Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal

ISSN: 1461-5517 (Print) 1471-5465 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tiap20

Regulatory impact assessment in Slovakia:

performance and procedural reform

Katarina Staronova

To cite this article: Katarina Staronova (2016) Regulatory impact assessment in Slovakia:
performance and procedural reform, Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, 34:3, 214-227,
DOI: 10.1080/14615517.2016.1176410

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14615517.2016.1176410

Published online: 06 Jun 2016.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 121

View Crossmark data

Citing articles: 1 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=tiap20
Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, 2016
VOL. 34, NO. 3, 214–227
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14615517.2016.1176410

Regulatory impact assessment in Slovakia: performance and procedural reform

Katarina Staronova 
Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, Institute of Public Policy, Comenius University Bratislava, Bratislava, Slovakia

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

Regulatory reforms in Europe and OECD countries in the last decade have focused on various Received 6 January 2016
tools that would improve ‘regulatory quality’ by bringing more evidence, science and analysis Accepted 22 March 2016
into policy-making. This trend was also followed by Central and Eastern European Countries
KEYWORDS
where regulatory impact assessment (RIA) was institutionalized on a formal level. In order to Better regulation; impact
increase efficiency of RIA, several procedural changes, such as standardization of reports, two- assessment; regulatory
phase system and oversight mechanism are considered. This article looks at these changes oversight; regulatory quality;
and discusses whether any qualitative improvements can be observed in evidence utilization. procedural changes; Slovakia
The paper focuses on RIAs conducted in Slovakia from 2007 to 2013 in order to observe any
patterns. Most significant qualitative improvement is due to the standardization of RIA and clear
methodologies. The effect of an oversight mechanism with limited powers and improper timing
of its control function not only does not bring the expected qualitative improvement of RIA
output, but can create loopholes for avoiding RIA altogether.

1. Introduction Union (EU), impact assessment – the EU does not use the
term ‘RIA’ – is seen as a major part of the drive for Better
The concept of ex-ante regulatory impact assessment
Regulation and Smart Regulation (European Commission
(RIA) was introduced in the late 1990s in OECD countries,
2010, 2012; OECD 2012). Thus, many European member
followed by Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries
states have adopted Better Regulation programmes
in early 2000. The OECD declaration on regulatory quality
and legislative frameworks for the introduction of RIA
in 1995 (OECD 1995) provided the first set of international
as a tool for the improvement of regulatory processes.
standards in this policy area and was endorsed at the
The CEE countries have followed a different path in this
highest possible level by its member states. Typically, a
respect, since in most of them RIA was adopted prior
RIA describes a policy problem, identifies alternative solu-
to the development of better regulation programmes
tions to achieve the policy objectives, assesses possible
due to international organizations being the single-most
effects and describes measures to be taken (OECD 1997).
important trigger (Staroňová 2010). Discussions of RIA
The RIA should help decide whether action is appropri-
on the international level are relatively coherent in terms
ate and if regulation is the best method of addressing
of the nature and purpose of the tool (e.g. Radaelli &
the problem (hence RIA). RIA became a  fundamental
De Francesco 2007; OECD 2008; European Commission
component of the smart regulatory state advocated by
2015): rational, evidence-based, participatory, transpar-
international organizations (OECD 2012) because of its
ent, looking at options and bringing stakeholder views.
systematic consultation, criteria for policy choice and
Regardless of the impetus for the introduction of RIA
economic analysis of how the costs and benefits of pro-
methods and rules, the advocates of RIA argue that it
posed regulations affect a wide range of actors. Many
introduces ‘new discipline and rigor to the rule-making
countries have introduced the obligation of regulatory
process’ (Harrington & Morgenstern 2004, 3) as it pro-
authorities to perform an ex-ante impact assessment
vides decision-makers with empirical data and evidence
during the process of drafting and prior to law approval.
as well as with a comprehensive framework in which they
RIA is currently experiencing a remarkable level of
can assess their options and the possible consequences
attention in many countries (see Radaelli 2004, 2005;
of their decisions. A poor understanding of the prob-
De Francesco 2012) under different names in govern-
lems at hand or of the indirect effects of government
mental policy-making processes, utilizing terms such as
action can undermine regulatory efforts and result in
impact assessment, impact analysis, impact evaluation,
regulatory failures. Many previous studies assume that
policy appraisal or policy assessment. In the European

