART II
The triple helix innovation model 121
PART III
Case studies 237
PART IV
Conclusion 299
Index 317
Figures
Two classic instances, Silicon Valley and Boston (Route 128), exemplify the
effect of a University–Industry–Government (U–I–G) triple helix innovation
dynamic. The original triple helix identified in 1920s New England was a classic
university–industry–government exercise of lateral cooperation; Silicon Valley
was based on a series of university–industry and industry–government double
helices that eventually coalesced into a triple helix relationship. The Governors
of the New England States involved all three actors from the outset in designing
a regional innovation strategy that led to the invention of venture capital and
the emergence of a new knowledge-based industrial infrastructure. In Silicon
Valley, the triadic dynamic began from academia but soon became a university–
industry and industry–government series of parallel double helix interactions.
Then an invisible government–industry double helix was revealed and eventu-
ally a university–industry–government triple helix was established.
Silicon Valley’s triple helix is a relatively unacknowledged substrate to the dou-
ble helix interactions that generated venture capital firms, angel networks, technol-
ogy transfer offices, intellectual property attorneys, accounting firms, immigrant
entrepreneur organizations and other intermediaries. A series of entrepreneurship
support structures came to be viewed collectively as an innovation “ecosystem,”
similar to the dynamic interactive evolving natural environment from which it
took its name. The social configuration was covered by an ideology of libertarian
entrepreneurship that obscured the Valley’s deep university–industry–government
roots. Proponents of the innovation succession to the triple helix came to believe
that it was a motive force, infused with a “secret sauce” that made it an independ-
ent entity with the ability to find a “fix” for any problem generated by the increas-
ingly malnourished roots of the innovation ecosystem.
Thus, the 1970s California ballot initiative, proposition 13, reducing business
and residential property taxes, eventually impoverished all but the most affluent
xii Preface
The Silicon Valley innovation ecosystem may hardly be duplicated as its natural
and social conditions may not easily be found elsewhere. Nevertheless, we can
learn Silicon Valley’s “secret,” and create a triple helix dynamic anywhere that
has academia, industry and government (or functional substitutes such as research
institutes, NGOs and international organizations). Through improving the ca-
pacities of the actors, even in the absence of functions from one or more spheres,
a triple helix can be formed (for example the Linyi case in Chapter 6). This book
will show how to create a triple helix in a region, highlighting the role of the
entrepreneurial university in the process.
A “triple helix” for innovation and entrepreneurship, formed by university–
industry–government interactions, is the key to knowledge-based economic
growth and social development. A triple helix is an invisible institutional tool
and dynamic mechanism, driving regional innovation. It is also a universal
Preface xiii
This book follows the first edition published in 2008 to continue the triple
helix study, including its concept, model and practice in regional innovation;
especially new to this edition, practical cases in China are added to exemplify
the application of triple helix theory. A series of research projects on innovation
mechanisms, conducted from the early 1980s and mostly sponsored by the US
National Science Foundation, provide the empirical base for this volume. These
studies have been supplemented by visits and research projects in various coun-
tries typically sponsored by universities, think tanks, and regional and national
development agencies that allowed us to make this analysis comparative. We
hope that it is helpful for practitioners in academia, industry and government,
such as policymakers, government officers, academic researchers, inventors,
managers, entrepreneurs, as well as faculty and students.
Henry Etzkowitz
Chunyan Zhou
Palo Alto, 29 April 2017
Introduction
Triple helix: a universal innovation model?
guide to pioneering policies and practices at the local, regional, national and
multinational levels.
Government and industry, the classic elements of public–private partner-
ships, have been recognized as primary institutional spheres since the 18th
century. The triple helix thesis is that the university is moving from a second-
ary, albeit important societal role in providing higher education and research,
to a leading role on a par with industry and government, as a generator of new
industries and firms. The Entrepreneurial University, exemplified by MIT and
Stanford, superseding and incorporating the Ivory Tower model, is an increas-
ingly significant academic format, globally. As industrial society is superseded
by a knowledge-based era, advanced knowledge is more expeditiously trans-
lated into practical uses, due to its polyvalent nature as simultaneously theo-
retical and practical.
These virtual phenomena paradoxically increase rather than substitute for
personal contacts and face-to-face collaboration. The growth of “landing
sites” and co-working spaces in iconic innovation venues, like Silicon Valley,
Berlin and London’s “Roundabout,” to host newcomers, is one indicator
of the velocity of interaction. Moreover, processes of technology transfer
from theoretical findings that formerly took generations to accomplish now
occur within the work life of the inventors, allowing them the possibility of
participating in the invention and innovation dynamic, as well as the research
and publication process.
