EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 134777-78. July 24, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLAND MOLINA, accused-appellant.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us on automatic review is the Decision[1] dated February 26, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Bangued, Abra, Branch 2, in Criminal Case
No. 1757 finding Roland Molina guilty of murder for killing Joseph Bon-ao and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death. In Criminal
Case No. 1758 which was tried jointly with Criminal Case No. 1757, the trial court found Molina likewise guilty of frustrated murder committed
against Angelito Bon-ao.

The information for each crime reads as follows:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1757 for Murder

That on or about the 4th day of March, 1996, at around midnight, at Poblacion Lagangilang, Abra, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and while armed with a sharp-pointed instrument (unrecovered), did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab one JOSEPH BON-AO, thereby inflicting a fatal stab wound at the back hitting the
intercostal vessels, lacerating the right lung and severing the third right posterior rib which caused his instantaneous death; to the damage and
prejudice of the victim and his heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1758 for Frustrated Murder

That on or about the 4th day of March, 1996, at about 12:00 Midnight, at Poblacion, Municipality of Lagangilang, Province of Abra, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and while armed with a sharp-pointed instrument
(unrecovered), did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab one ANGELITO BON-AO, thereby inflicting stab wounds on
the different parts of his body, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of MURDER as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, by reason of the timely medical attendance rendered to the
victim which prevented his death; to the damage and prejudice of the victim and his heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

At the arraignment, accused-appellant Molina, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged.

Trial ensued with prosecution witnesses' Dr. Hubert L. Seares[4] testifying on the operation and treatment he performed on Angelito Bon-ao to save
his life; SPO4 Mariano Rabaja[5] testifying on the statements made by Danny Vidal and Angelito Bon-ao upon investigation; Danny Vidal[6] and
Angelito Bon-ao[7] testifying on the events that transpired before, during and after the crimes; and Dr. Maria Dickenson[8] testifying on the post-
mortem examination[9] she performed on Joseph Bon-ao.

The People's version of the events that lead to the crimes may be succinctly stated as follows:

Between the hours of 12 and 1 in the morning of March 4 and 5, 1996, brothers Joseph and Angelito Bon-ao, along with their cousin, Danny Vidal,
were on their way home after having witnessed the town fiesta of Lagangilang.[10] They were on their way from the fair grounds to the gate of the
Abra State Institute of Sciences and Technology (ASIST) to get a ride home when suddenly they heard somebody shout "Kuba", referring to Joseph
Bon-ao, a hunchback.[11] Looking back, they asked a group of persons, with accused-appellant Roland Molina among them, who shouted
"Kuba".[12] None of them answered back, though accused-appellant said in the local dialect "I am Roland Molina of Pagpagatpat, Tayum, across the
river."[13] Joseph then said: "If no one among you said that, we will be on our way.[14] Accused-appellant even told Joseph and his companions Do
not fool Sleepy Molina of Pagpagatpat.[15]

As the three were about to turn around to go on their way, with Joseph the only one having made a full turn, accused-appellant Roland Molina
rushed him and delivered a strong stabbing blow at the back of Joseph.[16] Angelito saw this happened since he has not yet made a full turn when
accused-appellant stabbed his brother Joseph.[17] Angelito swiftly went to aid his brother but accused-appellant likewise stabbed him at the
back.[18] Then, accused-appellant and his companions, among them Lorenzo Tejero, fled the scene.[19]

Danny carried Joseph, who was by that time slumped on the ground, to the edge of the road and likewise did the same for Angelito.[20] The police
authorities were called and with their help the two brothers were brought to the Seares Family Clinic in Bangued, Abra, for treatment, but Joseph
was declared dead on arrival while Angelito was saved only through the expert medical attendance of Dr. Hubert L. Seares.[21] Angelito Bon-ao
sustained three (3) stab wounds, with one (1) fatal wound, 4 cms., located at the posterior chest wall, and two (2) non-fatal wounds located at the
lumbar area. As testified to by Dr. Hubert L. Seares, Angelito was discharged from the clinic on March 14, 1996 though he was not yet completely
healed. He was given medical treatment as an outpatient for more than a month.[22]

Dr. Maria L. Dickenson, Municipal Health Officer of Lagangilang, Abra conducted the post-mortem examination on the body of Joseph Bon-ao which
revealed, (a) a stab wound which was 1.8 cm. in length located at the back just to the left side of the vertebral column, at the level of the third
intercostal space, posteriorly, with the upper extremity sharp and the lower extremity blunt, directed inwards, medialwards and to the right, hitting
the intercostal vessels, lacerating the upper lobe of the right lung, severing the third posterior rib, right; and (b) a deep abrasion on the left cheek.
The cause of death was the massive, external and internal hemorrhage due to the stab wound at the back, left side.[23]

For his part, accused-appellant professed innocence. He denied the crimes imputed to him and attempted to put the blame upon somebody, an
unknown unidentified person. Along with accused-appellant's testimony, the testimony of Jovito Nadarisay[24] was offered by the defense.

Accused-appellant's version of the incident is as follows:

Accused-appellant. and Lorenzo Tejero, residents of Pagpagatpat, Tayum, Abra, went to Lagangilang, Abra on that fateful night of March 4, 1996 to
attend the town fiesta.[25] They watched a "zarzuela" at the ASIST amphitheater at 9:00 o'clock.[26] Between the hours of 10 and 12, they went on
their way to the road where the public utility vehicles pass to get a ride for home.[27]
They met three drunk persons while descending an incline at the main gate of ASIST. When he told Tejero "Bumaba" (go down or going down) the
three misheard what he said as "Kuba" (hunchback).[28] One of the drunk men, Joseph Bon-ao, a hunchback, asked accused-appellant and his group
whom among them said "Kuba".[29]He and Tejero denied they were the ones but the hunchback asked for their names and the accused gave his
name as Roland "Sleepy" Molina from Pagpagatpat and he, in turn, asked who they are.[30] The Bon-aos and their companion did not answer,
instead they surrounded Molina and Tejero and when Joseph tried to draw a bolo, he picked up a stone and threw the same at Joseph who was not
hit.[31] Molina then ran away and after covering a distance of 10-15 meters, he was overtaken by a "taller" man who held him at the back of his
collar.[32] Joseph got near this "taller" man and armed with a knife tried to stab Molina who stooped low to avoid the blow and was not hit.[33] A
table belonging to a "balut" vendor was hit instead.[34] He shouted for help saying, "Bro, help me." By the time he called again Lorenzo Tejero for
help, the "taller" man was not there anymore.[35] He did not recognize this "taller" man because he was stooping to avoid "kuba's" knife. He ran to
the fair grounds where there is a big crowd.[36] He did not notice a third man. He learned just then that there was somebody hurt in the commotion
where he and Tejero were before he ran to the fair ground.[37] Afterwards, he went home.[38]

In the course of the trial, it was discovered that accused-appellant was previously charged and convicted of attempted homicide in Criminal Case No.
1133 by the same Regional Trial Court in a decision dated October 9, 1996.[39] The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Roland Molina and Pio Pataray guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted homicide, with the
aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Articles 6, 51,
and 64 of the same code, and hereby sentences him to the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to four (4) years of prision
correccional as maximum.

Both accused are further ordered to indemnify the private complainant the sum of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) representing actual damages
and to pay the costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED.[40]

When confronted with this fact on the witness stand on December 18, 1997, accused-appellant interposed no objection and admitted the same.[41]

In a Decision dated February 26, 1998, the trial court convicted accused-appellant of the crimes for which he was charged, appreciating against him
the aggravating circumstance of recidivism. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Roland Molina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, with the aggravating circumstance of recidivism and
no mitigating circumstance for the death of Joseph Bon-ao and sentences him to suffer the extreme penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of
the victim the amount of P75,000.00 in actual damages plus the amount of P50,000.00 for his death plus the amount of P500,000.00 in moral and
exemplary damages and to pay the costs; likesise [sic], the Court finds the same accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated
murder defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended in relation to Article 6 of the same code with the aggravating circumstance
of recidivism and no mitigating circumstance for the fatal wounding of Angelito Bon-ao and sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years, two (2) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum, to indemnify
Angelito Bon-ao the amount of P50,000.00 in actual and compensatory damages plus P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages and to pay the
costs.

SO ORDERED.[42]

Accused-appellant challenges the appreciation of facts by the trial court in totally disregarding the defense's version of the incident. He contends
that the testimony of Nadarisay is not per se incredible and improbable. In a simple manner, he argues, 44-year-old Nadarisay narrated how the
Bon-aos were stabbed by Lorenzo Tejero and not by accused-appellant himself. He professed that Nadarisay unequivocally identified Tejero as the
real assailant of the Bon-aos. Furthermore, accused argues that the encounter between the accused-appellant and the victims was casual and the
attack was done impulsively, hence the act done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous.[43]

We find accused-appellant's protestations to be untenable.

We see no reason to disturb the findings and evaluation made by the trial court. Issues of appreciation of evidence and credibility of witnesses are
best left to the trial court for it is only the trial court that has the foremost opportunity to weigh and assess these matters. We have long declared
that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the credibility of opposing witnesses, unless there
appears in the record some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which have been overlooked and, if considered, would affect the
result.[44]

Indeed, the testimony of the two eyewitnesses, Angelito Bon-ao and Danny Vidal, to the commission of the crime, is consistent, categorical and
hardly suffers from grave inconsistencies.

Angelito Bon-ao testified thus:

DIRECT EXAMINATION (Atty. Pre)

Q: Where were you going with your companions?

A: We plan in going home here in Bangued because we have a service car near the gate of the ASIST sir and our arrangement to the driver around
12:00 o'clock we're going home in Bangued, Abra.
Q: And while you were walking with your cousin Danny Vidal and brother Joseph Bon-ao, is there anything unusual incident that happened
A: Yes sir.
Q: What happened?
A: My brother sir was stabbed.

COURT:
Q: How about you?
A: I was also stabbed sir.

ATTY. PRE:
Q: When you said your brother was stabbed were there persons?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Who were these persons?
A: He is Mr. Sleepy Molina sir. Witness pointed to the accused who is sitting at the accused bench.
Q: Was he with some companions?
A: Yes sir but I can't recognize his companions.
Q: Did you know Roland Molina on that night?
A: On that spot sir he introduced himself sir.

COURT:
Q: How did he introduced himself?
A: When we were walking and about to meet the group of Roland Molina one of them shouted kuba, kuba my brother got angry because he is a
hunchback and still they call him kuba, kuba. We consulted them.

ATTY. PRE:
Q: Who consulted them?
A: My brother and my cousin sir.
Q: What did they say when they confronted them?
A: Do not fool at Sleepy Molina who is from Pagpagatpat.
Q: Who is Sleepy Molina you are referring to?
A: The accused sir.

COURT:
Q: Do not fool at sleepy Molina who is from Pagpagatpat is that what he said?
A: Yes sir.

ATTY. PRE:
Q: When Roland Molina said that what followed next?
A: Then if you were not the one who shouted "kuba kuba" then it is alright with us.
Q: Who said that?
A: Danny and my brother sir.
Q: Then what happened next?
A: As soon as we turn our back that was the time Roland Molina stab my brother sir.
Q: What part of the body of your brother was stabbed by Roland Molina?
A: At his back sir.
Q: How many times?
A: Once sir.
Q: Did you see the stabbing of your brother?
A; Yes sir.
Q: And then what did you do when your brother was stab?
A: When my brother was stabbed I went to help him sir. When I went to the succor of my brother although I was not armed he stab me sir. I was
stab here witness showing a scars at the right side of his back.

ATTY. PRE:

May we make it of record that the witness puts up his shirt, showed his body where there are several scars.

COURT:
Q: So, you are the second man who was stabbed of the two of you?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: And what happened when you were stabbed?
A: They ran away sir.
Q: And how about you, what did you do?
A: We asked for the help of the police authorities sir.
Q: Was there police who came? ,
A: Yes Sir.
Q: What did they do with your brother Joseph?
A: We were brought to the police car sir.
Q: Where did they bring him?
A: Seares Family Clinic, Sir.
Q: Did your brother reach the hospital alive?
A: He was already dead when we reached the hospital sir.
Q: And you were the one who was treated?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: Do you know the doctor who treated you?
A: Yes Sir. Dr. Huber Seares sir.

xxx xxx xxx

CROSS-EXAMINATION (Atty. Velasco)

Q: Did you see actually the stabbing of your brother?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Even from a distance of about 3 to 4 meters away ahead with your back against your brother and the accused?
A: Yes sir because I turn my head towards them (tinalliaw).[45]

Thus, Angelito Bon-ao categorically and consistently pointed out accused-appellant as the person who inflicted the fatal wound on his brother
Joseph and likewise administered the fatal injuries on Angelito himself. Where it not for the timely medical assistance of Dr. Suares[46], Angelito
would have succumbed to death.
The other eyewitness to the incident, Danny Vidal, likewise gave a credible testimony. His declaration at the witness stand:

DIRECT EXAMINATION (Atty. Pre)

Q: Will you narrate how the incident happened on that night?
A: While we were walking we met several persons one of them shouted "kuba".

COURT:
Q: Kuba is kubbo in ilocano dialect is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Is there any "kuba" among the three of you?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Who?
A: Joseph Bon-ao sir.

ATTY. PRE:
Q: When somebody said "Kuba" what followed next?
A: We asked who among them shouted "kuba" and they answered none.
Q: Who answered?
A: Roland Molina Sir.
Q: Is that Roland Molina you are referring to inside the courtroom?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: Will you point at him?
A: Witness pointed to the accused who is sitted [sic] at the accused bench.
Q: And when Roland Molina said "none", what followed next?
A: After that we told them if nobody shouted that, we better go. But when we proceeded walking that was the time Roland Molina stabbed Joseph
Bon-ao Sir.
Q: How far were you from Joseph Bon-ao, when he was stabbed by Roland Molina?
A: Two (2) meters sir.

COURT:
Q: Who of them was stabbed first?
A: Joseph Sir.
Q: What part of Joseph was hit? At his back?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: How many times did Molina stab Joseph?
A: Once Sir.

COURT:

Continue.

ATTY. PRE:
Q: What happened when Joseph was stabbed?
A: When he was stabbed his brother came to his succor but he again stab the younger brother of Joseph Sir.
Q: You are referring to Angelito Bon-ao?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: How many times did Roland Molina stab Angelito Bon-ao when he came to succor his brother?
A: I cannot recall sir.

COURT:
Q: What happened after Roland Molina stab Angelito Bon-ao?
A: They ran away sir.
Q: When you say they, the group of Molina or your group?
A: Group of Roland Molina Sir.
Q: Where did they go?
A: I do not know sir.
Q: How many people were there in the group of Molina?
A: There were 3 of them sir.
Q: What did you du after the stabbing of your cousins?
A: When Joseph Bon-ao slog down to the ground I went to carry him sir.
Q: Where did you bring him?
A: I brought him at the edge of the road sir.
Q: How about Angelito Bon-ao, what did you do to him?
A: After bringing Joseph Bon-ao at the edge of the road I also went to get Angelito Bon-ao Sir.
Q: Where did you bring him?
A: I brought him to the police car sir.
Q: How about Joseph, where did you bring him?
A: I also brought him to the police car sir.
COURT:

Continue.

ATTY. PRE:
Q: And when they were brought to the police car where did you bring them?
A: We brought to the Seares Family Clinic sir.
Q: Who were the policemen who help you bring the Bon-ao brothers to the Seares Clinic?
A: I cannot recall anymore sir.

COURT:
Q: Was Joseph still alive when you reach Seares Family Clinic?
A: No more sir.
Q: So, he is dead already?
A: Yes sir.[47]

Danny Vidal was unwavering in his positive identification of accused-appellant as the malefactor of the crimes for which he was charged. Thus,
Danny further buttressed Angelito Bon-ao's testimony.

As weighed against the positive identification of accused-appellant by one of his victims, Angelito Bon-ao, which was further corroborated by an
eyewitness to the scene, Danny Vidal, and the absence of any showing of ill-motive on their part other than their quest for justice, accused-
appellant's denial of commission of the crime and imputation of the same to another person is demolished to obscurity.[48] Besides, accused-
appellant's imputation of the crime to another malefactor was heard of only during his testimony[49] and was never raised before the police
authorities during the investigation. Clearly, his bare denial amounts to nothing more than negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight
in law.[50]

With respect to treachery, it is our view that the prosecution has convincingly established the same. Jurisprudence has required that treachery must
be proved by clear and convincing evidence, or as conclusively as the killing itself.[51] For treachery to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance,
two (2) conditions must concur, to wit: (a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself
or to retaliate; and (b) that said means of execution be deliberately and consciously adopted.[52]

In the case under review, the concurrence of the said conditions is firmly anchored on the declarations of the prosecution eyewitnesses', Danny
Vidal and Angelito Bon-ao. Both Vidal and Bon-ao witnessed that, for no apparent reason, after they started to leave the presence of Molina's group,
the latter stabbed Joseph Bon-ao at his back. The sudden and unanticipated killing of Joseph Bon-ao reinforced the trial court's finding of treachery,
bolstered by the fact that the striking blow was at the back of the victims.[53] The same holds true to Angelito who was completely caught off guard
as he was stabbed three (3) times when he chose to aid his brother Joseph. The Bon-aos had no inkling that Joseph's inquiry on who shouted "kuba"
would foreshadow the untimely demise of Joseph and the near death of Angelito. As consistently held by this Court, an unexpected and sudden
attack under circumstances which render the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the
attack constitutes alevosia or treachery.[54] Its essence lies in the adoption of ways that minimize or neutralize any resistance which may be put up
by the unsuspecting victim.[55]

On the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, the trial court properly appreciated the same though not alleged in the information. Article 14(9) of
the Revised Penal Code defines a recidivist as "one who, at the time of his trial for one crime shall have been previously convicted by final judgment
of another crime embraced in the same title of this Code." To prove recidivism, it is necessary to allege the same in the information and to attach
thereto certified copies of the sentences rendered against the accused. Nonetheless, the trial court may still give such aggravating circumstance
credence if the accused does not object to the presentation of evidence on the fact of recidivism.[56]

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant never voiced out any objection when confronted with the fact of his previous conviction for attempted
homicide in a decision dated October 9, 1996 in Criminal Case No. 1133.[57] Neither does it appear that accused-appellant appealed from the said
decision of conviction for attempted homicide, claiming he became aware of the promulgation of the decision in that case only at the provincial jail
during the pendency of his case for murder and frustrated murder.[58] Thus, at the time of his trial for murder and frustrated murder, the decision
in Criminal Case No. 1133 for attempted homicide has long been final.

All the foregoing considered, the trial court did not err in convicting the accused-appellant for the crimes of murder and frustrated murder. Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Article 63, second par. of
the Revised Penal Code, provides that "[i]n all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules
shall be observed in the application thereof: 1. [w]hen in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the
greater penalty shall be applied." Thus, the imposable penalty, in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, shall be the
supreme penalty of death for the killing of Joseph Bon-ao.

As regards the frustrated murder of Angelito Bon-ao, the penalty one degree lower than reclusion perpetua to death, which is reclusion temporal,
shall be imposed pursuant to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Art. 50 thereof. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and in the
presence of the modifying circumstance of recidivism, the maximum penalty to be imposed shall be taken from the maximum period of the
imposable penalty which is reclusion temporal maximum, the range of which is seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor in any of its periods, the range of which is six
(6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.

As to the amount of damages, prevailing jurisprudence[59] sets the civil indemnity for death in the amount of P50,000.00, which can be awarded
without need of further proof other than the death of the victim. With respect to the award of actual damages in both cases, the same is deleted
considering that there is nothing in the record to justify the said award. The Court can only grant such amount for expenses if they are supported by
receipts.[60] Moral damages may be recovered in criminal offenses resulting in physical injuries but there must be a factual basis for the award.
None appears in this case.[61] As to exemplary damages, there being one aggravating circumstance, exemplary damages in the amount of
P30,000.00[62] may be awarded in both cases, pursuant to Article 2230 of the New Civil Code.

Four (4) Justices of the Court however continue to maintain the unconstitutionality of RA No. 7659 insofar as it, prescribes the death penalty;
nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority to the effect that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed
in the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated February 26, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Bangued, Abra, Branch 2 in Criminal Case Nos. 1757
imposing the death penalty on the accused-appellant ROLAND MOLINA for the crime of murder is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
accused-appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Joseph Bon-ao, in the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages. In Criminal Case No. 1758, the appealed decision finding accused-appellant ROLAND MOLINA guilty of frustrated murder is
likewise AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the victim, Angelito Bon-ao, the amount of P30, 000.00 as
exemplary damages. The awards of actual and moral damages in both cases are DELETED.

In accordance with Sec. 25 of the RA 7659, amending Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of Criminal
Case No. 1757 be forthwith forwarded to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, for the possible exercise of his pardoning power. Costs
against accused-appellant.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 149368. April 14, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. FRANCISCO DACILLO alias DODOY AND JOSELITO PACOT y IBARRA (case provisionally dismissed),
accused,
FRANCISCO DACILLO alias DODOY, appellant.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Before us on automatic review is the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 31, in Criminal Case No. 45,283-2000 convicting
appellant Francisco Dacillo y Timtim alias Dodoy of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.

Appellant Dacillo together with Joselito Pacot y Ibarra were indicted for murder in an information that read:

The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of Murder, under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659,
committed as follows:

That on or about February 6, 2000, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned
accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, with treachery and evident premeditation, and with intent to kill, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stabbed one Rosemarie B. Tallada with a bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal
wounds which caused her death.

That the commission of the foregoing offense was attended by the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

The case against appellants co-accused, Joselito Pacot, was provisionally dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to identify him with certainty.

Appellant was arraigned on February 21, 2001 and, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial was conducted on March 1, 2001 and trial
ensued thereafter.

To establish appellants guilt, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Charlita Tallada, the victims mother; Patricia Turlao, the victims
aunt; appellant Dacillos neighbors, Jovelyn Dagmil, Augusto Cesar Arara, Roche Abregon, Resna Abregon, Allan Castanares, Jupiter Campaner; police
officers SPO2 Rodolfo Taburda and SPO1 Avelino Alcobus, and medico-legal officer Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma.

The facts, as established by the prosecution witnesses collective testimonies, follow.

The victim, seventeen-year-old Rosemarie B. Tallada, was last seen alive at dusk on February 6, 2000, on the bridge near appellants house at Purok
No. 3, New Society Village, Ilang, Davao City.

Around 7:45 p.m. that evening, witness Jovelyn Dagmil, who was living with her aunt in the house adjacent to appellants, was looking for her cousin
when she saw the victim Rosemarie on the bridge. Because it was drizzling, she invited Rosemarie inside their house but the latter declined and told
her she was waiting for someone.[3]

After a while, Jovelyn heard a man inside appellants house calling Psst, psst . . . Thinking the call was meant for her, she turned but instead saw
Rosemarie walking towards and entering appellants house.[4]

Not long after Rosemarie went inside the house, a struggle was heard therein. Witnesses Roche and Resna Abregon, who were in the adjacent
house singing with a karaoke machine, suddenly felt the floor shaking as if a scuffle was going on at the other side of the wall. The houses were built
on stilts above the seashore, adjoining one another with mere wooden partitions in between. Roche Abregon peeped through a hole on the wall and
saw appellant and another man grappling with a woman who was gagged with a handkerchief.[5] When Roche saw appellant choking the woman,
she informed her aunt about the commotion in appellants house but the aunt brushed it aside as a simple family quarrel.[6] For a while they heard
the sound of a woman being beaten up. Then everything became quiet. Later that evening, they saw appellant leaving his house.[7]

The following day, February 7, 2000, at around 8:00 a.m., appellant was seen entering his house carrying lumber and screen.[8] He was observed
going in and out of his house several times, each time carefully locking the gate as he left.[9] At around 9:00 a.m., appellant was seen with ready-
mixed cement in a plastic pail and, when asked what he was going to do with the cement, replied that it was for the sink he was constructing.[10]

Later, appellant entrusted a bag of womans personal belongings to barangay tanod Allan Castaares and told the latter that it belonged to his woman
companion. He allegedly could not bring it home because his wife might see them.[11]

By February 11, 2000, neighbors started smelling the rotten odor of Rosemaries already decomposing body.[12]

At 5:00 p.m. the same day, witnesses Roche, Resna, and Rachel were gathering seashells under appellants house when they saw droplets of blood
and pus dripping from appellants comfort room. They immediately reported it to their aunt who in turn instructed her husband to get a stick and
poke the sacks covering the comfort room. However, the husband instead climbed up the house and was greeted by the stink emanating from the
corner where he saw a tomb-like structure. They immediately reported the matter to barangay officials who called the police.[13]

At about 10:00 p.m., policemen arrived at appellants house, accompanied by his wife, and forcibly opened the lock. They proceeded to where the
tomb was located.

When cracked open, the tomb revealed the decomposing body of a woman.[14]

The corpse was brought to the Rivera Funeral Parlor where it was identified by the victims mother Charlita Tallada and aunt Patricia Turlao as that of
Rosemarie, through the keloid scar on her forearm.
Dr. Danilo Ledesma conducted an autopsy on Rosemaries remains. His necropsy report revealed that Rosemarie died from a stab wound in the
abdomen. The report further disclosed that she suffered contusions in the anterior chest wall and her right hand; an incised wound on her left
middle finger; a stab wound on the left side of the face and fractures on the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th ribs on her side.[15]

Dr. Ledesma testified that the wounds suffered by Rosemarie indicated that she put up a struggle and the wounds were inflicted before her
death.[16]

In his defense, appellant admitted complicity in the crime but minimized his participation. Appellant alleged that he only held down Rosemaries legs
to prevent her from struggling and, after the latter was killed by another man he identified as Joselito Pacot, he encased the corpse in cement.

He claimed that Pacot, a co-worker at Davao Union Cement Corporation (DUCC), was looking for a house where he and his girlfriend Rosemarie
could spend the night. He offered his brothers house which was under his care. In the evening of February 6, 2000, he and Joselito Pacot brought
Rosemarie to the house at Purok No. 3, New Society Village, Ilang, Davao City.

After accompanying the couple there, he went home to take supper. Later that evening, he returned to the house with the bottle of Sprite Pacot had
ordered. When he arrived, Pacot and Rosemarie were already grappling with each other and Pacot was strangling the girl. He told Pacot to stop but
instead of heeding him, the latter ordered him to close the door. Pacot told appellant that he was going to be implicated just the same so he closed
the door as ordered and helped Pacot (hold) the feet of the woman as her feet kept hitting the walls.[17]

The two men stopped only when Rosemarie was already motionless. Pacot wanted to dump the body into the sea but appellant told him it was low
tide. Appellant then suggested that they entomb the body in cement for which Pacot gave appellant P500.

Pacot left the house at dawn the following day, February 7, 2000. At past 10:00 a.m., appellant brought the concrete mixture and cast the dead body
in cement. After finishing the job in the afternoon of that day, appellant reported for work at DUCC.

When the body was discovered in the evening of February 11, 2000, appellant immediately left for Cebu City, arriving there the next day, February
12, 2000. He stayed in Cebu City until his arrest the following year.

On May 31, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty of murder and imposed upon him the supreme penalty of death:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Francisco Dacillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER for the death of Rosemarie
Tallada, as defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Considering the aggravating circumstance of recidivism
with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, he is hereby sentenced to the extreme penalty of DEATH,

He is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the offended party in the amount of P50,000.00, plus the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
the sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.

His immediate confinement to the national penitentiary is hereby ordered.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.[18]

Thus, this automatic review.

In his brief, appellant raises the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING THE HEIRS OF THE OFFENDED PARTY THE AMOUNT OF PHP50,000.00, WHICH APPEARS AS
PAYMENT FOR ACTUAL DAMAGES.[19]

Appellant admitted that he had a hand in the killing of Rosemarie but attempted to downgrade his participation in the crime by claiming he only
held Rosemaries legs as Pacot was strangulating her. The rule is that any admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same
case does not require proof to hold him liable therefor. Such admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or no such admission was in fact made. There was never any such disclaimer by appellant.

Moreover, despite appellants self-serving, exculpatory statement limiting his involvement in the crime, all circumstances pointed to his guilt. His
declaration faltered in the face of the testimonies of eyewitnesses positively identifying him as one of the two men who were with Rosemarie when
she was killed. Witness Roche Abregon pointed to appellant as the one who strangled Rosemarie. He was established to be inside the house at the
time the witnesses heard a woman being battered. Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that Pacot was the mastermind, appellants admission
that he participated in its commission by holding Rosemaries legs made him a principal by direct participation.

Two or more persons taking part in the commission of a crime are considered principals by direct participation if the following requisites are
present:

1. they participated in the criminal resolution and

2. they carried out their plan and personally took part in its execution by acts which directly tended to the same end.[20]

Both requisites were met in this case. Two or more persons are said to have participated in the criminal resolution when they were in conspiracy at
the time of the commission of the crime. To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof of the previous agreement and decision to
commit the crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.[21]
The prosecution was able to prove appellants participation in the criminal resolve by his own admission that, right after he was told by Pacot to
close the door, he held down Rosemaries legs. He was pinpointed as the one who throttled the victim. He admitted that they only stopped when
they were sure that Rosemarie was already dead. The two men planned how to dispose of the victims body; it was in fact appellants idea to pour
concrete on the body, prevailing over Pacots suggestion to just dump the body into the sea. It was appellant himself who encased the body in
cement and made sure that there were no leaks from which foul odor could emanate. He was a conspirator in the killing and, whether or not he
himself did the strangling or the stabbing, he was also liable for the acts of the other accused.

It is well-settled that a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another where, between them, there is conspiracy or unity of purpose and
intention in the commission of the crime charged.[22] Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of prior agreement on the commission of
the crime as the same can be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime showing that they
acted in unison with each other pursuant to a common purpose or design.[23]

We are convinced beyond doubt of the joint and concerted effort between appellant and the man he identified as Pacot in the killing of Rosemarie.

Appellant likewise contends that the trial court erred in ruling that the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength
qualified the killing to murder. He contends that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was not specifically alleged in the
information. Nothing can be farther from the truth. A cursory reading of the information reveals that appellant was sufficiently informed of the
charges against him, including the use of superior strength in killing the hapless and defenseless female victim.

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength necessitates a showing of the relative disparity in the physical characteristics of the
aggressor and the victim such as age, gender, physical size and strength. We agree with the trial court that the killing of Rosemarie was committed
with abuse of superior strength. As found by the court a quo, two grown-up men against a young fragile woman whose ability to defend herself had
been effectively restrained revealed a shocking inequality of physical strength. The victim was much weaker in constitution and could not have
possibly defended herself from her stronger assailants.[24] Such disparity was manifest in the contusions in the chest and hands, wounds on the
fingers, a stab wound on the left side of the face and multiple fractures in the ribs of the victim.[25] The abuse of superior strength was obvious in
the way Rosemarie was mercilessly beaten to a pulp.

The killing of Rosemarie was thus correctly qualified to murder by the abuse of superior strength, a circumstance specifically pleaded in the
information and proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court, however, finds that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty on the ground that appellant admitted during re-cross
examination that he had a prior conviction for the death of his former live-in partner. The fact that appellant was a recidivist was appreciated by the
trial court as a generic aggravating circumstance which increased the imposable penalty from reclusion perpetua to death.

In order to appreciate recidivism as an aggravating circumstance, it is necessary to allege it in the information and to attach certified true copies of
the sentences previously meted out to the accused.[26] This is in accord with Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which
states:

SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall
be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. (Emphasis supplied)

The aggravating circumstance of recidivism was not alleged in the information and therefore cannot be appreciated against appellant. Hence the
imposable penalty should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

Regarding the award of P50,000 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim, appellant claims that said amount was awarded by the trial court as
payment for actual damages. This claim is misleading. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the amount was granted by the trial court by
way of indemnity ex delicto to compensate for the death of the victim which prevailing jurisprudence fixes at P50,000.[27] The award of such
indemnity requires no proof other than the death of the victim and the accuseds responsibility therefor.[28]

The award of P50,000 as moral damages is proper, supported as it was by the testimony of Charlita Tallada, the victims mother, that Rosemaries
death caused her immeasurable pain.[29]

In addition, the Court awards P25,000 in temperate damages, said amount being awarded in homicide or murder cases when no evidence of burial
and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.[30]

With regard to the award of exemplary damages, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example of correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.

ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

In People vs. Catubig,[31] we explained that:

The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense.
The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it
causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the
attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State
concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little
sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld
when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to
the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil
Code.
Thus, the award of exemplary damages is warranted under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength. Imposition of exemplary damages is also justified under Art. 2229 of the Civil Code in order to set an example for the
public good.[32] For this purpose, we believe that the amount of P25,000 may be appropriately awarded.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment in Criminal Case No. 45,283-2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 31, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant Francisco Dacillo y Timtim alias Dodoy is declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder as defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, appellant is hereby sentenced to
reclusion perpetua and is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Rosemarie Tallada the sum of P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral
damages, P25,000 as temperate damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 65833 May 6, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUGENIO LAGARTO y GETALADO, JR., accused-appellant.

PARAS, J.:

This is an automatic review of the judgment * of the Regional Trial Court, 8th Judicial Region, Branch XXII, Laoang, Northern Samar, in Criminal Case
No. 1566, finding the accused EUGENIO LAGARTO y GETALADO, JR. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER.

The pertinent facts of the case are:

In the early evening of May 25, 1983, Reynaldo Aducal, who was buying fish in the public market, Poblacion Laoang, Northern Samar, was fatally
stabbed. Right after the stabbing, the assailant was apprehended by Pfc. Wenefredo Laguitan whose commendable act thwarted the assailant's
escape.

For the killing of Reynaldo Aducal, accused Eugenio Lagarto y Getalado, Jr. was charged in an amended information with the crime of Murder as
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 25th day of May, 1983, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening more or less, inside the public market Bgy. Little Venice,
Municipality of Laoang, Province of Northern Samar, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused with
deliberate intent to kill with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab one REYNALDO ADUCAL y LURA with the use of a Batangas fan knife or Balisong which the above-named accused
had provided himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon said victim fatal wounds on his chest, which wounds caused the instantaneous death
of the victim.

