1. Republic vs. Rosario, G.R. No.

186635, January 27, 2016 [Stare decisis]

Ponente: Perez, J.

Nature of the Case: This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the Decision of the RTC – which ordered the reconstitution of TCT No. 269615 in the name of respondent
Segundina Rosario (Rosario).

FACTS:
 The property subject of the present controversy is located in the Diliman campus of the University of the
Philippines
o This is now the site of various buildings and structures along Commonwealth Avenue, including the
PHILCOA Wet Market, the Asian Institute of Tourism, the Philippine Social Sciences Building, the
National Hydraulic Center, the UP Sewerage Treatment Plant, the Petron Gas Station, the UP
Arboretum, the Campus Landscaping Office, the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission Building, the
INNOTECH Building, and the UP-Ayala Land TechnoHub .
 On November 12, 1997, respondent Rosario filed a petition for the reconstitution of TCT No. 269615 before the
RTC of Quezon City, claiming that her title covers lots 42-A-1, 42-A-2 and 42-A-3 of subdivision plan Psd 77362
and Psd 4558.
 To support respondent Rosario’s claim:
o She presented the owner’s duplicate copy of said title (TCT No. 269615) and a certification issued by
Atty. Samuel Cleofe of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to prove that the original copy of said title
was among those burned during the fire that razed the Quezon City Hall on June 11, 1998.
o She presented a sketch plan of the subject piece of land, which was recorded in the Bureau of Lands and
Tax Bill Receipts, together with certification issued by the City Treasurer of Quezon City stating that she
paid all the real property taxes due on the subject piece of land.
o She maintained that she is in possession of the subject piece of land through a caretaker named Linda
Salvacion.
 Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and oppositor University of the Philippines (UP) opposed the
petition.
Petitioner’s contentions:
 The documents presented by respondent Rosario are of suspicious authenticity.
 The land supposedly covered by TCT No. 269615 is already covered by RT-58201 (192687) and RT-107350
(192689) in the name of UP.
 Oppositor UP argued that the petition for reconstitution was a collateral attack on the land titles registered in its
name and if granted, will cause it prejudice.

RTC Ruling:
 Granted the reconstitution.
CA Ruling: [Republic and UP appealed before the CA]
 Affirmed RTC decision – granting the reconstitution of TCT No. 269615 in the name of petitioner Rosario
 Held that as the case was one for reconstitution of title, it does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered
by the lost or destroyed title

ISSUE: Were the decisions and resolutions of the trial court and CA – ordering the reconstitution of TCT No. 269615 –
contrary to the decisions of the SC on the indefeasibility of the titles of the University of the Philippines?

Or stated differently: Did the trial court and CA failed to take judicial notice of the various jurisprudence upholding UP’s
indefeasible title over its landholdings?

RULING:
 Yes. The decisions and resolutions of the trial court and CA in this case were contrary to the decisions of the SC
on the indefeasibility of the titles of the University of the Philippines (UP).
 The indefeasibility of the titles of UP over its landholdings has been affirmed both by law and jurisprudence.
 Section 22 of RA 9500 is explicit in providing for land grants and other real properties of the University. This
provision confirmed the absolute ownership of the national university over these landholdings, including those
covered by original and transfer certificates of title in the name of the University of the Philippines and their
future derivatives.
 In this case, the Republic and UP were able to establish that TCT No. 269615 overlaps with two valid and existing
certificates of title in the name of UP. These were corroborated by the Official Report of OIC Regional Technical
Director Mamerto Infante of the LMB-DENR-NCR
o These reports were duly offered in evidence

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 o The RTC and the CA should have taken judicial notice of the various jurisprudence upholding U’s
indefeasible title over its landholdings
 Several jurisprudence also emphasized that the titles of UP over its landholdings have become incontrovertible
so that courts are precluded from looking anew into their validity.
 It is judicial notice that the legitimacy of UP’s title has been settled in several other cases decided by this
Court.

 Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court mandates that a court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the
Philippines.
o Thus, as both Congress and this Court have repeatedly and consistently validated and recognized UP’s
indefeasible title over its landholdings, the RTC and the Court of Appeals clearly erred when it faulted
the Republic and UP for presenting certified true copies of its titles signed by its records custodian
instead of either the duplicate originals or the certified true copies issued by the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City.
o Indeed, the RTC and the CA should have taken judicial notice of UP’s title over its landholdings, without
need of any other evidence.
 It may be, as pointed out by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, that a petition for reconstitution of title does not
treat of the issue of ownership.
o However, in the case at bar, as it was established that TCT No. 269615 overlaps with UP’s titles, and as
UP’s indefeasible jurisprudence, adopting the myopic view of the RTC and the CA will only result into an
unnecessary and pointless re-litigation of an issue that has already been repeatedly settled by this
Court.
FURTHER:
 SC reminded the courts that they are duty bound to abide by precedents, pursuant to the time-honored
principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere.
 In the case Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., this Court reiterated:
o Time and again, the Court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when
a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that
principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same.
o Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled.
o Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be
applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be
different.
o It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations,
like cases ought to be decided alike.
o Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties
similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.