CONTACT  Katarina Staronova  staronova@governance.sk

© 2016 IAIA

the availability and use of information from RIA leads to
changes in the outcome of policy-making, notably to
better law-making and regulatory quality (Hahn & Litan
1997; OECD 1997, 2008; Mandelkern Group Report 2001).
It should also improve the accountability and legitimacy
of any policy- and law-making system due to the factual
efficiency provided by adequate information (Hahn &
Litan 2003). In addition, proponents also believe that RIA
increases policy coordination and stronger stakeholder
involvement (European Commission 2009).
In this paper, we want to take institutional context
approach – explore the wider political and institutional
context within which RIA system operates. The relation-
ship between evidence, knowledge, information and
governance and institutions is extremely complicated.
Both international organizations (e.g. the World Bank,
OECD and EC) and academics have called for more evi-
dence in national policy-making. However, existing stud-
ies (Bosswell 2008, 2009; Jacob et al. 2008; Turnpenny
et al. 2008, 2013; Schrefler 2010) show how difficult it is to
connect evidence with policy-making processes. RIA pro-
cesses are often formal box ticking exercises (Staroňová
2010), evidence is often ignored, used selectively for pre-
ferred decisions (Radaelli 1995, 2010) or simply regarded
as an additional administrative burden on civil servants in
policy-making (Jacob et al. 2008). Thus, political context
within which individual countries institutionalize RIAs
shapes actual implementation and practice. It has been
argued that institutional arrangements play a considera-
ble role as they shape the incentive structures for the use
of RIA tools, including how the assessment is being timed
in relation to the policy-making process and how closely
linked the assessment is to the political arena (Nilsson
et al. 2008; Turnpenny et al. 2008). Various authors have
tried to identify important institutional factors influ-
encing the implementation of RIA, such as differing
bureaucratic and organizational traditions (Turnpenny
et al. 2008), governmental capacities and policy pro-
cesses (Radaelli & De Francesco 2007), sectorization of
policy-making (Turnpenny et al. 2008), phasing of the
assessment process, the strength of institutional over-
sight and coordination (Staroňová 2010) and existence
of guidelines for standardizing the RIA (Staroňová 2010).
In response to these challenges, many countries have
reformed their processes to increase the quality of RIA
output, including Central European countries. One of
the major implications for the reform of RIA processes
is whether an oversight body on RIA exists. Indeed,
a widespread consensus seems to be emerging on the
merit of having a strong oversight body for RIA (Jacobs
2006; Renda 2006; Staroňová 2010; Fritsch et al. 2012).
Also, through the soft-law mechanisms of RIA policy
recommendations, the OECD strongly encourages the
establishment of a central oversight body as the single
most significant quality assurance mechanism (OECD
2008, 2009, 2012). Such a body should have a mandate
Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal   215
for issuing guidance and checking that the quality of
the analysis is satisfactory, and for ensuring transparency
and coordination. There exist many types and models of
oversight mechanisms; perhaps the most studied ones
are the US Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
the UK Better Regulation Executive and the European
Commission’s Impact Assessment Board. The last of these
was created in 2007 within the Secretary General to
check the quality of draft IAs. The Secretary General also
coordinates the machinery of inter-service consultation
and manages the Commission’s policy on transparency
and access to documents.
RIA should ideally work as an iterative learning pro-
cess which starts early in the policy-making process
and runs in parallel with the decision-making process.
As the assessment evolves, new questions may emerge
or new data may require the reinterpretation of original
assumptions. One approach to this issue may involve
the official division of the impact assessment process
into different phases. Some phases must be compul-
sory, while others can be optional. The adoption of a
two-phase (‘dual stage’) system was also recommended
by the Mandelkern Group (Mandelkern Group Report
2001) and can be found, among others, in the European
Commission’s impact assessment procedures. The
Commission applies this approach to RIAs on the basis of
a so-called ‘principle of proportionate analysis’ (European
Commission 2009). This translates, since 2005, into prac-
tice the obligation to produce preliminary ‘roadmaps’ on
all proposals, while more comprehensive impact assess-
ments are carried out only on selected items. It is the
Secretary General, the Impact Assessment Board and
individual Directorates General that decide on an annual
basis which proposals undergo an impact assessment.
The services are then invited to match the depth of the
necessary analysis with the time and financial resources
at disposal. The EC guidelines (European Commission
2009) explain in detail the nature and various steps, and
provide advice on how and when to prepare it.
Many authors call for RIA and policy analysis not to
be perceived as a ‘purely scientific process’ (Hertin et al.
2009, 9), but rather as a ‘discursively rational’ and ‘par-
ticipatory’ process (Fischer & Forester 1993). This trans-
formation of policy analysis into an ‘argumentative’
form (Fischer & Forester 1993; Hoppe 1999) leads to the
emergence of wider concepts of what evidence actually
means: not only the generation of data and information
by expert analysts in purely scientific processes, but also
a discursive process encouraging dialogue and the gath-
ering of ‘lay knowledge’ via consultation process.
The main aim of the research discussed in this paper is
to assess various institutional procedural changes intro-
duced in order to increase the quality of RIA output, such
as the regulatory oversight, two-phase system, standard-
ization of RIA reports, guidelines for the use and interpre-
tation of RIA. It aims to answer the following questions:
216    K. Staronova
Table 1. Key milestones in RIA system institutionalization in Slovakia.
Key milestones Regulation
November 2001 Legislative Rules of the Government
241/1997: amendment by Government
Decree 512/2001
November 2001 Guidelines for the preparation and submis-
sion of material for government sessions
512/2001
2006 Law on environmental impact assessment
24/2006: new
October 2007 Better regulation programme
May 2008 Joint methodology for the RIA: new
document
2008–2009 Joint methodology for the RIA piloting
February 2010 Joint methodology for the RIA comes to
full effect: revised after pilot evaluation
January 2012 The Legislative Rules of Government
amendment in June 2011 (in effect as of
1 January 2012)
2015 Joint methodology for the RIA: substantive
revisions expected.
• Are the institutional procedural changes an
effective tool for strengthening evidence-based
policy-making?
• How are RIA process changes reflected in the qual-
ity of contents of RIA reports?
• Have the policy ammendments failed, and if so,
what are the reasons for this failure?
In order to explore these sets of questions, we focus on
RIA practice using Slovakia as a case study. We have chosen
this jurisdiction because it has introduced RIA process in
early 2000s, nevertheless with dubious results reflected
in extreme formalism (Staroňová 2007, 2010). Many CEE
countries, including Slovakia, have reformed its processes
in order to overcome the formalism. Thus, the early phase
of RIA adoption was followed by a phase of RIA process
changes. Nevertheless, it is useful to look at Slovak case
because only here the procedures have been changed on
a number of occasions and with shifting rationales. The
article checks the theoretical expectations of improve-
ment in RIA output (data and analysis in the RIA reports)
due to the RIA process changes (the introduction of regu-
latory oversight, two-phase system, standardization of RIA
reports, methodology) against empirical evidence from
impact assessments reports from the period of 2007 to
2013. This period was selected to reflect the broad trends
conducted against the backdrop of repeated procedural
changes (see Table 1). Therefore, we want to observe if
qualitative changes occurred throughout this period in the
content of the RIAs. The paper looks at two levels: firstly
Contents
To introduce the requirement for RIA in Explanatory Memoranda and open inter-­
ministerial review process to the public
Interpretation and Explanation of Legislative Rules: Statement of Impacts to become
explicit part of Explanatory Memoranda
To comply with EU requirements and secure public consultation in construction pro-
jects (a parallel procedure to RIA)
Better regulation strategic documents (Action Plan for the Reduction of Administrative
Burden 2007–2012)
• Introduction of RIA oversight by four supervisory bodies: Ministry of Finance; Ministry
of Economy; Ministry of Environment; and Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and
Family
• Introduction of a two-phase system via quick test
• Standardization of RIA report – Note on Selected Impacts
Statement of Impacts replaced by:
Note on Selected Impacts (preliminary),
Note on the Analysis of Impacts (full), if Note of Selected Impacts indicated any potential
(positive or negative) impacts in any of 5 areas
• quick test replaced by preliminary review procedure (PRP)
• PRP merges two RIA reports (Note on Selected Impacts + Note on Analysis of
Impacts) into one procedural step
• Note on Analysis of Impacts: standardized forms introduced by each supervising
body
• Shortened time for supervisory bodies to review RIA documents
• Supervisory bodies are obliged to establish ‘analytical centres’ to review RIAs more
effectively and start providing feedback (opinion)
Preliminary Review Procedure voluntary for legislative items
the institutional setting of the RIA process, i.e. the formal
requirements for RIA, and secondly the actual practice of
RIA as manifested in the impact assessments produced
between 2007 and 2013. To this end we have coded infor-
mation on RIA, as attached in Explanatory Memoranda to
the draft legislation. Specifically, we ask how the quality
of RIA has been effected by the regulatory reforms over
the years and what main trends can be observed since the
introduction of the institutional changes in RIA process.
2.  Institutionalization of RIA in Slovakia
This section looks at how the RIA process has been insti-
tutionalized in Slovakia and examines how the RIA pro-
cedures and guidance has changed over time, the case
study studied here. Table 1 summarizes the main steps
of RIA institutionalization.
The preparation of material for government sessions
is guided by several documents, setting the general
requirements for presenting the assessment of the pos-
sible impacts of draft laws. The most important ones
are the Legislative Rules of Slovakia, Guidelines for the
Preparation and Submission of Material for Government
Sessions of the Slovak Republic and since 2008 the Joint
Methodology for the RIA. All three documents have been
amended several times to reflect developments in RIA
(see Table 1).
The first requirement to apply ex ante RIA to draft
legislation was introduced by amending the Legislative

