Moore, ed.

Costanza, Author

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT)

Keywords: agent, informant, case officer, HUMINT, espionage, defector, recruitment

cycle, covert, overt

ABSTRACT

! This article provides an overview of the concept of human intelligence as used

within the U.S. intelligence community. Commonly referred to as HUMINT, human

intelligence provides an important and in some cases a unique stream of intelligence

used in a broad array of intelligence products utilized by consumers in the U.S.

intelligence and policymaking communities. This entry will define human intelligence

and provide an understanding of how it is collected, the types of sources that provide it,

and how it is used in formulating intelligence assessments and in guiding operational

decision-making.

INTRODUCTION

! In the most general sense, human intelligence refers to information of intelligence

value provided by a human source for use in the analysis of an intelligence issue or

support to an operational activity. Human intelligence, also known as HUMINT in

intelligence jargon, is not only the intelligence derived from human sources but also

reflects a specific type of collection activity whereby information is passed from one

individual to another either directly or indirectly. The various forms this process takes

will be determined by what type of intelligence is being provided by the human source,

who is collecting it, under what circumstances and for what particular use.

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! This article will first identify the principal agencies in the U.S. government

responsible for collecting and analyzing HUMINT in support of policymakers intelligence

requirements. HUMINT will then be categorized by type reflecting the broad range of

operational environments in which human intelligence is collected. This will be followed

by a brief overview of the human intelligence collection process. The focus will then

shift to the human sources who provide the intelligence looking at the classical agent

recruitment process and the types of agents that are recruited. This entry concludes

with a look at some of the tradecraft employed by intelligence officers to securely run

operations to collect information from human sources.

U.S. AGENCIES INVOLVED IN THE COLLECTION OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

! The U.S. intelligence community is currently composed of 17 organizations within

the Executive Branch. Their job is to gather intelligence to collectively support the

President and other intelligence consumers in the policymaking, law enforcement and

military communities to carry out foreign relations and other national security activities.

The premier collector of HUMINT in the U.S. government is the National Clandestine

Service (NCS) within the Central Intelligence Agency. (1) It is made up of case

officers, staff officers, linguists, analysts, specialists and support personnel that deploy

to foreign countries to run HUMINT collection operations. (2)

! The Defense Counterintelligence and HUMINT Center (DX), the HUMINT

collection organization within the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), also makes

important contributions in support of Department of Defense (DoD) and military

operational requirements. The DX was activated in August 2008 and was formed from

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the combination of DoDʼs Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) and DIAʼs CI and

HUMINT capabilities. DX responsibilities include managing the Defense Attache

system and is the primary focal for contact with the NCS. In addition, the individual

military services maintain their own intelligence collection activities to support their

specific tactical and combat support intelligence requirements. (3)

! The FBI is extremely active in recruiting foreign diplomats and other officials in

support of their counterintelligence responsibilities inside the U.S. The FBI has also had

a successful track in recruiting foreign intelligence officers residing in the U.S. (4) In

response to a 2004 director by President Bush, the FBI embarked on a program to

greatly expand its human intelligence collection capabilities, particularly in the area of

counterterrorism. In addition to its traditional role of acquiring informants to support

criminal investigations, FBI Special Agents also recruit informants to track foreign spies

as part of their counterintelligence responsibilities. To bolster their HUMINT collection

capabilities, the FBI has adapted recruitment techniques from CIA training courses for

use in the U.S. in accordance with U.S. law. (5)

! The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) runs a large network of informants

worldwide to gather drug enforcement intelligence in its efforts to combat domestic and

international drug trafficking.

