Prospective & Retroactive Effect of Laws, Art. 4 NCC - Lex Prospicit, Non Respicit

PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS
Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
The law looks forward, not backward. (Lex prospicit, non respicit)
G.R. No. 193993 November 8, 2017
VIVENNE K. TAN, Petitioner vs.VINCENT "BINGBONG" CRISOLOGO, Respondent
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Vivenne K. Tan (Tan) assailing the 20 April 2010 Decision2 and
the 1 October 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 112815. The CA found that the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 95, Quezon City (RTC), exercised grave abuse of discretion when it reversed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 37, Quezon City (MeTC), to exclude Tan from the voter's list of Precinct 0853-A of Barangay Sto. Domingo, Quezon
City.
THE FACTS
On 19 January 1993, Tan, born to Filipino parents, became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America (US.A.).4
On 26 October 2009, Tan applied to be registered as a voter in Quezon City. 5 She indicated that she was a Filipino .Citizen by birth.
Her application was approved by the Election Registration Board (ERB) on 16 November 2009 making her a registered voter of
Precinct 0853-A, Sto. Domingo, Quezon City.6
On 30 November 2009, Tan took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before a notary public in Makati City. 7
The following day, or on 1 December 2009, she filed a petition before the Bureau of Immigration (BI) for the reacquisition of her
Philippine citizenship.8 She stated in her petition that she lost her Philippine citizenship when she became a naturalized American
citizen. However, Tan executed a sworn declaration renouncing her allegiance to the U.S.A. 9 Thereafter, the BI confirmed her
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.10
On the same day, Tan filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the 2010 National Elections to run as congresswoman for the First
District of Quezon City.11
On 28 December 2009, respondent Vincent "Bing bong" Crisologo (Crisologo) filed a petition before the MeTC, docketed as Civil
Case No. 37- 09-1292, seeking the exclusion of Tan from the voter's list because (1) she was not a Filipino citizen when she registered
as a voter; and (2) she failed to meet the residency requirement of the law.12
In her answer, Tan countered that she is a natural-born citizen having been born to Filipino parents on 1 April 1968. Although she
became a naturalized American citizen on 19 January 1993, Tan claimed that since 1996 she had effectively renounced her American
citizenship as she had been continuously residing in the Philippines. She had also found employment within the country and even set
up a school somewhere in Greenhills.13
The Ruling of the Me TC
On 14 January 2010, the MeTC rendered a decision excluding Tan from the voter's list. 14 It held that she was not a Filipino citizen at
the time that she registered as a voter, viz:
Through her acts and deeds, [Tan] clearly manifested and unequivocally admitted that she was not a Filipino citizen at the time of her
application as a registered voter. If indeed she was a Filipino citizen as she claimed and represented, she would not have gone to the
extent of re-affirming her Filipino citizenship, by her act of applying for the same. If indeed she was a Filipino citizen on October 26,
2009, the day she registered as a voter, she would not have been allowed to apply for Filipino citizenship as she was already a Filipino
citizen. There is the act of [Tan] which would clearly manifest her lack of Philippine citizenship upon her registration. Said act is her
taking an Oath of Allegiance on December 1, 2009. A Filipino citizen would not be required to perform an Oath of Allegiance to
affirm his or her Filipino citizenship, because affirmation is no longer necessary because the citizenship has always been in her
possession.
When' she took her oath of allegiance on December 1, 2009, she renounced any and all allegiance to the Government of the United
States of America. This act is again a clear showing that she was an American and not a Filipino citizen at the time she registered as a
voter on October 26, 2009.
xxxx
The foregoing manifest that [Tan], through her subsequent acts and deeds, through the authoritative permission given to her by
governmental agencies, 'and through her application for, and taking of an Oath of Allegiance for Filipino citizenship, could not be
considered as a Filipino citizen at the time that she registered as a Philippine voter.
In view thereof, the petition for her to be excluded as a voter is GRANTED. [Tan] is hereby to be excluded from the voter's list of
Precinct 0853-A of Barangay Sto. Domingo, Quezon City.15
The Ruling of the RTC
Aggrieved, Tan appealed the MeTC decision to the RTC, where it was reversed and Crisologo's petition was dismissed for lack of
merit. The RTC's position was that Tan's questioned citizenship was cured, to wit:
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that [Tan] upon registration as voter in the First District of Quezon City was still a naturalized
American Citizen. But her questioned citizenship was cured when [Tan] made the following acts:
1) She took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on November 30, 2009;
2) She filed a Petition for Reacquisition and/or Retention of Philippine Citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 before the [BI];
3) On December 1, 2009, the [BI] has issued an Order granting the petition and ordering the issuance of a Certificate of
Retention/Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship in favor of [Tan]; and
4) Lastly, [Tan] executed a Sworn Declaration that she make a formal renunciation of her United States nationality; that she
absolutely and entirely renounce her United States nationality together with all rights and privileges and all duties and
allegiance and fidelity there unto pertaining before a notary public on December 1, 2009.
With these acts of [Tan], she is deemed to have never lost her Filipino citizenship.
xxxx
Clearly, the court a quo erred in concluding that [Tan], through her subsequent acts and deeds, through the authoritative permission
given to her by government agencies, and through her application for, and taking an Oath of Allegiance for Filipino citizenship, could
not be considered as a Filipino citizen at the time she registered as a Philippine voter. [citation omitted]
[Tan] having re-acquired her Filipino citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, she is deemed not to have lost her Filipino citizenship
and is, therefore, a valid registered voter. In short, whatever defects [Tan] had in her nationality when she registered as a voter should
now be deemed cured by her re-acquisition of her Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 14, 2010 of the [Me TC] is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered
dismissing the Petition For Exclusion Of A Voter From The List for lack of merit. 16
Since the RTC decision became final and executory pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8189, otherwise known as the Voter's
Registration Act of 1996,17 Crisologo filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.18 He argued that Tan should have been excluded
from the list of registered voters for failure to meet the citizenship and residency requirement to be registered as a voter.
The Assailed CA Decision
After the parties submitted their respective memoranda, the CA came up with a decision finding that the RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in reversing the decision of the MeTC. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed disposition is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The MeTC decision dated
January 14, 2010 excluding Vivenne K. Tan from the voter's list of Precinct 0853-A of Barangay Sto. Domingo, Quezon City, is
REINSTATED. Costs against the Private Respondent.19
In coming up with its conclusion, the CA gave the following reasons:
(1) The taking of the Oath of Allegiance is a condition sine qua non for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship by a
natural-born Filipino citizen who became a naturalized citizen of a foreign country;
(2) Section 2 of R.A. No. 9225,20 cannot be relied upon to declare that Tan never lost her Philippine citizenship or that her
reacquisition of such cured the invalidity of her registration because the provision applies only to citizens of the Philippines at
the time of the passage of R.A. No. 9225;
(3) R.A. No. 9225 contains no provision stating that it may be applied retroactively as regards natural-born citizens who became
naturalized citizens of a foreign country prior to the effectivity of the said law; and
(4) Tan must have first taken her Oath of Allegiance before she can be validly registered as a voter because R.A. No. 9225 itself
says that individuals with dual citizenships must comply with existing laws for them to enjoy full civil and political rights.
Arguing on pure questions of law, Tan filed the present petition before this Court.
OUR RULING
The pivotal question in this case is whether Tan can be considered a Philippine citizen at the time she registered as a voter.
A natural-born Filipino citizen who