rules of the Slovak government in 2001 following the
recommendations of SIGMA OECD, a think tank and a
joint initiative of EU and OECD. In contrast to the expe-
rience of other OECD countries the adoption of RIA took
place prior to the development of the Better Regulation
Program. The main document on impact assessment
that brought about significant RIA procedural changes
is the 2008 Joint Methodology of the Assessment of
Impacts standardizing the RIA reports and providing
clear requirements and expectations. On this basis the
government introduced two-phase system for RIA devel-
opment, oversight mechanism by entrusting four line
ministries with the development of unified joint method-
ologies for particular areas of RIA: the Ministry of Finance
for both fiscal RIA and RIA on e-democracy; the Ministry
of Economy for RIA in the business environment; the
Ministry of Environment for environmental RIA; and the
Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family for social
RIA. The document has been modified after its pilot-
ing in the first two years (2008–2009). The revised Joint
Methodology came into full effect in February 2010. As of
2012 two-phase system was made voluntary through an
amendment of the Legislative Rules of the government.
When looking at the overall framework in place, the
requirements for the RIA outcome presentation evolved
with procedural changes. During the first phase of RIA
adoption (2001–2007) the information on RIA-related
issues were not standardized and were found in various
parts of the Explanatory memoranda, creating confusion
for the reader (Staroňová 2007, 2010). The introduction
of Joint Methodology in 2008 brought standardization
for presenting data and information in a formal RIA
report which has two distinctive formats depending
on the RIA phase and corresponding depth of analysis
conducted: Note on Selected Impacts (partial RIA) and
Note on the Analysis of Impacts (full RIA). The former
one is utilized for the first phase and initial scanning for
potential impacts, whereas the latter one is utilized in
the second phase of a more in-depth RIA analysis if any
impact has been identified. Note on Selected Impacts
has a very simple format, identifying impacts for five
requested areas (fiscal, economic, social, environmen-
tal, e-government) by ticking the relevant box: positive,
no, negative impact. Only if positive/negative impact
is ticked, further Analysis is conducted, but only in the
selected RIA area.
One of the biggest methodological concerns is
related to narrow understanding of RIA as assessment
of impacts only. As seen from Table 2, the assessment
of impacts is not seen in the context of problem anal-
ysis and subsequent justification of intervention and
goal setting. Thus, these vital pre-conditions for effec-
tive options development, monitoring and effective
policy assessment are not in place. Consequently, the
existing formal framework does not provide adequate
space for looking at options, although in contrast to the
past, the changes now at least provide space for options
Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal   217
development (but not comparison). Rather, current form
focuses on specific issues of effects than providing incen-
tives to analyse and see trade-offs between options, or
wide range of potential impacts, including side effects.
The selection of questions focuses on producing ‘hard’
data, particularly in the fiscal area (such as costs), and
no space is given for exploratory methods. In none of
the cases do the methodologies ask for the provision
of analytical methods and sources for data or any type
of evidence to substantiate the answer (e.g. why ‘no’ has
been ticked). This can have severe consequences on the
way how RIA is conducted, namely providing analysis of
effects only for the option already chosen.
Contrary to EC and OECD terminology and practice,
there is no specific requirement in Slovakia for consulta-
tions outside of the bodies of public administration. The
participation of stakeholders is not foreseen in the design
of RIAs, even after the reform. To the contrary, the consul-
tation process is related to a formal inter-­ministerial review
process which, however, is a different process compared
to the consultation. It is reserved for the gathering of leg-
islative opinions on the draft l­egislation primarily from
central agencies rather than on the design of regulation,
and its mechanism appears very late in the process of
policy-making. Although this process was opened up to
public scrutiny thanks to the Free Access to Information
Law, it still does not fulfil the consultation function. Thus,
external actors have to rely on a formal inter-ministerial
review process which comes at a late stage in the whole
process; most such materials are already prepared in legal
paragraphs for approval by the government, and civil serv-
ants are reluctant to deal with opinions from the public
at such a late stage. Further, this formal procedure must
be observed by the public participating in the process of
inter-ministerial review. In ­practice, this means that the
legal f­ormulation of ­opinions, including those from the
public, is extremely important which contradicts the idea
of public consultation.
3.  Methods and data
Data collection took place on three principal levels: (a)
changes anchored in official regulations guiding RIA
process (b) RIA documents coding (Notes on Selected
Impacts, Notes on the Analysis of Impacts and the
Opinions of the Supervisory Bodies) taken from the
government’s official site for documents presented
and approved at cabinet meetings, and (c) five semi-­
structured interviews with heads of the supervisory
units for five RIA areas (fiscal RIA, e-democracy RIA,
economic RIA, social RIA and environmental RIA) from
four Ministries that were designed as regulatory over-
sight: Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economy, Ministry
of Labour, Ministry of Environment. All draft laws and
amendments with their explanatory memoranda and
accompanying statements of impacts proposed at cab-
inet meetings from 2007 to 2013 were analysed in terms
218    K. Staronova

Table 2. RIA components required by formal guidance.

Guiding document
Explanation (based on EC guiding Guidelines 2001– Joint methodology Joint methodology in ef-
Components documents 2009, 2015) 2007 piloting 2008–2009 fect (revised) 2010–2015
RIA report Independence of RIA report from other Statement of Impacts Note on Selected Impacts Note on Selected Impacts
accompanying documents to draft as part of the Explan- (partial) (partial)
legislation atory Memoranda Note on the Analysis of Note on the Analysis of
(EM) Impacts (full) Impacts (full) with ques-
tions for each area
Purpose (justification Identification and analysis of the issue(s) or Justification of need Justification of need rath- Justification of need rather
of intervention) problem(s) in one or more policy areas rather than justifica- er than justification of than justification of
tion of intervention intervention (not part intervention (not part of
(not part of RIA of RIA report, but EM) RIA report, but EM)
report)
Objectives Policy objectives will be expressed in terms General aims (e.g. EU General aims (e.g. EU har- General aims (e.g. EU
of expected results in a given timeframe harmonization), not monization), not part of harmonization), not part
(i.e. in terms of ‘ends’ not ‘means’). part of RIA report, RIA report, but EM of RIA report, but EM
but EM
Options Alternative policy options to achieve the No ‘Has originator consid- Blank field ‘Options’: (no
objective(s) will be considered at an ered options’ (yes-no methodology on devel-
early stage in the preparation of policy question without need opment or requirement
proposals. This includes the option of ‘no to further specify or to fill in)
policy change’, which will always be used analyse the options)
as the point of reference against which
the other options are assessed
Assessment of All relevant positive and negative impacts Not standardized Not standardized Questions in five impact
impacts examined and reported on with a specific areas for full IA (including
emphasis on their environmental, eco- methodology how to
nomic and social dimensions answer)
Comparison of Following the assessment of the most No No No
options relevant options, the results will be
presented in a clear and transparent way
in the Impact Assessment report.
Monitoring/ex-post Once the preferred option has been iden- No No No
evaluation tified, the arrangements for monitoring
and evaluation will be broadly analysed
and described
Effected groups Analysis of stakeholders No No Covered by questions in
identification economic and social RIA
Consultation process Mechanisms for input gathering from No (voluntary) No (voluntary) No (voluntary)
effected groups throughout the whole
policy process

of the RIA process and RIA information (in total 668 draft
law and law amendments with RIAs). Although the joint
methodology requires RIA for all material going to gov-
ernment sessions, the sole focus of this paper is on the
RIA reports accompanying draft laws and amendments
proposed to the cabinet in meetings in the selected
period. The analysis omitted all other material that goes
for discussion to government sessions, such as law inten-
tions, concept papers, information, action plans, bilateral
agreements and loans. The reason for this focus is two-
fold: firstly, most of the policies in CEE countries take the
form of a legal document which is binding for every-
one in the country. Thus, draft laws and amendments
usually have a significant impact on the lives of citizens.
Secondly, it is the legislative process that is formally reg-
ulated which allows the author to evaluate the degree
of compliance with international standards. Draft laws
debated more than once within government sessions
are calculated as one unit, simultaneously taking the
characteristics of all the materials into account.
Data on each RIA document was collected for both
quantitative and qualitative analysis by employing a sin-
gle coding template to cover (a) institutional and con-
text variables (background variables) (b) 120 variables
organized around variable groups: basic RIA content
components variables (see Table 3), stakeholders and
consultation, presentation of the RIA report (number of
words, organization, transparency), phasing of RIA, over-
sight body (support, opinions, veto), RIA tools, specific
RIA areas (quantification and monetization). Each RIA
document is coded manually following the template. By
collating and systematizing the findings under the above
mentioned categories, the analytical framework allows
to go beyond a descriptive presentation and assessment
of the quality of contents of RIA report towards a more
analytic understanding of key variables. Once all the
manual codes were compiled, statistical reliable infer-
ences could be drawn. This process enables to create
a database that can be utilized for more countries and
comparative quality assessment of RIA documents can
be conducted in future.
The variables were derived from the guidelines of the
European Commission (2009, 2015) and best practice of
OECD countries. In terms of the variable group related to
criterion of basic content components of RIA, EC suggests
the following issues to be assessed by the RIA: justifica-
tion of intervention (purpose), measurable objectives,
options for intervention (including non-regulatory ones),
 Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal   219

assessment of impacts, comparison of options, monitor-

217 (max.990, min. 26)

128 (max.506, min. 15)

224 (max.1434, min.0)
ing and ex-post evaluation measures and identification

835 (max.3684, min.

