SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, PETITIONER, VS. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR.
, The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision[2] and
the 14 March 2012 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of
a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre
(Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and
Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go-Bangayan (Sally)
who was a customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamin’s
family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In February
1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sally’s father was against
the relationship. On on 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought
Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage
contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage
contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During
the period of their cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the
names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of
Benjamin, married to Sally;
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783
registered in the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of
Sally as a single individual.
bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and
falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage
contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent
marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that
his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid
marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he
acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his
appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and for
the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered
properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven
properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her
answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial
court denied. Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court also denied.
Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals never
issued. Sally then refused to present any evidence before the trial court citing the
pendency of her petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial court gave Sally several
opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September
2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November 2008.
Despite repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still refused to present her evidence,
prompting the trial court to consider the case submitted for decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In a Decision[4] dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor of Benjamin. The trial
court gave weight to the certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil
Registrar, which was confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License Series Nos.
6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982 and the purported
Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin and Sally.[5] The trial court
ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage
with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous.
The trial court ruled that the second marriage was void not because of the existence of
the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage
license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the
issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley because they were not parties to
the case. The trial court denied Sally’s claim for spousal support because she was not
married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice and Bentley who
were both of legal age and did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties
she named in her answer as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court
ruled that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that Sally
was claiming were owned by Benjamin’s parents who gave the properties to their
children, including Benjamin, as advance inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of
Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase “married to Sally Go” was merely descriptive
of Benjamin’s civil status in the title. As regards the two lots under TCT Nos. 61720 and
190860, the trial court found that they were bought by Benjamin using his own money
and that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money, property or industry in
their purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots
covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two condominium
units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot under
TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units were purchased from the earnings of
Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720,
and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal partnership of
Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamin’s right to dispute his conjugal
state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin
was married to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited
Sally’s share in the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor of
Bernice and Bentley while Benjamin’s share reverted to his conjugal ownership with
Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY
S. GO on March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby
declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared NON-EXISTENT.
Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirty-seven (37)
properties under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-
73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951,
193035, 194620, 194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626,
194627, 194628, 194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634,
194635, 194636, 194637, 194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210,
206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The registered
owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo
B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of
“Sally Go” Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila
are directed to delete the words “married to Sally Go” from these
thirty[-]seven (37) titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and
8783 are properties acquired from petitioner’s money without contribution
from respondent, hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his lawful
wife. Consequently, petitioner is appointed the administrator of these five (5)
properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of her
collections of income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days
from notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is
further directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn over and
surrender control and possession of these properties including the
documents of title to the petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these
properties are under co-ownership of the parties shared by them equally.
However, the share of respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of
Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the
petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The
liquidation, partition and distribution of these two (2) properties shall be
further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15,
2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to
Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.
Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims
are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no declaration of the status of the
parties’ children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial
Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and the Registry of Deeds in Manila,
Quezon City and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.[6]

Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration.
In its Order dated 27 August 2009,[7] the trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed
the trial court’s decision before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court
of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err in submitting the case for decision. The
Court of Appeals noted that there were six resettings of the case, all made at the
instance of Sally, for the initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly warned to
present her evidence on the next hearing or the case would be deemed submitted for
decision. However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to present her evidence. She
insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not subpoenaed despite
the presence of her other witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action
for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamin’s action
was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there was no evidence that the
marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second marriage
with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court committed no error in declaring
Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null and void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the
properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37 properties being claimed by Sally
rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that
only the properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of
Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was able to establish that they were
acquired by him solely.
The Court of Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681
and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of
proof of Benjamin’s actual contribution in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that
the property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall
be owned by them in common, to be shared equally. However, the share of Benjamin
shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his existing marriage with Azucena while
Sally’s share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing proof of bad
faith.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing
evidence that would show bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would
justify his inhibition from the case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY
GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Order dated March 26, 2009 and
August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification
declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the
petitioner-appellee while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and
253681 as well as [CCT] Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely owned by the
respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by
them and common and to be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-
appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his first marriage
while the share of respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the
decision stands.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision. In its 14 March
2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming
the trial court’s ruling that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming
the trial court’s decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
null and void ab initio and non-existent; and
 (3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming
with modification the trial court’s decision regarding the property relations of
Benjamin and Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling that she
waived her right to present her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present
evidence that she and Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to
protect marriage as an inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter
of right but is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.[9] In this case, Sally’s
presentation of evidence was scheduled on 28 February 2008. Thereafter, there were six
resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October
2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all made at Sally’s instance. Before the
scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally that in case she
still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the date
of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally
insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sally’s
counsel insisted that the trial court could not dictate on the priority of witnesses to be
presented, disregarding the trial court’s prior warning due to the numerous resettings of
the case. Sally could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to present her
evidence because all the postponements were at her instance and she was warned by
the trial court that it would submit the case for decision should she still fail to present her
evidence on 28 November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she
was deemed to have waived her right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, Sally’s continued failure to present her evidence despite the opportunities given
by the trial court showed her lack of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was
clear that Sally was delaying the case because she was waiting for the decision of the
Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the trial court’s denial of her demurrer to
evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any temporary
restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to
protect marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial court also has the duty to
ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of
the parties.[10]
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage
to Benjamin because a marriage could not be non-existent and, at the same time, null
and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to present her evidence,
she would have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin,
Sally asked this Court to consider that in acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as
his wife by declaring he was “married to” her; that Benjamin was the informant in their
children’s birth certificates where he stated that he was their father; and that Benjamin
introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there
was no real property registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further
alleges that Benjamin was not the informant in the birth certificates of his children with
Azucena.
First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established
before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the
time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the
marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros),
Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no
valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only
Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February
1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series issued for the month.
Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage
License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar
is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious
circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license.[11] Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract, the
marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license.[12]
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer
IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pasig; [13] Teresita R.
Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the Records Management and Archives Office,
National Commission for Culture and the Arts;[14] and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III,
Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics Office.[15] The documentary and
testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As
pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally “was made only
in jest”[16] and “a simulated marriage, at the instance of [Sally], intended to cover her up
from expected social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially
from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives.”[17] In short, it was a fictitious
marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley
was not a proof of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that
Benjamin was the informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which stated that Benjamin and
Sally were married on 8 March 1982[18] while Sally was the informant in Bentley’s birth
certificate which also stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982.[19]
Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which did not match the
dates reflected on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and
void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a
marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no
license is necessary, “shall be void from the beginning.” In this case, the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established
that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did
not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City
for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35[20]
which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article
1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are
“inexistent and void from the beginning.”[21] Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in
sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null
and void ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed
in all aspects the trial court’s decision and ruled that “[t]he rest of the decision
stands.”[22] While the Court of Appeals did not discuss bigamous marriages, it can be
gleaned from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring that “[t]he rest of the
decision stands” that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial court’s discussion that the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous. The trial court stated:
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is
required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The
marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is
valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of
invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if
the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first
marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy
was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held
that what was committed was contracting marriage against the provisions of
laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code.
Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous because
there was no marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of
respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance,
be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has the marriage
license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be
invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena.[23]
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential
requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage.[24] In this case, there
was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage
contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the
local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article,
only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint
deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not
validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are
in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the
properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the
37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s father to his
children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court even
admitted that “Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his
children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x.”[25]
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of
Appeals is more in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by
TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.[26] The
properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin[27] with the
descriptive title “married to Sally.” The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783
were registered in the name of Sally[28] with the descriptive title “married to Benjamin”
while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name
of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words “married to” preceding the
name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.[29]
Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either
or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.[30]
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself
from hearing the case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in
presenting her evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella practically labeled her
as an opportunist in his decision, showing his partiality against her and in favor of
Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience
and sound discretion on the part of the judge.[31] To justify the call for inhibition, there
must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in
addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself.[32] In
this case, we have sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the
case for decision because of Sally’s continued refusal to present her evidence.
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used
uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his
prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would
justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Bersamin,* Del Castillo, and Perez, JJ., concur.
SUSAN LIM-LUA, PETITIONER, VS. DANILO Y. LUA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner seeks to set aside the
Decision[1] dated April 20, 2006 and Resolution[2] dated October 26, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) dismissing her petition for contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 01154) and
granting respondent’s petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 01315).
The factual background is as follows:
On September 3, 2003,[3] petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
29346 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 14.
In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner sought
the amount of P500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondent’s huge earnings from
salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad.[4]
After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order[5] dated March 31,
2004 granting support pendente lite, as follows:
From the evidence already adduced by the parties, the amount of Two
Hundred Fifty (P250,000.00) Thousand Pesos would be sufficient to take
care of the needs of the plaintiff. This amount excludes the One hundred
thirty-five (P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical attendance expenses
needed by plaintiff for the operation of both her eye[s] which is demandable
upon the conduct of such operation. The amounts already extended to the
two (2) children, being a commendable act of defendant, should be
continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.
According to Art. 203 of the Family Code, support is demandable from the
time plaintiff needed the said support but is payable only from the date of
judicial demand. Since the instant complaint was filed on 03 September
2003, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (P250,000.00) Thousand should be
paid by defendant to plaintiff retroactively to such date until the hearing of
the support pendente lite. P250,000.00 x 7 corresponding to the seven (7)
months that lapsed from September, 2003 to March 2004 would tantamount
to a total of One Million Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750,000.00) Thousand
 Pesos. Thereafter, starting the month of April 2004, until otherwise ordered
by this Court, defendant is ordered to pay a monthly support of Two
Hundred Fifty Thousand (P250,000.00) Pesos payable within the first five
(5) days of each corresponding month pursuant to the third paragraph of
Art. 203 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The monthly support of
P250,000.00 is without prejudice to any increase or decrease thereof that
this Court may grant plaintiff as the circumstances may warrant i.e.
depending on the proof submitted by the parties during the proceedings for
the main action for support. [6]
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,[7] asserting that petitioner is not entitled
to spousal support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling
from their children and respondent has continued to support the family for their
sustenance and well-being in accordance with family’s social and financial standing. As
to the P250,000.00 granted by the trial court as monthly support pendente lite, as well as
the P1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent found it unconscionable and beyond
the intendment of the law for not having considered the needs of the respondent.