Disposition: Petition granted. Decision and resolution of CA and decision of RTC are reversed and set aside. Petition for
reconstitution is dismissed.

2. Cabigon vs. Pepsi-Cola Products, Philippines, Inc. (stare decisis et non quieta movere)
G.R. No. 168030. December 19, 2007
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
60137 and its resolution denying reconsideration.
FACTS:
 This case involves actions filed against respondent Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. in connection with its
1992 number fever promo.
 Petitioners, holders of non-winning 349 crowns, filed complaints for sum of money and damages, as well as
specific performance and damages, against respondent in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Cebu City.
o They similarly alleged that respondent, by changing the winning combination and refusing to pay their
prizes, was guilty of gross negligence or fraud in dealing with its customers.
 The RTC found that respondent caused pain and suffering, mental anguish, broken dreams or hopes, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock, embarrassment and humiliation to its long-time patrons.
o Thus, on December 15, 1997, it rendered a consolidated decision in favor of petitioners
 Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the CA.
o In the assailed decision, the appellate court found that the confusion with regard to the winning and
non-winning 349 crowns arose because respondent decided to extend the promo period.

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 o Nevertheless, respondent did not fail to emphasize the importance of the alpha-numeric security code
in its promotional materials.
o It clearly stated that the code, printed on each crown, was its only means to verify the genuineness of
the winning crown.
o Thus, it was not negligent in the conduct of its promo.
 Accordingly, the CA granted respondent's petition and reversed the December 15, 1997 RTC decision.
o Because petitioners raised an identical cause of action and issue, and presented evidence similar to
those in previous 349 number fever cases, the appellate court dismissed the petition pursuant to its
decision in the cases of Rodrigo and Mendoza.
 Petitioners moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied.
 Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court is bound to follow the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere in the case?
RULING:
 Yes. The court is bound to follow the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere in the case.
 Over the past years, we have promulgated a number of cases involving the 349 number fever promo. Thus, we
are bound by our pronouncement in those cases.
 The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere holds that a point of law, once established by the court,
will generally be followed by the same court and by all courts of lower rank in subsequent cases involving a
similar legal issue.
 This proceeds from the legal principle that, in the absence of powerful countervailing considerations, like cases
ought to be decided alike.
 We have consistently held (in previous 349 number fever promo cases) that the correct security code was an
indispensable requirement to be entitled to the cash prize concerned.
o Here, petitioners held 349 crowns bearing either security code L-2560-FQ or L-3560-FQ.
o These, however, were not the security codes for the 349 crowns issued during the extended period of
the promo.
o Thus, petitioners were never entitled to any prize.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DENIED. The February 24, 2004 decision and March 21, 2005 resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60137 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

3. Tajeda vs. People 691 SCRA 252, 267, February 20, 2013 (pro hac vice)

Facts:
 On the strength of their co-accused Plaridel Tadeja’s extrajudicial confession, taken after his apprehension on 29
November 2006, petitioners pray for the reopening of the homicide case against them.
 Their prayer is for the reception of newly discovered evidence, despite the fact that this Court’s Decision
affirming their conviction already became final and executory on 26 July 2007.
 Notably, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) does not object to the reopening of the case.
 Plaridel admitted that he had killed the victim
 With the arrest of Plaridel and his account of what happened, petitioners argued that the situation called for the
application of the rules on newly discovered evidence, which provided grounds for a new trial.
 Since the statement of Plaridel was obtained only after his arrest, it was not produced or presented during the
trial and even during the pendency of the appeal.
 Petitioners then reiterated their prayer that the judgment of conviction meted out to them be vacated and the
entire records of the criminal case remanded to the RTC for the conduct of a new trial.
 Petitioners alleged that, in a parallel case, we had granted pro hac vice a motion to reopen a case for further
reception of evidence filed by the accused, whose judgment of conviction had already been entered in the Book
of Entry of Judgments.

Issue: Should petitioner’s motion to reopen the case for reception of further evidence be granted?

Ruling:
 NO. Fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice necessitate that, at the risk of occasional
errors, the judgment or orders of courts should attain finality at some definite time fixed by law. Otherwise,
there would be no end to litigation.
 This is the reason why we have consistently denied petitioners’ motions for reconsideration of this Court’s
Decision and subsequent pleas for the reopening of the case.