355 (max.1055, min.

62 (max.301, min. 3)
of effected groups and its consultation. The second cri-

2013
terion of impact analysis looks into details of the analysis

–
conducted in social, economic and environmental areas.

29)

36)
To this we have included also traditional fiscal impact
assessment (namely impacts on state budget) to bet-

526 (max.1995,

259 (max.1212,
ter differentiate among ‘internal’ (impacts on state) and
165 (max.443,

151 (max.724,

131 (max.229,

142 (max.484,
min. 469)
2012

‘external’ (impacts on society) impacts. In this sense, we

min. 73)

min. 56)
min.93)
–

min.)

min.)
look at identification of impacts in each area, provision
of data (qualitative or quantitative) in each area, identi-
fication of costs, identification of benefits and quantifi-
Amendment

241 (max.711, min.

226 (max.912, min.

154 (max.596, min.

81 (max.441, min.
cation of costs and quantification of benefits, as well as
298 (max.1392,

794 (max.5522,
2011

mutual trade-offs. The third criterion of consultancy pro-

min. 167)
–

min.74)

cess looks into the way how affected parties have been
125)

79)

18)

49)
identified and involved into the consultation process as
well as how the results of the consultation process are
360 (max.2466,

presented in the RIA report.

2009

The coding involves only RIA reports accompanying

min.44)

ministerial proposals which have been approved by the

cabinet in its meetings. There is no obligation to prepare
RIA for parliamentary initiatives. Therefore, the research
361 (max.4209,

presented in this article is based on content analysis of

Legislative type

2007

min. 40)

government-initiated draft laws and amendments.

4.  Evidence from RIA performance

186 (max.893, min.

98 (max.238, min.
1070 (max.3991,
279 (max.2883,

209 (max.1969,
236 (max.935,

Formally speaking, almost all draft legislation in Slovakia

2013
–

min. 89)
min.94)

min.93)

complies with the requirement of attaching a Note on

min. 5)
13)

12)

Selected Impacts for assessing potential impacts to the

material that goes to government sessions. The analy-
sis of the RIA documents (see Tables 4–5) show that the
300 (max.1109,

954 (max.6988,

360 (max.2225,

294 (max.829,

114 (max.424,
57 (max.153,

biggest problem is not compliance so much as the scope

min. 424)

min. 158)

min. 123)
2012

min. 55)

min. 98)
min.68)
–

and depth of the further analysis, although even this did

improve significantly with the standardization of docu-
ments and provision of specific questions in each area
255 (max.668, min.

145 (max.882, min.

.15012,min. 446)

17 (max.70, min.3)
New law

since 2010.
430 (max.1549,

247 (max.2698,

The introduction of standardized forms with questions

2011

min. 142)
1738 (max
–

min.77)

has forced the civil servants to answer these questions,

96)

55)

and although the answers still do not provide the used

analytical methods or data sources, they do show the
512 (max.5249,
Table 3. The depth of RIA – the average number of words.

costs and benefits, and they discuss issues in more depth.

2009

When discussing the scope and depth of RIAs conducted

–

–
min.59)

prior to changes (2007), during the piloting period with-

out having standardized forms (2009) as well as after the
revisions (2010 onwards), it is worthwhile looking at a
(max.8568,
2007

proxy indicator – the average number of words used in

min.65)
–

the RIA document. Although it is not a direct indicator

783

of the depth of analysis (in-depth analyses can be just a

Note on Selected

few pages long), it is still an indicator of the length of the

Environmental

E-governance
Statement of

document and thus an indirect measurement of what

Year

Economic
Impacts

Impacts

such a document can potentially contain (in the case of

Social
Fiscal

forms we have deducted the words in the questions to

get a ‘pure’ word count). A typical A4 page with double
of words in
of Impacts
(average #

(average #
Note on the
of words)

the filled

spacing and Times New Roman Font contains approxi-

Analysis
Impacts

forms)
Note on

mately 300 to 330 words. Table 3 shows that the aver-

age number of words in the individual Notes on Impacts
 
220    K. Staronova
Table 4. The scope of RIAs.
Note on selected impacts: ‘No impact’
2007 (n = 126) 69 (55%)
2009 (n = 130) 53 (40.7%)
2011 (n = 131) 38 (29%)
2012 (n = 84) 37 (44%)
2013 (n = 108) 44 (41%)
Notes: The official guidelines on RIA state five possible areas: fiscal, economic, social, environmental and e-government. In order to eliminate RIAs which only
formally stated ‘RIA brings positive effect’, we have calculated into ‘full’ RIA in this table only those which had more than 30 words in one area.
x – E-government as a fifth area was introduced by Joint Methodology only in 2008, however, standardized form was introduced only as of 2010. Therefore,
years 2007 and 2009 have only maximum of four RIA areas.
dramatically increased and by far exceeds the average
number of words in the Statement of Impacts covering
all four areas (financial, economic, environmental and
social), which ranges from 340 to 730 words. In other
words, what used to be one to two A4 pages, or half
a page per RIA area, is now several pages long for each
area, particularly in the area of finance and the economy.
This can be considered a clear benefit of rigidly following
a given format.
Yet, another benefit of standardized forms for RIA
documents was observed in the increase of non-fiscal
areas covered and in the increase of the number of areas
covered simultaneously (Table 4). While prior to the intro-
duction of joint methodology, fiscal analysis was the only
RIA conducted in depth, other RIA areas became part of in
depth analysis. However, the fiscal area is still a dominant
area covered by RIAs and it is still equated with expendi-
tures and costs that fall on the state budget, due to the
strong supervisory position of the Ministry of Finance. Full
RIAs (Notes on the Analysis of Impacts) are followed by
economic analyses, which prior to the joint methodology
were basically absent. Environmental analyses remain
the weakest both in terms of number of RIAs conducted
and depth of analysis provided (see Table 5). This finding
contradicts the findings of Zvijáková et al. (2014). Still,
close to the half of all RIAs show that there is ‘no impact’
foreseen (Table 4), although this number has decreased
by 15% since the introduction of Joint Methodology. The
lowest number of RIAs showing ‘no impact’ is only in 2011
(only 30% which corresponds to OECD estimates of the
percentage of regulations that may not have a significant
impact)), a year when three new procedural measures
collided: introduction of standardized questions for each
RIA area, oversight mechanism in place in practice, oblig-
atory two-phase process.
Turning to quantification, data show that prior to
the procedural changes, the biggest problem was the
superficial way of filling in the documents with simple
statements such as ‘no impact’, ‘will bring positive impact’
and ‘no serious impacts’, and numerical information with
no further explanation as to how this number had been
calculated or achieved. There was no effort to analyse or
quantify information, except for quantification of costs
on state budget (Staroňová 2007, 2010). As noted before,
Note on the analysis of impacts (full)
5 areas 4 areas 3 areas 2 areas 1 area
x 0 0 1 57
x 2 22 31 21
1 8 16 29 19
1 4 12 16 13
0 13 17 14 18
with the introduction of Joint Methodology there is an
immediate increase in full analyses in other than fiscal
areas. However, this surge of full RIAs was not accom-
panied by increase of quantification of costs or benefits
in any of the areas. Thus, although it might seem from
Table 6 that in 2007 and 2009 significantly more RIAs
were conducted in the fiscal area, this number also cov-
ers simple monetization with no provision of evidence
or logic as to how that monetization had been arrived
at (except for costs on state budget). Thus, also increase
in social and economic full RIAs meant identification of
primarily benefits with phrases such as ‘positive impact
on citizentry/society’.
Regarding the further step of quantification of costs
and benefits, the data reveal increase in 2011 with the
introduction of standardized questions in each area (as
of 2010). The rigour of quantification of both costs and
benefits became a standard in fiscal area (as opposed
to prior focus on costs solely) and there is effort notice-
able in other areas (as opposed to zero previously). The
finding confirms that institutionalization of assessment
system (via questions and methodology) brings results
in short term. This finding corresponds to previous stud-
ies of other RIA systems, such as European Commission
(Radaelli & Meuwese 2010). Nevertheless, quantification
of social and environmental costs and benefits is lag-
ging behind the identified effects despite the questions
and methodology provided. Other research reveals that
indeed quantification often focuses on easily quantifi-
able and typically neglects social and environmental
aspects which are not easily quantifiable (Renda 2006).
In addition, civil servants are also reluctant to engage in
quantifications of administrative burden (economic IA)
which typically belongs to easily quantifiable aspects.
This could be attributed to the fact that despite exist-
ing guidance in the form of questions and examples,
if no trainings are provided, civil servants ignore the
requirement.
5.  Discussion: effectiveness of institutional
changes
Our data suggest that there has been some improve-
ment in the performance of RIAs, both in quantitative
Table 5. Number of Full RIAs (Notes on the Analysis of Impacts) that identify and quantify costs and benefits.
Note on the Analysis of Impact – Fiscal RIA (full) Note on the Analysis of Impact – Economic RIA (full) Note on the Analysis of Impact – Social RIA (full)
Note on the
Iden- Quan- Analysis of
Identified Quantified Identified Quantified Identified Quantified Identified Quantified Identified Quanti- tified tified Impact –
N % costs costs benefits benefits % costs costs benefits benefits % costs fied costs benefits benefits Enviro
2007 126 60 (47%) 45 40 23 17 3 (2%) 1 0 1 0 20 (15.8%) 0 0 9 0 15 (12%)
2009 130 77 (60%) 42 36 30 20 57 (44%) 13 1 29 4 49 (37%) 4 0 19 4 11 (8%)
2011 131 55 (42%) 49 41 41 39 40 (30%) 37 10 29 7 27 (20%) 22 7 22 7 2 (2%)
2012 84 27 (32%) 24 21 23 22 35 (41%) 32 8 23 4 19 (22%) 14 4 15 4 5 (6%)
2013 107 42 (38%) 38 33 35 28 39 (36%) 28 5 26 5 34 (31%) 5 1 32 10 8 (7%)
Notes: N = number of draft laws and ammendments approved at Government meeting at that year. Through a yes/no answer, the Note on Selected Impacts identifies evidence of a ‘positive’, ‘negative’ or ‘no’ impact. The Note on the Analysis of
Impacts is a more in-depth RIA analysis that follows if positive/negative impact is identified in any of the requested areas (combination of any) and thus can cover also very formal full RIAs identifying benefits e.g. ‘will bring positive effects on
society’.
The Impact on E-government was introduced by the Joint Methodology in 2008, but pilot year (2008 and 2009 used an older form of the Statement of Impacts which did not incorporate that area. Thus, only data for 2011 onwards are available
and therefore it was not included into a detailed analysis.

