(;(: --+-+' - --

REPUBLICOFTHEPHILIPPINESl:~151.11 18 f,i 3: 38
SUPREME COURT
MANILA

JESUS NICARDO M. FALCIS ill,

Petitioner, G.R.No. ___~1_7-91~0~

- versus -

CIVIL REGISTRAR-GENERAL,

R espondent.

x-----------------------------------------------------x

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION

PE'TTflONER, through undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable

Supreme Court, most respectfully states that

PREFATORY STATEMENTS

"The Family Code provides that the '~Jr1ture, consequences, and inCJdents /of
marriage} are governed by law and not subject to stipulation," but this does
not gv as far as reaching into d1e choices of intimacy inherent in human
relations. These choices form part of autonomy, protected by dJe liberty and
human dignity clauses. Human dignitv includes our choices of association,
and we are as free to associatf} and identifv as we are free not to associate or
1denti/Y. " '

- Justice Marvic Leonen

I 1' I 11 •1•
"We do not doubt that a number ofour citizens may believe that homosexual
conduct is dist.asteful, olknsive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and
express that VIew. On the other hanJ, LGBTs and their supporters, in all
hke!JJ10od, believe with equal fervor that relationships between indiVIduals of
the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too,
are entJded to hold and expres!J t/1at VJe w. However, as far as this Cowt is
concemed, our democracv precludes using the religious or moral VJews ofone
part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of other
members ofthe community.. " ~
/

- Justice Mariano del Castillo

I.

NATURE OF PETIDON

1. This is a Petition for CERTIORARI and PROHIBITION

under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to:

1.1 NULLIFY the portions of Articles 1 and 2, which

defines and limits marriage as between man and woman, of
Executive Order 209, othen vise known as "The Family Code of
the Philippines" (hereafter referred to as the "Family Code") for
violating Section 1 Article III and Section 3(1) Article XV of the
1987 Philippine Constitution; and

1.2 NULLIFY portions of Articles 46(4) and 55 (6),

which mentions lesbianism or homosexuality as grounds for
annulment and legal separation, of the Family Code as a
consequence of the unconstitutionality of Articles 1 and 2; and

1.3 PROHIBIT the Civil Registrar-General (hereafter

referred to as "Respondent") from enforcing the aforementioned
portions of Articles l and 2 of the Family Code in processing
applications for and in . issuing marriage licenses against
homosexual couples.

' Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.190582, April 8, 2010.
 II.

. THE PARTIES

2. PETITIONER is a taxpayer, a resident of Quezon City, and a

citizen of the Republic of the Philippines. He, as an open and se lt~identified
homosexual, is interested in the unconstitutionality of the provisions of the
Family Code disallowing same-sex marriage. He may be served with summons
and other processes of the Honorable Supreme Court through undersigned
counsel.

3. The Respondent CIVIL REGISTRAR-GENERAL is a public

officer tasked to carry out and administer the provisions of Commonwealth
Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the "Civil Registry Law", and authorized to
give orders and instructions to the local civil registrars with reference to the
performance of their duties in processing applications for and in issuing
marriage licenses. The CIVIL REGISTRAR-GENERAL may be served with
summons at 3'd Floor, NSO-CVEA Building, East Avenue, Diliman, Quezon
City.

ill.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

4. On June 18, 1949, then President approved Republic Act No.

386, othenvise known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines" (the "Civil
Code").

5. Articles 52,3 53,' and 54:1 of the Civil Code did not define and
limit marriage as between man and woman.

' Article 52 of the New Civil Code stales: "Marriage is not a mere contract but ;m inviolable
social institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are governed by law and not
subject Lo slipulalion, except t11a! die marriage sc!Ucments may to a certain extent fix the
properly rclatiom during t11e marriage"
1
Arlicle 53 of the New Civil Code ~t alcs: " 1o marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with:
(!) Legal capacity or the conlracting p;utics;
(2) T heir consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing t11c marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character"
" Article 54 of ilie New Civil Code stales: "Any male of the age of sixteen years or upwards,
and any female of the age of four! ~en years or upwards, not under any of the impediments
mentioned in articles 80 lo 84'., may contract 1muTiage"
 6. On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued,
under her legislative powers, Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as
the Family Code. The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.

7. Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code repealed Articles 52, 53, and
54 of the Civil Code, thus ch;mging and limiting the definition of marriage as
between man and woman.

IV.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

A. Jurisdiction

8. Petitioner submits that Article 1 and 2 of the Family Code violate

the petitioner's constitutionally protected right to due process and equal
protection, right to decisional 1)rivacy, and right to found a family in
accordance with religious convictions.

9. Petitioner submits that th is petition is cognizable by the Supreme

Court under its power of b·aditional and expanded power of judicial review as
conferred by Section 1 Article VIII of the Constitution and under its original
jurisdiction as conferred by Section 5 (1) Article VIII of the Constitution.

B. Propriety of Rule 65

l 0. Petitioner submiL-; that using the procedural device or Rule 65 to

assail the constitutionality of a statute is proper and appropriate given the
absence of a specific remedial vehicle. This is supported by this Court's
pronouncement in the case or Magallona vs. Executive Secretary where it said:

''lf1ien this Court r:xercises its constitutional power of

judicial renew, however, we have, bv tradition. newed the wnts
of certioran· and prohibition as proper remedial veh.Jdes to test
the constitutionalitv ofsta.tutes. ,, Ii

11. This Honorable Court reiterated such rule recently in Araullo vs.
Executive Secretary stating:

• Prof. Magallona vs. Executive Sccrct;:u·y Ermita, C.R. o.1 87 167, August 16, 2011.
 "With respect to the Courl, however, the remedies of certiorari
and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the
writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
j urisdiction commilted not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or
officer exercising 1i1dicial, quasi:fudicial or ministerial functions but also
to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lad or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Governm ent, even if the latter does not exercise
judicial, quasi:fudicial or ministerial functions. This application is
expressly authorized by d1e text of the second paragraph of Section 1,
supra.

Thus, petitions for certioran· and prohibition are appropnate

remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or
nullifjrthe act.s oflegislative and executive oflicials. 111

12. Justice Brion, in his Separate Opinion, further said:

"That Rule 65 of the Rules of Court has been expressly

cited, to my mind, i\· not a hii1drance to our present review as the
allegations of the pelitions and d1e rem edies sought, not tl1eir
titles, determine ourjun:~diction in the exercise of the p ower of
judicial review. 118

U~. Petitioner respenlully submit<; that until this H onorable Court

crafts a specific remedial' vehicle under iL-; constitutional rule-making powers,
availing of Rule 65 to assail the constitutionality of statutes is proper and
appropriate.

C. Requisites of Judicial Review

14. .Petitioner submits that the requisites for this Court's exercise of
the power of judicial review exist, whether under the traditional or expanded
concept.

