1
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES merit. Petitioners have no personality to sue and their
vs. AQUINO petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of
(G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986) the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It
------------------------ belongs to the realm of politics where only the people
(There is no "Full-Text" of this case. This is a Minute of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have
Resolution made by the SC.) made the judgment; they have accepted the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is
Minute Resolutions in effective control of the entire country so that it is not
merely a de facto government but is in fact and law a
EN BANC de jure government. Moreover, the community of
nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
[G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986] government. All the eleven members of this Court, as
reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES law of the Republic under her government.
AND/OR OLIVER A. LOZANO VS. PRESIDENT
CORAZON C. AQUINO, ET AL. In view of the foregoing, the petitions are hereby
SIRS/MESDAMES: dismissed.
Very truly yours,
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution
of this Court MAY 22, 1986. (Sgd.) GLORIA C. PARAS
Clerk of Court
In G.R. No. 73748, Lawyers League for a Better
Philippines vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.; * The Court was then composed of Teehankee, C.J.
G.R. No. 73972, People's Crusade for Supremacy of and Abad Santos., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin,
the Constitution vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al., and G.R. Gutierrez, Jr., Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo, JJ.---------
No. 73990, Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. ---------------------------------
Aquino, et al., the legitimacy of the government of DIGEST
President Aquino is questioned. It is claimed that her
government is illegal because it was not established FACTS:
pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino
issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and
As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already Vice President Laurel were taking power.
voted to dismiss the petitions for the reasons to be On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued
stated below. On April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano as providing the basis of the Aquino government
counsel for the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and assumption of power by stating that the "new
73972 withdrew the petitions and manifested that they government was installed through a direct exercise of
would pursue the question by extra-judicial methods. the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the
The withdrawal is functus oficio. New Armed Forces of the Philippines."
The three petitions obviously are not impressed with ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is
legitimate.
HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics
where only the people are the judge.
The Court further held that:
The people have accepted the Aquino government
which is in effective control of the entire country;
It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and
law a de jure government; and
The community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the new government.
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR BETTER PHILIPPINES
VS. AQUINO
G.R. No. 73748 73972 May 22, 1986
Lawyers’ League for Better Philippines and/or Oliver A.
Lozano, petitioner
vs.
President Corazon Aquino, et al, defendant
Facts:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino
issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and
Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued
providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by stating that the “new
government was installed through a direct exercise of
the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the
New Armed Forces of the Philippines.”
2
Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is
illegal because it was not established pursuant to the
1973 Constitution.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to
sue.
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is
legitimate.
Discussions:
In order that the citizen’s actions may be allowed a
party must show that he personally has suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favourable action.
The community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the provisional It was the people that
made the judgement and accepted the new
government. Thus, the Supreme Court held its
legitimacy.
Rulings:
Petitioners have no personality to sue and their
petitions state no cause of action. The holding that
petitioners did not have standing followed from the
finding that they did not have a cause of action.
The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics
where only the people are the judge. And the people
have made the judgment; they have accepted the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is
in effective control of the entire country so that it is not
merely a de facto government but is in fact and law a
de jure government. Moreover, the community of
nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government.
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES
AND/OR OLIVER A. LOZANO VS. PRESIDENT
CORAZON C. AQUINO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986
FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino
issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and
Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25,
1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the
basis of the Aquino government assumption of power
by stating that the "new government was installed
through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino
people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of
the Philippines."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is
legitimate.
HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics
where only the people are the judge. The Court further
held that the people have accepted the Aquino
government which is in effective control of the entire
country. It is not merely a de facto government but in
fact and law a de jure government. The community of
nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new
government.
FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1
on February 25, 1986 announcing that she and Vice
President Laurel were taking power. On March 25,
1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the
basis of the Aquino government assumption of power
by stating that the "new government was installed
through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino
people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of
the Philippines."
Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is
illegal because it was not established pursuant to the
1973 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is
legitimate.
HELD:
Yes.
The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people are the judge.
The Supreme Court further held that:
 The people have accepted the Aquino
government which is in effective control of
the entire country;
 It is not merely a de facto government but
in fact and law a de jure government; and
 The community of nations has recognized
the legitimacy of the new government.
3
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997]
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987
Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos,[1] is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing,
respondents maintain that the provision is not self-
executing but requires an implementing legislation for
its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51%
shares form part of the national economy and
patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the
Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8
December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding
30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual
strategic partner, is to provide management expertise
and/or an international marketing/reservation system,
and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel.[2] In a close bidding
held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to
buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58
per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with
ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the
same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42
more than the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared
by respondent GSIS state -
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS
WITH GSIS/MHC -
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the
conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset
to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose
the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS
will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other
Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute
with the GSIS/MHC the Management Contract,
International Marketing/Reservation System Contract
or other type of contract specified by the Highest
Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila Hotel x x x x
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock
Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS x x x x
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING
BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER -
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning
Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions
are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with
GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995 (reset to
November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP
(Committee on Privatization)/ OGCC (Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained.[3]
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the
winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of
the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to
respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched
the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong
Berhad.[4] In a subsequent letter dated 10 October
1995 petitioner sent a managers check issued by
Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos
(P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of
the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad x x x
x[5] which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that
respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may
be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated
with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on
prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the
Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from perfecting and consummating the
sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was
accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to
it by the First Division. The case was then set for oral
arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici
curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second
par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that
the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino
nation and has practically become a historical
4
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine
heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier
generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and
sacredness of independence and its power and
capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino
people. To all intents and purposes, it has become
a part of the national patrimony.[6]Petitioner also
argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries
with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which
is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned
and controlled corporation, the hotel business of
respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is
unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus,
any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of
the MHC is clearly covered by the term national
economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987
Constitution, applies.[7]
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila
Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business
also unquestionably part of the national economy
petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the
bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules
mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may
offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly
submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders
are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share.[8]
Respondents except. They maintain that: First,
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution
is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is
not a self-executing provision and requires
implementing legislation(s) x x x x Thus, for the said
provision to operate, there must be existing laws to lay
down conditions under which business may be done. [9]
Second, granting that this provision is self-
executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the
term national patrimony which only refers to lands of
the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and
all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive
marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs
of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to
respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who
have slept in the hotel and the events that have
transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these
alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of
the nation. What is more, the mandate of the
Constitution is addressed to the State, not to
respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its
own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a
State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of
the national patrimony, the constitutional provision
invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is
only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation,
not the hotel building nor the land upon which the
building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the
MHC cannot be considered part of the national
patrimony.Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of
the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner
should have questioned it right from the beginning and
not after it had lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V.,
subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides that if
for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded
the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids
provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to
match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is
misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of
submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it
only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the
submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature
since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded
the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the
exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had
not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on
grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent
GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious,
whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion
it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for
mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal
right to what it demands and respondents do not have
an imperative duty to perform the act required of them
by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of
fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious,
absolute and unalterable except by the authority from
which it emanates. It has been defined as the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation.[10] It
prescribes the permanent framework of a system of
government, assigns to the different departments their
respective powers and duties, and establishes certain
fixed principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a
supreme law to which all other laws must conform and
in accordance with which all private rights must be
determined and all public authority
administered.[11] Under the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the
constitution that law or contract whether promulgated
by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered
into by private persons for private purposes is null and
void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and
supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract.
5
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely
declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions
command the legislature to enact laws and carry out
the purposes of the framers who merely establish an
outline of government providing for the different
departments of the governmental machinery and
securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of
citizens.[12] A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing.Thus a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of
the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by
the constitution itself, so that they can be determined
by an examination and construction of its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action.[13]
As against constitutions of the past, modern
constitutions have been generally drafted upon a
different principle and have often become in effect
extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly
upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory
enactments, and the function of constitutional
conventions has evolved into one more like that of a
legislative body.Hence, unless it is expressly provided
that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing.If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify
the mandate of the fundamental law.[14] This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has
always been, that -
x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be
considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing x x x x Unless the contrary is clearly
intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would
give the legislature discretion to determine when, or
whether, they shall be effective. These provisions
would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking
body, which could make them entirely meaningless by
simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute.[15]
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art.
XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-
executing, as they quote from discussions on the floor
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission -
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am
asking this question as the Chairman of
the Committee on Style. If the wording
of PREFERENCE is given to
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, can it be
understood as a preference to qualified
Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not
qualified. So, why do we not make it
clear? To qualified Filipinos as against
aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of
Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove
the word QUALIFIED?
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS as against
whom? As against aliens or over aliens
? intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think
that is understood. We use the word
QUALIFIED because the existing laws
or prospective laws will always lay down
conditions under which business may
be done. For example, qualifications on
capital, qualifications on the setting up
of other financial structures, et
cetera (underscoring supplied by
respondents).
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.[16]
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII
is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that
it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of
style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded
from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional
provision so long as the contemplated statute squares
with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the
legislature without impairing the self-executing nature
of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the
legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution,
further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a
practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a
convenient remedy for the protection of the rights
secured or the determination thereof, or place
reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the
right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement
and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a
self-executing constitutional provision does not render
such a provision ineffective in the absence of such
legislation. The omission from a constitution of any
express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or
liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not
executing provision of the constitution does not
necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject,
but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right
and make it more available.[17] Subsequent legislation
6
however does not necessarily mean that the subject
constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully
enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-
executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is
implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs
of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-
executing.[18] The argument is flawed. If the first and
third paragraphs are not self-executing because
Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by
Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still
needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority
over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction,
as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same
logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing
as it does not by its language require any legislation in
order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the
grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony. A constitutional
provision may be self-executing in one part and non-
self-executing in another.[19]
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that
certain constitutional provisions are merely statements
of principles and policies, which are basically not self-
executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral
incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable
rights - are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine
Amusements and Gaming Corporation[20] speaks of
constitutional provisions on personal dignity, [21] the
sanctity of family life,[22] the vital role of the youth in
nation-building,[23] the promotion of social
justice,[24] and the values of education.[25]Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance[26] refers to constitutional
provisions on social justice and human rights[27] and on
education.[28] Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato[29] cites
provisions on the promotion of general welfare,[30] the
sanctity of family life,[31] the vital role of the youth in
nation-building[32] and the promotion of total human
liberation and development.[33] A reading of these
provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not
judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely
guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the
provisions manifest that they are only principles upon
which legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII
of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs
no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for
its enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per
se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution
mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a
right exists in certain specified circumstances an action
may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance, and from which all legislations must take
their bearings. Where there is a right there is a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission[34] explains -
The patrimony of the Nation that should
be conserved and developed refers not only
to our rich natural resources but also to the
cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to
our intelligence in arts, sciences and
letters. Therefore, we should develop not
only our lands, forests, mines and other
natural resources but also the mental ability
or faculty of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the
term patrimony pertains to heritage.[35] When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not
only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the term natural
resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living
testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in
1912, it immediately evolved to be truly
Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since
then become the venue of various significant events
which have shaped Philippine history. It was called
the Cultural Center of the 1930s. It was the site of the
festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine
Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House
of the Philippine Government it plays host to dignitaries
and official visitors who are accorded the traditional
Philippine hospitality.[36]
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the
book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a
City.[37] During World War II the hotel was converted by
the Japanese Military Administration into a military
headquarters. When the American forces returned to
recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the
Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2)
places for their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950s and
1960s, the hotel became the center of political
activities, playing host to almost every political
convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a
renovation and reaped numerous international
recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent
and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a
failed coup d etat where an aspirant for vice-president
was proclaimed President of the Philippine Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has
bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves
7
and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is MR. MONSOD. Madam President,
impressed with public interest; its own historicity apparently the proponent is agreeable,
associated with our struggle for sovereignty, but we have to raise a controlled entities or entities fully-
independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel question. Suppose it is a corporation
has become part of our national economy and that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not
patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC give it preference?
comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter
for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment
would refer to an individual
that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have
actual control and management of the hotel. In this Filipino. What about a corporation
wholly owned by Filipino citizens?
instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated
from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam
stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents President.
claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not
applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we
building nor the land upon which the building stands.[38]
would be limiting it if we say that the
The argument is pure sophistry. The preference should only be 100-percent
term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also Filipino.
includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned
MR. DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning
by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of
clear because QUALIFIED FILIPINOS
the 1986 Constitutional Commission -
may refer only to individuals and not to
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is juridical personalities or entities.
recognized.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an President.[39]
amendment to the Nolledo
xxxx
amendment. And the amendment would
consist in substituting the words MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS with the request that the amendment be read
following: CITIZENS OF THE again.
PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS
OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will
CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK read: IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS,
IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS
CITIZENS. COVERING THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE
xxxx STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE
TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. And the
word Filipinos here, as intended by the
proponents, will include not only
individual Filipinos but also Filipino-
controlled by Filipinos.[40]
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was
explained thus -
MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to
request Commissioner Nolledo to
please restate his amendment so that I
can ask a question.
MR. NOLLEDO. IN THE GRANT OF
RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS.
MR. FOZ. In connection with that
amendment, if a foreign enterprise is
qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also
qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still
be given a preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in
some aspects than the Filipino
enterprise, will the Filipino still be
preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is yes.
MR. FOZ. Thank you.[41]
Expounding further on the Filipino First
Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President.
Instead of MUST, it will be SHALL - THE
STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE
8
TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This
embodies the so-called Filipino First
policy.That means that Filipinos should
be given preference in the grant of
concessions, privileges and rights
covering the national patrimony.[42]
The exchange of views in the sessions of the
Constitutional Commission regarding the subject
provision was still further clarified by Commissioner
Nolledo[43] -
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the
Pro-Filipino bias in all economic concerns. It is better
known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy x x x x This
provision was never found in previous Constitutions x
xxx
The term qualified Filipinos simply means that
preference shall be given to those citizens who can
make a viable contribution to the common good,
because of credible competence and efficiency. It
certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and
preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or
organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since
such an indiscriminate preference would be
counterproductive and inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and
concessions, when a choice has to be made between
a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter
shall be chosen over the former.
Lastly, the word qualified is also
determinable. Petitioner was so considered by
respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified
bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in
accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole
inference here is that petitioner has been found to be
possessed of proven management expertise in the
hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in
another hotel company, or it has an overall
management and marketing proficiency to successfully
operate the Manila Hotel.[44]
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate
of the Constitution by arguing that the subject provision
is not self-executory and requires implementing
legislation is quite disturbing.The attempt to violate a
clear constitutional provision - by the government itself
- is only too distressing. To adopt such a line of
reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness
to the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of
the Constitution which evidently need implementing
legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the
source of a judicial remedy.We cannot simply afford the
government a defense that arises out of the failure to
enact further enabling, implementing or guiding
legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G.
Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt -
The executive department has a constitutional duty to
implement laws, including the Constitution, even
before Congress acts - provided that there are
discoverable legal standards for executive
action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by
its own understanding of the constitutional command
and of applicable laws. The responsibility for reading
and understanding the Constitution and the laws is
not the sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the
executive would have to ask Congress, or perhaps
the Court, for an interpretation every time the
executive is confronted by a constitutional
command. That is not how constitutional government
operates.[45]
Respondents further argue that the constitutional
provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent
GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct
personality. This argument again is at best specious. It
is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could
only be carried out with the prior approval of the State
acting through respondent Committee on
Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G.
Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the
assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a state
action. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of
persons distinct from the government are
considered state action covered by the Constitution (1)
when the activity it engages in is a public function; (2)
when the government is so significantly involved with
the private actor as to make the government
responsible for his action; and, (3) when the
government has approved or authorized the action. It
is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling
51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the
second and third categories of state action. Without
doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into
by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State
and therefore subject to the constitutional command.[46]
When the Constitution addresses the State it
refers not only to the people but also to the government
as elements of the State. After all, government is
composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative,
executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional
mandate directed to the State is correspondingly
directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is
undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional
injunction is addressed among others to the Executive
Department and respondent GSIS, a government
instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm
offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning
bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the
highest bidder shall only be declared the winning
bidder after it has negotiated and executed the
necessary contracts, and secured the requisite
approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of
the Constitution bestows preference
9
on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest
bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be
declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents
are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they
under obligation to enter into one with the highest
bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are
mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987
Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to
be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it
should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued
by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified
for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic
principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts
must conform with the fundamental law of the
land.Those which violate the Constitution lose their
reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides
that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to
other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids
provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to
match the highest bid in terms of price per
share.[47] Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself
is reason enough not to award the block of shares
immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its
submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact,
we cannot conceive of a strongerreason than the
constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits
the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant
of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding
the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino
will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign
entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign
firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if
we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First
Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while
this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated
in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is
omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it
would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension
that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But
the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are
understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These
are given factors which investors must consider when
venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any
person therefore desiring to do business in the
Philippines or with any of its agencies or
instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and
obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the
forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is
now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong
Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the
beginning that a foreigner could participate in the
bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and
foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But
foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino
qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the
highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case
before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the
inception of the bidding because of the constitutional
mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered
by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or
personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept
its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid
of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by
respondent GSIS of petitioners matching bid did the
latter have a cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the
constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has
been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel
to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to
match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that
government be treated as any other ordinary market
player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of
judgment, regardless of the consequences to the
Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the
Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather
remedy the indiscretion while there is still an
opportunity to do so than let the government develop
the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down
the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price
tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding
rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to
award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to
execute the necessary agreements and documents to
effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding
guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as
well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as provided
in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid
of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine
nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not
merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation
but primarily to be enforced; so must it be
enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the
Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable
circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the
Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth
emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to
impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx
of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court
encourages and welcomes more business
opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference
for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by
the Constitution. The position of the Court on this
10
matter could have not been more appropriately
articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa -
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not
its function to substitute its judgment for that of the
legislature or the executive about the wisdom and
feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the
Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for
decisions perceived as obstacles to economic
progress and development x x x x in connection with a
temporary injunction issued by the Courts First
Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a
Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements
were published in a major daily to the effect that that
injunction again demonstrates that the Philippine legal
system can be a major obstacle to doing business
here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it
is no business of the Court to intervene in contracts of
the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of
whether they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden
duty to make sure that they do not violate the
Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or
implemented with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will
never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds
of unfair and ill-informed criticism.[48]
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of
enhancing its business viability and preventing further
losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should
not take precedence over non-material values. A
commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should
not be pursued at the expense of national pride and
dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and
nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will
always defer to the Constitution in the proper
governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing
so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself
beyond judicial review when the Constitution is
involved.[49]
Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the
Philippines being a democratic and republican state,
with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and
from whom all government authority emanates. In
nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people
must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher
purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional
provision must adhere to such basic
concept. Protection of foreign investments, while
laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the
demands of nationalism.[50]
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the
MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the
highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We
are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a
commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic
that has hosted many of the most important events in
the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are
talking about a hotel where heads of states would
prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their
desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function
to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila
Hotel has played and continues to play a significant
role as an authentic repository of twentieth century
Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has
become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul - a place
with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that
has played a part in the shaping of a country.[51]
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from
the determined efforts of respondents to sell the
historical landmark - this Grand Old Dame of hotels in
Asia - to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance
of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien
hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in
whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a
nations soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so
we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally
drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the
Filipinos if Manila Hotel - and all that it stands for - is
sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will
vanish if the nations cultural heritage is entrusted to a
foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will
be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is
safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-
meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning
of the Filipino First Policyprovision of the Philippine
Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of
the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the
elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect
and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION
and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from
selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT
the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per
share and thereafter to execute the necessary
agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue
the necessary clearances and to do such other acts
and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan,
Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ, concur.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), and Melo,
J., joins J. Puno in his dissent.
Padilla, J., see concurring opinion.
Vitug, J., see separate concurring opinion
Mendoza, J., see concurring opinion
Torres, J., with separate opinion
Puno, J., see dissent.
11
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS
G.R. NO. 122156. February 3, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL,
respondents.
Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder,
or the eventual “strategic partner,” will provide
management expertise or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of the
Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares
at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares
at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhard
as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
matched the bid price and sent a manager’s check as
bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender
of the matching bid and that the sale may be
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a
petition before the Court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of
the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision.
2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the
national patrimony.
3. Whether or not the submission of matching bid is
premature
4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondents in
refusing the matching bid of the petitioner.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
1. It is a self-executing provision.
1. Since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it
is deemed written in every statute and
contract. A provision which lays down a
general principle, such as those found in Art.
II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-
executing. But a provision which is complete
in itself and becomes operative without the
aid of supplementary or enabling legislation,
or that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
2. A constitutional provision is self-executing if
the nature and extent of the right conferred
and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action. Unless it
is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are
treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law.
3. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to
put it in operation. It is per sejudicially
enforceable. When our Constitution
12
mandates that in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just
that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.
And when our Constitution declares that a
right exists in certain specified circumstances
an action may be maintained to enforce such
right notwithstanding the absence of any
legislation on the subject; consequently, if
there is no statute especially enacted to
enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency
and puissance, and from which all legislations
must take their bearings. Where there is a
right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. The Court agree.
1. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term
patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it
refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have
very well used the term natural resources, but
also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
2. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts,
sciences and letters. In the present case,
Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living
testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first
opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it
has since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped
Philippine history.
3. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our
national economy and patrimony. For sure,
51% of the equity of the MHC comes within
the purview of the constitutional shelter for it
comprises the majority and controlling stock,
so that anyone who acquires or owns the
51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance,
51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated
from the hotel and the land on which the hotel
edifice stands.
3. It is not premature.
1. In the instant case, where a foreign firm
submits the highest bid in a public bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of
a Filipino, there is no question that the
Filipino will have to be allowed to match the
bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino
matches the bid of a foreign firm the award
should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the
Court is to give life and meaning to the
Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be
expressly stated nor contemplated in the
bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is
omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To
ignore it would be to sanction a perilous
skirting of the basic law.
2. The Court does not discount the
apprehension that this policy may discourage
foreign investors. But the Constitution and
laws of the Philippines are understood to be
always open to public scrutiny. These are
given factors which investors must consider
when venturing into business in a foreign
jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to
do business in the Philippines or with any of
its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed
to know his rights and obligations under the
Constitution and the laws of the forum.
4. There was grave abuse of discretion.
1. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to
foreigners when there is a Filipino group
willing to match the bid of the foreign group is
to insist that government be treated as any
other ordinary market player, and bound by
its mistakes or gross errors of judgement,
regardless of the consequences to the
Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the
13
Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the Court
would rather remedy the indiscretion while
there is still an opportunity to do so than let
the government develop the habit of
forgetting that the Constitution lays down the
basic conditions and parameters for its
actions.
2. Since petitioner has already matched the bid
price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant
to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left
with no alternative but to award to petitioner
the block of shares of MHC and to execute
the necessary agreements and documents to
effect the sale in accordance not only with the
bidding guidelines and procedures but with
the Constitution as well. The refusal of
respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as
provided in the bidding rules after the latter
has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm
clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION
and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from
selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT
the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE
HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51%
of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the
sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do
such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for
the purpose.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS GR 122156, 3
February 1997
WHETHER OR NOT THE COSNTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS ARE SELF-EXECUTING
FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated
8 December 1986, decided to sell through public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding
shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding
held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders
participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the
MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton
as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number
of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the
bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong
Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and
the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila
Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per
share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS
dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a
manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter,
but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October
1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has
disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that
the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by
GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila
Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and
mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the
Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are
self-executing.
RULING:
A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
14
protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of
the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed
by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its
terms, and there is no language indicating that the
subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-
executing constitutional provisions, the legislature
may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of
powers directly granted by the constitution, further the
operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to
be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient
remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards
around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that
legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a
penalty for the violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision does not render such a
provision ineffective in the absence of such
legislation. The omission from a constitution of any
express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or
liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not
intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-
executing provision of the constitution does not
necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject,
but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right
and make it more available. Subsequent legislation
however does not necessarily mean that the subject
constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully
enforceable. As against constitutions of the past,
modern constitutions have been generally drafted
upon a different principle and have often become in
effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate
directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of
statutory enactments, and the function of
constitutional conventions has evolved into one more
like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is
expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary
to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated
as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation.
15
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner v GSIS,
respondent (DIGEST)
G.R. No. 122156; February 3, 1997
TOPIC: Non-Self Executing v Self Executing
Constitutional Provisions
FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel
(MHC).
In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid
for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share,
or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the
winning bidder and the execution of the contracts, the
MPHC matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS.
MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a
subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On
17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS
has disregarded the tender of the matching bid,
MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and
mandamus.
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and
has practically become a historical monument which
reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.
Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art.
XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing
provision and requires implementing legislation(s).
ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly
Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
RULING:
Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing provision.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such
as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is
usually not self-executing. But a provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the
aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that
which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing.
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of
the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead
of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of
the fundamental law.
In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation.
16
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE
ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented by their parents ANTONIO and
RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA,
minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and
ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and
PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and
represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA
FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor,
represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES
FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all
surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their
parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN
ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his
parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE
MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her
parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO,
MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor,
represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE
CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and
ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T.
NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents
GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA,
MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA
and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ,
minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO
and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN,
MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all
surnamed KING, minors, represented by their
parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID,
FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all
surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their
parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA,
JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA,
minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO
and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and
MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors,
represented by their parents MARIO and LINA
CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and
IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and
represented by their parents RICARDO and
MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN
JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT,
minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX
and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO,
ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed
BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents
FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE
PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN,
JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati,
Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right
of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which
the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin
concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and
"inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on
the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause
of action to "prevent the misappropriation or
impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life
support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-
77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro
Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National
Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein,
now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly
represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-
stock and non-profit corporation organized for the
purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action
geared for the protection of our environment and
natural resources. The original defendant was the
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by
the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala,
was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the
petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs
"are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed
for themselves and others who are equally concerned
about the preservation of said resource but are "so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all
before the Court." The minors further asseverate that
they "represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed
for that judgment be rendered:
17
. . . ordering defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license
agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license
agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just
and equitable under the premises."5
The complaint starts off with the general averments
that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a
land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is
endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in
which varied, rare and unique species of flora and
fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a
genetic, biological and chemical pool which is
irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous
Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and
flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence
reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and
healthful ecology, the country's land area should be
utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent
(54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and
other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this
balance as a consequence of deforestation have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as
(a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the
water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well
as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the
water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt
water, incontrovertible examples of which may be
found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of
Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the
consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural
productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated
at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum
— approximately the size of the entire island of
Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of
the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna,
(e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural
communities, including the disappearance of the
Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers
and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals
and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in
marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of
drought as is presently experienced by the entire
country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds
which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the
floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising
from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of
forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan
of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated
for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses,
irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k)
the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon
dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and
catastrophic climatic changes such as the
phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as
the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and
detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable
demonstration that the same may be submitted as a
matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they
expressed their intention to present expert witnesses
as well as documentary, photographic and film
evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the
foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the
Philippines had some sixteen (16)
million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the
country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987
reveal that there remained no more
than 1.2 million hectares of said
rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of
the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a
mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-
growth rainforests are left, barely
2.8% of the entire land mass of the
Philippine archipelago and about 3.0
million hectares of immature and
uneconomical secondary growth
forests.
11. Public records reveal that the
defendant's, predecessors have
granted timber license agreements
('TLA's') to various corporations to cut
the aggregate area of 3.89 million
hectares for commercial logging
purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the
corresponding areas covered is
hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of
deforestation, i.e. about 200,000
hectares per annum or 25 hectares
18
per hour — nighttime, Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays included — the
Philippines will be bereft of forest
resources after the end of this
ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous
consequences, serious injury and
irreparable damage of this continued
trend of deforestation to the plaintiff
minor's generation and to generations
yet unborn are evident and
incontrovertible. As a matter of fact,
the environmental damages
enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof
are already being felt, experienced
and suffered by the generation of
plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by
defendant of TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forest stands
will work great damage and
irreparable injury to plaintiffs —
especially plaintiff minors and their
successors — who may never see,
use, benefit from and enjoy this rare
and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment
of the natural resource property he
holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff
minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and
constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity
as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all
administrative remedies with the
defendant's office. On March 2, 1990,
plaintiffs served upon defendant a
final demand to cancel all logging
permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated
March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as
Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and
refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to
the continuing serious damage and
extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal
by defendant to cancel the TLA's is
an act violative of the rights of
plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors
who may be left with a country that is
desertified (sic), bare, barren and
devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna
and indigenous cultures which the
Philippines had been abundantly
blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the
aforementioned TLA's is manifestly
contrary to the public policy
enunciated in the Philippine
Environmental Policy which, in
pertinent part, states that it is the
policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and
improve conditions under which man
and nature can thrive in productive
and enjoyable harmony with each
other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and
other requirements of present and
future generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is
conductive to a life of dignity and
well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's
continued refusal to cancel the
aforementioned TLA's is contradictory
to the Constitutional policy of the
State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution
of opportunities, income and wealth"
and "make full and efficient use of
natural resources (sic)." (Section 1,
Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine
wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's
cultural heritage and resources (sic)"
(Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of
the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature."
(Section 16, Article II, id.)
19
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary
to the highest law of humankind —
the natural law — and violative of
plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in law other
than the instant action to arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the
country's vital life support systems
and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary
Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs
have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue
raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990
Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that
(1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable
cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the
action presents a justiciable question as it involves the
defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order
granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the
said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that
the complaint states no cause of action against him
and that it raises a political question — sustained, the
respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the
relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law
of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the
dismissal order on the ground that the respondent
Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the
action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not
only represent their children, but have also joined the
latter in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to
the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and
unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound
environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the
1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of
generational genocide in Criminal Law and the
concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation
and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law.
Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's
correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to
safeguard the people's right to a healthful
environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent
Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover
more areas for logging than what is available involves
a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the
Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners
maintain that the same does not apply in this case
because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit
that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the
said clause, it is well settled that they may still be
revoked by the State when the public interest so
requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the
petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific
legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for
which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing
in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations
concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly
entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in
its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations,
according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of
action. They then reiterate the theory that the question
of whether logging should be permitted in the country
is a political question which should be properly
addressed to the executive or legislative branches of
Government. They therefore assert that the
petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court,
but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill
that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs,
respondents submit that the same cannot be done by
the State without due process of law. Once issued, a
TLA remains effective for a certain period of time —
usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity,
the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless
the holder has been found, after due notice and
hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement
or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners'
proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately
cancelled without the requisite hearing would be
violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some
procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case
No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and
20
the present respondents did not take issue with this
matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said
civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of
the complaint is of common and general interest not
just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines.
Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it,
becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to
bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare
that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and
representative enough to ensure the full protection of
all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for
the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3
of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the
said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter
being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find
no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue
in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be
based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means
the created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and
harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10Needless to say, every generation has
a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors'
assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been
addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the
petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question
and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the
issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties,
We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule
against the respondent Judge's challenged order for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent
portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect
evaluation of the Complaint, the Court
cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe
that plaintiffs have but the noblest of
all intentions, it (sic) fell short of
alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a
specific legal right they are seeking to
enforce and protect, or a specific
legal wrong they are seeking to
prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2,
RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes
that the Complaint is replete with
vague assumptions and vague
conclusions based on unverified data.
In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause
of action in its Complaint against the
herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes
that the matter before it, being
impressed with political color and
involving a matter of public policy,
may not be taken cognizance of by
this Court without doing violence to
the sacred principle of "Separation of
Powers" of the three (3) co-equal
branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the
impression that it cannot, no matter
how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant
the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing
timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber
license agreements. For to do
otherwise would amount to
"impairment of contracts" abhored
(sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that
the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness
a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong
committed, and that the complaint is replete with
vague assumptions and conclusions based on
unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies
these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental
legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides:
21
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony
of nature.
This right unites with the right to
health which is provided for in the
preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and
promote the right to health of the
people and instill health
consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
to be found under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does
not follow that it is less important than any of the civil
and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a
right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate
all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact,
these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of
the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to
health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and
advance the second, the day would not be too far
when all else would be lost not only for the present
generation, but also for those to come — generations
which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. During the debates on this right in one
of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, the following exchange transpired
between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and
Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the
section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section
mandate the State to
provide sanctions
against all forms of
pollution — air, water
and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic)
environment necessarily carries with it the correlative
duty of not impairing the same and, therefore,
sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the
judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or
environmental balance would be irreversiby
disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced
and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well
as the other related provisions of the Constitution
concerning the conservation, development and
utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then
President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June
1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly
mandates that the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources "shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the
country's environment and natural resources,
specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral,
resources, including those in reservation and
watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as
well as the licensing and regulation of all natural
resources as may be provided for by law in order to
ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived
therefrom for the welfare of the present and future
generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the
following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is
hereby declared the policy of the
State to ensure the sustainable use,
development, management, renewal,
and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas
and other natural resources, including
the protection and enhancement of
the quality of the environment, and
equitable access of the different
segments of the population to the
development and the use of the
country's natural resources, not only
for the present generation but for
future generations as well. It is also
the policy of the state to recognize
and apply a true value system
including social and environmental
22
cost implications relative to their
utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title
XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1)
The State shall ensure, for the benefit
of the Filipino people, the full
exploration and development as well
as the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, consistent with the
necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and
enhancing the quality of the
environment and the objective of
making the exploration, development
and utilization of such natural
resources equitably accessible to the
different segments of the present as
well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize
and apply a true value system that
takes into account social and
environmental cost implications
relative to the utilization, development
and conservation of our natural
resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of
maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the
other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the
DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the
fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher
authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The
Department of Environment and
Natural Resources shall be primarily
responsible for the implementation of
the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher
authority, be in charge of carrying out
the State's constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and
conservation of the country's natural
resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of
1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the
bases for policy formulation, and have defined the
powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes
already paid special attention to the "environmental
right" of the present and future generations. On 6
June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment
Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing
policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and
improve conditions under which man and nature can
thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each
other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other
requirements of present and future generations of
Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of
dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the
"responsibilities of each generation as trustee and
guardian of the environment for succeeding
generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand,
gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they
represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as
clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by
virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192
and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and
advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has
the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect
the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners
maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they
claim was done with grave abuse of discretion,
violated their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires
that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in
violation of the legal right or rights of
the other; and its essential elements
are legal right of the plaintiff,
correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal
right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to
dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails
to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to
the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the
facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter
should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity
23
of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth
thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only
issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such
alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court
laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise
the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a
motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence
thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest
a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and
deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants
or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens,
there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands
in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint,
We find the statements under the introductory
affirmative allegations, as well as the specific
averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF
ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima
facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis
thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly,
the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that
insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned,
there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the
grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be
said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or
determination by the executive or legislative branches
of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is
principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-
vis policies already formulated and expressed in
legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that
the political question doctrine is no longer, the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial
power or the impenetrable shield that protects
executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry
or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine
Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority
represents the traditional concept of
judicial power, involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred as law. The second part of
the authority represents a broadening
of judicial power to enable the courts
of justice to review what was before
forbidden territory, to wit, the
discretion of the political departments
of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in
the judiciary, and particularly the
Supreme Court, the power to rule
upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the
legislature and to declare their acts
invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. The catch,
of course, is the meaning of "grave
abuse of discretion," which is a very
elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition
of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now
speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the
jurisdictional objection becomes even
less tenable and decisive. The reason
is that, even if we were to assume
that the issue presented before us
was political in nature, we would still
not be precluded from revolving it
under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political
question. Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in
dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of
contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a
quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the
impression that it cannot, no matter
how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant
the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing
timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber
license agreements. For to do
otherwise would amount to
24
"impairment of contracts" abhored
(sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are
amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent
Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in
his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he
had done so, he would have acted with utmost
infidelity to the Government by providing undue and
unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber
license holders because he would have forever bound
the Government to strictly respect the said licenses
according to their terms and conditions regardless of
changes in policy and the demands of public interest
and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed
out by the petitioners, into every timber license must
be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D.
No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national
interest so requires, the President
may amend, modify, replace or
rescind any contract, concession,
permit, licenses or any other form of
privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be
revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is
not a contract, property or a property right
protested by the due process clause of the
Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of
Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument
by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. A timber license
is not a contract within the purview of
the due process clause; it is only a
license or privilege, which can be
validly withdrawn whenever dictated
by public interest or public welfare as
in this case.
A license is merely a permit or
privilege to do what otherwise would
be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state,
or municipal, granting it and the
person to whom it is granted; neither
is it property or a property right, nor
does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this
Court held that the granting of license
does not create irrevocable rights,
neither is it property or property rights
(People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael,
Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and
license agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the
end that public welfare is promoted.
And it can hardly be gainsaid that
they merely evidence a privilege
granted by the State to qualified
entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the
particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be
validly amended, modified, replaced
or rescinded by the Chief Executive
when national interests so require.
Thus, they are not deemed contracts
within the purview of the due process
of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and
20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of
Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October
27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-
impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the
obligation of contracts shall be
passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that
the same are contracts, the instant case does not
involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring
the cancellation or modification of existing timber
licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as
yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a
law has actually been passed mandating
cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still
be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment
clause. This is because by its very nature and
purpose, such as law could have only been passed in
the exercise of the police power of the state for the
purpose of advancing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health
and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster
Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our
system of government, is not meant
to be absolute. The same is
understood to be subject to
25
reasonable legislative regulation
aimed at the promotion of public
health, moral, safety and welfare. In
other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of
obligations of contract is limited by
the exercise of the police power of
the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, moral and general
welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia
vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life
Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the
use of property and the making of
contracts are normally matters of
private and not of public concern. The
general rule is that both shall be free
of governmental interference. But
neither property rights nor contract
rights are absolute; for government
cannot exist if the citizen may at will
use his property to the detriment of
his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally
fundamental with the private right is
that of the public to regulate it in the
common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the
police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did,
how the non-impairment clause could apply with
respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent
Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save
in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet
existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect
to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter
of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the
instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July
1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set
aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their
complaint to implead as defendants the holders or
grantees of the questioned timber license
agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado,
Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ.,
concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother
in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my
mind, is one of the most important cases decided by
this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles
laid down in this decision are likely to influence
profoundly the direction and course of the protection
and management of the environment, which of course
embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in
the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore
sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court
appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have
the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing
and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-
12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim
that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I
understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest
which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the
suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of
"class" here involved — membership in this "class"
appears to embrace everyone living in the country
whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be
expected to benefit from the course of action
petitioners seek to require public respondents to take,
is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court
may be seen therefore to be recognizing
a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of
environmental protection, as against both the public
administrative agency directly concerned and the
private persons or entities operating in the field or
sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries'
right of action may be found under any and all
circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the
first instance, on the part of the governmental agency
concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the
decision and presumably is left for future
determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has
alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental
legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that
"the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is
"fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in
character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it
26
cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in fact very
difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in
scope and generalized in character than a right to "a
balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular
claims which can be subsumed under this rubic
appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and
control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil,
chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into
rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs,
factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping
of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets
and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after
strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-
burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and
other living sea resources through the use of
dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals;
contamination of ground water resources; loss of
certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The
other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3,
Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section
1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code;
and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear
to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract
as the constitutional statements of basic policy in
Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and
healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The
Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other
hand, a compendious collection of more "specific
environment management policies" and "environment
quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause,
Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of
topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management
and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural
calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of
surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection.
Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified
the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the
Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a
specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to
enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code
identifies with notable care the particular government
agency charged with the formulation and
implementation of guidelines and programs dealing
with each of the headings and sub-headings
mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code
does not, in other words, appear to contemplate
action on the part of private persons who are
beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of
action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in
effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of
Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and
judicially enforceable even in their present form. The
implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in
future cases; those implications are too large and far-
reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before
the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a
right cast in language of a significantly lower order of
generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution —
that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to
act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so
that the trial court can validly render judgment
granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my
mind, the Court should be understood as simply
saying that such a more specific legal right or
rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering
the general policy principles found in the Constitution
and the existence of the Philippine Environment
Code, and that the trial court should have given
petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate,
instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to
dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is
an essential component of a cause of action be a
specific, operable legal right, rather than a
constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2)
reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to
have been violated or disregarded is given
specification in operational terms, defendants may
well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and
effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration —
where a specific violation of law or applicable
regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be
27
expected to fall back on the expanded conception of
judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of
Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as
"the right to a balanced and healthy ecology"
and "the right to health" are combined with
remedial standards as broad ranging as "a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it
is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into
the uncharted ocean of social and economic
policy making. At least in respect of the vast
area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to
special technical competence and experience
and professional qualification. Where no
specific, operable norms and standards are
shown to exist, then the policy making
departments — the legislative and executive
departments — must be given a real and
effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate those norms and standards, and
to implement them before the courts should
intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that
the timber companies, whose concession agreements
or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents
should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings
below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement
to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of
breach by the timber companies of one or more of the
specific terms and conditions of their concession
agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume),
what will those companies litigate about? The answer
I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the
existence of the specific legal right petitioners should
allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual
nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and
the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public
respondent administrative agency. They may also
controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the
circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the
protection of the environment, including the forest
cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the
country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision
issued today should, however, be subjected to closer
examination.
# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother
in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my
mind, is one of the most important cases decided by
this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles
laid down in this decision are likely to influence
profoundly the direction and course of the protection
and management of the environment, which of course
embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in
the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore
sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court
appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have
the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing
and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-
12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim
that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I
understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest
which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the
suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of
"class" here involved — membership in this "class"
appears to embrace everyone living in the country
whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be
expected to benefit from the course of action
petitioners seek to require public respondents to take,
is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court
may be seen therefore to be recognizing
a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of
environmental protection, as against both the public
administrative agency directly concerned and the
private persons or entities operating in the field or
sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries'
right of action may be found under any and all
circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the
first instance, on the part of the governmental agency
concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the
decision and presumably is left for future
determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has
alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental
legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
28
ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that
"the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is
"fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in
character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it
cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in fact very
difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in
scope and generalized in character than a right to "a
balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular
claims which can be subsumed under this rubic
appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and
control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil,
chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into
rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs,
factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping
of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets
and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after
strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-
burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and
other living sea resources through the use of
dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals;
contamination of ground water resources; loss of
certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The
other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3,
Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section
1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code;
and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear
to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract
as the constitutional statements of basic policy in
Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and
healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The
Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other
hand, a compendious collection of more "specific
environment management policies" and "environment
quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause,
Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of
topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management
and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural
calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of
surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection.
Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified
the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the
Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a
specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to
enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code
identifies with notable care the particular government
agency charged with the formulation and
implementation of guidelines and programs dealing
with each of the headings and sub-headings
mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code
does not, in other words, appear to contemplate
action on the part of private persons who are
beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of
action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in
effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of
Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and
judicially enforceable even in their present form. The
implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in
future cases; those implications are too large and far-
reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before
the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a
right cast in language of a significantly lower order of
generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution —
that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to
act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so
that the trial court can validly render judgment
granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my
mind, the Court should be understood as simply
saying that such a more specific legal right or
rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering
the general policy principles found in the Constitution
and the existence of the Philippine Environment
Code, and that the trial court should have given
petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate,
instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to
dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is
an essential component of a cause of action be a
specific, operable legal right, rather than a
constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2)
reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to
have been violated or disregarded is given
specification in operational terms, defendants may
29
well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and
effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration —
where a specific violation of law or applicable
regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be
expected to fall back on the expanded conception of
judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of
Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as
"the right to a balanced and healthy ecology"
and "the right to health" are combined with
remedial standards as broad ranging as "a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it
is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into
the uncharted ocean of social and economic
policy making. At least in respect of the vast
area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to
special technical competence and experience
and professional qualification. Where no
specific, operable norms and standards are
shown to exist, then the policy making
departments — the legislative and executive
departments — must be given a real and
effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate those norms and standards, and
to implement them before the courts should
intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that
the timber companies, whose concession agreements
or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents
should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings
below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement
to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of
breach by the timber companies of one or more of the
specific terms and conditions of their concession
agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume),
what will those companies litigate about? The answer
I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the
existence of the specific legal right petitioners should
allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual
nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and
the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public
respondent administrative agency. They may also
controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the
circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the
protection of the environment, including the forest
cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the
country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision
issued today should, however, be subjected to closer
examination.
Oposa vs Factoran
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law:
Intergenerational Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993
FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan
Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation
and generations yet unborn, and represented by their
parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of
DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered
ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives
and other persons acting in his behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing
Agreements (TLA) in the country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;
and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and
equitable under the premises.” They alleged that they
have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the
State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore,
they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing
TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests
constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of
the natural resources property he holds in trust for the
benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the following grounds:
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against
him;
2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a
political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of the government.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in
filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests?”
30
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations to come. The
Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves,
for others of their generation, and for the succeeding
generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of succeeding generations is based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and
harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the
country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development, and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as
well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility
to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for
the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of
their right to a sound environment constitutes at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations
to come.
Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083,
July 30, 1993)
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly
represented and joined by their parents. The first
complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the
Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial
Court, National capital Judicial Region against
defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR).
Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit,
use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure
that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further
asseverate that they represent their generation as well
as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued
deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance
of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering
the respondent, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing
Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to
cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action
against him and that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss,
further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would
result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited
by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil
action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and
set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the
respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion
in dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs
result in the impairment of contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in
their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided
by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint
focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated
in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right
carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the
environment and implies, among many other things,
the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly
mandates the DENR to be the primary government
agency responsible for the governing and supervising
the exploration, utilization, development and
conservation of the country's natural resources. The
policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-
stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code
of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of
1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the
bases for policy formation, and have defined the
powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the
petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced
and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to
protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has
the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect
or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which
they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion,
violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology.
Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no
further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint,
the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima
facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
31