In its May 13, 2004 Order, the trial court stated that the March 31, 2004 Order had
become final and executory since respondent’s motion for reconsideration is treated as a
mere scrap of paper for violation of the three-day notice period under Section 4, Rule 15
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, and therefore did not interrupt the
running of the period to appeal. Respondent was given ten (10) days to show cause why
he should not be held in contempt of the court for disregarding the March 31, 2004 order
granting support pendente lite.[8]
His second motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA.
On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision,[9] finding merit in respondent’s
contention that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in granting P250,000.00
monthly support to petitioner without evidence to prove his actual income. The said
court thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this petition is given due
course. The assailed Orders dated March 31, 2004, May 13, 2004, June 4,
2004 and June 18, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City
issued in Civil Case No. CEB No. 29346 entitled “Susan Lim Lua versus
Danilo Y. Lua” are hereby nullified and set aside and instead a new one is
entered ordering herein petitioner:
a) to pay private respondent a monthly support pendente lite
of P115,000.00 beginning the month of April 2005 and
every month thereafter within the first five (5) days
thereof;
b) to pay the private respondent the amount of P115,000.00
a month multiplied by the number of months starting from
September 2003 until March 2005 less than the amount
supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent
as her and their two (2) children monthly support; and
c) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Neither of the parties appealed this decision of the CA. In a Compliance[11] dated June
28, 2005, respondent attached a copy of a check he issued in the amount of
P162,651.90 payable to petitioner. Respondent explained that, as decreed in the CA
decision, he deducted from the amount of support in arrears (September 3, 2003 to
March 2005) ordered by the CA -- P2,185,000.00 -- plus P460,000.00 (April, May, June
and July 2005), totalling P2,645,000.00, the advances given by him to his children and
petitioner in the sum of P2,482,348.16 (with attached photocopies of receipts/billings).
In her Comment to Compliance with Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution,[12]
petitioner asserted that none of the expenses deducted by respondent may be
chargeable as part of the monthly support contemplated by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
84740.
On September 27, 2005, the trial court issued an Order[13] granting petitioner’s motion
for issuance of a writ of execution as it rejected respondent’s interpretation of the CA
decision. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and subsequently also filed a
motion for inhibition of Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. On November 25, 2005, Judge
Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order[14] denying both motions.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, both motions are
DENIED. Since a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited under the
Rules, this denial has attained finality; let, therefore, a writ of execution be
issued in favor of plaintiff as against defendant for the accumulated support
in arrears pendente lite.
Notify both parties of this Order.
 SO ORDERED.[15]
Since respondent still failed and refused to pay the support in arrears pendente lite,
petitioner filed in the CA a Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 01154 (“Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua”). Respondent, on the
other hand, filed CA-G.R. SP No. 01315, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court (“Danilo Y. Lua versus Hon. Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr., in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 14, and Susan Lim Lua”) . The
two cases were consolidated.
By Decision dated April 20, 2006, the CA set aside the assailed orders of the trial court,
as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for Contempt of Court
with Damages filed by Susan Lim Lua against Danilo Y. Lua with docket no.
SP. CA-GR No. 01154;
b) GRANTING Danilo Y. Lua’s Petition for Certiorari docketed as SP. CA-GR
No. 01315. Consequently, the assailed Orders dated 27 September 2005 and
25 November 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued
in Civil Case No. CEB-29346 entitled “Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua,
are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and instead a new one is entered:
i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of
PhP2,482,348.16 plus 946,465.64, or a total of
PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of
Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two (2)
children;
ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his monthly
support of PhP115,000.00 pesos starting from the time
payment of this amount was deferred by him subject to the
deductions aforementioned.
iii. DIRECTING the issuance of a permanent writ of preliminary
injunction.
SO ORDERED.[16]
The appellate court said that the trial court should not have completely disregarded the
expenses incurred by respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two
cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and the credit card purchases involving
groceries, dry goods and books, which certainly inured to the benefit not only of the two
children, but their mother (petitioner) as well. It held that respondent’s act of deferring
the monthly support adjudged in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 was not contumacious as it was
anchored on valid and justifiable reasons. Respondent said he just wanted the issue of
whether to deduct his advances be settled first in view of the different interpretation by
the trial court of the appellate court’s decision in CA- G.R. SP No. 84740. It also noted
the lack of contribution from the petitioner in the joint obligation of spouses to support
their children.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition raising the following errors allegedly committed by the CA:
I
.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING RESPONDENT
GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT.
II
.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE DEDUCTION OF
THE AMOUNT OF PHP2,482,348.16 PLUS 946,465.64, OR A TOTAL OF
PHP3,428,813.80 FROM THE CURRENT TOTAL SUPPORT IN ARREARS
OF THE RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER AND THEIR CHILDREN.
[17]
The main issue is whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be
deducted from the total support in arrears owing to petitioner and her children pursuant
to the Decision dated April 12, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.
The pertinent provision of the Family Code of the Philippines provides:
Article 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the
preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some
profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and
 from place of work. (Emphasis supplied.) evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that
the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the
Petitioner argues that it was patently erroneous for the CA to have allowed the deduction record.[20]
of the value of the two cars and their maintenance costs from the support in arrears, as
these items are not indispensable to the sustenance of the family or in keeping them In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for petitioner and her two
alive. She points out that in the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740, the CA already children was determined after due hearing and submission of documentary evidence by
considered the said items which it deemed chargeable to respondent, while the monthly the parties. Although the amount fixed by the trial court was reduced on appeal, it is
support pendente lite (P115,000.00) was fixed on the basis of the documentary clear that the monthly support pendente lite of P115,000.00 ordered by the CA was
evidence of respondent’s alleged income from various businesses and petitioner’s intended primarily for the sustenance of petitioner and her children, e.g., food, clothing,
testimony that she needed P113,000.00 for the maintenance of the household and other salaries of drivers and house helpers, and other household expenses. Petitioner’s
miscellaneous expenses excluding the P135,000.00 medical attendance expenses of testimony also mentioned the cost of regular therapy for her scoliosis and
petitioner. vitamins/medicines.
ATTY. ZOSA:
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that disallowing the subject deductions would
result in unjust enrichment, thus making him pay for the same obligation twice. Since
xxxx
petitioner and the children resided in one residence, the groceries and dry goods
purchased by the children using respondent’s credit card, totalling P594,151.58 for the
period September 2003 to June 2005 were not consumed by the children alone but QHow much do you spend for your
shared with their mother. As to the Volkswagen Beetle and BMW 316i respondent bought food and your two (2) children every
for his daughter Angelli Suzanne Lua and Daniel Ryan Lua, respectively, these, too, are month?
to be considered advances for support, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family. Respondent stressed that being children of parents belonging to the upper-class A Presently, Sir?
society, Angelli and Daniel Ryan had never in their entire life commuted from one place
to another, nor do they eat their meals at “carinderias”. Hence, the cars and their ATTY. ZOSA:
maintenance are indispensable to the children’s day-to-day living, the value of which
were properly deducted from the arrearages in support pendente lite ordered by the trial
Yes.
and appellate courts.
A For the food alone, I spend not over
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family P40,000.00 to P50,000.00 a month
relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources for the food alone.
or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient.[18] Such support comprises
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, xxxx
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
ATTY. ZOSA:
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or for
annulment of voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time during the QWhat other expenses do you incur
proceeding, the court, motu proprio or upon verified application of any of the parties, in living in that place?
guardian or designated custodian, may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to
the rendition of judgment or final order.[19] Because of its provisional nature, a court
does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can settle an application
for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of
A The normal household and the
normal expenses for a family to
have a decent living, Sir.
QHow much other expenses do you
incur?
WITNESS:
A For other expenses, is around over
a P100,000.00, Sir.
QWhy do you incur that much
amount?
A For the clothing for the three (3) of
us, for the vitamins and medicines.
And also I am having a special
therapy to straighten my back
because I am scoliotic. I am
advised by the Doctor to hire a
driver, but I cannot still afford it now.
Because my eyesight is not reliable
for driving. And I still need another
househelp to accompany me
whenever I go marketing because
for my age, I cannot carry anymore
heavy loads.
xxxx
ATTY. FLORES:
xxxx
QOn the issue of the food for you and
the two (2) children, you mentioned
P40,000.00 to P50,000.00?
A Yes, for the food alone.
QOkay, what other possible expenses
that you would like to include in
those two (2) items? You mentioned
of a driver, am I correct?
A Yes, I might need two (2) drivers,
Sir for me and my children.
QOkay. How much would you like
possibly to pay for those two (2)
drivers?
A I think P10,000.00 a month for one
(1) driver. So I need two (2) drivers.
And I need another househelp.
QYou need another househelp. The
househelp nowadays would charge
you something between P3,000.00
to P4,000.00. That’s quite…
A Right now, my househelp is
receiving P8,000.00. I need another
which I will give a compensation of
P5,000.00.
xxxx
Other than that, do you still have
Q
other expenses?
A My clothing.
COURT:
How about the schooling for your
children?
WITNESS:

The schooling is shouldered by my
A
husband, Your Honor.
COURT:
Everything?
A Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
ATTY. FLORES:
Madam witness, let us talk of the
present needs. x x x. What else,
Q
what specific need that you would
like to add so I can tell my client,
the defendant.
WITNESS:
A I need to have an operation both of
my eyes. I also need a special
therapy for my back because I am
scoliotic, three (3) times a week.
QThat is very reasonable. [W]ould
you care to please repeat that?
A Therapy for my scoliotic back and
then also for the operation both of
my eyes. And I am also taking
some vitamins from excel that will
cost P20,000.00 a month.
QOkay. Let’s have piece by piece.
Have you asked the Doctor how
much would it cost you for the
operation of that scoliotic?
A Yes before because I was already
due last year. Before, this eye will
cost P60,000.00 and the other eyes
P75,000.00.
QSo for both eyes, you are talking of
P60,000.00 plus P75,000.00 is
P135,000.00?
A Yes.
xxxx
QYou talk of therapy?
A Yes.
QSo how much is that?
