G.R.

35748 December 14, 1931

People of the Philippines v. Silvestre and Atienza

FACTS

Romana Silvestre, wife of Domingo Joaquin by her second marriage, cohabited

with her co-defendant Martin Atienza. On May 16, 1930, the complaining husband,
Joaquin, filed a case for adultery and concubinage against Silvestre and Atienza,
respectively. A barangay conciliation happened, in which Martin Atienza signed a promise
to discontinue cohabitation with Silvestre, in exchange of Joaquin’s withdrawal of
complaint. On May 20, 1930, Joaquin filed a motion for the dismissal of his complaint. In
November 20, 1930, accused Romana went to the house of her son and his wife by her
former marriage, where she was followed by Martin Atienza since they are still in cohabit.
While they were gathered during supper on November 25, Atienza told the couple to take
the furniture out of the house because he is going to set fire on it as his way of revenge
to the residents who instigated Domingo Joaquin to file a case against him. Martin was
armed with a pistol so no one dared say anything to him. Eventually, the house was set
on fire. Both were charged of the crime of arson. But as to Romana Silvestre, the only
evidence on record against her are that (1) first, she lived adulterously with her co-
defendant Atienza, and (2) second, that Silvestre listened to Atienza’s intentions without
raising a protest and did not give the alarm when the latter set fire to the house. Thus,
based on these facts, the court also found Silvestre guilty of arson as accomplice.

ISSUE

Whether or not Romana Silvestre guilty of the crime of arson as accomplice?

RULING

According to Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, and in connection with Article 13,
defines an accomplice to be the one who does not take direct part in the commission of
the act who does not force or induce other to commit it, nor cooperates in the commission
of the act by another act without which it would not have been accomplished, yet
cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous actions. In the case at
bar, no cooperation was made by Silvestre, since the complicity or involvement requires
a certain degree of cooperation whether moral through advice, encouragement or
agreement or material, through external acts. In Silvestre’s case, her mere presence and
simultaneous acts do not constitute the cooperation and therefore does not make her
qualify to be an accomplice, as stated and required by Article 14 of the Penal
Code.