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  Section 1 of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court provides that a new trial may only be granted by the court on motion
of the accused, or motu proprio with the consent of the accused “(a)t any time before a judgment of conviction
becomes final”
 In this case, petitioners’ judgment of conviction already became final and executory on 26 July 2007―the date
on which the Decision of this Court denying the petition and affirming the ruling of the CA was recorded in the
Book of Entries of Judgments.
 Thus, pleas for the remand of this case to the trial court for the conduct of a new trial may no longer be
entertained.
 Petitioners point out that this Court has had occasion to grant a motion for a new trial after the judgment of
conviction had become final and executory.
 In People v. Licayan, 363 SCRA 234 (2001), all the accused were convicted of the crime of kidnapping for ransom
and sentenced to death by the trial court.
 More than two years after their conviction became final and executory, the accused Lara and Licayan filed an
Urgent Motion to Re-Open the Case with Leave of Court.
 They attached thereto the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by two of their co-accused in the case, to the effect
that Lara and Licayan had not participated in the commission of the crime.
 Since the OSG also recommended the reopening of the case, this Court remanded the case to the trial court for
the reception of newly discovered evidence.
 It is worth pointing out that the motion in Licayan was granted pro hac vice, which is a Latin term used by
courts to refer to rulings rendered “for this one particular occasion”
 A ruling expressly qualified as such cannot be relied upon as a precedent to govern other cases

4. Land Bank of the Philippines vs Santos (obiter dictum)

Facts:
 Santos owned 3 parcels of agricultural land devoted to corn situated in Camarines Sur
 In 1984, the lands were placed under the Government’s Operation Land Transfer Program and distributed to the
farmer-beneficiaries who were issued the corresponding Emancipation Patents
 DAR fixed the just compensation at P164,532.50 for Land 1, P39,841.93 for Land 2, and P66, 214.03 for Land 3
 Finding the valuation unreasonable, Santos filed 3 petitions for summary administrative proceedings for the
determination of just compensation of the subject lands before the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD) of
Camarines Sur
o the PARAD rendered separate decisions21 fixing the just compensation as follows: (a) P510,034.29 for
Land 1; (b) P2,532,060.31 for Land 2; and (c) P1,147,466.73 for Land 3, using the formula, LV = AGP x
2.5 x GSP
 Dissatisfied with the PARAD’s valuation, the LBP instituted two (2) separate complaints for the determination of
just compensation before the RTC, averring that the computations were erroneous when they disregarded the
formula provided under EO 228
 RTC dismissed both complaints
 Santos filed before the RTC a motion to release the initial valuation for Lands 1 and 2. RTC granted but
conditioned on the submission of several documentary requirements
 Santos moved for recon pointing out that what was sought was the initial valuation but nonetheless submitted the
documents. RTC ruled in favor of Santos
 LBP elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition asserting that the RTC abused its
discretion considering that no further proceedings were necessary to arrive at the just compensation for lands 2
and 3 in view of the final and executory decision in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 75010 that directed the remand of the case
to the RTC for computation purposes only, hence, res judicata had set in.
 CA dismissed the petitions and affirmed the RTC’s Orders
o In C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 110779, the CA ruled that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the RTC
when it proceeded with the determination of just compensation, thereby rejecting the LBP’s contention
that the RTC was barred by res judicata from conducting further proceedings to determine just
compensation with the finality of its earlier decisions in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 7491970 and 75010. It pointed
out that the said decisions merely resolved the LBPÊs personality to institute an action for determination
of just compensation, and reinstated the LBPÊs complaints for just compensation which were well within
the RTC’s original and exclusive jurisdiction under RA 6657.

Issue: What is an obiter dictum?

Ruling:
Obiter dictum is an opinion expressed upon some question of law that was not necessary in the determination of the case
before it. As succinctly pointed out in the case of LBP v. Suntay, “it is a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in
his decision upon a cause by the way, that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before him, or
upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or
argument.

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It does not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and is made without argument, or full consideration of the
point. It lacks the force of an adjudication, being a mere expression of an opinion with no binding force for
purposes of res judicata.

As correctly observed by the CA, the decision in C.A.- G.R. CV No. 75010 did not preclude the RTC from proceeding with
the determination of just compensation of the subject lands since the issue raised in the said case merely pertained to the
LBP’s legal standing to institute the complaints for just compensation and not the valuation of the subject lands. The
pronouncement in the said decision on the matter of computation of just compensation was a mere obiter dictum.