renounces his or her Philippine
citizenship, effectively becomes a
foreigner in the Philippines with no
political right to participate in
Philippine politics and governance.
The right to vote is reserved for Filipino citizens. The Constitution is clear on this matter:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law who are at least eighteen
years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at
least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the
exercise of suffrage.21 (emphasis ours)
This constitutional provision is reflected in R.A. No. 8189 this way: "[a]ll citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law
who are at least eighteen (18) years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year, and in the place
wherein they propose to vote, for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the election, may register as a voter." 22 Although the
Voter's Registration Act of 1996 does not contain a similar provision like R.A. No. 918923 that disqualifies non-Filipino citizens from
voting, it does, however, provide that the ERB shall deactivate the registration and remove the registration records of any person who
has lost his or her Filipino citizenship.24
Without any doubt, only Filipino citizens are qualified to vote and may be included in the permanent list of voters.25Thus, to be
registered a voter in the Philippines, the registrant must be a citizen at the time he or she .filed the application.
In the present case, it is undisputed that Tan filed her voter's registration application on 26 October 2009, and that she only took her
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 30 November 2009, or more than a month after the ERB approved her
application.
Tan argues that (1) her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship through R.A. No. 9225 has a retroactive effect, such that a natural-born
Filipino citizen is deemed never to have lost his or her Filipino citizenship,26 and that (2) the reacquisition cured any and all defects,
assuming any are existing, attendant during her registration as a voter. 27
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow natural-born Filipino citizens, who lost their Philippine citizenship through naturalization in a
foreign country, to expeditiously reacquire Philippine citizenship.28 Under the procedure currently in place under R.A. No. 9225, the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship requires only the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Congress declared as a state policy that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions laid out by the law.29 The full implications of the effects of R.A. No. 9225 can be
fully appreciated in Section 3, which reads:
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are
deemed hereby to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
I _________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, and obey
the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (emphasis ours)
Based on this provision alone, it would seem that the law makes a distinction between Filipino citizens who lost their Philippine
citizenship prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 9225 and reacquired their citizenship under the same law from those who lost their
Philippine citizenship after R.A. No. 9225 was enacted and retained their citizenship.30 On this point, Tan contends that this
distinction does not substantially affect her citizenship status because reacquiring or retaining Filipino citizenship has the same
effect.31 Moreover, she points out that the framers of the law did not distinguish the difference; hence, using the words "reacquire" and
"retain" interchangeably.32
In the light of factual circumstances of this case and considering the plain meaning of the words "reacquire" and "retain," we find it
fitting to address the seeming confusion brought about by Section 2 of R.A. No. 9225. In other words, by
declaring "deemed to have not lost their Philippine citizenship," does this mean that once Philippine citizenship is reacquired after
taking the Oath of Allegiance required in R.A. No. 9225, the effect on the citizenship status retroacts to the period before taking said
oath. We rule in the negative.
Borrowing the words of Chief Justice Maria Lourdes A. Serreno, "[t]he renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that
can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign
citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship." 33 The
tenor of these words in Maquiling v. Comelec paved the way for the Court to rule that Amado, the mayoral candidate who garnered
the most number of votes during the May 2010 Elections, was disqualified from running for any local elective position.34 In that case,
the Court found that Amado effectively recanted his oath of renunciation because he used his U.S. passport after taking the oath.35
While the facts and issue in the case at bar do not involve the same matters discussed in Maquiling and in Arnado,the Court's position
on renunciation and its effect lead us to conclude that once Philippine citizenship is renounced because of naturalization in a foreign
country, we cannot consider one a Filipino citizen unless and until his or her allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines is
reaffirmed. Simply stated, right after a Filipino renounces allegiance to our country, he or she is to be considered a foreigner.
Note that Tan's act of acquiring U.S. citizenship had been a conscious and voluntary decision on her part. While studying and working
in the U.S.A., Tan chose to undergo the U.S. naturalization process to acquire U.S. citizenship. This naturalization process required
her to renounce her allegiance to the Philippine Republic and her Philippine citizenship. This is clear from the Oath of Allegiance she
took to become a U.S. citizen, to wit:
I, hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate,
state, or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution and
laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign or domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same;
that I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform noncombatant service in the Armed
Forces of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform work of national importance under civilian direction when
required by the law; and that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; so help me
God.36(emphasis and italics ours)
Renunciation or the relinquishment of one's citizenship requires a voluntary act for it to produce any legal effect. This willingness to
disassociate from a political community is manifested by swearing to an oath. If we were to consider the words in the Oath of
Allegiance as meaningless, the process laid out under the law to effect naturalization would be irrelevant and useless. Thus, to give
effect to the legal implications of taking an Oath of Allegiance, we must honor the meaning of the words which the person declaring
the oath has sworn to freely, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
Tan took an Oath of Allegiance to the U.S.A. on 19 January 1993, prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on 29 August 2003. If we
were to effect as retroactive Tan's Philippine citizenship to the date she lost her Philippine citizenship, then the different use of the
words "reacquire" and "retain" in R.A. No. 9225 would effectively be futile.
An interpretation giving R.A. No. 9225 a retroactive effect to those who have lost their Philippine citizenship through naturalization
by a foreign country prior to R.A. No. 9225 would cause confusion to what is stated in Section 3: "natural-born citizens by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic." To go beyond what the law says and interpret it in its ordinary and plain meaning would
be tantamount to judicial legislation.
The plain meaning rule or verba legis is the most basic of all statutory construction principles. When the words or language of a
statute is clear, there may be no need to interpret it in a manner different from what the word plainly implies. 37 This rule is premised
on the presumption that the legislature know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent
by use of such words as are found in the statute.38
Corollary to this rule is the holistic approach. There is no conflict between the plain meaning rule and this approach as the latter does
not espouse going outside the parameters of the statute. It merely adopts a broader approach towards the body of the law. In Mactan-
Cebu International Airport Authority v. Urgello,39 we pronounced:
The law must not be read in truncated parts; its provisions must be read in relation to the whole law. It is a cardinal rule in statutory
construction that a statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part
thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole. Every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with other parts of the
statute and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 40
To harmonize, given the distinction between citizens who have "reacquired" from those who "retained" Philippine
citizenship,41 coupled with the legal effects of renunciation of citizenship, Section 2 of R.A. No. 9225 cannot be used as basis for
giving a retroactive application of the law. R.A. No. 9225 contains no provision stating that it may be applied retroactively as regards
natural-born citizens who became naturalized citizens of a foreign country prior to the effectivity of the said law. In fact, correlating
Sections 2 and 3 of the law would readily reveal that only those falling under the second paragraph of R.A. No. 9225, i.e., natural-born
citizens who became naturalized citizens of a foreign country after the effectivity of the said law, shall be considered as not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship.
Moreover, to consider that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship retroacts to the date it was lost would result in an absurd scenario
where a Filipino would still be considered a Philippine citizen when in fact he had already renounced his citizenship. We are not about
to give a statute a meaning that would lead to absurdity as it is our duty to construe statutes in such a way to avoid such consequences.
If the words of a statute are susceptible [to] more than one meaning, the absurdity of the result of one construction is a strong
argument against its adoption and in favor of such sensible interpretation as would avoid such result. 42
Finally, it is a well-settled rule that statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation, unless the legislature intended
to give them a retroactive effect.43 We must bear in mind that a law is a rule established to guide our actions without no binding effect
until it is enacted.44 It has no application to past times but only to future time, and that is why it is said that the law looks to the future
only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions. 45
During the time Tan lost her Philippine citizenship, R.A. No. 9225 was not yet enacted and the applicable law was still
Commonwealth Act No. 63.1âwphi1 Under this law, both the renunciation of Philippine citizenship and the acquisition of a new
citizenship in a foreign country through naturalization are grounds to lose Philippine citizenship:
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. - A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
xxxx
Since the foregoing law was still effective when Tan became an American citizen, the loss of her Philippine citizenship is but a
necessary consequence. As the applicable law at that time, Tan was presumed to know the legal effects of her choice to become a
naturalized U.S. citizen. The loss of Tan's Philippine citizenship is reinforced by the fact that she voluntarily renounced her Philippine
citizenship as a requirement to acquire U.S. citizenship.
All said, absent any legal basis for the retroactive application of R.A. No. 9225, we agree with the CA that Tan was not a Filipino
citizen at the time she registered as a voter and her inclusion to the permanent voter's list is highly irregular.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the 20 April 2010 Decision and the 1
October 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112815 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996
JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA. IMMACULADA T. ALANON, ROBERTO A. TORRES,
CRISTINA A. TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES and AGUSTIN TORRES, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION and ANTONIA ARUEGO, respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p
On March 7, 1983, a Complaint1 for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights was filed before Branch 30 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila by the minors, private respondent Antonia F. Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn F. Aruego,
represented by their mother and natural guardian, Luz M. Fabian. Named defendants therein were Jose E. Aruego, Jr. and the five (5)
minor children of the deceased Gloria A. Torres, represented by their father and natural guardian, Justo P. Torres, Jr., now the
petitioners herein.
In essence, the complaint avers that the late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian
sometime in 1959 until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego on
October 5, 1962 and September 3, 1963, respectively. The complaint prayed for an Order praying that herein private respondent and
Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr.; that herein petitioners be compelled to recognize and
acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs of the deceased Jose M. Aruego; that their share and participation in the estate of their
deceased father be determined and ordered delivered to them.
The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged "open and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate
children" as stated in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Complaint, to wit:
6. The plaintiffs' father, Jose M. Aruego, acknowledged and recognized the herein plaintiffs as his children verbally among
plaintiffs' and their mother's family friends, as well as by myriad different paternal ways, including but not limited to the
following:
(a) Regular support and educational expenses;
(b) Allowance to use his surname;
(c) Payment of maternal bills;
(d) Payment of baptismal expenses and attendance therein;
(e) Taking them to restaurants and department stores on occasions of family rejoicing;
(f) Attendance to school problems of plaintiffs;
(g) Calling and allowing plaintiffs to his office every now and then;
(h) Introducing them as such children to family friends.
7. The plaintiffs are thus, in continuous possession of the status of (illegitimate) children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego who
showered them, with the continuous and clear manifestations of paternal care and affection as above outlined. 2
Petitioners denied all these allegations.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, dated June 15, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered —
1. Declaring Antonia Aruego as illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego and Luz Fabian;
2. Evelyn Fabian is not an illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;
3. Declaring that the estate of deceased Jose Aruego are the following:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Antonia Aruego is entitled to a share equal to 1/2 portion of share of the legitimate children of Jose Aruego;
5. Defendants are hereby ordered to recognize Antonia Aruego as the illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz
Fabian;
6. Defendants are hereby ordered to deliver to Antonia Aruego (her) share in the estate of Jose Aruego, Sr.;
7. Defendants to play (sic) plaintiffs (Antonia Aruego) counsel the sum of P10,000.00 as atty's fee;
8. Cost against the defendants.3
Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the decision alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court
over the complaint by virtue of the passage of Executive Order No. 209 (as amended by Executive Order No. 227), otherwise known
as the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988. This motion was denied by the lower court in the Order,
dated January 14, 1993.
Petitioners interposed an appeal but the lower court refused to give it due course on the ground that it was filed out of time.
A Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed by herein petitioners before
respondent Court of Appeals, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit in a decision promulgated on August 31, 1993. A Motion for
Reconsideration when filed was denied by the respondent court in a minute resolution, dated October 13, 1993.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 alleging the following grounds:
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND
IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY ISSUED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FILED BY PETITIONERS BEFORE IT DOES NOT
INVOLVE A QUESTION OF JURISDICTION.
RESPONDENT COURT HAD CLEARLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO PERCEPTIBLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION AND THOSE OF THE FAMILY CODE ANENT THE TIME AN ACTION FOR COMPULSORY
RECOGNITION MAY BE MADE AND THAT THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE UNDER THE CIVIL CODE FROM THAT OF THE
FAMILY CODE CONCERNING THE REQUIREMENT THAT AN ACTION FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION ON THE
GROUND OF CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE STATUS OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD SHOULD BE FILED DURING
THE LIFETIME OF THE PUTATIVE PARENT, IN UTTER DISREGARD OF THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN
THE UYGUANGCO CASE THAT THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION HAD BEEN SUPERSEDED OR AT LEAST MODIFIED BY
THE CORRESPONDING ARTICLES IN THE FAMILY CODE.
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS' PETITION FOR PROHIBITION AND IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONERS REMEDY IS THAT OF AN APPEAL WHICH ALLEGEDLY HAD ALREADY BEEN LOST. 4
Private respondent's action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child was brought under Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code
on PERSONS, specifically Article 285 thereof, which state the manner by which illegitimate children may prove their filiation, to wit:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in