TYPES OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

! Three key categories of intelligence in which the collection of information from

human sources plays an important and often a critical role are positive intelligence,

operational intelligence and counterintelligence. Positive intelligence is information of

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intelligence value about worldwide issues of concern to policymakers. For example,

what are Country Yʼs intentions in the Middle East? When will Country Z have a fully

weaponized biological warfare capability? The goal is to recruit well-placed human

sources who would be able to provide valuable insight into the plans and intentions of

target countries of intelligence interest as well as corroborate intelligence collected by

other means. Human sources also provide operational intelligence to support ongoing

operational activities such as the spotting and assessing of new recruitment targets. (6)

Human intelligence is also an important element in counterintelligence programs in

which a clandestine human source, known as a penetration, embedded inside a hostile

intelligence service provides a steady stream of reporting on the serviceʼs organization,

personnel, intelligence practices and activities. (7)

! Human intelligence may also be distinguished by the methods of collection which

fall into two general categories. Covert collection of human intelligence, which

generally refers to classical espionage, is the clandestine collection of protected

intelligence information from a human source. The human source is referred to in

intelligence jargon as an asset or agent. For example, an asset may be a penetration

of the National Security Council of country X reporting positive intelligence on that

countryʼs plans and intentions. An asset might also be a penetration of the country Xʼs

intelligence service providing counterintelligence information. An asset could also

function as an access agent who confidentially provides operational intelligence to his

or her case officer in the form of assessment data on a potential recruitment target.

These are all clandestine relationships which if revealed would result in dire

consequences for the asset and potentially the handling officer. (8)

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! The other category is overt collection which involves obtaining intelligence

information from human sources in a generally open but discreet manner. The

collection activities “are openly acknowledged by or are readily attributable to the U.S.

Government, and include activities designed to acquire information through legal and

open means without concealment.” A broad range of collection activities fall into this

category and reflect varying degrees of sensitivity with regard to to source protection

and disclosure. Diplomats and military attaches may elicit information of intelligence

value during the normal course of their duties in dealing with their foreign counterparts

or other contacts of intelligence interest who know that their information may be shared

with other officials in the U.S. Government. Overt intelligence collection may be in the

form of debriefings of individuals in a controlled environment. For example, intelligence

may be obtained from programmatic debriefings of emigrants who may have worked at

a facility or in a job that is of interest to the U.S. intelligence community. Individuals

who volunteer information of intelligence value is another source of human intelligence

that is overt but handled discreetly. (9)

! Within a military environment, interrogations of prisoners of war (POWs) provide

another important stream of HUMINT that is collected overtly. Interrogations are used

to address military tactical and strategic requirements as well as civilian intelligence

requirements such as information on terrorist group activities. In this controlled

environment, the subject of the interrogation may not be fully cooperating and the ability

to obtain actionable intelligence will be dependent on the skill of the interrogator. An

example of overt HUMINT collection outside a controlled environment within the

context of military operations is the work of the Human Terrain Teams which collect

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cultural intelligence for tactical use in engaging the local population during stability

operations in conflict zones. (10)

! Overt HUMINT collection within the U.S. is another important source of

intelligence that provides a valuable stream of reporting on critical intelligence issues.

The U.S. intelligence community has established ongoing relationships with

businessmen and academicians who voluntarily share information that address a wide

range of intelligence requirements. The U.S. business community has a broad array of

contacts in international business circles with individuals who have access to

information of intelligence interest. The U.S. academic community also has relies on

an extensive range of international contacts to further research efforts bringing

professors from various disciplines into contact with foreign colleagues who may be

working in areas of interest to the U.S. intelligence community. Particularly with regard

to highly technical areas of intelligence interest, such as the development of missile

technology or nuclear enrichment capability , a professorʼs assessment of any potential

technical breakthroughs may offer valuable insight that will provide intelligence analysts

with a richer context in which to evaluate the significance of the technological

advances. (11)

! The National Resources Division (NRD) within the National Clandestine Service

(NCS) of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the primary group within the

intelligence community responsible for domestic collection of intelligence within the

corporate world, and among universities and scientific institutions. Although the fact

that voluntary debriefings of business, academic and scientific contacts in U.S. is

considered an overt domestic collection activity, the actual contacts are handled

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discreetly with contact approvals obtained at the highest level of each organization. As

part of the contact approval process, the ground rules for contact and level of

cooperation is established to the mutual satisfaction of each party to ensure the

confidentiality of the arrangement and complete protection of proprietary information.