5. Tabalno vs Dingal (Immutability of Judgment)

Nature: present petition traces its roots to the Forcible Entry case, docketed as Civil Case No. 3682, filed by Paulino
Dingal, Sr. (Paulino) before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Abuyog, Leyte (MCTC), against spouses Florentino and
Consolacion Tabalno (petitioners), Victoriano Tuale, Dionesio Mansueto, Iñego „Dondon” Cabus, and Bienvenido
Dinglasa

FACTS:
 the MCTC ordered the petitioners, et al., to: vacate the premises and restore its possession to Paulino; demolish
any and all structures illegally constructed therein at their expense. The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision
to the RTC.
 Paulino sought the dismissal of the petitionersÊ appeal and prayed for the issuance of a writ of execution.
 On August 20, 2008, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution, in accordance with the MCTC decision,
for the petitionersÊ failure to file a supersedeas bond.
 The petitioners sought to reconsider the RTCÊs August 20, 2008 order, which the RTC denied.
 On October 27, 2008, while the forcible entry case was still pending appeal before the RTC, the petitioners filed
with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
 In its November 27, 2009 resolution, the CA subsequently dismissed the petitionersÊ Rule 42 petition with
finality.
 Meanwhile, on January 28, 2009, the RTC again issued an order for the issuance of a Writ of Execution, in
accordance with the MCTC decision.
 On March 26, 2009, the Sheriff submitted a Report stating that the writ of execution was „partially served [on]
the defendant, Sps. Tabalno [who] refuses [sic] to demolish the structure inside the property x x x and pay their
money judgment.
 On the other hand, the RTC affirmed in toto the March 31, 2008 decision of the MCTC in its order10 dated July
31, 2009.

 The assailed RTC orders

 The RTC granted, in its September 28, 2009 order,11 the manifestation with omnibus ex parte motion for
substitution filed by respondent Juanita Galola Vda. de Dingal (Juanita); the RTC ordered the substitution of
Paulino (who in the interim died) by his surviving spouse Juanita.
 In its November 9, 2009 order,12 the RTC denied, for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioners from its September 28, 2009 order, The RTC explained that the appealed forcible entry case was still
pending before it, and even before the CA via the petitionersÊ Rule 42 petition, thus barring JuanitaÊs
substitution of her husband. Moreover, their motion for reconsideration lacked the required notice of hearing;
hence, it was pro forma.

 The petitioners charge the RTC with grave abuse of discretion in granting the substitution of Paulino by his wife
Juanita.
 The petitioners argue that, first, under Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the husband and the wife shall sue
or be sued jointly, except as may be provided by law. In this case, Juanita was not joined as a party in PaulinoÊs
forcible entry case; hence, her participation in the proceedings is deemed waived. Accordingly, she could no
longer be substituted as a party in the case as the MCTC decision had already been executed.
 Also, the RTC no longer had jurisdiction over the case when it ordered JuanitaÊs substitution as the case was
already then pending appeal before the CA.
 In fact, per the Sheriff’s certification, the MCTC decision was already final and had been executed. As a side
issue, the petitioners question the writ of execution issued by the RTC which they argue was issued when the
case was already pending before the CA.

 Respondent’s contention:

 Juanita argues in defense that the RTC correctly issued the assailed orders granting her substitution as plaintiff,
in place of her deceased husband Paulino, pursuant to Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.16

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 o She adds that the cases cited by the petitioners · Temic Semi conductors, Inc. Employees Union (TSIEU)-
FFW, et al. v. Federation of Free Workers (FFW), et al., and Mocorro, Jr. v. Ramirez · are misplaced. These
cases speak of decisions which have already attained finality, hence, immutable and unalterable. Here,
the RTC issued the assailed orders while the forcible entry case was still on appeal before it, as well as
before the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not judgment of the MCTC is final and executory thus immutability of judgment principle applies.

RULING: No. MCTC’s judgment is not yet final and executory.

 The principle of immutability of a final judgment stands as one of the pillars supporting a strong, credible, and
effective court.17 The principle prohibits any alteration, modification, or correction of final and executory
judgments as what remains to be done is the purely ministerial enforcement or execution of the judgment.
 On this point, the Court has repeatedly declared:
It is a hornbook rule that once a judgment has become final and executory, it may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless
of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the
land, as what remains to be done is the purely ministerial enforcement or execution of the judgment. The
doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice
that at the risk of occasional errors, the judgment of adjudicating bodies must become final and executory on
some definite date fixed by law. [x x x], the
Supreme Court reiterated that the doctrine of immutability of judgment is adhered to by necessity
notwithstanding occasional errors that may result thereby, since litigations must somehow come to an end for
otherwise, it would be even more intolerable than the wrong and injustice it is designed to protect.
 Once a judgment is issued by the court in a case, and that judgment becomes final and executory, the principle
of immutability of judgments automatically operates to bar any modification of the judgment. The modification
of a judgment requires the exercise of the court’s discretion. At that stage · when the judgment has become
final and executory · the court is barred from exercising discretion on the case; the bar exists even if the
modification is only meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or law as these are discretionary acts that
rest outside of the court’s purely ministerial jurisdiction.
 Before the finality of the judgment, however, a court has plenary power to alter, modify, or altogether set aside
its own decision. Thus, in situations where the judgment has not yet become final and executory, the principle of
immutability of judgments will not and cannot apply.
 Obviously, therefore, the principle of immutability of judgments presupposes the existence of a final and
executory judgment. Where no final and executory judgment exists ·because the case is still under review by the
appellate or higher court or there still are incidental matters under consideration by the court · the principle
simply cannot operate. The court would have plenary power not only to modify its judgment, but also to address
all matters incidental to the case.