the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the
expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; . . . .
Petitioners, on the other hand, submit that with the advent of the New Family Code on August 3, 1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction
over the complaint of private respondent on the ground of prescription, considering that under Article 175, paragraph 2, in relation to
Article 172 of the New Family Code, it is provided that an action for compulsory recognition of illegitimate filiation, if based on the
"open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent
without any exception, otherwise the action will be barred by prescription.
The law cited reads:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173 [during the lifetime of the child], except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.
In the case at bench, petitioners point out that, since the complaint of private respondent and her alleged sister was filed on
March 7, 1983, or almost one (1) year after the death of their presumed father on March 30, 1982, the action has clearly
prescribed under the new rule as provided in the Family Code. Petitioners, further, maintain that even if the action was filed
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, this new law must be applied to the instant case pursuant to Article 256 of the
Family Code which provides:
This Code shall, have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested of acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws.
The basic question that must be resolved in this case, therefore, appears to be:
Should the provisions of the Family Code be applied in the instant case? As a corollary Will the application of the Family Code in this
case prejudice or impair any vested right of the private respondent such that it should not be given retroactive effect in this particular
case?
The phrase "vested or acquired rights" under Article 256, is not defined by the Family Code. "The Committee did not define what is
meant by a 'vested or acquired right,' thus leaving it to the courts to determine what it means as each particular issue is submitted to
them. It is difficult to provide the answer for each and every question that may arise in the future." 5
In Tayag vs. Court of Appeals,6 a case which involves a similar complaint denominated as "Claim for Inheritance" but treated by this
court as one to compel recognition as an illegitimate child brought prior to the effectivity of the Family Code by the mother of the
minor child, and based also on the "open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," we had occasion to rule that:
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the minor child has been vested by the
filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. We herein
adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et. al. 7 where we held that the fact of
filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in
accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a
new law.
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect
adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the minor child she represents, both of which have been vested
with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the
Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.
Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench. The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory
recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be governed by
Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be given retroactive
effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case
decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by
the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code. Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the
action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative father was already deceased, since private
respondent was then still a minor when it was filed, an exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code.
Hence, the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same
despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of the Philippines.
Our ruling herein reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot be
ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first
instance, and it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case. 8
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1993 and its Resolution dated
October 13, 1993 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002
ERNESTINA BERNABE, petitioner, vs. CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian ad litem for the minor ADRIAN
BERNABE, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took
effect cannot be impaired or taken away. The minors have up to four years from attaining majority age within which to file an action
for recognition.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying for (1) the nullification of the July 7,
1999 Court of Appeals2 (CA) Decision3 in CA-GR CV No. 51919 and the October 14, 1999 CA Resolution4 denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration, as well as (2) the reinstatement of the two Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City
(Branch 109) concerning the same case. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court dismissing Civil Case No. 94-0562 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Let the records of this case be remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits." 5
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
"The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of twenty-three (23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant
Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993,
while his wife Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
"On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged
illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he (Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabe’s estate, which is now being held by
Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
"On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that under the provisions of the Family Code as well as
the case of Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, the complaint is now barred x x x." 6
Orders of the Trial Court
In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court granted Ernestina Bernabe’s Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court’s Decision
and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for recognition. Citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the
putative father had barred the action.
In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since the putative father had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian
Bernabe in writing, the action for recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the
opportunity to either affirm or deny the child’s filiation.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the
illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which
allows an action for recognition to be filed within four years after the child has attained the age of majority. The subsequent enactment
of the Family Code did not take away that right.
Hence, this appeal.7
Issues
In her Memorandum,8 petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
"Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner, the legitimate daughter of the putative father, for
recognition and partition with accounting after the putative father’s death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity
by the latter.
II
"Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents had four years from the attainment of minority to file
an action for recognition as provided in Art. 285 of the Civil Code, in complete disregard of its repeal by the [express] provisions of
the Family Code and the applicable jurisprudence as held by the Honorable Court of Appeals.
III
"Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the petition[er] is fatally defective for failure to implead the Court of Appeals as one
of the respondents."9
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First and Second Issues: Period to File Action for Recognition
Because the first and the second issues are interrelated, we shall discuss them jointly.
Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action for recognition, because Article 285 of the Civil Code has been
supplanted by the provisions of the Family Code. She argues that the latter Code should be given retroactive effect, since no vested
right would be impaired. We do not agree.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing an action for recognition as follows:
"ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents,
except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the
expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which
either or both parents recognize the child.
"In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document."
The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however been omitted by Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family
Code, which we quote:
"ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws."
"ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs
should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to
institute the action.
"The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties."
"ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate
children.
"The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph
of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent."
Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The
Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by
the new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that "illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and
without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. x x x The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm
or deny the child’s filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead." 10
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already vested prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced
or impaired as follows:
"ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws."
The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Adrian’s right to an action for recognition, which was granted by Article 285 of
the Civil Code, had already vested prior to the enactment of the Family Code. Our answer is affirmative.
A vested right is defined as "one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which
is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency x x x." 11 Respondent however
contends that the filing of an action for recognition is procedural in nature and that "as a general rule, no vested right may attach to
[or] arise from procedural laws." 12
Bustos v. Lucero13 distinguished substantive from procedural law in these words:
"x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is
a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive
law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a
cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion." 14 (Citations omitted)
Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto,15 the Court laid down the test for determining whether a rule is procedural or substantive:
"[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges,
enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction
of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with
procedure."16
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to
file his petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take
Adrian’s right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.
Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals17 is not applicable to the case at bar, because the plaintiff therein sought recognition as an illegitimate
child when he was no longer a minor. On the other hand, in Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals18 the Court ruled that an action for
recognition filed while the Civil Code was in effect should not be affected by the subsequent enactment of the Family Code, because
the right had already vested.
Not Limited to Natural Children
To be sure, Article 285 of the Civil Code refers to the action for recognition of "natural" children. Thus, petitioner contends that the
provision cannot be availed of by respondent, because at the time of his conception, his parents were impeded from marrying each
other. In other words, he is not a natural child.
A "natural child" is one whose parents, at the time of conception, were not disqualified by any legal impediment from marrying each
other. Thus, in De Santos v. Angeles,19 the Court explained:
"A child’s parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a ‘natural
child.’"20
A strict and literal interpretation of Article 285 has already been frowned upon by this Court in the aforesaid case of Aruego, which
allowed minors to file a case for recognition even if their parents were disqualified from marrying each other. There, the Complaint
averred that the late Jose Aruego Sr., a married man, had an extramarital liason with Luz Fabian. Out of this relationship were born
two illegitimate children who in 1983 filed an action for recognition. The two children were born in 1962 and 1963, while the alleged
putative father died in 1982. In short, at the time of their conception, the two children’s parents were legally disqualified from
marrying each other. The Court allowed the Complaint to prosper, even though it had been filed almost a year after the death of the
presumed father. At the time of his death, both children were still minors.
Moreover, in the earlier case Divinagracia v. Rovira,21 the Court said that the rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment of
natural children, as well as the prescriptive period for filing such action, may likewise be applied to spurious children. Pertinent
portions of the case are quoted hereunder:
"The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other than natural children, commonly known as bastards, include those
adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married woman cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a married
man cohabiting with a woman other than his wife. They are entitled to support and successional rights. But their filiation must be duly
proven.
"How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the investigation of the paternity or maternity or spurious
children under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsory
recognition of natural children are applicable to spurious children.
"Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules on proof of filiation of natural children or the
rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to spurious children.
"That does not mean that spurious children should be acknowledged, as that term is used with respect to natural children. What is
simply meant is that the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of
spurious children.
"A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing. These are the modes of voluntary recognition of natural children.
"In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious child, then his filiation may be established by means of the
circumstances or grounds for compulsory recognition prescribed in the aforementioned articles 283 and 284.
"The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in the case of natural children, as provided for in article 285
of the Civil Code, applies to spurious children." 22 (Citations omitted, italics supplied)
Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have superior successional rights over spurious ones. 23 However, Rovira treats them as
equals with respect to other rights, including the right to recognition granted by Article 285.
To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died
during their minority are thus given the right to seek recognition (under Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four years
from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.
Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who could not have filed suit, on their own, during the
lifetime of their putative parents. As respondent aptly points out in his Memorandum, 24 the State as parens patriae should protect a
minor’s right. Born in 1981, Adrian was only seven years old when the Family Code took effect and only twelve when his alleged
father died in 1993. The minor must be given his day in court.
Third Issue: Failure to Implead the CA
Under Section 4(a) of Rule 45 of the current Rules of Court, it is no longer required to implead "the lower courts or judges x x x either
as petitioners or respondents." Under Section 3, however, the lower tribunal should still be furnished a copy of the petition. Hence, the
failure of petitioner to implead the Court of Appeals as a party is not a reversible error; it is in fact the correct procedure.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., no part. Relationship with family.
G.R. No. 181556 December 14, 2009
IN RE: PETITION FOR ASSISTANCE IN THE LIQUIDATION OF INTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC.
PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. STOCKHOLDERS OF INTERCITY SAVINGS AND
LOAN BANK, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Central Bank of the Philippines, now known as Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, filed on June 17, 1987 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (Intercity Bank) alleging that,
inter alia, said bank was already insolvent and its continuance in business would involve probable loss to depositors, creditors and the
general public.1
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave it due course. 2 Petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC) was eventually substituted as the therein petitioner, liquidator of Intercity Bank. 3
In the meantime, Republic Act No. 9302 (RA 9302) 4 was enacted, Section 12 of which provides:
SECTION 12. Before any distribution of the assets of the closed bank in accordance with the preferences established by law, the
Corporation shall periodically charge against said assets reasonable receivership expenses and subject to approval by
the proper court, reasonable liquidation expenses, it has incurred as part of the cost of receivership/liquidation
proceedings and collect payment therefor from available assets.
After the payment of all liabilities and claims against the closed bank, the Corporation shall pay any surplus dividends at the legal rate