15. In Justice Brion's Separate Opinion in the case of Araullo vs.

Executive Secretary, he offe red a "fresh" approach to this Court's judicial
power. H e said:

"This H onor;J/J/c Court under the 1987 ConstJLudon

possesses three p o,we1:;·:

' Araullo vs. Aquino, C .R. No. 209287, J uly 1, 20 14.

' Ibid., Separale Opinion orJusticc Brion.
 (J) the traditionaf.iusticiable cases involving actual disputes
and controvenies based purely on demandable and
enforceable right'i;

(2) the trad//Jonal justiciri.ble cases as understood 1i1 (1),

but additionally 1i1vo!VJi1gjuri5dictional and consatu/Jonal
1ssues;

(3) pure cons/Jtuaonal disputes attended by grave abuse of

di'>cretion in d1e process 1iJVo!ved or in their result/ s." ''

16. Petitioner submils that the instant petition falls under the third
(3'.i) classification pointed out by.Justice Brion.

17. Assuming ;ffguendo that the instant petition does not fall under
the expanded power of judicial review, Petitioner submit-; that the requisites
for judicial re'view still exists even under the traditional power of judicial
reV1ew.

i. Expanded power ofJudicial Review

18. 1 he third (3"') classification of the "fresh" approach requires two

essential requisites:

"/F/irst, they must demonstrate a prima Jacie show1i1g of

grave abuse ofdiscretion on die part ofthe govemmentiJJ body's
actions; and seconcl, they must prove that they relate to matters
oltranscendenW 1in1H>nance to dJe nation. "' 0

1. Prima facie case of Grave Abuse of Discretion

19. Prima facie evidence is defined as:

"EVJdence gpod. and su!Hcient on its /ace. Such e vidence

as, 1n the judgment of' die Jaw, is sulficient to establish a ;_p'ven
fact, or the group or ch;ui1 ol lricts constitutJng the party~· claJm
or defense, and which 1/'not rebutted or contradicted, will remain
sufficient. Evidence wh/ch, _Ii' unexpiaJned or uncontradicted, is
sulficient to sustain a judgment 1n Javor of the issue it supports,
but which may be contradicted by odier eVJdence. " 11

' Ibid.
0
' Ibid.

" 'Na-Aeon vs. People of the Phili ppines, C.R. o . 164.575, December 6, 20()().
 20. Petitioner submiL'> that a µrima facie case of grave abuse of
discretion exists in the passage of Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code.
Limiting the definition of marriage as between man and woman is, on its face,
a grave abuse of discretion because of the following facts:

20.1 The 1987 Philippine Constitution does not define

marriage solely as belween man and woman. 12

20.2 The Family Code does not require married

individuals to procreate or have t11e ability to procreate. 13 The law
allows impotency, which refers to the inability to copulate or have
sexual intercourse, as a ground for annulment" of marriage but
not sterility, which refers to the inability to procreate. Old men
and women who are sterile are allowed to marry and are not
allowed to annul their marriage on the ground of sterility.

20.3 Homosexuals ordinarily are not impotent. \Vhile

same-sex couples cannot biologically procreate together, they are
ordinarily not sterile. Even if assuming homosexuals can be
classified as a group as sterile, they are not prohibited by
Philippine law 911 ·domestic adoption15 and inter-country
adoption 16 from individually adopting children.

20.4 Heterosexuals are no better parents than

homosexuals. Stated otherlvise, homosexuals aren't necessarily
worse parents than . heterosexuals. Homosexuals can raise
children well in the same manner that heterosexuals can. \tVhile
there is no assurance that gays will not be bad or incompetent
parents, there is also no assurance t11at heterosexuals will not be
bad or incompetent parents. This Honorable Court itself has
stated that:

"Sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove

parental neglect or incompetence. " 11

20.5 Homosexu;tl men and women are ordinarily attracted

to the same-sex in the same way that heterosexual men and
women are ordinarily attracted to the opposite-sex. Gay
12
Section 2 Article XV.
" Articles 2 and 3 of the Family Code.
"Article 1t.5(5) of Lhe Family Code.
" Republic Act No. 8552 or the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
,. Republic Act No. 8043 or the Inter Adoption Act of 1995.
11
Gualberlo vs. GualberLo Y, C.R. o. J511D94, June 28, 2005.
 individuals are human beings who can love another person just
like straight individuals.

20.6 Heterosexuals who enter marriage after committing

to or to commit to a long-term monoga1nous relationship arc no
different from homosexuals, who can enter into long-term
monogamous relationships as well. Both straight and gay couples
have the same chances of' breaking up or falling out of love.

2. Transcendental Importance

21. Petitioner submits that the instant petition raises issues of

transcendental importance.

22. Lesbian ai1d gay Filipinos, who are citizens just as much as
straight Filipinos, are releg<1ted to 2""-class citizens. The United Nations
Development Programn~e and the l Tnited States Agency for International
D evelopment identified the -elfocts of the unequal treatment of lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (hereafrer referred to as "LGBT") Filipinos in our
marital laws and said:

''Without die right to many, LGBT Filipinos are treated

unequally in a whole host of way.5 in comparison to heterosexual
married couples. There remain no clear nghts for either spouse
in same-sex and transgender-heterosexual partnerships reg;u-ding
hospital and prison· 11:r;itations, making medical and burial
decision:,~ transfer of' .101i1t properties, custody of clnldren,
insurance benefits, and other privileges accorded to married and
unmarried opposite-sex couples. Sim1Jarly, government-mcu1aged
social security and health insur;mce are not awarded to the
sUiviving spouse ofa deceased swne-sex partner. " 18

23. Petitioner forthcr submits that homosexuals are deprived of their

right to due process and equal protection, the right to decisional and mai·ital
privacy, and the right to found a family in accordance with their religious or
irreligious convictions.

24.. 'fhe right of indivi<luals, homosexual or heterosexual, to choose

the person he or she wants to have a relationship with and consequently have
that relationship legally recognized wit·h all concomitant the rights and
obligations is a private decision for individuals to make, not the State. This
H onorable Court itself recog1lized the right to marital privacy when it said:

" UNDP, USAID (201 4). Being LGBT in Asia: The Philippin·es Country Report
Bangkok.
 ''Motives for entering Ji1to ;1 marriage are varied and
complex. The SCJ.te does not and cannot dictate on the Jund of
life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their
lifestyle would go into Uie realm of their right to privr2cy and
would raise serious constitutional questions. The right to m adtal
pdvacv allows married ccuples to structure their marn"ages in
almost any way they sec fit, to live together or live apart, to have
children or no ch1ldren, Lo love one another or not, and so on. 1119

25. Lastly, Petitioner suhmilc; t1·1at the instant petition raises an issue
of transcendental importance to the nation because of the millions of LGBT
Filipinos all over the country who are deprived from marrying the one they
want or the one they love. They are discouraged and stigmatized from
pursuing same-sex relationships to begin with. Those who pursue same-sex
relationships despite the stigma are deprived of the bundle of rights that flow
from a legal recognition of a couple's relationship - visitation and custody
rights, property and successional righl'i, and other privileges accorded to
opposite-sex relationships.

ii. Traditional power of Judicial Review

26. Assuming arguendo that tl1e instant petition does not invoke tl1is
Honorable Court's expanded power of'juclicial review, Petitioner submits that
the requisites for the exercise oJ' the traditional power of judicial review exist.