Meanwhile, the domestic collection activities are monitored by in-house CIA lawyers

and congressional overseers to ensure legal compliance with all laws governing contact

between intelligence organizations with the public and private sectors. (12)

! Any contact with foreign nationals within the U.S. by any intelligence community

agency must be coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which has

primacy regarding intelligence activities involving foreign nationals present in the U.S.

The FBI has traditionally been active in collecting human intelligence from informants in

support of law enforcement and counterintelligence investigations in the U.S. In the

aftermath of 9/11, reorganization within the FBI led to the creation of the Directorate of

Intelligence to optimize the collection of intelligence information. The Directorate of

Intelligence subsequently merged with the Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence

divisions to form the National Security Branch. In this organizational restructuring, the

FBI leveraged intelligence community tradecraft practices to enhance their HUMINT

collection process. (13)

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROCESS

! The collection of human intelligence begins first by defining exactly what

information is needed to contribute to the analysis of a particular intelligence issue.

Information that is needed to conduct an analysis is requested in the form of questions

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known as requirements that are sent to the appropriate intelligence collection groups to

implement collection. In the case of HUMINT collection, requirements are tailored for

use with selected human sources who are well-positioned because of their access to

the information to provide answers to the questions on the requirements list. Whether

the collection is overt or covert, the collector must accurately debrief the human source

being careful to separate the factual information provided by the source from the

sourceʼs opinion about the information. A sourceʼs opinion is useful to the extent that it

places the factual information within a specific context. For example, a nuclear

scientist in a hostile country working in a top secret program to develop the capability to

enrich uranium reports factual information on the arrival of new technology for the

program. The nuclear scientist might also be positioned to provide an opinion on how

the technology might accelerate the countryʼs timetable to achieve enrichment

capabilities suitable to construct a nuclear weapon.

! Information obtained from a human source is known as raw intelligence, which is

obtained from a debriefing, is evaluated by matching it with any existing information on

the same topic to determine whether it corroborates known information, is at variance

with what is known or is new information, which may then generate a new set of

requirements. Over time the reliability of the sourceʼs reporting can be established and

a determination can be made regarding whether the reporting relationship with the

source should continue. (14)

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THE AGENT ACQUISITION CYCLE OR RECRUITMENT CYCLE !

! There is a constant need to recruit new sources to provide raw intelligence for

use in preparing finished intelligence that respond to specific policymaker requirements.

New agents are needed to address new sets of requirements in emerging areas of

interest to intelligence analysts. For example, hostile County X may have recently

established a biological weapons program about which little is known. There is also a

need to replenish and maintain established agent networks that provide intelligence on

issues of continuing concern to policymakers such as Chinese military modernization

programs. Whatever the reason, the general procedure used by most intelligence

services worldwide to recruit agents is known as the agent acquisition cycle or

recruitment cycle.

! The recruitment of new agents is the primary function of a case officer. The

first step in the process generally begins with “spotting” a source of potential interest.

A case officer might begin the spotting process by researching openly available

information on the Internet or other open sources to identify individuals with potential

access to information of intelligence value. The case officer would also be active in

frequenting locations where potential recruitment targets may appear. The venues

could range anywhere from the host country diplomatic circuit to the local skydiving

club. The goal is to engineer a direct contact to a target of potential interest in a way

that is plausible, natural and non-alerting.