of interest, from date of takeover to date of distribution, to creditors and claimants of the closed bank in accordance with legal priority
before distribution to the shareholders of the closed bank. (emphasis supplied)
Relying thereon, PDIC filed on August 8, 2005 a Motion for Approval of the Final Distribution of Assets and Termination of the
Liquidation Proceedings,5 praying that an Order be issued for:
1. The reimbursement of the liquidation fees and expenses incurred and/or advanced by herein petitioner, PDIC, in the amount of
₱3,795,096.05;
2. The provision of ₱700,000.00 for future expenses in the implementation of this distribution and the winding-up of the
liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc.;
3. The write-off of assets in the total amount of ₱8,270,789.99, as set forth in par. 2.1 hereof;
4. The write-off of liabilities in the total amount of ₱1,562,185.35, as set forth in par. 8 hereof;
5. The Final Project of Distribution of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank as set forth in Annex "Q" hereof;
6. Authorizing petitioner to hold as trustee the liquidating and surplus dividends allocated in the project of distribution for
creditors who shall have a period of three (3) years from date of last notice within which to claim payment therefor. After the
lapse of said period, unclaimed payments shall be escheated to the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with Rule 91 of
the Rules of Court;
7. Authorizing the disposal of all the pertinent bank records in accordance with applicable laws, rules and regulations after the
lapse of one (1) year from the approval of the instant Motion.
By Order of July 5, 2006,6 Branch 134 of the Makati RTC granted the motion except the above-quoted paragraphs 5 and 6 of its
prayer, respectively praying for the approval of the Final Project of Distribution and for authority for PDIC "to hold as trustee the
liquidating and surplus dividends allocated . . . for creditors" of Intercity Bank.
In granting the motion, the trial court resolved in the negative the sole issue of whether Section 12 of RA 9302 should be applied
retroactively in order to entitle Intercity Bank creditors to surplus dividends, it otherwise holding that to so resolve would run counter
to prevailing jurisprudence and unduly prejudice Intercity Bank shareholders, the creditors having been paid their principal claim in
2002 or before the passage of RA 9302 in 2004.
PDIC appealed to the Court of Appeals7 before which respondent Stockholders of Intercity Bank (the Stockholders) moved to dismiss
the appeal, arguing principally that the proper recourse should be to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari since the
question involved was purely one of law.8
By Resolution of October 17, 2007,9 the appellate court dismissed the appeal, sustaining in the main the position of the Stockholders.
Its Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution dated January 24, 2008, 10 PDIC filed the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari.1avvphi1
PDIC contends that the appellate court disregarded the issue of the trial court’s disapproval of the payment of additional liquidating
dividends to Intercity Bank creditors, which involved a question of fact that entailed a review of the evidence; that the prayer for
surplus dividends involved another question of fact as there must first be a factual finding that all claims against Intercity Bank have
been paid; and that there having been previously approved but unclaimed liquidating dividends, the denial of its prayer for
appointment as trustee therefor resulted in an anomalous situation where no one has the authority to handle them until they are
claimed.11
The Stockholders, for their part, maintain that only a question of law was brought to the appellate court, the parties having stipulated
in the trial court that the sole issue for determination was whether RA 9302 may be applied retroactively; that the payment of
additional liquidating dividends should be deemed approved since they never opposed it and the trial court specifically disapproved
only the payment of surplus dividends; and that in any event, RA 9302 cannot be given retroactive effect absent a provision therein
providing for it.12
The petition lacks merit.
Indeed, PDIC’s appeal to the appellate court raised the lone issue of whether Section 12 of RA 9302 may be applied retroactively in
order to award surplus dividends to Intercity Bank creditors, which was, as stated above, what the parties had stipulated upon as the
sole legal issue in PDIC’s Motion for Approval of the Final Distribution of Assets and Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings.
Whether a statute has retroactive effect is undeniably a pure question of law. PDIC should thus have directly appealed to this Court by
filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not an ordinary appeal with the appellate court under Rule 41. The appellate
court did not err, thus, in holding that PDIC availed of the wrong mode of appeal. 13
In the interest of justice, however, and in order to write finis to this controversy, the Court relaxes the rules and decides the petition on
the merits.14
A perusal of RA 9302 shows that nothing indeed therein authorizes its retroactive application. In fact, its effectivity clause indicates a
clear legislative intent to the contrary:
Section 28. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following the completion of its publication in the Official
Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. (emphasis supplied)
Statutes are prospective and not retroactive in their operation, they being the formulation of rules for the future, not the past. Hence,
the legal maxim lex de futuro, judex de praeterito — the law provides for the future,
the judge for the past, which is articulated in Article 4 of the Civil Code: "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided." The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive legislation to be unjust and oppressive on account of its liability to
unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior transactions.15
En passant, PDIC’s citation of foreign jurisprudence that supports the award of surplus dividends is unavailing. Resort to foreign
jurisprudence is proper only if no local law or jurisprudence exists to settle the controversy. And even then, it is only persuasive.16
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012
MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES, Complainant, vs. LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the Order 1 dated September 24, 2007 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL which dismissed the lnformation for Bigamy
filed against respondent Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano. Also assailed is the RTC Resolution 2 dated January 2, 2008 denying the motion
for reconsideration.
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan. 3 On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the
said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro, Laguna. 4 In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of
Muntinlupa, Branch
256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity as defined under
Article 36 of the Family Code, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-204. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256,
rendered an Amended Decision5 declaring the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became final and
executory on October 13, 2003.6
On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage, filed with the Municipal Trial
Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint7 for Bigamy against respondent, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 41972. Attached
to the complaint was an Affidavit8 (Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated August 23, 2004, thumb-marked and signed by
Silverio,9 which alleged, among others, that respondent failed to reveal to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates. On November
17, 2004, an Information10 for Bigamy was filed against respondent with the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL. The Information reads:
That on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent
marriage with one SILVERIO CIPRIANO VINALON while her first marriage with SOCRATES FLORES has not been judicially
dissolved by proper judicial authorities.11
On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to Quash Information (and Dismissal of the
Criminal Complaint)12 alleging that her marriage with Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no
more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic element of the crime of bigamy, i.e.,
two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimed that since the second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy had
already prescribed. The prosecution filed its Comment13 arguing that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated when
respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity; that the law punishes the act of contracting a second marriage which appears to
be valid, while the first marriage is still subsisting and has not yet been annulled or declared void by the court.
In its Order14 dated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It found respondent's argument that with the declaration of nullity of
her first marriage, there was no more first marriage to speak of and thus the element of two valid marriages in bigamy was absent, to
have been laid to rest by our ruling in Mercado v. Tan 15 where we held:
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a
letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. For contracting a second marriage while the first is still subsisting, he committed the acts
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had
already been consummated by then. x x x16
As to respondent's claim that the action had already prescribed, the RTC found that while the second marriage indeed took place in
1983, or more than the 15-year prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy, the commission of the crime was only discovered on
November 17, 2004, which should be the reckoning period, hence, prescription has not yet set in.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 claiming that the Mercado ruling was not applicable, since respondent contracted her
first marriage in 1976, i.e., before the Family Code; that the petition for annulment was granted and became final before the criminal
complaint for bigamy was filed; and, that Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given any retroactive effect because this will impair
her right to remarry without need of securing a declaration of nullity of a completely void prior marriage.
On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order, 18 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set aside. Let a new one be entered quashing the information.
Accordingly, let the instant case be DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had contracted a second marriage on January 24, 1983, i.e., before the
effectivity of the Family Code, the existing law did not require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to
contracting a subsequent marriage; that jurisprudence before the Family Code was ambivalent on the issue of the need of prior judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage. The RTC found that both marriages of respondent took place before the effectivity
of the Family Code, thus, considering the unsettled state of jurisprudence on the need for a prior declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage before commencing a second marriage and the principle that laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the accused, it
declared that the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity should not prejudice the accused whose second marriage was declared
once and for all valid with the annulment of her first marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa City in 2003.
Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but opposed by respondent. In a Resolution dated January 2,
2008, the RTC denied the same ruling, among others, that the judicial declaration of nullity of respondent's marriage is tantamount to a
mere declaration or confirmation that said marriage never existed at all, and for this reason, her act in contracting a second marriage
cannot be considered criminal.
Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us raising the following issues:
I. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs.
Sempio-Diy on the ground of psychological incapacity is a valid defense for a charge of bigamy for entering into a second marriage
prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy?
II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy regarding the necessity of securing a declaration of nullity of the first marriage before entering a second
marriage ambivalent, such that a person was allowed to enter a subsequent marriage without the annulment of the first without
incurring criminal liability.19
Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy was filed by private
complainant and not by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which should represent the government in all judicial proceedings
filed before us.20
Notwithstanding, we will give due course to this petition as we had done in the past. In Antone v. Beronilla, 21 the offended party
(private complainant) questioned before the Court of Appeals (CA) the RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against
her husband, and the CA dismissed the petition on the ground, among others, that the petition should have been filed in behalf of the
People of the Philippines by the OSG, being its statutory counsel in all appealed criminal cases. In a petition filed with us, we said that
we had given due course to a number of actions even when the respective interests of the government were not properly represented
by the OSG and said:
In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any order ruling of the trial judge in a criminal case, the
OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one to question the order or ruling before us. x x x
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the plaintiff People of the Philippines, we opted not to
dismiss the petition on this technical ground. Instead, we required the OSG to comment on the petition, as we had done before in some
cases. In light of its Comment, we rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as its own the instant petition for the People of the
Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)22
Considering that we also required the OSG to file a Comment on the petition, which it did, praying that the petition be granted in
effect, such Comment had ratified the petition filed with us.
As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in quashing the Information for bigamy filed
against respondent.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy as follow:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or,
in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts
a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. 23 It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the
alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.24
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio in 1983, her first marriage with Socrates
celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet been annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the
elements of bigamy were alleged in the Information. In her Motion to Quash the Information, she alleged, among others, that:
xxxx
2. The records of this case would bear out that accused's marriage with said Socrates Flores was declared void ab initio on 14
April 2003 by Branch 256 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. The said decision was never appealed, and
became final and executory shortly thereafter.
3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this case, her marriage with Mr. Flores had already been declared
void from the beginning.
4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983 to speak of. In other words, there was only one marriage.
5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two valid marriages, is therefore wanting.25
Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity was declared only in 2003. The
question now is whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy
filed against her.
We rule in the negative.
In Mercado v. Tan,26 we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial, because prior
to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. And by contracting a second marriage while the first
was still subsisting, the accused committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
In Abunado v. People,27 we held that what is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the
time the second marriage is contracted.28 Even if the accused eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab
initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.29
In Tenebro v. CA,30 we declared that although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is
significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the
judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is, therefore, a recognition written into the law itself
that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring
criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.31
And in Jarillo v. People,32 applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we affirmed the accused's conviction for bigamy, ruling that the
moment the accused contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of
bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, the accused’s first marriage which
had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting.
Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet been legally
dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not
change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly
charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA33 is not applicable, since the declaration of nullity of the previous marriage came after the filing
of the Information, unlike in this case where the declaration was rendered before the information was filed. We do not agree. What
makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.34 Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. 35
Anent respondent's contention in her Comment that since her two marriages were contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect because this will impair her right to remarry without need of