A Around P5,000.00 a week. [21]
As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond doubt that he can solely
provide for the subsistence, education, transportation, health/medical needs and
recreational activities of his children, as well as those of petitioner who was then
unemployed and a full-time housewife. Despite this, respondent’s counsel manifested
during the same hearing that respondent was willing to grant the amount of only
P75,000.00 as monthly support pendente lite both for the children and petitioner as
spousal support. Though the receipts of expenses submitted in court unmistakably show
how much respondent lavished on his children, it appears that the matter of spousal
support was a different matter altogether. Rejecting petitioner’s prayer for P500,000.00
monthly support and finding the P75,000.00 monthly support offered by respondent as
insufficient, the trial court fixed the monthly support pendente lite at P250,000.00.
However, since the supposed income in millions of respondent was based merely on the
allegations of petitioner in her complaint and registration documents of various
corporations which respondent insisted are owned not by him but his parents and
siblings, the CA reduced the amount of support pendente lite to P115,000.00, which
ruling was no longer questioned by both parties.
Controversy between the parties resurfaced when respondent’s compliance with the final
CA decision indicated that he deducted from the total amount in arrears (P2,645,000.00) GRAND TOTAL - Php 3,428,813.80
the sum of P2,482,348.16, representing the value of the two cars for the children, their The CA, in ruling for the respondent said that all the foregoing expenses already incurred
cost of maintenance and advances given to petitioner and his children. Respondent by the respondent should, in equity, be considered advances which may be properly
explained that the deductions were made consistent with the fallo of the CA Decision in deducted from the support in arrears due to the petitioner and the two children. Said
CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordering him to pay support pendente lite in arrears less the court also noted the absence of petitioner’s contribution to the joint obligation of support
amount supposedly given by him to petitioner as her and their two children’s monthly for their children.
support.
We reverse in part the decision of the CA.
The following is a summary of the subject deductions under Compliance dated June 28,
2005, duly supported by receipts[22]
Judicial determination of support pendente lite in cases of legal separation and petitions
Car purchases for Angelli Suzanne - Php 1,350,000.00 for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage are guided by the following provisions
and Daniel Ryan - 613,472.86 of the Rule on Provisional Orders[24]
Car Maintenance fees of Angelli - 51,232.50 Sec. 2. Spousal Support.–In determining support for the spouses, the court
Suzanne may be guided by the following rules:
Credit card statements of Daniel
- 348,682.28 (a) In the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between
Ryan
Car Maintenance fees of Daniel the spouses, the spouses may be supported from the properties of the
- 118,960.52 absolute community or the conjugal partnership.
Ryan
TOTAL - Php 2,482,348.16
(b) The court may award support to either spouse in such amount and for
such period of time as the court may deem just and reasonable based on
After the trial court disallowed the foregoing deductions, respondent filed a motion for
their standard of living during the marriage.
reconsideration further asserting that the following amounts, likewise with supporting
receipts, be considered as additional advances given to petitioner and the children [23]:
(c) The court may likewise consider the following factors: (1) whether the
spouse seeking support is the custodian of a child whose circumstances
Medical expenses of Susan Lim- Php 42,450.71 make it appropriate for that spouse not to seek outside employment; (2) the
Lua time necessary to acquire sufficient education and training to enable the
Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan 11,500.00 spouse seeking support to find appropriate employment, and that spouse’s
Travel expenses of Susan Lim- 14,611.15 future earning capacity; (3) the duration of the marriage; (4) the comparative
Lua financial resources of the spouses, including their comparative earning
abilities in the labor market; (5) the needs and obligations of each spouse;
Credit card purchases of Angelli 408,891.08 (6) the contribution of each spouse to the marriage, including services
Suzanne rendered in home-making, child care, education, and career building of the
Salon and travel expenses of 87,112.70 other spouse; (7) the age and health of the spouses; (8) the physical and
Angelli Suzanne emotional conditions of the spouses; (9) the ability of the supporting spouse
School expenses of Daniel Ryan 260,900.00 to give support, taking into account that spouse’s earning capacity, earned
Lua and unearned income, assets, and standard of living; and (10) any other
Cash given to Daniel and Angelli 121,000.00 factor the court may deem just and equitable.
TOTAL - Php 946,465.64
(d) The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support
from the salary of the spouse.
 Sec. 3. Child Support.–The common children of the spouses shall be
supported from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership.
Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either parent or both may be
ordered to give an amount necessary for the support, maintenance, and
education of the child. It shall be in proportion to the resources or means of
the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.
In determining the amount of provisional support, the court may likewise
consider the following factors: (1) the financial resources of the custodial
and non-custodial parent and those of the child; (2) the physical and
emotional health of the child and his or her special needs and aptitudes; (3)
the standard of living the child has been accustomed to; (4) the non-
monetary contributions that the parents will make toward the care and well-
being of the child.
The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from
the salary of the parent.
Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by the CA was not appealed
by either party, there is no controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness. The
dispute concerns the deductions made by respondent in settling the support in arrears.
On the issue of crediting of money payments or expenses against accrued support, we
find as relevant the following rulings by US courts.
In Bradford v. Futrell,[25] appellant sought review of the decision of the Circuit Court
which found him in arrears with his child support payments and entered a decree in favor
of appellee wife. He complained that in determining the arrearage figure, he should
have been allowed full credit for all money and items of personal property given by him
to the children themselves, even though he referred to them as gifts. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland ruled that in the suit to determine amount of arrears due the
divorced wife under decree for support of minor children, the husband (appellant) was
not entitled to credit for checks which he had clearly designated as gifts, nor was he
entitled to credit for an automobile given to the oldest son or a television set given to the
children. Thus, if the children remain in the custody of the mother, the father is not
entitled to credit for money paid directly to the children if such was paid without any
relation to the decree.
In the absence of some finding of consent by the mother, most courts refuse
to allow a husband to dictate how he will meet the requirements for support
payments when the mode of payment is fixed by a decree of court. Thus he
will not be credited for payments made when he unnecessarily interposed
himself as a volunteer and made payments direct to the children of his own
accord. Wills v. Baker, 214 S. W. 2d 748 (Mo. 1948); Openshaw v.
Openshaw, 42 P. 2d 191 (Utah 1935). In the latter case the court said in
part: “The payments to the children themselves do not appear to have been
made as payments upon alimony, but were rather the result of his fatherly
interest in the welfare of those children. We do not believe he should be
permitted to charge them to plaintiff. By so doing he would be determining
for Mrs. Openshaw the manner in which she should expend her allowances.
It is a very easy thing for children to say their mother will not give them
money, especially as they may realize that such a plea is effective in
attaining their ends. If she is not treating them right the courts are open to
the father for redress.”[26]
In Martin, Jr. v. Martin,[27] the Supreme Court of Washington held that a father, who is
required by a divorce decree to make child support payments directly to the mother,
cannot claim credit for payments voluntarily made directly to the children. However,
special considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in crediting such
payments on his indebtedness to the mother, when such can be done without injustice to
her.
The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a divorce
decree to pay to the mother money for the support of their dependent
children and the unpaid and accrued installments become judgments in her
favor, he cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on account of payments
voluntarily made directly to the children. Koon v. Koon, supra; Briggs v.
Briggs, supra. However, special considerations of an equitable nature
may justify a court in crediting such payments on his indebtedness to
the mother, when that can be done without injustice to her. Briggs v.
Briggs, supra. The courts are justifiably reluctant to lay down any general
rules as to when such credits may be allowed.[28] (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be
credited against the accrued support pendente lite. As earlier mentioned, the monthly
support pendente lite granted by the trial court was intended primarily for food,
household expenses such as salaries of drivers and house helpers, and also petitioner’s
scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by
respondent for his children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of petitioner and
Angelli, purchases through credit card of items other than groceries and dry goods
(clothing) should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the judgment
awarding support pendente lite. While it is true that the dispositive portion of the
executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordered herein respondent to pay the
support in arrears “less than the amount supposedly given by petitioner to the private
respondent as her and their two (2) children monthly support,” the deductions should be
limited to those basic needs and expenses considered by the trial and appellate courts.
The assailed ruling of the CA allowing huge deductions from the accrued monthly
support of petitioner and her children, while correct insofar as it commends the
generosity of the respondent to his children, is clearly inconsistent with the executory
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. More important, it completely ignores the unfair
consequences to petitioner whose sustenance and well-being, was given due regard by
the trial and appellate courts. This is evident from the March 31, 2004 Order granting
support pendente lite to petitioner and her children, when the trial court observed:
While there is evidence to the effect that defendant is giving some forms of
financial assistance to his two (2) children via their credit cards and paying
for their school expenses, the same is, however, devoid of any form of
spousal support to the plaintiff, for, at this point in time, while the action for
nullity of marriage is still to be heard, it is incumbent upon the defendant,
considering the physical and financial condition of the plaintiff and the
overwhelming capacity of defendant, to extend support unto the latter. x x
x[29]
On appeal, while the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 reduced the amount of monthly
support fixed by the trial court, it nevertheless held that considering respondent’s
financial resources, it is but fair and just that he give a monthly support for the
sustenance and basic necessities of petitioner and his children. This would imply that
any amount respondent seeks to be credited as monthly support should only cover those
incurred for sustenance and household expenses.
In the case at bar, records clearly show and in fact has been admitted by
petitioner that aside from paying the expenses of their two (2) children’s
schooling, he gave his two (2) children two (2) cars and credit cards of
which the expenses for various items namely: clothes, grocery items and
repairs of their cars were chargeable to him which totaled an amount of
more than One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) for each of them and
considering that as testified by the private respondent that she needs the
total amount of P113,000.00 for the maintenance of the household and
other miscellaneous expenses and considering further that petitioner can
afford to buy cars for his two (2) children, and to pay the expenses incurred
by them which are chargeable to him through the credit cards he provided
them in the amount of P100,000.00 each, it is but fair and just that the
monthly support pendente lite for his wife, herein private respondent, be
fixed as of the present in the amount of P115,000.00 which would be
sufficient enough to take care of the household and other needs. This
monthly support pendente lite to private respondent in the amount of
P115,000.00 excludes the amount of One Hundred Thirty-Five
(P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical attendance expenses
needed by private respondent for the operation of both her eye[s]
which is demandable upon the conduct of such operation. Likewise, this
monthly support of P115,000.00 is without prejudice to any increase or
decrease thereof that the trial court may grant private respondent as the
circumstances may warrant i.e. depending on the proof submitted by the
parties during the proceedings for the main action for support.