Accused is a recidivist, having been previously convicted by final judgment of another came embraced IN THE SAME TITLE OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE, THAT OF MURDER IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1473.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(Record, "Amended Information", p. 35)

Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of guilty.

The records disclose that the trial court had asked appellant whether or not he understood the consequences of his plea. Following the rulings of
this Court, however, the trial court still directed the prosecution to present its evidence for the purpose of establishing with certainty the guilt and
the degree of culpability of the accused.

Two witnesses were presented by the prosecution: they were Zosimo Aducal, father of the victim, and Pfc. Wenefredo Laguitan.

1. Zasimo Aducal testified that in the evening of May 25, 1983 while he was attending to his farm, three (3) kilometers away from the
poblacion of Little Venice, Laoang, Northern Samar, his grandson Artemio Aducal, son of Reynaldo, informed him that Reynaldo Aducal had been
stabbed dead; he was not able to see his deceased son that night because he could not see his way during night time; it was only in the following
morning when he saw his deceased son with two stab wounds on the right and left breast. (TSN, October 18, 1983, pp. 14-20).

2. Pfc. Wenefredo Laguitan testified that on May 25, 1983, around 6:00 in the evening, while he and Pat. Manuel Sevillana were passing the
market place, his attention was called by a certain Armando Baluyot to a commotion; he observed that the people were scampering for safety and a
man was escaping; when somebody shouted that the man was the assailant, he immediately followed the man and apprehended him right then and
there; at the police headquarters the man admitted to him that he had long planned to kill the victim and that, the plotter was Eugenio Lagarto, Jr.,
herein appellant. (TSN, October 18, 1983, pp. 22-28,).

The prosecution likewise presented the following evidence:

(a) Case Record of Criminal Case No. 1473 entitled "People vs. Eugenio Lagarto, Jr." showing that appellant had been convicted by final
judgment of homicide. (Exhibit "A" to "A-1 a");
(b) Death Certificate of deceased Reynaldo Aducal (Exhibit "B");
(c) Fan knife (Exhibit "D");
(d) Extra-judicial confession of appellant (Exhibit "C" to "C-4"), which discloses the following:

07. Question: Do you know Reynaldo Aducal personally?

Answer: Not so much, sir, but he was the one who stabbed my brother Pablito last 1980.

08. Question: What was the result when Reynaldo Aducal stabbed your brother Pablito?
Answer: As a result, my brother Pablito was hospitalized.

09. Question: Why did you stab to death Reynaldo Aducal?

Answer: I stabbed him to death sir, as a revenge or retaliation for his stabbing of my brother Pablito.

10. Question: According to what you have said Reynaldo Aducal had stabbed your brother Pablito in 1980. Do you mean to say that since 1980
up to May 25, 1983 you had been planning to avenge your brother by killing Reynaldo?
Answer: Yes, sir.

(p. 2, Exhibit "C")

Based on the appellant's plea of guilty and the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court accepts his plea and declares accused, Eugenio Lagarto y Getalado guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime
of Murder defined and penalized in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information, appreciating in his favor the mitigating
circumstance of spontaneous plea of guilty which is offset by the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, the Court hereby sentences
said accused to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH with all the accessories provided for in Art. 40 of the Revised Penal Code.

The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of Reynaldo Aducal in the amount of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

(Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 20)

The imposition of the supreme penalty of death warrants an automatic review by this Court. However, the penalty of Death had been changed to
reclusion perpetua in accordance with the provision of Section 19(l), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

The counsel de oficio recommends that the sentence be modified, contending that:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AGAINST THE ACCUSED.

II. THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY AGAINST THE ACCUSED; AND

III. CONSEQUENTLY, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED TO SUFFER THE EXTREME PENALTY OF DEATH."

(Brief for Accused-Appellant, p. 4; Rollo, p. 1 1 8)

It is a well-established rule that a plea of guilty, besides being a mitigating circumstance, is a judicial confession of guilt—an admission of all the
material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances. (People vs. Ariola, 100 SCRA, 523) To be considered a true plea of
guilty, it must be made by the accused freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act. It must be made
unconditionally. (People vs. Comendador, 100 SCRA 155).

In the case at bar, the trial court exerted its utmost effort to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that the accused understood, the meaning and
importance of his plea. Thus,

Q Do you realize the import and consequences of your having entered the plea of guilty?
A Yes, your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, the Court would repeat to you that you have entered the plea of guilty to a most grievous offense?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q For having entered a plea of guilty to the present crime of murder for the killing of Reynaldo Aducal you are therefore submitting the case
without presenting your own evidence, do you realize that?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q And despite this advise and admonition to you by the court, do you still insist on entering a plea of guilty to the crime as charged?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q The Court will advise you that in this kind of offense which is a crime of murder there is only one possible penalty and the court has no
other recourse but to impose it, that of death, do you realize that?
A Yes, your Honor.

(Translated in the dialect known to the accused)

(TSN, October 11, 1983, pp. 2-4).

The trial court was not remiss in its obligation to warn the accused of the important consequences of his plea. The possibility that death might be
imposed should have warned the accused to protect his interest: even an ordinary unlettered man fears death. And despite the thought of losing his
life, the accused pleaded guilty. We are convinced that the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt in the light of
overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution, fully corroborated and substantiated by the plea of guilty of the accused.

The only issue before Us is whether or not the trial court correctly appreciated the existence of recidivism and the qualifying circumstances of
evident premeditation and treachery.

Section 5, Rule 118 of the old Rules of Court provides that "Where the defendant pleads guilty to a complaint or information, if the trial court
accepts the plea and has discretion as to the punishment for the offense, it may hear witnesses to determine what punishment shall be imposed."
(emphasis supplied). The trial court in a criminal case may sentence a defendant who pleads guilty to the offense charged in the information,
without the necessity of taking testimony. (US vs. Talbanos, 6 Phil. 541). Yet, it is advisable for the trial court to call witnesses for the purpose of
establishing the guilt and the degree of culpability of the defendant. (People vs. Comendador, supra) The present Revised Rules of Court, however,
decrees that where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, it is now mandatory for the court to require the prosecution to prove the guilt of
the accused and his precise degree of culpability, with the accused being likewise entitled to present evidence to prove, inter alia, mitigating
circumstances (See People vs. Camay, 152 SCRA 401; Section 3, Rule 116 of Rules of Court).

In the case at bar, the trial court directed the prosecution to present evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt and degree of culpability of
the defendant.
We find, as the trial court found, that the accused is a recidivist. A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been
previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code. Herein accused had been convicted
of the crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1473 before the trial of the present Criminal Case No. 1566. The former counsel de oficio of herein
accused alleged that the judgment in Criminal Case No. 1473 was rendered on September 15, 1983, hence when the accused was arraigned on
October 11, 1983 for Criminal Case No. 1566 he was not a recidivist.

The former counsel de oficio is of the opinion that "the time of trial" is to be reckoned with the date of the arraignment. The phrase "at the time of
his trial" should not be restrictively construed as to mean the date of arraignment.

We declared in People vs. Enriquez, 90 Phil. 428, that the phrase "at the time of his trial for an offense" is employed in its general sense, including
the rendering of the judgment. In US vs. Karelsen, 3 Phil. 23, We held that the phrase "at the trial" is meant to include everything that is done in the
course of the trial, from arraignment until after sentence is announced by the judge in open court. In the case at bar, the accused was convicted of
homicide in Criminal Case No. 1473 on September 15, 1983. There being no appeal, the judgment therein became final on October 11, 1983. The
second conviction was rendered on October 26, 1983 for Murder. Hence, it is crystal clear that the accused is a recidivist: the accused had been
convicted by final judgment at the time of the rendition of the judgment for the second offense.

We find no merit in the finding of the trial court that evident premeditation and treachery existed in the commission of the crime. It is a rule that a
plea of guilty cannot be held to include evident premeditation and treachery where the evidence adduced does not adequately disclose the
existence of these qualifying circumstances (People vs. Gravino, 122 SCRA 123).

Evident premeditation requires proof of the following requisites: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act
manifestly indicating that he had clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution of the
crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. (People vs. Cafe,
166 SCRA 704; People vs. Montejo, 167 SCRA 506).

The statement of the accused, that he had long planned to kill Reynaldo Aducal in retaliation for the act of Reynaldo Aducal in stabbing his brother,
does not adequately prove the existence of evident premeditation. It is necessary to establish that the accused meditated on his intention between
the time it was conceived and the time the crime was actually perpetrated. Defendant's proposition was nothing but an expression of his own
determination to commit the crime which is entirely different from premeditation. (People vs. Carillo 77 Phil. 572). In People vs. Alde, 64 SCRA 224,
We ruled that there is no evident premeditation where the only evidence to support it is the statement of the accused that he planned to kill the
victim in 1964 when actual stabbing was 1969.

To show premeditation, it is required that the criminal intent be evidenced by notorious acts evincing the determination to commit the same.
(People vs. Guiyab, 139 SCRA 446). It must be evident and not merely suspected (People vs. Iturriaga, 88 Phil. 534) or merely thought of or
contemplated mentally, without externalized acts. The finding of the trial court, that the accused had clandestinely concealed the knife in his body
away from the searching eye of the prison guards which showed the deliberate intent of the accused, is not borne out by the records. Perusal of the
records does not show that the accused deliberately planned the killing through external acts. The finding of facts by the trial court should not be
based on mere assumptions; there must be proof that such facts exist.

In order that treachery may be appreciated, it is necessary to prove the manner in which the victim was attacked.1âwphi1 Treachery can in no way
be presumed but must be fully proved. Where there are merely indications that the attack was sudden and unexpected, but there are no precise
data on this point, the circumstance of treachery can not be taken into account. (People vs. Ariola, supra)

In the case at bar, there is no evidence to show that the mode of attack was consciously adopted as to insure the perpetration of the crime and
safety from the defense that the victim might put up. There is an absence of evidence to show the means employed by assailant and the mode of
attack. Treachery may not be simply deduced from assumptions; it must be as clearly proved as the crime itself in order to qualify the crime into
murder.

WHEREFORE, the that court's judgment is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant EUGENIO LAGARTO y GETALADO is hereby CONVICTED of homicide;
appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of spontaneous plea of guilty which is offset by the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, the
Court hereby sentences said accused to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of Reynaldo Aducal an indemnity of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00). Costs de
oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-28547 February 22, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELIAS JARANILLA, RICARDO SUYO, FRANCO BRILLANTES and HEMAN GORRICETA, accused. ELIAS JARANILLA, RICARDO SUYO, and FRANCO
BRILLANTES, defendants-appellants.

AQUINO, J.:p

This is an appeal of defendants Elias Jaranilla, Ricardo Suyo and Franco Brillantes from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, which
convicted them of robbery with homicide, sentenced each of them to reclusion perpetua and ordered them to pay solidarily the sum of six thousand
pesos to the heirs of Ramonito Jabatan and the sum of five hundred pesos to Valentin Baylon as the value of fighting cocks (Criminal Case No.
11082).

The evidence for the prosecution shows that at around eleven o'clock in the evening of January 9, 1966, Gorriceta, who had just come from Fort San
Pedro in Iloilo City, was driving a Ford pickup truck belonging to his sister, Remia G. Valencia. While he was in front of the Elizalde Building on J. M.
Basa Street, he saw Ricardo Suyo, Elias Jaranilla and Franco Brillantes. They hailed Gorriceta who stopped the truck. Jaranilla requested to bring
them to Mandurriao, a district in another part of the city. Gorriceta demurred. He told Jaranilla that he (Gorriceta) was on his way home.

Jaranilla prevailed upon Gorriceta to take them to Mandurriao because Jaranilla ostensibly had to get something from his uncle's place. So, Jaranilla,
Brillantes and Suyo boarded the pickup truck which Gorriceta drove to Mandurriao.

Upon reaching Mandurriao, Gorriceta parked the truck at a distance of about fifty to seventy meters from the provincial hospital. Jaranilla, Suyo and
Brillantes alighted from the vehicle. Jaranilla instructed Gorriceta to wait for them. The trio walked in the direction of the plaza. After an interval of
about ten to twenty minutes, they reappeared. Each of them was carrying two fighting cocks. They ran to the truck.

Jaranilla directed Gorriceta to start the truck because they were being chased. Gorriceta drove the truck to Jaro (another district of the city) on the
same route that they had taken in going to Mandurriao.

It is important to note the positions of Gorriceta and his three companions on the front seat of the track. Gorriceta the driver, was on the extreme
left. Next to him on his right was Suyo. Next to Suyo was Brillantes. On the extreme right was Jaranilla.

While the truck was traversing the detour road near the Mandurriao airport, then under construction, Gorriceta saw in the middle of the road
Patrolmen Ramonito Jabatan and Benjamin Castro running towards them. Gorriceta slowed down the truck after Patrolman Jabatan had fired a
warning shot and was signalling with his flashlight that the truck should stop. Gorriceta stopped the truck near the policeman. Jabatan approached
the right side of the truck near Jaranilla and ordered all the occupants of the truck to go down. They did not heed the injunction of the policeman.

Brillantes pulled his revolver but did not fire it. Suyo did nothing. Jaranilla, all of a sudden, shot Patrolman Jabatan. The shooting frightened
Gorriceta. He immediately started the motor of the truck and drove straight home to La Paz, another district of the city. Jaranilla kept on firing
towards Jabatan.

Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes alighted in front of Gorriceta's house. Gorriceta parked the truck inside the garage. Jaranilla warned Gorriceta not to
tell anybody about the incident. Gorriceta went up to his room. After a while, he heard policemen shouting his name and asking him to come down.
Instead of doing so, he hid in the ceiling. It was only at about eight o'clock in the morning of the following day that he decided to come down. His
uncle had counselled him to surrender to the police. The policemen took Gorriceta to their headquarters. He recounted the incident to a police
investigator.

Victorino Trespeces, whose house was located opposite the house of Valentin Baylon on Taft Street in Mandurriao, testified that before midnight of
January 9, 1966, he conducted a friend in his car to the housing project in the vicinity of the provincial hospital at Mandurriao. As he neared his
residence, he saw three men emerging from the canal on Taft Street in front of Baylon's house. He noticed a red Ford pickup truck parked about fifty
yards from the place where he saw the three men. Shortly thereafter, he espied the three men carrying roosters. He immediately repaired to the
police station at Mandurriao. He reported to Patrolmen Jabatan and Castro what he had just witnessed. The two policemen requested him to take
them in his car to the place where he saw the three suspicious-looking men. Upon arrival thereat, the men and the truck were not there anymore.

Trespeces and the policemen followed the truck speeding towards Jaro. On reaching the detour road leading to the airport, the policemen left the
car and crossed the runway which was a shortcut. Their objective was to intercept the truck. Trespeces turned his car around in order to return to
Mandurriao. At that moment he heard gunshots. He stopped and again turned his car in the direction where shots had emanated. A few moments
later, Patrolman Castro came into view. He was running. He asked Trespeces for help because Jabatan, his comrade, was wounded. Patrolman
Castro and Trespeces lifted Jabatan into the car and brought him to the hospital. Trespeces learned later that Jabatan was dead.

Doctor Raymundo L. Torres, the chief medico-legal officer of the Iloilo City police department, conducted an autopsy on the remains of Patrolman
Jabatan. He found:

(1) Contusion on left eyebrow.

(2) Bullet wound one centimeter in diameter, penetrating left anterior axilla, directed diagonally downward to the right, perforating the left
upper lobe of the lungs through and through, bitting the left pulmonary artery and was recovered at the right thoracic cavity; both thoracic cavity
was full of blood.

Cause of death: Shock, hemorrhage, secondary to bullet wound.

Valentin Baylon, the owner of the fighting cocks, returned home at about six o'clock in the morning of January 10, 1966. He discovered that the door
of one of his cock pens or chicken coops (Exhs. A and A-1) was broken. The feeding vessels were scattered on the ground. Upon investigation he
found that six of his fighting cocks were missing. Each coop contained six cocks. The coop was made of bamboo and wood with nipa roofing. Each
coop had a door which was locked by means of nails. The coops were located at the side of his house, about two meters therefrom.

Baylon reported the loss to the police at Mandurriao. At about ten o'clock, a group of detectives came to his house together with the police
photographer who took pictures of the chicken coops. The six roosters were valued at one hundred pesos each. Two days later, he was summoned
to the police station at Mandurriao to identify a rooster which was recovered somewhere at the airport. He readily identified it as one of the six
roosters which was stolen from his chicken coop (Exh. B).

Gorriceta, Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes were charged with robo con homicidio with the aggravating circumstances of use of a motor vehicle,
nocturnity, band, contempt of or with insult to the public authorities and recidivism. The fiscal utilized Gorriceta as a state witness. Hence, the case
was dismissed as to him.

On February 2, 1967, after the prosecution had rested its case and before the defense had commenced the presentation of its evidence, Jaranilla
escaped from the provincial jail. The record does not show that he has been apprehended.

The judgment of conviction was promulgated as to defendants Suyo and Brillantes on October 19, 1967 when it was read to them in court. They
signed at the bottom of the last page of the decision.

There was no promulgation of the judgment as to Jaranilla, who, as already stated, escaped from jail (See Sec. 6, Rule 120, Rules of Court).

However, the notice of appeal filed by defendants' counsel de oficio erroneously included Jaranilla. Inasmuch as the judgment has not been
promulgated as to Jaranilla, he could not have appealed. His appeal through counsel cannot be entertained. Only the appeals of defendants Suyo
and Brillantes will be considered.

In convicting Suyo, Jaranilla and Brillantes of robo con homicidio, the trial court assumed that the taking of the six fighting cocks was robbery and
that Patrolman Jabatan was killed "by reason or on the occasion of the robbery" within the purview of article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.

In this appeal the appellants contend that the trial court erred in not finding that Gorriceta was the one who shot the policeman and that Jaranilla
was driving the Ford truck because Gorriceta was allegedly drunk. Through their counsel de oficio, they further contend that the taking of roosters
was theft and, alternatively, that, if it was robbery, the crime could not be robbery with homicide because the robbery was already consummated
when Jabatan was killed.

After evaluating the testimonies of Gorriceta and Brillantes as to who was driving the truck and who shot policeman, this Court finds that the trial
court did not err in giving credence to Gorriceta's declaration that he was driving the truck at the time that Jaranilla shot Jabatan.

The improbability of appellants' theory is manifest. The truck belonged to Gorriceta's sister. He was responsible for its preservation. He had the
obligation to return it to his sister in the same condition when he borrowed it. He was driving it when he saw Brillantes, Jaranilla and Suyo and when
he allegedly invited them for a paseo. There is no indubitable proof that Jaranilla knows how to drive a truck.

The theory of the defense may be viewed from another angle. If, according to the appellants, Gorriceta asked Jaranilla to drive the truck because he
(Gorriceta) was drunk then that circumstance would be inconsistent with their theory that Gorriceta shot Jabatan. Being supposedly intoxicated,
Gorriceta would have been dozing when Jabatan signalled the driver to stop the truck and he could not have thought of killing Jabatan in his
inebriated state. He would not have been able to shoot accurately at Jabatan. But the fact is that the first shot hit Jabatan. So, the one who shot him
must have been a sober person like Jaranilla.

Moreover, as Jaranilla and his two comrades were interested in concealing the fighting cocks, it was Jaranilla, not Gorriceta, who would have the
motive for shooting Jabatan. Consequently, the theory that Gorriceta shot Jabatan and that Jaranilla was driving the truck appears to be plausible.

Was the taking of the roosters robbery or theft? There is no evidence that in taking the six roosters from their coop or cages in the yard of Baylon's
house violence against or intimidation of persons was employed. Hence, article 294 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be invoked.

Neither could such taking fall under article 299 of the Revised Penal Code which penalizes robbery in an inhabited house (casa habitada), public
building or edifice devoted to worship. The coop was not inside Baylon's house. Nor was it a dependency thereof within the meaning of article 301
of the Revised Penal Code.

Having shown the inapplicability of Articles 294 and 299, the next inquiry is whether the taking of the six roosters is covered by article 302 of the
Revised Penal Code which reads:

ART. 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in private building.—Any robbery committed in an uninhabited place or in a building other than those
mentioned in the first paragraph of article 299, if the value of the property exceeds 250 pesos, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods provided that any of the following circumstances is present:

1. If the entrance has been effected through any opening not intended for entrance or egress.
2. If any wall, roof, floor or outside door or window has been broken.
3. If the entrance has been effected through the use of false keys, picklocks or other similar tools.
4. If any door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed furniture or receptacle has been broken.
5. If any closed or sealed receptacle, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, has been removed, even if the same be broken open
elsewhere.

xxx xxx xxx

In this connection, it is relevant to note that there is an inaccuracy in the English translation of article 302. The controlling Spanish original reads:

ART. 302. Robo en lugar no habitado o edificio particular.—El robo cometido en un lugar no habitado o en un edificio que no sea de los
comprendidos en el parrafo primero del articulo 299, ... . (Tomo 26, Leyes Publicas 479).

The term "lugar no habitado" is erroneously translated. as "uninhabited place", a term which may be confounded with the expression "uninhabited
place" in articles 295 and 300 of the Revised Penal Code, which is the translation of despoblado and which is different from the term lugar no
habitado in article 302. The term lugar no habitado is the antonym of casa habitada (inhabited house) in article 299.
One essential requisite of robbery with force upon things under Articles 299 and 302 is that the malefactor should enter the building or dependency,
where the object to be taken is found. Articles 299 and 302 clearly contemplate that the malefactor should enter the building (casa habitada o lugar
no habitado o edificio). If the culprit did not enter the building, there would be no robbery with force upon things. (See Albert, Revised Penal Code,
1932 edition, p. 688).

Thus, where the accused broke the show-window of the Bombay Palace Bazar at Rizal Avenue, Manila and removed forty watches therefrom, the
crime was theft and not robbery because he did not enter the building. The show-window was outside the store. (People vs. Adorno, CA 40 O. G.
567, per Montemayor, J., who later became a member of this Court). *

In the instant case, the chicken coop where the six roosters were taken cannot be considered a building within the meaning of article 302. Not being
a building, it cannot be said that the accused entered the same in order to commit the robbery by means of any of the five circumstances
enumerated in article 302.

The term "building" in article 302, formerly 512 of the old Penal Code, was construed as embracing any structure not mentioned in article 299
(meaning not an "inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship" or any dependency thereof) used for storage and safekeeping of
personal property. As thus construed, a freight car used for the shipment of sugar was considered a private building. The unnailing of a strip of cloth
nailed over the door, the customary manner of sealing a freight car, was held to constitute breaking by force within the meaning of article 512, now
article 302. (U.S. vs. Magsino, 2 Phil. 710).

The ruling in the Magsino case is in conflict with the rulings of the Supreme Court of Spain that a railroad employee who, by force, opens a sealed or
locked receptacle deposited in a freight car, does not commit robbery. He is guilty of theft because a railroad car is neither a house nor a building
within the meaning of article 302 which corresponds to article 525 of the 1870 Spanish Penal Code. Article 302 refers to houses or buildings which,
while not actually inhabited, are habitable. Thus, a pig sty is not a building within the meaning of article 302. The stealing of hogs from a pig sty is
theft and not robbery, although the culprit breaks into it. Article 302 refers to habitable buildings. (Guevara, Revised Penal Code, 1939 Edition, pages
555-6, citing II Hidalgo Codigo Penal 636-7, 642, which in turn cites the decisions of the Spanish Supreme Court dated March 2, 1886 and April 25,
1887). **

As may be seen from the photographs (Exhs. A and A-1) Baylon's coop, which is known in the dialect as tangkal or kulungan, is about five yards long,
one yard wide and one yard high. It has wooden stilts and bamboo strips as bars. The coop barely reaches the shoulder of a person of average height
like Baylon. It is divided into six compartments or cages. A compartment has an area of less than one cubic yard. A person cannot be accommodated
inside the cage or compartment. It was not intended that a person should go inside that compartment. The taking was effected by forcibly opening
the cage and putting the hands inside it to get the roosters.

Therefore, the taking of the six roosters from their coop should be characterized as theft and not robbery. The assumption is that the accused were
animated by single criminal impulse. The conduct of the accused reveals that they conspired to steal the roosters. The taking is punishable as a
single offense of theft. Thus, it was held that the taking of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes of
theft (People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437, citing decision of Supreme Court of Spain dated July 13, 1894 and 36 C. J. 799; People vs. Tumlos, 67 Phil.
320; People vs. Villanueva, 49 O.G. 5448, L-10239, August 7, 1953).

Nocturnity and use of a motor vehicle are aggravating. Those circumstances facilitated the commission of the theft. The accused intentionally sought
the cover of night and used a motor vehicle so as to insure the success of their nefarious enterprise (People vs. Tan, 89 Phil. 647, 660; People vs.
Gardon, 104 Phil. 372).

Also to be appreciated against appellants Suyo and Brillantes is the aggravating circumstance of recidivism which was alleged in the information.
They admitted their previous convictions for theft (130, 132 tsn; Exhs. I and J; Art. 14[9], Revised Penal Code).

The theft of six roosters valued at six hundred pesos is punishable by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (Art. 309[3], Revised
Penal Code). That penalty should be imposed in its maximum period because only aggravating circumstances are present (Art. 64[3], Revised Penal
Code).

Although recidivists, appellants Suyo and Brillantes are not habitual delinquents. They are entitled to an indeterminate sentence (Sec. 2, Act No.
4103).

With respect to the killing of Patrolman Jabatan, it has already been noted that the evidence for the prosecution points to Jaranilla as the malefactor
who shot that unfortunate peace officer. The killing was homicide because it was made on the spur of the moment. The treacherous mode of attack
was not consciously or deliberately adopted by the offender (U.S. vs. Namit, 38 Phil. 926; People vs. Tumaob, 83 Phil. 738; People vs. Abalos, 84 Phil.
771).

The twenty-four year old Jabatan was an agent of authority on night duty at the time of the shooting. He was wearing his uniform. The killing should
be characterized as a direct assault (atentado) upon an agent of authority (Art. 148, Revised Penal Code) complexed with homicide. The two
offenses resulted from a single act. (Art. 48, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307; People vs. Lojo, Jr., 52 Phil. 390).

The evidence for the prosecution does not prove any conspiracy on the part of appellants Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes to kill Jabatan. They
conspired to steal the fighting cocks. The conspiracy is shown by the manner in which they perpetrated the theft. They went to the scene of the
crime together. They left the yard of Baylon's residence, each carrying two roosters. They all boarded the getaway truck driven by Gorriceta.

The theft was consummated when the culprits were able to take possession of the roosters. It is not an indispenable element of theft that the thief
carry, more or less far away, the thing taken by him from its owner (People vs. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665; Duran vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 476; U.S vs. Adiao, 38
Phil. 754).

It is not reasonable to assume that the killing of any peace officer, who would forestall the theft or frustrate appellants' desire to enjoy the fruits of
the crime, was part of their plan. There is no evidence to link appellants Suyo and Brillantes to the killing of Jabatan, except the circumstance that
they were with Jaranilla in the truck when the latter shot the policeman. Gorriceta testified that Suyo did not do anything when Jabatan approached
the right side of the truck and came in close proximity to Jaranilla who was on the extreme right. Brillantes pulled his revolver which he did not fire
(47, 53-55 tsn). Mere presence at the scene of the crime does not necessarily make a person a co-principal thereof.

Jaranilla heard Gorriceta's testimony that he (Jaranilla) shot Jabatan. Instead of taking the witness stand to refute the testimony of Gorriceta,
Jaranilla escaped from jail. That circumstance is an admission of guilt.
The instant case is different from People vs. Mabassa, 65 Phil. 568 where the victim was killed on the occasion when the accused took his chickens
under the house. It is distinguishable from the People vs. Gardon, 104 Phil. 372 and People vs. Salamudin No. 1, 52 Phil. 670 (both cited by the
Solicitor General) where the robbery was clearly proven and the homicide was perpetrated on the occasion of the robbery. As already noted, theft,
not robbery, was committed in this case.

The situation in this case bears some analogy to that found in the People vs. Basisten, 47 Phil. 493 where the homicide committed by a member of
the band was not a part of the common plan to commit robbery. Hence, only the person who perpetrated the killing was liable for robbery with
homicide. The others were convicted of robbery only.

There is a hiatus in the evidence of the prosecution as to the participation of Suyo and Brillantes in the killing of Jabatan by Jaranilla. As already
stated, no robbery with homicide was committed. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that those two appellants have any responsibility for Jabatan's
death. Their complicity in the homicide committed by Jaranilla has not been established.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court convicting appellants Ricardo Suyo and Franco Brillantes of robbery with homicide is reversed. They are
acquitted of homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt.

As co-principals with Elias Jaranilla in the theft of the six fighting cocks, they are (a) each sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of
arresto mayor as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum and (b) ordered to indemnify solidarily the
complainant, Valentin Baylon, in the sum of five hundred pesos (P500). Each appellant should pay one-third of the costs.

As to the liability of Elias Jaranilla for theft and homicide, with direct assault upon an agent of authority, trial court should render a new judgment
consistent with this opinion (See Sec. 19, Art. IV, Constitution).

So ordered.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Antonio and Fernandez, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 95320 September 4, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BALTAZAR LACAO, SR., PATRIA LACAO and TRINIDAD LACAO MANSILLA, accused-appellants.

REGALADO, J:p

In an information filed on February 3, 1986 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 1416 in the Regional Trial Court of Capiz, Branch XXI, Baltazar Lacao,
Sr., alias "Bantan", Patria Lacao, Trinidad Mansilla, Baltazar Lacao II, alias "Boticol," and Baltazar Lacao III, alias "Toto," were charged with the
complex crime of murder with direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 28th day of September, 1985, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, in Brgy. Manibad, Municipality of Mambusao, Province of
Capiz, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused armed with knives and wooden stools, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of
nighttime and superior strength to better facilitate the commission of the offense, assault, attack and hit one POLICE CORPORAL JOSE G.
INOCENCIO, JR., an agent of person in authority while in the actual performance of his official duties, thereby inflicting upon the latter several
injuries on the different parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death; that due to the death of said Police Corporal Jose G. Inocencio, Jr.
and the consequent loss of his earning capacity, his heirs have suffered and are entitled to an indemnity in the sum of P30,000.00 plus moral and
exemplary damages.

That accused Baltazar Lacao, Sr., alias "Bantan", has been previously convicted by final judgment of the crime of homicide.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

Upon arraignment, herein accused-appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. admitted killing the victim but interposed self-defense, hence a plea of not guilty
was entered in his behalf, while Patria Lacao and Trinidad Mansilla pleaded not guilty. The other two accused, Baltazar Lacao II and Baltazar Lacao III,
were not apprehended and have remained at large.

The facts found by the trial court, as established by unassailable evidence adduced at the trial, are as follows: At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening
of September 28, 1985, prosecution witness Mila Parto was at her house in Barangay Manibad attending to persons who came to the wake of her
aunt, Nemesia Lacao. Mila Parto is the sister-in-law of the deceased police Cpl. Jose G. Inocencio, Jr. While she was so engaged, she heard and
witnessed a commotion at the first floor of the two-storey house and the events that took place thereafter. The commotion arose from a card game
where one Mansueto Rivera was losing and accused Baltazar Lacao II, who was playing with him, was furiously arguing with the former. Baltazar
Lacao II then unsheathed his knife and threatened Mansueto Rivera by pointing the knife at the latter's neck. Wilma Rivera, the sister-in-law of
Mansueto, intervened and Baltazar Lacao II released the latter. Baltazar Lacao II then went inside the house wielding his knife and causing the other
guests to panic.

It was then that Cpl. Jose G. Inocencio, Jr. went down to inquire into the matter and to pacify the people. When he saw Baltazar Lacao II with a knife,
he held the latter's hand holding that knife. Baltazar Lacao II then said: "Nyor, release me." As Cpl. Inocencio did not release him, the latter's mother,
Patria Lacao, then said: "Nyor, release my son." When Cpl. Inocencio released Baltazar Lacao II, the latter suddenly stabbed Inocencio on his right
side. Baltazar Lacao, Sr. and his other son, Baltazar Lacao III, together with his wife, Patria Lacao, and his sister, Trinidad Lacao Mansilla, rushed
inside the house and surrounded the victim.

The men then stabbed Cpl. Inocencio several times while the women hit him with stools. As the attack continued, the victim was pushed toward the
door of the kitchen and he later slumped on the floor facing downward. Baltazar Lacao, Sr. then sat astride him and continued stabbing the latter as
he was thus lying prostrate. Thereafter, this appellant asked: "Nyor, Nyor, are you still alive?" Appellant Patria Lacao interjected: "What are you
waiting for, it is already finished, we have to go." Baltazar Lacao III then got the gun of Cpl. Inocencio and all the accused went away.2

All the foregoing facts were clearly and categorically established by said prosecution witness, unshaken and unaffected by the gruelling cross-
examination to which she was subjected. In the process she categorically identified the three appellants then present in the courtroom, as well as
the knives and the stools used against the victim in the commission of the crime. Ample and credible corroboration was afforded by the
straightforward testimonies of two other eyewitnesses, Isabel Llorente3 and the victim's widow, Nelfa Inocencio,4 who were admittedly present at
the scene and the time of the bloody incident.