Table 6. The two-phase system in practice.

Total number of laws and Quick test (2008–2009) Preliminary review procedure (‘PRP’) (2010–present)
amendments going to gov. Number of EU-related
  session items (exempt from PRP) New laws Amendments New laws Amendments Total (non-EU related)
2008 112 0 0 – –  
2009 130 0 0 – –  
2010 103 34 – – 11 21 32 (46%)
2011 131 34 – – 28 42 70 (72%)
2012 84 33 – – 5 6 11 (21%)
2013 108 34 – – 6 5 11 (10%)
Total 668     50 74 124
Notes: 2008 and 2009 were pilot years for the joint methodology, and in 2010 and 2011 the Joint Methodology was in full effect (the PRP replaced the quick test). The 2012 amendment changed the preliminary review procedure to a voluntary
one.
Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 
 221
222    K. Staronova
and qualitative aspects. We discuss in this section how
changes in RIA procedures positively effect the output, or
to the contrary, create obstacle to how RIA knowledge is
supposed to be produced and used in the policy process.
We can observe an improvement in providing full
RIA reports across all RIA areas from 2009 onwards
when joint methodology was introduced. However,
only clear methodology and set of questions in each
area meant that not only ‘identification’ of impacts was
mentioned, but also more in depth-analysis in quantifi-
cation of costs and benefits started to occur since 2011.
Thus, major element of institutionalization and learning
occurred through the publication of RIA guidance doc-
uments. Second, the standardization of the RIA docu-
ments helped to systematically locate information in one
place and force civil servants to provide information in
structured ways thanks to the questions in the form. In
general, transparency has improved, although there still
exist ad hoc cases where there is a reference to a detailed
analysis in an external source (analysis, modelling, etc.)
which, however, is not attached, thus making it impos-
sible to check the results of the analysis.1 Surprisingly,
the oversight bodies did not object to such a practice.
This can be attributed to low authority and inadequate
powers vested in oversight bodies.
Nevertheless, standardization has also its limits; RIA
report does not provide specific information unless such
information is asked for. Unfortunately, the design of the
RIA documents is strongly focused on and reduced to
assessing impacts (Table 2) rather than detailing the
objectives, problem at hand and providing a rationale
and options for solving the problem. The concept of RIA
follows a rationalist idea: the assessment is perceived as
a value-free technical exercise where context (assump-
tions, problem framing, objectives, dominant discourses,
other options and other stakeholders’ views) lies outside
the scope of RIA.
Thus, even the renewed RIA documents reflect the
old unreformed formal legislative process where RIA was
typically a one-off activity which took place at the wrong
place and time within the decision-making process. Prior
to procedural changes RIA took place towards the end
of the policy formulation process, notably once a draft
law was ready and written in articles with no time left
for options or consultations. To have policy formulation
constrained before the decision-making has even started
is not limited to CEE countries only. Hertin et al. (2009),
Russel and Jordan (2007) mention administrative, legal
and international (EU) procedures and commitments
that narrow down the alternatives consideration.
In general, we could not observe a steady improve-
ment over time in scope (number of areas covered)
or depth of analysis (number of full RIAs and percent-
age of quantification of costs and benefits). Although
patterns are rarely linear, we can see some clusters of
improvement and degradation. It seems that in 2009
most integrated full RIAs were conducted (Table 5),
while many of these remained formal. 2011, on the other
hand, witnessed the peak of quantification of costs and
benefits. In addition, the data show that the preliminary
reports still formally state ‘no impact’ (Table 5) in more
than 40% of RIAs, except for one year in 2011. However,
these results were not reached in subsequent years of
2012 and 2013. Why further improvement and learning
did not take place? There are several possible explana-
tions for this failure, related to procedural change of reg-
ulatory oversight and phasing.
First, there seem to be resistance among both politi-
cians and civil servants against any attempts to make the
RIA process into more iterative one by gradual decon-
struction of the phasing system. The procedural changes
implemented a two-phase process to all material, except
for those implementing EU directives. The output of the
first phase (‘Note of Preliminary Impacts’) is sent to the
four supervising bodies. If this quick test identifies any
type of impact in five areas (fiscal, economic, social,
environmental and e-democracy), a more detailed RIA
(‘Analysis of Impacts’) is prepared in a  second phase.
While the draft of the reform was being prepared, there
was a discussion on the table to connect the RIA pro-
cess more tightly to the existing legislative procedure
by requiring RIA very early in the process at the phase of
the preparations of the annual list of bills (interview 1).
However, this idea was immediately dismissed by law
drafters in the legislative departments of individual min-
istries on the basis of ‘creating additional administrative
burden’ (Interview 1) and never became materialized.
During the pilot period from 2008 to 2009 none of the
material underwent the first phase (see Table 6). Simply,
the old routine of presenting RIAs only once a draft
act or amendment was ready and had gone through a
regular inter-ministerial review process remained. After
the pilot, the procedural change of phasing came into
full effect on 1 February 2010, with additional changes
that again narrowed down the iterative aspect: the first
phase (preliminary review procedure) merged the prepa-
ration of the two types of RIA reports into one step and
shortened the amount of time available for supervisory
bodies to provide feedback. The reluctance of line min-
istries to start early with the RIA process culminated in
final deconstruction step as of January 2012 when the
first phase (preliminary review process) was changed
from being obligatory to voluntary. Making this phase
voluntary factually terminates the two-phase process.
Table 6 shows that the number of RIAs submitted to the
first phase (though never in full compliance) dropped
from over 72% (when EU-related items are deducted, as
they were exempted) in 2011, when the reform was in
full effect, to 10% in subsequent years, when the pro-
cess was made voluntary. This confirms that RIAs are not
conducted in an iterative way anymore, at least prior to
having the draft law proposed written in legal language

