Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
December 23, 1933] This is an appeal from a final order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, requiring the register of deeds of the City of
Manila to cancel certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and
28331, covering lands located in the City of Manila, Philippine
ALLISON D. GIBBS, petitioner and appellee, vs. THE
Islands, and issue in lieu thereof new certificates of transfer of
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, oppositor
title in favor of Allison D. Gibbs without requiring him to present
and appellant. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF
any document showing that the succession tax due under
MANILA, respondent and appellant.
Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code has been
1.HUSBAND AND WlFE; RlGHT OF A CALIFORNIA paid.
MARRIED WOMAN TO ACQUIRE LANDS IN FOREIGN
JURISDICTIONS.—The attention of the court has not been
called to any law of California that incapacitates a married The said order of court of March 10, 1931, recites that the
woman from acquiring or holding land in a foreign jurisdiction in parcels of land covered by said certificates of title formerly
accordance with the lex rei sitæ. belonged to the conjugal partnership of Allison D. Gibbs and
Eva Johnson Gibbs; that the latter died intestate in Palo Alto,
2.ID. ; ARTICLE 9, CIVIL CODE, CONSTRUED.—Article 9 of
California, on November 28, 1929; that at the time of her death
the Civil Code treats of purely personal relations and status
she and her husband were citizens of the State of California
and capacity for juristic acts, the rules relating to property, both
and domiciled therein.
personal and real, being governed by article 10 of the Civil
Code. Furthermore, article 9, by its very terms, is applicable
only to "Spaniards" (now, by construction, to citizens of the
Philippine Islands). It appears further from said order that Allison D. Gibbs was
appointed administrator of the estate of his said deceased wife
3.JONES LAW; PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW.—The in case No. 36795 in the same court, entitled 'ln the Matter of
Organic Act of the Philippine Islands (Act of Congress, August the Intestate Estate of Eva Johnson Gibbs, Deceased"; that in
29, 1916, known as the "Jones Law") as regards the said intestate proceedings, the said Allison D. Gibbs, on
determination of private rights, grants practical autonomy to the September 22, 1930, filed an ex parte petition in which he
Government of the Philippine Islands. This Government, alleged "that the parcels of land hereunder described belong to
therefore, may apply the principles and rules of private the conjugal partnership of your petitioner and his wife, Eva
international law (conflict of laws) on the same footing as an Johnson Gibbs", describing in detail the three tracts here
organized territory or state of the United States. involved; and further alleging that his said wife, a citizen and
resident of California, died on November 28, 1929; that in
4.ARTICLE 10, CIVIL CODE, CONSTRUED.—The second
accordance with the law of California, the community property
paragraph of article 10, Civil Code, applies only when a legal
of spouses who are citizens of California, upon the death of the
or testamentary succession has taken place in the Philippines
wife previous to that of the husband, belongs absolutely to the
in accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands; and the
surviving husband without administration; that the conjugal
foreign law is consulted only in regard to the order of
partnership of Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs,
succession or the extent of the successional rights; in other
deceased, has no obligations or debts and no one will be
words, the second paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only
prejudiced by adjudicating said parcels of land (and seventeen
when the deceased was vested with a descendible interest in
others not here involved) to be the absolute property of the
property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.
said Allison D. Gibbs as sole owner. The court granted said
5.HUSBAND AND WIFE; CONJUGAL PROPERTY.—Under petition and on September 22, 1930, entered a decree
the provisions of the Civil Code and the jurisprudence adjudicating the said Allison D. Gibbs to be the sole and
prevailing here, the wife, upon the acquisition of any conjugal absolute owner of said lands, applying section 1401 of the Civil
property, becomes immediately vested with an interest and title Code of California. Gibbs presented this decree to the register
therein equal to that of her husband, subject to the power of of deeds of Manila and demanded that the latter issue to him a
management and disposition which the law vests in the "transfer certificate of title".
husband. Immediately upon her death, if there are no
obligations of the decedent, as is true in the present case, her
share in the conjugal property is transmitted to her heirs by Section 1547 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative
succession. (Articles 657, 659, 661, Civil Code; cf. also Code provides in part that:
Coronel vs. Ona, 33 Phil., 456, 469.)