After an examination of the body of the deceased by Dr. Abel P. Martinez, a medico-legal officer and rural health physician, the following autopsy
report was submitted and thereafter admitted in evidence:

PERTINENT POST-MORTEM FINDINGS ON THE BODY OF P/CPL. JOSE G. INOCENCIO, JR. DONE AT MAMBUSAO, CAPIZ, ON SEPTEMBER 29, 1985 at
4:30 AM

1. Rigor mortis — present.

2. Livor mortis — present.
3. Lacerated wound about 1" dia located at the left frontopa reital region of the head, superficial.
4. Stab wound, about 3/4" dia. located at the level of 31 CS MCL, left, going posters-inferiorly reaching the anterior pericardium.
5. Stab wound, about 3/4" dia. located at the level of 31 CS 1" lateral to MCL right, going posters-inferiorly reaching the right lung tissue.
6. Stab wound, about 2-1/2" horizontally located at the subcostal area, MCL right, going posters-superiorly hitting the liver.
7. Stab wound 1" dia. located at the level of 51 CS AAL, right, going medio-superiorly reaching the right lung.
8. Stab wound, about 2" dia. located at the level of the 10ICS AAL right, going media-superiorly reaching the right lung.
9. Incised wound, about 1/2" dia. superficially located at the superior portion of the posterior elbow.
10. Stab wound, about 1/2" dia. located at the base of the neck, left going medio-inferiorly reaching the body of the cervical vertebra.
11. Stab wound, about 1" dia. diag. located at the supra-scapular region, left going antero-inferiorly reaching the left lung.
12. Two stab wounds superimposed to one another located at the scapular region, left, superficial, reaching the scapula.
13. Stab wound about 1-1/2" dia. perpendicularly located at the midscapular region, superficial, reaching the body of the scapula.

14. Stab wound, about 1" dia. located at the left paravertebral line 10T, left hitting the rib.
15. Stab wound, about 1" dia. located at the left paravert, line 1L, superficial, hitting the underlying muscles.
16. Stab wound, 1" dia. located 2" lateral to Wd 15 going anteromedially hitting the underlying muscles.

CAUSE OF DEATH: CARDIAC TAMPONADE SEVERE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL HEMORRHAGES SECONDARY TO THE HEREIN INFLICTED WOUNDS.5

After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment convicting the three appellants of the crime charged, imposing on them the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and ordering them to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P30,000.00 for his death, P9,250.00 as actual damages, plus
P100,000.00 as moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.6

In their present recourse, appellants assign the following errors:

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS BALTAZAR LACAO, SR., PATRIA LACAO AND TRINIDAD LACAO MANSILLA
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER WITH DIRECT ASSAULT UPON AN AGENT OF PERSON IN AUTHORITY PURSUANT
TO THE PROVISION OF ARTICLES 248 AND 148 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 48 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, As AMENDED, WHERE THE TRIAL COURT
SENTENCES EACH OF THEM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIM P/CPL JOSE
INOCENCIO, JR. IN THE SUM OF THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) FOR HIS DEATH; PLUS P9,250.00 AS ACTUAL DAMAGES; PLUS P100,000.00
MORAL DAMAGES AND TO PAY THE COST OF THE SUIT.

II

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BALTAZAR LACAO, SR. ACTED IN COMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE WHEN
HE STABBED THE DECEASED JOSE INOCENCIO, JR.

III

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TREACHERY AS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE ATTENDED IN THE KILLING OF JOSE INOCENCIO BY
ALL ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

IV

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING APPELLANTS PATRIA LACAO AND TRINIDAD MANSILLA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER WITH DIRECT ASSAULT NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT PERFORMED OVERT ACT SHOWING CONSPIRACY
FOR MERE KNOWLEDGE, ACQUIESCENCE OR APPROVAL OF THE ACT, WITHOUT COOPERATION IS NOT ENOUGH TO CONSTITUTE ONE A PARTY TO A
CONSPIRACY, AND THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT APPELLANTS TRINIDAD MANSILLA AND PATRIA LACAO NOT HAVING
CONSPIRED WITH BALTAZAR LACAO, SR. IN KILLING THE VICTIM JOSE INOCENCIO, JR. TREACHERY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AGAINST THEM.

THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT BALTAZAR LACAO, SR. ON SELF-DEFENSE AND IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS PATRIA LACAO AND TRINIDAD MANSILLA FOR FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF SAID ACCUSED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.7

The main thrust of the defense is that appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. acted in self-defense since Cpl. Jose Inocencio, Jr. attempted to shoot him but the
gun did not fire. Said appellant allegedly grabbed the gun and stabbed the deceased more than five (5) times.8

The other appellants, Trinidad Mansilla and Patria Lacao, interposed the defense of alibi. Their version is that at 7:30 in the evening of September
28, 1985, they and one Consolacion Lago went to the wake at Barangay Manibad. They prayed and, at about 9:30 A.M., they went home but
Baltazar, Sr. was left behind.9 Baltazar Lacao II was alleged to be sleeping in their house and Baltazar Lacao III was said to be then in Roxas City
studying at the La Purisima College.10

The Court finds the appeal to be devoid of merit.

Appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr., by pleading self-defense necessarily admits that he killed the victim and he is thus duty bound to prove the essential
requisites for this justifying circumstance.11 This circumstance he has to prove by clear and convincing evidence,12 the onus probandi having shifted
to him.

Now, this appellant admitted stabbing the victim more than five (5) times. As seen from the medico-legal report, the victim actually suffered fifteen
(15) stab wounds, that the cause of death was hemorrhage and multiple stab wounds,13 and that most of the injuries inflicted were indeed fatal. It
cannot now be denied that, even indulging said appellant in his theory, he definitely exceeded the limits of what is necessary to suppress an alleged
unlawful aggression directed to him by the victim. In fact, from the eyewitness accounts, he even continued stabbing the victim who was already
slumped prone and helpless.

Said appellant also sought to buttress his defense by claiming that Cpl. Inocencio, prior to the stabbing, fired his gun at the former but the gun did
not fire. This subterfuge is refuted by the unequivocal statements of the prosecution witnesses that the victim never removed his gun from his
waistband,14 and that the revolver only fell when appellants pushed the deceased.15 Significantly, this story of appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. was
never corroborated by any evidence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The first requisite of self-defense is indispensable. There can
be no self-defense unless it is proven that there has been unlawful aggression on the part of the person injured or killed by the accused. If there is
no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or to repel. The second requisite of self-defense will have no basis.16

We also take note of the finding of the court below that none of the six (6) bullets recovered from the gun showed any sign or mark that the gun
was ever fired. Had the gun been fired, the base of at least one bullet would have been impressed in the center by the corresponding indentation
caused by the impact thereon by the firing pin of the revolver when the trigger is pulled. The absence of such physical evidence further sustains the
holding of the trial court that even the first element of self-defense has not been proved despite said appellant's protestations.
Appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad Mansilla were positively identified by all the prosecution witnesses as the ones who hit the victim with stools
several times while the other three (3) male accused were stabbing the victim with their knives. In their defense, Patria and Trinidad sought refuge
in the impuissant sanctuary of alibi. Trite as it is, we have to impress on appellants once again the doctrine that alibi is the weakest defense an
accused can concoct. In order to prosper, it must be so convincing as to preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been physically present
at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the time of the commission. In the face of positive identification of the accused by eyewitnesses, an alibi
crumbles like a sand fortress.17

The trial court definitely held that appellants "Patria Lacao and Trinidad Mansilla were positively identified by all the eyewitnesses for the
prosecution who were without any motive to falsely testify and implicate or point an unerring finger at the three accused inside the courtroom as
the perpetrators of the crime. Their disavowal of participation in the gory killing of Cpl. Inocencio are self-serving and feeble attempts to disprove
complicity and to which the court gives scant consideration."18 Indeed, the participatory acts of said appellants having been testified to so clearly in
detail by three (3) eyewitnesses, to refute the same by the discreditable defense of alibi would be an evidential travesty.

Identification of the culprits in this case was not difficult because the place where the crime occurred was sufficiently lighted. Where considerations
of visibility are favorable and the witnesses do not appear to be biased against the accused, their assertions as to the identity of the malefactor
should be normally accepted. This is more so when the witness is the victim or his near relative because these witnesses usually strive to remember
the faces of the assailants. Moreover, the trial court gave credence to the prosecution's identification of the appellants as the culprits. Subject to
exceptions which do not obtain in this case, the trial court is in a better position to decide this question, having seen and heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.19

The Court, however, is not favorably impressed with the prosecution's theory that the assailants acted pursuant to a conspiracy just because they
apparently acted in unison in attacking the victim. True, conspiracy is always predominantly mental in composition because it consists primary of the
meeting of minds and, generally, complicity may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, i.e., the community of purpose and the unity of design in
the contemporaneous or simultaneous performance of the act of assaulting the deceased.20 However, conspiracy must be proved with as much
certainty as the crime itself.21 The same degree of proof required to establish the crime is required to support a finding of conspiracy,22 that is,
proof beyond reasonable doubt.23

At the very least, conspiracy presupposes a prior agreement or contemporaneous understanding on the part of the conspirators to commit a felony,
in this case, to kill Cpl. Inocencio. A dispassionate appraisal of the facts readily reveals, however, that the attack on the victim originated
spontaneously from and was initiated unexpectedly by Baltazar Lacao II. Appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. and his other son, Baltazar Lacao III,
immediately joined in the fray by attacking the victim with their knives, whereupon the two female appellants, also assisted their menfolk by hitting
the victim with stools.

The rapidity in the succession of such consecutive acts of the assailants, with the last four coming instinctively, as it were, to the aid of the original
assailant, cannot but produce the conclusion that their actuations were activated without prior or apparent deliberation. It does not even appear
that there was a call or a signal from one to the other to join the attack on Cpl. Inocencio, much less is there even an intimation that they had such a
murderous intent or cabal at any time prior thereto. The spontaneity of their respective reactions, albeit resulting in an attack where they all
participated, rules out the existence of a conspiracy.

As a consequence, therefore, the respective liabilities of appellants shall be determined by the nature of their individual participations in the
felonious act.24 It is understood, however, that whatever liabilities may attach to Baltazar Lacao II and Baltazar Lacao III are not concluded by the
dispositions herein nor shall they be bound by the discussions in this opinion on their putative participations in the crime charged.

Anent the issue on whether or not treachery was properly appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, we agree with the holding of the court below
since this was sufficiently proven by the evidence. It is elementary hornbook knowledge that there is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against persons employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.25

In the present case, the deceased was stabbed without warning the moment he unsuspectingly released the hand of Baltazar Lacao II. So sudden
and unanticipated was the attack that the victim was given no chance to defend himself. Then herein appellants, although apparently acting without
prior agreement, also instantly and all together attacked him. Even if their aforesaid acts were independently performed on their individual
initiatives, such concerted action ensured the commission of the crime without risk to them arising from any defense or retaliation that the victim
might have resorted to. Treachery was thus correctly appreciated against all appellants, the use of superior strength being absorbed as an integral
part of the treacherous mode of commission.

Appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. admitted during the trial that he was once convicted of the crime of homicide but he was granted an absolute pardon
therefor.26 The lower court properly considered recidivism since a pardon for a preceding offense does not obliterate the fact that the accused is a
recidivist upon his conviction of a second offense embraced in the same title of the Code.27 This aggravating circumstance of recidivism accordingly
offsets the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender by Baltazar Lacao, Sr.

With respect to appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad Lacao Mansilla, they did cooperate in the execution of the offense by simultaneous acts which,
although not indispensable to the commission of the offense, bore a relation to the acts done by the principal and supplied material or moral aid in
the execution of the crime in an efficacious way.28 Since they were aware of the criminal intent of the principals and having participated in such
murderous criminal design sans a conspiracy, we hold them guilty of the milder form of responsibility as accomplices.29

The penalty for the complex crime at bar is that for the graver offense, the same to be applied in its maximum period. No modifying circumstance
can be considered for or against herein appellants. With the proscription against the imposition of the death sentence, the trial court correctly
sentenced appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. to suffer reclusion perpetua. Appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad Lacao Mansilla are hereby sentenced to
serve an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. The death indemnity is hereby increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with the present policy on the matter, with appellant
Baltazar Lacao, Sr. primarily liable for P40,000.00 and appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad Lacao Mansilla for P10,000.00, subject to the provisions
of Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, with the foregoing modifications, the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 109138-39 April 27, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALBERTO GAORANA y ERAN, 1 accused-appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness strengthen, rather than impair, credibility. Such harmless and inconsequential errors are
indicative of truth, not falsehood.

The Case

This is an appeal from the Decision 2 dated September 4, 1992, promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo, Davao, in Criminal Case
Nos. 91-316 and 91-317, convicting Appellant Alberto Gaorana 3 y Eran of two counts of rape and sentencing him to two terms of reclusion
perpetua.

On March 13, 1991, a Criminal Complaint4 was filed by Marivel J. Fuentes with the assistance of her mother, Priscilla J. Fuentes, before Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) Judge Daydews D. Villamor of Panabo, Davao. After conducting preliminary investigation, the MTC recommended that appellant
be charged with two are separate cases of simple seduction. However, in a Resolution dated August 22, 1991, 5 Davao State Prosecutor I Castor B.
Dorado and Provincial Prosecutor Francisco G. Rivero modified the investigating judge's recommendation and charged appellant with two counts of
rape.

Except for the dates of the commission of the crime, the two Informations contained the same allegations. The first Information, docketed as Crim.
Case No. 91-316, charged appellant as follows:6

That on or about March 5, 1991, in the Municipality of Panabo, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, and with the use of a hunting knife, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of Marivel Fuentes, against her will.

The commission of the foregoing offense is attended by the aggravating circumstance of [q]uasi-[r]ecidivism.

The second Information, docketed as Crim. Case No. 91-317, charged appellant with rape committed on March 6, 1991.7 The cases were
consolidated and filed before the RTC of Panabo, Davao. Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.8

In due course, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:9

WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds Alberto Gaorana Y Iran guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the two cases of rape,
punishable under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and this Court hereby sentences the said accused to suffer and undergo the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count, with all the accessory penalties and to pay the costs.

The accused is also ordered to indemnify the victim, Marivel Fuentes, [in] the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS.

Hence, this appeal. 10

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

In the Appellee's Brief, 11 the prosecution presented this version of the facts: 12

On March 5, 1991, before 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Marivel Fuentes, herein private complainant, was cleaning her house located at DAPECOL,
Panabo, Davao. At the same time, she was also putting her younger brother and sister to sleep. Rowena Sanchez, common-law wife of appellant,
arrived and instructed her to go to her house which was about 20 meters away. 13 Private complainant finished cleaning before she proceeded to
Rowena's place.

When private complainant arrived in appellant's house, she saw appellant and Rowena lying down. Rowena bade her to come in and told her to sit
down. Rowena then stood up and told private complainant that she [would] urinate. Appellant approached private complainant, covered her mouth
and pointed a hunting knife to her neck. He told her that he [would] kill her if she [would] tell her mother. Private complainant fought appellant but
appellant pulled her inside a room. Appellant made her lie down on the floor. Appellant then took off his pants and opened private complainant's
duster and removed her panty. He put himself on top of private complainant and had intercourse with her. All the while, private complainant's
mouth was covered with a handkerchief.

After about five minutes, Rowena came back and saw appellant still on top of Marivel. Appellant instructed Rowena to step out of the room. After a
while, appellant stood up, put on his briefs and called his wife inside the room. Both of them said, "Let us see."

Private complainant was allowed to leave appellant's house at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Private complainant's parents arrived at 7:00 o'clock in
the evening but she did not report the incident to them because she was afraid appellant might make good his threat (pp. 7-13, 20-24, 29-32, tsn,
March 30, 1992).

The second incident of rape occurred at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of March 6, 1991. Private complainant was sleeping in the sala with her
brother and sister when she was awakened by the kisses of appellant. Appellant had a knife which scared private complainant. Appellant pulled
private complainant from the mat, removed his pants, opened her duster and removed her panty, and again had intercourse with her. Private
complainant did not shout because she was afraid of appellant who was a prisoner and had already killed somebody. After satisfying his lust,
appellant left (pp. 14, 34-36, tsn, ibid.).

Version of the Defense

Appellant interposes the defense of alibi and denial. In his Brief, 14 he presented the following version of the facts:

EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE:

MRS. ROWENA GAORANA testified that she is the wife of the accused Alberto Gaorana, and they have one (1) child. She had known the accused
since 1989 and had become his sweetheart since May 26, 1990. Gaorana [was] a living out prisoner which means that he [was] living in a house
outside the compound of DAPECOL. She became a resident of DAPECOL since 1989 when she was then living with her mother and stepfather who
[was] likewise a colonist. She knew Marivel Fuentes because they [had been] neighbors since she arrived in DAPECOL in December 2, 1989. She was
then 16 years old. She and Marivel Fuentes [were] friends, and as such, they would talk sometimes and would practice how to ride on a bicycle.

It is not true that she invited Marivel Fuentes to visit their house in DAPECOL at about 2 p.m. of March 5, 1991 because at that time and date, they
were sleeping. However, on that date, she could recall having met Marivel Fuentes in their house, when Marivel borrowed a pitcher from them.
After borrowing the pitcher, Marivel left and she continued sleeping. Then she stood up and went to her mother's house 300 meters away to answer
the call of nature. After 45 minutes she returned and saw Marivel Fuentes sitting in their kitchen. Her husband was also sitting on the bench of their
kitchen, two (2) meters away from where Marivel was and conversing with the latter. She could not however hear what they were talking about. She
asked Marivel Fuentes why she was there and Marivel answered that she was returning the pitcher she borrowed. She noticed that Marivel was
somewhat embarrassed because she turned her face from her. Then after around 30 minutes, Marivel went home.

It is not true that she just laughed when she saw them doing the sexual intercourse because if it were true that she saw them doing that thing,
maybe she would kill.

It is not also true that on [the] midnight of March 6, 1991, her common-law husband Alberto Gaorana barged in[to] the house of Marivel Fuentes
and had sexual intercourse with her, because at that time, they were sleeping in the room of their house.

Whenever she would meet Marivel Fuentes after March 5 and 6, 1991, they just looked at each other. Marivel would not talk to her because she
believe[d] she was ashamed. She asked Marivel why she did not care to answer. That was not the usual behavior of Marivel prior to March 5 and 6,
because they used to talk and laugh together whenever they were in company. She also asked her husband why [I]nday (referring to Marivel)
changed and her husband answered "I do not know why. You may know it because you are close to each other." TSN, June 1, 1992, pp. 3-14.

Accused ALBERTO GAORANA, 27 years old, live-in partner of Rowena and a prisoner, testified that he came to know Marivel Fuentes in 1989. He met
her in their store, being a living but prisoner, [and] he worked as a carpenter in the house of Fuentes family in DAPECOL in 1990.

At about 2 p.m. of March 5, 1991, he was in their house sleeping with his common-law-wife. He woke up at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. His wife was
still with him when he woke up. On said date he did not see or meet Marivel Fuentes. What Marivel Fuentes are [sic] saying against him are not true
because he was sleeping at that time with his wife. (TSN, June 1, 1992, pp. 17-19).

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimony of complainant who was not shown to have any motive to falsely testify against
appellant. It ruled that it was improbable that a naive and inexperienced 15-year old girl would fabricate her own ravishment and subject herself to
the humiliation and embarrassment of a public trial if her charges were not true. Further, her testimony was corroborated by Dr. Bendijo who, after
conducting physical examination on her, found that her hymen was no longer intact. Her positive and categorical testimony prevailed over
appellant's bare denial and alibi.

The trial court also ruled that appellant had a motive to commit the crime. Complainant's parents supposedly failed to give him their payment for his
common-law wife's laundry services.

Assignment of Errors

In his Brief, appellant imputes the following errors to the court a quo: 15

The trial court erred in finding the testimony of Complainant Marivel Fuentes as credible despite its inconsistencies.

II

The trial court erred in finding Accused-Appellant Alberto Gaorana guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape despite the weakness of the
evidence for the prosecution.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

First Issue: Harmless Inconsistencies

Appellant contends that the following cast "inconsistencies" cast serious doubt on the veracity and reliability of complainant's testimony: (1)
complainant declared that her father wanted her to be away from DAPECOL (Davao Penal Colony), but she also claimed that he was happy when she
returned because he missed her terribly; 16 (2) on cross-examination, she testified that it took Rowena five minutes to answer the call of nature 17
but, later on, she said that Rowena returned after an hour; 18 (3) during the direct examination she said that appellant "opened" her house dress,
19 but on cross-examination she said that he pulled her house dress up to her breast; 20 and (4) she claimed that appellant had already pulled his
penis out of her vagina when Rowena returned, which was at the same time that complainant opened her eyes 21 — a statement contradicting her
earlier one which pointed out that appellant's penis was still inside her private part when Rowena saw the two of them. 22
The alleged discrepancies do not discredit the complainant's testimony. The claimed inconsistency regarding the father's reaction to the
complainant's return to DAPECOL is more apparent than real. Her father, being an inmate himself, must have realized that the penal colony was not
an ideal place for a girl to grow up in; thus, he welcomed the possibility that his daughter would live outside the colony with her aunt. By the same
token, he cannot be faulted for missing a daughter whom he had not seen for some time.

Equally insignificant is the discrepancy regarding complainant's account of the length of time it took Rowena to defecate and return. This is a minor
lapse which is not unusual when a person is recounting a humiliating and painful experience.

On the other hand, whether the complainant's house dress was "opened" or "pulled up" is merely a semantic discrepancy. It could very well be
attributed to an error in the translation of the testimony from the dialect to English. In any case, both terms similarly describe how appellant
exposed the complainant's body to enable him to commit the crime.

Whether appellant's penis was still inside complainant's vagina when Rowena returned is similarly a trivial matter. In either case, it is undisputed
that appellant, with the use of force and intimidation, had carnal knowledge of the complainant.

These alleged inconsistencies are inconsequential in the face of the essential fact that appellant forced the complainant to have sexual intercourse
with him. The Court has consistently adhered to the rule that inconsistencies on minor derails strengthen, rather than impair, the witness'
credibility. They are considered more as badges of truth, rather than as indicia of falsehood.23

Appellant also contends that the testimony of complainant was contrary to human experience, because he could not have stayed at her house for
thirty minutes just threatening her and doing nothing else, after he had supposedly ravished her for two minutes around 3:00 a.m. of March 6, 1991.
The Court is not persuaded.

Rape is essentially an offense committed in secrecy, generally executed in dark or deserted and secluded places away from prying eyes. Thus,
conviction for this crime rests largely upon the credibility of the offended party who is usually the sole witness of its actual occurrence. 24 Thus,
herein complainant's testimony must thus be considered and calibrated in its entirety, and not by truncated portions or isolated passages thereof.
25

The complainant cannot be faulted for her inability to do anything, while appellant continuously threatened her for thirty minutes after he had
defiled her body. She has more than sufficiently explained that she was deeply distressed and overcome with fear. In People vs. Pontilar, the Court
stated: 26

It is a truism that "the workings of the human mind placed under a great deal of emotional and psychological stress are unpredictable, and different
people react differently. There is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling, frightful or
traumatic experience . . . .

The assessment of a witness' credibility has always been considered to be the province of the trial court. After all, the trial judge had the
opportunity, which appellate courts do not have, to observe the witness' demeanor and deportment on the stand. 27 In the case at bar, appellant
failed to show any cogent reason to justify a departure from this time-honored rule.

Second Issue: Evidence of Guilt Sufficient

Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) when force or intimidation is used; (2)
when the woman is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age. 28 The prosecution
established that appellant raped the complainant the first time in the following manner: 29

Q After you laid [sic] down because Alberto Gaorana pointed a knife on [sic] your neck, what did Alberto Gaorana do to you?
A He removed his pants.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, when Alberto Gaorana succeeded in removing your panty, what did Alberto Gaorana do to you?
A After he removed my panty, he put himself on top of me . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Q Was the penis of Alberto Gaorana able to penetrate . . . your vagina?

A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, can you tell this Honorable Court how long did Alberto Gaorana sexually abused [sic] you?
A About 5 minutes. (Emphasis supplied.)

The perpetration of rape for the second time was also established: 30

Q Now can you tell this Honorable Court what happened on March 6, 1991 at 3:00 o'clock in the morning?
A I was surprised [at] the kisses made to me by Alberto Gaorana and he was bringing [sic] a hunting knife and that was the reason I was
awakened.

xxx xxx xxx

Q When you were brought to the floormat [sic], what did Alberto Gaorana do?
A He removed his pants.
Q Then, what did he do?
A He opened my duster.

xxx xxx xxx

Q And you said that you were sexually abused by Alberto Gaorana, was he able to penetrate on [sic] your vagina?

A Yes, sir. (Emphasis supplied.)

The complainant positively identified appellant as her ravisher. The first rape was committed in the afternoon at appellant's house where there was
sufficient light to identify the culprit. Despite the relatively dark situs when the second rape was committed, complainant knew that the malefactor
was appellant because there was sufficient moonlight; besides, she was familiar with him, as he had been their neighbor for a long time. As held in
People v. Castillo, 31 identification is facilitated by the fact that the person has gained familiarity with another.

Appellant's alibi that he was at home sleeping during the second incident is negligible, because he failed to prove the physical impossibility of his
presence at the scene of the crime. His house and that of the complainant were only 20 meters apart. Further, it was undisputed that appellant had
access to the house of the complainant because he had constructed its door. 32

The trial court ruled that appellant had a motive in raping the complainant. This is a surplusage, considering that motive is not necessary in rape
cases when the felon has been positively identified. Appellant alleged that the complainant's mother instigated the charges against him, because
she did not pay for the laundry services of his common-law wife. Such bizarre reasoning does not explain why a mother would subject her young
daughter to the shame, scandal, embarrassment and anxiety concomitant with a prosecution for rape. Indeed, complainant and her mother could
not have been impelled by any motive other than to bring to justice the author of the sexual assault.33

In sum, no evidence has been presented to show that Marivel or her mother fabricated the charges against appellant.

Quasi-Recidivism Was Not Established

The two Informations alleged that both instances of rape were attended by the aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism. The trial court made
no express ruling that appellant was a quasi-recidivist, and rightly so. During the trial, the prosecution manifested that appellant had been convicted
by the Regional Trial Court of Kabangkalan, Negros Occidental in Crim. Case No. 013 on March 29, 1988 and was serving sentence for the crime of
homicide. 34 However, the prosecution failed or neglected to present in evidence the record of appellant's previous conviction. Quasi-recidivism,
like recidivism and reiteracion, necessitates the presentation of a certified copy of the sentence convicting an accused. 35 The fact that appellant
was an inmate of DAPECOL does not prove that final judgment had been rendered against him. 36

Civil Indemnity Improperly Imposed

The trial court erred in imposing on appellant civil indemnity of only P50,000. Appellant should pay indemnity of P50,000 for each count of rape. 37
Because he was convicted of two counts of rape, he should indemnify the victim in the amount of P100,000.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is ORDERED to PAY the
offended party civil indemnity in the amount of P100,000. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 73656. October 5, 1989.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROGELIO VILLAPANDO y BUNSOL, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

MEDIALDEA, J.:

The accused-appellant, Rogelio Villapando y Bunsol was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City 1 with the crimes of murder in CCC-
VIII-823(79) and of attempted homicide in Criminal Cases Nos. 770 and 771. The information filed in the said cases read as follows:

CCC-VIII-823(79)

"That on or about the 14th day of January, 1979, at around 6:10 o’clock in the evening at P. Genato St., Batangas City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a fan knife, with intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstance
of either treachery or evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab suddenly and without
warning, one Saturno Romulo Manalo y Gabia, thereby inflicting upon the latter wounds on the different parts of his body which directly caused the
victim’s instantaneous death.

"CONTRARY TO LAW." (Records of CCC-VIII-823(79), p. 1)

Criminal Case No. 770:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about the 14th day of January, 1979, at around 6:10 o’clock in the evening at P. Genato St., Batangas City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a fan knife, with intent to kill and without any justifiable cause, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of homicide directly by overt acts, that is, by then and
there, attacking, assaulting and stabbing with said fan knife one Alicia Beron y Panganiban, thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries, to wit:
`incised wound 1 cm. long posterior aspect distal 3rd forearm right,’ which injuries had required medical attendance and prevented her from
performing her customary work for a period of not more than nine (9) days, and if said accused did not perform all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, it was not due to his spontaneous desistance but because Saturno Romulo Manalo y
Gabia was able to push the offended party.

"CONTRARY TO LAW." (Records of CC No. 770, p. 1)

Criminal Case No. 771:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about the 14th day of January, 1979, at around 6:10 o’clock in the evening at P. Genato St., Batangas City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a fan knife, with intent to kill and without any justifiable cause, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of homicide directly by overt acts, that is, by then and
there, attacking, assaulting and stabbing with said fan knife one Ramon Tolentino y Delgado, thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries, to
wit: ‘1. Sutured wound 23 cms. long extending from distal half of arm to proximal 3rd of forearm, anterior aspect right; and 2. Sutured wound 14
cms. long anterior aspect right forearm,’ which injuries had required medical attendance and prevented him from performing his customary work
for a period of more than one (1) month, and if said accused did not perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of
homicide as a consequence, it was not due to his spontaneous desistance.

"CONTRARY TO LAW." (Records of CC No. 771, p. 1)

Upon being arraigned, the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the offenses charged. After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its
decisions in CCC-VIII-823(79) on October 9, 1984, and in Criminal Cases Nos. 770 and 771 on July 12, 1985, the dispositive portions of which
read:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

CCC-VIII-823(79)

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, Accused ROGELIO VILLAPANDO Y BUNSOL is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA
(life imprisonment), to indemnify the lawful heirs of the deceased in the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS, plus FIVE THOUSAND
(P5,000.00) PESOS as actual damages and TWENTY FIVE (sic) (P25,000.00) PESOS as moral and exemplary damages and to pay the costs.

"IT IS SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 92)

CC Nos. 770 and 771

"PREMISES CONSIDERED, in Criminal Case No. 770, Accused Rogelio Villapando is hereby sentenced to a straight penalty of TWENTY (20) DAYS
imprisonment and to pay the costs.

"In Criminal Case No. 771, Accused Rogelio Villapando is hereby sentenced to an imprisonment of SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
TWO (2) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as maximum, together with the accessory penalties and to pay the costs.

"The accused in the said two cases shall be credited with the full term of his preventive imprisonment if he has any, and to serve first the most
severe penalty imposed against him in these two cases, pursuant to Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code.

"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 70)

Not satisfied with the aforesaid decisions, the accused appealed.

The antecedent facts as summarized in the People’s brief are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On January 14, 1979 at about 6:00 o’clock in the evening, Ramon Tolentino, Nelia Panganiban and Alicia Beron went to the BLTB Co. bus terminal in
Batangas City to take a bus bound for Manila (pp. 10-11, tsn., July 28, 1983). Romulo Manalo, who was Alicia’s boyfriend, went with them to see
Alicia off (p. 11, Ibid.). Upon reaching the terminal, Nelia, Alicia and Romulo immediately boarded a parked bus while Ramon went to the terminal
counter to secure student fare discounts for themselves (pp. 12-13, Ibid.). The trio proceeded to the back of the bus where Nelia and Alicia were
able to seat themselves (p. 13, Ibid.). While inside the bus, it appears that Romulo got into an argument with the accused who was seated infront
(sic) of the girl’s (sic) seats (p. 5, tsn., Dec. 9, 1983). Subsequently, Romulo turned to the direction of the bus door to alight from the bus (p. 13, Ibid.,
July 28, 1983). He was followed by the accused (Id.). Near the door of the bus, Romulo and the accused began to exchange fist blows (pp. 5-6, Ibid.,
Dec. 9, 1983). They continued to trade fist blows on the ground (Id.). Suddenly, the accused pulled out a fan knife and stabbed Romulo (pp. 8-9, tsn.,
May 13, 1983). Upon seeing Romulo being stabbed by the accused, both Alicia and Ramon approached the duo to break up the fight (p. 10, Ibid.). As
Alicia embraced Romulo, the accused lunged at her three times with the knife (Id.). The first two blows landed near the base of her handbag and at
the bottom of her handbag. The third blow struck her right forearm (Id.) Ramon, on the other hand, who was also pulling Romulo away from the
accused, was likewise stabbed by the accused with the knife, hitting the former twice on the right arm (pp. 10-11, Ibid.). The accused then ran away
towards the public market (pp. 11-12, Ibid.). Ramon chased the accused but gave up the pursuit at the entrance of the market as it was already dark
(p. 12, Ibid.). Romulo died as a result of the stab wound inflicted by the accused on his chest which penetrated his chest wall and caused him to
suffer cardiac arrest (pp. 7-9, tsn., Aug. 31, 1983; Exh. U). Ramon sustained 2 stab wounds on his right forearm which incapacitated him from
performing his regular work for a period of more than 1 month (Exhibit A). Alicia suffered a stab wound on her right arm which prevented her from
doing her customary duties for nine (9) days (Exhibit B)." (Appellee’s Brief, pp. 4-6; Rollo, p. 105)

The accused, on the other hand, interposed the defense of alibi. He claimed that he and his kumpadre, Romy Acedillo, were at the cockpit in San
Pablo City at the time of the incident; and that thereafter, on their way to Acedillo’s house, Accused purchased a Seiko watch from out of his
winnings and the store issued to him a guarantee book dated January 14, 1979. In addition, he presented an eyewitness to the crime, Paquito Sorizo,
who testified that the accused was not the victims’ assailant.

The lower court discredited the appellant’s defense of alibi as weak and the testimony of the defense witness as biased and without probative value.

In this appeal, the accused assigned the following errors:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Trial Court grossly became dishonest to itself when it did not take into consideration the defense of ALIBI put up by the accused perfected
collaborated (sic) by two credible witnesses;

"The Trial Court blinded itself by not taking against the prosecution the inconsistencies in the testimonies given by the witnesses against the
accused." (Appellant’s Brief, p. 3; Rollo, p. 57)

The appeal is devoid of merit.