The growing participation of highly educated persons and knowledge-producing
organizations in invention is a key argument for involving knowledge-creating
institutions and their personnel more closely in the innovation process. Forged in
different academic and national traditions, the university is arriving at a common
entrepreneurial format that incorporates and transcends its traditional educational
and research missions.
From the mid-19th century, an ongoing Academic Revolution legiti-
mized research as an academic mission ( Jencks and Riesman, 1968). A Sec-
ond Revolution arises from the confluence of several tributaries, including
(1) the identification of useful as well as commercially valuable properties in
the results of academic research; (2) the internal development of higher ed-
ucation institutions e.g. the development of research groups as “quasi-firms”
and (3) external influences on academic structures, like the US Bayh-Dole
Act of 1980, encouraging universities to take concrete steps to put research
findings to use.
The Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act (Pub. L. 96-517) insti-
gated by the US university technology transfer profession, legitimized and
clarified the legal foundation for their enterprise. Moreover, it made explicit
the tacit contract between the federal government and academia, instantiated
in Vannevar Bush’s 1945 Endless Frontier Report, commissioned by President
Roosevelt, at his instance. Policies, practices and organizational innovations,
like the country agent two-way flow model from practitioners (farmers) to
4 Introduction
academia (agricultural researchers), built upon the 1862 Land Grant Act, sup-
porting universities oriented to agricultural and mechanical innovation, as well
as the liberal arts.
Indeed, one-third of the Massachusetts land grant was devoted by that state’s
legislature to support the development of the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology (MIT) as a public/private hybrid. MIT’s founding purpose was to infuse
regional industry with scientific expertise. The founding of New York Univer-
sity, a privately-financed public good initiative, promoted commercial training
in that quintessential business locale. Such initiatives to translate knowledge into
economic activity as well as addressing problems from society, posed to aca-
demia, have spread globally.
The lesson of the triple helix is to examine strengths and weaknesses and
fill gaps in “Innovation Systems,” whether publicly recognized as highly
successful, declining or emergent. It provides clear guidelines and focuses
attention and effort. The common objective is to develop an innovation
strategy that neither rests on previous accomplishments nor fails to take action
even in the face of parlous conditions and strenuous opposition to change.
Knowledge, technology and organizational transfer that formerly occurred
through publications, both academic and popular; visits of varying length
for advanced degrees; temporary positions that may last for most of a career;
or professional tourism and migration are now driven by Internet and social
media exchanges.
Triple helix focuses on “overlapping” spaces, cross-cutting the boundaries
of the institutional spheres. Actors with the ability to encompass multiple logics
may perform various functions, individually and collectively. For example,
capital may come from a variety of university, industry, government and other
sources. They may create a public, private or mixed venture capital entity (like
Israel’s Yozma project, later transferred to Brazil by FINEPE on the sidelines
of the 2000 Second International Triple Helix Conference in Rio de Janeiro),
institutionalizing the arrangement.
Variants of the triple helix include a laissez-faire version with institutional
spheres strictly demarcated. However, this is largely a US ideological model that
obscures a reality of U–I–G interactions at national, regional and local levels. In
a statist version that is government-, military- or Party-directed, Civil Society,
to the extent that it exists, is an oppositional force to an authoritarian regime.
For example, after the demise of Brazil’s military regime, some of the academic
opposition became innovation organizers, instituting entrepreneurship training
programs and innovation support structures, like the incubator, into Brazilian
universities.
Nevertheless, large-scale one-off efforts, like the Manhattan project to
construct the atomic bomb, have been accomplished through this top-down
format. In the historical instance, even this military controlled project was in-
spired by academics and proceeded with voluntary industry participation, putting
Introduction 5
label of Silicon Valley in 1971. In succeeding decades the essential dynamic was
replicated in other technology domains, supported by an increasingly complex
set of supporting actors, including venture capital firms, technology transfer of-
fices as well as large firms, like Yamaha, seeking advanced technology to remain
at the forefront of their industry (Nelson, 2015). However, the most fundamen-
tal dynamic instantiated in the Valley emanated from the porous boundaries
between university and industry, among firms and between government and
these more visible Silicon Valley actors. Behind the two PhD students who met
at Stanford’s computer science department and became Google’s founders was
a Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) program that funded
the research group in which they were members and posed the search problem
that they solved. It is the relationship among the different actors, in this case
university and government that produced the third element, a new industry and
firm, originating from a university spin-off’s wish to remain close to their source
of origin in order to more easily re-infuse the firm with new knowledge and
recent graduates.