in articles. Rather the process stays as it used to be – at
the wrong time and place at the end of the decision-­
making process.
Thus, although a two-phase system today still exists
on paper, the reality is different for several reasons. Firstly,
merging the preliminary and full impact assessments
into one step is contrary to the idea of identifying the
material that requires an in-depth analysis early enough
for there to be sufficient time to conduct the analyses
based on a  plan with a time schedule for collecting
additional data and information (e.g. via consultation
with stakeholders). Secondly, shortening the period to
provide feedback by the supervising bodies does not
give sufficient time to both supervisory bodies and RIA
writers to reflect upon the comments received. Thirdly,
although the timing is set for a minimal period (20 days),
most of the line ministries use even less than the mini-
mal period by utilizing a ‘short-track procedure’, which in
practice means that ministries submit material to the first
phase five days prior to the second phase starts – regular
inter-ministerial review process which is far too late for
all supervising bodies (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5). In fact,
supervising body for environmental RIAs state that this
is one of the core reasons why environmental RIAs are so
lagging behind in comparison to other RIAs:
Environmental RIAs take time, they cannot be done
hastily… we are used to [from strategic environmental
RIA] to at least 100 days for conducing environmental
RIAs ... and also our methodology assumes more time
available ... but originating ministries when told during
the first phase they have to postpone submission of
the law due to more in-depth environmental RIA, they
do not do that. There is no time ... the timeframework
within which ministries work is too short. (Interview 5)
Fourthly, EU-related items are exempted from the pre-
liminary review process, which gives yet another possi-
bility for the originating ministries to skip this phase by
simply labelling the item as ‘EU-related’. In an interview
(1, 4), it was confirmed that nobody checked whether the
item was really EU-related or simply a strategy to avoid
the development of RIAs. In sum, the system provides
a number of loopholes for ministries to avoid the early
signalling of analysis and review opportunities for the
supervisory bodies. Even in the best scenario, there is no
time to conduct a real in-depth analysis and review of
the conducted analysis based on supervisors’ opinions.
Such a system creates problems for supervising min-
istries as well. The first time a supervisor sees a draft and
has the opportunity to comment and ask for a correc-
tion to the identification of potential impacts before
reviewing them (or asking for a plan for data collection)
is also the very same time that the actual in-depth anal-
ysis is undertaken. In addition, this timing is too close
to the regular inter-ministerial review process when
ready-made draft laws or amendments are proposed.
Moreover, since 2012 the supervising ministries usu-
ally see RIAs for the first time only during the second
Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal   223
phase – regular inter-ministerial review process. This is
only few days prior to government meeting and with no
real possibility to check the quality (and validity) of the
answers. One supervisory body observed:
I have less authority when providing feedback to the
originator of RIA during the inter-ministerial review
process than during the first phase [preliminary review
procedure], since I am one of the many subjects pro-
viding formal opinions on draft legislation [and RIA] ….
And I do not have any opportunity or chance to check
whether the opinion was taken seriously or into an
account …. I do not feel like a supervising body any-
more, but only another part of the ministerial machin-
ery. (Interview 2)
Thus, opinions provided during the regular inter-­ministerial
review process are tackled as opinions of a ministry (not
a supervising body) with no obligation on the part of the
originating ministry to deal with it until it is marked as
‘important’.
Second, contrary to the title joint methodology,
both the methodologies (i.e. the five areas of format-
ted questions for a more in-depth note on the analysis
of impacts) and the oversight is broken down to four
ministries depending on the type of RIA (the Ministry of
Finance oversees impacts on the state budget and the
informatization of society; the Ministry of Economy over-
sees impacts on the business environment; the Ministry
of Labour, Social Affairs and Family oversees impacts in
the social area; and the Ministry of Environment oversees
impacts on the environment) with limited, if any, mutual
coordination. In fact, each supervisory body provides its
‘own’ opinion with no coordination:
It would help me if I  could have access to opinions
provided by other supervisors, particularly Ministry
of Finance since fiscal RIA is usually well done. If they
see something, it helps me to see if I overlooked some-
thing, but until I see their opinion my has to be ready
and out, so it is too late for me. (Interview 2)
This approach directly contradicts the efforts of the EU for
an ‘integrated approach’ in the European Commission’s
proposal, Impact Assessment: Next Steps (2002), where it
urges the consideration of social, economic, financial,
environmental and administrative aspects in an inte-
grated and balanced manner in order to avoid sectori-
alism. The barriers to integration appear at micro, meso
and macro levels (Hertin & Berkhout 2003; Turnpenny
et al. 2008) and range from lack of resources or train-
ing available to civil servants, to sectorialism but also
to perceived role of analysis in a particular RIA area and
capacity development.
In order to strengthen the capacity of the supervising
ministries, the procedural changes in 2010 obliged them
to create specific analytical units whose task is to assist
and supervise the quality of the conducted RIAs. The
Ministry of Economy has created the Economic Analysis
Unit; the Ministry of Finance has created the Public
Administration Budget Unit and E-government Unit; the
Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family has created
224    K. Staronova
the Analytical Unit; and the Ministry of Environment has
created the Environmental Impacts Unit. Nevertheless,
these units are understaffed (having only two to three
people who have other tasks in addition to RIA over-
sight). The only exception is the Ministry of Finance,
where the PA Budget Unit has three subunits and is part
of the Department on Budgetary Policy. The workload
at the Ministry of Finance is distributed according to
the specialization of the proposal (also outside of the
department, e.g. to the tax department), and RIAs and all
documentation are circulated and archived in an internal
database. There is a clear role division with an assigned
responsibility. At the same time, the document develop-
ment is traceable in the database. The expertise of the
Ministry of Finance has a long tradition and reputation
which is strengthened by a clear division of responsibility
within a shared case management. The overall analytical
capacity of the Ministry, its institutional internal system
of work division and document circulation and sharing is
also strengthened by the fact that the Ministry of Finance
is the least politicized ministry with the most stable staff
that survives the turmoils of elections and ministerial
changes (Staroňová & Adamicová 2016).
Despite the efforts to supervise the quality of RIA, in
addition to the above-mentioned capacity, the supervis-
ing ministries are facing hierarchical problems ­vis-à-vis
other line ministries due to several factors. Firstly, opin-
ions have a non-binding character. Secondly, the first
phase where the oversight might bring results was
made voluntary, which reduced the number of propos-
als going to the oversight bodies to 10% of the overall
amount going to cabinet sessions. Thirdly, the opinions
provided during the second phase – the inter-ministerial
review – are not considered to be the ‘supervisory body’s
opinions’, but are collected along with other substantive
opinions of the ministry and presented in an aggregated
manner together with opinions from other line minis-
tries towards each proposal (legislative item) prior to
its submission to the cabinet. Thus, even if opinions on
RIA quality are provided, there is no time or place for
the supervisory body to check whether the proponent
reacted and redrafted the RIA.
Our data show that fiscal RIAs are both quantitatively
and qualitatively superior to any other RIAs. This can be
attributed to the fact that the Ministry of Finance has a
specific position and strength, both formal and informal,
as a supervisory body over fiscal RIA. The formal strength
is derived from its role in the preparation of the state
budget which is also anchored in the Law on the State
Budget and which requires the originating ministry to
consult any aspect of a proposed law that might effect
the state budget with the Ministry of Finance and have its
approval. At the same time the Law on the State Budget
enables the Ministry of Finance to ask the originating
ministry for any additional explanations, calculation or
other data to explain the calculations backing the pro-
posal and the Ministry of Finance may do so at any stage
of the legislative process. This mechanism is derived
from long tradition of linking policy decision-making to
implications for the state budget. At the same time, the
Ministry of Finance has a very strong informal position
(confirmed by all interviewees). Its strong informal posi-
tion comes from expertise developed inside the ministry
and accepted by both politicians and civil servants. As
a result, it is the only supervisory body that is able to
see how the opinion towards RIA was incorporated and
return draft law (RIA) if they are of low quality in terms
of (a) inadequate analysis on fiscal impacts or (b) inad-
equate information on how finances are to be secured
for any fiscal implications (Interview 3). This is done in an
informal way; prior to the cabinet meeting. The minister
is briefed by his or her experts from the supervisory unit
to what extent the opinion was taken into account and
on the basis of this he or she is able to veto the proposal
at the cabinet meeting level. No other minister has such
a strength and/or will to practice this (and/or internal
informal mechanisms established):
We have already authority in this …. Informally, we ask
the originating ministries to send us information on
how our opinions have been tackled. They always do
that. And we report – in writing – to our minister on
how satisfactory that was done … so that he is prepared
for the negotiations at Cabinet meeting, or Legislative
Council meeting or even Parliament ….we have special
position – it is about finances after all. (Interview 3)
Overall, the introduction of supervising ministries is of
the utmost importance, but the lack of real authority
(no binding power and no sanctioning power) com-
bined with inadequate communication between the
four supervisors and the bad timing of opinion provi-
sion means that the opinions are not taken seriously,
with the exception of the Ministry of Finance, which has
a different status and informal ways utilizing its power.
In addition, opinions provided during the regular inter-­
ministerial review process do not even have the status
of a ‘supervising body opinion’, and there is no real space
for the supervisor to find out if the originating ministry
has taken the opinion seriously (Interviews) unless they
do so in an informal way as Ministry of Finance.
6. Conclusion
The research clearly confirms some advancement in
reforming RIA process by having an oversight mecha-
nism incorporated into the system and RIA sequencing in
legislation procedure. The first finding of the study draws
attention to the importance of standardization of RIA
documents that force the civil servants to provide more
elaborative answers and broadening the overall scope
of RIAs. The standardization brings structure and trans-
parency into the way how evidence and information is
provided. As a result, standardization increased RIA qual-
ity both quantitatively and qualitatively. Nevertheless,
standardization has also its limits: conductor of RIA does
not provide specific information unless such information