27. The requisites fo r the exercise of the traditional power of judicial

review are:

"J) there must he ;111 actual case or controversy calhi1;/ for

d1e exercise ofjudici;:d powe_r;

(2) the person challeng1i1g the act must have the st;wd1ng
to question the validity of d1e sul?/ect act or issuance; od1erwise
stated, he must ha.ve a personal and subst.a.ntial interest in the
case such that he has susra1i1ed, or will sustain, direct iJ?fury as a
result ofits enforcement;

(3) the question of constitutionali ty must be raised at the

earliest opportunity; aI1d

09
Republic of the Philippines vs. Albios, C.R. No. 198780, October 16, 20Ia.
 (4) the issue o{constitutionality must be the very ii> mota
olthe case. " 20

28. Petitioner submit'i that there is an actual case calling for the
exercise of judicial power. Citing the case of Pimentel vs. Aguirre, this
H onorable Court reiterated that:

"Vliflen an act of' the Jegi5lative department is senr;us/y

alleged to have infhnged the Constitution, settling the
controversy becomes d1e duty of' this Court. By the mere
enactment of the questJoned Jaw or the approval ol the
challenged actJon, the dispute 1:5 saJd to have ripened 1i1to a
judicial controve1:>y ei 'en 1vithout ;UJy other overt act mi

29. Petitioner submits that he has standing to question Lhe Family

Code. This Honorable Court explained that:

"The question 011 leg-;.J/ st;mrhng is whether sud1 parties

have 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure d1at concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the cowt so
largely depends for 1J/um1naaon of difficult constitu/Jonal
questJons. nm

30. Petitioner has a personal stake in the ·outcome or this case.

Petitioner is an open and sell~i d entifi ed homosexual. Petitioner has sustained
direct injury as a result of the prohibition against same-sex marriages.
Petitioner has grown up in a society where same-sex relationships are frowned
upon because of the law's normative impact. Petitioner's ability to find and
enter into long-term monogamous same-sex relationships is impaired because
of the absence of a leg-al incentive for gay individuals to seek such relationship.

31. Petitioner has currently no plans to settle down in any other

country except the Philippines, where he exercises his profession. The
prohibition against t11e right to marry tl1e same-sex injures Petitioner's plans to
settle down and have a companion for lite in his beloved country. A favorable
or unfavorable outcome of this case will heavily influence Petitioner's decision
Lo stay or migrate to a more LGBT friendly country.

'° 13iraogo vs. Philippine Trut11 Com mis~~:on , C .R. Nos. 192935, December 7, 2010.
" La Bugal-B'Ja;m Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos, C.R. No. 127882, December l,
2004.
"'Araullo vs. Aquino, C.R. No. 209287, July l , 20 14.
 32. Petitioner suhmiLs that the question of constitutionaliLy has been
raised at the earliest opportu11ity. 'This Honorable Court explained that raising
a constitutional issue at the earliest opportunity:

"fEfnt.a.Jls the 1i1Lerposit/on of the issue in the pleadings

before a competent court, such d1at, 1f the issue is not rais·ed 1i1
the plead1i1gs before d1at competent court, it cannot be
cons1dered at the tJ1~1l and, 1fnot cons1dered in the trial, it cannot
be cons1dered on ~rppe';d. " 2"

33. Petitioner submiL'i that he has raised the issue of constitutionality

in this pleading before a competent court. Direct recourse to this Honorable
Court is justified by the transcendental importance of the issues raised and the
absence of necessity for trial to obtain facts required to decide the issues
raised.

34. Petitioner submits that the issue of constitutionality is the very !is
m ota of the instant petition. This H onorable Court explained that lis mota
means:

''that the Coult will not pass upon a question of

unconstitutionality, although properly presented, 1f the case can
be disposed olon some od1er ground, such as the applicatJ.on of
the st:a.tute or the general law. The petJtioner must be able to
show that d1e case · c,w not be legall y resol ved unless the
constitutJ'onaJ question raJsed is deLenmned. "u

35. Petitioner submits that the instant petition cannot be disposed of

on some other ground. T'here Is no other way to determine whether the
Petitioner should be prohibited from having the legal opportunity to pursue
same-sex marriage except by resolving the constitutional anchor of' Articles 1
and 2 of the Family Code.

D. ,A..pplicability of the rule on Facial Challenge

36. Petitioner suhmiL'i that the Family Code is facially invalid and
may be facially challenged. '!~his Honorable Court has said that:

"The rule establi~'/1ed 1n our jurisdictJ'on is, only statutes

on free speech, religious keedom, and other fundamental rights
may be facially dial./enged. " 2·1

" Scmmo vs. Gallant Maritime Sci vice~, Inc., C.R. o. 167614, March 24, 2009.
"CongTessman Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, C .R. No. 157584, Apri12, 20W.
" Romualdez vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 167011, December 11 , 2008.
 37. In the case of Imbong vs. Ochoa, this Honorable Court
reiterated the rule in Romualclez saying:

"In this juris·d/ction, dJe application of doctrines

originating from the l!.S. has been generally maint.a.ined, albeit
with some modifications. vVhile this Gou.rt ha.s withheld the
application of facial r·hallenges to stricdy penal statues, 1t· has
expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free
5peech, but also d10se involving rdigious freedom, and other
li.mdamental nghts. ""';

38. Petitioner submits that Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code

regulates h.mdamental rights such as the right to due process and equal
protection, right to decisional ·and marital privacy, and the right to found a
family in accordance with religious convictions. Thus, Petitioner submits that
a facial challenge is proper.

:39. Petitioner s1,1bm;Ls that the violation of the right to privacy has
been recognized by this H onorable Court as a right that triggers a facial
challenge. In Ople vs. Torres, thi.- Honorable Court said:

'~4. 0. No. 308 /. ../ a.nnot pass constitutional muster as an

administrative legislation because fa.ciallr it violates the nght to
pn'vacv. "v

"" Imbongvs. Executive Secreta1y Ochoa, C.R . .'o. 2048 19, April 8, 2014..
"' Opie vs. Torres, C.R. No. 12768.'i, July 23, 1998.
 v.

LEGAL ARGUMENTS

A.

'T'HE FAMILY CODE, 'I r DEFINING AND LIMITING

MARRIAGE AS BET\IVEE MAN AND WOMAN, IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT DEPRIVES
PETITIONER AND OTHER HOMOSEXUALS T HE
RIGI--I'I' T'O LIBERrl 'Y \IVITHOUT SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS OF lAW;

B.