It is a classic fallacy of “misplaced concreteness” that a set of buildings or a
formal enclosed institutional format such as a Technopole can substitute for such
an interactive dynamic. Unfortunately, this is the message that is most often
taken away from Silicon Valley by visitors who are looking for a “quick fix” to
achieve a knowledge-based conurbation without serious institutional restructur-
ing, new institution formation, or long-term perspective and commitment. Such
efforts are often informed by an evolving innovation system approach that views
self-organizations as having specialized functions, automatically necessitating
special boundary-spanning organizations or intermediaries to navigate between
the institutional spheres with special purpose logics.
A triple helix with integrative “boundary spaces”, operates according to
hybrid logics, incorporating elements of the special logics of the institutional
spheres on either side, facilitating their mediation. The 1980 US Bayh-Dole Act,
for example, created one such space, legitimating interaction between university
and industry (Etzkowitz and Champenois, 2017). In this regime, institutional
spheres “take the role of the other,” in a spiraling innovation process in which
gaps may be filled by substitution of one actor by another. It is this latter capabil-
ity that makes the triple helix especially relevant to both developing and declin-
ing industrial regions alike. Indeed, the two prototypical US triple helix regions
“Silicon Valley” and Boston, in their early 20th-century conditions, exemplified
these two classic innovation environments’ need for collaborative action and pol-
icy support.
Rather than interactions across porous boundaries, innovation-impeding
boundaries are sustained by an innovation systems approach that is often coun-
terproductive to the very purpose it wishes to attain, that of promoting inno-
vation. The accelerator model, as exemplified by Silicon Valley’s Y-Combinator
and Start-X, is more relevant for start-up growth once a triple helix dynamic is
Introduction 11
in place as its substrate. The key element of such accelerators is a training process
through selection, insertion into a network of fellow start-ups, mentoring by
experienced entrepreneurs and access to seed investment opportunities. The ac-
celerator format rests upon an already developed high-tech environment, replete
with a deep bench of angel investors, venture capital firms and potential start-up
collaborators, all making it possible for the accelerator-supported firms to take
off and flourish. That innovation ecosystem is itself a second order phenomenon,
resting on a first order dynamic of triple helix interactions among institutions
with porous boundaries.
When the “cart is placed before the horse,” as when the Brazilian military
regime constructed science parks in isolated suburban regions during the
1960s, little innovation activity occurred until a smaller-scale model of
incubators and entrepreneurial education within universities was adopted. At
best, branches of existing firms and government laboratories may be attracted
to a stand-alone Science Park. Some decades later when they close or down-
size, their former employees who wish to stay in the area, may generate
a start-up dynamic as in Sophia Antipolis and Research Triangle. A more
direct route is to focus on facilitating university–industry interactions, espe-
cially creating an academic environment that recognizes this work as a valued
activity. The entrepreneurial university, holding a commitment to its region’s
development, with a significant number of faculty members who encourage
their graduates to spin-off technology from their well-funded labs and may
hold dual roles in high-tech firms themselves, are the core of a triple helix
dynamic.
An endless transition
All societies are in transition in the 21st century, with no fixed endpoint to
change in sight. The functional differentiation of institutions in the early mod-
ern era is being displaced by integration and hybridization of functions in the
post-modern era. Although this process begins from a different starting point
of relationships among institutional spheres, a secular trend toward a common
triple helix can be identified. An open Civil Society paves the way for triple helix
actors to organize and overcome blockages to the transformation of knowledge
into innovation. A meta-innovation system is created of bottom-up, top-down
and lateral initiatives in which science, technology and innovation policy are the
outcomes of the interaction among university, industry and government, rather
than a unique state function.
Entrepreneurship is found in academia and government as well as industry.
New hybrid organizations, such as High-Tech Councils, cross cut the institutional
spheres, creating a dynamic element that sparks further organizational innovation.
Out of a variety of possible candidates for a new technological paradigm, a few foci
must be selected to concentrate resources and effort. The entrepreneurial university
12 Introduction
takes in inputs and problems from the local environment and translates the outputs
of academic knowledge into economic activity. After generations of firms are spun
off from the original university start-ups, academic links revert to the traditional
ones of supplying human capital and knowledge in Silicon Valley. The role of
Stanford University as the source of regional innovation is forgotten, even said to
have been a myth. Nevertheless, the university is called upon when an old techno-
logical paradigm is exhausted and a new source of innovation is required.