The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a
commendable act of petitioner, should be continued by him considering the
vast financial resources at his disposal.[30] (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, only the following expenses of respondent may be allowed as deductions
from the accrued support pendente lite for petitioner and her children:
Medical expenses of Susan Lim- Php 42,450.71
Lua
Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan 11,500.00
Credit card purchases of Angelli 365,282.20
(Groceries and Dry Goods)
Credit Card purchases of Daniel
Ryan
228,869.38
TOTAL Php 648,102.29
As to the contempt charge, we sustain the CA in holding that respondent is not guilty of
indirect contempt.
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its
authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of
the court’s order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration
of justice.[31] To constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an
illegitimate or improper purpose.[32] The good faith, or lack of it, of the alleged
contemnor should be considered.[33]
Respondent admittedly ceased or suspended the giving of monthly support pendente lite
granted by the trial court, which is immediately executory. However, we agree with the
CA that respondent’s act was not contumacious considering that he had not been remiss
in actually providing for the needs of his children. It is a matter of record that respondent
continued shouldering the full cost of their education and even beyond their basic
necessities in keeping with the family’s social status. Moreover, respondent believed in
good faith that the trial and appellate courts, upon equitable grounds, would allow him to
offset the substantial amounts he had spent or paid directly to his children.
Respondent complains that petitioner is very much capacitated to generate income on
her own because she presently maintains a boutique at the Ayala Center Mall in Cebu
City and at the same time engages in the business of lending money. He also claims
that the two children have finished their education and are now employed in the family
business earning their own salaries.
Suffice it to state that the matter of increase or reduction of support should be submitted
to the trial court in which the action for declaration for nullity of marriage was filed, as this
Court is not a trier of facts. The amount of support may be reduced or increased
proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient
and the resources or means of the person obliged to support.[34] As we held in
Advincula v. Advincula[35]
…Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of
such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire
period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be
modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs,
and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final
determination.[36]
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated April 20, 2006
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 01154 and 01315 is hereby MODIFIED to
read as follows:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for Contempt of Court with
Damages filed by Susan Lim Lua against Danilo Y. Lua with docket no. SP.
CA-G.R. No. 01154;
b) GRANTING IN PART Danilo Y. Lua’s Petition for Certiorari docketed as SP.
CA-G.R. No. 01315. Consequently, the assailed Orders dated 27 September
2005 and 25 November 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu
City issued in Civil Case No. CEB-29346 entitled “Susan Lim Lua versus
Danilo Y. Lua, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and instead a new
one is entered:
i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of Php 648,102.29 from
the support pendente lite in arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife,
Susan Lim Lua and their two (2) children;
ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his monthly
support of PhP115,000.00 pesos starting from the time payment of
this amount was deferred by him subject to the deduction
aforementioned.
iii. DIRECTING the immediate execution of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.”
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 183896, January 27, 2013 ]
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, PETITIONER, VS. GLORIA GOO ABBAS, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, questioning the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11,
2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision[2] in Civil Case No. 03-
0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay
City, and theCA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of
Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109.
Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I,
Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the
Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract[3] of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No.
9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the
solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen,
in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in
Taiwan.[4] He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at
around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law’s residence, located at
2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He
testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the
requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said
ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he
did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further
testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that
he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to
show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be
found.[5] The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification
on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage
contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another
marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.[6] Said
certification reads as follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this
office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO
GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED
AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal
purpose or intents it may serve.[7]
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in
2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his
counsel.[8]
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to
Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.[9] Bagsic testified that their office issues serial
numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued chronologically.[10] He
testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina
Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage
License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January
19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the same serial
number, namely 9969967, to any other person.[11]
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz,
Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a
barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the
Philippines.[12] He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and
Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993.[13] He stated that the
witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.[14] He
testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with
the requirements.[15] Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the
marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was
prepared by his secretary.[16] After the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered
with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract
and copy of the marriage license with that office.[17]
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed
Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.[18] He testified that he
requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this
Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993.[19] He
further testified that he did not know where the marriage license was obtained.[20] He
attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as
sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the
solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.[21]
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-
in-law, and that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at
her house.[22] She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City
Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take
place, a male person went to their house with the application for marriage license.[23]
Three days later, the same person went back to their house, showed her the marriage
license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer.[24] She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of
the marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage license was obtained from
Carmona.[25] She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against
Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy
dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
[26]
As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she
is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9,
1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons
depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty.
Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage
contract bearing their signatures as proof.[27] She and her mother sought the help of
Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors.
A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for
them, and after several days returned with an application for marriage license for them to
sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave
the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria
testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.[28]
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993. [29]
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a
certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage, and
that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.
[30]
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan,
but that she did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites,
because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at
the time were Chinese.[31]
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license
was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and
Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no
marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed.[32] It also took into account the
fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage
License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code.[33] As the
marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of
a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and
Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and
against the respondent declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar
Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the
petitioner and the respondent even if no property was acquired
during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of
the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General,
National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their
respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed
Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993
in Manila.
SO ORDERED.[34]
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied
the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID
DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE
CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE
OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING
THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE
APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE
SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT
THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE
PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF
ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE
TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.[35]
The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that MARRIAGE.[42]
said certification could not be accorded probative value.[36] The CA ruled that there was
sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly The Ruling of this Court
married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.[37] It
gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The petition is meritorious.
The CA also considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and
wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for
bigamy.[38] As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive
Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows: provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The
Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-
CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar
Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in
and subsisting. No costs. Chapter 2 of this Title; and

SO ORDERED.[39] (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of
the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008[40] but the same was in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.[41]
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable
as provided in Article 45.

I An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the
marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS
THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
THE COURT’S OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
x x x x
II
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN preceding Chapter.
REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND

There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with
the formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the
marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a
valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this
case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the
couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held that
there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and
relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the
existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the
office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said
license. It was there that he requested certification that no such license was issued. In
the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals[43] such certification was allowed, as permitted
by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer
having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent
search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the
records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record
or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to
prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that
despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or
that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register.
As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers
charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they
are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the
names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such
other relevant data.[44]
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed
probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria
and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage
license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage
license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified
machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in
Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the
document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did
not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words “despite diligent search” in the
certification, and since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears to
have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the certification
could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.[45] It is
worth noting that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower
court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be
located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it
categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a
categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an
official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the
contrary. We held, “The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.”[46] No such affirmative
evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of
checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does
exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was
indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not
correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the
registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the
court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a
location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the
license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said
license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the
marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her
mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having
admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom
Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not
knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license was
delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was
secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as
the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy
of the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a
copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured from that office and
submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening
her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,[47] following the case of Republic,[48] it was held that
the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage
license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cariño
further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome,
and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the
marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured.[49] Gloria
has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that
no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple
irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no
license was presented by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been
issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and
Syed were validly married. To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary,
that appellant and appellee have been validly married and there was
compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally
capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the
Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their
consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his name in the
marriage contract was his. Several pictures were presented showing
appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and
other members of appellant’s family, taken during the marriage ceremony,
as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the marriage
ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit “5-C” which shows appellee signing
the Marriage Contract.
x x x x
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic]
one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It
took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003
his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the
Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to have been
instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit “1”) dated 10
January 2003 was filed against him for contracting a second or subsequent
marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not
ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give
him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit
and perfidy.[50]
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a
marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage
license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, “The absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2).” Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized
without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license
requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code. [51] Again, this
marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been
solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that
his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may,
the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a
valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of
a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps
to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal
requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in
Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on
January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, Abad, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
 WILLEM BEUMER, PETITIONER, VS. AVELINA AMORES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the October 8, 2009 Decision[2] and January 24, 2011 Resolution[3] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01940, which affirmed the February 28,
2007 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Branch 34 in Civil
Case No. 12884. The foregoing rulings dissolved the conjugal partnership of gains of
Willem Beumer (petitioner) and Avelina Amores (respondent) and distributed the
properties forming part of the said property regime.
The Factual Antecedents
Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29, 1980. After
several years, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 32, declared the nullity of their
marriage in the Decision[5] dated November 10, 2000 on the basis of the former’s
psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code.
Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership[6] dated
December 14, 2000 praying for the distribution of the following described properties
claimed to have been acquired during the subsistence of their marriage, to wit:
By Purchase:
a. Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the
Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 22846, containing an area of 252 square meters (sq.m.),
including a residential house constructed thereon.
b. Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21974,
containing an area of 806 sq.m., including a residential house
constructed thereon.
c. Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21306,
containing an area of 756 sq.m.
d. Lot 4, Block 4 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the
Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21307, containing an
area of 45 sq.m.
e. By way of inheritance:
f. 1/7 of Lot 2055-A of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No.
23567, containing an area of 2,635 sq.m. (the area that appertains
to the conjugal partnership is 376.45 sq.m.).
g. 1/15 of Lot 2055-I of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No.
23575, containing an area of 360 sq.m. (the area that appertains to
the conjugal partnership is 24 sq.m.).[7]
In defense,[8] respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential
houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties
during their marriage, the truth being that she used her own personal money to purchase
Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way
of inheritance.[9] She submitted a joint affidavit executed by her and petitioner attesting
to the fact that she purchased Lot 2142 and the improvements thereon using her own
money.[10] Accordingly, respondent sought the dismissal of the petition for dissolution as
well as payment for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.[11]
During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the
name of respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he received from
the Dutch government as his disability benefit[12] since respondent did not have
sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. He also claimed that the joint affidavit they
submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was contrary to Article 89 of
the Family Code, hence, invalid. [13]
For her part, respondent maintained that the money used for the purchase of the lots
came exclusively from her personal funds, in particular, her earnings from selling jewelry
as well as products from Avon, Triumph and Tupperware.[14] She further asserted that
after she filed for annulment of their marriage in 1996, petitioner transferred to their
second house and brought along with him certain personal properties, consisting of
drills, a welding machine, grinders, clamps, etc. She alleged that these tools and
equipment have a total cost of P500,000.00.[15]
The RTC Ruling
On February 28, 2007, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 34 rendered its Decision,
dissolving the parties’ conjugal partnership, awarding all the parcels of land to
respondent as her paraphernal properties; the tools and equipment in favor of petitioner
as his exclusive properties; the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-
owned by the parties, the dispositive of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered granting the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner Willem Beumer and
[respondent] Avelina Amores considering the fact that their marriage was
previously annulled by Branch 32 of this Court. The parcels of land covered
 by Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. 22846, 21974, 21306, 21307, 23567
and 23575 are hereby declared paraphernal properties of respondent
Avelina Amores due to the fact that while these real properties were
acquired by onerous title during their marital union, Willem Beumer, being a
foreigner, is not allowed by law to acquire any private land in the
Philippines, except through inheritance.