securing a judicial declaration of nullity of a completely void marriage.
We are not persuaded.
In Jarillo v. People,36 where the accused, in her motion for reconsideration, argued that since her marriages were entered into before
the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613),37 instead of Article 40 of the
Family Code, which requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent
marriage. We did not find the argument meritorious and said:
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure,
should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to explain, thus:
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.1âwphi1
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing the provisions of Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:
In the case at bar, respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that
very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous
bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply
claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of
nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage license and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a
declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provision
on bigamy.38
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated September 24, 2007 and the Resolution dated
January 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL, are hereby SET
ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL is ordered REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 188056 January 8, 2013
SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R. DACUDAO, Petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL M.
GONZALES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioners - residents of Bacaca Road, Davao City - were among the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in
the Legacy Group of Companies (Legacy Group) allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Group's "buy back agreement" that earned
them check payments that were dishonored. After their written demands for the return of their investments went unheeded, they
initiated a number of charges for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City
on February 6, 2009. Three of the cases were docketed as NPS Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-A-00356, Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-C-
00752, and Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-C-00753.1
On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional
State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to
the Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action.
DO No. 182 reads:2
All cases against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr., et al. under Legacy Group of Companies, may be filed with the docket section of the
National Prosecution Service, Department of Justice, Padre Faura, Manila and shall be forwarded to the Secretariat of the Special
Panel for assignment and distribution to panel members, per Department Order No. 84 dated February 13, 2009.
However, cases already filed against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr. et al. of Legacy group of Companies in your respective offices with
the exemption of the cases filed in Cagayan de Oro City which is covered by Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, should be forwarded
to the Secretariat of the Special Panel at Room 149, Department of Justice, Padre Faura, Manila, for proper disposition.
For information and guidance.
Pursuant to DO No. 182, the complaints of petitioners were forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City to the
Secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ.3
Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have directly come to the Court via petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
ascribing to respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182. They claim that DO No. 182 violated
their right to due process, their right to the equal protection of the laws, and their right to the speedy disposition of cases. They insist
that DO No. 182 was an obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule against enactment of laws with retroactive effect.
Petitioners also challenge as unconstitutional the issuance of DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 exempting from the coverage of
DO No. No. 182 all the cases for syndicated estafa already filed and pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro
City. They aver that DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violated their right to equal protection under the Constitution.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent Secretary of Justice, maintains the validity of DO No. 182 and
DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, and prays that the petition be dismissed for its utter lack of merit.
Issues
The following issues are now to be resolved, to wit:
1. Did petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus directly to the Court?
2. Did respondent Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182?
3. Did DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violate petitioners’ constitutionally guaranteed rights?
Ruling
The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, being bereft of substance and merit, is dismissed.
Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the Court with their petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus without tendering therein any special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the
petition.
We emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue
the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum.4 An undue disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court will cause the dismissal of the
recourse. In Bañez, Jr. v. Concepcion,5 we explained why, to wit:
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be ignored
without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are also
well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential
tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy. This was
why the Court stressed in Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto:
x x x. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by
the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the
first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or
where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or
proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or
another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the
Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be
presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe. (Emphasis
supplied)
In People v. Cuaresma, the Court has also amplified the need for strict adherence to the policy of hierarchy of courts. There, noting "a
growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes
even their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land," the Court has cautioned
lawyers and litigants against taking a direct resort to the highest tribunal, viz:
x x x. This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts x x x, which may issue the writ, enforceable in any
part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals x x x,
although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue the extraordinary
writs was restricted to those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with
the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a
policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra— resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction" — was evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with applications for
the extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the Appellate Court corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with
it.1âwphi1
xxxx
The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration for the information and evidence of all concerned, that it will not only
continue to enforce the policy, but will require a more strict observance thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only judicial forum from which to seek and obtain effective
redress of their grievances. As a rule, the Court is a court of last resort, not a court of the first instance. Hence, every litigant who
brings the petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy on the
hierarchy of courts, the observance of which is explicitly defined and enjoined in Section 4 of Rule 65, Rules of Court, viz:
Section 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order
or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60)
day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board,
officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may
also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or
these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the
Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. 6
Secondly, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ direct resort to the Court was permissible, the petition must still be dismissed.
The writ of certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 7"The sole office of the writ of certiorari,"
according to Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:8
x x x is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be
grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a
positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or
board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, therefore, the following requisites must concur, namely: (a) it must be directed
against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no
appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 9 The burden of proof lies on petitioners to
demonstrate that the assailed order was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the requisites. To start with, they merely alleged that the Secretary of Justice had
acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction. Also, the petition did not show that the Secretary of Justice was an officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Instead, the Secretary of Justice would appear to be not exercising any judicial or quasi-judicial
functions because his questioned issuances were ostensibly intended to ensure his subordinates’ efficiency and economy in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation of all the cases involving the Legacy Group. The function involved was purely executive or
administrative.
The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its
preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function when it
reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case. Indeed, in Bautista v. Court of Appeals,10 the
Supreme Court has held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, stating:
x x x the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise
adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering
the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a
trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as
a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal. 11
There may be some decisions of the Court that have characterized the public prosecutor’s power to conduct a preliminary
investigation as quasi-judicial in nature. Still, this characterization is true only to the extent that the public prosecutor, like a quasi-
judicial body, is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law.
But the limited similarity between the public prosecutor and a quasi-judicial body quickly endsthere. For sure, a quasi-judicial body is
an organ of government other than a court of law or a legislative office that affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule-making; it performs adjudicatory functions, and its awards and adjudications determine the rights of the parties
coming before it; its decisions have the same effect as the judgments of a court of law. In contrast, that is not the effect whenever a
public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause in order to file a criminal information against a
person properly charged with the offense, or whenever the Secretary of Justice reviews the public prosecutor’s orders or resolutions.
Petitioners have self-styled their petition to be also for prohibition. However, we do not see how that can be. They have not shown in
their petition in what manner and at what point the Secretary of Justice, in handing out the assailed issuances, acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On the other hand, we already
indicated why the issuances were not infirmed by any defect of jurisdiction. Hence, the blatant omissions of the petition transgressed
Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action
or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (2a) Similarly, the petition could not be one for mandamus, which is a remedy available only when
"any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as
a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court." 12 The main objective of mandamus is to compel the performance of
a ministerial duty on the part of the respondent. Plainly enough, the writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise
of discretion or to compel a course of conduct,13 which, it quickly seems to us, was what petitioners would have the Secretary of
Justice do in their favor. Consequently, their petition has not indicated how and where the Secretary of Justice’s assailed issuances
excluded them from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which they were unquestionably entitled.
Thirdly, there is no question that DO No. 182 enjoyed a strong presumption of its validity. In ABAKADA Guro Party List v.
Purisima,14 the Court has extended the presumption of validity to legislative issuances as well as to rules and regulations issued by
administrative agencies, saying:
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce
have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as
if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court. 15
DO No. 182 was issued pursuant to Department Order No. 84 that the Secretary of Justice had promulgated to govern the performance
of the mandate of the DOJ to "administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof"16 as expressed
in Republic Act No. 10071 (Prosecution Service Act of 2010) and Section 3, Chapter I, Title III and Section 1, Chapter I, Title III of
Book IV of Executive Order 292 (Administrative Code of 1987).
To overcome this strong presumption of validity of the questioned issuances, it became incumbent upon petitioners to prove their
unconstitutionality and invalidity, either by showing that the Administrative Code of 1987 did not authorize the Secretary of Justice to
issue DO No. 182, or by demonstrating that DO No. 182 exceeded the bounds of the Administrative Code of 1987 and other pertinent
laws. They did not do so. They must further show that the performance of the DOJ’s functions under the Administrative Code of 1987
and other pertinent laws did not call for the impositions laid down by the assailed issuances. That was not true here, for DO No 182
did not deprive petitioners in any degree of their right to seek redress for the alleged wrong done against them by the Legacy Group.
Instead, the issuances were designed to assist petitioners and others like them expedite the prosecution, if warranted under the law, of
all those responsible for the wrong through the creation of the special panel of state prosecutors and prosecution attorneys in order to
conduct a nationwide and comprehensive preliminary investigation and prosecution of the cases. Thereby, the Secretary of Justice did
not act arbitrarily or oppressively against petitioners.
Fourthly, petitioners attack the exemption from the consolidation decreed in DO No. 182 of the cases filed or pending in the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City, claiming that the exemption traversed the constitutional guaranty in their favor of the
equal protection of law.17
The exemption is covered by the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, to wit:
It has come to the attention of the undersigned that cases for syndicated estafa were filed with your office against officers of the
Legacy Group of Companies. Considering the distance of the place of complainants therein to Manila, your Office
is hereby exempted from the directive previously issued by the undersigned requiring prosecution offices to forward the records of all
cases involving Legacy Group of Companies to the Task Force.
Anent the foregoing, you are hereby directed to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases involving the Legacy Group of
Companies filed in your office with dispatch and to file the corresponding informations if evidence warrants and to prosecute the same
in court.
Petitioners’ attack deserves no consideration. The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the universal application
of the laws to all persons or things without distinction; what it requires is simply equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classification.18 Hence, the Court has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the
classification stands as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end.19
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, the Secretary of Justice took into account
the relative distance between Cagayan de Oro, where many complainants against the Legacy Group resided, and Manila, where the
preliminary investigations would be conducted by the special panel. He also took into account that the cases had already been filed in
the City Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan de Oro at the time he issued DO No. 182. Given the considerable number of complainants
residing in Cagayan de Oro City, the Secretary of Justice was fully justified in excluding the cases commenced in Cagayan de Oro
from the ambit of DO No. 182. The classification taken into consideration by the Secretary of Justice was really valid. Resultantly,
petitioners could not inquire into the wisdom behind the exemption upon the ground that the non-application of the exemption to them
would cause them some inconvenience.
Fifthly, petitioners contend that DO No. 182 violated their right to the speedy disposition of cases guaranteed by the Constitution.
They posit that there would be considerable delay in the resolution of their cases that would definitely be "a flagrant transgression of
petitioners’ constitutional rights to speedy disposition of their cases." 20
We cannot favor their contention.