We have already ruled that for alibi to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must be established by clear and convincing evidence (People v. Cruz, G.R. No.
68805, July 9, 1986; 142 SCRA 576). Appellant must not only prove that he was elsewhere at the time the crime was committed but also that it was
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. This appellant failed to do. The distance between San Pablo City and Batangas City does
not render it impossible for appellant to be present at the place and time of the incident taking into account the modern means of transportation.
Further, the Seiko guarantee booklet is to Us an unconvincing piece of evidence. It does not assure Us that the purchase was really done in San
Pablo City and not in Batangas City. It is also possible that the watch was purchased in the morning or in the afternoon of the said date. The
conflicting testimonies of appellant and his witness regarding the circumstances attendant to the purchase of the watch, likewise, weakens the
defense of alibi. Appellant contends that upon his purchase of the Seiko watch, the jewelry store just handed him a guarantee booklet but did not
give him any receipt (TSN, February 10, 1984, p. 7; Records, p. 296). On the other hand, his witness, Romy Acedillo, testified that the store issued to
appellant a receipt and a guarantee booklet (TSN, February 10, 1984, pp. 71-72; Records, pp. 360-361). If the two were indeed together in
purchasing the watch, how come their testimonies as to the circumstances of the purchase do not jibe?

Moreover, appellant was clearly and positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as the assailant. Witness Ramon Tolentino
testified:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"FISCAL ATIENZA:

Q Now, Mr. Tolentino, after you were stabbed twice by that particular man, what else happened if anything else happened?
A He turned again on Romulo Manalo, sir.
Q And what did he do again if he did anything else?
A Maybe he delivered another stab blow but I did not see where it landed, sir.
Q What else happened if anything else happened?
A I spoke these following words: `Tama na naman.’ And then we faced each other and then he ran away, sir.
Q You have been referring to this particular man who stabbed Romulo, who stabbed you and likewise stabbed Alicia, if that man is present in
court, will you be able to point to him?
A I could, sir.
Q Please do so.
A (Witness pointing to a person and when that person pointed to was asked of (sic) his name, identified himself as Rogelio Villapando).
Q Now, when you mentioned that man whom you identified now as Rogelio Villapando ran away, what did you do if you did anything?
A I chased him up to the point he was able to gain entrance to the old public market of Batangas City, sir.

x x x

"ATTY. CABILING (counsel for the accused):chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q When you saw for the first time that Romulo was being stabbed, Mr. Romulo was facing you, is that correct?
A Yes, sir, but Romulo was holding the neck around his left arm (kilik) while that person being "kilik" stabbed him, sir.
Q And the person who was stabbing Romulo whom you had just described as "kilik," embraced by the neck by Romulo, has his back in front
of you, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q So that at that precise moment when you saw for the first time Romulo being stabbed by that man, you were not able to see his face at
all?
A It was this way, sir. When Romulo was stabbed first by the accused, Romulo was facing me and Romulo was holding the accused by the
neck and his back was facing me, and I approached Romulo and pulled him back and that was the time when the accused turned on me and stabbed
me twice and I was able to hold his hand and thereafter since Romulo was already wounded, he turned again on Romulo.

. . ." (TSN, May 13, 1983, pp. 11-13, 27-28; Records, pp. 65-67, 81-82)

and witness Nelia A. Panganiban also declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"FISCAL ATIENZA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q And when yon heard the shouting outside the BLTB Co. bus, what else transpired, if anything else transpired?
A Alicia also alighted and I remained at the bus, sir.
Q And then what did you do thereafter?
A I approached the right side of the BLTB Co. bus and I moved to a seat for two (2) persons and by the side of the window, I looked out of
that window, sir.
Q Looking out from that window, what did you witness, if you witnessed anything?
A I saw Villapando stabbing Romulo Manalo, sir.
Q If this Villapando is inside the courtroom, will you be able to point to him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please do so.
A There he is, sir. (Witness pointing to a person and when that person pointed to was asked of (sic) his name, identified himself as Rogelio
Villapando)
Q And you mentioned that Villapando was stabbing Romulo Manalo at that time that you looked out from the window of that BLTB Co. bus,
will you please demonstrate to us their respective positions on (sic) that time you saw Villapando striking stab blows on the person of Romulo
Manalo? May I request, if your Honor please, for any female person here? (The witness representing herself as Romulo Manalo and the old woman
representing Villapando, standing face to face while the left hand of Romulo was embracing the neck of Villapando while Villapando’s right hand was
delivering stab blows from the left side of his head downward)
Q At that particular time when you saw Villapando stabbing Romulo Manalo, who among them were facing you, if anybody of them were
facing you?
A Romulo was facing me, sir.
Q If Romulo was the one facing you, how were you able to say with clarity here it was Villapando who was stabbing Romulo at the time?

ATTY. BAYANI:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Objection, Your Honor. It is fiscal who is cross-examining this witness.

FISCAL ATIENZA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Precisely that is just to clarify.

COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That is very favorable to the defense. He is helping you.

A They made a turn, sir.

FISCAL ATIENZA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q And during that turn, who were then facing you?

ATTY. BAYANI:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Leading, Your Honor.

COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Villapando was facing after the turn.

FISCAL ATIENZA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q And then thereafter, what else did you do, if you did any thing?
A I took my things and alighted from the bus, sir.
Q And then after alighting from the bus, what else transpired, if anything else transpired?
A When I had already alighted from the bus, I saw Ramon Tolentino chasing Villapando towards the south, sir.

. . ." (TSN, July 28, 1983, pp. 14-17; Records, pp. 116-119)

We find nothing in the records of the case which would show that these witnesses were actuated by improper motives in pointing to the appellant
as the person responsible for their injuries and for the death of their companion. Their testimonies are, therefore, credible and worthy of belief.

Appellant’s avowal of innocence also cannot be sustained on the basis of the testimony of his witness, Paquito Sorizo. A careful reading of Sorizo’s
entire testimony fails to convince Us of its veracity. Sorizo appears to be more of a coached witness. The following findings of the trial court
demonstrate clearly the unreliability of Sorizo’s testimony:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"As to the testimony of defense witness Paquito Sorizo stating that he witnessed the said stabbing incident that resulted to the death of Romulo
Manalo, this court could not believe him when he said that Rogelio Villapando is not the assailant of Romulo Manalo. This particular witness of the
defense is a bias witness due to the special relationship and or treatment given by the accused, his wife and the lawyer of the defense, under the
following circumstances, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That he was always present during the hearing of this case and the other two (2) attempted homicide cases filed against herein accused, as
evidenced by his testimony earlier stated in this findings;

"2. That he attended at the Letty’s Restaurant to have a conference with the lawyer for the defense upon the request of the wife of the herein
accused.

"If really said witness was (sic) present when the deceased was assaulted and stabbed to death and that he was only two (2) brazas away from the
crime-scene, why is it that there is (sic) no showing that he at least attempted to prevent the victim and the accused from the (sic) struggling with
each other, if really true (sic) as janitor of the BLTB Co, that he was then only two brazas away from them, why did he not help when Alicia Beron
embraced the victim in order to prevent the (sic) further assault of the accused and likewise did not prevent the said accused from inflicting injury to
said Alicia Beron and Ramon Tolentino? and (sic), finally, why did he fail and/or refuse to execute any written statement similar in substance on
what he said in court immediately after the stabbing incident or immediately after the apprehension of the accused, considering that the said
incident was properly attended to for investigation by the police authorities of Batangas City who were then personally present immediately after
the incident took place?

"To the best analysis and findings of this court, witness Paquito Sorizo was coached by someone to testify in favor of the accused and his testimony
given in court is (sic) concocted or fabricated one and, therefore, without credence and probative value in the instant case.

"It is a well-settled rule that if a man remains silent when he ought to speak (like in the present case) he will be barred from speaking later (Gabriel
v. Bans, 56 Phil. 314)

"Further, the court has observed the demeanor or manner of said witness Paquito Sorizo while on the witness stand and while testifying, said
witness usually responded to the questions propounded by the defense counsel on direct-examination in a manner as if the answers were already
inside his mouth or just at the tip of his tongue and, when asked if the assailant was inside the courtroom, said witness answered that the accused
was not present, although said witness did not bother himself to look around the court premises and gave his answer while his face was little bit
downward and facing directly to the Presiding Judge." (Rollo, pp. 33-34)

Appellant, furthermore, assails the credibility of some prosecution witnesses. He claims that the prosecution witnesses’ second, rather than their
first, statements before the police were submitted to the court; that the given description of the assailant in their first statements matched the
description given by defense witness Sorizo; that the second statements’ description of the assailant did not match appellant’s physical appearance
especially as to height since he is short while the given height was 5’7" ; that witness Panganiban’s identification of appellant is questionable since it
was not done in a police line-up and appellant was in front of Panganiban ready to be identified; that, also, she did not see the actual stabbing of her
companions, Tolentino and Beron; that witnesses Alicia Beron and Dr. Celso Bulanhagui, the attending physician, were not presented in court; that
the mother of the victim, Lucia Manalo, did not identify the accused; and that Miss Rosario Panaligan, Head, Medical Records Section of the
Batangas Regional Hospital, who was presented in lieu of Dr. Bulanhagui, could not testify as to the correctness of the death and medical certificates
signed by Dr. Bulanhagui (Appellant’s Brief, pp. 6-10; Rollo, p. 57).

We are not persuaded. The fact that Panganiban did not see the actual stabbing of Ramon Tolentino and Alicia Beron and that Lucia Manalo did not
identify the appellant as the assailant is of no moment. The important thing is that the victims themselves identified their assailant as the Appellant.

Moreover, identification of an accused need not be done in a police line-up. It may also be made by just pointing to the accused directly as what was
done in this case. We find, too, that contrary to the appellant’s claim, witness Panganiban was aware of appellant’s near presence,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q Upon arrival at the police headquarters, what did you do?

A I pin-pointed at the person of Villapando and there were many persons inside when I pin-pointed to him, Your Honor.
Q Why did you pin-point to him upon your arrival at the police station?
A Because I was asked by the police if I could possible (sic) point the assailant of Romulo Manalo, Your Honor.

x x x

ATTY. BAYANI (counsel for the accused):chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q When your statement was being taken by the police, where was Villapando? How far was Villapando from you?
A Very near, sir.
Q How many meters, inches or feet?
A About less than two (2) meters distance at the time my statement was taken, sir.
Q And Villapando was also seated?
A No, sir.
Q He was standing?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when you were being investigated, you already knew that Villapando was the one standing approximately one and one-half (1 1/2)
meters from you?
A Yes, sir.
Q How about the other persons whom you claimed to be present at the investigating room, how far were they from you?
A They were also equi-distant from one another. They moved one after the other, sir.
Q But Villapando was all the while standing infront (sic) of you?
A He was somewhat on my left side, sir.
Q He was all the while standing on your left side during the investigation?
A Yes, sir.
Q While the others were walking from one direction to another?
A Yes, sir.

. . ." (TSN, July 28, 1983, pp. 36-37, 42-43; Records, pp. 138-139, 144-145).
As regards the medical and death certificates signed by Dr. Bulanhagui, We hold that the testimony of Miss Panganiban is admissible to prove the
authenticity of Dr. Bulanhagui’s signatures on the said documents. The circumstance of Dr. Bulanhagui being abroad and thus, could not verify the
contents of the documents is not fatal to the prosecution’s case. Neither is the unavailability of Alicia Beron to testify as she is now in the United
States weaken the prosecution’s cause. The fact of the death of the victim and the injuries sustained by the other victims could be established by
testimonial evidence as was done in this case (TSNs, May 13, 1983, pp. 14-15, 20-22; Records, pp. 68-69, 74-75; August 14, 1983, pp. 6-10; Records,
pp. 168-170; July 28, 1983, pp. 17-20; Records, pp. 119-122).

Contrary to appellant’s assertion, all the statements executed by the prosecution witnesses were submitted and now formed part of the records of
the case (Records of CCC-VIII-825, pp. 3-9, 11). The alleged inconsistency regarding the description of the height of the assailant compared to
appellant’s actual height is trivial. It must be noted that the description given by Alicia Beron was merely the approximate height of the assailant
which does not militate against her credibility.

The over-all evidence presented in these cases has fully established the culpability of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. However, We do not
agree with the trial court that treachery is present in CCC-VIII-823(79). For treachery to be present, it must be shown that the offender employed
means, methods or forms of execution which tend directly and specifically to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make (Art. 14, par. 16, Revised Penal Code). In the case at bar, the testimonies of the eyewitnesses were limited to
the actual stabbing of the victims by the accused. There were no details as to how the stabbing incident commenced and developed. The death
certificate presented by the prosecution also did not disclose the nature of the stab wound which killed the victim so as to infer therefrom how he
was killed. It merely recited the following: "death due to cardiac arrest, stab wound, chest, left, penetrating chest cavity" (Exhibit U, Records of CCC-
VIII-823(79), p. 133). There being no circumstance which would qualify the killing to murder, the crime committed is simple homicide. Neither do We
agree that reiteracion or habituality should be appreciated in this case. The appellant was found by the trial court to have committed offenses prior
to and after the incident of January 14, 1979, as follows:" (1) prior to January, 1979, he was arrested and accused of the crime of theft, in Criminal
Case No. 172 before the Municipal Court of Mendez, Cavite; (2) that on May 15, 1973, he was likewise charged for physical injuries in Lipa City but
said case was amicably settled; (3) that on January 15, 1973, he was likewise charged in Criminal Case No. 1343 in Lemery, Batangas for the crime of
theft and he was convicted of the said offense; (4) that he was likewise charged and convicted before the City Court of Batangas City in Criminal Case
No. 9517; (5) that he was also charged in Criminal Case No. 842-B for theft, before the Court of First Instance of Biñan, Laguna, but said case was
settled amicably; (6) finally, Accused was charged and convicted for the crime of theft before the Court of First Instance of Manila in Criminal Case
No. 8212791 per Judgment of said court on October 30, 1982" (Decision, p. 19; Rollo, p. 89). In reiteracion or habituality, it is essential that the
offender be previously punished, that is, he has served the sentence, for an offense in which the law attaches, or provides for an equal or greater
penalty than that attached by law to the second offense, or for two or more offenses, in which the law attaches a lighter penalty (People v. Layson,
Et Al., G.R. No. L-25177, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 92). Here, the records do not disclose that the appellant has been previously punished by an
offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty. Considering therefore,
the absence of either aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty for homicide, which is reclusion temporal should be imposed in its
medium period (Article 249, in relation to Article 64, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum penalty is twelve (12) years of prision mayor and the maximum penalty is seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal. The indemnity for
death imposed by the trial court is increased to thirty thousand (P30,000.00) pesos in addition to the award of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos as
actual damages and twenty five thousand (P25,000.00) pesos as moral and exemplary damages.

As to Criminal Case No. 770, We uphold the trial court’s finding that the appellant is guilty of slight physical injuries only, it not being shown by any
clear and convincing evidence that appellant intended to kill Alicia Beron.

In Criminal Case No. 771, We find the appellant guilty only of less serious physical injuries. We gathered from the testimony of Ramon Tolentino that
appellant stabbed him and Alicia Beron because they intervened in his fight against the deceased. In fact, when Tolentino was held back
momentarily by his wounds, appellant attacked the deceased again and then, ran away (TSN, May 13, 1983, pp. 10-11; Records. pp. 64-65). There
was no injury to any vital part of Tolentino and Beron. Clearly from the foregoing, We could not see any intention on the part of appellant to kill
Tolentino and Beron (see United States v. Maghirang, 28 Phil. 655). He merely wanted to incapacitate these two people so he could turn his ire once
more to his real and intended victim, the deceased Romulo Manalo. Absent the intent to kill, appellant should be liable only for less serious physical
injuries. He should, therefore, be sentenced to an imprisonment of our (4) months.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgments appealed from (1) in Criminal Cases Nos. CCC-VIII-823(79) and 771, are hereby modified as above indicated; and (2) in
Criminal Case No. 770, is hereby affirmed. Costs against Accused-Appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur

.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 122498. September 27, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELMEDIO CAJARA, accused-appellant.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

ELMEDIO CAJARA alias Elming is before us on automatic review after having been found guilty by the trial court of Qualified Rape and sentenced to
death.

The Information alleged that on 30 May 1994 in Barangay Serum, Basey, Samar, the accused Elmedio Cajara, a brother-in-law of Marita B. Cajote
and husband of her older sister, by means of force and intimidation, willfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of her against her will and
consent.[1]

On 16 March 1995 the trial court found the accused guilty of rape as defined in Art. 335 of The Revised Penal Code in relation to Sec. 11 of RA 7659,
and sentenced him to death.[2]

On 18 May 1994 16-year old Marita Cajote, a resident of Manila, arrived in Basey, Samar, and stayed with her sister Marie. The following day, Marita
was fetched by another sister, Merly Tagana also known as Meling, and by the latters husband, accused Elmedio Cajara also known as Elming. Upon
being told by Meling that they would be going to Sulod to get copra, Marita went with Meling and Elming to the couples house in Sitio Catuhaan in
Barangay Serum. Since then until 30 May 1994 Marita stayed with Meling and Elming together with their two (2) small children in a house consisting
of only one room without any partition.

In the evening of 30 May 1994 complaining witness Marita Cajote slept at one end of the room with the two (2) children, with Meling and Elming at
the other end. At about two oclock the following morning Marita was awakened by the weight of accused who was already on top of her. The
accused who was holding a bolo told her to keep quiet or he would kill her. He then placed his bolo aside and held Maritas hands with his right hand.
With his left hand accused lowered Maritas pants as well as her panty down to her knees. Marita shouted for help but her sister Meling just
wrapped her head with their mosquito net and pretended to be asleep. Marita struggled continuously against the advances of the accused but he
was much stronger, while she was getting weak. The accused first inserted his fingers into Maritas private part and later succeeded in inserting his
penis into her vagina. Meling then pulled Elming away from Marita and hit Elming in the eye. Elming boxed Meling on the mouth and kicked her
when she fell on the floor. Elming went back to Marita and continued with his beastly acts. By this time, Marita was already too weak to resist.
Elming inserted his fingers first and then his penis into her private organ. The older of the two (2) children of Meling cried. Meling who was holding
her youngest child helplessly watched the accused rape her younger sister.

After satisfying his lust, the accused asked Marita to go away with him. Marita cried and dressed herself. When accused went to the door, she
jumped out of the window and ran away, but the accused chased her and after overtaking her threatened to kill her if she would return to their
house. So Marita pretended to submit to his wishes. Fortunately she found an opportunity to hide herself from the accused. Then she dashed for
safety to the house of her sister Marie and then to another sister Lilia. Marita revealed to both of them what the accused had done to her. But her
sisters advised her not to file a criminal case against their brother-in-law for fear that he might kill all of them. But Marita went to the chief of the
barangay tanod" whom she called Mano Henry, who accompanied her to the barangay captain. The barangay captain, Rolando Jaingue, also made
the same advice against filing a criminal charge against the accused as the latter might attack and kill them. The accused was known in the
community to have killed six (6) people. Finally, barangay captain Jaingue issued an indorsement of the case to the Philippine National Police
stationed in Basey, Samar.[3]

When physically examined by Dr. Danilo Fami, Municipal Health Officer of Basey, Samar, Marita was found to have a healed laceration of her hymen
at 4 oclock position.

In his defense, the accused Elmedio Cajara denied the charge against him. He alleged that Marita was the maternal half-sister of Meling, his
common-law wife; that at around 6 oclock in the evening of 30 May 1994 he was in his house with Meling and their two (2) children when Marita
arrived and invited them for a drink; that since he was then busy gathering tuba he was able to join them only at around 8 oclock until 11 oclock that
evening after which he went to sleep. However, at around 2 oclock in the morning he was awakened by the quarrel of his wife and Marita; that
when his wife asked Marita why the latter placed her leg over him, Marita answered that she did not know; and, that Meling ordered her to get out
of their house, but before she left Marita said that she would file a case against him who was on parole.[4]

Merly Tagana alias Meling, common-law wife of the accused, corroborated his testimony. When asked on direct examination why her sister Marita
would file a rape charge against her husband, Meling denied that her husband raped Marita, saying that "it was not the mistake of (her) husband
because he is a man and that she is a girl."[5]

Persuaded beyond reasonable doubt that Elmedio Cajara did rape 16-year old Marita Cajote on 30 May 1994 in front of his common-law wife and
his two small children, the trial court convicted him as charged and sentenced him to death.

In his Brief the accused faults the trial court for giving credence to the testimony of the rape victim, Marita Cajote, despite its failure to meet the test
of moral certainty; that the testimony of Merly Tagana, his common-law wife, that there was no rape should have been given more weight than the
testimony of Marita Cajote because Meling being a half-sister of Marita would have sympathized with her if the rape incident was true; and, that
Maritas claim that she was a virgin before she was raped was belied by the testimony of the medico-legal officer that there was a laceration which
could have healed even before the rape incident.

The Office of the Solicitor General, in its brief, belittles the accused for failing to show any compelling or justifiable reason to set aside his conviction
for rape and his penalty of death, citing Art. 335 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, the relevant portion of which states:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: x x x x 3. when rape is
committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
The Solicitor General is correct in finding the accused guilty of rape. The bare denial of the accused and his common-law wife cannot overcome the
categorical testimony of the victim. Denial when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence is a negative and self-serving evidence which
deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of a credible witness on affirmative matters.[6] No woman, especially of tender age, would
concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public trial if she was
not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished.[7] A complainants act in immediately reporting the commission of
the rape has been considered by this Court as a factor strengthening her credibility. The immediate decision of Marita to report the crime to her
sisters and the barangay officials as well as to face police authorities and submit to a medical examination are a mute but eloquent testimony of the
truth of her charge against accused.

We agree with the finding of the trial court that Maritas positive identification of the accused as the person who raped her was given in a
categorical, straightforward and spontaneous manner which rendered it worthy of faith and belief -

Q: While you were asleep on May 30, 1994, at 2:00 in the morning, can you still recall if you were awakened and why?
A: I was awakened because I was surprised.
Q: Why were you surprised?
A: Because he was on top of me.
Q: Who was the person on top of you?
A: Elming Cajara.
Q: How do you know that it was Elming?
A: Because there was light for the whole morning.
Q: Where was this light being placed?
A: On the altar.
Q: How far was the light to the place where you were lying down?
A: About two meters.
Q: Did Elming say anything to you when he was on top of you?
A: Yes, ma'am x x x x He said keep quiet x x x x If you will make a noise I will kill you.
Q: What else?
A: I shouted x x x x Help, help Manding.
Q: Who is this Manding you are referring to?
A: Meling.
Q: Your elder sister?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And when Elming Cajara warned you not to make any noise did you observe if he has (sic) any weapon with him?
A: Yes he has x x x x Sundang.
Q: Where was the bolo?
A: Near the head x x x x Elming Cajara at the time he slept he has a bolo with him.
Q: Where is this bolo you are referring to?
A: Near the head he was holding.
Q: He was holding the bolo with what hand?
A: Right hand.
Q: About you when you shouted, what else did you do while he was on top of you.
A: I kept on asking for help because he was holding my two hands over my head.
Q: With what hand he was holding your hands as he was holding the bolo?
A: When he told me not to make any noise he was holding my two hands.
Q: With what hand and how did he hold your two hands?
A: His right hand.
Q: How about his left hand?
A: Undressing me.
Q: What was being undressed? (sic)
A: My maong pants x x x x Garterized.
Q: Do (sic) you have panty at that time?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: How about your panty, was it undressed?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Up to what portion of your body were you undressed?
A: Middle part of my legs.
Q: As you were shouting for your Manding to help you, what did your Manding do?
A: After I was shouting for help for a long time, Manding grabbed Elming from me and Meling punched Elming hitting his eye.
Q: When Meling grabbed and punched Elming, what was Elming doing at that time?
A: He inserted his finger into my vagina after which he inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q: What did you do when Elming inserted his finger into your vagina?
A: I was trying to resist (from) him but I could not as he was holding my hands.
Q: While he was inserting his penis to your vagina, what did you do?
A: I was trying to resist and shouting and I was weak x x x x
Q: After Meling pulled her husband, what happened next?
A: Meling fell because she was punched by Elming x x x x She was hit on her mouth and she was kicked x x x x
Q: After kicking Meling what did Elming do?
A: After Elming kicked Meling and I was able to put on my panty Elming came back.
Q: When Elming went back to you, what did Elming do to you?
A: x x x x he undressed me again x x x x he abused me again x x x x he was inserting his finger and penis into my vagina.
Q: Was he able to insert again his penis into your vagina?
A: Yes, ma'am x x x x
Q: For how many times have (sic) he inserted his penis?
A: Twice.[8]

The argument of the accused is untenable that the testimony of his common-law wife that there was no rape should have been believed by the trial
court because she was Maritas half-sister who would naturally protect Maritas honor if she was indeed raped. Not every witness to a crime can be
expected to act reasonably and conformably to the expectation of mankind.[9] We have noted that in some instances it was but natural for
witnesses not to come to the victims rescue for fear of their lives, especially when threatened with harm should they do so. Self preservation is still
recognized as the most fundamental human instinct.[10]

In the case of Merly Tagana, although she is half-sister to Marita, she is also the common-law wife of the accused. While relationship between the
accused and his witness is not necessarily detrimental to the formers line of defense, this relationship taken together with the want of logic in the
declarations of the witness, yields to the conclusion that her testimony is not credible.[11] The trial court found evident discrepancies in Merly
Tagana's testimony which cannot but raise well-founded and overriding doubts on her testimony. Merly Tagana contradicted the testimony of the
accused and herself twice when she stated that Marita slept in the house with her and the accused on 29 May 1994, the night before the rape.[12]
Although she testified that the accused did not rape her sister, she complained on the witness stand that it was not the mistake of the accused to
have done what he did because he was a man and Marita was a girl. The opinion of the trial court as to who of the witnesses should be believed is
entitled to great respect on the oft-repeated rationale born of judicial experience that the trial judge who heard the witnesses testify and had the
occasion to observe their demeanor on the stand was in a vantage position to determine who of the witnesses deserve credence.[13]

The assertion of the accused that Marita was no longer a virgin when she was raped will not exculpate him from criminal liability. The records show
that Marita was sexually abused twice. After inserting his fingers, the accused inserted his organ into her private part, and after awhile, accused
repeated the sexual abuse. Clearly, when Marita was raped for the second time, she was no longer a virgin; she could have already lost her virginity
during the first rape. Further, well-settled is the rule that prior sexual intercourse which could have resulted in hymenal laceration is not necessary
in rape cases for virginity is not an element of rape.[14] It should be emphasized however that since the Information charged only one offense, even
if the evidence showed a second act of forcible intercourse, conviction for one rape was proper.[15]

The trial court in the case at bar imposed the penalty of death upon the accused after taking into account the following circumstances, i.e., the
minority of Marita Cajote who was only 16- years old at the time of the rape; relationship by affinity where the victim was said to be the sister of the
common-law wife of the accused; and, finally, the fact that the rape was committed by the accused in the full view of his wife and children. The
relevant portions of Sec. 11 of RA 7659 amending Art. 335 of The Revised Penal Code, which took effect 31 December 1993, state:

When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. By
using force or intimidation; 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and, 3. When the woman is under twelve years of
age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua x x x x The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances: 1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree or the common-law spouse of parent of the victim x x x x 3. When
the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity x x x x

Contrary to the ruling of the trial court and the stand of the Solicitor General, the accused can only be convicted of simple rape punishable by
reclusion perpetua. It was error for the trial court to impose the penalty of death. Although the circumstance of relationship by affinity within the
third civil degree was alleged in the Information, evidence for the prosecution clearly showed the lack or absence of such circumstance to qualify the
rape because the accused and Merly Tagana, sister of the victim Marita Cajote, were mere common-law husband and wife and were not legally
married at the time of the rape. The accused and the victim cannot be said to be related by affinity within the third civil degree at the time of the
commission of the crime.

Neither can the accused be convicted of qualified rape on the basis of the circumstance that the rape was committed in full view of the relatives of
the victim within the third degree of consanguinity because this qualifying circumstance was not pleaded in the Information or in the Complaint
against the accused.

The Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. Thus, it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of
requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.[16]

In People v. Morena[17] this Court explained that it would be a denial of the accused of his right to be informed of the charges against him and,
consequently, a denial of due process if he is convicted of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information. Hence, when the
information alleges rape by force and intimidation under par. 1, Art. 335, of The Revised Penal Code, the accused cannot be convicted of rape under
pars. 2 or 3 of the same Article.[18] In this case, since the accused was charged with rape qualified by minority and relationship under the first
attendant circumstance where the death penalty is imposable, he cannot be convicted of rape qualified by the third attendant circumstance of
commission of rape within the full view of the relatives of the victim, since this was not alleged in the Information.

The records show that the crime was aggravated by reiteracion under Art. 14, par. 10, of The Revised Penal Code, the accused having been convicted
of frustrated murder in 1975 and of homicide, frustrated homicide, trespass to dwelling, illegal possession of firearms and murder sometime in 1989
where his sentences were later commuted to imprisonment for 23 years and a fine of P200,000.00. He was granted conditional pardon by the
President of the Philippines on 8 November 1991.[19] Reiteracion or habituality under Art. 14, par. 10, herein cited, is present when the accused has
been previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty than that attached by law to the second offense or
for two or more offenses to which it attaches a lighter penalty. As already discussed, herein accused can be convicted only of simple rape and the
imposable penalty therefor is reclusion perpetua. Where the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied regardless of the
mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant to the crime, such as in the instant case.

We note that the trial court did not award any civil indemnity. Pursuant to current jurisprudence and without need of further proof, we award the
victim Marita Cajote an indemnity of P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00. In People v. Prades[20] the Court resolved that moral damages
may additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding in such amount as the Court may deem just without the need for pleading or
proof of the basis therefor.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court convicting the accused ELMEDIO CAJARA alias Elming of Qualified Rape is MODIFIED to the effect that he
is convicted instead only of Simple Rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to pay the victim Marita
B. Cajote civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and moral damages of another P50,000.00. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. L-No. 5292 August 28, 1909
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff,
vs.
THE MORO MANALINDE, defendant.
TORRES, J.:

Between 2 and 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th of January, 1909, while Juan Igual, a Spaniard, was seated on a chair in the doorway of Sousa's
store in Cotabato, Moro Province, he suddenly received a wound on the head delivered from behind and inflicted with a kris. Ricardo Doroteo, a
clerk in the said store, who was standing behind the counter, upon hearing the noise and the cry of the wounded man, ran to his assistance and
found him lying on the ground. Meanwhile the aggressor, the Moro Manalinde, approached a Chinaman named Choa, who was passing along the
street, and just as the latter was putting down his load in front of the door of a store and was about to enter, attacked him with the same weapon,
inflicting a severe wound in the left shoulder, on account of which he fell to the ground. The Moro, who came from the rancheria of Dupit and had
entered the town carrying his weapon wrapped up in banana leaves, in the meantime escaped by running away from the town. Both wounded men,
the Chinaman and the Spaniard, were taken to the hospital, where the former died within an hour, the record not stating the result of the wound
inflicted on the Spaniard Juan Igual.

In view of the above a complaint was filed by the provincial fiscal with the district court charging Manalinde with the crime of murder, and
proceedings having been instituted, the trial judge, in view of the evidence adduced, rendered judgment on the 5th of February of said year,
sentencing the accused to the penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The case has been
submitted to this court for review.

From the above facts fully substantiated in this case, it appears beyond doubt that the crime of murder, defined and punished by article 403 of the
Penal Code, was committed on the person of the Chinaman Choa, in that the deceased was unexpectedly and suddenly attacked, receiving a deep
cut on the left shoulder at the moment when he had just put down the load that he was carrying and was about to start for the door of the store in
front of which he stopped for the purpose of entering therein. As a result of the tremendous wound inflicted upon him by the heavy and unexpected
blow, he was unable, not only to defend himself, apart from the fact that he was unarmed, but even to flee from the danger, and falling to the
ground, died in an hour's time. It is unquestionable that by the means and form employed in the attack the violent death of the said Chinaman was
consummated with deceit and treachery (alevosia), one of the five qualifying circumstances enumerated in the aforesaid article as calling for the
greatest punishment.

When Manalinde was arrested he pleaded guilty and confessed that he had perpetrated the crime herein mentioned, stating that his wife had died
about one hundred days before and that he had come from his home in Catumaldu by order of the Datto Rajamudah Mupuck, who had directed him
to go juramentado in Cotabato in order to kill somebody, because the said Mupuck had certain grievances to avenge against a lieutenant and a
sergeant, the said datto further stating that if he, Manalinde, was successful in the matter, he would give him a pretty woman on his return, but that
in case he was captured he was to say that he performed the killing by order of Maticayo, Datto Piang, Tambal and Inug. In order to carry out his
intention to kill two persons in the town of Cotabato he provided himself with a kris, which he concealed in banana leaves, and, traveling for a day
and a night from his home, upon reaching the town, attacked from behind a Spaniard who was seated in front of a store and, wounding him,
immediately after attacked a Chinaman, who was close by, just as the latter was placing a tin that he was carrying on the ground and he was about
to enter a store near by, cutting him on the left shoulder and fleeing at once; he further stated that he had no quarrel with the assaulted persons.

From the statements made by the accused his culpability as the sole-confessed and self-convicted author of the crime in question has been
unquestionably established, nor can his allegation that he acted by order of Datto Mupuck and that therefore he was not responsible exculpate him,
because it was not a matter of proper obedience. The excuse that he went juramentado by order of the said datto and on that account killed only
two persons, whereas if he had taken the oath of his own volition he would have killed many more, because it is the barbarous and savage custom
of a juramentado to kill anyone without any motive or reason whatever, can not under any consideration be accepted or considered under the laws
of civilized nations; such exhibitions of ferocity and savagery must be restrained, especially as the very people who up to the present time have been
practicing such acts are well aware that the established authorities in this country can never allow them to go unpunished, and as has happened a
number of times in towns where juramentados are in the habit of appearing, the punishment of the author has followed every crime so committed.