is asked for. Thus, if the oversight body has limited under-
standing of the RIA as a tool, it can focus on unneces-
sary exactness of calculations of impacts rather than
overall justification of regulation as such. The Slovak
case has clearly shown that. Therefore, the emergence
of oversight body should go hand in hand with clear
understanding of RIA functions and training provided
to oversight body staff.
Second, the Slovak case study illustrates how RIA is
still not commonly perceived as an essential element
in the whole system of policy-making or as a tool for
improvement in policy design and coherence by pre-
senting evidence to the decision makers despite of the
reform efforts. This is manifested by predominant focus
of RIA methodology on prediction (and the unnecessary
exactness) of impacts without considering the context
which narrows down the scope of RIA to a pure assess-
ment of impacts. As a consequence, RIAs as a process is
methodologically weak in ‘alternative’ consideration of
policy options when preparing draft policy proposals,
including limited deliberation with stakeholders to gain
ordinary knowledge. Low embeddedness of RIA in the
overall policy-making process results in the dominance
of assessments in the fiscal area, with emphasis given to
quantification rather than justification.
Third, the case study has shown that the system is
easy to be bended and a number of loopholes arise for
ministries a) to avoid the RIAs altogether b) conduct RIAs
after the preferred regulatory option has been put into
the legal articles c) downplay early signalling of analysis
and review opportunities for the supervisory bodies. This
is one of the research areas which future investigations
should focus on. The Slovak case shows that the main
challenge still seems to be proper linking of the RIA pro-
cess to the existing legislative process to ensure a timely
‘flow’ of relevant and objective findings from the various
analytical stages. The organizational culture, including
the strong legalistic tradition typical for CEE countries,
constitutes a major barrier to the effective use of RIA.
Although Slovakia has tried to achieve a smoother pro-
cess by introducing a two-phase RIA process, gradual
pressure from the ministries reversed the reform efforts
to a ‘box-ticking’ exercise that is done at the end of the
process, once a draft law has been prepared, with no real
possibility for a supervising body to step in and point
out the analytical drawbacks. Also, the Slovak case has
pointed out the potential for loopholes, such as the
misuse of fast-track procedure and EU related agenda
to avoid RIA process altogether, which is worth research-
ing in the future. As a result, RIAs are to be made ex post
in a bureaucratic manner to fulfil obligations rather than
during the process of policy-making, which would assist
the decision maker to make an evidence-based decision.
The other important issue is the strength of the over-
sight body that can enhance RIA capacity by means of
support and sanctions if low-quality RIAs are produced.
Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal   225
The Slovak case study has shown that the reason why
oversight has not been effective is because the oversight
body does not have the power to challenge low-quality
RIAs, with the exception of the Ministry of Finance which
utilizes most of its power in an informal way. In addition,
the quality control function is fragmented among the
line ministries which in combination with bad timing
and communication of opinions is the reason why RIA
reforms have not been effective and the quality of RIA
reports have not improved. This finding confirms that
sectorism is a barrier not only to integrated RIAs and pol-
icies (Hertin & Berkhout 2003, Turnpenny et al. 2008) but
also to integrated oversight which decreases the overall
effectiveness of the RIA process.
In addition, the study showed a very important fac-
tor that determines the effectiveness (and strength) of
reform – internal expertise and political support for using
RIA. The Slovak case has showed that lack of politiciza-
tion strengthens the expertise of civil servants and in
return the political leader (minister) trusts and backs
the decisions of them. Thus, if political leader supports
and considers RIA to be a priority, he/she will find even
an informal way for influencing the decision-making
based on data from RIA oversight. This approach is then
reflected in the institutional set up of the oversight mech-
anism which needs to rely on effective internal processes
of data sharing and processing (as well as workload divi-
sion and capacity issues). This is not only important for
understanding the internal process of effective oversight
function but also for understanding the formal – informal
relations related to influencing the decision-making.
These analytical results of the formal existence of RIA
in Slovakia only confirm the notion by Radaelli (2005),
who argues that the RIA policy process is shaped by
context in terms of dimensions and mechanisms. He
claims that the particular context of public adminis-
tration institutions and bureaucracy in continental
Europe is different from the Anglo-Saxon one where RIA
originated. In this sense, ‘efficiency still comes s­ econd
to formal respect of legitimate procedures in the list
of criteria used by bureaucracies’ (Radaelli 2005, 11).
In addition, a transition country (or a country with a
­legacy of transition) constitutes yet another specific
context. Firstly, the bureaucracy still bears the legacy
of ‘non-activism’ and thus increases the chances for the
presence of formalism where the RIA process is reduced
to a bureaucratic ticking-off exercise and a political tool
for substantiating a preferred option. In other words,
it is the politicians who set the course of actions to be
­followed and bureaucrats are not expected to do any
analytical work. Secondly, the systematic data collection
and analysis is still in the process of being e
­ stablished.
Whatever the reason for the specific context, ignoring
the importance of RIA may increase the risk of there
being an inadequate basis for decision-making, leading
to poor and/or symbolic policies.
226    K. Staronova
Note
1. 
A notorious case of such a practice is the big reform of
the state administration (known as the ‘ESO reform’)
to increase efficiency in local state administration
by creating ‘one-stop’ offices. These announced
(and approved) administrative changes will have a
significant impact. Nevertheless, the RIA documents
were not attached or provided to the opponents of
the reform, and the draft law was approved without
any analysis being made available to the decision-
maker.
Funding
This work was supported by the Slovak Research and
Development Agency (APVV) [grant number APVV-0880-12].
ORCID
Katarina Staronova   http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4581-4791
References
Boswell C. 2008. The political functions of expert knowledge:
knowledge and legitimation in European Union immigration
policy. Journal of European Public Policy. 15:471–488.
Boswell C. 2009. The political uses of expert knowledge:
immigration policy and social research. Cambridge (UK):
Cambridge University Press.
De Francesco F. 2012. Diffusion of regulatory impact analysis
among OECD and EU member states. Comp Political Stud.
45:1277–1305.
European Commission. 2015. Better regulation guidelines.
Brussels: European Commission. Available from http://
ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/toc_tool_en.htm
European Commission. 2012. EU Regulatory Fitness.
Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM. 2012.
746 final. Strasbourg: European Commission.
European Commission. 2010. Smart Regulation in the European
Union. Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee of the Regions. COM (2010) 543 final.
Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission. 2009. Impact assessment guidelines.
SEC (2009) 92. Brussels: European Commission.
Fischer F, Forester J. 1993. The argumentative turn in policy
analysis and planning. Durham (NC): Duke University Press.
Fritsch O, Radaelli CM, Schrefler L, Renda A. 2012. Regulatory
quality in the European Commission and the UK: old
questions and new findings. Centre for European Policy
Working Paper, (362).
Hahn RW, Litan RE. 1997. Improving regulatory accountability.
Washington (DC): Brookings Institution Press.
Hahn RW, Litan RE. 2003. Recommendations for improving
regulatory accountability and transparency. Testimony
before the House Government Reform Committee.
Harrington W, Morgenstern RD. 2004. Evaluating regulatory
impact analyses. Washington (DC): Resources for the Future.
Hertin J, Berkhout F. 2003. Analyzing institutional strategies for
environmental policy integration: the case of EU enterprise
policy. J Environ Policy Planning. 5:39–56.
Hertin J, Jordan A, Turnpenny J, Nilsson M, Russel D, Björn
N. 2009. Rationalising the policy mess? Ex ante policy
assessment and the utilisation of knowledge in the policy
process. Ex Ante Policy Assessment and the Utilisation of
Knowledge in the Policy Process (March 17, 2009).
Hoppe R. 1999. Policy analysis, science and politics: from
'speaking truth to power' to 'making sense together'. Sci
Public Policy. 26:201–210.
Jacob K, Hertin J, Hjerp P, Radaelli C, Meuwese A, Wolf O,
Pacchi C, Rennings K. 2008. Improving the practice of impact
assessment. Evaluating Integrated Impact Assessments.
EVIA Project Report 028889. European Commission Sixth
Framework Program.
Jacobs S. 2006. Current trends in regulatory impact analysis:
the challenges of mainstreaming RIA into policy-making.
Washington (DC): Jacobs and Associates.
Mandelkern Group Report. 2001. Final Report, Brussels, Nov 13.
Available from http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/regulation/
docs/europe/pdf/mandfinrep.pdf.
Nilsson M, Jordan A, Turnpenny J, Hertin J, Nykvist B, Russel D.
2008. The use and non-use of policy appraisal tools in public
policy making: an analysis of three European countries and
the European Union. Policy Sci. 41:335–355.
OECD. 1995. Recommendation of the council on improving the
quality of government regulation. Paris: OECD.
OECD. 1997. Law drafting and regulatory management in
Central and Eastern Europe. Paris: SIGMA Papers No. 18.
OECD. 2008. Building an institutional framework for regulatory
impact analysis (RIA). Guidance for policy makers. Paris:
OECD.
OECD. 2009. Indicators of regulatory management systems.
Paris: OECD.
OECD. 2012. Recommendation of the council on regulatory
policy and governance. Paris: OECD.
Radaelli CM. 1995. The role of knowledge in the policy process.
J Eur Public Policy. 2:159–183.
Radaelli CM. 2004. The diffusion of regulatory impact analysis –
best practice or lesson-drawing? Eur J Political Res. 43:723–
747.
Radaelli CM. 2005. Diffusion without convergence: how
political context shapes the adoption of regulatory impact
assessment. J Eur Public Policy. 12:924–943.
Radaelli CM. 2010. Rationality, power, management and
symbols: four images of regulatory impact assessment.
Scand Political Studies. 33:164–188.
Radaelli CM, Meuwese AC. 2010. Hard questions, hard solutions:
proceduralisation through impact assessment in the EU.
West Eur Politics. 33:136–153.
Radaelli C, De Francesco F. 2007. Regulatory quality in Europe.
Concepts, measures and policy processes. Manchester:
Manchester University Press.
Renda A. 2006. Impact assessment in the EU: The state of the
art and the art of the state. Brussels: Centre for European
Policy Studies.
Russel D, Jordan A. 2007. Gearing-up governance for sustainable
development: patterns of policy appraisal in UK central
government. J Environ Planning Manage. 50:1–21.
Schrefler L. 2010. The usage of scientific knowledge by
independent regulatory agencies. Governance. 23:309–330.
Staroňová K, Adamicová N. 2016. Politicization of civil service
in Slovakia: case study of selected ministries in 2004–2014.
In: Current trends in public sector research. Brno: Masaryk
University; p. 86–93.
Staroňová K. 2010. Regulatory impact assessment: formal
institutionalization and practice. J Public Policy. 30:117–136.