! The next step is the initial “assessment” phase where the officer tries to gain

insight into the potential recruitment target by obtaining biographic information to verify

the individualʼs identity and potentially assist in validating access to information of

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intelligence interest. Through direct contact with the target, the case officer working

undercover seeks to elicit information that provides insight into the targetʼs interest,

attitudes and beliefs, relationships, and any hints of potential vulnerabilities. In addition

to direct assessment, the officer may be able to acquire indirect assessment information

from recruited “access agents” who have knowledge of the target. The case officer may

also be able to obtain further assessment data on the target through surveillance,

telephone taps or audio devices .

! If the initial assessment of the target appears positive, the officer will seek to

move the target into the “development” phase in which ongoing contact is established to

further build the relationship and gather more detailed assessment information. The

aim is to develop a close, personal relationship that allows the potential recruitment

target to more fully trust the officer. As mutual trust builds, the officer gains greater

insight into the target mindset and susceptibility to recruitment. It is during this phase

that the relationship between the case officer and the target becomes firmly established

and potential vulnerabilities are identified. Vulnerabilities essentially amount to the

targetʼs perceived needs unique to that individual. Motivations to provide secret

information to a case officer may range from simple venality to an urgent need for

medical attention for a family member that the case officer could arrange. Generally it

is a constellation of factors that come together to enable the target to become

susceptible to a recruitment “pitch” at a particular point in time. If no vulnerabilities

surface during the development phase, the case officer will drop the target from active

consideration for recruitment and move on to other possible candidates.

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! The “pitch” is the most critical phase in the recruitment cycle. It constitutes the

case officerʼs proposal to the recruitment target to provide protected information in

exchange for some form of renumeration or benefit. This stage is critical because it

involves serious consequences for both the case officer and target. It is during the

pitch phase that the case officer “breaks cover” and reveals his or her true intelligence

affiliation. If the target accepts the pitch and agrees to provide protected information,

the target has, in effect, agreed to violate the laws of his or her country and must rely on

the skill of the case officer to securely protect their relationship against being revealed

to authorities. If the target refuses the pitch and reports it to the authorities, the case

officer may come under close scrutiny by the host countryʼs counterintelligence

unit, be informally be asked to leave or be formally asked to leave by being declared

persona non grata. If the case officer is under official cover, the officer would generally

not face civil or criminal charges; however, not all countries will necessarily respect an

officialʼs status, which increases the risk of pitching targets in countries that have a

history of not respecting established international law. For case officers who are

operating under non-official cover (NOC) , for example posing as a businessman, a

reported pitch could subsequently lead to their arrest and potential exposure of

intelligence activities to the host country intelligence authorities. Consequently,

developing a solid assessment and a strong personal relationship with the recruitment

target works towards minimizing “blowback” potential, i.e. negative consequences, of a

failed recruitment pitch.

! Gathering extensive assessment data during the developmental process

culminating in a approach to the recruitment target to provide protected information

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leads to what is known as a “warm” pitch. Another type of approach known as a “cold”

pitch is sometimes used against high priority targets in certain circumstances when

extensive collection of assessment data during a an appropriately paced development

of the target is not possible. In this instance a case officer operating in alias may enter

a country to make a quick pitch to the target with plans to immediately depart the

country immediately in the event the pitch is refused.

! If the recruitment target accepts a pitch, the operation moves into the “handling”

phase. In this stage, the case officer formalizes the recruitment usually by having the

newly acquired agent sign a secrecy agreement. The terms of the arrangement are

reviewed - financial renumeration and any other commitments - and “tradecraft” is

introduced to ensure that the case officer and the agent can meet securely to avoid

detection. The agentʼs access to protected information will be more clearly defined

and requirements tailored to the agentʼs access will be provided as a guide to collection.

Although a recruitment target accepts a pitch and becomes an agent, the case officer

continues the assessment process to gain insight into the agentʼs ability to discreetly

perform the agent role and handle the stresses associated with living a new clandestine

life. Over time the case officer will be able to assess the accuracy of the agentʼs

reporting as well as identify any potential signs that the agent may have been detected

and has been doubled back against the case officer by the counterintelligence unit of

the local service.