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the

constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction
vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to
rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the
Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is

an instrument by which the state regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end
that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause thus, the
non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be
validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or
public welfare as in this case. The granting of license
does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property
or property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-

impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the
exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest
of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In
short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the
police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is

hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET
ASIDE.
32

G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO,
TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS,Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------ x
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.MONSOD, RENE B.
AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T.
TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, and CARLOS P.
MEDINA, JR., Intervenors.
by Chairperson Eleanor de Guzman, LEAGUE OF
FILIPINO STUDENTS represented by Chair Vencer
Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the League
of Concerned Professionals and Businessmen,
DR. DARBY SANTIAGO of the Solidarity of Health
Against Charter Change, DR. REGINALD
PAMUGAS of Health Action for Human
Rights,Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO
AGUJA, and ANA THERESA HONTIVEROS-
BARAQUEL,Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Intervenor.
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL
RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL
WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR.
VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION,
INC., Intervenor.

x------------------------------------------------------ x x ------------------------------------------------------- x
x ------------------------------------------------------- x

ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, Intervenor. TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE

x--------------------------------------------------------x
BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr.
Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA
represented by its Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo
Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented by its
Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD
represented by its Secretary General Dr. Gene
Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM
represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas, MIGRANTE
represented by its Chairperson Concepcion
Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA represented by its
Secretary General Emerenciana de Jesus,
GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY represented by Sec.
Gen. Cristina Palabay, ANAKBAYAN represented
PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS
C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M.
BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR.,
FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT
INCIONG, Intervenors.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA.
TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR,
and RANDALL TABAYOYONG, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU
CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE
CHAPTERS, Intervenors.
x --------------------------------------------------------x
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL, JR. and SENATORS SERGIO R.
OSMENA III, JAMBY MADRIGAL, JINGGOY
ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO
LACSON, Intervenors.
33
x -----------------------------------------------------x
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG
MASANG PILIPINO, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN,
JR., and RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by
Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and
Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA,
FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A.
BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T.
FERRER, and John Doe and Peter
Doe,, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution
dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission on
Elections ("COMELEC") denying due course to an
initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.
Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO
namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado THE OTHER?
("Lambino Group"), with other groups1 and individuals,
commenced gathering signatures for an initiative On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an
petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory
the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their Provisions) of their initiative.7
initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and
Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative The Ruling of the COMELEC
and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the
Resolution denying due course to the Lambino
support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing
twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with
initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The
each legislative district represented by at least COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v.
three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The
Commission on Elections8 declaring RA 6735
Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election
inadequate to implement the initiative clause on
registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million
proposals to amend the Constitution.9
individuals.
In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the
issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to
1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article
set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August
VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of
2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due
Article VII (Executive Department)5 and by adding course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group
Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions."6 These
contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse
proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-
of discretion in denying due course to their petition
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
since Santiago is not a binding precedent.
form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that
Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims
after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and
should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite their petition deserves cognizance as an expression
for the voters' ratification:
of the "will of the sovereign people."
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray
ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 that the Court require respondent COMELEC
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM Commissioners to show cause why they should not
OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT
be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's verification
BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A
of signatures and for "entertaining" the Lambino
UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM,
Group's petition despite the permanent injunction
AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE
34
in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's
petition as an opposition-in-intervention.
In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the
Solicitor General joined causes with the petitioners,
urging the Court to grant the petition despite
the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed
that the Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing
rules "as temporary devises to implement the system
of initiative."
Various groups and individuals sought intervention,
filing pleadings supporting or opposing the Lambino
Group's petition. The supporting
intervenors10 uniformly hold the view that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing
intervenors11 hold the contrary view and maintain
that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing
intervenors also challenged (1) the Lambino Group's
standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the
signature gathering and verification process; (3) the
Lambino Group's compliance with the minimum
requirement for the percentage of voters supporting
an initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII of
the 1987 Constitution;12 (4) the nature of the proposed
changes as revisions and not mere amendments as
provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's compliance
with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735
limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral
arguments on 26 September 2006. After receiving the
parties' memoranda, the Court considered the case
submitted for resolution.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition
complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution
through a people's initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling
in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions" to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying due course to the Lambino
Group's petition.
The Ruling of the Court
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with
the basic requirements of the Constitution for
conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no
need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition
warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino
Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution. For following the
Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of
discretion is attributable to the Commision on
Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the
governing constitutional provision that allows a
people's initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters
therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
vividly explain the meaning of an amendment
"directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition," thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics.
Let us say some voters want to propose a
constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the
proposed constitutional amendment ready
to be shown to the people when they are
asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably
assumed, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor
mean? The draft is ready and shown to
them before they sign. Now, who prepares
the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves,
Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they
sign there is already a draft shown to
them and they are asked whether or not they
35
want to propose this constitutional
amendment.
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino
can prepare that proposal and pass it
around for signature.13 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that
the "draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the
people "before" they sign such proposal. The framers
plainly stated that "before they sign there is already
a draft shown to them." The framers also
"envisioned" that the people should sign on the
proposal itself because the proponents must
"prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition" is
that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by
the people. This means two essential elements must
be present. First, the people must author and thus
sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative
can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon
a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a
petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full
text of the proposed amendments is first shown to
the people who express their assent by signing such
complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an
amendment is "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition" only if the
people sign on a petition that contains the full text
of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be
either written on the face of the petition, or attached to
it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of
such attachment. This is an assurance that every one
of the several millions of signatories to the petition
had seen the full text of the proposed amendments
before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible,
given the time constraint, to prove that every one of
the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the
proposed amendments before signing.
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed14 the
concept of people's initiative from the United States
where various State constitutions incorporate an
initiative clause. In almost all States15 which allow
initiative petitions, the unbending requirement is
that the people must first see the full text of the
proposed amendments before they sign to signify
their assent, and that the people must sign on an
initiative petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments.16
The rationale for this requirement has been
repeatedly explained in several decisions of various
courts. Thus, in Capezzuto v. State Ballot
Commission, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit Court of
Appeals, declared:
[A] signature requirement would be
meaningless if the person supplying the
signature has not first seen what it is that
he or she is signing. Further, and more
importantly, loose interpretation of the
subscription requirement can pose a
significant potential for fraud. A person
permitted to describe orally the contents of an
initiative petition to a potential signer, without
the signer having actually examined the
petition, could easily mislead the signer by,
for example, omitting, downplaying, or even
flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition
that might not be to the signer's liking. This
danger seems particularly acute when, in
this case, the person giving the
description is the drafter of the petition,
who obviously has a vested interest in
seeing that it gets the requisite signatures
to qualify for the ballot.17 (Boldfacing and
underscoring supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,18 the Court of Appeals
of Oregon explained:
The purposes of "full text" provisions that
apply to amendments by initiative commonly
are described in similar terms. x x x (The
purpose of the full text requirement is to
provide sufficient information so that
registered voters can intelligently evaluate
whether to sign the initiative petition."); x x
x (publication of full text of amended
constitutional provision required because it is
"essential for the elector to have x x x the
section which is proposed to be added to or
subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently,
he must have this knowledge. Otherwise in
many instances he would be required to vote
in the dark.") (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the
time of signing of the nature and effect of that which
is proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and
misleading" which renders the initiative void.19
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not
expressly state that the petition must set forth the full
text of the proposed amendments. However, the
deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly
show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant
American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In
36
particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission explicitly reveal that the framers
intended that the people must first see the full text
of the proposed amendments before they sign,
and that the people must sign on a petition
containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of
Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum
Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires
that the people must sign the "petition x x x as
signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures
from the people. The proponents secure the
signatures in their private capacity and not as public
officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties
who can impartially explain the advantages and
disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the
people. The proponents present favorably their
proposal to the people and do not present the
arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or
their supporters, often pay those who gather the
signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents
observed the constitutional requirements in gathering
the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of
proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures - that the
petition contained, or incorporated by attachment,
the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present
petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the
people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino
Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature
sheet20 after the oral arguments of 26 September
2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11
October 2006. The signature sheet with this Court
during the oral arguments was the signature sheet
attached21 to the opposition in intervention filed on 7
September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino- 3
Quadra. 4
5
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's
6
opposition and the signature sheet attached to the
Lambino Group's Memorandum are the same. We 7
reproduce below the signature sheet in full: 8
9
Province: City/Municipality: No. of 10
Legislative District: Barangay: _________________ _________________
Verified Barangay Official Witness
(Print Name and Sign) (Print Name and Sign)
Signatures:
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of
PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE text of the Lambino Group's proposed changes in
AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE the signature sheet. Neither does the signature
1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF sheet state that the text of the proposed changes
GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino
BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL- admitted this during the oral arguments before this
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN Court on 26 September 2006.
ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY,
SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT;
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether
AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-
SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?" Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system
of government. The signature sheet does not show
to the people the draft of the proposed changes
I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the before they are asked to sign the signature sheet.
1987 Constitution. My signature herein which shall Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition" that
form part of the petition for initiative to amend the the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they
Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof. formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution.
Precinct Name Address Birthdate Signature Verification
Number Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that
Last Name, First MM/DD/YY
during the signature-gathering from February to
Name, M.I. August 2006, the Lambino Group circulated, together
1 with the signature sheets, printed copies of the
2 Lambino Group's draft petition which they later filed
on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC. When asked
37
if his group also circulated the draft of their amended
petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the COMELEC,
Atty. Lambino initially replied that they circulated both.
However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer and
stated that what his group circulated was the draft of
the 30 August 2006 amended petition, not the draft of
the 25 August 2006 petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe
that they prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006
amended petition almost seven months earlier in
February 2006 when they started gathering
signatures. Petitioner Erico B. Aumentado's
"Verification/Certification" of the 25 August 2006
petition, as well as of the 30 August 2006 amended
petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as follows:
I have caused the preparation of the
foregoing [Amended] Petition in my personal
capacity as a registered voter, for and on
behalf of the Union of Local Authorities of
the Philippines, as shown by ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached,
and as representative of the mass of
signatories hereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present petition.
However, the "Official Website of the Union of Local
Authorities of the Philippines"22 has posted the full text
of Resolution No. 2006-02, which provides:
RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE
PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S
CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON
CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A
MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987
CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of
Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to
adopt a common stand on the approach to
support the proposals of the People's
Consultative Commission on Charter Change;
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified
support to the agenda of Her Excellency
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for
constitutional reforms as embodied in the
ULAP Joint Declaration for Constitutional
Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP
and the majority coalition of the House of
Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in
October 2005;
WHEREAS, the People's Consultative
Commission on Charter Change created by
Her Excellency to recommend amendments
to the 1987 Constitution has submitted its
final report sometime in December 2005;
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the
current political developments in Congress
which militates against the use of the
expeditious form of amending the 1987
Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its
institutional members and the failure of
Congress to amend the Constitution as a
constituent assembly, ULAP has unanimously
agreed to pursue the constitutional reform
agenda through People's Initiative and
Referendum without prejudice to other
pragmatic means to pursue the same;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS
HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE
MEMBER-LEAGUES OF THE UNION OF
LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE
PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S
CONSULATATIVE (SIC) COMMISSION ON
CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A
MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987
CONSTITUTION;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive
Board special meeting held on 14 January
2006 at the Century Park Hotel,
Manila.23 (Underscoring supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not
authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the 25
August 2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended
petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution
No. 2006-02 "support(s) the porposals (sic) of the
Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter
Change through people's initiative and referendum as
a mode of amending the 1987 Constitution." The
proposals of the Consultative
Commission24 are vastly different from the proposed
changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006
petition or 30 August 2006 amended petition filed with
the COMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the
Consultative Commission affect all provisions of the
existing Constitution, from the Preamble to the
Transitory Provisions. The proposed revisions have
profound impact on the Judiciary and the National
Patrimony provisions of the existing Constitution,
provisions that the Lambino Group's proposed
changes do not touch. The Lambino Group's
proposed changes purport to affect only Articles VI
38
and VII of the existing Constitution, including the
introduction of new Transitory Provisions.
The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14
January 2006 or more than six months before the
filing of the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August
2006 amended petition with the COMELEC. However,
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not establish that
ULAP or the Lambino Group caused the circulation of
the draft petition, together with the signature sheets,
six months before the filing with the COMELEC. On
the contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts
grave doubt on the Lambino Group's claim that
they circulated the draft petition together with the
signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02
does not refer at all to the draft petition or to the
Lambino Group's proposed changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended
petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino Group
declared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners
belatedly realized that the proposed
amendments alleged in the Petition, more
specifically, paragraph 3 of Section 4 and
paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Transitory
Provisions were inaccurately stated and failed
to correctly reflect their proposed
amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were
amending the petition because the amended petition
was what they had shown to the people during the
February to August 2006 signature-gathering. Instead,
the Lambino Group alleged that the petition of 25
August 2006 "inaccurately stated and failed to
correctly reflect their proposed amendments."
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August
2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition
with the COMELEC that they circulated printed copies
of the draft petition together with the signature sheets.
Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in their
present petition before this Court that they circulated
printed copies of the draft petition together with the
signature sheets. The signature sheets do not also
contain any indication that the draft petition is
attached to, or circulated with, the signature sheets.
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the
Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino Group
first claimed that they circulated the "petition for
initiative filed with the COMELEC," thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect
that "(w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a
signer who did not read the measure
attached to a referendum petition cannot
question his signature on the ground that
he did not understand the nature of the
act." [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan,
224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the
registered voters who signed the
signature sheets circulated together with
the petition for initiative filed with the
COMELEC below, are presumed to have
understood the proposition contained in the
petition. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to
the people "the petition for initiative filed with the
COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the
intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu
City Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty.
Quadra had pointed out that the signature sheets did
not contain the text of the proposed changes. In their
Consolidated Reply, the Lambino Group alleged that
they circulated "the petition for initiative" but failed
to mention the amended petition. This contradicts
what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the oral
arguments that what they circulated was the draft of
the amended petition of 30 August 2006.
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris
Secundum, stating that "a signer who did not read the
measure attached to a referendum petition cannot
question his signature on the ground that he did not
understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group
quotes an authority that cites a proposed
change attached to the petition signed by the
people. Even the authority the Lambino Group quotes
requires that the proposed change must be attached
to the petition. The same authority the Lambino Group
quotes requires the people to sign on the petition
itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the
proposed amendment must be incorporated with, or
attached to, the initiative petition signed by the
people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's
proposed changes were not incorporated with, or
attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino
Group's citation of Corpus Juris Secundumpulls the
rug from under their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group
prepared, printed, circulated, from February to August
2006 during the signature-gathering period, the draft
of the petition or amended petition they filed later with
the COMELEC. The Lambino Group are less than
candid with this Court in their belated claim that they
printed and circulated, together with the signature
sheets, the petition or amended
petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino
Group circulated the amended petition during the
signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group
admitted circulating only very limited copies of
the petition.
39
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly
admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies of
the draft petition they filed more than six months
later with the COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that
he also asked other supporters to print additional
copies of the draft petition but he could not state with
certainty how many additional copies the other
supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only
assure this Court of the printing of 100,000 copies
because he himself caused the printing of these
100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed
on 11 October 2006, the Lambino Group expressly
admits that "petitioner Lambino initiated the
printing and reproduction of 100,000 copies of the
petition for initiative x x x."25 This admission binds
the Lambino Group and establishes beyond any
doubt that the Lambino Group failed to show the
full text of the proposed changes to the great
majority of the people who signed the signature
sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000
signatories could have received with certainty one
copy each of the petition, assuming a 100 percent
distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and
company attached one copy of the petition to each
signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could
have circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet
contains space for ten signatures. Assuming ten
people signed each of these 100,000 signature sheets
with the attached petition, the maximum number of
people who saw the petition before they signed the
signature sheets would not exceed 1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it
would be physically impossible for all or a great
majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the
petition before they signed the signature sheets. The
inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group
failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full
text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than
one million signatories saw the petition before they
signed the signature sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets
do not contain the full text of the proposed changes,
either on the face of the signature sheets, or as
attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of
such attachment. Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted
this during the oral arguments, and this
admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact is
also obvious from a mere reading of the signature
sheet. This omission is fatal. The failure to so
include the text of the proposed changes in the
signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-
compliance with the constitutional requirement that
the amendment must be "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition." The
signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the
initiative clause of the Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people
who signed the signature sheets did not see the full
text of the proposed changes before signing. They
could not have known the nature and effect of the
proposed changes, among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the
legislature will be lifted and thus members
of Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;26
2. The interim Parliament can continue to
function indefinitely until its members, who
are almost all the present members of
Congress, decide to call for new
parliamentary elections. Thus, the members
of the interim Parliament will determine
the expiration of their own term of office; 27
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the
proposed changes, the interim Parliament
shall convene to propose further
amendments or revisions to the
Constitution.28
These three specific amendments are not stated or
even indicated in the Lambino Group's signature
sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets
had no idea that they were proposing these
amendments. These three proposed changes are
highly controversial. The people could not have
inferred or divined these proposed changes merely
from a reading or rereading of the contents of the
signature sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino
stated that he and his group assured the people
during the signature-gathering that the elections
for the regular Parliament would be held during
the 2007 local elections if the proposed changes
were ratified before the 2007 local elections.
However, the text of the proposed
changes belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory
Provisions, as found in the amended petition, states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall
provide for the election of the members of
Parliament, which shall be synchronized
and held simultaneously with the election
of all local government officials. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
40
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the
regular Parliament will be held simultaneously with the
2007 local elections. This section merely requires that
the elections for the regular Parliament shall be held
simultaneously with the local elections without
specifying the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the
principal drafter of the proposed changes, could have
easily written the word "next" before the phrase
"election of all local government officials." This would
have insured that the elections for the regular
Parliament would be held in the next local elections
following the ratification of the proposed changes.
However, the absence of the word "next" allows the
interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the
regular Parliament simultaneously with any future
local elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will
decide the expiration of their own term of office. This
allows incumbent members of the House of
Representatives to hold office beyond their current
three-year term of office, and possibly even beyond
the five-year term of office of regular members of the
Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the
representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to
the 6.3 million people who signed the signature
sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the
6.3 million signatories, and even the entire nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people
to sign an initiative petition that contains the full text of
the proposed amendments to avoid fraud or
misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3
million signatories had to rely on the verbal
representations of Atty. Lambino and his group
because the signature sheets did not contain the full
text of the proposed changes. The result is a grand
deception on the 6.3 million signatories who were led
to believe that the proposed changes would require
the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular
Parliament simultaneously with the local elections.
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another
surprise on the people who signed the signature
sheets. The proposed changes mandate the interim
Parliament to make further amendments or revisions
to the Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article
XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from
ratification of these amendments, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose
amendments to, or revisions of, this
Constitution consistent with the principles of
local autonomy, decentralization and a strong
bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that
this provision is a "surplusage" and the Court and the
people should simply ignore it. Far from being a
surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino
Group's initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to
the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the
Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American
jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this
as logrolling - when the initiative petition incorporates
an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This
puts the people in a dilemma since they can answer
only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing
them to sign a petition that effectively contains two
propositions, one of which they may find
unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling
is to nullify the entire proposition and not only the
unrelated subject matter. Thus, in Fine v.
Firestone,29 the Supreme Court of Florida declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one
proposal constitutes "logrolling," which, if
our judicial responsibility is to mean
anything, we cannot permit. The very
broadness of the proposed amendment
amounts to logrolling because the electorate
cannot know what it is voting on - the
amendment's proponents' simplistic
explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg.
x x x x The ballot must give the electorate fair
notice of the proposed amendment being
voted on. x x x x The ballot language in the
instant case fails to do that. The very
broadness of the proposal makes it
impossible to state what it will affect and
effect and violates the requirement that
proposed amendments embrace only one
subject. (Emphasis supplied)
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people.
In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine,30 the Supreme Court
of Alaska warned against "inadvertence, stealth and
fraud" in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative
process, all of the problems that the single-subject
rule was enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is
a greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate
intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an
initiative's passage, and there is a greater
opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth and fraud"
in the enactment-by-initiative process. The drafters
of an initiative operate independently of any structured
or supervised process. They often emphasize
particular provisions of their proposition, while
remaining silent on other (more complex or less
appealing) provisions, when communicating to the
41
public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters typically
use simplistic advertising to present their
initiative to potential petition-signers and eventual
voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the
initiative before the election. More importantly, there is
no process for amending or splitting the several
provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties
clearly distinguish the initiative from the legislative
process. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a
preliminary step for further amendments or revisions
to be undertaken by the interim Parliament as a
constituent assembly. The people who signed the
signature sheets could not have known that their
signatures would be used to propose an
amendment mandating the interim Parliament to
propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution.
Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed
Section 4(4) to compel the interim Parliament to
amend or revise again the Constitution within 45 days
from ratification of the proposed changes, or before
the May 2007 elections. In the absence of the
proposed Section 4(4), the interim Parliament has the
discretion whether to amend or revise again the
Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the
initiative proponents want the interim
Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise
again the Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the
reason for this rush in amending or revising again so
soon the Constitution. The signature sheets do not