In The Ombudsman v. Jurado,21 the Court has clarified that although the Constitution guarantees the right to the speedy disposition of
cases, such speedy disposition is a flexible concept. To properly define that concept, the facts and circumstances surrounding each
case must be evaluated and taken into account. There occurs a violation of the right to a speedy disposition of a case only when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are sought
and secured, or when, without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried.22 It is cogent to mention that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not determinant of the concept.23
The consolidation of the cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. was ordered obviously to obtain expeditious justice for the parties with
the least cost and vexation to them. Inasmuch as the cases filed involved similar or related questions to be dealt with during the
preliminary investigation, the Secretary of Justice rightly found the consolidation of the cases to be the most feasible means of
promoting the efficient use of public resources and of having a comprehensive investigation of the cases.
On the other hand, we do not ignore the possibility that there would be more cases reaching the DOJ in addition to those already
brought by petitioners and other parties. Yet, any delays in petitioners’ cases occasioned by such other and subsequent cases should
not warrant the invalidation of DO No. 182. The Constitution prohibits only the delays that are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive,
and tend to render rights nugatory.24 In fine, we see neither undue delays, nor any violation of the right of petitioners to the speedy
disposition of their cases.
Sixthly, petitioners assert that the assailed issuances should cover only future cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al., not those already
being investigated. They maintain that DO No. 182 was issued in violation of the prohibition against passing laws with retroactive
effect.
Petitioners’ assertion is baseless.
As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is
procedural in nature. The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not create new
rights or take away vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation of already existing rights.25 A
statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
its passage. All procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive application is not violative of any right
of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right generally attaches to or arises from procedural laws.
Finally, petitioners have averred but failed to establish that DO No. 182 constituted obstruction of justice. This ground of the petition,
being unsubstantiated, was unfounded.
Nonetheless, it is not amiss to reiterate that the authority of the Secretary of Justice to assume jurisdiction over matters involving the
investigation of crimes and the prosecution of offenders is fully sanctioned by law. Towards that end, the Secretary of Justice
exercises control and supervision over all the regional, provincial, and city prosecutors of the country; has broad discretion in the
discharge of the DOJ’s functions; and administers the DOJ and its adjunct offices and agencies by promulgating rules and regulations
to carry out their objectives, policies and functions.
Consequently, unless and until the Secretary of Justice acts beyond the bounds of his authority, or arbitrarily, or whimsically, or
oppressively, any person or entity who may feel to be thereby aggrieved or adversely affected should have no right to call for the
invalidation or nullification of the rules and regulations issued by, as well as other actions taken by the Secretary of Justice.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the omnibus petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus for lack of merit.
Petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 205837 November 21, 2017
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, Petitioner vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This treats of the petition for certiorari1 filed by Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC), which seeks to annul and set
aside the Decision2 No. 2013-016 dated January 30, 2013 of the Commission on Audit (COA). In the assailed decision, the COA
denied PITC's request for the amendment of certain provisions of the 2010 Annual Audit Report (AAR) 3 of PITC, which relate to the
payment and accrual of liability for retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756.
The Facts
PITC is a government-owned and controlled corporation that was created under Presidential Decree No. 252 4issued by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on July 21, 1973. Thereafter, said law was repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1071, 5 which was issued on
January 25, 1977.
On December 28, 1981, President Marcos issued Executive Order No. 756, 6 which authorized the reorganization of PITC. Section 6
thereof states:
SECTION 6. Exemption from OCPC. - In recognition of the special nature of its operations, the Corporation shall continue to be
exempt from the application of the rules and regulations of the Office of the Compensation and Position Classification or any other
similar agencies that may be established hereafter as provided under Presidential Decree No. 1071. Likewise, any officer or employee
who retires, resigns, or is separated from the service shall be entitled to one month pay for every year of service computed at highest
salary received including all allowances, in addition to the other benefits provided by law, regardless of any provision of law or
regulations to the contrary; Provided, That the employee shall have served in the Corporation continuously for at least two
years: Provided, further,That in case of separated employees, the separation or dismissal is not due to conviction for any offense the
penalty for which includes forfeiture of benefits: and Provided, finally, That in the commutation of leave credits earned, the employees
who resigned, retired or is separated shall be entitled to the full payment therefor computed with all the allowance then being enjoined
at the time of resignation, retirement of separation regardless of any restriction or limitation provided for in other laws, rules or
regulations. (Emphasis supplied.)
On February 18, 1983, President Marcos issued Executive Order No. 877 that further authorized the reorganization of PITC. Section I
thereof reads:
1. Reorganization. - The Minister of Trade and Industry is hereby designated Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation with full
powers to restructure and reorganize the Corporation and to determine or fix its staffing pattern, compensation structure and related
organizational requirements. The Chairman shall complete such restructuring and reorganization within six (6) months from the
date of this Executive Order. All personnel of the Corporation who are not reappointed by the Chairman under the new reorganized
structure of the Corporation shall be deemed laid off; provided, that personnel so laid off shall be entitled to the benefits accruing
to separated employees under Executive Order No. 756 amending the Revised Charter of the Corporation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Apparently, PITC continued to grant the benefits provided under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 to its qualified employees even
after the lapse of the six-month period specified in Executive Order No. 877.
The legality of such policy was put in issue and directly resolved by this Court in the Decision dated June 22, 2010 in G.R. No.
183517, entitled Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit 7 (hereinafter, the Decision in G.R. No.
183517). In said case, the COA disapproved the claim of a retired PITC employee for the payment of retirement differentials based on
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. PITC's bid to oppugn the COA's disallowance via a petition for certiorari was dismissed by the
Court, ruling in this wise:
As an adjunct to the reorganization mandated under Executive Order No. 756, we find that [Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756]
cannot be interpreted independent of the purpose or intent of the law. Rather than the permanent retirement law for its employees that
[PITC] now characterizes it to be, we find that the provision of gratuities equivalent to "one month pay for every year of service
computed at highest salary received including all allowances" was clearly meant as an incentive for employees who retire, resign or
are separated from service during or as a consequence of the reorganization [PITC's] Board of Directors was tasked to implement. As
a temporary measure, it cannot be interpreted as an exception to the general prohibition against separate or supplementary insurance
and/or retirement or pension plans under Section 28, Subsection (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, amended. Pursuant to Section 10
of Republic Act No. 4968 which was approved on June 17, 1967, said latter provision was amended to read as follows:
Section 10. Subsection (b) of Section twenty-eight of the same Act, as amended is hereby further amended to read as follows:
(b) Hereafter no insurance or retirement plan for officers or employees shall be created by any employer. All supplementary
retirement or pension plans heretofore in force in any government office, agency, or instrumentality or corporation owned or
controlled by the government, are hereby declared inoperative or abolished: Provided, That the rights of those who are already
eligible to retire thereunder shall not be affected.
xxxx
The dearth of merit in [PITC's] position is rendered even more evident when it is borne in mind that Executive Order No. 756 was
subsequently repealed by Executive Order No. 877 which was issued on February 18, 1983 to hasten the reorganization of [PITC], in
light of changing circumstances and developments in the world market. x x x.
xxxx
Specifically mandated to be accomplished within the limited timeframe of six months from the issuance of the law, the reorganization
under Executive Order No. 877 clearly supplanted that which was provided ·under Executive Order No. 756. Nowhere is this more
evident than Section 4 of said latter law which provides that, "All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1071 and Executive Order No.
756, as well as of other laws, decrees, executive orders or issuances, or parts thereof that are in conflict with this Executive Order, are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly." In utilizing the computation of the benefits provided under Section 6 of Executive Order
No. 756 for employees considered laid off for not being reappointed under [PITC's] new reorganized structure, Executive Order No.
877 was correctly interpreted by [the COA] to evince an intent not to extend said gratuity beyond the six-month period within which
the reorganization is to be accomplished.
xxxx
It doesn't help [PITC's] cause any that Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756, in relation to Section 3 of Executive Order No. 877, was
further amended by Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation and Classification Act of 1989. Mandated under
Article IX B, Section 5 of the Constitution, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6758 specifically extends its coverage to government
owned and controlled corporations like [PITC]. With this Court's ruling in Philippine International Trading Corporation v.
Commission on Audit to the effect that [PITC] is included in the coverage of Republic Act No. 6758, it is evidently no longer
exempted from OCPC rules and regulations, in keeping with said law's intent to do away with multiple allowances and other incentive
packages as well as the resultant differences in compensation among government personnel.8 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)
PITC moved for a reconsideration of the above ruling, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated August 10, 2010.1âwphi1 The
Decision in G.R. No. 183517 became final on September 27, 2010.
Pending the resolution of the above motion, PITC still allocated part of its Corporate Operating Budget for retirement benefits
pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. The amount allocated therefor was ₱46.36 million.
On September 30, 2010, PITC resident COA Auditor Elizabeth Liberato informed PITC that the accrual of the retirement benefits
under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 was bereft of legal basis, in accordance with the Decision in G.R. No. 183517. PITC was
advised to stop the payment of such benefits or reverse the amount already accrued. PITC, on the other hand, argued that it could
continue to allocate part of its budget for the aforesaid benefits while its motion for reconsideration was still pending. Should the
Court deny its motion, PITC believed that the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 should be applied prospectively.
PITC filed a Motion to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration (MR) with attached Second MR of the Decision in G.R. No.
183517, but the second MR was denied in the Court's Resolution dated November 23, 2010. It was only then that PITC allegedly
stopped the monthly accrual of the retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756.
On November 14, 2011, COA Director IV Jose R. Rocha, Jr., Cluster C, Corporate Government Sector, transmitted to PITC a copy of
the 2010 AAR. Paragraphs 1 and 1.7 of the Comments and Observations portion state:
1. Estimated liability for employees' benefits account balance of 1!52.70 million was misstated by P46.36 million because
management erroneously accrued retirement benefits provided under Section 6 of EO 756. Payments' of such benefits to
employees retiring after the 1983 reorganization were, likewise, without legal basis.
xxxx
1.7 We did not agree with the view of Management on the matter and we reiterated our recommendation that management stop the