Staroňová K. 2007. The quality of impact assessment in Slovakia.
In: George C, Kirkpatrick CH, editor. Impact assessment and
sustainable development. European practice experience.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar; p. 230–254.
Turnpenny J, Russel D, Rayner T. 2013. The complexity
of evidence for sustainable development policy:
analysing  the boundary work of the UK Parliamentary
Environmental Audit Committee. Trans Inst Br Geogr.
38:586–598.
Turnpenny J, Nilsson M, Russel D, Jordan A, Hertin J,
Nykvist B. 2008. Why is integrating policy assessment
so hard?  A  comparative analysis of the institutional
capacities and constraints. J Environ Planning Manage.
51:759–775.
Zvijáková L, Zeleňáková M, Purcz P. 2014. Evaluation of
environmental impact assessment effectiveness in Slovakia.
Impact Assess Project Appraisal. 32:150–161.
Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal   227
Interviews
Interview 1 – Gurská, D, Ministry of Economy, Economic
Analyses Unit, supervisory body for economic Impacts,
interview conducted by the author, 10 April 2014.
Interview 2 – Fašungová, L, Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and
Family; Head of Analytical Centre; supervisory body for social
impacts; interview conducted by the author; 30 April 2014.
Interview 3 – Cirák, A, Ministry of Finance, Head of State
Budget Unit, supervisory body for fiscal impacts, interview
conducted by the author, 30 June 2014.
Interview 4 – Krajčovičová, G, Ministry of Finance, E-government
Unit, supervisory body for e-government, interview
conducted by the author, 26 June 2014.
Interview 5 – Nižňanský, G, Ministry of Environment, Head of
Environmental Impacts, supervisory body for environmental
impacts, interview conducted by the author, 20 June 2014.