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Acting upon the authority of said section, the register of deeds
Imperial, J. of the City of Manila, declined to accept as binding said decree
of court of September 22, 1930, and refused to register the
transfer of title of the said conjugal property to Allison D. Gibbs,
on the ground that the corresponding inheritance tax had not
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
been paid. Thereupon, under date of December 26, 1930,
Solicitor-General Hilado for appellants. Allison D. Gibbs filed in the said court a petition for an order
requiring the said register of deeds "to issue the corresponding
Allison D. Gibbs in his own behalf. titles" to the petitioner without requiring previous payment of
any inheritance tax. After due hearing of the parties, the court
BUTTE, J.:
reaffirmed said order of September 22, 1930, and entered the
order of March 10, 1931, which is under review on this appeal.
or the District of Columbia, subject to the common-law estate
by the curtesy which would vest in her husband. Nor is there
On January 3, 1933, this court remanded the case to the court any doubt that if a California husband acquired land in such a
of origin for new trial upon additional evidence in regard to the jurisdiction his wife would be vested with the common law right
pertinent law of California in force at the time of the death of of dower, the prerequisite conditions obtaining. Article 9 of the
Mrs. Gibbs, also authorizing the introduction of evidence with Civil Code treats of purely personal relations and status and
reference to the dates of the acquisition of the property capacity for juristic acts, the rules relating to property, both
involved in this suit and with reference to the California law in personal and real, being governed by article 10 of the Civil
force at the time of such acquisition. The case is now before us Code. Furthermore, article 9, by its very terms, is applicable
with the supplementary evidence. only to "Spaniards" (now, by construction, to citizens of the
Philippine Islands).
But the appellant's chief argument and the sole basis of the
1. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by lower court's decision rests upon the second paragraph of
transfer certificate of title No. 20880, dated March 16, 1920, article 10 of the Civil Code which is as follows:
and registered in the name of "Allison D. Gibbs casado con
"Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect
Eva Johnson Gibbs"."
to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the
2. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
transfer certificate of title No. 28336, dated May 14, 1927, in shall be regulated by the national law ,of the person whose
which it is certified "that the spouses Allison D. Gibbs and Eva succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the
Johnson Gibbs are the owners in fee simple" of the land property or the country in which it may be situated."
therein described.
"In accord with the rule that real property is subject to the lex
rei sitæ, the respective rights of husband and wife in such The record does not show what the proper amount of the
property, in the absence of an antenuptial contract, are inheritance tax in this case would be nor that the appellee
determined by the law of the place where the property is (petitioner below) in any way challenged the power of the
situated, irrespective of" the domicile of the parties or of the Government to levy an inheritance tax or the validity of the
place where the marriage was celebrated." (See also Saul vs. statute under which the register of deeds refused to issue a
His Creditors, 5 Martin [N. S.], 569; 16 Am. Dec., 212 [La.] ; certificate of transfer reciting that the appellee is the exclusive
Heidenheimer vs. Loring, 26 S. W., 99 [Texas].) owner of the Philippine lands included in the three certificates
of title here involved.
Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title
which vested in Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the The judgment of the court below of March 10, 1931, is
community lands here in question must be determined in reversed with directions to dismiss the petition, without special
accordance with the lex rei sitæ. pronouncement as to the costs.
It is admitted that the Philippine lands here in question were Avanceña, C. J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, and
acquired as community property of the conjugal partnership of Vickers, JJ., concur.
the appellee and his wife. Under the law of the Philippine
Islands, she was vested of a title equal to that of her husband.
Article 1407 of the Civil Code provides:
Street, J., dissents.
“On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court
“ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws
subject to the law of the country where it is situated. rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law.
But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle
is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back
should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would
“However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
have resulted in the ‘endless chain of references’ which has so
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois,
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
seems no compelling logical reason why the original reference
the nature of the property and regardless of the country where
should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws
said property may be found.”
rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go- “After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be
round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid resorted to as governing a particular case, the further question
this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in
and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question
of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few
internal law as the rule of reference. instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by
textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been
descriptively designated by them as the ‘Renvoyer’ to send
back, or the ‘Ruchversweisung’, or the ‘Weiterverweisung’,
“Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to
since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the
the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption
operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in
of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that
many cases result in returning the main controversy to be
the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem
decided according to the law of the forum. x x x (16 C.J.S.
is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal
872.)
basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should
be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the “Another theory, known as the “doctrine of renvoi”, has been
result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court
the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take
renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its
suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual
rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This
same result would happen, though the courts would switch with may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has
respect to which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the generally been repudiated by the American authorities.” (2 Am.
renvoi. Jur. 296)
“The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and
where the title to land is in question, and where the validity of a the reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof.
decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-
Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties 1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted
in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further herein below:
reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person’s title to
land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every
court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties,
will be valid everywhere.” (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, “The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of
pp. 13-14.) the conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not
only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country,
but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this
theory ‘the law of a country’ means the whole of its law.