THE FAMILY CODE, IN DEFINING AND LIMIT ! TG

MARRIAGE AS BETWEEN MAN AND WOMAN , IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT DENIES
PETITIONER A. ID OTHER HOMOSEXUALS THE
EQUALPROTECTIO OFTHElAWS;

c.

THE FAMILY CODE, IN DEFINING AND LIMIT ING

MARRIAGE AS ' BETWEE r MAN AND WOMAN, IS
UNCONSTITUTIO! AL BECAUSE IT VIOLATES SEC.
3(1) ART. XV OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION.
 VI.

DISCUSSION

A. THE FAMILY CODE, IN

DEFINING AND LIMITING
MARRIAGE AS BETWEE1 A MA.
A D A WOMAN, IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECA USE
IT DEPRIVES PET!TIONAJ? AND
OTI-fER HOMOSA"Xf!ALS THE
RIGHT TO UBERTY WITHOUT
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF
!A vr;:

40. Petitioner ~ubmi ts that applying the strict scrutiny test, Articles 1
and 2 of the Family Code is unconstitutional because there is no rational
nexus between the means of limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples and the
compelling state interest of protecting marriage as the foundation of the
family.

41. Petitioner submits the strict scrutiny test is appropriate. 'T'his

Honorable Court explained in Lhe case orvVhite Light Corporation vs. City of
Manila:

"Jn tenns ofjudicia/ review o/'statutes qr ord1i1ance.~~ strict

scrutJny refers to the sLaJJdard for detenmning the quality ;wd the
amount ofgovernmental 1i1terest brought to justifj the regu!atJon
of funda:nenta! freedoms. Stn"ct scrutinv is used todav to test the
vahditv oflaws dealing with the regulation ofspeech, gender~ or
race as well as othe'r fundaIIJentaJ rights as expansion from its
earlier applicatJons to equal protectJon. " 28

42. Articles l and 2 of the Family Code regulate the right to

decisional privacy, the right to marital privacy, and the right to found a family
in accordance with religious convictions. Petitioner avers that such rights are
fundamental rights.

43. Preliminarily, Petitioner avers that the presumption of

constitutionality is reversed in cases where the strict scrutiny is applied. This
Honorable Court has stated that:

"' While Lighl Corporation vs. CiLy o r I:mila, G.R No. 122846,January 20, 2009.
 "The apphca/Jon of the stn'ct scrotinv analvsis to
petitJoners' daims lbr provi51on;J/ relief warrants the inevit;1ble
conclus1on that the tn"rd court cannot deny provisional relie f to
the party alleging a prima lane case alleging government
infringement on the n~ht to Hee expression without hearing Ii-om
the infiinger the cause why its actions should be sust;11ned
provisionally. Such acts of infringement are presump/J.velv
uncons/Jtutional, thus Lhe trial court cannot deny provisional
relief outright since to do so would lead to the sustena'on of a
presumpa'vely unconstJtutional act. It would be necesswyfor the
infringer to appear in court and somehow rebut against the
presumption ofunconstJtu/Jonalitv for the trial court to deny the
1i1junctive relief sought for 1n cases where there is a pnina
lac1e case esta.blish1i1g Lhe infringement of the right to kee
expre.\~s·1on. H 'l'J

44. Proceeding to the application, for a statute to pass the strict

scrutiny test under substantive clue process, this Honorable Court explained
in the case of City of Manila vs. Laguio, .Jr. that:

''/l/f it is ;w art>;1 whe1e strict scrutiny is used, such as for

protectJi1g fundamen tal nghts, d1en the gvvemment wi.U meet
substmtive due process only if 1t can prove that the law is
,1ecesswy to achieve a compeUinggovemment purpose. ,, 30

45. Petitioner submit" that the compelling state interest is the

protection of marriage as the fo undation of the family as provided by Section
2, Article XV of the ComtiLuLio n."' The presence of a state interest is
complied with if it is laid down by the Constitution itself. This Honorable
Court, speaking through .T ustice Cruz, in the case of Association of Small
Landowner!' vs. Secretary of' Agrarian Reform explained:

''.As the suqject and purpose ofagrarian reform have /Jeen

laid down by d1e ConstJi:uuon itself,' we may say that die /jrst
requirement has been satisfied. vVhat remains to be examii1ed is
the validity ofthe m edwd employed to achieve the constitutional
goal. ,m

"Newsounds Broadcasling N elwork Inc. vs. Dy, C.R. No. 170270 & 179411, April 2,
200~).
"' City of' M<mila vs. Laguio,Jr., C.R. No. 1181 27, April 12, 2005.
" Seel.ion 2, Article XV slates: "Marriage, as <Ul inviolable social inslitulion, is the
l'oundalion 01' 1.he fmnily and shall be prolcclecl b y Lhc State."
" Association of' Small Landowners vs. Secrelary of Agrarian Reform, C.R. No. 78742, July
14, 1989.
 46. Even though a compelling state interest exists, Petitioner submits
that the provisions of t:he Family Code limiting marriage as between a man
and a woman is not necessary to achieve such interest. To emphasize, the
state interest is the protection of marriage as the foundation of the family and
no t the protection of heterosexual relationships per se.

47. What is a family? According to Black's Law Dictionary, a family

is a collective body of persons who live in one house and under one head or
management. 33 Merriam \tVehster defines family as a group of people who are
related to each other. :u

48. Petitioner emphalically avers that homosexuals are people or

persons like heterosexuals who can be a part of a family and contribute to that
family. Homosexuals are born out of a family and grow up in a family.
Homosexuals can leave their family and found their own family. Same-sex
couples who live in one house constitute a family. Same-sex couples can
formally adopt children as individuals under Philippine law or informally
adopt children jointly, either or which is a family according to the definition of
Black's Law Dictionary.

49. Aside from tl1e ability to fo und and constitute a fan1ily, Petitioner
submits that homosexuals jusl like heterosexuals can fulfill the essential
marital obligations laid 'do\\;n by the Family Code, as identified by this
H onorable Court in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals85 , namely:

49.1 The obligation t.o live together, observe mutual love,

respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. 86

49.2 The obligation to fix the family domicile. 37

49.3 The obligation to support the family and pay the

expenses for such supp<)1t and other conjugal obligations.38

49.4 The obligations in regard to parents and their

children as stated in Articles 220, 221, and 225 of the Family
Code. ·

·" Black's Law Dictionary 2"' l·:dition Online, http:// thelawdjctionan1.ord family/, last
accessed on May 18, 2015.
" Merriam-\Vebsler Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionarvlfamily, last
accessed on May 18, 20 15.
"' Republic vs. Courl of Appeals and M~lina, C.R. o. 108763, February 13, l ~)97.
"" ArLicle 68 of the Family Code.
" ArLicle 69 of the Family Code.
" Article 70 of the Family Code.
 50. Petiti.oner subm its that homosexuals can fulfill the essential
marital obligations regardless whether it is as between the spouses or as
between the pa.rents and their children.