! There are a number of reasons the clandestine relationship between a case

officer and an agent ends. This phase is known as “termination” and, despite the

sinister popular connotation, termination simply means that the secret “agreement” to

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provide protected information has been terminated. The termination may center

around the agentʼs access to information. The agent may have changed jobs and has

lost access to information that is of intelligence value. Obversely the intelligence

requirements may have changed and the information provided by the the agent is no

longer needed or of intelligence interest. The termination may also be made on the

basis of operational security. Information may surface that indicates that the agent has

come to the attention of local counterintelligence. It may also be the case that the agent

simply wanted to end the clandestine relationship because of the stress of leading a

double life, psychological exhaustion, recalculation of risk or a myriad number of other

factors that lead the agent to a decision not to provide protected information anymore.

The optimal conclusion to the clandestine relationship is by mutual agreement where

both agree that the relationship has run its course. Any commitments that formed part

of the recruitment proposal would also be fulfilled. (15)

TYPES OF CLANDESTINE AGENTS

! A case officer is trained to handle various categories of clandestine agents. The

most common category is the recruited asset, which is an agent that has gone through

the agent acquisition cycle and is productively working in-place to provide protected

information. Recruited assets are also known as penetrations or more notably in

popular literature as moles.

! Defectors in the most general sense are indiviudals who change sides. Within

the context of intelligence, a defector is an individual with access to intelligence

information of interest who renounces allegiance to the country he or she is serving and

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seeks refuge and support in another country. Defectors, also known as walk-ins or

volunteers, represent a potential treasure trove of intelligence if the defector was a well-

placed official who has had broad access to protected information. Defectors are

distinguished from refugees in that refugees refer to individuals seeking to leave their

native country for personal or poltical reasons but do not have access to information of

intelligence interest. (16) After the defectorʼs identity is verified and any intellligence

provided by the defector is evaluated and determined to be high value, it is standard

procedure for the intelligence officer handling the case to explore whether the defector

would be willing to “work in place.” A number of issues have to be addressed before a

a decision is made to encourage a defector to return to their official position and work

work as a penetration of his or her government. For example, does anyone in the

defectorʼs government know that he or she has defected? Did the defector leave

because of some incident that put the individual in jeopardy, i.e. did the person “burn

their bridges” making it impossible to return? Is the defector psychologically capable

of serving as a clandestine agent? In highly sensitive cases where the intelligence and

access of the defector is determined to be extremely valuable to U.S. national security,

a resettlement package may be offered in which the defector would return to work in

place for a period of time in exchange for resettlement in the U.S. or a third

country. (17)

! Many intelligence services recognize that defectors are a highly valued

commodity and will use false defectors to walk in to the opposing service to hopefully

penetrate that service as part of their counterespionage (CE) program. This is a type

of “double agent” operation is known as a “dangle” in which an agent under the control

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of one intelligence service allows him- or herself to be recruited by another service to

gain access to protected CI information. Another variation of a double agent operation

occurs when an individual is approached by a hostile intelligence service to work for

them. The individual subsequently reports the “pitch” to the appropriate authorities and

under the guidance and control of his countryʼs CI service will pretend to act as an

agent of the hostile service in order to gain access to that serviceʼs protected

information. In yet another scenario, an intelligence service may have detected a

recruited asset working for hostile service and then “turned” that individual to work for

them as a channel into the hostile service. (18) In the most general sense, a double

agent operation essentially refers to an agent who is ostensibly working for one

intelligence service but is actually secretly working for another intelligence agency. (19)

TRADECRAFT

! Operational tradecraft within the context of human intelligence collection broadly

refers to the procedures to securely conduct HUMINT collection operations. The use of

good operational tradecraft is vital in allowing a case officer to meet and communicate

with human sources without the opposition counterintelligence service becoming aware

of the clandestine relationship. Tradecraft training of intelligence officers who handle

agent networks will include instruction on establishing and managing clandestine

meetings, techniques for securely making contact with an agent, use of disguise and

aliases, surveillance detection, and securely communicating with an agent. A case

officer will often use a “safe house” to meet and debrief recruited assets. A safe house

is essentially a secure location suitable for conducting a clandestine meeting without