In the commission of the crime of murder the presence of aggravating circumstances 3 and 7 of article 10 of the Penal Code should be taken into
consideration in that promise of reward and premeditation are present, which in the present case are held to be generic, since the crime has already
been qualified as committed with the treachery, because the accused confessed that he voluntarily obeyed the order given him by Datto Mupuck to
go juramentado and kill some one in the town of Cotabato, with the promise that if he escaped punishment he would be rewarded with a pretty
woman. Upon complying with the order the accused undoubtedly acted of his own volition and with the knowledge that he would inflict irreparable
injury on some of his fellow-beings, depriving them of life without any reason whatever, well knowing that he was about to commit a most serious
deed which the laws in force in this country and the constituted authorities could by no means permit. Datto Mupuck, who ordered and induced him
to commit the crimes, as well as the accused knew perfectly well that he might be caught and punished in the act of committing them.

As to the other circumstance it is also unquestionable that the accused, upon accepting the order and undertaking the journey in order to comply
therewith, deliberately considered and carefully and thoughtfully meditated over the nature and the consequences of the acts which, under orders
received from the said datto, he was about to carry out, and to that end provided himself with a weapon, concealing it by wrapping it up, and
started on a journey of a day and a night for the sole purpose of taking the life of two unfortunate persons whom he did not know, and with whom
he had never had any trouble; nor did there exist any reason which, to a certain extent, might warrant his perverse deed. The fact that the
arrangement between the instigator and the tool considered the killing of unknown persons, the first encountered, does not bar the consideration
of the circumstance of premeditation. The nature and the circumstances which characterize the crime, the perversity of the culprit, and the material
and moral injury are the same, and the fact that the victim was not predetermined does not affect nor alter the nature of the crime. The person
having been deprived of his life by deeds executed with deliberate intent, the crime is considered a premeditated one as the firm and persistent
intention of the accused from the moment, before said death, when he received the order until the crime was committed in manifestly evident.
Even though in a crime committed upon offer of money, reward or promise, premeditation is sometimes present, the latter not being inherent in
the former, and there existing no incompatibility between the two, premeditation can not necessarily be considered as included merely because an
offer of money, reward or promise was made, for the latter might have existed without the former, the one being independent of the other. In the
present case there can be no doubt that after the crime was agreed upon by means of a promise of reward, the criminal by his subsequent conduct
showed a persistency and firm intent in his plan to carry out the crime which he intentionally agreed to execute, it being immaterial whether Datto
Mupuck did or did not conceive the crime, once Manalinde obeyed the inducement and voluntarily executed it.

The facts in this case are quite different from those in the proceedings instituted by the United States vs. Caranto et al., wherein the decision on
page 256 of Volume IV of the Philippine Reports was rendered, as may be seen from the mere perusal of the statement of facts. It is also different
from the case where a criminal who has made up his mind to kill a certain individual kills a person other than the object of his criminal intent. On
going to Cotabato the Moro Manalinde intended to and did kill the first two persons he encountered, and the fact that the victim was not
predetermined does not alter the nature, conditions, or circumstances of the crime, for the reason that to cause the violent death of a human being
without any reasonable motive is always punishable with a more or less grave penalty according to the nature of the concurrent circumstances.

For the above reasons and in view of the fact that no mitigating circumstance is present to neutralize the effects of the aggravating ones, it is our
opinion that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed with costs provided however, that the penalty imposed on the culprit shall be
executed in accordance with the provisions of Acts. Nos. 451 and 1577, and that in the event of a pardon being granted he shall likewise be
sentenced to suffer the accessory penalties imposed by article 53 of the Penal Code. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34497 January 30, 1975
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BENJAMIN ONG y KHO and BIENVENIDO QUINTOS Y SUMALJAG, defendants-appellants.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

This is an automatic appeal from a decision of the Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District in Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-922 Rizal, dated
October 11, 1971, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Benjamin Ong y Kho and Bienvenido Quintos y Sumaljag, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Kidnapping with Murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 267 thereof, as charged in the Information, the
Court hereby sentences each one of them to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Henry Chua, the amount of
P12,000.00; to pay moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and another P50,000.00 as exemplary damages jointly and severally; and to pay
their proportionate share of the
costs.1

The information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, B. Jose Castillo against (1) Benjamin Ong y Kho, (2) Bienvenido Quintos y Sumaljag (3) Fernando
Tan, alias "Oscar Tan," and (4) Baldomero Ambrosio alias "Val", the latter two being then at large, reads: .

That on or about April 23 to April 24, 1971, inclusive, in the municipality of Parañaque, province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then private individuals, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and with treachery and known premeditation and for the purpose of killing one Henry Chua and
thereafter extorting money from his family through the use of a ransom note, kidnap(ped) and carry(ied) away said Henry Chua, initially by means of
a friendly gesture and later through the use of force, in an automobile, and later after having taken him to an uninhabited place in Caloocan City,
with the use of force detained him (Henry Chua) and kill(ed) him in the following manner to wit: The accused after gagging and tying up Henry Chua
and repeatedly threatening him with death, assured him that if he would write and sign a ransom note for the payment by his family of the sum of
$50,000.00 (US), he would not be killed and would be released upon receipt of the ransom money, but after said Henry Chua agreed and did execute
such a ransom note, he was again gagged and tied up by the accused, and thereafter stabbed in the abdominal region several times with an icepick,
inflicting upon him (Henry Chua) mortal wounds on his vital organs, which directly caused his death.

All contrary to law with the following generic aggravating circumstances:

(a) Evident premeditation;

(b) Grave abuse of confidence;
(c) Nighttime;
(d) Use of a motor vehicle;
(e) Use of superior strength; and
(f) Cruelty.2

Personal Circumstances of the Two

Appellants

At the time of the trial before the lower court in September of 1971, the accused Benjamin Ong was 31 years old, employed with the Acme Shoes,
Rubber and Plastic Corporation, a firm owned by his brother-in-law, Chua Pak, for the past 11 years, the last 6 of which was as an assistant manager.
He was already receiving a monthly salary of P1,800.00 excluding yearly bonuses of P30,000.00 and other representation allowances or a total
annual income of from P60,000.00 to P70,000.00. He had his elementary schooling at the Assumption Academy in San Fernando, Pampanga; his first
and second years of high school at Chiang Kai-shek High School in Manila; and his third and fourth years at the Mapua Institute of Technology. He
was a third year Commerce student, majoring in accounting at the University of the East, when he quit schooling in 1959. He married Athena Caw
Siu Tee Ong on November 25, 1962 at the St. Jude Catholic Church, by whom he already had four children: Connie Louis, 7 years old; Dennis, 5 years
old; Edgar, 3 years old; and Fanny, 1 year old.3

On the other hand, accused Bienvenido Quintos was 39 years old, single, an unlicensed surveyor and computer for two years already at the Robes
Francisco Realty Corporation with a relatively "small" income. He was a third year engineering student when he stopped studying. In 1954 he was
charged of Resisting Arrest and Assault Upon an Agent in Authority but this case was settled amicably.4

Brief Synopsis of the Testimony of

the Prosecutions Witnesses

The prosecution presented several witnesses to prove its charge of kidnapping with murder. First to testify was Patrolman Marciano Roque of the
Crimes against Property Division of the Detective Bureau of the Caloocan City Police Department who declared that: He knew Benjamin Ong for
about 6 years already because he usually investigated theft and robbery cases at the Acme Firm and at times received some money from Ong. In a
series of 6 meetings with Benjamin Ong starting from the first week of April, 1971, Benjamin Ong confided to him his plan to get a man who cheated
him in gambling by as much as P150,000; that he would ask for money from the latter's parents; and that after which, he would kill the victim.
Benjamin Ong's determination was shown when his godson was even introduced to him as one who would help him. Benjamin Ong brought him to
Barrio Makatipo in Novaliches, Caloocan City and described it as a suitable place where to bring the victim. Ong also told him that he had acquired a
bag, flashlight and a piece of cloth. He was prevailed upon by Benjamin Ong to participate in his plan assuring that he could resign from the
government service once the money is collected. Patrolman Roque revealed this plan to his Division Chief, Capt. Dueñas, the Officer-in-Charge, Lt.
Manapat and the Chief of Police, Celestino Rosea. However, the three did not believe that Benjamin Ong had the guts to do it. After the incident,
Patrolman Roque said that he and Police Chief Rosca met with Atty. Nestor Gonzales of the National Bureau of Investigation to supply the early
leads in this case although they did not find a trace of the crime when they went to Barrio Makatipo.5

Miss Ligaya Tamayo testified next. She declared that: She worked as an entertainer at the Wigwam Nightclub in Parañaque, Rizal and knew Henry
Chua very well. At around 1:30 o'clock in the early morning of April 24, 1971, she and Miss Mickie Yaro had Henry Chua and Benjamin Ong for their
guests. The two talked in Chinese and had some drinks. Benjamin Ong showed her a check in favor of Henry Chua which he claimed that the latter
won in a gambling game. She, however, did not actually see him give it. At around 1:30 that same morning, she accompanied the two to the door
and saw them leave the place and ride in a Mustang car.6

Sy Yap, older brother of Henry Chua, was the third witness. He testified that: He was with Atty. Nestor Gonzales and other agents of the NBI on
September 2, 1971 in Barrio Makatipo after Benjamin Ong pinpointed the place of burial, and there he saw the decomposing body of the victim
under the ground, immersed in water. He saw and identified the following personal effects found with the body: a white gold watch which stopped
at the hour of 6:22 and date of "24"; Driver's License No. 32219 with the name of Sy Sing Biok alias Henry Chua; Diner's card — Diner Group
0004149-1; pass issued by the Bureau of Customs for Henry Chua dated January 19, 1971; receipt for payment of the license of the car; residence
certificate; lighter; wallet; currencies in different denominations; shirt jacket; pair of shoes; socks; brief; undershirt; T-shirt; and trousers with a mark
"Especially tailored for Henry Chua, 2-2-71, No. 95812."7

Dr. Ricardo G. Ibarrola, Jr., Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI appeared as the fourth witness. He testified on his post mortem examination made on
September 2, 1971 at La Funeraria Paz, of the deceased Henry Chua, 31 years old, single, and on his necropsy report, Exhibit "M". He said that the
deceased sustained two wounds on the liver and large intestine caused by a long pointed cylindrical instrument similar to an icepick. He added that
most likely, the assailant was in front of and on a higher level than the victim. Although this did not appear in his report, he theorized that the two
wounds were not the immediate cause of death since there was only a slight degree of hemorrhage in the vicinity of the punctured wounds. He said
that the liver and large intestine had no sufficient time to bleed because something else must have happened which was the asphyxiation or
suffocation of the victim due to his burial.8 He stated, however, in his necropsy report, Exhibit "M", that the cause of death of the deceased was
"punctured wounds of the abdomen."

Miss Clarita Teh, travel agent of Skyways Travel Service located At Ongpin St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, declared that: At about 4:00 p.m. of April 22, 1971,
Benjamin Ong called her up by phone to ask for a reservation ticket for Hongkong and Taipei. On the morning of April 23, 1971, Benjamin Ong went
to her office but forgot to bring along his papers including his Alien Certificate of Registration. In the afternoon of April 24, 1971, Benjamin Ong went
back to the office, this time with the pertinent papers plus P4,000 cash. She said that he changed his destination from that of Hongkong and Taipei
to that of Canada. However, he needed P7,000 for this purpose. On April 29, 1971, Mrs. Ong got back the P4,000 because the latter said that her
husband did not have enough money. 9

Patrolman Gener S. Estrella, municipal policeman of Baliuag, Bulacan, followed next on the witness stand. He stated that on April 25, 1971, he was
on his tour of duty from 4:00 o'clock to 8:00 o'clock a.m. at the poblacion when he received information that an unidentified car was parked in a
gasoline station. He therefore sought the company of Patrolman Ceferino Castro and they went to Barrio Tibag where they saw the locked Mustang
car parked in a gasoline station with plate number 16-02B, L-P.C., series '71. They reported the matter to their head, Lt. Herminio Angeles. 10

Severo "Boy" Roslin, mechanic, gave the next testimony. He knew Fernando Tan since 1965. On April 29, 1971, early morning, he saw Fernando Tan
and another, introduced to him as Alfredo Hernandez, who happened to be Benjamin Ong. Fernando Tan requested him to bring them to the airport
and obtain airplane seats for the Visayas. He accompanied them but they failed in this endeavor so that they proceeded to the pier. Likewise, they
were frustrated in getting a passage to the South. They ended up taking a train ride to Lucena City. Roslin said that he went back to Manila that
same day. On May 1, 1971, he and Fernando Tan went to the house of Bienvenido Quintos near Abad Santos St. in Manila. They did not see him so
that they had to come back at noon. They then took him with them and, after passing by a laundry shop, they went to Singalong where they picked
up Benjamin Ong at around 7:00 p.m. Roslin claimed that they were using his Chevy car. They went to Barrio Balugo, Oas, Albay and stayed at his
parent's house. He, Quintos, and Tan stayed there for one half month where they took themselves into swimming at the river. They left Benjamin
Ong there. 11

Enrique Lacanilao, an NBI agent, testified that: Exhibits "N" and "O" are the voluntary written statements signed respectively by Benjamin Ong on
September 1, 1971 and by Bienvenido Quintos on September 3, 1971. He said that Benjamin Ong pinpointed to them the place of burial at Barrio
Makatipo, and Sy Yap was with them during the examination. They found the mouth of the victim gagged and his hands tied. It was in a state of
decomposition. The victim's body was facing downward with the buttocks protruding up. The hands were tied just above the chest while the feet
were far apart. The buttocks were one foot from the surface while the face was one and a half feet below facing down. There were no houses in the
area which he believed was the Araneta subdivision. He directed the reenactment of the crime. It appeared in their reenactment that Fernando Tan
and Bienvenido Quintos were the ones who grabbed Henry Chua from his Mustang car when Benjamin Ong was urinating; that the victim's mouth
was gagged while his hands were tied at the back; that during the making of the ransom note. Tan was holding the gun while Quintos was focusing
the flashlight; that afterwards, Henry Chua's hands were tied again, this time in front; that he was stabbed after he was made to lie down facing up;
that Baldomero Ambrosio and Bienvenido Quintos pulled the victim to the hole that Baldomero Ambrosio shovelled while Bienvenido Quintos held
the flashlight; that at the time the ransom note was being prepared Benjamin Ong was near the car, about 50 meters from the hole, so that his
person did not appear in the picture of the reenactment of this portion. Benjamin Ong was taken by the NBI into custody from the 2nd PC Zone on
September 1, 1971 at around 6:30 in the evening whereupon at 10:00 p.m. of that same night, his written testimony was taken down up to past
12:00 midnight. He had a small bandage around his wrists because of an attempted suicide on his part. Bienvenido Quintos, on the other hand, he
said, was arrested on September 3, 1971 and his extrajudicial statement was taken on the same day at around 7:00 or 8:00 p.m. 12

Diego H. Gutierrez, also an NBI agent, testified last for the prosecution. He identified Exhibits "Q" and "R" as the voluntary supplementary
extrajudicial statements respectively of Bienvenido Quintos and Benjamin Ong. Gutierrez' testimony focused on Bienvenido Quintos' admission that
the hole was dug and covered with fresh twigs after the group's second meeting at the Barrio Fiesta Restaurant. 13

Brief Synopsis of the Testimony of

the Witnesses for the Defense

The defense started the presentation of their evidence with the testimony of Dr. Mariano P. Lara, retired Chief Medico-Legal Officer of the Manila
Police Department. His testimony centered on the matter of asphyxiation. He said that asphyxiation as the possible cause of death was nowhere
reflected on the necropsy report of Dr. Ibarrola of the NBI; and that the death of the victim could have been due to shock as a result of the wounds
inflicted on him. 14

Rene Aguas, BIR examiner and first cousin of Bienvenido Quintos, then testified. He said that he went to the NBI on September 8, 1971 in order to
follow up the clearance papers of his deceased father. By coincidence, he discovered that Quintos was detained there, so, he tried to get in touch
with him. He gathered that Quintos was "okay" although later on the latter revealed that he was hurt also. 15
Artemio R. Quintos, an engineer and father of accused Bienvenido Quintos, followed next. He said that he visited his son on September 3, 1971
along with Atty. Bonicilla at around 7:00 p.m. at the NBI. The guard refused to tell him where his son was so that the following day, September 4, he
went back to the NBI in the morning as well as in the evening. Still he did not find his son. On September 5, he delivered clothes for the use of his
son to the jailer, Benjamin Laforteza and was issued a receipt therefor. On September 6, he brought a letter addressed to the Director of the NBI
requesting him that he be allowed to see his son. It was only on September 7, at 4:00 p.m. he claimed, that he met his son. He said that Bienvenido
Quintos showed to him his stomach with some bluish discoloration at the navel. On that day, he also received his son's dirty clothes and found
bloodstains on it. 16

Bienvenido Quintos then took the witness stand. He revealed that he came to know Fernando Tan when they were still in Dagupan City long time
ago. He said that he was invited on April 23, 1971 by Fernando Tan and that they met at around 7:00 p.m. of that day. They proceeded to the Barrio
Fiesta Restaurant in Caloocan City where he was introduced to Benjamin Ong and Baldomero Ambrosio for the first time. At 9:00 p.m., they went to
Brown Derby Supper Club in Quezon City after which they proceeded to Amihan Nightclub at around 10:30 p.m. at Roxas Boulevard. He, Fernando
Tan, and Baldomero Ambrosio were left in the car. Later, Benjamin Ong went out of the Amihan Nightclub and took Fernando Tan with him.
Fernando Tan returned and after a while he was invited to the nearby Wigwam Nightclub. They hurriedly left the place and Fernando Tan took the
front seat of the Biscayne car while he took the back seat and followed a certain car. When that car stopped, he saw Benjamin Ong vomitting.
Fernando Tan and Baldomero Ambrosio went down and Fernando Tan pulled out his gun. The victim was dragged and forced into the rear part of
their car. The victim's hands and feet were tied by Baldomero Ambrosio while the mouth was gagged by Fernando Tan with a flannel cloth.
Bienvenido Quintos made clear in his testimony that the victim was lying on his back inside the car so that his face was up and his hands were on his
breast. Fernando Tan then threatened him with his gun should he not cooperate with them. At Barrio Makatipo, the victim laid down on the ground
and Benjamin Ong got the shovel and flashlight and gave them to Fernando Tan. The victim was made to walk a little distance and then lie down
again face up. Benjamin Ong gave to Fernando Tan an icepick who then gave it to Baldomero Ambrosio and in turn gave it to him. He refused to stab
the victim so that he returned it to Fernando Tan who made the actual stabbing on the victim's chest twice. According to him, there was already a
hole in that place. He also claimed that Exhibit "O" was not a voluntary statement of his and that he was maltreated by more or less 5 men. He said
that he went to Oas, Albay on May 1, 1971 but that he was never contacted by the group between April 24 and 30. At a certain point during the
proceedings, the court suspended his testimony for about 15 minutes after he complained of an aching head. 17

Benjamin Ong testified last for the defense. He related that Henry Chua was a friend and that they were slightly related to each other. He felt that he
was cheated because he was the only one who continuously lost in their mahjong sessions. Henry Chua's group, including Ko King Pin, Go Bon Kin
and Marcelo Tanlimco went to his office and humiliated him there. On April 21, 1971, Henry Chua called him up by phone and invited him to the
Amihan Nightclub where he could settle the gambling debt. He admitted responsibility for Henry Chua's death but emphasized that his purpose was
merely to kill him. He added that nothing was taken from the body of the victim. He asked the assistance of Fernando Tan and Baldomero Ambrosio
who merely drove the car. He denied the testimony of Patrolman Marciano Roque regarding his revelation of his plan. He believed that Henry Chua
knew that he had a grudge against him during that fatal day. He waited for them to dig and cover the hole which took about one hour and a half
after the stabbing. He attempted suicide by slashing his wrist 7 or 8 times while he was still in the custody of the P.C. at Camp Vicente Limin Laguna.
He was also brought by the NBI to the Salem Motel where he was investigated from 8:30 in the evening up to 5:30 in the morning of the next day.
Exhibit "N", his extrajudicial statement, was taken while he was groggy and very weak. He likewise pinpointed the grave. At a certain juncture during
Benjamin Ong's testimony, his counsel sought the court's permission to exclude the public from the hearing because Ong's wife would testify on
something that would constitute a "great shame" to their family. Benjamin Ong, however, refused to go ahead with said testimony. Benjamin Ong
further claimed that he decided to kill Henry Chua on April 23, 1971. He was hurt by the threatening words on the part of the victim which
humiliated him and, as such, he was forced to resign from his job. He went to the Skyways Travel Service only after the incident. He, however,
changed his destination and wanted to go instead to Canada and Europe. The reason why he was not able to pursue his departure was because Sy
Yap called him up and asked him about his brother's whereabouts so that he seriously felt that the authorities were already after him. He left Manila
on April 29, 1971 and went to Legaspi City with Fernando Tan but found no acquaintance there so that they went back to Manila. It was Fernando
Tan who contacted Boy Roslin and Bienvenido Quintos after which they went to Oas, Albay and stayed there for about two to three days. He hid
himself on top of the mountain with an old man. Furthermore, he said that Henry Chua was aware that he resented him. Benjamin Ong likewise
denied having called Fernando Tan at anytime, to come in with him to the nightclub. 18

Non-Conflicting Facts

Non-conflicting facts, as shown in the testimonies of the accused and witnesses in open court, and reiterated in the respective briefs of the parties,
are as follows: For more or less one year and a half prior to the dreadful incident, the accused Benjamin Ong used to play mahjong with the
deceased Henry Chua and the latter's companions, Ko King Pin, Go Bon Kim (sic) and Marcelo Tanlimco. In those sessions he lost substantially that at
one time, it amounted to as much as P150,000.00. He suspected that he lost in unfair games and was completely cheated by Henry Chua and the
latter's companions, who made things worse by pressing him to pay his gambling debt with a threat of bodily harm upon his person and that of his
family. The deceased and his companions embarrassed Benjamin Ong, incident after incident, especially when they went time and again to Benjamin
Ong's office at the Acme Shoes, Rubber and Plastic Corporation to confront him. The extent of his embarrassment was made manifest by the fact
that he had to resign from his job.

On April 21, 1971, Henry Chua repeated his demands for early settlement of his gambling debt and, as such, invited Benjamin Ong to see him on
April 23, 1971 at the Amihan Nightclub and bring with him the money owed (P50,000.00). That same day that Henry Chua phoned Benjamin Ong,
the latter contacted and sought the assistance of Fernando Tan, a technical supervisor also of the Acme Firm. Benjamin Ong told Fernando Tan
about his grudge and plans against Henry Chua in order to avenge the embarrassment and humiliation he suffered before the eyes of his
subordinates.

Fernando Tan, who incidentally, owed Benjamin Ong his job19, was very accommodating and he shared Ong's feelings against Henry Chua. And,
according to Benjamin Ong, Tan said "Why not just kill him." 20 Tan immediately contacted Baldomero Ambrosia, Benjamin Ong's godson in
marriage and a former Acme employee, and likewise called upon his boyhood friend Bienvenido Quintos at the latter's office at the Robes Francisco
Realty Corporation.

On April 23, 1971, the four met at the Barrio Fiesta Restaurant in Caloocan City and finalized their plan to liquidate Henry Chua. The group, riding in
Benjamin Ong's Biscayne car, then went to the Amihan Nightclub and arrived there at past nine o'clock in the evening. The two, Benjamin Ong and
Henry Chuamet there and had a couple of drinks. Benjamin Ong asked for patience and leniency with regard to his indebtedness and ample time for
its settlement.

From the Amihan the two went to the nearby Wigwam Nightclub where they tabled two hostesses Ligaya Tamayo and Mickie Yaro and had some
more drinks. At around 1:30 a.m. of the following day, April 24, 1971, the duo left the place and rode in Henry's Mustang car. Fernando Tan,
Bienvenido Quintos and Baldomero Ambrosio riding in Ong's Biscayne car, followed the couple down Roxas Boulevard, then to Quiapo and Quezon
Boulevard Extension in Quezon City where, after passing the Sto. Domingo Church, they made a turn towards a dirt road leading to Del Monte
Avenue. When they reached a dark and secluded place, Benjamin Ong urged Chua to stop the car in order to urinate, to which the latter obliged. It
was at this time that the Biscayne car arrived and stopped in front of the Mustang car whereupon Fernando Tan and Baldomero Ambrosio alighted
with a flashlight and pretended to be policemen. Fernando Tan poked his gun at Henry Chua and pulled him down from his Mustang car with
Baldomero Ambrosio giving him help. They then guided and forced him inside the rear part of the Biscayne. He was made to lie, face up. His hands
were tied and his mouth gagged with a flannel cloth. Fernando Tan and Bienvenido Quintos then rested their feet on him. Baldomero Ambrosio
drove the Biscayne while Benjamin Ong drove the Mustang and followed them from behind.

The group took Del Monte Avenue, Roosevelt Avenue, and then E. de los Santos Avenue, right to the North Diversion Road, and right again to
Novaliches until they reached a deserted place that looked like an idle subdivision in Barrio Makatipo, Novaliches, Caloocan City. It was here that
Henry Chua was stabbed twice with an icepick, allegedly by Fernando Tan, and buried there with all his belongings with him consisting of a Piaget
watch, lighter, wallet containing P50 bills, driver's license, diner's card, etc.

After this, the group proceeded to Barrio Tibag, Baliuag, Bulacan with Benjamin Ong and Fernando Tan on the Mustang. There they left it locked
near a gasoline station. The foursome then regrouped in the Biscayne and proceeded back to Caloocan City where they separated at about 7:00
o'clock in the morning.

On August 29, 1971, somewhere in Barrio Balugo, Oas, Albay, Benjamin Ong was arrested by operatives of the 2nd PC Zone and later turned over to
the NBI. On the other hand, Bienvenido Quintos was apprehended on September 2, 1971 in his residence at Tayabas St., in Sta. Cruz, Manila by
members of the MPD and later turned over to the NBI also.

Important Points of Conflict

The prosecution adds more to what the defense claims and conflicts appear in various instances. One such instance was the testimony of the first
prosecution witness, Patrolman Marciano Roque of Caloocan City, to the effect that one month or so before the execution of the crime, Benjamin
Ong solicited his help in consummating his plan. Patrolman Roque testified that he tried his best to convince Benjamin Ong to desist but to no avail.
It was this witness who revealed Benjamin Ong's plan to ask for money from the rich family of the deceased and, with said money, he, Roque, could
already resign from his job should he participate. 21

In his testimony before the lower court, Benjamin Ong vehemently denied having revealed such plan to the witness. 22 However, in his brief,
accused Benjamin Ong claims that this testimony if ever there was such, does not reveal his intention to kill Henry Chua that early. At most, he said,
it was a mere "infantile thought of wishing someone dead" and no more. 23

On this point, counsel for the accused Ong, argued as follows in their well-written brief:

Pat. Roque has not categorically asserted that he was a friend of Benjamin Ong. They came to know each other when he, as a policeman,
investigated theft and robbery cases on the complaint of the Acme Shoe and Rubber Corporation where Benjamin Ong worked as Assistant
Manager. (pp. 5-7, t.s.n., Sept. 16, 1971) As so why Benjamin would reveal a plan to kidnap another to a policeman, in the absence of a close and
long association, is just too incredible to merit belief. Pat. Roque said that Benjamin Ong "confided to me that I am the only person whom he can
trust so he further enumerated a detail that he intended to get a money and ask for the money from the parents of the victim. (Id., p. 10) As to why
he merited the trust of Benjamin Ong, he did not say.

Pat. Marciano Roque said that he has no criminal record (Id., p. 42). He has not conveyed to Benjamin Ong any information that he is a gun for hire
(Id., p. 43), nor does he have that reputation (Id., p. 43). If he were a criminal or he had a reputation as a professional killer, it is perhaps possible for
one in Benjamin Ong's position to have made the proposition to him. Moreover, when he was cross-examined on the alleged intention to collect
ransom, he committed material contradictions such as to raise serious doubt on the veracity of his testimony. He could not categorically assert
whether the alleged intention of Benjamin Ong was to kill the victim first and demand money from his parents after, or detain him first, and after
receiving ransom money, kill the victim.

ATTY. QUISUMBING:

Q Your testimony is as follows: that he told you that after demanding the money to kill the man, you remember that?
A That was what he said.
Q In other words, this was not the way he told you, that he would grab the man so that he could get the money by extortion or by ransom?
A He said that after having in his possession his intended victim he would demand some money from his parents.
Q I will recall in your direct testimony ... you said that afterwards if he could get the money he will kill the man, that was your first testimony,
which is correct?
A He lost one hundred fifty thousand.
Q And he needed money and so he would demand money from the father or parents of the victim, is that not your testimony?
A Yes, sir.
Q And afterwards he wanted to kill the man?
A No, sir.
Q And so what is your testimony now?
A After he got the man he will demand money from the parents or ransom money from the parents of the victim.
Q So it is the other way. He first would kill the man and afterwards get the money.

ATTY. DE SANTOS

The question is misleading.

COURT:

Answer.

WITNESS:
A No, sir, he said that after receiving the money the man may be killed.
Q Is that your testimony? That he will kill the victim or the victim may be killed?
A No, sir.
Q So which is which?
A He will kill the victim.
Q After getting the money?
A Yes sir. (pp. 38-41, t.s.n., Sept. 16, 1971)

Another point of conflict is the claim of the prosecution that a ransom note was indeed written and copied by Henry Chua from a prepared note
before the latter was ice-picked and buried. It appears that co-accused Bienvenido Quintos stated in his supplementary extrajudicial statement
before the NBI that:

Yes sir. After we have brought victim some meters away from the road, FERNANDO TAN ordered victim to lie face down on the ground at the same
(time) he untied victim and removed the gag while his gun was still pointed at the head of Victim. Thereafter he ordered the victim to copy a
prepared ransom note in a piece of yellow paper. I saw the figure $50,000.00 because I was holding then the flashlight. It was only after the ransom
note was written and was submitted to BENJAMIN ONG that FERNANDO TAN returned to us. 24

This is hearsay as against Benjamin Ong. And Ong vehemently denied the same in his testimony in open court when he said upon questioning:

Q In this statement Exhibit "N", you admitted that Henry Chua was taken from the Mustang car and transferred to the Viscain (sic) car and
then brought to that uninhabited place in Barrio Makatipo; what was your purpose in having the late Henry Chua taken from his car and brought to
Makatipo?
A My purpose was just to kill him, and there is (sic) not going to be any delay.
Q Was there any purpose of detaining him for sometime?

xxx xxx xxx

A No, there was no purpose to detain him any further. 25

Also, in his extrajudicial statement, he said:

Q When you hatched the plan to kill HENRY CHUA, did it ever occur to you to demand or ask for any ransom money from the family of
HENRY CHUA?

A Never, the question of ransom money never entered my mind? 26

Admittedly, no such genuine ransom note was received by the family of the deceased. Undoubtedly, its presence in the crime could aggravate it,
allowing the imposition of the capital punishment of death. 27

Also conflicting is the matter of Bienvenido Quintos' participation at the time Henry Chua was dragged into the Biscayne car. The briefs of both
parties tend to show that it was Fernando Tan and Baldomero Ambrosio who pulled Henry Chua out of his Mustang car, forced him into the
Biscayne car, tied and gagged him. 28 However, Agent Lacanilao testified that in the reenactment of the crime it was shown that Bienvenido Quintos
and Fernando Tan were the ones who dragged Henry Chua out of his car. 29 Added to this is the claim of Benjamin Ong that Baldomero Ambrosio
merely drove the Biscayne for the
group. 30

The prosecution likewise claims in its brief that as early as a week before the incident, the group already chose a site and prepared a hole where to
bury Henry Chua; 31 that this group was in constant search of the victim along the nightclub row in Roxas Boulevard during the succeeding evenings
but failed to see him; 32 that a day before the unfortunate evening, Ong contacted Miss Clarita Teh of the Skyways Travel Service at Ongpin St., Sta.
Cruz, Manila, and asked for a booking for Hongkong and Taipei, and deposited P4,000.00 therein. 33 Similarly, it is alleged that on April 29, 1971, a
few days after the incident, Tan and Ong contacted Severo "Boy" Roslin, a long-time friend of Tan, to help them obtain airplane seats for the Visayas,
but they failed; 34 that they also proceeded to the pier to seek passage to the South on a boat but they were likewise frustrated; 35 that instead,
they took a train ride to Lucena City where Roslin left them and after which, they continued to Legaspi City; 36 that finding no acquaintance there,
they went back to Manila; 37 that on May 1, 1971, Tan again engaged Roslin's services and with the latter driving his car, they picked up Quintos and
Ong and went to Barrio Balugo, Oas, Albay and stayed there in the house of Roslin's parents; 38 that Ong was left there while Roslin, Tan and
Quintos went back to Manila. 39

A reenactment of the crime was had by Benjamin Ong, Bienvenido Quintos and some NBI and MPD agents who played the role of their co-accused
Fernando Tan and Baldomero Ambrosio. 40

The trial of this case in the lower court proceeded with commendable speed, although separate trials for the two accused who had been arrested so
far at that time were held upon the latter's request. Both entered a plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged upon arraignment on September 4,
1971. However, in the case of Benjamin Ong, he invoked the doctrine laid down in the case of People vs. Yturriaga 41 to the extent that the
prosecution should not nullify the mitigating circumstance of a plea of guilty, by counteracting it with "unfounded allegations" of aggravating
circumstances in the information. In other words, he admitted his guilt in so far as the crime of simple murder was concerned. 42

Before this Court, the accused Benjamin Ong maintains that:

The Court a quo erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of kidnapping with murder because —
(a) There was no evidence offered against the accused which would prove that the crime of kidnapping was committed at all;
(b) Kidnapping cannot be complexed with murder;
(c) In those cases where the Supreme Court convicted the accused of Kidnapping with Murder, there was shown an intention to deprive the
victim of his liberty, and it was held that the kidnapping was a necessary means to commit the crime of murder.

II

The court a quo erred in finding that the killing of the deceased was attended by the generic aggravating circumstances of —
(a) Abuse of superior strength;
(b) Nighttime;
(c) Uninhabited place;
(d) Abuse of confidence;
(e) Use of motor vehicle; and
(f) Cruelty.

and the qualifying circumstances of —

(a) Alevosia
(b) Evident premeditation.