51. To reiterate, as aforementioned, the Family Corle does not

require married individuals to p1 ocreate or have the ability to procreate.
There is no legal requirement in any Philippine law for married couples to
have children before ent,ering marriage or during its subsistence.

52. Petitioner is aware that this Honorable Court has stated that
procreation is one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code
in the case of Chi Ming T soi vs. Court of' Appeals, where it stated:

"Endendy, one of the essential mantal obligations under

the Fam1ly Code 1:~· '/t/o procreate children based on the
universal principle d1at p rocreation of children through sexual
cooperation is d1e basic end ofmaniage. "139

53. Petitioner respect.fully submits that such declaration of this

Honorable Court is without legal basis and is obiter dictum. No such
obligation can be found in the Family Code or in any Philippine law.

54. Assuming a.rguendo that married couples are required, Petitioner

respectfully points out, as aforementioned, that homosexuals are not
prohibiLed by Philippine law on domestic adoption'° and inter-country
adoption4 1 from adopting children.

55. Also, again, heterosexuals are no better parents than

homosexuals. Stated otherwise, homosexuals aren't necessarily worse parents
than heterosexuals. Homosexuals can rnise children well in the same manner
that heterosexuals can. While there is no assurance that gays will not be bad
or incompetent parents, there is also no assurance that heterosexuals will not
be bad or incompetent p;u·enLs. ~l his H o norable Court itself has stated that:

''Sexual preference or m oral laxity 'alone does n ot prove

parental neglect or 1i1competence. " n

"' Chi Ming T soi vs. Courl of Appeals, G.R. o. 11 9190, January 16, 1997.
"' Republic Acl No . 8552 or t11c Domcslic Adoption Act of 1998.
" Republic Act No. 8043 or the Inter Adoption Acl of 1995.
"Gualbcrlo vs. Gualberlo V, G.R lo. 154994,June 28, 2005.
 56. Thus, Petitioner submits that homosexuals and same-sex couples
DO NOT and CANNOT HARM the institution of marriage. In fact,
homosexuals and sam \ -sex. couples can serve to f01ward the State's
compelling interest in protecting and strengthening the family as a basic
autonomo us social institution. "' Consequently, there is NO NECESSITY to
limit marriage as between a man and a woman to protect and strengthen the
family. There is actually a necessity to allow same-sex marriage.

57. There being no. necessity lo limit marriage to o pposite-sex

couples, there is no rational nexus or relation of the means of limiting
marriage as between a man and a woman to the compelling stale interest of
protecting marriage as the foundation o r the family. Thus, Articles 1 and 2 of
the Family Code are UNCONSTITUTIONAL for depriving Petitioner of his
right to liberty without substantive due process of law.

B. T'HE FAMILY CODE, IN

DEFI ING AND UMITI TC
MARIUAGE AS B).\T\VEGN M A
Al D WOMAN, IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BJ;,CA l f.)E
I T DENIES PE17TfO,\'ER AND
OTI-fER HOMOS.t,"'X[iAl.S, THE
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAW);

58. Petitioner submits that applying the strict scrutiny test, Articles 1
and 2 of the Family Code are unconstitutional because the classification of
same-sex and opposite-sex couples is not necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest of protecting marriage as the foundation of the family.

59. Alternatively, assuming that the rational basis test is applicable,

Petitioner submits that Articles I and 2 of the Family Code a.re still
unconstitutional because the re is no substantial distinction between same-sex
and o pposite-sex couples and the classification is not applied eq ually to all
members of the same class.

i. Strict scrutiny test

GO. Petitioner submits the sb·ict scrutiny test is appropriate. T his

H onorable Court explained in Lhe case of ~'hite Light Corporation vs. City of
Manila:

" Section 12, Article II st.ales: ,''The Stale recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
prol.ecl ;md strengthen I.he family as ;1 basic aulonomous social institution."
 "Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a
valid classification. and its policies should be accorded
recognition and respect by the courts ofjustice except when diey
run afoul of die Constitution. The deference stops where the
classification violates a fundamental right, or preiudices persons
accorded special protection bv the Constitution. Vfiflen these
violations arise, thi'i Court must discharge its primary role as the
vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and
more exacting adhercnf'e to constitulional limitatJons. Rational
11
basis should not suflice. "

61. Classifying legally capacilated and consenting adults into same-

sex and opposite-sex couples violate decisional and marital privacy. The
decision who to marry is a fundamental right, thus strict scrutiny test is
appropriate.

62. Furthermore. sb·ict scrutiny is appropriate when the classification

is considered suspect. This H onorable Court explained in the case of Serrano
vs. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.:

"171e Court has 1i1 a way f(;und the strict scrudny stand;ud,
an American constJtutional construct, useful in determimil/J" the
constitutionality of Jar:~<; diat tend to target a class of thing:'i or
persons. According· to du:> st;mdard, a legislative classification
that impermissibly 1i1lederes w1d1 the exercise of' fundam ental
right or operates to die peculiar class disadvant;Jge of a suspect
class is presumed unconsbtutional. The burden is on die
government to prove tJ1at d1e class1/jcalion is necessaiy to aclueve
a compelling sta.Le 1i1tcrest and that 1t is the least restrictive means
to protect such 1ntere.st. "1.1

63. Petitioner submits that classifying . individuals by sexual

orientation and gender, so a~ to rlistinguish between same-sex and opposite-
sex couples, is a suspect classilication.

64. Former Chier .T ustice Reyinto Puno imported into Philippine

jurisprudence the factors that the United States Supreme Court takes into
account in assessing whether or not a classification is suspect. In the case of
Ang Ladlad vs. COMELEC, former Chief Justice Puno explained in his
Separate Concurring Opinion:

" Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bcu1gko Sentral ng Pilipin<ts, G.R. No.
148208, December 15, 2004. ·
"Scrrrmo vs. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., C.R. No. 1676 14, March 24., 2009.
 ''Instead ofadopai1g a rigid !Ormula to determine whether
cert.ain legislative clas.Hfications warrant more demanding
constitutional analJ~'ii'i, the United St.ates Supreme Court has
looked to four facton~ thw:

(I) The histor;' of'irmdious discrimination against the class

burdened by the legic;lation;

(2) Whed1er U1e characteristics that distinguish die class

indic<.:te a typical class member's ab1lity to contribute to
society;

(3)Whether d1e dic;angui5h1i1g characteristic is 'immutable'

or beyond d1e class memben' control,· and

(4)The political power ofthe sul{ject. class." 46

65. Former Chief Justice Puno, looking into the four factors, found
that state action singling out homosexuals or homosexuality warrant a
heightened judicial scrutir.y. Looking into the first factor, he finds:

"The first consideration is whether homosexuals have

sufkred a history of purposeful unequal treatment because of
their sexual orienration. One cannot, 1n good faith, dispute that
ffelY and lesbian penons hist.oncally have been, and conaiwe to
be, the t.arget of J.> ur1msefu l and pernicious discrim1nation due
solely lo the1i· sexual onentatJon. Paragraphs 6 and 7 ol Ang
Ladlad's Peation for Regislra.aon for party-list accreditaaon Ji1
fact state: ·

6. There have heen documented cases of discnininatJon

and VJolence perpetuated a;punst the LGBT Community,
;unong which are:

(a) J;,/fennnate or gay youths being beaten up by

their parent'i and/or guardians to make them
confonn Lo standard gender norms ofbehaVJrJ1~·

(b) FatheH and/or guardians who allow their

daughten; 1vho are butch lesbians to be raped/, so
as/ to "cure "dJem 1nlo becoming straight women;

"' Ang Ladlad LGBT Parly vs. Colllmission on l~lcclions, Separate Concurring O pinion of
Chier.Justice Puno, C.R. o.l ~J0.5 8 2, Ajiril 8, 20 10.
 (c) Eflenni1ate /FIJ~s· and butch lesbians a.re kicked
out of school, NCO.c,~ and choirs because at U1eir
identity;

(d) Ailenni1r1te youths and m asculine young women

a.re refused admission from (sic) certain school.s~ are
suspended or are rwtomatically put on probation;

(e) D em;d of.fobs~ prom otions, IIainings and other

work lx:ne/jtc; once one's sexual orienta.t1(>n and
gemJer .1~';entity is (51() revealed;

(!} Consensual partneHhips or relatiomhips hy gays

and les/Jians 1,vho a1e already of age, are broken up
by dJeir parents or guardians using the /A/nD._
ludnapping IL/aw; ·

(g) Pray-overs, exorcism s, a.nd other religious cures

are p edr>1med on gay.'i and lesbians to ''reH>rm"
them;

(h) Youn// g-r1y.c,· and lesbians are forCJbly sul{/ected

to psychiatric counseling and therapy to cure
them/,/ de:,pite d1e de-lisDng (sic) of h om osexuality
an d lesh1;mi'im as a mental disorder hy the
American P.c,ychiaDfr: Association;

(J) T1-rmsgenders, or individuals who were horn

mall buL 1vho se/f~1den/Jly as wom en and d1ess as
such, a1e denied entry or ·serVJces in certain
restwrant..- and est1b/ir;hments; and

(J) Sevend murders from the years 2003-3006 were

committed ag21nst gay m en, but we1e not
adwo1vler./,t;ed by police as hate crimes or violent
acts o/higouy.

7. Jn U1e recc11/ \lfay 2009 US asylum case of' Plnlip

B elarmino, he LestJfir~:d dwL as a young gay person 1i1 the
Ph1Jip p1nes, he IVrts sul{/ected to a variety of sexual abuse
and vi'olence, including repe<1ted rapes/,/ which he could
not report to /d1e/ police /or speak ofl to his own parents
 According/v. this historr of discrimination suggests that
anvlegislative burden pl:iced on lesbian and ga.vpeople as a class
is "more li.kelv than. others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather
than legislative rationality m pursuit of some legitimate
obiective. "" 11

66. Moving into the second facto r, former Chief Justice Puno finds
that homosexuality is not related or relevant to a person's ability to contribute
Lo society.

''.it second relevant cons1deration is whether the character-

in-issue is related to the person -S abihi:v to contnbute to society.
Heightened scrutiny is· applied when the classification beaH no
relationsh1jJ to d1is ahihiy,· dJe e,n:•;tence of this factor Ii1dicates
the c/r15sJ/ication i5 likely based on irrelevant stereotypes and
prejudice. Insofar as sexual orientition is concerned, it 1:'i gainful
Lo repair to Kerrigan v. Commim'oner ofPublic Healdi, viz.:

The dek11dants also concede that sexual orientation

bears no relation to a persons ability to participate 1n or
contnbute to society, a fact that many courts· have
acknowle~~ed, ·as well. x xx Ifhomosexuals were aflheted
with some sort of imped1inent to their ability to pedorm
and lo contnbute lo society, die entire phenomenon of'
'sraying in die /c/loset' and of 'coming out' would not exist;
their imped1inent ;,wJUld betray their status. x x x Jn this
critical re.spec{, ;.;ay pe1:sDns stand 1ii swk contrast to od1er
groups d1at kll'e been demed suspect or quas1~swpect
class recogmtion, &·spite a history of discnimi1a/Jon,
because die di~'lli1gw:s'fung characteristics of those gmups
adversely ;dfcct the1i· a/JJ/1Ly or capacity to perform certaJi1
functions or to dis·charge ceJte:un responsibilities In soCJety.

Unlike the charactenstics unique to those groups,

however, "homosexuality bears no relation at all to [an/
individual's ability to contn'bute fuDr to societv. * Indeed,
because an 1i1d/vidual'.~· homosexual orienldtion 'fo1plies
no Iinpmiment 1i1 judgment, sldbility, reliab1Jity or general
social or vocatJ'onal capah1Ji/Jes~· the observa/Jon of' the
United St;Ltes Supreme Court that race, aliena.ge and
national onjpi1 -all suspect classes entJded to the highest
level ol cons/Jtut1'onal protectJon- "are so seldom relevm1t
to du:: ac/11evement ofany legi'llinate state interest d1at laws
grounded 1n such cons1dera/Jons are deemed to reflect

" Ibid.
 pre;judice and ;mtljJathy" 1s no less applicable to ga.y
persons. (italics supplied)

Clearly, homosexual orientaa'on is no more relevant

to a. person's :1h!lity to perform and contribute to society
than is heLerosexual onentatlon. JJ<lll

67. Going further into the third factor, former Chief J ustice P uno
finds that ho mosexuality is s<'> central to the identity of gays and lesbians that
to penalize persons for it would be ahhorrent.

''.A third factor that courts have considered in detennining

whether the members of a class are entided to heightened
protection for equal protection purposes is whether the attribute
or chara.ctenstic that distingwshes them is immutable or
otheIWJse bevond theiJ: control Of' course, the characteristic that
di>tin;;uishes /:PLY permns !Tom others and qualifies them for
recognition as a disl1i1cl and diffrete group 1s the characteristic
that historically has resulted 1i1 d1eir social and legal ostl-aci5m,
namely, d1eir attiacti()JJ to persons ofthe same sex.