also explain what specific amendments or revisions
the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament
to make, and why there is a need for such further
amendments or revisions. The people are again left
in the dark to fathom the nature and effect of the
proposed changes. Certainly, such an initiative is not
"directly proposed by the people" because the people
do not even know the nature and effect of the
proposed changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the
Lambino Group's amended petition of 30 August
2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory
Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office
ends in 2010 shall be members of Parliament
until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators
will remain as member of Parliament if the interim
Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular
Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is no
counterpart provision for the present members of the
House of Representatives even if their term of office
will all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than
that of half of the present Senators. Thus, all the
present members of the House will remain members
of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June
2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises all the
powers of the President. If the interim Parliament
does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament
by 30 June 2010, the Prime Minister will come only
from the present members of the House of
Representatives to the exclusion of the present
Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this
discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million
people who signed the signature sheets could not
have known that their signatures would be used
to discriminate against the Senators. They could
not have known that their signatures would be
used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim
Parliament's choice of Prime Minister only to
members of the existing House of
Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people
without first showing to the people the full text of the
proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and
can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That
is why the Constitution requires that an initiative must
be "directly proposed by the people x x x in a
petition" - meaning that the people must sign on a
petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the
nation's fundamental law, the writing of the text of the
proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the
people under a general or special power of attorney
to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution. This
Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the
members of this Court do not personally know the
people who sign the petition. However, this trust
emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full
text of the proposed amendment is first shown to
the people before they sign the petition, not after
they have signed the petition.
In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and
unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply
with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution that the initiative must be "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition."
42
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies
only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to
its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional
convention can propose both amendments and
revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the
Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of,
this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-
fourths of all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this
Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative x x
x. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes
of amending the Constitution. The first mode is
through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its
Members. The second mode is through a
constitutional convention. The third mode is through a
people's initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and
second modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of
Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to
"[A]mendments to this Constitution." This distinction
was intentional as shown by the following
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the
Members of the Commission that pursuant to
the mandate given to us last night, we
submitted this afternoon a complete
Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the
proposed provision governing the matter of
initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of
the complete committee report. With the
permission of the Members, may I quote
Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the
date of the last plebiscite held, directly
propose amendments to this Constitution thru
initiative upon petition of at least ten percent
of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the
original Committee Report No. 7. This
proposal was suggested on the theory that
this matter of initiative, which came about
because of the extraordinary developments
this year, has to be separated from the
traditional modes of amending the
Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The
committee members felt that this system
of initiative should be limited to
amendments to the Constitution and
should not extend to the revision of the
entire Constitution, so we removed it from
the operation of Section 1 of the proposed
Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x x
xxxx
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by
providing this process of initiative as a
separate section in the Article on
Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable
to accepting an amendment in terms of
realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph
(c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as
another separate section as if it were a self-
executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except
that, as we clarified a while ago, this process
of initiative is limited to the matter of
amendment and should not expand into a
revision which contemplates a total
overhaul of the Constitution. That was the
sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: In other words, the
Committee was attempting to distinguish
the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in
Section 1 to include the process of
revision; whereas, the process of initiation
to amend, which is given to the public,
would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the
terms envisioned in the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank
you, Madam President.
xxxx
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question:
Commissioner Davide's proposed
amendment on line 1 refers to
43
"amendments." Does it not cover the word
"revision" as defined by Commissioner
Padilla when he made the distinction
between the words "amendments" and
"revision"?
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because
"amendments" and "revision" should be
covered by Section 1. So insofar as
initiative is concerned, it can only relate to
"amendments" not "revision."
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.31 (Emphasis
supplied)
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the
Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction
between "amendment" and "revision" of the
Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that
only Congress or a constitutional convention may
propose revisions to the Constitution. The
framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative
may propose only amendments to the Constitution.
Where the intent and language of the Constitution
clearly withhold from the people the power to propose
revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot
propose revisions even as they are empowered to
propose amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme
courts in the United States. Thus, in McFadden v.
Jordan,32the Supreme Court of California ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the
people by amendment to the Constitution
x x x applies only to the proposing and the
adopting or rejecting of 'laws and
amendments to the Constitution' and does
not purport to extend to a constitutional
revision. x x x x It is thus clear that a revision
of the Constitution may be accomplished only
through ratification by the people of a revised
constitution proposed by a convention called
for that purpose as outlined hereinabove.
Consequently if the scope of the proposed
initiative measure (hereinafter termed 'the
measure') now before us is so broad that if
such measure became law a substantial
revision of our present state Constitution
would be effected, then the measure may not
properly be submitted to the electorate until
and unless it is first agreed upon by a
constitutional convention, and the writ sought
by petitioner should issue. x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled
in Holmes v. Appling:33
It is well established that when a constitution
specifies the manner in which it may be
amended or revised, it can be altered by
those who favor amendments, revision, or
other change only through the use of one of
the specified means. The constitution itself
recognizes that there is a difference between
an amendment and a revision; and it is
obvious from an examination of the measure
here in question that it is not an amendment
as that term is generally understood and as it
is used in Article IV, Section 1. The document
appears to be based in large part on the
revision of the constitution drafted by the
'Commission for Constitutional Revision'
authorized by the 1961 Legislative Assembly,
x x x and submitted to the 1963 Legislative
Assembly. It failed to receive in the Assembly
the two-third's majority vote of both houses
required by Article XVII, Section 2, and hence
failed of adoption, x x x.
While differing from that document in material
respects, the measure sponsored by the
plaintiffs is, nevertheless, a thorough
overhauling of the present constitution x x x.
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.
Whether it be a revision or a new constitution,
it is not such a measure as can be submitted
to the people through the initiative. If a
revision, it is subject to the requirements of
Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new
constitution, it can only be proposed at a
convention called in the manner provided in
Article XVII, Section 1. x x x x
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute
that a people's initiative can only propose
amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution
itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no
deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes
of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor, even
one backed by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a
deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the
Constitution itself.
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re
Initiative Petition No. 364:34
It is a fundamental principle that a
constitution can only be revised or
amended in the manner prescribed by the
instrument itself, and that any attempt to
revise a constitution in a manner other
than the one provided in the instrument is
almost invariably treated as extra-
44
constitutional and revolutionary. x x x x
"While it is universally conceded that the
people are sovereign and that they have
power to adopt a constitution and to change
their own work at will, they must, in doing so,
act in an orderly manner and according to the
settled principles of constitutional law. And
where the people, in adopting a constitution,
have prescribed the method by which the
people may alter or amend it, an attempt to
change the fundamental law in violation of the
self-imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional."
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and
protect the Constitution, cannot shirk from its solemn
oath and duty to insure compliance with the clear
command of the Constitution ― that a people's
initiative may only amend, never revise, the
Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative
constitute an amendment or revision of the
Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative
constitutes a revision, then the present petition should
be dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between
an amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of
the earliest cases that recognized the distinction
described the fundamental difference in this manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an
instrument of a permanent and abiding
nature, and the provisions contained
therein for its revision indicate the will of
the people that the underlying principles
upon which it rests, as well as the
substantial entirety of the instrument, shall
be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On
the other hand, the significance of the term
"amendment" implies such an addition or
change within the lines of the original
instrument as will effect an improvement, or
better carry out the purpose for which it was
framed.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic
principle in the constitution, like altering the
principle of separation of powers or the system of
checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the
change alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution, as when the change affects
substantial provisions of the constitution. On the
other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change
that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the
basic principle involved. Revision generally affects
several provisions of the constitution, while
amendment generally affects only the specific
provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows
amendments but not revisions to the constitution just
like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-
part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test.
The quantitative test asks whether the proposed
change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change
directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by
the deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions."36 The court examines only the number of
provisions affected and does not consider the degree
of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects
of the proposed change in the constitution. The main
inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such
far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a
revision."37 Whether there is an alteration in the
structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry.
Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic
governmental plan" includes "change in its
fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of
its Branches."38 A change in the nature of the basic
governmental plan also includes changes that
"jeopardize the traditional form of government and the
system of check and balances."39
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the
Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely
an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's
proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on
the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive -
affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire
Constitution.40Qualitatively, the proposed changes
alter substantially the basic plan of government, from
presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to
a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision
of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal
branches of government in the present Constitution
are reduced into two. This alters the separation of
powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution.
Merging the legislative and executive branches is a
radical change in the structure of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as
the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of
powers and thus constitutes a revision of the
Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one
chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-
and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a
revision of the Constitution.
45
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift
from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the
Office of the President and the abolition of one
chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not
a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino
Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that
the changes will radically alter the framework of
government as set forth in the Constitution. Father
Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the
Constitutional Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a
few specific and separable provisions. The guiding
original intention of an amendment is to improve
specific parts or to add new provisions deemed
necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress
specific portions that may have become obsolete or
that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however,
the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a
re-examination of the entire document, or of
provisions of the document which have over-all
implications for the entire document, to determine how
and to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for
instance a switch from the presidential system to
a parliamentary system would be a revision
because of its over-all impact on the entire
constitutional structure. So would a switch from a
bicameral system to a unicameral system be
because of its effect on other important
provisions of the Constitution.41 (Emphasis
supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter,42 an initiative petition proposed
the amendment of the Florida State constitution
to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral
legislature. The issue turned on whether the initiative
"was defective and unauthorized where [the]
proposed amendment would x x x affect several other
provisions of [the] Constitution." The Supreme Court
of Florida, striking down the initiative as outside the
scope of the initiative clause, ruled as follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of
Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide
for a Unicameral Legislature affects not only
many other provisions of the Constitution
but provides for a change in the form of
the legislative branch of government,
which has been in existence in the United
States Congress and in all of the states of the
nation, except one, since the earliest days. It
would be difficult to visualize a more
revolutionary change. The concept of a
House and a Senate is basic in the American
form of government. It would not only
radically change the whole pattern of
government in this state and tear apart the
whole fabric of the Constitution, but would
even affect the physical facilities
necessary to carry on government.
xxxx
We conclude with the observation that if such
proposed amendment were adopted by the
people at the General Election and if the
Legislature at its next session should fail to
submit further amendments to revise and
clarify the numerous inconsistencies and
conflicts which would result, or if after
submission of appropriate amendments the
people should refuse to adopt them, simple
chaos would prevail in the government of this
State. The same result would obtain from an
amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of
Article V, to provide for only a Supreme Court
and Circuit Courts-and there could be other
examples too numerous to detail. These
examples point unerringly to the answer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of
the hundreds of men and women and many
sessions of the Legislature in bringing about
the Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate
inconsistencies and conflicts and to give the
State a workable, accordant, homogenous
and up-to-date document. All of this could
disappear very quickly if we were to hold that
it could be amended in the manner proposed
in the initiative petition here.43(Emphasis
supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with
greater force to the present petition. The Lambino
Group's initiative not only seeks a shift from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to
merge the executive and legislative departments. The
initiative in Adams did not even touch the executive
department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated
18 sections of the Florida Constitution that would be
affected by the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral
legislature. In the Lambino Group's present
initiative, no less than 105 provisions of the
Constitution would be affected based on the count
of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.44 There is
no doubt that the Lambino Group's present initiative
seeks far more radical changes in the structure of
government than the initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference
between "amendment" and "revision" is only one of
procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group
posits that when a deliberative body drafts and
proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive
changes are called "revisions" because members of
the deliberative body work full-time on the
changes. However, the same substantive changes,
when proposed through an initiative, are called
46
"amendments" because the changes are made by
ordinary people who do not make an "occupation,
profession, or vocation" out of such endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following
exposition of their theory in their Memorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that
the constitutional provisions expressly provide
for both "amendment" and "revision" when it
speaks of legislators and constitutional
delegates, while the same provisions
expressly provide only for "amendment" when
it speaks of the people. It would seem that the
apparent distinction is based on the actual
experience of the people, that on one hand
the common people in general are not
expected to work full-time on the matter of
correcting the constitution because that is not
their occupation, profession or vocation; while
on the other hand, the legislators and
constitutional convention delegates
are expected to work full-time on the same
matter because that is their occupation,
profession or vocation. Thus, the difference
between the words "revision" and
"amendment" pertain only to the process
or procedure of coming up with the
corrections, for purposes of interpreting the
constitutional provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference
between "amendment" and "revision"
cannot reasonably be in the substance or
extent of the correction. x x x x (Underlining
in the original; boldfacing supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress
or a constitutional convention had drafted the same
proposed changes that the Lambino Group wrote in
the present initiative, the changes would constitute a
revision of the Constitution. Thus, the Lambino
Group concedes that the proposed changes in the
present initiative constitute a revision if Congress
or a constitutional convention had drafted the
changes. However, since the Lambino Group as
private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the
changes are merely amendments to the Constitution.
The Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of
changing the fundamental law of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain
language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino
Group's theory. Where the intent of the framers and
the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly
stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical
intent and language.45 Any theory espousing a
construction contrary to such intent and language
deserves scant consideration. More so, if such theory
wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form
of government established in the Constitution. Such a
theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and
inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only
exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's
position. Any theory advocating that a proposed
change involving a radical structural change in
government does not constitute a revision justly
deserves rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that
initiative proponents in American jurisdictions have
attempted to advance without any success. In Lowe
v. Keisling,46 the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected
this theory, thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2,
does not apply to changes to the constitution
proposed by initiative. His theory is that
Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a
procedure by which the legislature can
propose a revision of the constitution, but
it does not affect proposed revisions
initiated by the people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot
measure constitutes a wholesale change to
the constitution that cannot be enacted
through the initiative process. They assert
that the distinction between amendment and
revision is determined by reviewing the scope
and subject matter of the proposed
enactment, and that revisions are not limited
to "a formal overhauling of the constitution."
They argue that this ballot measure proposes
far reaching changes outside the lines of the
original instrument, including profound
impacts on existing fundamental rights and
radical restructuring of the government's
relationship with a defined group of citizens.
Plaintiffs assert that, because the proposed
ballot measure "will refashion the most basic
principles of Oregon constitutional law," the
trial court correctly held that it violated Article
XVII, section 2, and cannot appear on the
ballot without the prior approval of the
legislature.
We first address Mabon's argument that
Article XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit
revisions instituted by initiative. In Holmes v.
Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court concluded
that a revision of the constitution may not be
accomplished by initiative, because of the
provisions of Article XVII, section 2. After
reviewing Article XVII, section1, relating to
proposed amendments, the court said:
"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV,
Section 1, authorizes the use of the initiative
47
as a means of amending the Oregon
Constitution, but it contains no similar
sanction for its use as a means of revising the
constitution." x x x x
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2,
relating to revisions, and said: "It is the only
section of the constitution which provides the
means for constitutional revision and it
excludes the idea that an individual, through
the initiative, may place such a measure
before the electorate." x x x x
Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument
that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply
to constitutional revisions proposed by
initiative. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's
theory which negates the express intent of the
framers and the plain language of the Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a
spectrum, at one end green for amendments and at
the other end red for revisions. Towards the middle of
the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in
determining whether there is an amendment or
revision. The present initiative is indisputably located
at the far end of the red spectrum where revision
begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul
of the existing separation of powers among the three
co-equal departments of government, requiring far-
reaching amendments in several sections and articles
of the Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific
provision of the Constitution without affecting any
other section or article, the change may generally be
considered an amendment and not a revision. For
example, a change reducing the voting age from 18
years to 15 years47 is an amendment and not a
revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino
ownership of mass media companies from 100
percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a
revision.48 Also, a change requiring a college degree
as an additional qualification for election to the
Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.49
The changes in these examples do not entail any
modification of sections or articles of the Constitution
other than the specific provision being amended.
These changes do not also affect the structure of
government or the system of checks-and-balances
among or within the three branches. These three
examples are located at the far green end of the
spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision
sought by the present petition is located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a
change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a
single word of one sentence of the Constitution may
be a revision and not an amendment. For example,
the substitution of the word "republican" with
"monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1, Article II50 of
the Constitution radically overhauls the entire
structure of government and the fundamental
ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each
specific change will have to be examined case-by-
case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as
well as how it affects the structure of government, the
carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and
the underlying ideological basis of the existing
Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic
principles, or several provisions of a constitution,
a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is
best suited to undertake a revision. A revision
requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but
also the altered principles with those that remain
unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize
deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or
constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On
the other hand, constitutions allow people's initiatives,
which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative
bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only
amendments and not revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's
proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions
states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of
the incumbent President and Vice President,
with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which shall hereby be amended and Sections
18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other
Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad
seriatim up to 26, unless they are
inconsistent with the Parliamentary
system of government, in which case, they
shall be amended to conform with a
unicameral parliamentary form of
government; x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later
law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the
later law prevails. This rule also applies to
construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino
Group's draft of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions
turns on its head this rule of construction by stating
that in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the
earlier provision "shall be amended to conform with a
unicameral parliamentary form of government." The
effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable provisions
until the earlier one "shall be amended," which
requires a future separate constitutional amendment.
48
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an
amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino readily
conceded during the oral arguments that the
requirement of a future amendment is a "surplusage."
In short, Atty. Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of
statutory construction so that the later provision
automatically prevails in case of irreconcilable
inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the
proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is not
between a provision in Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes.
The inconsistency is between a provision in Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution and the "Parliamentary
system of government," and the inconsistency shall
be resolved in favor of a "unicameral parliamentary
form of government."
Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of
government" do the Lambino Group's proposed
changes refer to ― the Bangladeshi, Singaporean,
Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among
the few countries with unicameral parliaments? The
proposed changes could not possibly refer to the
traditional and well-known parliamentary forms of
government ― the British, French, Spanish, German,
Italian, Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models,
which have all bicameral parliaments. Did the people
who signed the signature sheets realize that they
were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli,
or New Zealand parliamentary form of government?
This drives home the point that the people's initiative
is not meant for revisions of the Constitution but only
for amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-
Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system
requires harmonizing several provisions in many
articles of the Constitution. Revision of the
Constitution through a people's initiative will only
result in gross absurdities in the Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the
Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not an
amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and
unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a
people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this
Constitution."
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not
Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to
comply with the basic requirements of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and
scope of a people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court's
ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend
the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal
of Santiago will not change the outcome of the
present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to
revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735
does not comply with the requirements of the
Constitution to implement the initiative clause on
amendments to the Constitution.
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the
constitutionality of a statute if the case before the
Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such
avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled
doctrine that courts will not pass upon the
constitutionality of a statute if the case can be
resolved on some other grounds.51
Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to
implement the constitutional provision on initiatives to
amend the Constitution, this will not change the result
here because the present petition violates Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative,
the present initiative must first comply with Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution even before
complying with RA 6735.
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b)
of RA 6735 which requires that the "petition for an
initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least
twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
registered voters as signatories." Section 5(b) of RA
6735 requires that the people must sign the "petition
x x x as signatories."
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of
25 August 2006 or the amended petition of 30 August
2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino,
Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C.
Agra signed the petition and amended petition as
counsels for "Raul L. Lambino and Erico B.
Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC, the
Lambino Group, claiming to act "together with" the 6.3
million signatories, merely attached the signature
sheets to the petition and amended petition. Thus, the
petition and amended petition filed with the
COMELEC did not even comply with the basic
requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group
claims as valid.
The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates
Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition
embracing more than one (1) subject shall be
submitted to the electorate; x x x." The proposed
Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating
the interim Parliament to propose further amendments
or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter
totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government.
49
Since the present initiative embraces more than one
subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the
initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA
6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will still
fail.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of
Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino Group's
Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition,
the COMELEC en banc merely followed this Court's
ruling in Santiago and People's Initiative for
Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v.
COMELEC.52 For following this Court's ruling, no
grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the
COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition
warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court should
reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote,
that no grave abuse of discretion could be
attributed to the public respondent COMELEC
in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA
therein, it appearing that it only complied with
the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court
in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March
19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land,
deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all the
citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the
Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in
blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of
amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution
itself.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set
adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters, to be
tossed and turned by every dominant political group of
the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in
the Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed
modes, tomorrow the new dominant political group
that comes will demand its own set of changes in the
same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A
revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the
rule of law in this country.
An overwhelming majority − 16,622,111 voters
comprising 76.3 percent of the total votes cast 53 −
approved our Constitution in a national plebiscite held
on 11 February 1987. That approval is the
unmistakable voice of the people, the full
expression of the people's sovereign will. That
approval included the prescribed modes for
amending or revising the Constitution.
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952
million signatures gathered by the Lambino Group,
can change our Constitution contrary to the specific
modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity,
prescribed when they ratified the Constitution. The
alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which
means subverting the people's sovereign will and
discarding the Constitution. This is one act the
Court cannot and should never do. As the ultimate
guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to
perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the
Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will of
the people.
Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign
will," or "let the people decide" cannot override the
specific modes of changing the Constitution as
prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the
Constitution ― the people's fundamental covenant
that provides enduring stability to our society ―
becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes
by political groups gathering signatures through false
promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to be the
bedrock of the nation's stability.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the
"people's voice." However, the Lambino Group
unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02,
in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC,
that "ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the
agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms." The
Lambino Group thus admits that their "people's"
initiative is an "unqualified support to the agenda" of
the incumbent President to change the Constitution.
This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of
"people's voice" or "sovereign will" in the present
initiative.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend
and protect the Constitution. The Constitution, which
embodies the people's sovereign will, is the bible of
this Court. This Court exists to defend and protect
the Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm
initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered
signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution
is to allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow
such alteration and desecration is to lose this
Court's raison d'etre.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No.
174153.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga,
50