III

Assuming that the killing of Henry Chua was attended by the aggravating circumstance of alevosia, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength and nighttime, if present, are absorbed by treachery.

IV

The court a quo erred in not appreciating (a) plea of guilty, and (b) circumstances of a similar nature or analogous to Article 13, paragraphs 1 to 9 of
the Revised Penal Code as mitigating.

The court a quo erred in imposing the death penalty upon the accused.

VI

The court a quo erred in sentencing the accused to pay excessive damages. 43

For his part, the accused Bienvenido Quintos argues that:

1. The lower court erred in giving full weight and credit to the extrajudicial statement of the defendant-appellant.
2. The lower court erred in not finding that there was no conspiracy between defendant-appellant Bienvenido Quintos and the other
accused.
3. The lower court erred in not acquitting defendant-appellant Bienvenido Quintos. 44

OUR RULING
The Evidence on the Alleged Writing of a Ransom Note is Insufficient to Support a Finding in Favor of the Prosecution:

First, Benjamin Ong vehemently denied asking for ransom.

In the extrajudicial statement of Benjamin Ong, he was asked this question: "Q. When you hatched the plan to kill HENRY CHUA, did it ever occur to
you to demand or ask for any ransom money from the family of HENRY CHUA?" to which he answered: "Never, the question of ransom money never
entered my mind." (Question No. 5, Exh. N.)

Secondly, no ransom note was presented as evidence by the prosecution, nor did the latter show that a demand for money was made upon the
family of the victim. In the case of People vs. Manzanero, Jr.45, We held:

Furthermore, what could have been the motive for the kidnapping? According to the trial court, the ransom money was needed by Manzanero to
defray the huge expenses for the day-to-day living of his lawful wife and seven children, and of his mistress and his five children by her, and his
repair shop that was earning only about P1,000 monthly could hardly meet the salaries of his 16 workers and mechanics. But is it credible that
Manzanero, "being the intelligent and shrewd man that he appears to be," according to the trial court, could even have entertained the illusion that
the kidnapping that he was to perpetrate so clumsily and amateurishly would he profitable to him, and he could escape from criminal prosecution?
And what is strange is, if the ransom note was indeed written why was it never presented in evidence? The claim that it was lost is unbelievable.
That ransom note, if it ever existed, was the most important piece of evidence that could support the prosecution's theory that the kidnapping was
for ransom. Certainly, that piece of evidence should be kept and preserved. No plausible explanation was given how that ransom note got lost.
Neither the father nor mother of Floresita was made to testify regarding the alleged ransom note.

Moreover, if ransom was the purpose of the kidnapping, why did Manzanero so easily, and without apparent reason, give up his alleged criminal
enterprise, when he could have pursued it to a successful end? If there was really that ransom note, and that ransom note was sent the most logical
thing that Manzanero would have doing was to send instructions to Floresita's family on how, when, and to whom the ransom money should be
delivered. There is no evidence that Manzanero ever made any follow up in order to get the ransom.

Furthermore, barely two days after the alleged kidnapping for ransom, Manzanero, without having obtained even part of the ransom money,
released Floresita. Would a kidnapper, as Manzanero was alleged to be, readily release the victim without realizing his purpose? (Emphasis Supplied)

Thirdly, the extrajudicial statement of accused Quintos wherein he stated that Fernando Tan ordered Henry Chua to prepare a ransom note wherein
he saw the figure $50,000.00, is tainted with serious doubts due to the apparent maltreatment that Quintos received from the NBI and MPD men on
September 3, 1971. 46 The medical certificates and case record 47 issued by the Philippine General Hospital support the findings and remark of the
examining physician, Dr. Florencio Lucero, that in the person of accused Quintos, "intramascular hematoma is evident." Besides, it is hearsay and
therefore incompetent evidence against Benjamin Ong. And in the reenactment, as testified to by NBI agent Lacanilao, while the ransom note was
being prepared, Benjamin Ong was about 50 meters away from the place where the note was being prepared.

Fourthly, although both parties in their briefs agree that the victim's hands were tied after he was shoved into the rear floor of the Biscayne car,
neither makes a categorical claim that the hands were tied at his back. In fact Acting Solicitor General Hector C. Fule submits in his brief that the
victim was made to lie down "face up". 48 This leads to the conclusion that the rope around the victim's hands was never removed at any instance
up to the time that he was buried and exhumed. This discounts the idea that before the victim was made to copy a prepared ransom note, the
hands at his back were tied, and after the writing, his hands were again tied, this time in front. Bienvenido Quintos in open court positively stated
that the victim was made to lie on his back inside the car and his bands tied on his breast. 49 The contrary evidence on this point are those of Agent
Lacanilao on the reenactment of the crime which was based on the extra-judicial statement of Bienvenido Quintos. 50 However, as shown above,
this statement is of dubious veracity.

Finally, that appellants never intended to make money out of the murder of Henry Chua, can be clearly deduced from the fact that Chua was buried
with everything in his person; and during the exhumation of his body, his brother, Sy Yap Chua, identified the articles found in the body of the
deceased, such as a Piaget watch worth around P10,000.00 (Exh. B), a wallet together with money, with P50 bills and other denominations.
In the light of the foregoing facts and circumstances, We cannot give any credence to the testimony of Patrolman Roque that about the first week of
April, 1971, Benjamin Ong confided to him his plan to get a man who cheated him in gambling by as much as P150,000.00; that he would ask for
money from the latter's parents and after which he would kill the victim. And the facts brought out on cross examination of this witness, which We
have discussed earlier, show the incredibility of Ong confiding to Patrolman Roque his criminal intention, particularly, his intention to ask money
from the parents of the intended victim. As a matter of fact, this witness, on cross examination, got lost, so to speak, on the point of whether
according to Ong, he would first kill the intended victim and demand money from his parents afterwards, or detain him first and, after receiving a
ransom money, kill the victim. Furthermore, from the first week of April, 1971, when this intention was allegedly revealed by Ong to this witness,
Ong could have changed his mind with respect to the demand for money when the victim was actually taken and killed in the early morning of April,
1971.

There was no Kidnapping to Make the Crime a

Complex one of kidnapping the Murder

The extrajudicial confession (Exhibit N) of accused Benjamin Ong was affirmed and confirmed by him in open court, thus:

Q I show you this document marked as Exhibit "N", statement of Benjamin Ong, dated September 1, 1971, do you admit that this is your
statement given to the NBI?

A Yes, sir.

Q In this statement, Exhibit "N", you admitted that Henry Chua was taken from the Mustang car and transferred to the Biscayne car and then
brought to the uninhabited place in Barrio Makatipo, what was your purpose in having the late Henry Chua taken from his car and brought to
Makatipo?

A My purpose was just to kill him, and there is not going to be any delay.

Q Was there any purpose of detaining him for sometime?

A No, there was no purpose to detain him any further.

And the evidence on record shows clearly that the deceased Henry Chua and Benjamin Ong left the Wigwam Nightclub at Parañaque, at about 1:30
a.m. on April 24, 1971, in the car of Chua. Chua went voluntarily with Ong, so much so that Chua himself drove his car. They were already in Del
Monte Avenue, near the place in Caloocan where Chua was killed and buried when they tied the hands of the deceased; that there were still
disagreement among the four accused on who would kill the deceased, until finally it was the co-accused Fernando Tan who stabbed him with an
icepick; and that the four accused, including two others, parted from each other at 7:00 o'clock in the early morning of April 24, 1971 after they
brought the car of Chua and left it in Bo. Tibag, Baliuag, Bulacan.

In view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, We hold that there was no kidnapping, but only murder, because the detention of Chua was only
incidental to the main objective of murdering him and was not a necessary means for the commission of the murder. From the Commentaries on
the Revised Penal Code of Justice Aquino, an acknowledged authority in criminal law, We find the following:

If the detention of the victim is only incidental to the main objective of murdering him, and is not a necessary means for the commission of the
murder, the crime is only murder and not the complex one of murder through kidnapping. In the Guerrero case, the accused Huks brought to the
mountain two persons, father and son. The father was killed. The son, a 14-year old minor, was above to escape on the second night following his
detention. HELD: The accused were guilty of murder as to the father and kidnapping as to the son.

In a 1902 case, the victim was taken from his house and then brought to an uninhabited place, where he was murdered. HELD: The crime was
murder only. There was no illegal detention "since it does not appear that it was the purpose of the accused to commit this offense. The primary
objective was to kill the victim.

Where after the robbery committed in a house, three of its inmates were taken to a place near the river one kilometer from the house, where they
were killed, the kidnapping was deemed absorbed in the crime of robbery with homicide.

Where the appellants kidnapped the victim at his house at Avilos Street, Manila and forded him to ride in a car, but while the car was at the
intersection of Libertad Street, Pasay City, the victim jumped from the car and was shot to death, the crime was held to be murder only. (I Revised
Penal Code by Justice Aquino).

And We quote from the brief of appellant Ong:

The crime committed was only murder. —

As early as the case of US vs. Nicolas Ancheta, et al. (No. 422, March 14, 1902; 1 Phil. 165), it was held that where the accused kidnapped the victim,
Ventura Quinto, took him to a place called Radap and there by order of Nicolas Ancheta and Sebastian Dayag, the victim was killed, the crime
committed by them was murder. The acts committed by the accused do not constitute the crime of illegal detention since the deceased was
captured in his house and taken by the accused to an uninhabited place selected by them for the purpose of killing them there. (At p. 169). In the
case of US vs. Teodoro de Leon (No. 522), March 10, 1902; 1 Phil. 163), there was a demand for the payment of ransom. Nevertheless, the accused
was found guilty not of kidnapping with murder but of murder only. In this case, the deceased, Don Julio Banson was forcibly removed from his
house by Fabian Tolome, by order of Teodoro de Leon. He was tortured and maltreated by the defendant until they arrived at a place called
Bulutong. "Not satisfied with torturing the deceased by himself he (Teodoro de Leon) ordered Tolome to give him a blow upon the chest with a bolo.
Don Julio begging for mercy, the defendant sent one of his servants to the wife of the deceased to ask for $1,000.00 for his ransom. After the
servant had been sent all were led to a place called Cosme and upon arriving there the defendant ordered Fabian and Tomome to conduct Don Julio
to a ditch. At the same time the witness and his three companions were given their liberty by the defendant, who remained with his two
companions and with Don Julio. Don Julio was never afterwards seen alive and his headless body was found two or three days later in this same
place." The accused was found guilty of the crime of murder. Similarly, in the case of US vs. Emiliano Cajayon, et al. (No. 981, Oct. 8, 1903; 2 Phil.
570) twelve armed men kidnapped Tranquilino Torres and took him with them to the barrio Maliig in the town of Lubang, Cavite province, where
they killed him and buried him in a hole dug for that purpose. It was held that the crime committed was murder. The pertinent facts of the case are
stated briefly as follows: About 20 armed men forced their way into the house of Felix Marin, made him and his son prisoners, and carried them off
with their arms tied behind their backs. From there they proceeded to the house of the head man of the barrio which they set on fire, and after
capturing all the inmates, brought them to an estero called the "Pasig" where they set all prisoners free, except Felix Marin and Isabel Beltran. These
two they took away in a boat and carried to a clump of manglares, at the edge of the estero, where Maris still bound, was decapitated by one of the
band with a single stroke of a bolo. Isabel Beltran was set free. It will be noted that as to Isabel Beltran, the son of Felix Maris and the others, who
were made prisoners, there was deprivation of liberty. Nevertheless, the accused was found guilty of murder, and not of kidnapping with murder. In
the case of People vs. Magno Quinto, et al. (L-1963, Dec. 22, 1948; 82 Phil. 467), it was established that Gregorio Caling was picked up at his home in
Floridablanca, Pampanga by a band of Hukbalahap on the night of December 9, 1945 and taken to the bank of the Gumain River, Gregorio Caling
was investigated in connection with his arms, maltreated, and subsequently killed. The judgment finding him guilty of murder was affirmed. In the
case of People vs. Juan Bulatao (L-2186, Jan. 29, 1949; 82 Phil. 743), one Jose Tan was forcibly taken by four armed men, among them the accused.
The following morning, the victim was found dead. It was also held that the accused was guilty of murder. In the case of People vs. Eufracio Lansang
(L-1187, Jan. 25, 1949; 82 Phil. 662) the accused who participated in the kidnapping of the victim who was thereafter killed was found guilty as an
accomplice in the crime of murder. The case of People vs. Alejandro Mendiola, et al. (L-1642, Jan. 29, 1949; 82 Phil. 740) is more significant. In this
case the Supreme Court said:

"The circumstances of the case, as proved by the evidence, lead us to the conclusion that each and everyone of appellant took part with Taciano V.
Rizal in a conspiracy to kidnap as they did Teofilo Ampil and they are all equally responsible for his killing, which was perpetrated in accordance with
the plan of the kidnappers. Once the kidnapping has been decided, the authors necessarily had to entertain the killing as one of the means of
accomplishing the purposes of kidnapping.

"The three appellants were correctly found by the trial court guilty as authors of the crime of murder ..."

In the case of People vs. Francisco Moreno (L-2335, March 7, 1950; 85 Phil. 731), several armed men went to the house of Manuel Artates in barrio
Pogoncile Aguilar, Pangasinan, and took him to the Marapudo Mountains in Mangatarem where, he together with one Jose Jasmin, was beheaded.
Thereafter, "the defendant Francisco cautioned all the men who took part in or witnessed the execution as well as the kidnapping of the two men
not to reveal to anyone what they had seen that night under penalty of punishment." The decision of the trial court finding the appellant guilty of
murder was affirmed. In the case of People vs. Alfredo Riparip, et al.(L-2408, May 31, 1950; 85 Phil. 526), one Enrique Roldan was on December 27,
1944 kidnapped and on the following day killed by certain guerilla units. The accused were found guilty of the crime of murder. In People vs.
Gaudencio Villapa, et al. (L-4259, April 30, 1952; 91 Phil. 189), the deceased Federico Agonias was taken by the accused from the house of Guillermo
Calixto in barrio San Marcelino, Balugao, Pangasinan, and he was killed about 50 meters from the house. They were found guilty of murder. In
People vs. Emeterio Sarata, et al. (L-3544, April 18, 1952; 91 Phil. 111), it appeared that the four accused took the victim Sabiano Bucad from his
house, placed him in a banca and sailed towards the opposite shore of the Bato lake where the victim was maltreated and killed by the accused. It
was held that the crime committed was murder. In the case of People vs. Eligio Camo and Buenaventura Manzanido (L-4741, May 7, 1952; 91 Phil.
240), the accused took the deceased Patricio Matundan from his house in the barrio of Conda to the barrio of Talaan, both of the Municipality of
Sariaya, Quezon. Upon reaching a place near the mangroves, the group stopped, and accused Camo shot and killed the victim. The accused were
charged with the crime of murder with kidnapping. The Supreme Court held:

"The Solicitor-General next contends that the offense committed was the complex crime of kidnapping with murder. Again, we are inclined to agree
with the trial court that the crime committed was simple murder. It is true that Patricio was taken from his home but it was not for detaining him
illegally for any length of time or for the purpose of obtaining ransom for his release. In quite a number of cases decided by this court where the
victim was taken directly from his house to the place where he was killed, kidnapping was not considered to raise the offense to the category of a
complex." (At p. 246)

In People vs. Nestorio Remalante (L-3512, Sept. 26, 1952; 92 Phil. 48), the accused with about 10 armed men met Mercedes Tobias, accompanied by
Eusebio Gerilla and Lucia Pilo, on the way to her home in the barrio of Guiarona, municipality of Dagami, Province of Leyte. The accused took hold of
Mercedes Tobias and dragged her, while at the same time striking her with the butt of his rifle at different parts of her body. Eusebio Gerilla and
Lucia Pilo saw Mercedes being dragged towards the sitio of Sawahan. Hardly had they walked one kilometer when they heard gun reports. The
following day, Mercedes was found dead in Sawahan with two gunshot wounds. Nestorio Remalante was charged and found guilty by the trail court
of the crime of kidnapping with murder. As to the charge of kidnapping, the Supreme Court held:

"There is no sufficient evidence of intention of kidnap because from the moment Mercedes Tobias was held and dragged to the time when the gun
reports were heard nothing was done or said by the appellant or his confederates to show or indicates that the captors intended to deprive her of
her liberty for sometimes and for some purposes and thereafter set her free or kill her. The interval was so short as to negative the idea implied in
kidnapping. Her short detention and ill-treatment are included or form part of the perpetration of the crime." (at p. 51)

In the case of the People vs. Silvino Guerrero, et al., (L-9559, May 14, 1958; 103 Phil. 1136, Unrep), the appellants were found guilty for the murder
of Candido Disengano and the kidnapping of Paulo Disengano. As tot he killing of Candido Disengano, it was held:

"As the court a quo has correctly held, appellants cannot be convicted of the complex crime of kidnapping with murder under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, for the reason the kidnapping was not a necessary means to commit the murder. Candido was detained and brought to the
mountains to be killed — this we have held may not be considered kidnapping with murder but mere murder. (People v. Camo, G.R. No. L-4741, May
7, 1952; People vs. Remalante G.R. No. L-3512, 48 O.G. 3881-3883; People v. Villapa, et al., G.R. No. L-4259, April 30, 1952) [13 Velayo's Digest (new
series) 337; please see also 103 Phil. 1136]"

In People vs. Santos Umali, et al., (L-8860-70, January 23, 1957; 100 Phil. 1095 Unrep.), the accused were charge and convicted by the trial court of
kidnapping with murder. The evidence shows that the deceased was killed in front of this house. The crime committed is only murder. (13 Velayo's
Digest [New Series], p. 340).

In People vs. Cenon Serrano alias Peping, et al., (L-7973, April 27, 1959; 105 Phil. 531), the accused were charged with illegal detention with murder.
After a drinking spree, the accused, Cenon Serrano, suggested to the deceased Pablo Navarro to leave Bacolor, Pangpanga for San Fernando for a
good time, to which suggestion the latter agreed. While the victim together with the accused Cenon Serrano and others were on the way to San
Fernando, Cenon Serrano suggested that they proceed to Angeles for a good time to which Pablo Navarro agreed. Upon reaching barrio San Isidro,
Cenon Serrano ordered the driver to proceed to barrio Dolores, Bacolor, Pampanga where the deceased was detained and questioned at the
stockade of the civilian guards. That same afternoon, Pablo Navarro was taken out of the stockade and was brought to sitio Castilang Malati where
the deceased was shot and killed. The trial court found the defendants guilty of the crime of murder. The decision was affirmed by the Supreme
Court. In People vs. Rosario Lao, et al. (L-10473, January 28, 1961; 1 SCRA 42), one Rosa Baltazar was taken by two of the accused and killed beside a
creek about 6 to 10 meters away from the hatchery of the Lao poultry farm where she was staying. The trial court found them guilty of the crime of
kidnapping with murder. The Supreme Court held that "the crime committed is not kidnapping with murder as stated in the title of the information
but murder.".
In People vs. Felipe Sacayanan (L-15024-25, Dec. 31, 1960; 110 Phil. 588), a group of five armed men forcibly took from their hour the victims Juan
Galaraga and Victor Alamar to a place about 40 meters away from the house where they were shot. Juan Galaraga died. Victor Alamar was seriously
wounded. The trial court convicted the accused of the complex crime of kidnapping with murder. The Supreme Court held that this was error.
"Nothing was said or done by the accused on his confederates to show that they intended to deprive their victims of their liberty for sometime and
for some purpose. There was no appreciable interval between their being taken and their being shot from which kidnapping may be inferred." (See
People v. Remalante, 92 Phil. 48; O.G. [9] 38881).

From the foregoing discussion, it seems clear that the weight of authority is in favor of the proposition that where the victim was taken from one
place to another, solely for the purpose of killing him and not for detaining him for any length of time or for the purpose of obtaining ransom for his
release, the crime committed is murder, and not the complex crime of kidnapping with murder. This ruling is entirely consistent with law. Art. 267 of
the Revised Penal Code penalizes a person "who shall kidnap or detain another," and the penalty becomes capital "where the kidnapping or
detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person."

xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bar, the only evidence appreciable against the appellant Benjamin Ong regarding the surrounding circumstances of Henry Chua's
death are (1) the extrajudicial statement of Benjamin Ong, (2) the testimony of Benjamin Ong during the trial, (3) the testimony of agent Enrique
Lacanilao about the reenactment of the crime. .

In the extrajudicial statement (Exhibit N) Benjamin Ong said that from the Wigwam nightclub, Henry Chua and he rode on Henrys Mustang Car with
the latter driving it. Fernando Tan and his friend were in the Biscayne car of Benjamin Ong following the Mustang (Answer to Question No. 40, p. 3,
Exh,. N). At Araneta Avenue in Quezon City, Benjamin Ong requested Henry Chua to stop the car to enable him to urinate. When Henry Chua
complied, Fernando Tan and his friend stopped in front of the Mustang car, pretending to be policeman, and ordered Henry Chua to go with them to
the police precinct. (Id., p. 5) Fernando Tan drove the Biscayne car, while Benjamin Ong in henry Chua's car followed. From Araneta Avenue,
Fernando Tan drove to Novaliches where Henry Chua was killed, (Id.) It will be noted that no appreciable time elapsed from arrival at Novaliches up
to the time Henry Chua was killed, to indicate a separate intention to deprived the latter of his liberty. When Benjamin Ong testified on September
22, 1971, he affirmed his admission of responsibility for the death of Henry Chua (t.s.n.., Sept. 22, 1971, p. 26). He further testified as follows:

ATTY. QUISUMBING:

Q In this statement Exhibit "N", you admitted the Henry Chua was taken from the mustang car and transferred to the Biscayne car and then
brought to that uninhabited place in having the late Henry Chua taken from his car and brought to Makatipo?

A My purpose was just to kill him, and there is not going to be any delay.

Q Was there any purpose of detaining him for sometime?

xxx xxx xxx

A No, there was no purpose to detain him any further. (Id., pp. 27-28)

The narration of agent Enrique Lacanilao about the enactment of the crime showed that there was no detention of the deceased Henry Chua for any
length of time. He was killed and promptly buried. (Please see pp. 43-47, t.s.n., Sept. 18, 1971). On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the accused
can hardly be held liable for kidnapping as well. It may not be amiss to state that an accused is entitled to acquittal unless his guilt is shown by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. (Rule 133, Section 1, Revised Rules of Court). The evidence at hand hardly satisfied the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubts as to the charge of kidnapping. The necessary result is that the accused can be held liable only for the killing of Henry Chua. [Brief
for the Appellant Benjamin Ong y Kho, pp. 43 to 56]

And the evidence on record clearly show that Henry Chua voluntarily went with Benjamin Ong when they left the Wigwam Nightclub at Parañaque
at about 1:30 a.m. on April 24, 1971, so much so that they rode in the car of Chua and it was driven by Chua himself. The two drove straight down
Roxas Boulevard, then to Quiapo, and Quezon Boulevard Extension in Quezon City; and after passing Sto. Domingo Church, they made a turn
towards a dirt road leading to Del Monte Avenue. When they reached a dark and secluded place, Benjamin Ong urged Chua to stop the car for the
former to urinate to which the latter obliged. The Biscayne car where Fernando Tan, Bienvenido Quintos and Baldomero Ambrosio were riding,
stopped. Fernando Tan poked his gun at Chua and pulled him from his Mustang car with Ambrosio giving help. His hands were tied his mouth
gagged with a flannel cloth, and he was placed in the Biscayne car. Tan and Bienvenido Quintos then rested their feet on him. Then Ambrosio drove
the Biscayne while Ong drove the Mustang. They proceeded towards Barrio Makatipo, Novaliches, Caloocan City, where Henry Chua was stabbed to
death and buried.

In other words, the time interval When the deceased Henry Chua was actually deprived of his liberty was short (from Del Monte Avenue to Barrio
Makatipo, Novaliches, Caloocan); and the same was only incidental to the main objective of murdering him.

The only authority cited by the prosecution on this point is that of the case of Parulan vs. Rodas (88 Phil. 615). But the ruling in the Parulan case
cannot be applied to the case at bar, because in the Parulan case, the Court found that the kidnapping was a necessary means for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim and killing him if the desired amount could not be given; and that the defendants had to kidnap or carry the victim
from Manila (where he was already deprived of his liberty, with Parulan poking his gun on the victim), to a faraway and secluded place (a river in
Bambang, Bulacan) in order to better secure the consent of the victim through fear to pay the ransom, and kill him if he refuses to accede to their
demands, as in fact he was killed be Parulan because of his (victim's) refusal to the ransom.

We Hold that Both Appellants are Guilty

of Murder

The killing of the victim in this case was attended by several qualifying and aggravating circumstances. The facts on record prove this, beyond
reasonable doubt, even if we were to disregard the extrajudicial confession of Benjamin Quintos which he denied and was allegedly extracted from
him through force and intimidation.

Treachery (alevosia) qualified the killing to murder. Undisputed facts show that Henry Chua's hands were tied and his mouth was gagged with a
flannel cloth before he was stabbed twice with an icepick and buried in a shallow grave near a creek. These facts portray well that the tied hands of
the victim rendered him defenseless and helpless thereby allowing the accused to commit the crime without risk at all to their person. 51
The accused Benjamin Ong and Bienvenido Quintos, however, were quick to insist that this circumstance should not be taken against them because
they did not do the actual stabbing (which was done by Fernando Tan). Easily, the weakness of this claim can be discerned. Conspiracy, connivance
and unity of purpose and intention among the accused were present throughout in the execution of this crime. The four participated in the planning
and execution of the crime and were at the scene in all its stages, They cannot escape the consequence of any of their acts even if they deviated in
some detail from what they originally thought of. Conspiracy implies concert of design and not participation in every detail of execution. 52 Thus,
treachery should be considered against all persons participating or cooperating in the perpetration of the crime. 53

With regards to the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, the same should be deemed absorbed in treachery. This position is itself
supported by the Acting Solicitor General in his brief and is sustained in a long line of decisions. 54

In the same vein, the accused would like the aggravating circumstance of nighttime (nocturnidad) to be absorbed in treachery in that it forms part of
the peculiar treacherous means and manner adopted to insure the execution of the crime. The case of People vs. Berdida 55 provides the exception
to this rule and is applicable to the case at bar. It was there held that:

From the facts and evidence of record in this case, it is clear that appellants took advantage of nighttime in committing the felonies charged. For it
appears that to carry out a sentence they had pronounced upon Antonio Maravilla and Federico Cañalete for the death of one Pabling, they had
evidently chosen to execute their victims under the cover of darkness, at the dead of night, when the neighborhood was asleep. Inasmuch as the
treachery consisted in the fact that the victims' hands were tied at the time they were beaten, the circumstance of nighttime is not absorbed in
treachery, but can be perceived distinctly therefrom, since the treachery rests upon an independent factual basis. A special case therefore is present
to which the rule that nighttime is absorbed in treachery does not apply. 56

This aggravating circumstance was correctly appreciated by the lower court regardless of whether or not the same was purposely and deliberately
sought by the accused for it is clear that the darkness of the night facilitated the commission of the crime and was taken advantage of by them. 57

The purposive selection of an uninhabited place (despoblado) is likewise clear from the evidence. The killing was done in Barrio Makatipo,
Novaliches, Caloocan City, an isolated place that resembled that of an abandoned subdivision. The place was ideal not merely for burying the victim
but also forkilling him for it was a place where the possibility of the victim receiving some help from third persons was completely absent. The
accused sought the solitude of the place in order to better attain their purpose without interference, and to secure themselves against detection
and punishment. 58 As aptly stated in the "Sentence" of the lower court:

... The possibility of the victim calling for succor or assistance from any third person was ruled out by the chosen site. Trees, lush vegetation and
thick cogon grasses hide the place where the crime was committed from the view of even a chance passerby. The choice of an uninhabited place for
the killing of Henry Chua, therefore, further aggravated the offense committed by the accused. People vs. Curiano, L-15256-57, October 31, 1962;
U.S. vs. Vitug, 17 Phil. 1). 59

In the case of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence (abuso de confianza), it appears that the lower court wrongly appreciated this
circumstance. In order for this circumstance to obtain, it is necessary that there be a relation of trust and confidence between the accused and the
one against whom the crime was committed, and that the accused made use of such relation to commit the crime. 60 It is essential too that the
confidence be a means of facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended party's belief that the former would
not abuse said confidence. 61

Nowhere in the records does it appear that Henry Chua reposed confidence upon the person of Benjamin Ong. If any, Henry Chua was simply not
afraid of Benjamin Ong, having told and bragged to the latter about his violent exploits in the past and threatened him with bodily harm in case of
failure to pay. 62 He knew that he was far stronger than Benjamin Ong in terms of influence and money. He thought that Benjamin Ong would fear
him. The fact that Henry Chua invited Ong for nightclubbing that fatal evening and accommodated him in his car on their way home from the
nightclub does not mean that Henry Chua had confidence in him. There was no special relation of confidence between them. He knew that Benjamin
owed him a substantial amount and that its settlement had long been overdue which fact irritated him very much. Benjamin Ong and Henry Chua
were together that night in the nightclub as well as in the car not because of said confidence. It was simply because Benjamin Ong had some
accounts to settle with him. Thus, in the case of U.S. vs. Cruz, et al., 63 it was held that: .

... The fact of Cabaya having simulated friendship and desire for work, together with the companions who went with him, and the fact that he
received food and work immediately upon being accepted by the Americans to work in the mines, is not, as stated in the judgment, a degree of
treachery, according to law, sufficient to constitute the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence. It may however, be argued as unworthy
conduct and ingratitude, but not as abuse of confidence. It is necessary first to show what has been the confidence granted or given in order to
determine whether there was or was not an abuse of it, and in the present case there is nothing to show what the confidence given or conceded to
Cabaya was, that could facilitate the commission of the crime.

Likewise, in the case of People vs. Brocal, 64 it was held that:

There is no abuse of confidence in attempted rape where on the day of the crime the accused was in the company of the offended girl, not because
of her confidence in him, but because they were partners in a certain business.

More convincing this time is the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle in the commission of the crime. The Biscayne car of Benjamin Ong
was used in trailing the victim's Mustang car from Wigwam Nightclub up to the time that it was overtaken and blocked. It carried the victim on the
way to the scene of the killing, it contained at its baggage compartment the pick and shovel used in digging the grave; it was the fast means of
fleeing and absconding from the scene. Again, the motor vehicle facilitated the stark happening. It has been held that the use of a motor vehicle is
aggravating in murder where the said vehicle was used in transporting the victim and the accused. 65

Cruelty (ensanamiento) as an aggravating circumstance, cannot be considered here. The brief of the Acting Solicitor General agrees with that of the
accused in denying the attendance of cruelty as an aggravating circumstance. Indeed, as it appears from the record, the group intended merely to
kill the victim, bury him, and flee from the locale of the fearful crime. For cruelty to exist, it must be shown that the accused enjoyed and delighted
in making their victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical or moral pain in the consummation of the criminal act. 66 Even
granting that the victim died because of asphyxiation when he was buried and not hemorrhage from stab wounds, as testified to by Dr. Ibarrola67,
which however, has been contradicted by his own necropsy report which shows that the cause of death was the "punctured wounds in the
abdomen," and by Dr. Lara who testified that the two wounds could have produced death due to shock, it appears that the victim's burial was not
meant to make him suffer any longer but simply to conceal his body and the crime itself.

Concededly, the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation (premeditacion conocida) attended the commission of the crime. What else can
better portray this circumstance than the frequent meetings 68 of the four accused at the Barrio Fiesta Restaurant in order to discuss, lay out the
plan, and secure the different paraphernalia consisting of the rope, icepick, flannel cloth, flashlight and shovel69. Added to this is the careful
selection of an "ideal" site for the grissly happening70. Similarly, the plan to go to Taipei and Hongkong immediately after the incident pictures the
presence of evident premeditation71. The accused meditated and tenaciously persisted in the accomplishment of the crime and were not prompted
merely by the impulse of the
moment. 72

The claim of the accused Benjamin Ong that the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty should be appraised in his favor, is hereby sustained.
Indeed, the kidnapping portion of the crime cannot be appreciated here beyond reasonable doubt as stated at the outset. Furthermore, it can be
seen that the prosecution alleged so many aggravating circumstances which should be absorbed in one or the other. To plead guilty to this
information naturally would be most unfair for the accused especially where the penalty would be the capital punishment of death. The accused
showed signs of remorsefulness upon his arrest when he cooperated with the police authorities in the solution of the crime. As held in the case of
People vs. Yturriaga73,

... It only remains to consider briefly whether the defendant's plea of guilty in the form it was entered constitutes a voluntary confession of guilt
before the court as defined in the same subsection of Article 13. We think it does.

Although the confession was qualified and introduction of evidence became necessary, the qualification did not deny the defendant's guilt and,
what is more, was subsequently fully justified. It was not the defendant's fault that aggravating circumstances were erroneously alleged in the
information and mitigating circumstances omitted therefrom. If such qualification could deprive the accused of the benefit of plea of guilty, then the
prosecution could nullify this mitigating circumstance be counteracting it with unfounded allegations of aggravating circumstances.