“X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in
France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England,
and France. The question arises as to how this property is to
be distributed among X’s next of kin. x x x x x x x
“Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. “Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of
There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the
to movables calls for an application of the law of the following theses:
deceased’s last domicile. Since by hypothesis X’s last domicile
was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do
would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever “(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as
corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution regards the application of foreign laws.
accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would
show that if a French court were called upon to determine how
this property should be distributed, it would refer the
“(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists,
distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying
the court shall respect:
the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of
things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative
course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to
intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court “(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right
and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the to bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal statute,
assumption that this is what a French court would do. If it and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by
accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the latter the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where
course, thus applying its own law. the act in question occurred.
“This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which “(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law,
the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily
conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a
again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower question to the same system of law.
sense. The German term for this judicial process is
‘Ruckverweisung.’” (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523- “If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute
571.) the personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled
in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must
first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute
personal property upon death in accordance with the law of
domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the
distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that is domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
the English law — he must accept this reference back to his Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not
own law.” and should not refer the case back to California; such action
would leave the issue incapable of determination because the
case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between
the two states, between the country of which the decedent was
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its
a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court
conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman,
must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of
Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict
the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided,
of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its
especially as the application of the internal law of California
own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re
provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts.
Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article
887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural
946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in
children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of
recognizing them.
resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of
matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the
general principle of American law that the domiciliary law
should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156;
of the owner. Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil.
867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and
Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to
support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar,
“When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more
for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does
states, and leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of
not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but
the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at
with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each
the time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal
case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a
questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of
citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the
situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is
California Civil Code.
logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the
personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules
should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary
dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased
domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the
state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged
by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the
reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil
succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The Code of California, not by the internal law of California.
New York court has said on the point: ‘The general principle
that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile
of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed
application. It had its origin in that international comity which
and the case returned to the lower court with instructions that
was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when
the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession
business intercourse and the process of accumulating property
provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom
and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever.’” (Goodrich, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera,
Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.) Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Same; Foreign laws.—In the absence of proof as to the Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of
conflicts rule of Texas, it would be presumed to be the same as Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E.
our local conflicts rule. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children:
Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
Same; Applicability of national law to succession; Capacity to
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
succeed—The decedent's national law governs the order of
Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived
succession, the amount of successional rights, the intrinsic
him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis. Walter
validity of the provisions of the will and capacity to succeed.
S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three
Same; Third paragraph of article 17 of New Civil Code does illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
not modify article 16.—The third paragraph of article 17 of the Miriam Palma Bellis.
New Civil Code is not an exception to the second paragraph of
article 16. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
"notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
article," when it incorporated article 11 of the old Civil Code as
article 17, while reproducing without substantial change the
second paragraph of article 10 of the old Civil Code, as article
16. The legislative intent must have been to make the second On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the
paragraph of article 176 a specific provision in itself which must Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
be applied in testate and intestate succession. As a further obligations, and expenses of administration are paid f or, his
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following
provision, under article 1039, which decrees that capacity to order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E.
succeed is governed by the decedent's national law, Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, or
Same; Legitimes; Statutes; Special and general provisions.— P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have
Whatever public policy and good customs may be involved in been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving
our system of legitimes, Congres has not intended to extend children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A.
the same to the succession of foreign nationals. It has Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis, and Anna Bellis
specifically chosen the decedent's national law to govern, inter Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E.
alia, the amount of successional rights. Specific provisions Bellis, in equal shares.
must prevail over general ones.
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died, a
resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to
probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September
Same; Testamentary provision that successional right to 15, 1958.
decedent's estate would be governed by law other than his
national law is void.—A provision in a foreigner's will that his The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will,
properties should be distributed in accordance with Philippine paid all the bequests therein including the amount of
law and not in accordance with his national law is void, being $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen
contrary to article 16 of the New Civil Code. and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts
totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective
legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time
Same; System of legitimes does not apply to estate of a citizen
to time accordingly as the lower court approved and allowed
of Texas.—Where the decedent was a citizen of Texas and
the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three
under Texas laws there are no forced heirs, the system of
requesting partial advances on account of their respective
legitimes in Philippine law cannot be applied to the succession
legacies.
to the decedent's testate because the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the decedent's will and the amount of On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration,
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law. the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account,
Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to
$240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of
P40,000.00 each or a total of ?120,000.00. In the project of rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
partition, the executor—pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
testator's Last Will and Testament—divided the residuary succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature
estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages. property may be found."
Judgment affirmed.