Lambino vs COMELEC
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary 1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with
form of government. Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
Direct Proposal by the People
FACTS:
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with
Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating governing constitutional provision that allows a
the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory people’s initiative to propose amendments to the
initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution
Provisions) of their initiative. Constitution. This section states:
under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of
Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and
The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise
Referendum Act.
COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to be directly proposed by the people through
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the
the Constitution. centum of the total number of registered voters of
support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least
which every legislative district must be represented by
twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with
ISSUES: at least three per centum of the registered voters
each legislative district represented by at least three
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino
complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the The framers of the Constitution intended that the
Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution “draft of the proposed constitutional amendment”
had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million
through a people’s initiative; should be “ready and shown” to the people “before”
individuals.
they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to
The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the
Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people
1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article
or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to should sign on the proposal itself because the
VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass it
Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding
the Constitution; and around for signature.”
Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These
proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-
HELD:
51
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the
people. This means two essential elements must
be present. First, the people must author and thus
sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf. Second,
as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must
be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full
text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the
people who express their assent by signing such
complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment
is “directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition
that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.
There is no presumption that the proponents
observed the constitutional requirements in gathering
the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of
proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures – that
the petition contained, or incorporated by
attachment, the full text of the proposed
amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present
petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the
people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino
Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature
sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006
when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October
2006.
2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not
Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to
comply with the basic requirements of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and
scope of a people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court’s
ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend
the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago
will not change the outcome of the present petition.
Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which
effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with
the requirements of the Constitution to implement the
initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.
Lambino Vs. Comelec Case Digest
Lambino Vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 174153
Oct. 25 2006
Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced
gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change
the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group
alleged that the petition had the support of 6M
individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the
constitution. Their petition changes the 1987
constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and
sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed
changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential
form of government to unicameral- parliamentary.
COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling
law governing initiative petitions and invoked the
Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is
inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition
complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s
initiative.
Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in
Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate
or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend
the Constitution.
Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino
Group’s petition.
52

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to

comply with the basic requirements for conducting a
people’s initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC
did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the
Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section

2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by
the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the

initiative signer must be informed at the time of the
signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is
“deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative
void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the

Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear

distinction between “amendment” and “revision, it is
intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of
the constitution may propose only amendments to the
constitution. Merging of the legislative and the
executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a
revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not

Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change

the result because the present petition violated Sec 2
Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the
constitution before complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.
53
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997]
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER
PADILLA and MARIA ISABEL
ONGPIN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO
PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their
capacities as founding members of the
Peoples Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), respondents, SENATOR RAUL S.
ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL
ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT
OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES (IBP) and LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO
(LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way
of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court is the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system
of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special
attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to
the people of this country, except perhaps to a few
scholars, before the drafting of the 1987
Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission
itself, through the original proponent[1] and the main
sponsor[2] of the proposed Article on Amendments or
Revision of the Constitution, characterized this system
as innovative.[3] Indeed it is, for both under the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing
amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were
recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-
fourths of all its members and (2) by a constitutional
convention.[4] For this and the other reasons hereafter
discussed, we resolved to give due course to this
petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty.
Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent
Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a
Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits
of Elective Officials, by Peoples Initiative (hereafter,
Delfin Petition)[5] wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC
for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature
gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said
Order and the attached Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in
newspapers of general and local
circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in
all Regions of the Philippines, to assist
Petitioners and volunteers, in
establishing signing stations at the time
and on the dates designated for the
purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding
member of the Movement for Peoples Initiative, [6] a
group of citizens desirous to avail of the system
intended to institutionalize people power; that he and
the members of the Movement and other volunteers
intend to exercise the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution granted under Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of
that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the
control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as
required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature
stations shall be established all over the country, with
the assistance of municipal election registrars, who
shall verify the signatures affixed by individual
signatories; that before the Movement and other
volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that
the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be
first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC;
and that to adequately inform the people of the
electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary that
the said order, as well as the Petition on which the
signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers
of general and local circulation, under the control and
supervision of the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the
provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7
of Article VI,[7] Section 4 of Article VII,[8] and Section 8
of Article X[9] of the Constitution.Attached to the petition
is a copy of a Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution[10] embodying the proposed amendments
which consist in the deletion from the aforecited
sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and
with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS
OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND
7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII,
AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative
will first be submitted to the people, and after it is
signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number
54
of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed
with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was
forthwith given the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE),
the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an
Order[11] (a) directing Delfin to cause the publication of
the petition, together with the attached Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the
proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the
signature form), and the notice of hearing in three (3)
daily newspapers of general circulation at his own
expense not later than 9 December 1996; and (b)
setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at
10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12
December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and
Atty. Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the Peoples
Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco,
together with his two other lawyers; and
representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang
Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN).[12] Senator
Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory
petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC
directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda within five
days.[13]
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein --
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla,
and Maria Isabel Ongpin -- filed this special civil action
for prohibition raising the following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to
amend the Constitution can only be implemented by
law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been
passed; in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act
Prescribing and Regulating Constitutional
Amendments by Peoples Initiative, which petitioner
Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still
pending before the Senate Committee on
Constitutional Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three
systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local
legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle
on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other
modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for
in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission
indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend
the Constitution was left to some future law. Former
Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in
the law in his privilege speech delivered before the
Senate in 1994: There is not a single word in that law
which can be considered as implementing [the
provision on constitutional initiative]. Such
implementing provisions have been obviously left to a
separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity
of the law after publication in print media. This
indicates that the Act covers only laws and not
constitutional amendments because the latter take
effect only upon ratification and not after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16
January 1991 to govern the conduct of initiative on the
Constitution and initiative and referendum on national
and local laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since
the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and
regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to
amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized
by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5)The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to
the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or
lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is,
therefore, outside the power of the peoples initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds
for peoples initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any
other government department, agency, or office has
realigned funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil
action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the
event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the
peoples initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would entail
expenses to the national treasury for general re-
registration of voters amounting to at least P180
million, not to mention the millions of additional pesos
in expenses which would be incurred in the conduct of
the initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental
importance to the public and the nation of the issues
raised demands that this petition for prohibition be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside
technicalities of procedure and calling for the
admission of a taxpayers and legislators
suit.[14] Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the
respondents to comment on the petition within a non-
extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b)
issued a temporary restraining order, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders,
enjoining public respondent COMELEC from
proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and private
respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from
conducting a signature drive for peoples initiative to
amend the Constitution.
55
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through
Atty Quadra, filed their Comment[15] on the
petition. They argue therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT IT WOULD ENTAIL
EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR
GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS
AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00) IF
THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY
RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT
BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE
COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF
RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE
ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS
VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF
ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO
THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE
DAILY PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL
TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO
BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND
HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571, 200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE
COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE
GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY
BOUND TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY PURSUANT TO
ITS INITIATORY JURISDICTION UPHELD BY THE
HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT
SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE
OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS.
COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4,
1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING THE
POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-
SANTIAGOS SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A
DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY
PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300
PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991
PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY
THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT
SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE
OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS.
COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE
HONORABLE COURT SAID: THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY SEASONABLY
AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES
AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL
USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS.
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGOS
SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION
DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO
PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS
AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE
PURPOSES OF THIS ACT. (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290,
ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE
TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS
NOT A REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT IS
ONLY AN AMENDMENT. AMENDMENT
ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW
SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A
RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT
TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT
SHOULD BE ALTERED. (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED.
1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G.
BERNAS, S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin
filed in his own behalf a Comment[16] which starts off
with an assertion that the instant petition is a knee-jerk
reaction to a draft Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution ... which is not formally filed yet. What he
filed on 6 December 1996 was an Initiatory Pleading or
Initiatory Petition, which was legally necessary to start
the signature campaign to amend the Constitution or to
put the movement to gather signatures under
COMELEC power and function. On the substantive
allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as
follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a
law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct
of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence
therein of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, since
subtitles are not requirements for the validity or
sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides
that the proposition in an initiative to amend the
Constitution approved by the majority of the votes
cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as of the
day of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article
IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC
the power to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b)
Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers the
COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the
Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve
a revision of, but mere amendment to, the
56
Constitution because it seeks to alter only a few
specific provisions of the Constitution, or more
specifically, only those which lay term limits. It does
not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire
document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of
voters, Delfin considers petitioners estimate of P180
million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give
the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite it
will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay
Elections. In any event, fund requirements
for initiative will be a priority government expense
because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign
power of the people.
In the Comment[17] for the public respondent
COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of
the Solicitor General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia,
peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. Its
Section 2 on Statement of Policy explicitly affirms,
recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its
Section 3, which enumerates the three systems
of initiative, includes initiative on the Constitution and
defines the same as the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section
5 repeatedly mentions initiative on the Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution
is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being
national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed
included in the subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply
overlooked pertinent provisions of the law when he
claimed that nothing therein was provided
for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a
material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal
with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials
constitutes a mere amendment to the Constitution, not
a revision thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly
issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under
the Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power
of the COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A.
No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC .
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a)
confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining
order; (b) noted the aforementioned Comments and the
Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by
private respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as
the latters Manifestation stating that he is the counsel
for private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa
only and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas;
and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6
January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him
to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20
January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on 23
January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-
Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement
of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism,
Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention. Attached
to the motion was their Petition in Intervention, which
was later replaced by an Amended Petition in
Intervention wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a
mere amendment to, but a revision of, the
Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, S.J.,[18] it would involve a change from a
political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one
that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the
change might appear to be an isolated one, it can
affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of
elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing
equal access to opportunities for public service and
prohibiting political dynasties.[19] A revision cannot be
done by initiative which, by express provision of
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited
to amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President
and the limits provided for all other national and local
elective officials are based on the philosophy of
governance, to open up the political arena to as many
as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands
of leadership, to break the concentration of political
and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to
promote effective proper empowerment for
participation in policy and decision-making for the
common good; hence, to remove the term limits is to
negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987
Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of
initiative, particularly in a conflict-of-interest
situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position
that may be availed of by the people only if they are
dissatisfied with the performance of their elective
officials, but not as a premium for good
performance.[20]
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself
to be called the enabling law that implements the
peoples initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper parties who
may file the petition, (b) the appropriate agency before
whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the
petition, (d) the publication of the same, (e) the ways
57
and means of gathering the signatures of the voters
nationwide and 3% per legislative district, (f) the
proper parties who may oppose or question the
veracity of the signatures, (g) the role of the
COMELEC in the verification of the signatures and the
sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal from any
decision of the COMELEC, (I) the holding of a
plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such
peoples initiative. Accordingly, there being no
enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to
hear Delfins petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be
rectified or remedied by COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, since the COMELEC is without authority to
legislate the procedure for a peoples initiative under
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. That
function exclusively pertains to Congress. Section 20
of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal basis for
the Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient
standard for a valid delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his
Petition in Intervention.[21] He avers that R.A. No. 6735
is the enabling law that implements the peoples right to
initiate constitutional amendments. This law is a
consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No.
21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even
delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise
submits that the COMELEC was empowered under
Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends that
the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its
publication because the said petition is not the initiatory
pleading contemplated under the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in
an initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a petition
for initiative which is signed by the required number of
registered voters. He also submits that the proponents
of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the
authority and resources of the COMELEC to assist
them is securing the required number of signatures, as
the COMELECs role in an initiative on the Constitution
is limited to the determination of the sufficiency of the
initiative petition and the call and supervision of a
plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for
Leave to Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for
Intervention to which it attached a Petition in
Intervention raising the following arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law
mandated under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute
for the required implementing law on the initiative to
amend the Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect
in that it does not have the required number of
signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the
Constitution, which can be proposed only by
Congress or a constitutional convention.[22]
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a
Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention
filed by the DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well
as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN;
(b) admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of
DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of
Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the
respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five
days their Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid
Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to file
its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period
of three days from notice, and the respondents to
comment thereon within a nonextendible period of five
days from receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the
parties argued on the following pivotal issues, which
the Court formulated in light of the allegations and
arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing
for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to
include or cover initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded,
adequately covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the
Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative
and Referendum on National and Local Laws)
regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in
the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such
initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national
and local officials, as proposed in the draft Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, would constitute a
revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or
has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to
obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for
signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election
officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in
establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or
causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned
58
proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take
cognizance of the petition when there is a pending
case before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the
parties to submit simultaneously their respective
memoranda within twenty days and requested
intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the
deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in
Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and
arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that
the COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin
Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action
and that the Commissions failure or refusal to do so
constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco
submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and
the Record of the House of Representatives relating to
the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as
the transcripts of stenographic notes on the
proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee,
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6
June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No.
17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa
filed their Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in
Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and
IBP.[23] The parties thereafter filed, in due time, their
separate memoranda.[24]
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give
due course to this special civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated
issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which
appears to pose a prejudicial procedural question.
I
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE
PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN
PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the
parties paid no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e.,
whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of
this special civil action when there is a pending case
before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an
affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the petition filed by private respondent
Delfin. This being so, it becomes imperative to stop
the Comelec from proceeding any further, and under
the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for
prohibition is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial
writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and
directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of
preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a
jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People
v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an
urgent necessity, in view of the highly divisive and
adverse environmental consequences on the body
politic of the questioned Comelec order. The
consequent climate of legal confusion and political
instability begs for judicial statesmanship.
30. In the final analysis, when the system of
constitutional law is threatened by the political
ambitions of man, only the Supreme Court can save a
nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of
the Constitution.[25]
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with
the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition
on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or
authority to entertain the petition.[26] The COMELEC
made no ruling thereon evidently because after having
heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the
hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to
submit within five days their memoranda or
oppositions/memoranda.[27] Earlier, or specifically on 6
December 1996, it practically gave due course to the
Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the
publication of the petition, together with the attached
Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice
of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The
COMELECs failure to act on Rocos motion to dismiss
and its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered
ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. -- Where the
proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or
person, whether exercising functions judicial or
ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant to desist from further proceedings in the
action or matter specified therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims
that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin
Petition because the said petition is not supported by
the required minimum number of signatures of
59
registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to
dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the
required number of signatures. In light of these claims,
the instant case may likewise be treated as a special
civil action for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor
Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure in cases of transcendental
importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Guingona, Jr.:[28]
A partys standing before this Court is a procedural
technicality which it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, set aside in view of the importance of
issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers
Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality
because the transcendental importance to the public
of these cases demands that they be settled promptly
and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE
SYSTEM
OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY,
INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution
provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per
centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of
this Constitution nor oftener than once every five
years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of
the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his
book,[29] Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot
operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the
Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses
congressional action, in the last analysis it still is
dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold
niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. Stated otherwise, while the
Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the
people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever
reason, does not provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in
Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision
proposed by the Committee on Amendments and
Transitory Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed
Resolution No. 332).[30] That section reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-
fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as
provided for in Article ____ Section ____ of the
Constitution.[31]
After several interpellations, but before the period of
amendments, the Committee submitted a new
formulation of the concept of initiative which it
denominated as Section 2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we
respectfully call attention of the Members of the
Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us
last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete
Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the
proposed provision governing the matter of
initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the
complete committee report. With the permission of the
Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the
last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to
this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least
ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original
Committee Report No. 7.[32]
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the
details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the
legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple,
clarificatory questions.
60
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon
petition of at least 10 percent, there are no details in
the provision on how to carry this out. Do we
understand, therefore, that we are leaving this matter
to the legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore,
that for as long as the legislature does not pass the
necessary implementing law on this, this will not
operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during
the committee hearing, especially with respect to the
budget appropriations which would have to be
legislated so that the plebiscite could be called. We
deemed it best that this matter be left to the
legislature. The Gentleman is right. In any event, as
envisioned, no amendment through the power of
initiative can be called until after five years from the
date of the ratification of this Constitution. Therefore,
the first amendment that could be proposed through
the exercise of this initiative power would be after five
years. It is reasonably expected that within that five-
year period, the National Assembly can come up with
the appropriate rules governing the exercise of this
power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the
legislature - the details on how this is to be carried
out - is it possible that, in effect, what will be
presented to the people for ratification is the work of
the legislature rather than of the people? Does this
provision exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility
because even the legislature itself as a body could
propose that amendment, maybe individually or
collectively, if it fails to muster the three-fourths vote in
order to constitute itself as a constituent assembly
and submit that proposal to the people for ratification
through the process of an initiative.
xxx
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that
the intention in the proposal is to vest constituent
power in the people to amend the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam
President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying
precept of the proposal in terms of institutionalizing
popular participation in the drafting of the Constitution
or in the amendment thereof, but I would have a lot of
difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2,
as written. Would the sponsor agree with me that in
the hierarchy of legal mandate, constituent power has
primacy over all other legal mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam
President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me
that in the hierarchy of legal values, the Constitution is
source of all legal mandates and that therefore we
require a great deal of circumspection in the drafting
and in the amendments of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the
primacy of constituent power we have a separate
article in the constitution that would specifically cover
the process and the modes of amending the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as
the provisions are drafted now, to again concede to
the legislature the process or the requirement of
determining the mechanics of amending the
Constitution by people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could