We hold that the accused Benjamin Ong is likewise entitled to the mitigating circumstance that is analogous to passion and obfuscation (Art. 13, par.
10, Revised Penal Code), based on the following facts stated in his brief:

a) Henry Chua and his companions went to the office of Benjamin Ong. In a loud voice, with angry gestures, and in the presence of his
subordinates and fellow employees, Henry Chua demanded payment, and threatened bodily harm to him and his family.
b) Henry Chua went as far as to threaten the life of Benjamin Ong unless his obligation to Chua was paid. "If you treasure your life, you better
pay first."
c) Because of this incident, he, Benjamin Ong, "was humiliated."
d) His brother-in-law, Chua Pak told him that he was holding a very responsible position in the company and so he should not be involved in
any scandal.
e) He was "discredited and degraded in front of my brother-in-law." He was so embarrassed, he finally tendered his resignation from the
company.
f) Because of the threat of Henry Chua, the accused tried to get money from all sources but he was not successful. The allotted time was so
short. To relieve him of the pressure brought to bear upon him to pay his gambling debt, he even thought of embezzling money belonging to the
company in which he worked.
g) Because of his inability to raise money to be paid to Henry Chua, he became "deeply depressed." He felt: "I was being turned into a
criminal.
h) He begged Henry Chua to give him more time to raise the money. "Nagmamakaawa na ako sa kanya." This was the night before Henry
Chua was killed. If Henry Chua had granted him time "the whole plan to kill Henry Chua might not materialize." But Henry Chua, while not relenting,
but perhaps in utter contempt and disdain of Benjamin Ong instead decided to transfer from Amihan to Wigwam because he wanted to be
entertained by a hostess. Henry Chua, it will be noted, was well known to Wigwam hostess, Ligaya Tamayo. Benjamin Ong was seen by her for the
first time that evening.
i) So while Chua enjoyed himself, Benjamin Ong was worried, as he pleaded with Henry Chua in vain for more time to pay the obligation.

xxx xxx xxx

In People vs. Timoteo Olgado, et al (L-4406, March 31, 1952; 91 Phil. 908 Unrep.), the two accused were provoked to commit two murders because
of the indecent propositions made to the women by Jalumio and his companions. For Mario Aninias, this is the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obfuscation or vindication of a grave offense to his wife. 74

In this regard, accused Benjamin Ong filed on October 10, 1973 before this Court a Petition for New Trial and/or to Consider Case as Simple Murder.
75 In this petition, Benjamin Ong's wife, Athena Caw Siu Tee Ong, alleged in an affidavit an incident when her husband refused to allow her to testify
on during the regular trial in the lower court. She said that Benjamin Ong suppressed it because it would be a source of "great shame" to their
family. Indeed, the records show how Benjamin Ong's counsel vainly convinced him to tell it but he refused to do so. 76 Lately, Benjamin Ong has
changed his mind and has consented to his wife's divulging the story. Said story simply consists of Henry Chua's proposal of love and attempted rape
allegedly committed on the person of Athena on April 15, 1971 which Henry Chua asked in lieu of the payment of the gambling debt. However, this
matter is now academic because it would only tend to bolster the mitigating circumstance that is analogous to passion and obfuscation, which we
have just considered in favor of the accused Benjamin Ong.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the two accused-appellants Benjamin Ong y Kho and Bienvenido Quintos y Sumaljag, are hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder with the attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery, and the aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and use of motor vehicle. These two circumstances are offset by the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and one similar
or analogous to passion or obfuscation which are appreciated in favor of accused-appellant Benjamin Ong who is hereby sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. Justices Teehankee and Makasiar, however, are of the opinion that the crime committed by the two accused-appellants Benjamin Ong
and Bienvenido Quintos is kidnapping with murder and that the kidnapping was conceived for the purpose of extorting ransom, among other
motives. The members of the Court failed to arrive at a clear consensus on the existence of the aggravating circumstances of "nighttime" and
"uninhabited place" (which Justice Barredo, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, concluded do not obtain in this case).

With respect to the accused-appellant Bienvenido Quintos, although no mitigating circumstance can be appreciated in his favor, and he should
therefore be sentenced to death, the Court hereby imposes upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and not death, because of Our conclusion
that his co-accused-appellant Benjamin Ong should be sentenced only to reclusion perpetua, and because Justice Barredo, in his concurring and
dissenting opinion, even concluded that Bienvenido Quintos is guilty only as an accomplice; and hence, in any event, We would not have the
necessary ten votes for the imposition of the death penalty upon said accused-appellant. .

As We hereby sentence the two accused-appellants Benjamin Ong and Bienvenido Quintos to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, We affirm
that part of the decision under review, which sentenced them jointly and severally to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Henry Chua in the amount
of P1,000.00; to pay moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and another P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay their proportionate
share of the costs, as We find no reason to disturb the same.
Makalintal, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Castro, J., concurs in the result.

Fernando, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 71153 August 16, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EFREN PEÑONES, OSCAR PEÑONES, FROILAN PEÑONES, and ANDRES PEÑONES, accused-appellants.

NARVASA, J.:

Tomas Oronan died a violent death at the hands of four (4) persons who attacked him with bamboo spears (guhi), bows and arrows, and big stones.
The post-mortem examination disclosed that he had sustained seventeen (17) assorted wounds, abrasions and fractures.

At the time of the assault, Tomas Oronan was with his wife, Felomina Peñones Oronan, and two sons, Ramon and Antonio Oronan. Felomina
Identified the assailants as her own brothers, Efren, Oscar, Froilan and Andres Peñones. A like identification was also made by her sons, Ramon and
Antonio. After due preliminary proceedings, the four brothers were charged in the Court of First Instance at Ligao, Albay,1 with the felony of
murder, attended by evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength.

The circumstances of the killing were detailed before the Trial Court by said Felomina Oronan—the defendants' sister and their victim's widow—and
Ramon Oronan, Felomina's son by the deceased. According to these eyewitnesses, at the time of the assault on Tomas Oronan, he, his wife,
Felomina, and their two sons, Ramon and Antonio, were on their way to the home of the Barangay Captain at barrio Kinuartelan, Polangui, Albay.
They had arrived in Polangui at mid-morning of that day,2 having taken the bus from Iriga, and had forthwith proceeded to the Polangui Municipal
Building to report an incident that had occurred the day before—concerning Ramon, the son of the deceased Tomas Oronan, who was chased by the
latter's brothers-in-law (his wife's brothers: Efren and Oscar Peñones) and his father-in-law (his wife's father: Leon Peñones). Having been advised,
however, to make their report directly to the Barangay Captain of barrio Kinuartelan, which was the place where Leon Peñones and his children
were residing, the Oronan family had then taken a tricycle to go to the Barangay Captain, intending to avoid passing by the houses of the Peñones.
But as fate would have it, one of the tricycle's tires went flat before they could reach their destination, so they had to go the rest of the way on foot,
and perforce pass by the houses of the Peñones.

As the Oronans neared the house of Oscar Peñones, Froilan and Andres Peñones suddenly emerged from a grove of palomaria trees and blocked
their path. The two were armed with bamboo spears (guhi), large stones, and bolos sheathed in scabbards at their waists. The Oronans then heard a
voice from behind them say. "Fight them. They turned and saw that behind them were two other Peñones brothers, Efren and Oscar, armed with
bows and arrows. These two suddenly loosed their arrows at Tomas Oronan. The arrows hit Tomas in the back. Tomas tried to run towards the
house of Leon Peñones, his father-in-law, but Andres hurled a large stone at him, hitting him in the chest and causing him to stumble. Froilan
thereupon stabbed Tomas with his bamboo spear. The four brothers then joined in the attack on Tomas, inflicting more injuries on him with their
weapons until he expired. Felomina tried to go to her husband's defense but was pushed away by her brother, Andres Peñones. Tomas' corpse was
brought by his attackers to the home of Leon Peñones and left in the yard.

Testifying in their defense, three (3) of the accused brothers—Oscar, Froilan, and Andres Peñones told the Trial Court they could not have
committed the crime because on the day and at the time of its commission, they were in another place, San Antonio, Buhi, Camarines Sur,
harvesting palay in a field of which Andres was a tenant. It was while they were thus engaged that Andres Peñones Jr. came and told them of the
slaying of Tomas Oronan. They immediately decided to go to Kinuartelan. They left San Antonio at about 10:00 o'clock that morning and walked all
the way to Kinuartelan ,a distance of four kilometers or so, arriving there at around 12 o'clock noon.

In corroboration of their alibi, they presented two witnesses: Eleno Bronzal (father-in-law of Oscar Peñones) and one Dominador Ramos.

The fourth brother charged with the crime, Efren Pefiones also took the witness stand. He claimed self-defense and defense of relative. According to
him, he was then in the house of his father (Leon Peñones), starting a fire in the kitchen stove to cook lunch; and while he was thus occupied he
heard the voice of Tomas Oronan, his brother-in-law; Tomas was shouting that he would kill Leon Peñones (Efren's father) and was calling for him to
come out of the house. Efren looked out and saw that his sister, Felomina, was with Tomas, her husband, together with four of their children,
Julieta, Ramon, Poldo and Antonio. Efren says he also saw that his father, Leon, was at the porch, and that he heard Felomina tell Tomas to go into
the house and attack Leon. Tomas did so and struck out at Leon with a bolo but failed to hit him. Leon ran to the kitchen and placed himself behind
his son, Efren. Tomas Oronan followed and again struck out with his bolo, this time at Efren. Efren however shifted away from the blow and thus
avoided being hit. Efren picked up a piece of firewood and hit Tomas with it, causing the latter to stagger and drop the bolo. As Tomas was
staggering from the force of the blow, Efren saw that Ramon Oronan had a dart which he hurled at Efren. But Efren grabbed Tomas and used him as
a shield, so the dart hit Tomas instead. Efren released Tomas and picked up another piece of firewood which he cast at Ramon, who ran away, Efren
saw that Tomas was trying to pick up the bolo he had dropped; so with his firewood club, Efren struck Tomas again and again, and yet again until
Tomas ceased to move. Efren then went to the residence of Barangay Councilman Roberto Novales and surrendered to him.

In an attempt to bolster Efren's story, the defense also presented Leon Peñones Efren's father, and a certain Roberto Madrilejos as witnesses.

The Trial Court rendered judgment on January 24, 1985. It rejected as unworthy of credence the evidence tending to establish the alibi of Oscar,
Froilan and Andres Peñones and the claim of self-defense of Efren Peñones and ruled that the proofs of the prosecution established their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength. Accordingly, there being no mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances the Taal Court also having found that there was no sufficient evidence of the modifying circumstance of evident premeditation set
out in the indictment the Court sentenced all said accused to suffer the, penalty of reclusion perpetua together with all its accessory penalties, and
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, jointly and severally, in the amount of P20,000.00 as compensatory damages for death, P20,000.00 as moral
damages, and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, as well as to pay the costs.3

This judgment the accused now assail in this Court as being grievously in error. They ascribe the following specific errors to the Trial Court:

1) rejection of the defense of alibi asserted by Froilan, Andres and Oscar Peñones
2) rejection of Efren Peñones claim of complete defense of self and of his father;
3) basing the conviction solely on the evidence of biased witnesses the decedent's widow, Felomina Oronan, and son, Ramon;
4) admission of photographs of the victim and a police officer, over the defense objection that the same are incompetent without
accompanying testimony of the photographer and the policeman depicted, and opportunity to cross-examine them; and

5) denial of a motion for new trial to present newly discovered evidence consisting of the testimony of Bgy. Councilman Roberto Novales, to
whom Efren Peñones had voluntarily surrendered.

As regards the defense of alibi, well established and of unvarying application is the rule that it is unavailing against positive identification of the
accused by credible witnesses4 or absent a satisfactory showing of the physical impossibility of the accused's being present at the scene of the crime
at the time of its commission.5

Tested by these jurisprudential standards, the defense of alibi must fail. A leisurely walk of two hours, according to the three brothers invoking that
defense, is all that it takes to travel from barrio San Antonio, where they claimed they were, to barrio Kinuartelan where the killing of Tomas Oronan
was perpetrated. In fact, one of their own witnesses, Eleno Bronzal, estimated the time at only an hour. It cannot therefore be concluded that under
the circumstances it was physically impossible for the brothers to go from San Antonio to Kinuartelan kill their brother-in-law, and then immediately
return to San Antonio before their absence could be noticed, specially considering that they were the only people in the field or farm in San Antonio
where they were supposedly engaged in harvesting palay.

There is, moreover, the positive identification made of them by their own sister of the full-blood, and her son, their nephew, in addition to the
detailed narration of the manner by which they and their other brother, Efren, had attacked and slain Tomas Oronan. That positive identification-
not to mention the telling circumstance that it was made by relatives who, because of the closeness of their consanguineous relationship would not,
in the very nature of things, be expected to implicate them for so horrible a crime as murder and expose them to the grave penalty thereto attached
by law, if said relatives were not otherwise certain of the veracity and accuracy of their perceptions or were plagued by even the smallest doubt
respecting them—precludes sustaining the three brothers' defense of alibi.

As to Efren Peñones contention that he acted in legitimate defense of his person and of his father, Leon, this Court feels that the same was correctly
rejected by the Trial Court. Having admitted that he had clubbed Tomas Oronan to death, it behooved Efren to demonstrate, by preponderance of
evidence, the presence of the familiar elements of self-defense and defense of stranger, to wit: unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, Tomas
Oronan; lack of sufficient provocation on Efren's part, as the person making the defense; and reasonable necessity of the means adopted by him to
repel the aggression.

The trouble is that an objective appraisal of his own proofs as to the manner of the killing of Tomas Oronan, immediately provokes and impels
repudiation; for said proofs disclose an irreconcilable inconsistency between his story and evidence of so high an order as to be well nigh conclusive,
i.e., evidence of the wounds and injuries inflicted on Tomas Oronan disclosed by the post-mortem examination. Efren Peñones story that he had
clubbed Tomas Oronan to death in the process of defending himself and his father against the former's wild assault with a bolo, is obviously untrue.
It is contradicted by the nature and number of the deceased's injuries: no less than seventeen (17) different wounds, abrasions and fractures. These
wounds and injuries indubitably prove that Tomas Oronan was not only struck four or five times with a wooden club by just one person, but was
subjected to heavy blows and stabbing with pointed objects by more than one person, a proposition entirely consistent with the prosecution's
version of the tragic occurrence.6

Furthermore, the claim of self-defense would appear to be a mere afterthought on the part of Efren Penones. He did not make the claim of self-
defense or defense of relative when he allegedly surrendered to a barangay official, or when he was taken into custody by the police, which would
have been the natural and logical reaction of a person in his predicament. This omission makes his subsequent assertion of the defense in court
suspect, as this Court has had occasion to observe.7

In an effort to undermine the Trial Court's fundamental conclusions, the charge is made that Ramon and Felomina Oronan are biased. Their
disqualification as witnesses, or a refusal to give credence to their testimony cannot, to be sure, result merely from their being the surviving son and
widow of the victim and therefore, interested in the outcome of the case. For under the rules of evidence, neither parties "nor other persons
interested in the outcome of a case" are excluded as witnesses.8 More than once has this Court held that mere relationship to a party cannot
militate against the credibility of a witness or be taken as destructive of the witness' credibility, for it is not to be lightly supposed that relatives of
the victim would callously violate their conscience by blaming the crime on persons whom they know to be innocent .9

The defense sought to prove that the Felomina had a motive to testify falsely against the Peñoneses because her father and a brother had earlier
tried to manhandle her son, and she herself and her son had been haled to court for grave threats by Leon Peñones. Subsumed in this submittal is
the theory that Tomas Oronan had gone to the place of residence of Leon Peñones and his four (4) sons, bringing with him his wife and four (4)
children, to launch an attack against Leon. A more foolhardy "bearding of lions" can scarcely be imagined. The proffered scenario is also quite
improbable: that the mere chasing of Tomas' son by Leon Peñones would be considered so grievous an affront as to provoke Tomas to make a rash
attempt against Leon's very life; and, as stressed by the Solicitor General, that after grappling with and bludgeoning Tomas Oronan to death, Efren
"was unscathed while the alleged aggressor (Tomas) sustained fourteen (14) injuries." Moreover, the hypothesis is in contradiction with the clear
indication in the record of Tomas Oronan's peaceful bent at the time, for the undisputed fact is that he had traveled to Kinuartelan to report, as he
did report, to the police authorities there the incident involving his son and the latter's grandfather.

The appellants next make a half-hearted attempt in their brief to persuade this Court to reject Felomina's testimony because tainted by
inconsistencies. They do not however bother to particularize the inconsistencies or explain in what way they detract from Felomina's credibility. The
Court is satisfied of the correctness of the Trial Court's observation that any inconsistencies "between what was stated in the affidavit of Felomina
Peñones Oronan, taken at the police headquarters of Polangui, Albay, and her oral declarations on the witness stand * * are not substantial," and do
not affect her credibility.10 Besides, her narrative is fully corroborated on all substantial points by that of her son, Ramon.

Photographs depicting the lifeless victim and a police investigator at the scene of the crime, (Exhs. B and B-1) were shown to Felomina and her son,
Ramon, in the course of their testimony and as part thereof. They identified the corpse, and the place where he was lying, as they were eminently
qualified to do. It is claimed by the appellants however that it was error for the Trial Court to have admitted the photographs in evidence, because
the photographer had not been presented for cross-examination. The pictures were not presented as independent evidence, but merely as part of
the testimonies of Felomina and Ramon. And since the photographer obviously was not more competent than either Felomina or Ramon to identify
and describe the persons (living or dead) and things appearing in the pictures, there was therefore no need to present the photographer himself;
questions regarding the identity and description of the persons and things in the photographs, and even as regards any seeming inconsistency
between the photographs and the persons and things actually photographed could very well be asked of Felomina or Ramon as of the
photographer.
As regards the appellants' motion for new trial, its denial by the Trial Court was correct. The motion was grounded on newly discovered evidence.
But it is obvious that the evidence the testimony of the barangay official to whom Efren Peñones had supposedly surrendered—cannot in any sense
be considered newly discovered. It was known to the appellants during the trial. Much less may it be considered of so substantial a character as
would "change the judgement."11 For even if it be conceded that Efren Peñones had indeed given himself up to that barangay official, this
circumstance would not alter the outcome one bit.

The manner of the commission of the crime by the four (4) appellants establishes the existence of a conspiracy among them.1âwphi1 But, as the
Trial Court states, the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation may not be appreciated against them absent any proof "as to how and
when the plan to kill was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out ...."

On the other hand, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, alleged in the information, was correctly found to be attendant on the
perpetration of the slaying. Said the Court:

... There are four accused in this case, who relatively are of regular, medium built (build) and size. Two were armed with "guhi" (piece of bamboo,
sharpened or pointed at one end) and stone and the other two with Indian arrows. The four were carrying bolos inside a scabbard and tied to the
waist. The person attacked, Tomas Oronan, was unarmed. Although he had companions, the latter did not do anything to help the victim. Under the
circumstances ..., it is doubtful whether these companions could do anything even if they attempted to help the victim considering that the
attackers were four and fully armed. The violence and force used by the four accused were excessive and out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the victim. As earlier observed ..., the purpose of the Oronans in going to Kinuartelan was not to seek trouble. They were there to settle
things. To find out why Ramon Oronan was chased by his uncle and his grandfather the day before. If otherwise, they should not have requested for
a police as a companion.

The Trial Court required the appellants to indemnify the heirs of Tomas Oronan in the amount of only P30,000.00. This should be increased to
P50,000.00 in line with current doctrine.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court subject of the appeal at bar, being in accord with the facts and the applicable law, is
AFFIRMED in toto, with the sole modification above indicated, that the indemnity to the heirs is increased to FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00).

Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124319. May 13, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GARI BIBAT Y DESCARGAR, defendant-appellant.

DECISION

PURISIMA, J.:

Appeal interposed by accused Gari Bibat y Descargar from the judgment rendered by Branch IV of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, finding him
guilty of the crime of Murder in Criminal Case No. 93-123648.

Filed on July 23, 1993 by Assistant Prosecutor Alfeo T. Siccuon, the Information indicting accused for Murder, alleges:

That on or about October 14, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with others whose true names,
identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to
kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one LLOYD DEL ROSARIO Y
CABRERA, by then and there stabbing him with bladed weapon hitting him on the chest and abdomen, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal stab
wounds, which are necessarily fatal and which where the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.

Contrary to law.

With the accused entering a negative plea upon arraignment thereunder, with assistance of the counsel de oficio, Atty. Alejandro G. Yrreborre, Jr.,
trial ensued with the prosecution presenting Nona Avila Cinco, P03 Julian Bustamante, Florencio Castro and Rogelio Robles, as its witnesses.

Aside from accused, Marte Soriano, Lino Asuncion III, and Rogelio Robles (who was recalled to the stand by the defense), testified for the defense.

As synthesized by the trial court of origin :

From the record and evidence presented, it appears that the accused Gari Bibat stabbed to death one Lloyd del Rosario on October 12, 1992 at
around 1:30 p.m. along G. Tuazon cor. Ma. Cristina Sts., Sampaloc, Manila. The victim was on his way to school waiting for a ride when he was
stabbed. Thereafter the suspect fled while the victim was brought to the United Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) where he was pronounced dead on
arrival.

The incident was witnessed by Nona Avila Cinco, a laundry woman, who testified that on October 14, 1992, while she was at Funeraria Gloria waiting
for her bettor, she saw a person about one meter away talking to the accused. Said person told the accused O pare, anduon na. Puntahan mo na.
Siguruhin mo lang na itumba mo na. to which the accused answered: Oo ba. Ganito ba, ganito ba? (as the witness was speaking, she was
demonstrating with her arms.)[1]

After hearing the accused, she (witness) left towards Honrades Street to see another bettor. She first went inside a house and after a while, she
went outside where she saw the accused along Honrades Street, entering an alley. She walked along with the accused. She and the accused were
even able to look at each other.

While the victim was going out of a gate, the accused hurried towards the victim and took a pointed object from a notebook, then stabbed the
victim in the left chest twice.

She was only about 4 to 5 meters away from the scene of the crime.

Thereafter, the accused fled, the victim shouted for help. Upon hearing the shouts of the victim, the accused returned and stabbed the victim again
in the middle part of the chest. She (witness) then left the scene of the crime after the accused ran away.

She reported the matter to the authorities only on July 20, 1993 because she was afraid.[2]

xxx

Florencio Castro testified among others that he saw the accused together with four others inside the Gloria Memorial Homes along G. Tuason St. on
October 14, 1992. One of them used the phone inside said place to call somebody. The rest stayed beside the one calling. He saw one of them open
a notebook where a stainless knife was inserted. He heard the one using the phone, asking kung nasaan. Thereafter, the group went out and left
towards the direction of Balic-Balic.

Rogelio Robles, testified among others that the accused Gari Bibat had been going to his place at 424 Berdad St., Sampaloc, Manila, for a long time
already because their Samahang Ilocano (SI) president, Tonton Montero, is his (witness) neighbor. Before the incident occurred, Tonton Montero
told him (witness) about a rumble in school whereby somebody died. The group of the accused was planning to take revenge against the victim,
Lloyd del Rosario (see TSN, pp. 7-8, 6/30/94), thus:

PROS. EUGENIO:

Q - Now, do you know personally what this group of Gari Bibat and his companions plan to do regarding that trouble related to you by your
neighbor, Tonton Montero?
A -What I know, the person against whom they will take revenge is living from a far place. I did not know that he is from our place.
Q -Did they ever mention, during that meeting the name of the person whom they will take revenge?
A -In the beginning, no, sir, but later they told me.
Q -What was the name, if they did mention to you the name?
A -The one who was killed, Lloyd, sir.
Q -The same Lloyd del Rosario, the victim in this case?
A -Yes, sir, Lloyd del Rosario.

He further testified that he (witness) only knows Lloyd del Rosario by the face because the latter is from his place. He only knew what had happened
to Lloyd after that fateful incident because 6 or 7 of the members of the group arrived, all with a tusok and they even kept two (2) guns in his
(witness) house. Gari Bibat was one of the 6 or 7 people he saw on that day, with a tres-cantos or veinte nueve tucked in his (Bibats) waistline. (see
pp. 11-12, TSN, 6/30/94). He further narrated that he actually saw the killing of the victim, (see pp. 22-24, Ibid). that even before the day Lloyd died,
they (accused and companions) already hid some guns and tusok in his house. (see pp. 20, TSN, Ibid.)

xxx xxx xxx

Accused Gari Bibat testified among others that on October 14, 1992, he was staying in his house at 629 Reten St., Sampaloc, Manila; at that time it
was his mothers birthday; that he was reviewing his lessons from 7:00 oclock to 10:00 oclock in the morning in preparation for his final oral exams
on October 14, 1992; that Marte Soriano, a friend of his and a neighbor were in his house; that after lunch, they (he and Marte Soriano) left for
school at 12:35 noon; that they did not pass by Funeraria Gloria; that he and his friend were able to reach the school; that he had a review of with
his classmates up to 1:45 oclock in the afternoon, afterwhich they proceeded to their room for the final exams; that their examination lasted from
7:30 to 4:30 oclock in the afternoon; that he passed the subject with a grade of 2.25; that he does not know Nona Cinco but only later in the
precinct; that he saw Rogelio Robles who was also detained at the Manila City Jail; that when he asked why Rogelio Robles testified against him,
Robles told him that it was merely concocted because the complainant is Robles neighbor whom he cannot refuse; that he does not know Tonton
Montero; that he did frequent Verdad St., near Rogelio Robles house, neither did he go there on October 14, 1992 between 1:00 and 2:00 oclock in
the afternoon; that he is not a member of Samahang Ilocano fraternity but the United Ilocandia fraternity, a school fraternity; that he could not
remember of his fraternity being involved in any school rumble as the same is a very peaceful group which promotes brotherhood; that they did not
have a quarrel with the victim who is already dead because the latter is not studying at Arellano University; that with respect to the death of Lloyd
del Rosario, the same is an added charge (ipinatong) to him and that he was just implicated therein; that he knows nothing about it.

On cross examination, he testified that he neither saw the two prosecution witnesses before nor did he know of any grudge which said witnesses
have against him; and that he does not know of any reason why they would testify against him and identify him as one of the killers of Lloyd del
Rosario.

Marte Soriano, testified among others that he was at the house of Gari Bibat at Reten St., Sampaloc, Manila, attending the birthday (party) of Garis
mother on October 14, 1992; that Gari Bibat was reviewing his studies at that time in preparation for an oral examination. After taking lunch, he,
together with Gari, went to school (Arellano University) at around 12:00 noon. There, he reviewed his lessons in preparation for his exams while Gari
Bibat had a group study with his classmates until 2:00 P.M. when Gari went inside the classroom. He knew that Gari Bibat had an exam that day at
2:00 P.M. because he (witness) is also studying at Arellano University. The next time he saw the accused was two (2) days after October 14, 1992.

Lino Asuncion III, testified among others: that he is a classmate of Gari Bibat at Arellano University; that their common subject on MWF is Math 2,
English 2, Computer 2; that they had a last/final oral examination in Computer 2 on October 14, 1992; that he saw Gari Bibat in school on that day at
about 1:00 P.M.; that he and Gari Bibat took the said last final oral exam; that they both left the room at the same time at 4:30 P.M.

Rogelio Robles - (was recalled to the stand to testify contrary to what he had previously stated in court). He testified inter alia that he did not really
see what transpired on October 14, 1992 at 1:30 oclock in 6the (sic) afternoon; that he only assisted the parents of the victim because they come
from the same place; that the father of the victim handed to him the handwritten statement which he (witness) based his previous testimony; that
he did not actually see the killing.

On December 27, 1995, the court a quo handed down its decision in question; disposing, thus:

Wherefore, with all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused GARI BIBAT Y Descargar, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P49,786.14 as actual
damages; and to pay P50,000.00 as and for moral damages, with costs.

SO ORDERED.

Appellant places reliance on the assignment of errors, that:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE ALLEGED EYEWITNESSES NONA AVILA CINCO AND
ROGELIO ROBLES.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE VERSION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT THAT HE WAS NOT AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME WHEN
THE SAME HAPPENED.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF EVIDENT PREMEDITATION.

FIRST ISSUE:

CREDIBILITY OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES

The Court discerns no basis for disturbing the finding and conclusion arrived at below on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

In the matter of credibility of witnesses, we reiterate the familiar and well-entrenched rule that the factual findings of the trial court should be
respected. The judge a quo was in a better position to pass judgment on the credibility of witnesses, having personally heard them when they
testified and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. It is doctrinally settled that the evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses by
the trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect, because it had the opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and detect if
they were telling the truth. This assessment is binding upon the appellate court in the absence of a clear showing that it was reached arbitrarily or
that the trial court had plainly overlooked certain facts of substance or value that if considered might affect the result of the case.[3]

As well explained by the Solicitor General, Persons do not necessarily react uniformly to a given situation, for what is natural to one may be strange
to another.[4] Verily, there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange and startling experience.[5]

It was thus natural for Nona Cinco to just have stayed at the sidelines. She is a woman who could not have prevented the armed appellant from
stabbing the victim, anyway. The suddenness of the happening and Nona Cincos fear for her own life must have prevented her from shouting for
help.[6]

Delay in divulging the name of the perpetrator of the crime, if sufficiently reasoned out, does not impair the credibility of a witness and his
testimony nor destroy its probative value. It has become judicial notice that fear of reprisal is a valid cause for the momentary silence of the
prosecution witness.[7]

In the case at bench, witness Nona Avila Cinco gave an eyewitness account of the killing complained of in a categorical and straightforward manner.

Appellant belittles the fact that Nona Cinco remembers the stabbing incident to the minutest details. According to him, this is alright if the crime just
happened, or after the happening of the crime, the witness FORTHWITH reported the matter to the proper authorities. Unfortunately, the witness
reported the said incident after NINE (9) LONG MONTHS.

It does not appear that it was impossible for Nona Cinco to have a detailed recollection of the stabbing sued upon. Even before the incident, she
already saw the accused with some companions inside Funeraria Gloria and overheard the plan to kill someone. At that time, she was only about
one (1) meter from the accused and his companions. And when she proceeded to Honrades Street, she and the accused walked along with and even
looked at each other.

At the time when the stabbing in question was taking place, Nona Cinco was only four to five meters away. The possibility of her recalling even the
minutest details cannot therefore be ruled out.

Appellant faults Nona Cinco for reporting the stabbing incident to the police authorities only after nine (9) months, and for her apparent indifference
during the incident, doing nothing even while witnessing a cruel and gruesome crime.

Appellant also theorizes that Nona Cinco was lying when she testified that she was taking bets for a PBA game on October 14,1992, a Wednesday.
Claiming that PBA games are held only on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays; appellant concludes that She lies on a simple or minor thing, all the
more, she can lie on a bigger scale.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General pointed out that: There are 100 combinations which bettors can try their luck on the so-called PBA game
ending and, therefore, 100 corresponding bets should be collected for maximum profit. It was not farfetched, therefore, for Nona Cinco to collect
bets a day or two before the actual PBA games which would decide the winning bet.

Besides, the lie alluded pertains to an insignificant matter which does not affect the material details of the stabbing incident, and the unequivocal
eyewitness account of the killing of the victim, Lloyd del Rosario. The maxim or rule falsus in unos, falsus in omnibus does not lay down a categorical
test of credibility. It is not a positive rule of law of universal application. It should not be applied to portions of the testimony corroborated by other
evidence particularly where the false portions could be innocent mistakes. Moreover, the rule is not mandatory but merely sanctions a disregard of
the testimony of the witness if the circumstances so warrant. To completely disregard all the testimony of a witness on this ground, his testimony
must have been false as to a material point, and the witness must have a conscious and deliberate intention to falsify a material point.[8]

SECOND ISSUE:

THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI

The accused relies on the defense of alibi, an inherently weak defense.[9] In a long line of cases, this court has held that alibi is generally considered
a weak defense because of the facility with which it can be fabricated. Thus, courts have always looked upon it with suspicion. Well-settled is the
rule that for alibi to prevail, it must be established by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely that he was somewhere else.[10]

Appellant failed to convince the court that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at G. Tuazon cor. Ma. Cristina Sts. He
claimed that during the stabbing incident at around 1:30 p.m., he was reviewing for an oral examination in his subject of Computer 2 at the Arellano
University. But as the trial court noted, the situs of the crime was not far from Arellano University such that granting arguendo that the accused was
initially at the Arellano University, he could have easily sneaked back to the scene of the crime considering that the two places are just near each
other.[11]

To buttress his theory that he was actually reviewing for his final oral examination in Computer 2 at the very time the crime occurred, he alleged
that he received a grade of 2.25 in said subject. But aside from his testimony and that of Lino Asuncion, no other evidence was presented to
substantiate this submission. Appellant should have, at least, exhibited his class card or grading sheet to show that he did really take an examination
in that subject.

Furthermore, positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying
on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law.[12]

In the instant case, prosecution witness Nona Cinco positively identified appellant as the culprit. Another prosecution witness, Rogelio Robles,
testified to the actual killing of the victim by appellant. Although the latter recanted, the lower court correctly held that the later retraction made by
Rogelio Robles does not by itself render his previous testimony false or perjured because the same testimony appears to be credible and worthy of
belief.[13] Then too, affidavits of recantation are considered as exceedingly unreliable because they can be easily secured from poor and ignorant
witnesses usually for monetary consideration and most likely to be repudiated afterwards.[14]

THIRD ISSUE:

THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF EVIDENT PREMEDITATION

Appellant argues that the trial court erroneously appreciated evident premeditation against him. Assuming for the sake of argument that he is the
felon, the crime he committed is not MURDER but HOMICIDE,[15] he maintains.

Appellant correctly states the rule that the circumstance which would qualify the killing to murder must be proved as convincingly as the crime
itself.[16]

Here, we are of the irresistible conclusion that the attendance of evident premeditation to qualify the killing complained of to murder is borne out
by the evidence.

There is evident premeditation when the following requisites are met:

1. The time when the offender determined (conceived) to commit the crime;
2. An act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and
3. A sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[17]

The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out
the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.[18]

The appellant, in his brief, implies that the first requisite of evident premeditation was not sufficiently proven, contending, that:

xxx the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was appreciated by the trial court based solely on the testimony of witness Rogelio
Robles. The said witness testified that accused-appellant and several others often met in his (Rogelio Robles) house. In one of their meetings,
accused-appellant and his companions hid some guns and tusok in the said witness house. Other than these testimonies, the trial court proffered no
other rationale to justify the application of evident premeditation.[19]

At first glance, it may seem that the first requisite of evident premeditation, [i.e. the time when the offender determined (conceived) to commit the
crime], was appreciated by the lower court solely on the basis of the testimony of Rogelio Robles.