APPLICATION:
 In the present case, we find that, notwithstanding the petitionersÊ assertion, the forcible entry case was, in fact,
still under the RTCÊs review when it issued the assailed orders. In fact, as the petitioners no less pointed out, the
forcible entry case was also simultaneously then under the CA review (when they filed the Rule 42 petition
before the CA on October 27, 2008) while the case was still pending before the RTC.

 In addition, the sheriff Ês report did not state that the MCTC decision was already final and executed as the
petitioners insist. To accurately quote the sheriff’s report, the writ of execution was “partially served [on] the
defendant, Sps. Tabalno [who] refuses [sic] to demolish the structure inside the property x x x and pay their
money judgment.” In other words, the writ of execution had not yet been fully executed; something still
remained to be done to fully carry out the MCTC decision. Hence, the MCTC decision was not, contrary to the
petitionerÊs position, final and executory.

 Of course, we are aware of the CourtÊs rulings in Temic Semi conductors and Mocorro whose facts,
unfortunately for the petitioners, do not squarely fit the facts and circumstances of the present case. Unlike in
Temic Semiconductors and Mocorro,18 the present case does not question a final and executory judgment.
Rather, as discussed, the MCTC decision is not yet been final and executory and hence does not trigger the
application of the immutability of judgments principle.

 Accordingly, as the MCTC judgement was clearly not yet final and executory, the immutability of judgments
principle cannot apply.

DISPOSITION:

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WHEREFORE, in the light of these considerations, we hereby DISMISS the petition and AFFIRM the September 28, 2009
order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Abuyog, Leyte, in Civil Case No. 563 granting the substitution of Paulino
Dingal, Sr. by Juanita Galola Vda. de Dingal; and its November 9, 2009 and March 1, 2010 orders denying the
petitionersÊ motions for reconsideration. SO ORDERED.

6. Briones-Vasquez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144882, February 4, 2005 [Judgment nunc pro tunc]
Ponente: Azcuna, J.

Nature of the Case: This case is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which assails the
resolution of the CA, dated June 9, 2000 (denying petitioner’s motion for clarificatory judgment) and its resolution dated
August 3, 2000 (denying the motion for reconsideration).

FACTS:
 Maria Mendoza Vda. de Ocampo acquired a parcel of land from Luisa Briones, under an agreement
denominated as a pacto de retro sale.
o Briones thereunder reserved the right to repurchase the parcel of land up to December 31, 1970.
 Maria Mendoza Vda. De Ocampo passed away on May 27, 1979.
 On June 14, 1990, the heirs of Maria Mendoza Vda. De Ocampo, Hipolita Ocampo Paulite and Eusebio Mendoza
Ocampo, filed a petition for consolidation of ownership, alleging that the seller was not able to exercise her
privilege to redeem the property on or before December 31, 1970


RTC Ruling:
 Ruled, among others, that Briones can still redeem property within 30 days from the finality of this judgment

 Herein private respondents appealed the RTC decision to the CA
CA Ruling:
 Set aside the contested decision
 Declared that the 1970 sale with right of repurchase is one of an equitable mortgage
 MR was filed – but denied by the CA
 CA decision became final and executory and entry of judgment was made on July 17, 1996


Subsequently, at the RTC:

 Both petitioner and respondents filed their respective motions for a writ of execution.
 The RTC issued a writ of execution. However, the writ was returned unserved per sheriff‘s return
 Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for an alias writ of execution. This was granted by the RTC
 However, the Sheriff was unable to effect the satisfaction of the alias writ as stated in his report

 Unable to effect the execution of the Court of Appeals decision, petitioner filed with the RTC an omnibus motion
– which was denied by RTC
o Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above order – denied by the RTC
 Petitioner then filed a motion for clarificatory judgment with the CA – denied by CA
o Petitioner filed MR of the above resolution – CA denied the same
 Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Did the CA act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in refusing to grant petitioner’s
motion for clarificatory judgment?

