American Military University

A Recommendation for Teaching Moral Vigilantism

Devin Card

Mind of a Terrorist HLSS154 - Final

Doctor Kathryn Lambert

27 January 2018
 Introduction

Secular analysis of terrorist radicalization has been greatly distorted by the many different

political definitions of terrorist that are used by analysts. This writer utilizes the simplest and

most succinct definition of a citizen, soldier, freedom fighter, insurgent, etc, that has degenerated

into a terrorist, “a person that violently targets innocents for an ideological purpose” (Card, 2018,

1), bases his analysis on King and Taylor (2011) review of five models, and provides a

recommendation that prevents the radicalization of terrorists and persuades individuals to

disengage from terrorism.

Brief Analysis of Models

Model 1: Borum's (2003) Pathway fails to define terrorism and does not distinguish

between freedom fighters and terrorists. All four steps aptly apply to non-terrorist freedom

fighters (or even any government's soldiers) as they do to terrorists.

Model 2: Wiktorowicz’s (2004) Theory of Joining Extremist Groups is more aptly named,

Theory of Joining a Religion as it describes the process and effects of joining any religion. It does

not distinguish between the effects of joining normal religious groups and extremist groups.

Model 3: Moghaddam's (2005) Staircase to Terrorism conflates the definition of a non-

terrorist freedom fighter and a terrorist. Moghaddam begins to separate the two on the fourth

floor when he states that only death awaits once within a terrorist organization, as there is no exit

aside from death. Aside from being killed by the group, other violence upon its own members,

and pressure to commit violent acts against innocents, the fourth floor also pertains to non-

terrorist freedom fighters. Moghaddam's fifth, and final floor, is specific to terrorists; it entirely

excludes non-terrorists.

Model 4: Silber and Bhatt's (2007) Radicalization Process' first two stages are more aptly
named the NYPD's Theory of Middle Easterners Joining the Muslim Religion (practically

identical to Model 2). Silber and Bhatt's third stage describes a red flag behavior of an end-stage

radicalized Muslim, a radical will abruptly withdraw from the mosque that they have been

regularly attending, due to either the mosque being too moderate or to insulate themselves from

the risk that their mosque is under law enforcement surveillance. The fourth stage merely defines

the process of the actual attack committed by a radicalized person.

Model 5: Sageman's (2008) Four Prongs does not discuss any behavioral or psychological

factors that are exclusive to terrorists.

Commonalities

Even though, none of the models have the same foundation due to using different

definitions of terrorism and King and Taylor even described the models as “wide-ranging both in

structure and content” (608-609), King and Tayler point out that the five models, combined,

conclude that terrorist and non-terrorist radicalization is a social-psychological transformation

process. When using our Founding Fathers as a baseline and model to contrast terrorists against,

it is plain to see that there are many social-psychological and behavioral factors common

between them and terrorists. Namely, moral outrage, relative deprivation, and identity-related

issues.

Additionally, freedom fighters and terrorists actions are perceived similarly. Terrorists and

their supporters, and our Founding Fathers “and their supporters certainly see their actions as

heroic, courageous and noble” (Silke, 2015, 4). Sageman reinforces this commonality when he

describes radicals as fighting against injustice.

Distinctions

While there is a social-psychological transformation process commonality between

freedom fighters and terrorists, the distinctions are key to determining a foundation for a terrorist

model. Lambert (1993) distinguishes between the two by providing terrorist specific personality

profiles and psychological typologies. One would typically not describe our Founding Fathers in

the same way she describes terrorists as “absolutists who passionately support whichever

ideology attracts their interest[, as]...uncompromising, action-prone, impatient, instant

gratification seekers, and high risk-takers[, and]...tend[ing] to express ambivalence toward

authority and a lack of emotional attachment to the consequences of their acts” (Lambert, 1993,

75-76).

Actually quite to the contrary, our Founding Father's were vested heavily into their

ideology, they put forth great sums of time and effort to logically and rationally justify their

actions while determining the consequences of their actions, they exhausted all other options

before resorting to violence, and they respected authority. All of which is shown by the many

documents they drafted outlining their reasoning for rebelling (moral vigilantism) and its desired

results. Additionally, the Bill of Rights and Constitution's protections for minority groups and

individuals show that their underlying foundational thoughts (intent) were rational and morally

justified. They were being as all-inclusive, accepting, and tolerant of the maximum others as

feasibly possible; all signs of unconditional love. Robinson (2015) describes a possible Vigilante

Code that potentially emulates our Founding Fathers.

Similarly and yet contrasting fundamentally, Terrorists appear rational and sane on the

surface, supported by Rasch's findings that none of the captured terrorists he psycho-analyzed

could be “classified as psychotics, neurotics, fanatics, or psychopaths” (Silke, 8). However, upon

closer analysis of their fundamental beliefs used as moral justification for their actions, there is

always an irrational (anti-social) underlying foundational thought that is poisoning (violates basic
human rights) all of the sane and rational beliefs built upon it. Feed a tree poison and its sweet

fruit become bitter.

For example, Osama bin Ladens' teaching that killing American citizens is justified

because they are not innocent due to their government system of voting (or having an opportunity

to vote) for their leaders is irrational (hasty generalization fallacy), because not every citizen

voted for the leader and it is impossible to distinguish which citizen did or did not.

Disengaging from Terrorism

Indonesia has successfully de-radicalized terrorists by focusing on teaching moral

ideologies in an effort to replace radical ideologies. Specifically, that “[t]he Q'uran views the

killing of civilians as unacceptable and unjustifiable” (Zahid, 2016). Zahid (2016) further

describes the Indonesian initiative as changing the terrorists underlying irrational foundational

thoughts (“neutralizing the ideological foundations”).

Recommendation

The Founding Father's drafted our Constitution and within it they laid forth our right to

follow in their footsteps, repeating what they did (and how) as moral vigilantes. This right is not

comprehensively taught to our youth. Therefore, this writer recommends that an educational

program be implemented in High Schools that details the personality profiles and psychological

typologies of our Founding Fathers and teaches a Vigilante Code (Robinson, 2015, 416) in line

with the Constitutional right of moral vigilantism, with specific emphasis on the limits and lines

that, if crossed, would degenerate them into terrorists or simple criminals outside the protection

of the Constitution. A similar program could be implemented, targeting disillusioned adults, as an

incentive to received discounts on government fees or as a traffic violation reduction class.

 This educational program would help persuade individuals to disengage from terrorism by

replacing their irrational beliefs with what the Constitution does allow.

Devin Card
 References

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