Appellant theorizes that the testimony of Robles is not believable; ratiocinating, thus :

xxx such testimonies which were retracted by Rogelio Robles cannot by any yardstick be considered credible in itself. It simply defy human
experience. For evidence to be believed, it is basic that it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be CREDIBLE IN
ITSELF. (Emphasis supplied; Layug v. Sandiganbayan and People of the Phil., supra; Tuason v. C.A., supra; Lee Eng Hong v. C.A., 241 SCRA 392) If it
were true that accused-appellant and several others planned the subject killing, they would not be crazy enough to have openly discussed the same
in the presence of another person (TSN, June 30, 1994, p. 9). They would be very discreet about it because even the most unlearned or unschooled
person would know that killing is against the law of man and of God. If indeed they have planned it, they did it in complete secrecy. More, there is
no explanation why of all places, accused-appellant and his group met at Rogelio Robles house. The latter is only the neighbor of the alleged
president of the formers organization. Worse, accused-appellant and his group hid some guns (Ibid., p. 11) and tusoks (Ibid., p. 22), in Rogelio Robles
house. Any person who is in his right frame of mind would not allow anybody to use his house as an armory so to speak or for any illegal purposes.

Appellant faults Rogelio Robles for his utter lack of concern knowing fully well that the appellant and his companions were planning to kill someone
and even allowed them to hide guns and tusok in his house. But the reason for the apparent indifference of Robles could be gleaned from the
following revelation :

ATTY. CALIMAG:

Q - And when they left your house and took the tusok and left the guns, you know very well from Tonton Montero that they are going to kill
somebody, am I right?
A - In school. I did not know that the one they will kill is from my place.
Q - Now, my question you know that they are going to kill somebody, what did you do, if any as a concerned citizen?
A - What if they turn their ire on me.

COURT:
Aside from that English translation, you put on record the Tagalog answer of the witness: a Eh, kung ako naman ang pagbalingan.

ATTY. CALIMAG
Q - Now, Mr. Witness, why it took you so long to come out and testify, if you really know the truth about this matter?
A - Because the parents of the victim were still mad or angry, what would happen to me if I tell them early, what if they said that I am a part of it.
Q - Why, what do you think about yourself, are you not a part of it, Mr. Witness? Because you failed to report this matter immediately to the police
officer?
A - I kept it to myself for fear that my brother and sisters might be involved, what will happen to me.

Fully aware that the appellant and his companions were armed with guns and tusok, it was but natural for Robles to just observe the protagonists
and not get involved. Fear for his own life and that of his family may have overcome whatever humanitarian inclination he had as a concerned
citizen.

Besides, even without the testimony of Rogelio Robles, the presence of the first requisite of evident premeditation appears to have been thoroughly
and sufficiently established. The determination or conception of the plan to kill the victim could be deduced from the outward circumstances that
happened on the fateful day of October 14, 1992. Records show that at 11:30 in the morning of October 14, 1992, prosecution witness Nona Cinco
saw the accused with some companions at Funeraria Gloria. She personally heard the plan to kill someone. Another prosecution witness, Florencio
Castro, who works at the Funeraria Gloria also saw the group of Gari Bibat in the said place. At around 1:30 in the afternoon, Nona Cinco saw the
appellant for the second time. She saw the appellant hurry towards the victim, take a pointed thing from a notebook and with the use of such
weapon, stabbed the victim on the chest. These overt acts clearly evinced that the appellant clung to his resolution to kill the victim.

From the time Nona Cinco heard the plan to kill someone at 11:30 up to the killing incident at 1:30 in the afternoon of the same day, there was a
sufficient lapse of time for appellant to reflect on the consequences of his dastardly act.
As held in the case of People v. Dumdum[20] the killing of the deceased was aggravated by evident premeditation, because the accused conceived
of the assault at least one hour before its perpetration. In the case under examination, two hours had elapsed from the time appellant clung to his
determination to kill the victim up to the actual perpetration of the crime.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 85735 January 18, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULIO LUG-AW and ROGELIO BANNAY alias JUNIOR BANNAY, defendant-appellants.

ROMERO, J.:

This case demonstrates how passion can sway people who perceive that their right to till the soil is being violated — Carlos Pal-loy was shot to death
as he was fencing the boundary limits of the land he was farming by persons identified with the owner of the land adjacent to his own and with
whom Pal-loy had a boundary dispute.

Pal-loy was farming part of the communal forest land located in Sitio Kalipkip, Sto. Niño, Maddela, Quirino. Despite the boundary dispute between
him and his neighbor, Conchita Tipon (Nipol or Ngipol), on December 12, 1985, Pal-loy straightened out the boundary line by putting up a fence
allegedly upon the instruction of the public forester.1

As Pal-loy went about the task, his 13-year old-daughter, Sonia, and another daughter named Carina, followed him around. Pal-loy was proceeding
towards the house when Sonia heard a gun report. Immediately, she went uphill and just as a second gun report resounded, she saw Rogelio Bannay
and Julio Lug-aw from a distance of around four meters. She saw, too, that as her father was about to draw his bolo, Lug-aw shot him.

Approaching here father, she found him wounded on the right shoulder and the lower portion of the breast. Pal-loy asked her to call her mother.
Sonia obeyed and together with her mother, they returned to him. He told them that his assailants were Lug-aw and Bannay. Her mother told her to
seek help but no one responded. It was only when her mother herself called for help that Boy Culap, Gorio Gay-yaman and Patumbay Immul-yap
came to their assistance. They brought Pal-loy to their house.

According to Sonia, Lug-aw was behind a tree stump when he shot her father. Bannay, who was with Lug-aw, was hiding and he did not do
anything.2 She was around ten meters from the two but she could not have seen them had she and her sister Carina not climbed a tree after the
first shot. After shooting Pal-loy, Lug-aw ran towards the left side of Pal-loy with Bannay following him. Sonia saw the gun used in shooting hr father
but could not tell its caliber.3

Carmen, Pal-loy's wife, was at home at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 12, 1985 when he heard a gun report which was followed
by another shot three minutes later. She rushed to where she thought she heard the shots and found her daughters hiding behind the stump of a
tree near their father. Her daughters informed her that their father's assailants were Julio
Lug-aw and Junior Bannay, the nephew of Conchita Tipon. Her husband himself corroborated this and told her, "Awan sabali nga pimmaltog,
nangpatay kaniak no haan nga ni Julio Lug-aw kenni Rogelio Bannay" meaning, "nobody killed me except Lug-aw and Bannay."4

Instructing her daughters to look after their father, Carmen forthwith proceeded to the barangay captain and councilmen of Sto. Niño to ask for
help. Since no one came to help her, she sought the assistance of her neighbors. Her husband died at around 12 o'clock midnight and they buried
him within the premises of their residence.5

Having heard of the "suspicious circumstances" surrounding the death of Pal-loy, the police station commander in Maddela requested the municipal
health officer to conduct an autopsy after the body of Pal-loy shall have been exhumed.6 For his part, the municipal health officer, Dr. Teodomiro R.
Hufana, Jr., manifested before the municipal trial judge that after the burial of Pal-loy on December 15, 1985, the police acted on the case only upon
the order of the commanding officer of the 166th PC company. Dr. Hufana also requested that the police bring down the body of Pal-loy from the
mountain as he was incapable of negotiating the six-kilometer distance to the place where Pal-loy was buried.7

Upon exhuming the body on July 7, 1987, Dr. Hufana found it dressed in white T-shirt and wrapped in a blanket. The bones were all in "chronological
order" and there were four pellets in the lower quadrant of the abdomen and three pellets in the thoracic cage. There were two holes on the right
side of the back of the T-shirt which were "probably the exit of the two pellets." According to Dr. Hufana, Pal-loy could have died of "severe
hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound."8

The police filed before the municipal trial court of Maddela a complaint for murder against Lug-aw and Bannay on October 29, 1986.9 Bannay was
arrested on November 18, 1986 while Lug-aw was apprehended the following day. 10 The court thereafter fixed their bailbond at P20,000.00 each
11 but it was later reduced to P12,000.00 each. 12 Lug-aw and Bannay were then ordered released from custody in an Order dated January 26, 1987
upon posting of the bailbond. 13 On May 19, 1987, the following information was filed against them:

That on or about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 12, 1985 in barangay Sto. Niño, Municipality of Maddela, Province of Quirino,
Philippines, the above-named accused, armed with firearms, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
attended with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, shot CARLOS PAL-LOY which caused the
death of the latter.

That the crime was attended by the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Testifying in his own defense, Julio Lug-aw, the son-in-law of Conchita Nipol, swore that he was plowing his farm in Nalungtutan, Nagtipunan,
Quirino around 16 to 17 kilometers away from Sitio Kalipkip, Sto. Niño, Maddela, Quirino when the shooting occurred. Sitio Kalipkip can be reached
on foot from Nalungtutan for five (5) hours as the road between them can be negotiated only by a 6 x 6 truck when the river is shallow. He denied
farming his mother-in-law's agricultural land in Sitio Kalipkip as he never set foot therein except when he got married. He expressed amazement at
Sonia Pal-loy's testimony that he was the gunwielder, repeatedly denying any grudges between him and the victim's family. 14

Rogelio Bannay whose house in Nalungtutan was around fifty meters away from that of Lug-aw, testified that when the crime occurred, he was at
home "peeling peanuts" with his wife. He had gone to Sto. Niño in January 1984 to attend a wedding but he had not been to Sitio Kalipkip. He
belonged to the same Ifugao tribe as Carlos and Carmen Pal-loy and the latter was his barriomate in Banawe. Like Lug-aw, he disclaimed bearing any
grudge against Pal-loy and his family. Bannay Buanan and Conchita Nipol, his relatives in Sitio Kalipkip, indeed had a farm adjacent to the kaingin of
Pal-loy but he learned from his relatives that they and Pal-loy enjoyed "good company" (timpuyog). 15

Both alibis of Lug-aw and Bannay were supported by Jovito Pascual, the barangay captain of San Dionisio II, Nagtipunan, Quirino, who testified that
when the crime transpired, he saw Lug-aw plowing his farm with four other persons. He also saw Bannay "peeling peanuts" at home. 16 In its effort
to discredit the testimony of Sonia Pal-loy, the defense presented Mario Lingay, a farmer and storekeeper in Dipintin, Sangbay East, Nagtipunan,
Quirino, who testified that on December 13, 1985, two of Pal-loy's children came to his store to buy petroleum gas and gas and when he asked them
who killed their father, both allegedly replied, "I don't know." Lingay asked the children's names but in a rush, they failed to answer him. Only later
did he learn that their names were Sonia and Carmen. 17

In its decision of September 8, 1988, the lower court 18 ruled that the alibi and denial interposed by the defense cannot overcome the positive
identification of the accused by Sonia Pal-loy. Appreciating both treachery and evident premeditation against the accused, the lower court disposed
of the case, as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the prosecution had proven the guilt of the accused Julio Lug-aw and Rogelio Bannay beyond
reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the accused ROGELIO BANNAY and JULIO LUG-AW are hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
plus the accessory penalties provided by law and they are further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim Carlos
Pal-loy in the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos. Cost against the accused.

SO ORDERED.

The accused then filed a motion for "new trial and/or consideration" based on the "inefficient legal service" rendered by the CLAO (Citizens Legal
Assistance Office) which allegedly denied the accused due process and prevented them from properly ventilating their cause. 19 Attached to the
motion were the affidavits of: (1) Bannay attesting to the fact that before the promulgation of the decision, Carmen Pal-loy, the victim's widow,
twice approached him begging for forgiveness; telling him that she was just induced to frame up the accused and expressed her willingness to testify
to prove that both accused were innocent; (2) Fernando Lablalong, stating that he was with Lug-aw plowing the field on December 12, 1985; that he
was in the house of Bannay when Carmen Pal-loy confessed that she and her daughters were induced to point to the accused as the killers, and that
he confirmed the fact that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime, and (3) Gregorio Gayyaman, swearing
that he was one of those who helped Carmen bring her dead husband home; that being a relative of Pal-loy, he asked Carmen the name of the killer
but she replied that she did not know; that while he and the others made Pal-loy's coffin , no mention of the names of the accused as the killers;
that it was only after Carmen had lived with one Carlos Capinpin that the accused became the suspects in the killing and that he was surprised that
after the victim's family had informed him that there was no evidence as to who killed Pal-loy, the names of the accused suddenly cropped up.

After the prosecution had filed its comment on the motion, the lower court denied the same in an Order dated September 8, 1988 explaining that
the testimonies of Lablalong and Gayyaman could not be considered newly-discovered evidence because the defense had all the opportunity to
present them as witnesses at the trial. The court also turned the claim of the defense regarding the incompetence of counsel stating that, if upheld,
there would be no end to a suit as long as a new counsel could be employed by the accused. 20

The defense filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order quoting the "treatise" of then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez on "forgotten
evidence" under Rule 37 of the Rules of Court and ineffective counsel. 21 Attached to the motion were the affidavits of: (1) Rosalina Bookan stating
that Carmen Pal-loy, her townmate, admitted to her that the accused were not the real culprits and that Carmen was advised against recanting her
testimony which might subject her to persecution, and (2) Carmen Pal-loy swearing that her husband "did not state categorically and clearly that it
was the accused Julio Lug-aw and Rogelio Bannay who shot him" and that she did tell Bookan and the spouses Rogelio and Julie Bannay that her
husband did not say that the accused perpetrated the crime.

In its Order of October 7, 1988, the lower court denied the motion and held that it was Sonia Pal-loy and not her mother, Carmen, who is the
principal witness to the killing and that the alleged ineffective legal assistance is not a ground for new trial. 22 Hence, the instant appeal.

The appellants contend that the lower court erred in finding that they were positively identified as the culprits and that the victim's wife and
daughter Sonia were present when the crime was perpetrated. They also assail the lower court's finding that there was a conspiracy between them
in killing Pal-loy.

As in most criminal cases, the linchpin in the resolution of this case is the credibility of the witnesses. Times without number, this Court has declared
that the findings of the trial court on this matter should not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of substance and value have
been overlooked which, if considered, might well affect the result of the case. This doctrine is premised on the undisputed fact that, since the trial
court has the best opportunity of observing the demeanor of the witnesses while on the stand, it can discern whether the witnesses are telling the
truth or not. 23 We find no cogent reason to depart from this doctrine.

As expected, the appellants zeroed in on the testimony of Sonia Pal-loy, the only eyewitness presented by the prosecution. They contend that Sonia
did not actually witness how her father was shot. In support of this contention, appellants cite discrepancies between her sworn statement and her
testimony in open court. They assert that her failure to specifically name the two persons running away from the scene of the crime cast a doubt on
her testimony that she saw Lug-aw shooting her father. 24

The Court has always discouraged reliance on affidavits as a basis for resolving a criminal case. In People v. Caranzo 25 the Court said that "affidavits
being taken ex parte usually are incomplete and often inaccurate, caused sometimes from partial suggestions, sometimes for want of suggestions
and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of
the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that belongs to the subject." As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, Sonia's failure to name the appellants in her sworn statement could be attributed to her tender years and the trauma and shock she had
experienced after having witnessed the horrifying killing of her father.

The gaps in Sonia's sworn statement were, however more than offset by her testimony during the preliminary investigation conducted by the
municipal trial judge on November 12, 1986 wherein she testified, thus:
Q Who is your father?
A Carlos Palloy, sir.
Q Where is your father now?
A He was killed, sir.
Q Who killed him?
A Julio Lug-aw and Junior Bannay, sir.
Q Why do you know that your father was killed by Julio Lug-aw and Junior Bannay?

A I saw them shoot my father, sir.

Q Between the two, Julio Lug-aw and Junior Bannay, who shot your father?
A Julio Lug-aw, sir.
Q What kind of gun did you see they used to shoot your father?
A Long, sir.
Q How far were you when you saw Lug-aw shot your father?
A About four meters, sir, from my father, sir.
Q Where were Julio Lug-aw and Junior Bannay at the time when they shot your father?
A They were hiding behind a trunk of a tree, sir.
Q Did you tell your mother that your father was shot?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you heard the gun report and your father was shot what did you do?
A I called my mother, sir.
Q (Did) you have a companion at the time when you heard a gun report?
A Yes, sir my sister Carlina.
Q How many gun report(s) did you hear (from) the direction of your father?
A Two, sir.
Q And the gun report(s) (were) all in the direction of your father?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was your father doing when he was shot?
A He was driving a peg on the ground when he was shot and when he was shot he tried to draw his bolo but he was prevented when (sic)
drawing his bolo because they hit him on his arm, sir.
Q Before your father died did you talk to him?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did he tell you if any?
A He said that "IF I DIE MY ASSAILANT(S) WHO KILL (ED) BY SHOOTING ARE JULIO LUG-AW AND JUNIOR BANNAY." (Emphasis supplied). 26

During the trial, Sonia clung tenaciously to her story and testified that it was during the second gun report that he saw Lug-aw shot her father. Sonia
testified as follows:
Q You said while you were at a lower place where your father was you heard a gun report, what did you do when you heard the gun report?
A We went uphill, sir.
Q When you were going uphill, what transpired?
A On the second time that he was shot we saw them, sir.
Q And who were those whom you saw?
A Rogelio and Julio, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q You said you saw these persons who shot your father, who actually shot your father?
A Julio Lug-aw, sir.
Q What was your father doing at the time Julio Lug-aw shot your father?
A He was about to draw his bolo but the bolo was thrown away, sir.
Q And how far were you at the time when you saw Julio Lug-aw shot your father?
A Four (4) meters, sir. (Emphasis supplied.) 27

In their attempt to discredit Sonia, the appellants pointed out that the normal reaction of a person to such a traumatic happening would be to flee.
However, no hard and fast rule can be laid down with respect to the reaction of persons to the same situation. Running to one's father who has
been shot to give him succor is equally a normal reaction of any daughter.

The failure of the defense to attribute any ill motive on the part of Sonia in order to pin responsibility on the appellant adds more credence to her
testimony. In fact, both appellants admitted before the court that there was no reason for Sonia to testify against them. Indeed, it is inconceivable
for a
13-year-old who barely finished third grade to impute a very serious offense on anyone unless it were true. If she were merely fabricating her
testimony, she would have broken down during the intensive cross-examination at the stand. Al contrario, as observed by the trial court, Sonia was
"natural in her manners" and testified "straight forwardly."

Her positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime demolished their alibi and denial. Even standing alone, such positive sole
testimony is enough basis for conviction. 28 Thus, even if we lend credence to defense's claim that the victim's widow, Carmen, prevaricated as
shown by the fact that she allegedly tried to recant after the termination of the trial, Sonia's testimony suffices as a basis for a finding of guilt.
Noteworthy is the fact that, unlike her daughters Sonia and Carina, Carmen was not an eyewitness.

Hence, it is principally from Sonia's testimony that we conclude that the crime committed was not murder but homicide. The qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court drew the conclusion of the
presence of treachery because the attack was sudden as Pal-loy was simply going about his task of fencing his kaingin. We find however, that no one
witnessed the initial attack. As Sonia herself testified, she heard the first shot, went up a hill, climbed a tree and from there, saw Lug-aw shooting
her father with the shot reverberating as the second gun report. Nowhere do we find in the records any evidence that she witnessed the first shot
nor how her father reacted to it. What she did see was her father trying to repel the assault with a bolo but he failed because a second shot hit him.
As this Court held in People v. Castor, 29 where the lone eyewitness was not able to observe the commencement of the assault, he could not,
therefore, testify on how it all began and developed. Citing United States v. Perdon 30 and United States v. Pangilion, 31 the Court held in the Castor
case that absent any particulars as to the manner in which the aggression commenced or how the act resulted in the death of the victim unfolded,
treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing to murder.
Similarly, the records are bereft of evidence that the crime was committed with evident premeditation. The three requisites of this aggravating
circumstance, namely, the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his
determination and a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow the accused opportunity to reflect upon the
consequences of his act, 32 are wanting in the case at bar. Evident premeditation was, therefore, incorrectly appreciated by the trial court. 33

While the guilt of Lug-aw, the gunwielder, has been established beyond reasonable doubt, the complicity of his companion, Bannay, is open to
question. As regards his participation in the crime, Sonia testified as follows:

Q At the time Julio Lug-aw shot your father, what was the other accused Rogelio Bannay also doing at that time?
A He was hiding, sir.
Q Did you notice if he has a firearm?

ATTY. FLORES —

Objection.

FISCAL FERNANDEZ —
Q What did you notice to (sic) Rogelio Bannay when he was hiding?
A None, sir.
Q And what was the participation of Rogelio Bannay if any in connection with the shooting of your father?
A None, sir.

COURT —
Q (To the witness) But he was there near Julio Lug-aw?
A Yes, Your Honor. 34

Additionally, Sonia stated that after Lug-aw shot her father, Bannay followed him in running away. 35 Bannay's presence at the scene of the crime
was also proven by the victim's declaration that Bannay and Lug-aw were his assailants. While these circumstances and utterances may prove
Bannay's presence at the scene of the crime, unless conspiracy is proven, these do not, by themselves, indicate criminal culpability. The quantum of
evidence required for a finding that Bannay was in conspiracy with Lug-aw has not been met. Conspiracy, as with any other ingredient of the
offense, must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself through clear and convincing evidence and not merely by conjecture. As such, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is required. 36

There is conspiracy when two (2) or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 37 Direct
proof, however, is not essential to prove conspiracy. It may be shown by acts or circumstances from which maybe logically inferred the existence of
a common design among the accused to commit the offense charged; it may likewise be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense
was perpetrated. 38 To extricate himself from criminal liability, the conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself
from the unlawful plan to commit the felony. 39

There is no evidence that Bannay shared Lug-aw's criminal intent. Thus, although he did not do anything in contravention of the supposed
conspiracy, his mere passive presence at the scene of the crime did not make him liable therefor. 40 Moreover, the prosecution failed to show other
facts and circumstances, aside form Bannay's presence near Lug-aw as the latter committed the dastardly act and following Lug-aw as he ran away,
from which a community of interest and design between the two may be construed. The prosecution's weakness in this respect cannot be taken
against Bannay. We should take into account the doctrine that, in case of doubt as to the culpability of an accused, it should be resolved in
accordance with the presumption of innocence.

Homicide under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code is punishable by reclusion temporal. In the absence of any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the penalty imposable is the medium degree of reclusion temporal. 41 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty that
should be imposed on Lug-aw is ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as minimum penalty to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal medium as maximum penalty. Pursuant to the latest jurisprudence, Lug-aw shall indemnify the heirs of Carlos Pal-loy
in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).

WHEREFORE, appellant Julio Lug-aw is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide under Art. 249 of the Revised penal Code for killing
Carlos Pal-loy and he shall serve the indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as minimum penalty to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium as maximum penalty, and indemnify the heirs of Carlos Pal-loy in the
amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00). Appellant Rogelio Bannay is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged and he shall be released from
custody immediately. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 70392 June 30, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REGINO CAMILET, defendant-appellant.

FERNAN, J.:

Convicted of murder and sentenced to "life imprisonment" by the Regional Trial Court in Iloilo, Regino Camilet interposed this appeal.

The information filed on October 25, 1982 by the Provincial Fiscal in the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo stated thus:

That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1982 in the Municipality of Leon, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above- named accused, armed and with the use of a deadly weapon, a knife, with treachery and evident premeditation and taking
advantage of nighttime to better realize his purpose and in utter disregard of the rank [barangay captain] and age [62 years old] of his victim, with
deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, stab and hit Perfecto Camancho,
Sr. who at the time was in the performance of his duty as barangay captain, thereby inflicting upon said Perfecto Camancho, Sr. a stab wound at the
left middle inguenal [sic] region [stomach] which directly caused his death immediately thereafter.

At the arraignment on April 20, 1983, Camilet pleaded not guilty.

The prosecution's version of the crime is as follows:

At around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of July 2, 1982, a Baptist prayer meeting was held at the residence of Barangay Captain Perfecto Camancho, Sr.
in Coyogan Sur, Leon, Iloilo. After the prayer meeting, the members of the group stayed in that house and whiled away their time conversing with
each other.

Shortly before 9:00 o'clock, Dione [Jolly] Camancho, a dumb nephew of Perfecto, Sr., arrived crying. By making signs with his hands and fingers,
Dione communicated to the group that he was strangled and hit on his buttocks by someone at a certain place. He asked Perfecto, Sr. to go with him
to the place where he was attacked to locate the person who choked and hit him.

Although it was a moonlit night, Perfecto, Sr. brought along his flashlight. Accompanied by Dione, Perfecto Camancho, Jr., Rosita Camayo and Cobin
[Joven] Cagayao, Perfecto, Sr. went to the place indicated by Dione.

When they had walked a distance of around 150 meters, Camilet suddenly stepped from a grove of banana plants and, without word or warning,
stabbed Perfecto, Sr. with a one- foot-long, sharp-bladed knife. Perfecto, Sr. exclaimed "To Reno, ginbuno mo ako" [To Reno, you stabbed me].
Cagayao also heard Perfecto, Sr. say, "You flee"

Perfecto, Jr., who was seven meters behind Perfecto, Sr., stopped in his tracks after he saw his father being stabbed by Camilet. He also saw his
father grappling momentarily with Camilet and then both fell down the ground. He then went to a barangay official to ask for help.

Cagayao, who was around eight feet from Perfecto, Sr., ran away from the scene after he heard Perfecto, Sr. telling them to flee. Rosita, who was
eight meters away from Perfecto, Sr., also scampered away after she heard him say that Camilet had stabbed him.

Perfecto, Sr. sustained a stab wound with a 5-centimeter entrance at his left inguinal region. His large intestine, which was injured, protruded. When
autopsied, his intra-abdominal cavity revealed a great amount of blood clot [Exhibit A]. He died because of the massive hemorrhage caused by the
stab wound [Exhibit B].

The Camancho family incurred expenses in the total amount of P4,520 for the burial and interment of Perfecto, Sr. [Exhibits C and D].

The defense presents another story. Witness Emilio Cachila related in court that on the night of July 2, 1982, while he was on his way home, he saw
Perfecto, Sr. and his children, Sherwin, Perfecto, Jr. and Niel. Perfecto, Sr. was standing near the dike along the road. Later on, Camilet arrived,
Perfecto, Sr. told Camilet, "Reno, so you are here. I will kill you. Your soul has no value to me. "

Camilet, a 43-year old farmer, testified that he was walking along the road to his mother-in-law's house to ask for help in planting rice the following
morning when the Camanchos "waylaid" him. Perfecto, Sr. allegedly hit his mouth with a hammer and knocked off five of his teeth. He fell down on
the muddy ricefield. As he stood up, Sherwin struck him on the shoulder with the muzzle of an air rifle. He fell down again and received another
blow from Sherwin's air rifle. Once again, he fell on the mud. Sherwin hit his left eye which caused it to swell.

Camilet's wife, Thelma, who came to his aid after hearing the shout of Perfecto, Sr., tried to help by lifting Camilet up from the mud. While Thelma
was leading him home, he pulled out his one-foot-long knife, swung it and hit someone whose identity he did not know. He only learned that he
wounded and killed Perfecto, Sr. the following morning. Camilet was brought to the Aleosan General Hospital where his injuries required treatment
for ten days.

The trial court discredited Camilet's claim of self-defense. If Perfecto, Sr. really hit Camilet with a hammer, which assault would have constituted
unlawful aggression, Camilet would have been rendered unconscious. If Sherwin really attacked him, Camilet would have filed a case against him.
And, if it were true that his wife came to his rescue, then the Camanchos would have attacked her as well. During the trial, when Camilet opened his
mouth to show the alleged missing teeth, the court observed that he had lost them due to decay.
The trial court found him guilty of murder aggravated by disregard of rank and sentenced him to "life imprisonment". It ordered Camilet to pay the
heirs of Perfecto Camancho, Sr. total damages amounting to P35,000.

In this appeal, Camilet alleges that the lower court erred in not holding that he acted in self-defense, and in convicting him. He avers that the injuries
he suffered from the Camanchos caused his hospitalization. He prays that he be acquitted of murder.
We agree with the Solicitor General that Camilet's claim of self-defense is devoid of merit. Camilet's testimony that he had a knife with him because
he had to prepare his ricefield and at the same time make bamboo stakes for the dike is simply incredible. Those tasks are not performed at night. It
is more likely that he was preparing for an encounter with Perfecto, Sr. or any of his children.

It should be noted that prior to the incident described earlier, there was a misunderstanding between the Camanchos and Camilet. According to one
of Perfecto's sons, Niel, his land and the land of Camilet's mother-in-law were adjoining each other. Camilet worked in the latter land. A dispute over
a portion of that land was referred to the barangay captain who happened to be Perfecto, Sr.

In the presence of the barangay councilmen, the dispute was settled when Camilet's mother-in-law agreed to turn over the disputed land to Niel.
That settlement apparently did not satisfy Camilet. In fact, that morning of July 2, 1982, he passed by that land and warned Niel that he and his
family should be careful [TSN, February 27, 1984, pp. 4-6]. Camilet himself related in his sworn statement taken by the police at the Aleosan General
Hospital, that in that encounter with the Camanchos, Perfecto, Sr. and Niel challenged him to a fight which he allegedly did not mind at all although
they harvested his corn and took the produce away [Exhibit 3].

Camilet's claim that he was attacked in unison by the Camanchos is an attempt at self-exoneration. Considering their number, the Camanchos could
have succeeded in killing him, and, his wife who allegedly arrived to help him, would also have been harmed.

That Camilet was hospitalized after that incident is an accepted fact. However, Exhibit 2 shows that he sustained only superficial injuries. Doctor
Alejandro C. Caelian, his attending physician at the Aleosan General Hospital, made the following findings:

1. Lacerated wound bridge of the noses superficial 2cm.

2. Contusion and swelling of the supra orbital region, left.
3. Contusion, hematoma, infra orbital region, left.
4. Lacerated wound, superficial 2 cm. lateral angle of the left eye.
5. Conjunctival hemorrhage and swelling of the eyeball, left.
6. Swelling of the mandibular region, left.
7. Depress[ed] portion of the 7th rib posterior to the axillary line.

Doctor Caelian certified that barring complications, those injuries would heal in seven to ten days.

Those injuries may prove that a scuffle or "grappling" occurred between Perfecto, Sr. and Camilet. It is possible that during that momentary
grappling between the two, Perfecto, Sr. hit Camilet with his flashlight. Emilio Cachila's testimony that Perfecto, Sr. "stabbed an instrument" at
Camilet [TSN, November 28, 1984, p. 7] was totally ignored by the trial court.

If no unlawful aggression attributable to the victim is established, there can be no self-defense, either complete or incomplete [People vs. Gamut L-
34517, November 2, 1982, 118 SCRA 35]. However, by invoking self-defense, Camilet in effect admitted having stabbed and killed Perfecto, Sr. The
rationale for the requirement of clear and convincing proof of self-defense stems from the admission of the accused that he has killed or wounded
another which is a felony for which he should be criminally liable [Castañares vs. Court of Appeals, L-41269-70, August 6, 1979, 92 SCRA 567].

The information alleged treachery, evident premeditation, nighttime and disregard of rank and age as aggravating circumstances. The trial court's
decision, on the other hand, does not indicate what circumstance qualified the killing to murder but it considers disregard of rank an aggravating
circumstance.

As only one circumstance suffices to qualify the killing as murder [People vs. Dueño L-31102, May 5, 1979, 90 SCRA 23], either treachery or evident
premeditation must be proven.

Treachery cannot be appreciated in this case. The testimonial evidence as to the inception of the stabbing is quite nebulous. The prosecution only
succeeded in presenting the witnesses' reaction to the assault which indirectly proved its suddenness. However, mere suddenness of an attack is not
sufficient to constitute treachery where it does not appear that the aggressor adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the
killing without risk to himself [U.S. vs. Namit, 38 Phil. 926; People vs. Torejas, L- 29935, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 158].

Also, the prosecution failed to discredit Emilio Cachila's testimony that Perfecto, Sr. greeted Camilet when he saw the latter. Furthermore, it should
be noted that the fatal wound inflicted on Perfecto, Sr. was in the inguinal region or near the stomach. This shows that the attack was frontal.
Treachery does not exist where the victim is facing the assailant when the assault starts [People vs. Casiguran, L-45387, November 7, 1979, 94 SCRA
244].

Likewise, evident premeditation was not established by the prosecution. Although the facts tend to show that Camilet might have harbored ill-
feelings towards the Camanchos after they took a portion of the land he was farming and, as he himself stated to the police investigator, they also
took the produce from his cornfield, there is no proof that Camilet conceived of killing Perfecto, Sr. Indeed, there is no evidence of [1] the time when
he determined to commit the crime, [2] an act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination, and [3] sufficient lapse of time between
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his
will had he desired to hearken to its warnings [People vs. Gravino, L-31327, May 16, 1983,122 SCRA 123].

Nighttime can not be considered aggravating in this case as there is no proof that it was especially sought by Camilet to perpetuate the crime
[People vs. Villar, Jr., L-34092, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 512]. Neither could disregard of rank be aggravating here because, as correctly observed by
the Solicitor General, there is no clear evidence that Camilet committed the crime in disregard of the respect due Perfecto, Sr. as barangay captain.

In the absence of a qualifying circumstance, the fatal stabbing of Perfecto Camancho, Sr. is a homicide, not a murder. Homicide is punishable under
Articles 249 and 64[l] of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal medium as there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty is an indeterminate sentence of eight [8] years and one [1] day of prision mayor
medium as minimum to sixteen [16] years of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. In accordance with the ruling in People vs. De la Fuente, L-
63251-52, December 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 518, the indemnity is pegged at P30,000.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is modified. Appellant Regino Camilet is hereby found guilty of homicide and sentenced to eight [8]
years and one [1] day of prision mayor medium as minimum to sixteen [16] years of reclusion temporal medium as maximum, and to pay the heirs
of Perfecto Camancho, Sr. an indemnity of P30,000. Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.