ImmutabJ!ity is· a factor 1'n determining the appropriate

level of scrutiny because d7e 1i1abJ/ity of a person to change a
characteristic d1at is· used tojustifj1 different treatment makes the
discnininatlon v1olati·1 ·e of d1e rad1er "'basic concept or our
system that legal burdens should bear some relat1onsl11jJ to
1i1dividuaf respomibI!1!y. '" H oweve1; d1e constitutional relevance
of d1e immutability hLclor is not reserved to those instances In
which the trait dehiiing the burdened class is absolutely
1inpossible to change. That is, the 1inmutab1lity prong or the
suspectness 1i1quiry surely 1:s· sati:s'fied when the identifying ti-;ut is
"so central to a peHon '.s· 1den/Jly d1at it would be abhorrent for
government to penali?.e a pe1:5011 for refusing to change fit/. "

PresC1i1d1i1g liVJn d1ese premises, it is not appropnate to

require a person to repudiate or change his or her sexual
on'entation in order to avo:d dl'scnininatorytreatrnent, because a
person's sexual on'entadon is so integral an aspect of one's
identity. Consequently, because sexual orientation "may be
altered fif' at all/ only al the expense ofsignificant damage to the
1i1diVIdual's sense of sdf," dass1fica/Jons based thereon "a.re no
less entitled to consideraaon as a suspect or quas1~suspect class
dJan any other group d7at ha.s been deemed to exhibit an
1inmutable characteri~lic. "Stated d1flere11dy, sexual orientation is

'" Ibid.
 not the type of' human /Jwt diat allows courts to relax their
standard of review hecause die barrier is tempora1y or
susceptJb1e f ''j 1e; p' . '" ·"
l to se11-

68. Finally, looking into the fo urth factor, former Chief.I ustice Puno
lincls that lesbians and gays are a ~mall and insular minority.

"The final factor that bears consideration is whether the

m.J2 is 'a minoritv or politicaUv powerless.• Howe ve1~ the
p olitical powerlessness filctor of d1e level-of-scrutiny inqwiy does
not require a sho WJiig- of'a bsolute political powerlessness. Rather,
d1e touchstone of'd1e analysis should be "whether the group Jacks
sufficient political stJ-ength to hnng a prompt end to the pre;/udice
;111d discnimnatJ'on d1rough traditJ'onal political means. "

Apply1ng this· st;wdard, 1L would not be dlflicult to

conclude that gay persons are entitled to heightened
constJtutJonal procecLion despite som e recent political progress.
The discnimnatJ'on thaL they have suffered has been so p en 'l1sive
and severe - even d10ugh d1e1i· sexual orient.a/Jon has n o bearing
at all on their ability to contribute to or peJfonn in society - that
1( is hi!fhly unlikely d1at leg1~-/aa've enactments alone WJ/l suffice to
ehininate that discTJimnation. Furthermore, insofar as the LGBT
community plavs a role in the political process. it is apparent that
their numbers reflect their status as a smaU and insular minontv. "
.I()

69. Former Chi~f J Listice Puno concludes that state action classif)1ing
ho1nosexuals or individuals on the basis of sexual orientation is a quasi-
suspect classification that requi res intermediate review.

"Gwded by d1is· !i-a1;1ework, and cons1denng- furth er that

classilicafJons based on sex or gender - albeit on a male/ Iemale,
man/woman basis - have been pre viously held to Digger
heighten ed scrutJny, 1 respectfully submit that classificatJ'on on
the basis of sexual onent.afJ'on u:e.. homosexualitv and/or
bisexualitvJ is a quasi-suspect classification that prompts
intennediate review. "·"

70. Petitioner respectfully disagrees with the former Chief Justice's

conclusion. Petitioner respec'Lf'ully submits to this Honorable Court that based
on th e four factors in assessing classifications, the appropriate conclusion is

"' Iii id.

'° Ibid.
" Ibid.
that classifications on the basis of .'>exual orientation is a suspect classification
that requires strict scrutiny.

71. Classifications on the basis of sexual orientation ;u-e suspect

because it is almost always arbitrary and unreawnable. There is nothing in
one's sexual orientation Lhat would be relevant to a person's ability to
contribute to society. Sexu;1l orientation by itself is not debilitating to a
person's ability to function.

72. Sexual orientation is an immutable trait. The Separate

Concurring Opinion of former Chief .T ustice Puno implies that sexuality can
be changed or altered, only tfott it is abhorrent to penalize persons for refusing
to change it because it is cen.tral to a person's identity. Petitioner emphatically
avers that sexuality is wholly, totally, and absolutely immutable. Homosexual
individuals cannot change or choose who they are sexually attracted to.
Lesbians and gays cannot choose to be straight in the same way that
heterosexuals or straight individuals cannot choose to be gay.

73. Sexuality as a choice or preference is an illusion. While any

individual can choose to have sex with cu1y individual of the same or opposite
sex, they cannot choose who they have feelings of sexual attraction with, such
as bulterflies in the stomach or erotic arousal. If a gay person is sexually
attTacted to a woman and ends up having sex with a woman, he is better called
a bisexual rather than as having "chosen to change sexuality".

74. T'hus, classifications on the basis of sexual orientation are suspect

because such classifications cu·e often meaningless and ultimately unfair.

75. In summary, Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code trigger a strict

judicial scrutiny because it violates the fundamental rights to decisional and
marital privacy and because it created a suspect classification.

76. Applying the strict scrutiny test, Petitioner submits that Articles 1
;me! 2 of the Family Code are. unconstitutional because the classiticalion is not
necesscu)' to achieve a compelliug state interest.

77. As aforementioned in the l" legal argument regarding the Due

Process Clause, homo~exuals and same-sex couples DO NOT and
CANNOT HARM the institution of marriage and the Stat.e's compelling
interest in protecting marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, Articles
1 and 2 of the Family Code fail to pass the strict scrutiny test
 ii. Rational basis test

78. Assuming argu endo that strict scrutiny test is not applicable,
Petitioner submits that Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code are still
unconstitutional because there is no substantial distinction between same-sex
and opposite-sex couples and the classification is not applied equally to all
members of the same class or individuals who cannot procreate.

79. Under: the rational basis test, a classification to be valid and

constitutional must pass four .standards. Citing the case of People vs. Cayat,
a
this Honorable Court has consistently required that classification:

"(J) must rest 011 substantial distinctions;

(2) must be germane to the purposes ofthe law;
(3) must not be limited to exi5ting conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all m embers ofthe same class. 'm

80. Petitioner submiLc; that Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code fail
the l " and 4.'i. requisites.

81. The classification of same-sex couples as a group that is denied

marriage and of opposite-sex couples as a group that is allowed marriage does
not rest on substantial distinctions. Gay couples can do everything that
opposite-sex couples ca1 1do ·as required by the Family Code. Gay couples can
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support. 53 Gay couples can fix tl1e family domicile. 54 Gay couples can
support the family and pay the expenses for such support and other conjugal
obligations.55

82. Assuming arguendo that same-sex couples are denied marriage

because of their inability to procreate, the classification is not applied equally
to all members of the same class. While all same-sex couples might not be
able to naturally procreate, a portion of opposite-sex couples who are in tl1eir
old age are sterile and cannot procreate as well. However, the law allows
sterile opposite-sex couples to marry.