The personal properties, i.e., tools and equipment mentioned in the
complaint which were brought out by Willem from the conjugal dwelling are
hereby declared to be exclusively owned by the petitioner.
The two houses standing on the lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. 21974 and 22846 are hereby declared to be co-owned by the
petitioner and the respondent since these were acquired during their marital
union and since there is no prohibition on foreigners from owning buildings
and residential units. Petitioner and respondent are, thereby, directed to
subject this court for approval their project of partition on the two house[s]
aforementioned.
The Court finds no sufficient justification to award the counterclaim of
respondent for attorney’s fees considering the well settled doctrine that
there should be no premium on the right to litigate. The prayer for moral
damages are likewise denied for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[16]
It ruled that, regardless of the source of funds for the acquisition of Lots 1, 2142, 5845
and 4, petitioner could not have acquired any right whatsoever over these properties as
petitioner still attempted to acquire them notwithstanding his knowledge of the
constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of private lands.[17] This was made
evident by the sworn statements petitioner executed purporting to show that the subject
parcels of land were purchased from the exclusive funds of his wife, the herein
respondent.[18] Petitioner’s plea for reimbursement for the amount he had paid to
purchase the foregoing properties on the basis of equity was likewise denied for not
having come to court with clean hands.
The CA Ruling
Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA, contesting only the RTC’s award of Lots 1,
2142, 5845 and 4 in favor of respondent. He insisted that the money used to purchase
the foregoing properties came from his own capital funds and that they were registered
in the name of his former wife only because of the constitutional prohibition against
foreign ownership. Thus, he prayed for reimbursement of one-half (1/2) of the value of
what he had paid in the purchase of the said properties, waiving the other half in favor of
his estranged ex-wife.[19]
On October 8, 2009, the CA promulgated a Decision[20] affirming in toto the judgment
rendered by the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 34. The CA stressed the fact that
petitioner was “well-aware of the constitutional prohibition for aliens to acquire lands in
the Philippines.”[21] Hence, he cannot invoke equity to support his claim for
reimbursement.
Consequently, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
CA Decision due to the following error:
UNDER THE FACTS ESTABLISHED, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT
SUSTAINING THE PETITIONER’S ATTEMPT AT SUBSEQUENTLY
ASSERTING OR CLAIMING A RIGHT OF HALF OR WHOLE OF THE
PURCHASE PRICE USED IN THE PURCHASE OF THE REAL
PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.[22] (Emphasis supplied)
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The issue to be resolved is not of first impression. In In Re: Petition For Separation of
Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller[23] the Court had already denied a
claim for reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by
a foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura
Muller. It held that Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity
where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the
prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land[24] enshrined under Section 7,
Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which reads:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he “is well aware of the [above-cited]
constitutional prohibition”[25] and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he
and respondent registered the subject properties in the latter’s name.[26] Clearly,
petitioner’s actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition.
On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no reason why it should not apply the
Muller ruling and accordingly, deny petitioner’s claim for reimbursement.
As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must
do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely
stated, he who has done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be
denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable,
unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful. [27]
In this case, petitioner’s statements regarding the real source of the funds used to
purchase the subject parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While admitting to
have previously executed a joint affidavit that respondent’s personal funds were used to
purchase Lot 1,[28] he likewise claimed that his personal disability funds were used to
acquire the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies show his untruthfulness. Thus, as
petitioner has come before the Court with unclean hands, he is now precluded from
seeking any equitable refuge.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to
petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by
virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-established that equity as a rule will
follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public
policy, cannot be done directly.[29] Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and
the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal
effect at all.[30] Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code,[31] petitioner
cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he
had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract
or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.[32] Indeed, one cannot salvage
any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.
Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust
enrichment.[33] As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking
monetary reimbursement for money spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision
on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution, to wit:
Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which
reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any
other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him.
The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER
DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person should unjustly enrich himself at
the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid
without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This
provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the
Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be
unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over
the subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said
properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman v.
Johnson: "The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between the
plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the
defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed;
but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the
advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the
plaintiff."[34] (Citations omitted)
Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship.
[35] Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-
citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners
applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon,
such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly declared to
be co-owned by the parties subject to partition. Needless to state, the purpose of the
prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony[36] and it is this policy which the Court
is duty-bound to protect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed October 8, 2009
Decision and January 24, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
01940 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Perez, JJ., concur.
 MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑEZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. LOURDES TAJOLOSA
CIPRIANO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the Order[1]
dated September 24, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna,
Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL which dismissed the Information for
Bigamy filed against respondent Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano. Also assailed is the RTC
Resolution[2] dated January 2, 2008 denying the motion for reconsideration.
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan.[3] On
January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married
Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro, Laguna.[4] In 2001, respondent filed with the
RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with
Socrates on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity as defined under Article
36 of the Family Code, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-204. On July 18, 2003,
the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an Amended Decision[5] declaring the
marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became final and
executory on October 13, 2003.[6]
On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the
first marriage, filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint[7]
for Bigamy against respondent, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 41972.
Attached to the complaint was an Affidavit[8] (Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated
August 23, 2004, thumb- marked and signed by Silverio,[9] which alleged, among others,
that respondent failed to reveal to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates. On
November 17, 2004, an Information[10] for Bigamy was filed against respondent with the
RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
4990-SPL. The Information reads:
That on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of San Pedro,
Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with one SILVERIO
CIPRIANO VINALON while her first marriage with SOCRATES FLORES
has not been judicially dissolved by proper judicial authorities.[11]
On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a
Motion to Quash Information (and Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint)[12] alleging that
her marriage with Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there
was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983;
that the basic element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is therefore
wanting. She also claimed that since the second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of
bigamy had already prescribed. The prosecution filed its Comment[13] arguing that the
crime of bigamy had already been consummated when respondent filed her petition for
declaration of nullity; that the law punishes the act of contracting a second marriage
which appears to be valid, while the first marriage is still subsisting and has not yet been
annulled or declared void by the court.
In its Order[14] dated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It found respondent's
argument that with the declaration of nullity of her first marriage, there was no more first
marriage to speak of and thus the element of two valid marriages in bigamy was absent,
to have been laid to rest by our ruling in Mercado v. Tan[15] where we held:
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there
was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he
instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after
complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. For
contracting a second marriage while the first is still subsisting, he committed
the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been
consummated by then. x x x[16]
As to respondent's claim that the action had already prescribed, the RTC found that
while the second marriage indeed took place in 1983, or more than the 15-year
prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy, the commission of the crime was only
discovered on November 17, 2004, which should be the reckoning period, hence,
prescription has not yet set in.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration[17] claiming that the Mercado ruling was
not applicable, since respondent contracted her first marriage in 1976, i.e., before the
Family Code; that the petition for annulment was granted and became final before the
criminal complaint for bigamy was filed; and, that Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be
given any retroactive effect because this will impair her right to remarry without need of
securing a declaration of nullity of a completely void prior marriage.
On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order,[18] the dispositive portion of
which reads:
Wherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set aside. Let
a new one be entered quashing the information. Accordingly, let the instant
case be DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had contracted a second marriage
on January 24, 1983, i.e., before the effectivity of the Family Code, the existing law did
not require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to
contracting a subsequent marriage; that jurisprudence before the Family Code was
ambivalent on the issue of the need of prior judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the
first marriage. The RTC found that both marriages of respondent took place before the
effectivity of the Family Code, thus, considering the unsettled state of jurisprudence on
the need for a prior declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before commencing a
second marriage and the principle that laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the
accused, it declared that the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity should not
prejudice the accused whose second marriage was declared once and for all valid with
the annulment of her first marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa City in 2003.
Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but opposed by
respondent. In a Resolution dated January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling,
among others, that the judicial declaration of nullity of respondent's marriage is
tantamount to a mere declaration or confirmation that said marriage never existed at all,
and for this reason, her act in contracting a second marriage cannot be considered
criminal.
Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us raising the following
issues:
I. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the
Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy on the
ground of psychological incapacity is a valid defense for a charge of bigamy
for entering into a second marriage prior to the enactment of the Family
Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy?
II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior to the
enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs.
Sempio-Diy regarding the necessity of securing a declaration of nullity of
the first marriage before entering a second marriage ambivalent, such that a
person was allowed to enter a subsequent marriage without the annulment
of the first without incurring criminal liability.[19]
Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC's dismissal of the
Information for bigamy was filed by private complainant and not by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) which should represent the government in all judicial
proceedings filed before us.[20] Notwithstanding, we will give due course to this petition
as we had done in the past. In Antone v. Beronilla,[21] the offended party (private
complainant) questioned before the Court of Appeals (CA) the RTC's dismissal of the
Information for bigamy filed against her husband, and the CA dismissed the petition on
the ground, among others, that the petition should have been filed in behalf of the
People of the Philippines by the OSG, being its statutory counsel in all appealed criminal
cases. In a petition filed with us, we said that we had given due course to a number of
actions even when the respective interests of the government were not properly
represented by the OSG and said:
In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following
manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by
any order ruling of the trial judge in a criminal case, the OSG, and not the
prosecutor, must be the one to question the order or ruling before us. x x x
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the
State or the plaintiff People of the Philippines, we opted not to
dismiss the petition on this technical ground. Instead, we required the
OSG to comment on the petition, as we had done before in some cases. In
light of its Comment, we rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as its
own the instant petition for the People of the Philippines. (Emphasis
supplied)[22]
Considering that we also required the OSG to file a Comment on the petition, which it
did, praying that the petition be granted in effect, such Comment had ratified the petition
filed with us.