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drawing any undue attention. The operational environment may also allow a case

officer to use the common tradecraft practice known as car pickups to securely meet an

agent. At a pre-arranged time, the case officer picks up the agent by driving by a

designated location that minimizes direct observation of the car pickup contact. The

meeting is generally conducted while the case officer drives. The optimal time for a car

pickup meeting is after nightfall when it is difficult to discern identities of the occupants.

The case officer and the agent have pre-arranged a cover story to explain their reason

for being together if they are stopped by local authorities. In addition, the case officer

has already devised and discussed a contingency plan with the agent in the event they

get into an car accident or other situation that could threaten the clandestinity of the

meeting. (20)

! To enhance operational security when handling a particularly sensitive asset

when regular direct contact with the agent is not possible to due the potential detection

by local CI authorities, impersonal communication is employed to allow case officer-to-

agent contact in both directions without any traceable or discernible link between the

two. Impersonal communication may be used to signal a meeting at a safe house or to

the meet the case officer at a a particular pick-up site. It may also be used to transmit

information. The “dead drop” has been the classical form of impersonal

communications used in traditional espionage. A dead drop refers to a technique in

which either the case officer or the agent hides information or other material of

intelligence interest in some sort of concealment device which is then placed in a

preselected location for retrieval by the other party. (21) The revolution in modern

global communications has opened up other communications possibilities including the

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use of digital steganography. Digital steganography uses electronic communications as

the medium to embed messages inside a document or image file, program or protocol.

In 2010, the FBI charged that the Russian intelligence service was using specialized

steganography software to embed encrypted messages in image files which were then

sent to their deep cover agents overseas. (22)

! A specialized version of operational training known as “denied area tradecraft” is

employed in hostile operational environments and relies heavily on impersonal

communication techniques. Denied area tradecraft training is designed to provide the

necessary clandestine skills that a case officer needs to communicate and handle

agents in an operational environment in which the officer may be under constant

surveillance by the local CI service, is subject to harassment and possible interrogation,

and is assumed to have living spaces and communications devices bugged. Because

of the psychological stress of working in a hostile operational environment, case officers

and spouses are carefully screened to ensure that they have the ability to make good

operational decisions while working under constant stress. Those who pass

psychological screening will go through denied area operations training after having

successfully completed the basic operational training course. (23) Most of the case

officer training for the CIA is done at a facility colloquially known as “The Farm”. (24)

INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND COVER

! Intelligence officers posted overseas conceal the true nature of their activities by

working under “cover” to minimize the probability of detection by the local CI service and

other groups such as terrorists or drug traffickers seeking to target intelligence officers

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for kidnap or assassination in retaliation for operations against their groups. Without the

proper cover, intelligence officers would be unable to securely recruit and handle

clandestine agents in order to produce HUMINT reports.

! There are basically two types of cover used by intelligence officers. One type is

known as “official cover” and refers to intelligence officers assuming the role of a

diplomat or some other type government official while posted overseas. Diplomatic

cover has several advantages. It provides the intelligence officer with natural access to

host country targets that are potentially of operational interest. Diplomatic cover also

provides the officer with a degree of protection if the officerʼs intelligence activities are

exposed by potentially allowing a claim of diplomatic immunity. In this case, instead of

facing criminal espionage charges, the intelligence officer would be declared persona

non grata by the host government and expelled from the country, that is, if the host

country abides by international law with regard to espionage activities. In situations

where the U.S. has an otherwise good relationship with the host country, the host

country may simply quietly suggest that the officer be sent home promptly to avoid

being declared persona non grata and facing the public fanfare that goes with an offical

expulsion. Another advantage of diplomatic cover is that it provides the embassy with a

trained intelligence professional who can handle defectors with sensitive intelligence

information and other volunteers who may want to share threat information.