RULING:
 No. The CA did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in refusing to grant
petitioner’s motion for clarificatory judgment.
 As a general rule, final and executory judgments are immutable and unalterable except under the three
exceptions, namely: a) clerical errors; b) nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; and c)
void judgments.
 In this case, the petitioner claims the second exception, i.e., that her motion for clarificatory judgment is for the
purpose of obtaining a nunc pro tunc amendment of the final and executory Decision of the Court of Appeals.

 Nunc pro tunc judgments have been defined and characterized by this Court, as follows:
o The office of a judgment nunc pro tunc is to record some act of the court done at a former time which
was not then carried into the record, and the power of a court to make such entries is restricted to
placing upon the record evidence of judicial action which has been actually taken.

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 o It may be used to make the record speak the truth, but not to make it speak what it did not speak but
ought to have spoken.
o If the court has not rendered a judgment that it might or should have rendered, or if it has rendered
an imperfect or improper judgment, it has no power to remedy these errors or omissions by ordering
the entry nunc pro tunc of a proper judgment.
o Hence a court in entering a judgment nunc pro tunc has no power to construe what the judgment
means, but only to enter of record such judgment as had been formerly rendered, but which had not
been entered of record as rendered. xxx
o The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment and the ascertainment
and determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper form on the record, the judgment that
had been previously rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to make it show what the judicial
action really was, not to correct judicial errors, such as to render a judgment which the court ought to
have rendered, in place of the one it did erroneously render, nor to supply non-action by the court,
however erroneous the judgment may have been. xxx

Application
 From the above characterization of a nunc pro tunc judgment, it is clear that the judgment petitioner sought
through the motion for clarificatory judgment is outside its scope.
 Petitioners did not allege that the Court of Appeals actually took judicial action and that such action was not
included in the Court of Appeals’ Decision by inadvertence.
 A nunc pro tunc judgment cannot correct judicial error nor supply non-action by the court.
 Since the judgment sought through the motion for clarificatory judgment is not a nunc pro tunc one, the general
rule regarding final and executory decisions applies.

 In this case, no motion for reconsideration having been filed after the CA rendered its decision on June 29, 1995
and an entry of judgment having been made on July 17, 1996, the same became final and executory and, hence,
is no longer susceptible to amendment.
 It, therefore, follows that the CA did not act arbitrarily nor with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it issued the aforementioned Resolution denying petitioner’s motion for clarificatory judgment
and the Resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Disposition: Petition for certiorari is dismissed.

7. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. vs. Commissioner of Customs

G.R. No. 195876, December 5, 2016
summary judgment

Facts:
- Prior to R.A. 8180’s effectivity which provides for the reduction of the tariff duty on imported crude oil from ten
percent (10%) to three percent (3%). petitioner's importation of 1,979,674.85 U.S. barrels of Arab Light Crude Oil, thru
the Ex MT Lanistels, arrived on 7 April 1996 nine (9) days earlier than the effectivity of the liberalization provision.
- After shipment was unloaded from the carrying vessels docked at a wharf owned and operated by petitioner, to its oil
tanks located at Batangas City.
- Subsequently, petitioner filed the Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration and paid the import duty of said
shipment in the amount of P11,231,081.00 on 23 May 1996.
- More than four (4) years later, petitioner received a demand letter from the Bureau of Customs (BOC), through the
District Collector of Batangas, assessing it to pay the deficiency customs duties in the amount of P120,162,991.00 due
from the aforementioned crude oil importation, representing the difference between the amount allegedly due (at the
old rate often percent (10%) or before the effectivity of R.A. No. 8180) and the actual amount of duties paid by
petitioner (on the rate of 3%).
- Petitioner protested the assessment to which the District Collector of the BOC replied reiterating his demand for the
payment of said deficiency customs duties.
- Petitioner appealed to the respondent and requested for the cancellation of the assessment for the same customs
duties.
- However, five years after petitioner paid the allegedly deficient import duty' it received by telefax from the respondent
a demand letter for the payment of the amount of P936,899,885.90, representing the dutiable value of its 1996 crude oil
importation which had been allegedly abandoned in favor of the government by operation of law.

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- Respondent stated that Import Entry No. 683-96 covering the subject importation had been irregularly filed and
accepted beyond the thirty-day (30) period prescribed by law. Petitioner protested the demand letter for lack of factual
and legal basis, and on the ground of prescription.
- Seeking clarification, petitioner sent a letter to the Director of Legal Service of the BOC on 3 December 2001 for said
purpose.
- On 28 December 2001, BOC Valera sent petitioner a letter which stated that the latter had not responded to the
respondent's demand letter and demanded payment of the amount of P936,899,885.90, under threat to hold delivery of
petitioner's subsequent shipments, pursuant to Section 150812 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP),
and to file a civil complaint against petitioner.
- In reply thereto, petitioner sent a letter to the BOC Deputy Commissioner and expressed that it had already responded
to the aforesaid demand letter.
- On 11 April 2002, the BOC filed a civil case for collection of sum of money against petitioner, together with Caltex
Philippines, Inc. as co-party therein, docketed as Civil Case No. 02103239, before Branch XXV, Regional Trial Court
(RTC), of the City of Manila.
- Consequently, on 27 May 2002, petitioner filed with CTA a Petition for Review, upon consideration that the civil
complaint filed in the RTC of Manila was the final decision of the BOC on its protest.

- Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said petition raising lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a cause of action as
its grounds, which the CTA in Division denied. Likewise, respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied.
- Subsequently, respondent, through the OSG, filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, praying for
the reversal and setting aside of the CTA in Division's Resolutions.
- In the interim, respondent filed his Answer to the petition in C.T.A. which reiterated the lack of jurisdiction and failure
to state a cause of action. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
- Former First Division of the CA dismissed respondent's petition. Similarly, respondent's motion for reconsideration was
denied.
- CTA in Division ruled to dismiss petition for review on CTA for lack of merit.
- Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to CTA former en banc by filin a petition for review, which affirmend CTA Division's
ruling. Not satisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether Court's judicial prerogative to review the court a quo's findings of fact will prosper

Ruling: Yes
At this point, it bears emphasis that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised. The Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of
the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the
CA are conclusive and binding on the Court and they carry even more weight when the CA affirms the factual findings of
the trial court.
However, it is already a settled matter that, the Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.
In this case, upon an assiduous review of the factual finding of fraud, we find petitioner's contention meritorious. Hence,
the instant case falls among the exceptions to the general rule previously mentioned which would require this Court's
judicial prerogative to review the court a quo's findings of fact.

8. Roasters Philippines Inc. vs. Gaviola ( Single Motion Rule)

G.R. No. 191874. September 2, 2015
PEREZ, J.:
This Petition for Certiorari seeks to reverse the 11 December 2009 Decision1 and 30 March 2010 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals in CAG. R. SP No. 106728 which annulled the Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pinas City,
Branch 198 that the complaint be dismissed for failure of respondents to prosecute the case.

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FACTS:
 On 9 April 2003, Georgia Gaviola and Maria Leisa M. Gaviola (Maria Leisa), together with their children filed a
Complaint for Damages against Roasters Philippines before the RTC of Las Piñas City.
o The family was Hospitalized due to acute gastroenteritis and possible Food poisoning when they dined
at Kenny Rogers Roasters restaurant Duty-Free Branch in Parañaque.
 Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
o The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration filed
by petitioner.
 Meanwhile, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals questioning the refusal of the
trial court to dismiss the complaint.
o On 14 March 2005,5 the appellate court dismissed the petition.
o On 7 March 2006,6 the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution declaring the 14 March 2005 Decision to
have become final and executory as of 20 July 2005.
 On 26 April 2007, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure of respondents to prosecute the
pending case alleging that respondents had not filed any pleading to revive or re-activate their case since the 14
March 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals has become final and executory.
 In response to the Motion to Dismiss, respondents filed a· Manifestation with Motion to Set the Case for Pre-
Trial.
o The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner and set the pre-trial to 6 August 2007.
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration from said order but it was denied by the trial court.
 On 12 November 2007, the trial court referred the case to mediation.

 Petitioner meanwhile filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the denial of its Motion
to Dismiss.
 Petitioner also filed the corresponding motion to suspend proceedings before the trial court in view of the
pendency of its certiorari petition.
 The Court of Appeals eventually denied the petition on 18 April 2008 which prompted the trial court to deny
petitioner's motion to suspend proceedings.
 The trial court set the hearing for 19 May 2008.
 During the presentation of their evidence-in-chief on 19 May 2008, respondents failed to attend the hearing.
o Consequently, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the Complaint for failure to prosecute pursuant
to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.
 In their Motion for Reconsideration, respondents explained that on the day of the hearing, respondent Maria
Leisa had a prior engagement in the United States of America (USA), which nonetheless did not push through
because the latter was hospitalized due to profuse bleeding.
o The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration on 26 August 2008.
 Respondents changed their counsel and the new counsel filed a Motion for Leave to file a Second Motion for
Reconsideration and the Second Motion for Reconsideration.
o On 23 October 2008, the trial court. denied the second motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
 Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal from the 19 May 2008, 26 August 2008 and 23 October 2008 Orders of the
trial court.
 On 18 November 2008, the trial court denied the appeal on the ground that the orders appealed from are mere
interlocutory orders.
 Respondents then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court judge in dismissing the case for failure to prosecute, for affirming the dismissal of· the
case, and for denying the appeal taken by respondents.
o On 11 December 2009, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed · Decision annulling the orders of the
trial court and directing the reinstatement of the case.
 Moreover, the appellate court ruled that the order of the dismissal of. the trial court is not an interlocutory
order but a final order which is a proper subject of appeal, hence, respondents' correctly filed a notice of appeal.
 Petitioner filed the instant petition

ISSUE: Whether or not a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading?