As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in
quashing the Information for bigamy filed against respondent.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy as follow:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b)
the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage
has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration
of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.[23] It is essential in the prosecution for
bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would
be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.[24]
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio
in 1983, her first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the
same had not yet been annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the
elements of bigamy were alleged in the Information. In her Motion to Quash the
Information, she alleged, among others, that:
xxxx
2. The records of this case would bear out that accused's marriage with said
Socrates Flores was declared void ab initio on 14 April 2003 by Branch
256 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. The said decision was
never appealed, and became final and executory shortly thereafter.
3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this case, her
marriage with Mr. Flores had already been declared void from the
beginning.
4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983 to speak of. In
other words, there was only one marriage.
5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two valid marriages, is
therefore wanting.[25]
Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity was declared only in 2003. The question now is whether the declaration of
nullity of respondent's first marriage justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy
filed against her.
We rule in the negative.
In Mercado v. Tan,[26] we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of
the first marriage was immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of
bigamy had already been consummated. And by contracting a second marriage while
the first was still subsisting, the accused committed the acts punishable under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code.
In Abunado v. People,[27] we held that what is required for the charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted.[28] Even if the accused eventually obtained a declaration that his first
marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.[29]
In Tenebro v. CA,[30] we declared that although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it
is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects
is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage
shall be considered legitimate. There is, therefore, a recognition written into the law itself
that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.
Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold
otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner,
and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling
throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.[31]
And in Jarillo v. People,[32] applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we affirmed the
accused's conviction for bigamy, ruling that the moment the accused contracted a
second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void,
the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of
the second marriage, the accused’s first marriage which had not yet been declared null
and void by a court of competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting.
Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still
subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned
jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not
change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the
first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the
essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA[33] is not applicable, since the declaration of
nullity of the previous marriage came after the filing of the Information, unlike in this case
where the declaration was rendered before the information was filed. We do not agree.
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity
of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.[34] Therefore, he who contracts
a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.[35]
Anent respondent's contention in her Comment that since her two marriages were
contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 40 of the Family Code
cannot be given retroactive effect because this will impair her right to remarry without
need of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of a completely void marriage.
We are not persuaded.
In Jarillo v. People,[36] where the accused, in her motion for reconsideration, argued that
since her marriages were entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the
applicable law is Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613),[37] instead of Article 40 of
the Family Code, which requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void
before a person may contract a subsequent marriage. We did not find the argument
meritorious and said:
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the
declaration that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied
retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code
shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights." The Court went on to explain, thus:
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants'
rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions.
The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The
reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise
from, procedural laws.
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing
the provisions of Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that
very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot
have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous
bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract
a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply
claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent
marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity
of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the
absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter
contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of
nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void.
Such scenario would render nugatory the provision on bigamy.[38]
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated
September 24, 2007 and the Resolution dated January 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL, are
hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL is ordered REMANDED to the trial
court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,* Abad, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
CHARLES GOTARDO, PETITIONER, VS. DIVINA BULING, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari,[1] filed by petitioner Charles Gotardo, to
challenge the March 5, 2004 decision[2] and the July 27, 2004 resolution[3] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA GR CV No. 76326. The CA decision ordered the petitioner to
recognize and provide legal support to his minor son, Gliffze O. Buling. The CA
resolution denied the petitioner's subsequent motion for reconsideration.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, for compulsory recognition and
support pendente lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze.[4]
In his answer, the petitioner denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze.[5] For the parties’
failure to amicably settle the dispute, the RTC terminated the pre-trial proceedings.[6]
Trial on the merits ensued.
The respondent testified for herself and presented Rodulfo Lopez as witness. Evidence
for the respondent showed that she met the petitioner on December 1, 1992 at the
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte branch where she
had been hired as a casual employee, while the petitioner worked as accounting
supervisor.[7] The petitioner started courting the respondent in the third week of
December 1992 and they became sweethearts in the last week of January 1993.[8] The
petitioner gave the respondent greeting cards on special occasions, such as on
Valentine’s Day and her birthday; she reciprocated his love and took care of him when
he was ill.[9]
Sometime in September 1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the
respondent in the former’s rented room in the boarding house managed by Rodulfo, the
respondent’s uncle, on Tomas Oppus St., Agbao, Maasin, Southern Leyte.[10] The
petitioner rented the room from March 1, 1993 to August 30, 1994.[11] The sexual
encounters occurred twice a month and became more frequent in June 1994; eventually,
on August 8, 1994, the respondent found out that she was pregnant.[12] When told of
the pregnancy, the petitioner was happy and made plans to marry the respondent.[13]
They in fact applied for a marriage license.[14] The petitioner even inquired about the
costs of a wedding reception and the bridal gown.[15] Subsequently, however, the
petitioner backed out of the wedding plans.[16]
The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Maasin,
Southern Leyte for damages against the petitioner for breach of promise to marry.[17]
Later, however, the petitioner and the respondent amicably settled the case.[18]
The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995.[19] When the petitioner
did not show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter
on July 24, 1995 demanding recognition of and support for their child.[20] When the
petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent filed her complaint for compulsory
recognition and support pendente lite.[21]
The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the imputed
paternity,[22] claiming that he first had sexual contact with the respondent in the first
week of August 1994 and she could not have been pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or
three (3) months) when he was informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994.[23]
During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the respondent’s motion,[24] granted a
P2,000.00 monthly child support, retroactive from March 1995.[25]
THE RTC RULING
In its June 25, 2002 decision, the RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence proving Gliffze’s filiation. It found the respondent’s testimony inconsistent on
the question of when she had her first sexual contact with the petitioner, i.e., “September
1993” in her direct testimony while “last week of January 1993” during her cross-
testimony, and her reason for engaging in sexual contact even after she had refused the
petitioner’s initial marriage proposal. It ordered the respondent to return the amount of
support pendente lite erroneously awarded, and to pay P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
[26]
The respondent appealed the RTC ruling to the CA.[27]
THE CA RULING
In its March 5, 2004 decision, the CA departed from the RTC's appreciation of the
respondent’s testimony, concluding that the latter merely made an honest mistake in her
understanding of the questions of the petitioner’s counsel. It noted that the petitioner and
the respondent had sexual relationship even before August 1994; that the respondent
had only one boyfriend, the petitioner, from January 1993 to August 1994; and that the
petitioner’s allegation that the respondent had previous relationships with other men
remained unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set aside the RTC decision and
ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order
granting a P2,000.00 monthly child support.[28]
When the CA denied[29] the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,[30] the petitioner
filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
THE PETITION
The petitioner argues that the CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the RTC’s
appreciation of the respondent’s testimony, and that the evidence on record is insufficient
to prove paternity.
THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT
The respondent submits that the CA correctly explained that the inconsistency in the
respondent’s testimony was due to an incorrect appreciation of the questions asked, and
that the record is replete with evidence proving that the petitioner was her lover and that
they had several intimate sexual encounters during their relationship, resulting in her
pregnancy and Gliffze’s birth on March 9, 1995.
THE ISSUE
The sole issue before us is whether the CA committed a reversible error when it set
aside the RTC’s findings and ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal
support to his minor son Gliffze.
OUR RULING
We do not find any reversible error in the CA’s ruling.
We have recognized that “[f]iliation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate
paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship,
support (as in this case) or inheritance. [In paternity cases, the burden of proof] is on the
person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child.”[31]
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or
the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or
any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.[32] We have held that
such other proof of one's filiation may be a “baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family bible in which [his] name has been entered, common reputation respecting [his]
pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
[admissible] under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.”[33]
In Herrera v. Alba,[34] we stressed that there are four significant procedural aspects of a
traditional paternity action that parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative
defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative
father and the child.[35] We explained that a prima facie case exists if a woman declares
— supported by corroborative proof — that she had sexual relations with the putative
father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative father.[36] We explained
further that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative father are: (1)
incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or
impotency, or (2) that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of
conception.[37]
In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the
putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with
one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception.[38] Rodulfo corroborated her
testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship.[39]
On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters with the
respondent, only that it occurred on a much later date than the respondent asserted,
such that it was physically impossible for the respondent to have been three (3) months
pregnant already in September 1994 when he was informed of the pregnancy.[40]
However, the petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations
of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of
evidentiary support. The petitioner’s denial cannot overcome the respondent’s clear and
categorical assertions.
The petitioner, as the RTC did, made much of the variance between the respondent’s
direct testimony regarding their first sexual contact as “sometime in September 1993”
and her cross-testimony when she stated that their first sexual contact was “last week of
January 1993,” as follows:
ATTY. GO CINCO:
When did the defendant, according to you, start courting you?
A Third week of December 1992.
Q And you accepted him?
A Last week of January 1993.
Q And by October you already had your sexual intercourse?
A Last week of January 1993.
that no real inconsistency exists. The respondent has consistently asserted that she
started intimate sexual relations with the petitioner sometime in September 1993.[44]
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is
obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.[45] Support consists of
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.[46]
Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the
amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or
means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient.[47] It may be reduced or
increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the
recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support.[48]
In this case, we Sustain the award of P2,000.00 monthly child support, without prejudice
to the filing of the proper motion in the RTC for the determination of any support in
arrears, considering the needs of the child, Gliffze, during the pendency ofthis case.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. The March 5, 2004
decision and the July 27, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No.
76326 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr.,*Perez, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

COURT: What do you mean by accepting?

A I accepted his offer of love.[41]

We find that the contradictions are for the most part more apparent than real, having
resulted from the failure of the respondent to comprehend the question posed, but this
misunderstanding was later corrected and satisfactorily explained. Indeed, when
confronted for her contradictory statements, the respondent explained that that portion of
the transcript of stenographic notes was incorrect and she had brought it to the attention
of Atty. Josefino Go Cinco (her former counsel) but the latter took no action on the
matter.[42]
Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony must
be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a
testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and to anchor a conclusion based on
these parts. "In ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him
on direct, cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered."[43]
Evidently, the totality of the respondent's testimony positively and convincingly shows
 THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 140500, January 21, 2002 ]
ERNESTINA BERNABE, PETITIONER, VS. CAROLINA ALEJO AS GUARDIAN AD
LITEM FOR THE MINOR ADRIAN BERNABE, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate children who were
still minors at the time the Family Code took effect cannot be impaired or taken away.