very well be placed in the hands of the National
Assembly, not unless we can incorporate into this
provision the mechanics that would adequately cover
all the conceivable situations.[33]
It was made clear during the interpellations that
the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to
AMEND -- not to REVISE -- the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. ... This proposal was suggested on the
theory that this matter of initiative, which came about
because of the extraordinary developments this year,
has to be separated from the traditional modes of
amending the Constitution as embodied in Section
1. The committee members felt that this system of
initiative should not extend to the revision of the entire
Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of
Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or
Revision.[34]
xxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered
by providing this process of initiative as a separate
section in the Article on Amendment. Would the
sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in
terms of realigning Section 2 as another
61
subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up
as another separate section as if it were a self-
executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as
we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is
limited to the matter of amendment and should not
expand into a revision which contemplates a total
overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that
was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was
attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a)
and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision;
whereas the process of initiation to amend, which is
given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ.That is right. Those were the terms
envisioned in the Committee.[35]
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were
thereafter introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose
to substitute the entire Section 2 with the following:
xxx
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the
proposed amendment after taking into account the
modifications submitted by the sponsor himself and
the honorable Commissioners Guingona, Monsod,
Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified
amendment in substitution of the proposed Section 2
will now read as follows: "SECTION 2. --
AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY
LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE
PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION
OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL
NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH
EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE
REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT
OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE
AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING
THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR
OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW
PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the
proposed amendment is reflective of the sense
contained in Section 2 of our completed Committee
Report No. 7, we accept the proposed amendment.[36]
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed
modified amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that
it was a legislative act which must implement the
exercise of the right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's
amendment, is it possible for the legislature to set
forth certain procedures to carry out the initiative...?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioners amendment
does not prevent the legislature from asking another
body to set the proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other
words, the implementation of this particular right
would be subject to legislation, provided the
legislature cannot determine anymore the percentage
of the requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the
determination of the proper form for submission to the
people, may be subject to legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the
substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the
procedures to be proposed by the legislative body
must diminish or impair the right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the
Constitution can the procedures which I have
discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.[37]
Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his
modified amendment strictly confines initiative to
AMENDMENTS to -- NOT REVISION of -- the
Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner
Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendment." Does it not cover the word "revision" as
defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the
distinction between the words "amendments" and
"revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments"
and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So
62
insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to
"amendments" not "revision."[38]
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that
the process of proposing amendments
through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult
than the initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under
this proposal, what is involved is an amendment to the
Constitution. To amend a Constitution would ordinarily
require a proposal by the National Assembly by a vote
of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional convention
would require a higher number. Moreover, just to
submit the issue of calling a constitutional convention,
a majority of the National Assembly is required, the
import being that the process of amendment must be
made more rigorous and difficult than probably
initiating an ordinary legislation or putting an end to a
law proposed by the National Assembly by way of a
referendum. I cannot agree to reducing the
requirement approved by the Committee on the
Legislative because it would require another voting by
the Committee, and the voting as precisely based on
a requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I might present
such a proposal, by way of an amendment, when the
Commission shall take up the Article on the
Legislative or on the National Assembly on plenary
sessions.[39]
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2
were subjected to amendments, and the final version,
which the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in
favor and 3 against, reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section
2, as amended, reads as follows: "AMENDMENT TO
THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE
DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE
THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT
LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL
NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH
EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE
REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT
OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE
AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING
THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR
OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW
PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.[40]
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or
Revisions was approved on second reading on 9 July
1986.[41] Thereafter, upon his motion for
reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed to
introduce an amendment to Section 2 which,
nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof, the
Article was again approved on Second and Third
Readings on 1 August 1986.[42]
However, the Committee on Style recommended
that the approved Section 2 be amended by changing
percent to per centum and thereof to therein and
deleting the phrase by law in the second paragraph so
that said paragraph reads: The Congress[43] shall
provide for the implementation of the exercise of this
right.[44] This amendment was approved and is the text
of the present second paragraph of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the
system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2
of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress provided for the implementation of
the exercise of this right? Those who answer the
question in the affirmative, like the private respondents
and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No.
6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for
Congress to implement the exercise of the right than
through the passage of a statute or legislative act. This
is the essence or rationale of the last minute
amendment by the Constitutional Commission to
substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII
then reading:
The Congress[45] shall by law provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right.
with
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of
the exercise of this right.
This substitute amendment was an investiture on
Congress of a power to provide for the rules
implementing the exercise of the right. The rules
means the details on how [the right] is to be carried
out.[46]
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history
reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a
consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill
No. 17. The former was prepared by the Committee on
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House of
Representatives on the basis of two House Bills
referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497,[47] which dealt
with the initiative and referendum mentioned in
Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and
(b) House Bill No. 988,[48] which dealt with the subject
matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative
and referendum under Section 3 of Article X (Local
Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of
Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No.
63
17[49] solely dealt with initiative and referendum
concerning ordinances or resolutions of local
government units. The Bicameral Conference
Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House
Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently
approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate[50] and by the
House of Representatives.[51] This approved bill is now
R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the
power and duty of Congress to provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the right?
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative
answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public
respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not
suggest an initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. The said section reads:
SECTION 2. Statement and Policy. -- The power of
the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or
reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative
body upon compliance with the requirements of this
Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
(Underscoring supplied).
The inclusion of the word Constitution therein was a
delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor
relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to
initiative and referendum on national laws and local
laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent
as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out
earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to
proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the
power to directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in
whole or in part, the Constitution through the system
of initiative. They can only do so with respect to laws,
ordinances, or resolutions.
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by
the fact that this section was lifted from Section 1 of
Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement
of policy on local initiative and referendum and
appropriately used the phrases propose and enact,
approve or reject and in whole or in part.[52]
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of
Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to
the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three
systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements)
restates the constitutional requirements as to the
percentage of the registered voters who must submit
the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other
systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the
contents of a petition for initiative on the
Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among
other things, statement of the proposed law sought to
be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as
among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the
Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of
initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads
in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed,
as the case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided
therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters;
and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more
than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly
written or printed at the top of every page of the
petition. (Underscoring supplied).
The use of the clause proposed laws
sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended
or repealed only strengthens the conclusion that
Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is
provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that
the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum
on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A.
No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of
the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it
could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering
that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or
hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution is far more
important than the initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that
the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum because it is national in scope. Our
reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and
Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and
Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the
classification is not based on the scope of the initiative
involved, but on its nature and character. It is national
initiative, if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted
is a national law, or a law which only Congress can
pass.It is local initiative if what is proposed to be
64
adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or
resolution which only the legislative bodies of the
governments of the autonomous regions, provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This
classification of initiative into national and local is
actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote
for emphasis and clearer understanding:
SEC. 3. Definition of terms --
xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a
petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition
proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a
petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(Underscoring supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under
subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative
on amendments to the Constitution.[53]
A further examination of the Act even reveals that
the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane
to the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum
are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of
Section 9, which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution
approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the
plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved on the system of initiative on amendments to the
by majority of the votes cast in an election called for Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation,
the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days the Act provides for the following:
after certification and proclamation of the
Commission. (Underscoring supplied). (a) The required percentage of registered voters to
sign the petition and the contents of the petition;
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative)
referring to indirect initiative with the legislative bodies (b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
of local governments; thus:
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition
SEC. 11. Indirect Initiative. -- Any duly accredited and the required number of votes for its approval;
peoples organization, as defined by law, may file a
petition for indirect initiative with the House of (d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval
Representatives, and other legislative bodies....
of the proposition;
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the
decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or circulation in the Philippines; and
referendum, which could be petitions for both national
and local initiative and referendum.
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on Authority of proposition.[55]
Courts under subtitle III on Local Initiative and
Referendum is misplaced,[54] since the provision As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the
therein applies to both national and local initiative and following:
referendum. It reads:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of
SEC. 18. Authority of Courts. -- Nothing in this Act signatures of registered voters for the petition;
shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from
declaring null and void any proposition approved
(b) The submission of the petition to the local
pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or
legislative body concerned;
want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact
the said measure.
(c) The effect of the legislative bodys failure to
favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the power
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted
of initiative as a consequence thereof;
utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in
the implementation of initiative and referendum on
national and local legislation thereby giving them (d) The formulation of the proposition;
special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
65
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be
signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC
through its official in the local government unit
concerned as to whether the required number of
signatures have been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the
submission of the proposition to the registered voters
for their approval, which must be within the period
specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies.[56]
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all
of its twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the
word Constitution in Section 2; (b) defines initiative on
the Constitution and includes it in the enumeration of
the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks
of plebiscite as the process by which the proposition in
an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or
rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional
requirements as to the number of voters who should
sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of
effectivity of the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of
the more important or the paramount system of
initiative. R.A. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating
blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip
service.[57]
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that
R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its
lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot
be cured by empowering the COMELEC to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of [the] Act.[58]
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot
be delegated or as expressed in a Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest.[59] The
recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President
under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.[60]
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative
body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate
rules and regulations is a form of delegation of
legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in
every case of permissible delegation, there must be a
showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only
if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein
the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented
by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard -- the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate and determinable --
to which the delegate must conform in the performance
of his functions.[61] A sufficient standard is one which
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply
it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected.[62]
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably
failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate
legislation. The delegation of the power to the
COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300,
INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES
AND REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT
OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot
validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement
the exercise of the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative. It does not have that power under
R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELECs power
under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is
misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to
therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under
(a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a
law where subordinate legislation is authorized and
which satisfies the completeness and the sufficient
standard tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE
DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No.
6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress
66
to implement the right to initiate constitutional
amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the
COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and
that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution
and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for
initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least
12% of the total number of registered voters of which
every legislative district is represented by at least 3%
of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition
does not contain signatures of the required number of
voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet
gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition
is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather
signatures. Without the required signatures, the
petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a
petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then
is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is
cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only
participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before
the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form
of the petition;[63] (2) to issue through its Election
Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total
number of registered voters in each legislative
district;[64] (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in
the establishment of signature stations;[65] and (4) to
verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on
the basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits,
and voters identification cards used in the immediately
preceding election.[66]
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory
petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given
cognizance of by the COMELEC. The latter knew that
the petition does not fall under any of the actions or
proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did
not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the
said petition was merely entered as UND,
meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more
than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have
been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the
hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing
Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or
oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on
the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits
of the elective national and local officials is
an amendment to, and not a revisionof, the
Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the
COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for
initiative on amendments on the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide
for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution should no
longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and
blood, energy and strength.Congress should not tarry
any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate
to provide for the implementation of the right of the
people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hreby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to
cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient
standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolutions
No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing
rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to
forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18
December 1996 is made permanent as against the
Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED against
private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby
reserved.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero,
Bellosillo,Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part; related to a co-petitioner
and co-counsel of the petitioners.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., joins the separate,
concurring opinions of Justices Puno, Francisco and
Panganiban.
Puno, Vitug, , Francisco and Panganiban,
JJ., has separate opinions.
FACTS:
In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a
petition to amend Constitution, to lift term limits of
elective officials, by people’s initiative. Delfin wanted
COMELEC to control and supervise said people’s
initiative the signature-gathering all over the country.
The proposition is: “Do you approve of lifting the term
67
limits of all elective government officials, amending for
the purpose Sections 4 ) and 7 of Article VI, Section 4
of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article 8 of Article X of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution?” Said Petition for
Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after
it is signed by at least 12% total number of registered
voters in the country, it will be formally filed with the
COMELEC.
COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the
petition. Petitioners Sen. Roco et al moved for
dismissal of the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is
not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the
COMELEC.
a. Constitutional provision on people’s initiative to
amend the Constitution can only be implemented by
law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been
passed.
b. Republic Act No. 6735 provides for 3 systems on
initiative but failed to provide any subtitle on initiative
on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of
initiative. This deliberate omission indicates matter of
people’s initiative was left to some future law.
c. COMELEC has no power to provide rules and
regulations for the exercise of people’s initiative. Only
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the
implementing law.
d. People’s initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or
lifting of term limits constitutes a revision.
e. Congress nor any government agency has not yet
appropriated funds for people’s initiative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the people can directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution.
HELD:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735
It was intended to include or cover people’s initiative
on amendments to the Constitution but, as worded, it
does not adequately cover such intiative. Article XVII
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution providing for
amendments to Constitution, is not self-executory.
While the Constitution has recognized or granted the
right of the people to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution via PI, the people cannot exercise it if
Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for
its implementation.
FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC,
Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the
word “Constitution” therein was a delayed
afterthought. The word is not relevant to the section
which is silent as to amendments of the Constitution.
SECOND: Unlike in the case of the other systems of
initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of
a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Sec 5(c)
does not include the provisions of the Constitution
sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the
Constitution.
THIRD: No subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter
simply means that the main thrust of the Act is
initiative and referendum on national and local laws.
The argument that the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is not accepted to be subsumed under
the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum
because it is national in scope. Under Subtitle II and
III, the classification is not based on the scope of the
initiative involved, but on its nature and character.
National initiative – what is proposed to be enacted is
a national law, or a law which only Congress can
pass.
Local initiative – what is proposed to be adopted or
enacted is a law, ordinance or resolution which only
legislative bodies of the governments of the
autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities,
and barangays can pass.
Potestas delegata non delegari potest
What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The
recognized exceptions to the rule are: [1] Delegation
of tariff powers to the President; [2] Delegation of
emergency powers to the President; [3] Delegation to
the people at large; [4] Delegation to local
governments; and [5] Delegation to administrative
bodies.
COMELEC
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body
exercising quasi judicial functions, to promulgate rules
and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative
authority. In every case of permissible delegation,
there must be a showing that the delegation itself is
valid. It is valid only if the law
(a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy
to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the
delegate; and
(b) fixes a standard – the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate and determinable – to which
the delegate must conform in the performance of his
68
functions. Republic Act No. 6735 failed to satisfy both
requirements in subordinate legislation. The
delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then
invalid.
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300
Insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is void. COMELEC cannot validly
promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative. It does not have that power under Republic
Act No. 6735.
Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or
has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to
obtain an order:
(a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering;
(b) instructing municipal election officers to assist
Delfin’s movement and volunteers in establishing
signature stations; and
(c) directing or causing the publication of the unsigned
proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution.
DELFIN PETITION
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION. Even if it
be conceded ex gratia that RA 6735 is a full
compliance with the power of Congress to implement
the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that
it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of
subordinate legislation and that COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the Delfin Petition.
The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the
required number of voters. Without the required
signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly
initiated. The COMELEC requires jurisdiction over a
petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition
then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing
is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition
under RA6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it
cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the
COMELEC. The petition was merely entered as UND,
meaning undocketed. It was nothing more than a
mere scrap of paper, which should not have been
dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the
hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order
directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda to file their memoranda or oppositions. In
so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and
merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
Therefore, Republic Act No. 6735 did not apply to
constitutional amendment.
March/June 1997
Amendment to the Constitution
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with
COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift
Term Limits of elective Officials by People’s Initiative”
The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time
and dates for signature gathering all over the
country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the
said petition in papers of general circulation,
and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist
petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing
stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a
special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin
Petition. Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional
provision on people’s initiative to amend the
constitution can only be implemented by law to be
passed by Congress and no such law has yet been
passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for
three systems of initiative namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statues and on local legislation. The
two latter forms of initiative were specifically provided
for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were
specifically made for initiatives on the Constitution. This
omission indicates that the matter of people’s initiative
to amend the Constitution was left to some future law
– as pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to
include initiative on amendments to the constitution
and if so whether the act, as worded, adequately
covers such initiative.
HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of
initiative on amendments to the constitution but is
unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2
of Article 17 of the Constitution provides: “Amendments
to this constitution may likewise be directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least there per centum of the
registered voters therein. . . The Congress shall
provide for the implementation of the exercise of this
right” This provision is obviously not self-executory as
it needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress.
Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Con-Con stated
“without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17
cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending
the constitution is a mode of amendment which
bypasses Congressional action in the last analysis is
still dependent on Congressional action.” Bluntly
stated, the right of the people to directly propose
69