RULING:
 A second motion for reconsideration, as a rule, is a prohibited pleading which shall not be allowed
o except for extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only after an express leave shall have first been
obtained.
 The trial court found no persuasive reason to grant the Second Motion for Reconsideration and we affirm.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated 11 December 2009
and 30 March 2010, respectively of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106728, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The

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Regional Trial Court of Las Pifias City, Branch 198 Orders dated 19 May 2008, 26 August 2008, 23 October 2008 and 18
November 2008 are REINSTATED. Trial on petitioner's counterclaim shall proceed. SO ORDERED.

NOTES:

 The period to appeal is reckoned from the receipt of the denial of their First Motion for Reconsideration, which
was on 10 September 2008 and respondents had until 25 September 2008 to file their Notice of Appeal.
 But instead of filing a Notice of Appeal, respondents filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Second Motion
for Reconsideration and their Second Motion for Reconsideration on 18 and 19 September 2008, respectively.
 Considering that a second motion for reconsideration is a pro forma motion and does not toll the
reglementary period for an appeal, the period to appeal lapsed.
 Therefore, the impugned RTC Orders became final and executory.
 The Notice of Appeal was correctly denied by the trial court.

9. Ybiernas vs. Tanco-Gabaldon, G.R. No. 178925, June 1, 2011 (motion for new trial)

Facts:
 Estrella Ybiernas owned a parcel of land located in Talisay, Negros Occidental covered by a TCT. She executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of her heirs, one of them is Dionisio Ybiernas.
 On June 30, 1989, Bacolod RTC issued an Order in Cadastral Case No. 10, directing the registration and
annotation of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the title.
 Respondents Tanco-Gabaldon and Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc. filed with the Pasig RTC a Complaint for sum of
money and damages against Estrella and three other individuals. Upon respondents’ motion, the Pasig RTC
ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment upon filing of a bond. The sheriff issued the
corresponding writ of attachment and levied the subject property. When Estrella’s heirs learned about the levy,
Dionisio filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim, asserting the transfer of ownership to them.
 The Pasig RTC resolved the Complaint for sum of money in favor of respondents, and Estrella, et al. were
ordered to pay.
 In the meantime, Dionisio died and was succeeded by his heirs. Petitioners filed with the Bacolod RTC a
Complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages, claiming that the levy was invalid because the property is not
owned by any of the defendants in the Pasig RTC case. They averred that the annotation of the RTC Order and
the Deed of Absolute Sale on the TCT serves as notice to the whole world that the property is no longer owned
by Estrella.
 While the appeal was pending in the CA, respondents filed an MNT, claiming that they have discovered that the
Cadastral Case did not exist and the Deed of Sale was simulated.
 The CA granted respondents’ MNT. The CA denied petitioners’ MR. Petitioners subsequently filed this petition
for review on certiorari

Issue: WON MNT could be allowed

Ruling:
 YES; We find that a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is warranted. The Rules allows the courts to
grant a new trial when there are errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused
committed during the trial, or when there exists newly discovered evidence. The grant or denial of a new trial is,
generally speaking, addressed to the sound discretion of the court which cannot be interfered with unless a
clear abuse thereof is shown.
 This Court has repeatedly held that before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, it must be shown
(1) that the evidence was discovered after trial;
(2) that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence;
(3) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and
(4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted.
 If the alleged newly discovered evidence could have been very well presented during the trial with the exercise
of reasonable diligence, the same cannot be considered newly discovered.
 The only contentious element in the case is whether the evidence could have been discovered with the exercise
of reasonable diligence. The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether the movant has
exercised due diligence depends upon the particular circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, it has been
observed that the phrase is often equated with “reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to the defendant.” In
other words, the concept of due diligence has both a time component and a good faith component.
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 On the second requisite, respondents explained that they could not have discovered the evidence with
reasonable diligence because they relied in good faith on the veracity of the RTC Order dated June 30, 1989,
based on the principle that the issuance of a court order, as an act of a public officer, enjoys the presumption of
regularity
 As previously stated, respondents relied in good faith on the veracity of the Bacolod RTC Order which petitioners
presented in court. It was only practical for them to do so, if only to expedite the proceedings. Given this
circumstance, we hold that respondents exercised reasonable diligence in obtaining the evidence. The
certifications therefore qualify as newly discovered evidence.

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