The triple helix introduces a lateral approach into Innovation Policy,
conceived as collaboration among the institutional spheres. Thus, rather than
solely a “top-down” initiative of national government, innovation policy should
also be seen as the cumulative result of interaction among governments at various
levels, businesspersons, academics and NGOs, comprising membership from all
of these spheres, especially at the regional level. Networks are generated from a
variety of sources, for example, they may emanate from collaborations between
large firms and academic researchers (e.g. Pharmacia and Uppsala University)
that left in place a substrate of ties that became the basis for new firm formation
in biotechnology. It also appears informally among firms in a common area of
activity that then may be formalized into a “valley” through the organization of
an association, e.g. radio valley in Gothenburg Sweden or the effort to organize
a photonics cluster in Recife, Brazil.
as the source for new science-based firms. This is not to say that industry cannot
be a source for such firms. Indeed it often is, but such firms tend to be close to the
market companies rather than ones based on emerging technologies.
A relatively few regions have exhibited self-renewing capabilities. A continuous
flow across technological paradigms, moving beyond creative destruction to cre-
ative reconstruction, without sharp downturns, is the ultimate objective. The
triple helix provides a flexible framework to guide efforts, from different starting
points, to achieve the common goal of knowledge-based economic and social
development. The result is an “Assisted Linear Model,” with intermediate mech-
anisms that integrate the traditional starting points of science and technology
policy: the laboratory, the market and a government procurement requirement.
Innovation policy is then directed toward enhancing the interaction between
human needs, research goals and resource providers; science, technology and
society; university, industry and government. Innovation becomes an Endless
Transition.
A triple helix dynamic identified as the source of iconic innovation conur-
bations in Boston and Silicon Valley have spread more broadly in recent years.
For example, Malaysian triple helix analysis advocates renovating university
teaching, reducing reliance on lectures and encouraging students to be more
active class participants. John Dewey’s “public” principles are to be introduced
in academia as a precursor to academic entrepreneurship (Saad and Zawdie,
2008). Various innovation policies, whether placing government, industry or
the university in leading roles, typically find a place for the others, reweighing
the balance among them in different stages and phases of the innovation process
(Merchán-Hernández and Leal-Rodríguez, 2016). Indeed, triple helix has be-
come a ubiquitous rubric, like Kleenex, whose basic elements have become part
of the policy mix in regions reaching for high-tech growth.
The verdict is in: it is now well recognized that regions with a university
whose research is oriented to practical as well as theoretical inquiry, with links
to local industry and the ability to produce spin-offs, are better off than regions
lacking such a school. Some of this entrepreneurial activity is based on expecta-
tions that utilization of research will inspire new issues for investigation as well
as create new sources of income for the university. New research ideas may arise
from practical as well as theoretical sources and vice versa.
Conclusion
In ancient Mesopotamia, a triple helix water screw, invented to raise water from
one level to another, was the basis of a hydraulic system of agricultural innova-
tion that irrigated ordinary farms as well as the Hanging Gardens of Babylon,
one of the seven wonders of the ancient world (Dalley, S. and P. Oleson, 2003).
The triple helix as a physical device is succeeded by a conceptual framework,
the Triple Helix of university–industry–government interactions. Its practice has
led to the venture capital firm, the incubator, and the science park. These social
16 Introduction
inventions are hybrid organizations that embody elements of the triple helix in
the “DNA” of their official code.
The “life spiral” critique of the static life cycle human development model
preceded and helped inspire the Triple Helix of Innovation. A spiral model, as an
alternative to rigid stages, allowed for alternative modes of enacting adulthood,
such as the emergence of “singlehood,” in a non-linear sequence (Etzkowitz
and Stein, 1978). Similarly, a cycle model of innovation, even one with dual
cycles, is limited by its restricted definition and in its ability to encompass mul-
tiple non-linear paths of knowledge-based economic and social development in
contrast to a spiral model that encompasses an “endless transition” of enhanced
modalities.
Universities, firms and governments each “take the role of the other” in triple
helix interactions, even as they maintain their primary roles and distinct identities.
The university takes the role of industry by stimulating the development of new
firms from research, introducing “the capitalization of knowledge” as an academic
goal. Firms develop training to ever-higher levels and share knowledge through
joint ventures, acting like universities. Governments act as public venture capitalists
while continuing their regulatory activities. In contrast to theories that emphasize
the role of government or firms in innovation, the triple helix focuses on the
university as a source of entrepreneurship and technology as well as critical inquiry.
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