amendments to the Constitution through the system of

inititative would remain entombed in the cold niche of
the constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. The people cannot exercise such
right, though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress
for whatever reason does not provide for its
implementation.

***Note that this ruling has been “reversed” on

November 20, 2006 when ten justices of the SC ruled
that RA 6735 is adequate enough to enable such
initiative. HOWEVER, this was a mere minute
resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position,
as shown by their various opinions already given when
the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic
Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the
Constitution thru a people’s initiative.
As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did
not become stare decisis. See discussion here
See also Lambino vs COMELEC.
70
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-25843 July 25, 1974
MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant.
Seno, Mendoza & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.
Emilio Benitez, Jr. for defendant-appellant.
FERNANDO, J.:p
The disputants in this appeal from a question of law from a lower
court decision are the mother and the uncle of a minor beneficiary
of the proceeds of an insurance policy issued on the life of her
deceased father. The dispute centers as to who of them should be
entitled to act as trustee thereof. The lower court applying the
appropriate Civil Code provisions decided in favor of the mother,
the plaintiff in this case. Defendant uncle appealed. As noted, the
lower court acted the way it did following the specific mandate of
the law. In addition, it must have taken into account the principle
that in cases of this nature the welfare of the child is the paramount
consideration. It is not an unreasonable assumption that between a
mother and an uncle, the former is likely to lavish more care on and
pay greater attention to her. This is all the more likely considering
that the child is with the mother. There are no circumstances then
that did militate against what conforms to the natural order of
things, even if the language of the law were not as clear. It is not to
be lost sight of either that the judiciary pursuant to its role as an
agency of the State as parens patriae, with an even greater stress
on family unity under the present Constitution, did weigh in the
balance the opposing claims and did come to the conclusion that
the welfare of the child called for the mother to be entrusted with
such responsibility. We have to affirm.
The appealed decision made clear: "There is no controversy as to
the facts. "1 The insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian
Pilapil, with a married woman, the plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas. She
was ten years old at the time the complaint was filed on October 10,
1964. The defendant, Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the
deceased. The deceased insured himself and instituted as
beneficiary, his child, with his brother to act as trustee during her
minority. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to him. Hence this
complaint by the mother, with whom the child is living, seeking the
delivery of such sum. She filed the bond required by the Civil Code.
Defendant would justify his claim to the retention of the amount in
question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy.2
After trial duly had, the lower court in a decision of May 10, 1965,
rendered judgment ordering the defendant to deliver the proceeds
of the policy in question to plaintiff. Its main reliance was on Articles
320 and 321 of the Civil Code. The former provides: "The father, or
in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property
pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is
worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall
give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First
Instance."3 The latter states: "The property which the
unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with his work or
industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership,
and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under
parental authority and whose company he lives; ...4
Conformity to such explicit codal norm is apparent in this portion of
the appealed decision: "The insurance proceeds belong to the
beneficiary. The beneficiary is a minor under the custody and
parental authority of the plaintiff, her mother. The said minor lives
with plaintiff or lives in the company of the plaintiff. The said minor
acquired this property by lucrative title. Said property, therefore,
belongs to the minor child in ownership, and in usufruct to the
plaintiff, her mother. Since under our law the usufructuary is entitled
to possession, the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the insurance
proceeds. The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted
provision of law, is pro tanto null and void. In order, however, to
protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should file
an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No.
2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein to the total amount of
P5,000.00."5
It is very clear, therefore, considering the above, that unless the
applicability of the two cited Civil Code provisions can be disputed,
the decision must stand. There is no ambiguity in the language
employed. The words are rather clear. Their meaning is
unequivocal. Time and time again, this Court has left no doubt that
where codal or statutory norms are cast in categorical language,
the task before it is not one of interpretation but of application.6 So it
must be in this case. So it was in the appealed decision.
1. It would take more than just two paragraphs as found in the brief
for the defendant-appellant7 to blunt the force of legal commands
that speak so plainly and so unqualifiedly. Even if it were a question
of policy, the conclusion will remain unaltered. What is paramount,
as mentioned at the outset, is the welfare of the child. It is in
consonance with such primordial end that Articles 320 and 321
have been worded. There is recognition in the law of the deep ties
that bind parent and child. In the event that there is less than full
measure of concern for the offspring, the protection is supplied by
the bond required. With the added circumstance that the child stays
with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of
maternal care, the decision arrived at can stand the test of the
strictest scrutiny. It is further fortified by the assumption, both logical
and natural, that infidelity to the trust imposed by the deceased is
much less in the case of a mother than in the case of an uncle.
Manresa, commenting on Article 159 of the Civil Code of Spain, the
source of Article 320 of the Civil Code, was of that view: Thus "El
derecho y la obligacion de administrar el Patrimonio de los hijos es
una consecuencia natural y lógica de la patria potestad y de la
presunción de que nadie cuidará de los bienes de acquéllos con
mas cariño y solicitude que los padres. En nuestro Derecho antiguo
puede decirse que se hallaba reconocida de una manera indirecta
aquelia doctrina, y asi se desprende de la sentencia del Tribunal
Supremeo de 30 de diciembre de 1864, que se refiere a la ley 24,
tit. XIII de la Partida 5. De la propia suerte aceptan en general
dicho principio los Codigos extranjeros, con las limitaciones y
requisitos de que trataremos mis adelante."8
2. The appealed decision is supported by another cogent
consideration. It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that
the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is
called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is
a minor to accord priority to his best interest. It may happen, as it
did occur here, that family relations may press their respective
claims. It would be more in consonance not only with the natural
order of things but the tradition of the country for a parent to be
preferred. it could have been different if the conflict were between
father and mother. Such is not the case at all. It is a mother
asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the
State in its role of parens patriae, cannot remain insensible to the
validity of her plea. In a recent case,9 there is this quotation from an
opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative
of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State,
whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature,
and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes
exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the
people and the destruction of their liberties." What is more, there is
this constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: "The
State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." 10 If,
as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that
71
has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a
stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a
constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as
it did.
WHEREFORE, the decision of May 10, 1965 is affirmed. Costs
against defendant-appellant.
Costitutional Law: Cabanas v Pilapil
58 SCRA 94, July 25, 1974
MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant.
Facts: Deceased Florentino Pilapil, the husband of Melchora
Cabanas and the father of Millian Pilapil, left an insurance having
his child as the beneficiary and authorized his brother, Francisco
Pilapil, to act as trustee during his daughter’s minority. The lower
court decided to give the mother of the child the right to act as
trustee while her child is a minor citing the appropriate provisions in
the Civil Code. The welfare of the child is the paramount
consideration here, and the mother resides with the child so she is
the rightful trustee. The judiciary pursuant to its role as an agency
of the State parens patriae, called for the mother to take
responsibility. The defendant appealed for the case. He claims the
retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the
insurance policy. He is the rightful trustee of the insurance policy.
Issue: Whether the mother or the uncle should be entitled to act as
a trustee of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance
policy from her deceased father? Whether the trial court erred in its
decision to give the right to the mother?
Ruling: The decision is affirmed with costs against the defendant-
appellant. The provisions of Article 320 and 321 of the Civil Code
became the basis of the decision. The former provides that “the
father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the
property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the
property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or
mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of
First Instance." The latter provides that "The property which the
unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with his work or
industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership,
and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under
parental authority and whose company he lives; ...
With the added circumstance that the child stays with the mother,
not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the
decision arrived at can stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. The
appealed decision is supported by another cogent consideration. It
is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as
an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon
whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to
accord priority to his best interest This prerogative of parens patriae
is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power
is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity
to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by
irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the
destruction of their liberties." What is more, there is this
constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: "The State
shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." 10 If, as the
Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to
be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger
case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional
mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did.
The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision
of law, is pro tanto null and void. In order, however, to protect the
rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should file an
additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No.
2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein to the total amount of
P5,000.00."
Cabanas v Pilapil Digest
Facts:
1. Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child to be his
sole beneficiary. He likewise indicated that if he dies while the child
is still a minor, the proceeds shall be administered by his brother
Francisco. Florentino died when the child was only ten years old
hence, Francisco took charge of Florentino’s benefits for the child.
Meanwhile, the mother of the child Melchora Cabañas filed
a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money in her favor
and allow herself to be the child’s trustee. Francisco asserted the
terms of the insurance policy and contended that as a
private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the
parties and intended beneficiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of
“parens patriae” to the terms of the insurance policy?
YES.
The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as
the basic social unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as
in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest
be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should
resolve according to the best interest of that person.
The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as
she was the immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed
that the mother shows more care towards the child than an uncle.
It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as
an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon
whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to
accord priority to his best interest. It may happen, family relations
may press their respective claims. It would be more in consonance
not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the country
for a parent to be preferred. it could have been different if the conflict
were between father and mother. Such is not the case at all. It is a
mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality
of the State in its role of parens patriae, cannot remain insensible to
the validity of her plea.