83. There being no rational basis in classifying same-sex couples as a

group to protect marriage as the foundati on of the family, Articles 1 and 2 of
the Family Code are UNCONSTITUTIONAL for denying Petitioner of the
equal protection of the laws.

·" Biraogo vs. Philippine T ruth Commission , C.R. No. 192935, December 7, 20 10.
"' Article 68 of the Family Code.
·" Arlicle (i9 of the Family Code.
" Arlicle 70 of the Family Code.
C. THE FAMILY CODE, IN
DEFINING AND LIMITING
MARRIAGE AS BETWEEN MAN
AND WO.MAN, IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE
IT VIOi.ATES SEC 30 ) A RT. XV OF
THE 1.987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION

84. Petitioner subm ils that Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code a.re
contrary to Section 3(1) Article XV of the Constitution because it prohibits
same-sex couples from founding a family through the vehicle of marriage in
accordance with their religious convictions.

85. This H onorable Court has recognized Sec. 3(1) Art XV of the
Constitution as a source of rights specifically the right to marital privacy and
autonomy. In the case of Im bong vs. Ochoa, this Court said:

"Petitioner CFC assails the RH La.w because Section 23(a)

(2) (j) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution bv
inauding into manta.J pn'vacv and autonomr. It argues that it
cultivates disunity and fostc'H ;iminosity in the family rather than
promote its solidarity and to_t.;u development.

The Comt cannot but agree.

The 1987 Consdtution i5 replete with prov1s1011s

st.rengd1ening the fam1IJ·;is 1/: i5 d1e IN1sic social institution. In fact,
one article, Article X V, i•; devoted entirely to the family. "·~·

86. Petitioner avers that individuals belonging to religious

denominations that believe in same-sex marriage exist and are denied of the
right to fo und a family in accordance with their religious convictions. Gay
Christian Filipinos belonging to LGBTS Christian Church Inc.57 or
Metropolitan Community Churchs" believe in same-sex marriage .

.. Irnbong vs. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014.
·" LCBTS CHRISTIAN CHURCH INC, accessed on May 18, 2015,
l111ps://!ghL~christianchurch . wordprcss.com/
'"' f,GBT Holy Union / 'vVcdd1i11:~· - Jllfc1ropohi;1n Commumiy Church, accessed on May
18, 20 15, hup://mccmb.webs.corn/ lghlholyunionweddings.htm
 87. Same-sex weddings have been held by members· belonging to
such Christian denominatiom from Baguio City59 to Quezon City. 60 Such
religious weddings have been denied recognition under civil law unlike the
religious convictions of Catholics61 and Muslims.62

88. Thus, Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code are

UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violating Section 3(1) Article XV of the
Constitution.

"' " I 0 couples exchange vows in Baguio's lirsl smne-sex wedding," The P/11/ipp1i1c St;u-,
accessed May 18, 2015, htt])://mvw.philslar.com/headlines/699582/10-couplcs-exch;mge-
vo1vs-baguios-first-same-sex-wedcli11g.
'° "Protest.;mt church performs same-sex weddings in PHL," GMA News Onlii1c, accessed
on Ma}1, 18 2015, http://www.gm;melwork.com/news/stoiy/224555/news/nalion/proleslantc
church-nerfonns-same-sex-weddings-in-phl
., Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code of t11c Philippines.
"'Chapter Two Marriage (NIK.AH), Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
 RELIEF
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully
request<; that the H onorable Ccfurt grant the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition and decl<tre Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code as
unconstitutional and, as a consequence, nullify Articles 46(4) and 55(6) of the
Family Code.

Other just or equitahle relief·s under the premises arc likewise

requested for.

Q uezon City for the City of Manila, May 18, 2015.

Counsel for Petition

Roll of Attorneys No. 6479:1
MCLE Exemption No. - NI A
IBP Lifetime Member No. 0 13716
PTR No. 1324088

47-E Scout Rallos St., Brgy. Laging

Hand a, Quezon City 1103
Metro Manila
Pho ne: (+632) 738-2137
Email: jesusfalcis@yahoo.com

COPY FURNISHED:

CIVIL REGISTRAR-GENERAL
Public Respondent
3'.i Floor, NSO-CVEA Building
East Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City
 VERIFICATION
AND
CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING

1, JES US NICARDO M. FALCIS Ill, of legal age, Filipino, after

having been duly sworn in accordance with law, hereby depose and state that:

l. I am the petitioner in the instant case entitled ~'Jesus Nicardo M

Fa/cis III vs. Gnl Regist.rar-Ct:neral" that was filed before this Honorable
Court.

2. I caused the preparalion of the foregoing Petition for Cert.iordI'i and

Prohibition.

3. I have read the said pk:<lding and hereby aver that the allegations
therein are true and correct of my personal knowledge or based on authentic
records.

4. I have not commenced any other action or filed any claim involving
the same issues in any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best
of my knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein.

5. If I should hereafter learn that the same or a similar action or claim

has been filed or is pending before t11e Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or
any other tribunal or agency, I shall report such fact within live (5) days
therefrom to this Honorable Court.

IN WITNESS W,HEREOF, I have hereunto set our hand Lhis J8.'!1iay

of May 2015 in QUEZON CITY, Philippines.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this J{!'day of May

2015 at QUEZON CITY, afliant exhibiting his/ her competent evidence of
identity, to wit:

Name Identification Card Valid until

Jes us .Jicardo M. Falcis III /'BP ,eJ.i# 01~ 11r,

Doc. No.
Page No.I:
BoOkNo. ~
2.,t/-
ATTY.~~ tt:;Jz
Noldry Pubhc for ezon City. Until Dec. 31. 2015
Adm Molter NP· (2014·2015) / RoUNo. 31559
Serles of 20,JL ~TR O.R No. 055Msn 1.~'"" "r
 VERIFIE'D DECLARATION

I, JESUS NICARDO M. FALCIS III, of legal age, Filipino, after

having been duly sworn in accordance with l"-w, hereby declare that the
docurnent/s (and annexes thereof) hereto submitted electronically in
acconlance with the Efficienl Use of Paper Rule is/are complelc and true
copy/ ies of the document/s (and annexes) filed with the Supreme Court.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this L~!'day of May

2015 at QUEZON CITY, alfianl exhibiting his/her competent evidence of
identit:y, to wit:

Name Identification Card Valid until

.Tes us Nicardo M. Falcis III /BF' ~:JtO!~r/~

Doc. No. 25'

PageNo. i
Book No.
Serles of 20
Adm. Matter NP- i WA~
ATIY. OMEO . RUZ
Notary PubHc for zon City. nril Dec 3t. 7.0t5
(2014·2015) I RoU No 31559
l'TR 0 R No 0558856. t·5·2015. O.C
IBP 0 R. No S75559. 11-19-14. O.C
122 Alum111. Ctr. UP Oil.. Tel No. 3523587
MCLE Compliance No. V-OOOt 16. Issued on 11-20-13