payment and the accrual of liability for retirement benefits computed in accordance with Section 6 of EO 756 and derecognize or
reverse the amount already accrued, closing it to the Retained earnings account. 9(Underscoring omitted.)
In a letter10 dated June 22, 2012 to the COA Commission Proper, PITC sought the amendment of the 2010 AAR. PITC averred that
the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 must be applied prospectively, such that all qualified PITC employees should be allowed to claim
their vested rights to the benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 upon retirement or resignation, and the computation
thereof must be from the time of their employment until September 27, 2010 when the Decision became final.
The COA Commission Proper treated the above letter as an appeal from the decision of the COA Cluster Director approving the 2010
AAR. In the assailed Decision No. 2013-016 dated January 30, 2013, the COA decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the request is DENIED and the assailed observation in the 2010 AAR of the PITC STANDS. 11
PITC, thus, filed the present petition for certiorari.
The Arguments of PITC
According to PITC, the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 should be applied prospectively from the time it became final on September 27,
2010. To apply said decision retroactively would allegedly unjustly divest qualified PITC employees of their vested rights to receive
the benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. The six-month period in Executive Order No. 877 was only for the purpose
of implementing reorganization, but not for the purpose of amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756.
PITC claims that the COA itself deemed Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 as permanent in nature since the latter never issued any
notice of suspension, notice of disallowance or audit observation memorandum against the grant of the retirement benefits in said
provision during the years that PITC granted them to its retiring employees.
Prior to the finality of the Decision in G.R. No. 183517, the interpretation that Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 was permanent in
nature was allegedly an existing operative fact upon which PITC and its employees relied in good faith. As such, PITC argues that its
employees' entitlement to the benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 after two years of service in the company and the
computation and allocation of said benefits in PITC's books should only end on September 27, 2010.
PITC prayed for the annulment of the assailed COA Decision No. 2013-016 and the amendment of the 2010 AAR to reflect the fact
that PITC's estimated liability for employees' benefits account balance of ₱52.70 million was not misstated.
The Arguments of the COA
In praying for the dismissal of the petition, the COA asserts that when the Court renders a decision that merely interprets a particular
provision of law - one that neither establishes a new doctrine nor supplants an old doctrine - the interpretation takes effect and
becomes part of the law as of the date when the law was originally passed. The COA points out that the Decision in G.R. No. 183517
did not overrule an old doctrine nor adopt a new one. The Decision simply interpreted Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 and
clarified that the provision was effective in a temporary and limited application when it was correlated with other laws.
The COA also posits that no vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions that are against the law or which infringe upon
the rights of others. In the Decision in G .R. No. 183 51 7, the Court already declared the illegality of the disbursements and payments
of the retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 that were granted beyond the period of the reorganization of
PITC. The same were held to be contrary to Section 28(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended by Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 4968. Thus, the granting of the benefits, no matter how long practiced, cannot give rise to any vested right.
The Ruling of the Court
At the outset, it did not escape our notice that PITC did not first move for a reconsideration of the assailed COA decision before filing
the instant petition. Moreover, this is not the first time that PITC made such an omission. In ·another petition for certiorari filed by
PITC against COA, which was docketed as G.R. No. 152688, the Court noted that PITC took a similar procedural shortcut. However,
said technical issue was resolved as follows:
We first address the failure of the PITC to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision.
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through a
motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue
raised is purely oflaw, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency. As a fourth exception, it was also held that the
filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a condition sine qua non, when the questions
raised are the same as those that have already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court.
In the case at bar, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with not only because the issue presented is purely of law, but also
because the question raised has already been extensively discussed in the decisions of the Director, Corporate Audit Office II and the
COA.12 (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.)
In the present case, the same situation is availing in that the issue presented in this case is purely of law, i.e.,whether the Decision in
G.R. No. 183 517 should be applied prospectively upon its finality, and the same had already been squarely addressed by the COA in
its assailed ruling.
We proceed now to the merits of the case.
Article 8 of the Civil Code declares that "[j]udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of
the legal system of the Philippines." While decisions of the Court are not laws pursuant to the doctrine of separation of powers, they
evidence the laws' meaning, breadth, and scope and, therefore, have the same binding force as the laws themselves. 13
Article 4 of the Civil Code, on the other hand, enunciates the rule on non-retroactivity of laws, in that ''(l)aws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided."
In respectively arguing for and against the prospective application of the Decision in G.R. No. 183517, both PITC and the COA
invoke Co v. Court of Appeals14 that cited, among others, the following ruling in People v. Jabinal15 :
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why
under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system x x x.' The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law was
originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed
intends to effectuate. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
PITC argues, however, that the COA erred in relying on the second sentence in the above excerption from Jabinal,which PITC
dismissed as a "simple statement" that was "just an obiter dictum or an incidental remark that this Honorable Court made in passing."16
PITC's misinformed argument deserves scant consideration.
It was in the 1956 case of Senarillos v. Hermosisima17 that the above pronouncement first came to light. In said case, Senarillos was
the Chief of Police of Sibonga, Cebu and he served as such until his suspension by the municipal mayor on January 2, 1952. Senarillos
was investigated and tried by a "police committee" composed of three councilors of the municipal council. The committee then
rendered an adverse decision on April 15, 1952 that was approved by the municipal council. Upon Senarillos's petition, the Court of
First Instance of Cebu ordered his reinstatement. The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, ruling that the committee had no
jurisdiction to investigate Senarillos as the investigation of police officers under Republic Act No. 55718 must be conducted by the
municipal council itself as laid down in Festejo v. Mayor of Nabua19 that was promulgated on December 22, 1954.
The Court declared in Senarillos:
That the decision of the Municipal Council of Sibonga was issued before the decision in Festejo v. Mayor of Nabua was rendered,
would be, at the most, proof of good faith on the part of the police committee, but can not sustain the validity of their action. It is
elementary that the interpretation placed by this Court upon Republic Act [No.] 557 constitutes part of the law as of the date it was
originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law
carried into effect.20 (Emphasis supplied.)
The above ruling had since become the established doctrine on the matter of the effectivity of judicial interpretations of
statutes.1âwphi1
In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 21 we expounded on the import of our ruling in Senarillos in relation to the rule of
nonretroactivity of laws. Thus:
Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.["] Correlatively,
Article 8 of the same Code declares that "(j)udicial decisions applying the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system
of the Philippines."
Jurisprudence, in our system of government, cannot be considered as an independent source of law; it cannot create law. While it is
true that judicial decisions which apply or interpret the Constitution or the laws are part of the legal system of the Philippines, still
they are not laws. Judicial decisions, though not laws, are nonetheless evidence of what the laws mean, and it is for this reason that
they are part of the legal system of the Philippines. Judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute
itself.
Interpreting the aforequoted correlated provisions of the Civil Code and in light of the above disquisition, this Court emphatically
declared in Co vs. Court of Appeals, et al. that the principle of prospectivity applies not only to original amendatory statutes and
administrative rulings and circulars, but also, and properly so, to judicial decisions. x x x.
xxxx
The reasoning behind Senarillos vs. Hermosisima that judicial interpretation of a statute constitutes part of the law as of the date it was
originally passed, since the Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law
carried into effect, is all too familiar. Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law but consists merely of a
construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, x x x.
It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, subject
only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is
a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old
doctrine and acted in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there is
no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present case, the Court disagrees with PITC's position that the Decision in G.R. No. 183517
should be applied prospectively.1âwphi1
As the COA correctly argued, the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 neither reversed an old doctrine nor adopted a new one. The Court
merely construed therein the meaning and application of Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 by taking into consideration the
rationale behind the provision, its interplay with pre-existing retirement laws, and the subsequent enactments and statutes that
eventually repealed the same. Prior to the Decision in G.R. No. 183517, there was no other ruling from this Court that explained the
nature of the retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. Thus, the Court's interpretation of the aforesaid
provision embodied in the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 retroacts to the date when Executive Order No. 756 was enacted.
PITC' s position cannot be legally supported by our decision in Co.22 In Co, the Court gave prospective effect to its ruling in Que v.
People23 - that even checks to guarantee the performance of an obligation were covered by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 - as the accused
in Co relied on an official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such checks were not within the ambit of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. In
this instance, there is no previous administrative interpretation issued by a competent body that PITC could claim to have relied on in
good faith.
There is likewise no merit in PITC's contention that the retroactive application of the Decision in G.R. No. 183 517 would divest
qualified PITC employees of their vested rights to receive the retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756.
The fact that PITC continued to grant the retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 from the time of the
issuance of said executive order until the Court's Decision in G.R. No. 183517 does not mean that said benefits ripened into a vested
right. As held in Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Government Service Insurance System (KMG) v. Commission on Audit24 :
The Court has previously held that practice, no matter how long continued, cannot give rise to any vested right if it is contrary to law.
The erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers does not estop the Government
from making a subsequent correction of such errors. Where the law expressly limits the grant of certain benefits to a specified class of
persons, such limitation must be enforced even if it prejudices certain parties due to a previous mistake committed by public officials
in granting such benefit. (Citations omitted.)
In this case, the Court already ruled in G.R. No. 183517 that the grant of the retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order
No. 756 was temporary and limited in nature and the same should have been restricted to the six-month period of the mandated
reorganization of PITC.
All told, there is no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the COA for refusing to amend
the questioned provisions of the 2010 AAR.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