! The other type of cover is known as non-official cover (NOC) and refers to

intelligence officers, known as NOCs, who pose in various non-governmental positions

such as a businessmen, academics or engineers. NOCs have no direct affiliation with

the U.S. government which offers the advantage of being able to gain access to

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potential targets outside the normal range of contacts within diplomatic circles. In

addition, when diplomatic relations breakdown or are seriously impaired, a NOC may

still be positioned to conduct operations in the host country given the officerʼs low CI

profile due to his or her lack of affiliation with the U.S. government. There are,

however, several important drawbacks. If a CI service detects a NOCʼs operational

activity and arrests the officer, the NOC cannot make any claim of diplomatic immunity

since the officer does not have diplomatic status. In addition, to establish a NOC

identity entails large costs and requires complicated administrative support to maintain

the integrity of the cover. (25)

CONCLUSION

HUMINT plays a vital role in contributing to a broad range of intelligence

assessments used by U.S. policymakers to guide the formulation of U.S. foreign policy.

It often constitutes the only stream of intelligence on issues where intelligence collection

by other means is not possble. To maintain this key collection capability, HUMINT

programs require highly skilled intelligence officers to securely and effectively recruit

and manage the cadre of human sources who work with the U.S. often at great personal

risk to themselves and their families.

! The increasing global challenges and potential threats facing the U.S. and its

allies in the years ahead more than ever underscore the urgent need for the U.S. to

maintain a flexible, high quality intelligence capability necessary to support

policymakers as they devise policies to address a turbulent world. HUMINT will

continue to play an indispensible role in this effort by providing unique access to

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intelligence that provides the “ground truth” analysts need to produce more accurate

and timely intelligence assessments critical to formulating a coherent foreign policy.

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(4) Olson, James M. Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying; Potomac Books:
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(5) FBI Proposes Building Network of U.S. Informants. ABC News: The Blotter. July
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(6) https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol2no4/
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(9) Intelligence Community Directive Number 304: Human Intelligence. Office of the
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(10) Lucas, G.R. Anthropologists in Arms: The Ethics of Military Anthropology; AltaMira
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(11) Czajkowski, A. F. Techniques of Domestic Intelligence Collection. In Inside CIAʼs

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52-60.

(12) Calabresi, M. Business Travel: When the CIA Calls. Time, May 7, 2001. http://
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2011.

(13) Evolution of FBI Intelligence, Directorate of Intelligence, Federal Bureau of

Investigation; http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/intelligence/evolution Accessed on
June 16, 2011.

(14) Pechan, B. L. The Collectorʼs Role in Evaluation. In Inside CIAʼs Private World:
Declassified Journals From the Agencyʼs Internal Journal1955-1992; Westerfield,
H. Bradford, Ed.; Yale University Press: New Haven, 1995, 100-107.

(15) Olson (2006), 236n2 -239.

(16) Johnson (2009), 154-164.

(17) Olson (2006), 249n17.

(18) Johnson (2009), 91-92.

(19) Olson (2006), 234n13.

(20) Olson (2006), 250n19.

(21) Johnson 2009), 28.

(22) Criminal Complaint by Special Agent Ricci Against Alleged Russian Agents,
United States Department of Justice. http.//www.justice.gov/opa/documents/
062810complaint2.pdf. Accessed on June 16, 2011.

(23) Olson (2006), 248n15.

(24) Olson 2006), 232n8.

(25) Shulsky, Abram N.; Scmitt Gary J. Human Intelligence Collection. In Silent
Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence, 3rd Ed.; Brasseyʼs Inc.: Dulles,
VA, 2002; http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/khadr/readings/
humint.html Accessed on June 10, 2011.

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