Prospective & Retroactive Effect of Laws, Art. 4 NCC - Lex Prospicit, Non Respicit

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PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS

G.R. No. 193993 November 8, 2017

VIVENNE K. TAN, Petitioner vs.VINCENT "BINGBONG" CRISOLOGO, Respondent

The Ruling of the Me TC

The Ruling of the RTC

The Assailed CA Decision

In coming up with its conclusion, the CA gave the following reasons:

A natural-born Filipino citizen who

(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;

(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;

G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p

(a) Regular support and educational expenses;

(b) Allowance to use his surname;

(c) Payment of maternal bills;

(d) Payment of baptismal expenses and attendance therein;

(f) Attendance to school problems of plaintiffs;

(h) Introducing them as such children to family friends.

Petitioners denied all these allegations.

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered —

xxx xxx xxx

8. Cost against the defendants.3

The law cited reads:

xxx xxx xxx

Padilla, Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002

Orders of the Trial Court

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Hence, this appeal.7

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First and Second Issues: Period to File Action for Recognition

Bustos v. Lucero13 distinguished substantive from procedural law in these words:

Not Limited to Natural Children

Third Issue: Failure to Implead the CA

Melo, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 181556 December 14, 2009

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The petition lacks merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012

MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES, Complainant, vs. LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO, Respondent.

We rule in the negative.

We are not persuaded.

G.R. No. 188056 January 8, 2013

DO No. 182 reads:2

For information and guidance.

The following issues are now to be resolved, to wit:

We cannot favor their contention.

Petitioners’ assertion is baseless.

Petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.

G.R. No. 205837 November 21, 2017

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, Petitioner vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

PITC, thus, filed the present petition for certiorari.

The Arguments of PITC

The Arguments of the COA

The Ruling of the Court

We proceed now to the merits of the case.

PITC's misinformed argument deserves scant consideration.

The Court declared in Senarillos:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.