The minors have up to four years from attaining majority age within which to file an
action for recognition.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
praying for (1) the nullification of the July 7, 1999 Court of Appeals[2] (CA) Decision[3] in
CA-GR CV No. 51919 and the October 14, 1999 CA Resolution[4] denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration, as well as (2) the reinstatement of the two Orders issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City (Branch 109) concerning the same case.
The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court
dismissing Civil Case No. 94-0562 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the
records of this case be remanded to the lower court for trial on the
merits.”[5]
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
“The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his
secretary of twenty-three (23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo.
The son was born on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe.
Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife Rosalina died on
December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
“On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid
complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son
of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he (Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal
Bernabe’s estate, which is now being held by Ernestina as the sole
surviving heir.
“On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling
that under the provisions of the Family Code as well as the case of
Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, the complaint is now barred x x x.”[6]
Orders of the Trial Court
In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court granted Ernestina Bernabe’s Motion for
Reconsideration of the trial court’s Decision and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint
for recognition. Citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the
putative father had barred the action.
In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since the putative father
had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for recognition
should have been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the opportunity
to either affirm or deny the child’s filiation.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should
be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy
was born in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows
an action for recognition to be filed within four years after the child has attained the age
of majority. The subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.
Hence, this appeal.[7]
Issues
In her Memorandum,[8] petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
I
“Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against
petitioner, the legitimate daughter of the putative father, for recognition and
partition with accounting after the putative father’s death in the absence of
any written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.
II
“Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
respondents had four years from the attainment of minority to file an action
for recognition as provided in Art. 285 of the Civil Code, in complete
disregard of its repeal by the [express] provisions of the Family Code and
the applicable jurisprudence as held by the Honorable Court of Appeals.
 III
“Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the petition[er] is fatally
defective for failure to implead the Court of Appeals as one of the
respondents.”[9]
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First and Second Issues:
Period to File Action for Recognition
Because the first and the second issues are interrelated, we shall discuss them jointly.
Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action for recognition,
because Article 285 of the Civil Code has been supplanted by the provisions of the
Family Code. She argues that the latter Code should be given retroactive effect, since no
vested right would be impaired. We do not agree.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing an action for recognition as
follows:
“ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought
only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following
cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in
which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of
four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should
appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or
both parents recognize the child.
“In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the
finding of the document.”
The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however been omitted
by Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which we quote:
“ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
“In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.”
“ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child
during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the
child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs
shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
“The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding
the death of either or both of the parties.”
“ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
“The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.”
Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought
within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction on
whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is
given by the new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that “illegitimate
children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family
being aware of their existence. x x x The putative parent should thus be given the
opportunity to affirm or deny the child’s filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she
is already dead.”[10]
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already vested
prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows:
“ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.”
The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Adrian’s right to an action for
recognition, which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already vested prior
to the enactment of the Family Code. Our answer is affirmative.
A vested right is defined as “one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the
exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not
dependent upon a contingency x x x.”[11] Respondent however contends that the filing of
an action for recognition is procedural in nature and that “as a general rule, no vested
right may attach to [or] arise from procedural laws.”[12]
Bustos v. Lucero[13] distinguished substantive from procedural law in these words:
“x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this
respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which
includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the
disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which
creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and
duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts
are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law,
which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their
invasion.”[14] (Citations omitted)
Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto,[15] the Court laid down the test for determining whether
a rule is procedural or substantive:
“[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the
practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies
any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure,
that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not
procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with
procedure.”[16]
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a
substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four
years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take
Adrian’s right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior
to its enactment.
Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals[17] is not applicable to the case at bar, because the
plaintiff therein sought recognition as an illegitimate child when he was no longer a
minor. On the other hand, in Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals[18] the Court ruled that an
action for recognition filed while the Civil Code was in effect should not be affected by
the subsequent enactment of the Family Code, because the right had already vested.
Not Limited to Natural Children
To be sure, Article 285 of the Civil Code refers to the action for recognition of “natural”
children. Thus, petitioner contends that the provision cannot be availed of by respondent,
because at the time of his conception, his parents were impeded from marrying each
other. In other words, he is not a natural child.
A “natural child” is one whose parents, at the time of conception, were not disqualified by
any legal impediment from marrying each other. Thus, in De Santos v. Angeles,[19] the
Court explained:
“A child’s parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at
the time of conception for him to qualify as a ‘natural child.’”[20]
A strict and literal interpretation of Article 285 has already been frowned upon by this
Court in the aforesaid case of Aruego, which allowed minors to file a case for recognition
even if their parents were disqualified from marrying each other. There, the Complaint
averred that the late Jose Aruego Sr., a married man, had an extramarital liason with Luz
Fabian. Out of this relationship were born two illegitimate children who in 1983 filed an
action for recognition. The two children were born in 1962 and 1963, while the alleged
putative father died in 1982. In short, at the time of their conception, the two children’s
parents were legally disqualified from marrying each other. The Court allowed the
Complaint to prosper, even though it had been filed almost a year after the death of the
presumed father. At the time of his death, both children were still minors.
Moreover, in the earlier case Divinagracia v. Rovira,[21] the Court said that the rules on
voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment of natural children, as well as the
prescriptive period for filing such action, may likewise be applied to spurious children.
Pertinent portions of the case are quoted hereunder:
 “The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other than natural
children, commonly known as bastards, include those adulterous children or
those born out of wedlock to a married woman cohabiting with a man other
than her husband or to a married man cohabiting with a woman other than
his wife. They are entitled to support and successional rights. But their
filiation must be duly proven.
“How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows
the investigation of the paternity or maternity or spurious children under the
circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The
implication is that the rules on compulsory recognition of natural children
are applicable to spurious children.
“Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children.
The rules on proof of filiation of natural children or the rules on voluntary
and compulsory acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to
spurious children.
“That does not mean that spurious children should be acknowledged, as
that term is used with respect to natural children. What is simply meant is
that the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of natural children
are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children.
took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are thus given the right
to seek recognition (under Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four years
from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the
passage of the Family Code.
Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who could
not have filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. As
respondent aptly points out in his Memorandum,[24] the State as parens patriae should
protect a minor’s right. Born in 1981, Adrian was only seven years old when the Family
Code took effect and only twelve when his alleged father died in 1993. The minor must
be given his day in court.
Third Issue:
Failure to Implead the CA
Under Section 4(a) of Rule 45 of the current Rules of Court, it is no longer required to
implead “the lower courts or judges x x x either as petitioners or respondents.” Under
Section 3, however, the lower tribunal should still be furnished a copy of the petition.
Hence, the failure of petitioner to implead the Court of Appeals as a party is not a
reversible error; it is in fact the correct procedure.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

“A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth, a will, SO ORDERED.
a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. These are
the modes of voluntary recognition of natural children. Melo, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., no part. Relationship with family.
“In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious
child, then his filiation may be established by means of the circumstances or
grounds for compulsory recognition prescribed in the aforementioned
articles 283 and 284.

“The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in
the case of natural children, as provided for in article 285 of the Civil Code,
applies to spurious children.”[22] (Citations omitted, italics supplied)

Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have superior successional rights over
spurious ones.[23] However, Rovira treats them as equals with respect to other rights,
including the right to recognition granted by Article 285.

To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code
 GLENN VIÑAS, PETITIONER, VS. MARY GRACE PAREL-VIÑAS, RESPONDENT. Before Glenn decided to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
RESOLUTION Mary Grace, he consulted the latter’s friends. They informed him that Mary Grace came
from a broken family and was left to be cared for by her aunts and nannies. The
foregoing circumstance must have contributed to her sense of insecurity and difficulty in
REYES, J.:
adjusting to married life.[8]
For review is the Decision[1] rendered on January 29, 2013 and Resolution[2] issued on
August 7, 2013 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448. The CA set
To ease their marital problems, Glenn sought professional guidance and submitted
aside the Decision[3] dated January 29, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
himself to a psychological evaluation by Clinical Psychologist Nedy Tayag (Dr. Tayag).
Pablo City, Branch 30, in Civil Case No. SP-6564(09), which declared the marriage
Dr. Tayag found him as “amply aware of his marital roles” and “capable of maintaining a
between Glenn Viñas (Glenn) and Mary Grace Parel-Viñas (Mary Grace) as null and
mature and healthy heterosexual relationship.”[9]
void.
Antecedents
On the other hand, Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Grace’s personality through the data she
had gathered from Glenn and his cousin, Rodelito Mayo (Rodelito), who knew Mary
On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23 years old, respectively, got
Grace way back in college.
married in civil rites held in Lipa City, Batangas.[4] Mary Grace was already pregnant
then. The infant, however, died at birth due to weakness and malnourishment. Glenn
alleged that the infant’s death was caused by Mary Grace’s heavy drinking and smoking Mary Grace is the eldest among four siblings. She is a college graduate. She belongs to
during her pregnancy. a middle class family. Her father is an overseas contract worker, while her mother is a
housewife. At the time Dr. Tayag prepared her report, Mary Grace was employed in
Dubai and romantically involved with another man.[10]
The couple lived together under one roof. Glenn worked as a bartender, while Mary
Grace was a production engineer.
According to Rodelito, Mary Grace verbally abused and physically harmed Glenn during
the couple’s fights. Mary Grace is also ill-tempered and carefree, while Glenn is jolly,
Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home which she shared with Glenn.
kind and family-oriented.[11]
Glenn subsequently found out that Mary Grace went to work in Dubai. At the time the
instant petition was filed, Mary Grace had not returned yet.
Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder
with anti-social traits. Dr. Tayag concluded that Mary Grace and Glenn’s relationship is
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition[5] for the declaration of nullity of his not founded on mutual love, trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to each other. Hence,
marriage with Mary Grace. He alleged that Mary Grace was insecure, extremely jealous, Dr. Tayag recommended the propriety of declaring the nullity of the couple’s marriage.
outgoing and prone to regularly resorting to any pretext to be able to leave the house. [12]
She thoroughly enjoyed the night life, and drank and smoked heavily even when she
was pregnant. Further, Mary Grace refused to perform even the most essential
In drawing her conclusions, Dr. Tayag explained that:
household chores of cleaning and cooking. According to Glenn, Mary Grace had not
exhibited the foregoing traits and behavior during their whirlwind courtship.[6] The said disorder [of Mary Grace] is considered to be severe, serious,
grave, permanent and chronic in proportion and is incurable by any form of
clinical intervention. It has already been deeply embedded within her
Glenn likewise alleged that Mary Grace was not remorseful about the death of the infant
system as it was found to have started as early as her childhood years.
whom she delivered. She lived as if she were single and was unmindful of her husband’s
Because of such, it has caused her to be inflexible, maladaptive and
needs. She was self-centered, selfish and immature. When Glenn confronted her about
functionally[-]impaired especially with regards to heterosexual dealings.
her behavior, she showed indifference. She eventually left their home without informing
Glenn. Glenn later found out that she left for an overseas employment in Dubai.[7]
Such disorder of [Mary Grace] is mainly characterized by grandiosity, need
for admiration and lack of empathy[,] along with her pattern of disregard for
 and violation of the rights of others[,] which utterly distorted her perceptions
and views especially in terms of a fitting marital relationship. Such disorder
manifested in [Mary Grace] through her unrelenting apathy, sense of
entitlement and arrogance. Throughout her union with [Glenn], she has
exhibited a heightened sense of self as seen in her marked inability to show
proper respect for her husband. x x x She is too headstrong that most of the
time[,] she would do things her own way and would not pay close attention
to what her husband needed. She had been a wife who constantly struggled
for power and dominance in their relationship and [Glenn], being too
considerate to her, was often subjected to her control. x x x She is into
many vices and loved hanging out with her friends at night[,] and she even
got involved in an illicit relationship[,] which was still going on up to the
present time. x x x.
The root cause of [Mary Grace’s] personality aberration can be said to have
emanated from the various forms of unfavorable factors in her milieu way
back as early as her childhood years[,] which is the crucial stage in the life
of a person as this is the time when the individual’s character and behavior
are shaped. [Mary Grace] came from a dysfunctional family with lenient and
tolerating parents[,] who never impose any restrictions [upon] their children.
Considering such fact, she apparently failed to feel the love and affection of
the nurturing figures that she had[,] who were supposed to be the first to
show concern [for] her. x x x She has acquired a domineering character as
she was not taught to have boundaries in her actions because of the laxity
she had from her caregivers and also because she grew up to be the eldest
in the brood. She sees to it that she is the one always followed with regards
to making decisions and always mandates people to submit to her wishes.
She has not acquired the very essence of morality [and] has certainly
learned set of unconstructive traits that further made her too futile to
assume mature roles. Morals and values were not instilled in her young
mind that as she went on with her life, she never learned to restrain herself
from doing ill-advised things even if she is amply aware of the depravity of
her actions.
The psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is of a juridical antecedence
as it was already in her system even prior to the solemnization of her
marriage with [Glenn]. x x x.[13] (Underlining ours)
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed before the RTC a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity
of his marriage with Mary Grace. Substituted service of summons was made upon Mary
Grace through her aunt, Susana Rosita.[14] Mary Grace filed no answer and did not
attend any of the proceedings before the RTC.
During the trial, the testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito were offered as
evidence. Glenn and Rodelito described Mary Grace as outgoing, carefree, and
irresponsible. She is the exact opposite of Glenn, who is conservative and preoccupied
with his work.[15] On her part, Dr. Tayag reiterated her findings in the psychological
report dated December 29, 2008.
Ruling of the RTC
On January 29, 2010, the RTC rendered its Decision[16] declaring the marriage between
Glenn and Mary Grace as null and void on account of the latter’s psychological
incapacity. The RTC cited the following as grounds:
The totality of the evidence presented by [Glenn] warrants [the] grant of the
petition.
Reconciliation between the parties under the circumstances is nil. For the
best interest of the parties, it is best that the legal bond between them be
severed.
The testimonies of [Glenn] and his witness [Rodelito] portray the miserable
life [Glenn] had with [Mary Grace] who is a Narcissistic Personality
Disordered person with anti[-]social traits and who does not treat him as her
husband. [Glenn] and [Mary Grace] are separated in fact since the year
2006. [Mary Grace] abandoned [Glenn] without telling the latter where to go.
x x x Had it not for the insistence of [Glenn] that he would not know the
whereabouts of his wife. The law provides that [a] husband and [a] wife are
obliged to live together, [and] observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. x x x
For all intents and purposes, however, [Mary Grace] was in a quandary on
what it really means. x x x.
From the testimony of [Glenn], it was established that [Mary Grace] failed to
comply with the basic marital obligations of mutual love, respect, mutual
help and support. [Glenn] tried his best to have their marriage saved but
[Mary Grace] did not cooperate with him. [Mary Grace] is x x x, unmindful of
her marital obligations.
The Court has no reason to doubt the testimony of [Dr. Tayag], a clinical
psychologist with sufficient authority to speak on the subject of
psychological incapacity. She examined [Glenn], and was able to gather
sufficient data and information about [Mary Grace]. x x x This [Narcissistic]
personality disorder of [Mary Grace] is ingrained in her personality make-up,
so grave and so permanent, incurable and difficult to treat. It is conclusive
that this personal incapacity leading to psychological incapacity is already
 pre-existing before the marriage and was only manifested after. It has
become grave, permanent and incurable.[17](Underlining ours and italics in
the original)
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved for reconsideration but it was denied by
the RTC in its Order[18] dated December 1, 2010.
The Appeal of the OSG and the Ruling of the CA
On appeal before the CA, the OSG claimed that no competent evidence exist proving
that Mary Grace indeed suffers from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which prevents
her from fulfilling her marital obligations. Specifically, the RTC decision failed to cite the
root cause of Mary Grace’s disorder. Further, the RTC did not state its own findings and
merely relied on Dr. Tayag’s statements anent the gravity and incurability of Mary
Grace’s condition. The RTC resorted to mere generalizations and conclusions sans
details. Besides, what psychological incapacity contemplates is downright incapacity to
assume marital obligations. In the instant case, irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility were shown, but these do not warrant
the grant of Glenn’s petition. Mary Grace may be unwilling to assume her marital duties,
but this does not translate into a psychological illness.[19]
Glenn, on the other hand, sought the dismissal of the OSG’s appeal.
On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision reversing the RTC
ruling and declaring the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as valid and
subsisting. The CA stated the reasons below:
In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that “psychological
incapacity” should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment
of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The psychological condition must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
In the instant case, [Glenn] tried to prove that [Mary Grace] was carefree,
outgoing, immature, and irresponsible which made her unable to perform
the essential obligations of marriage. He likewise alleged that she refused
to communicate with him to save the marriage and eventually left him to
work abroad. To Our mind, the above actuations of [Mary Grace] do not
make out a case of psychological incapacity on her part.
While it is true that [Glenn’s] testimony was corroborated by [Dr. Tayag], a
psychologist who conducted a psychological examination on [Glenn],
however, said examination was conducted only on him and no evidence
was shown that the psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] was
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.
Certainly, the opinion of a psychologist would be of persuasive value in
determining the psychological incapacity of a person as she would be in the
best position to assess and evaluate the psychological condition of the
couple, she being an expert in this field of study of behavior. Although the
psychologist stated that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder, she did not fully explain the root cause of the disorder
nor did she make a conclusion as to its gravity or permanence. Moreover,
she admitted that she was not able to examine the respondent[,] hence, the
information provided to her may be subjective and self-serving.
Essential in this petition is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse’s
psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically
identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the
decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as
set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and
such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the
petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.
Unfortunately for [Glenn], the expert testimony of his witness did not
establish the root cause of the psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] nor
was such ground alleged in the complaint. We reiterate the ruling of the
Supreme Court on this score, to wit: the root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically identified; b) alleged in the
complaint; c) sufficiently proven by experts; and d) clearly explained in the
decision.
Discoursing on this issue, the Supreme Court, in Republic of the Philippines
vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, has this to say:
“Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
 be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so
as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis x x x[,] nevertheless[,] such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.”
The Supreme Court further went on to proclaim, that “Article 36 of the
Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves”. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.” Psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
From the foregoing, We cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage of
the parties for the obvious failure of [Glenn] to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability; and for his failure to observe the guidelines
outlined in the afore-cited cases.
Verily, the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
[Glenn]. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted from the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family.[20] (Citations omitted,
underlining ours and emphasis and italics in the original)
The CA, through the herein assailed Resolution[21] dated August 7, 2013, denied the
Motion for Reconsideration[22] filed by Glenn.
Issue
Unperturbed, Glenn now raises before this Court the issue of whether or not sufficient
evidence exist justifying the RTC’s declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.
In support thereof, Glenn points out that each petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage should be judged according to its own set of facts, and not on the basis of
assumptions, predilections or generalizations. The RTC judge should painstakingly
examine the factual milieu, while the CA must refrain from substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court.[23] Further, Glenn argues that in Marcos v. Marcos,[24] the
Court ruled that it is not a sine qua non requirement for the respondent spouse to be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist before a marriage could be declared
as a nullity.[25] However, if the opinion of an expert is sought, his or her testimony should
be considered as decisive evidence.[26] Besides, the findings of the trial court regarding
the credibility of the witnesses should be respected.[27]
In seeking the denial of the instant petition, the OSG emphasizes that the arguments
Glenn raise for our consideration are mere reiterations of the matters already resolved
by the CA.[28]
Ruling of the Court
The instant petition lacks merit.
The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent by a psychologist or
psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage.
“If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.”[29]
In the instant petition, however, the cumulative testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and
Rodelito, and the documentary evidence offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause,
gravity and incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. The evidence merely shows that Mary
Grace is outgoing, strong-willed and not inclined to perform household chores. Further,
she is employed in Dubai and is romantically-involved with another man. She has not
been maintaining lines of communication with Glenn at the time the latter filed the
petition before the RTC. Glenn, on the other hand, is conservative, family-oriented and is
the exact opposite of Mary Grace. While Glenn and Mary Grace possess incompatible
personalities, the latter’s acts and traits do not necessarily indicate psychological
incapacity. Rumbaua v. Rumbaua[30] is emphatic that:
In Bier v. Bier, we ruled that it was not enough that respondent, alleged to
be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital
obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the
respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from
complying with his essential marital obligations – had to be shown and was
 not shown in this cited case.
In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit with the
petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven to be
rooted in some psychological illness. x x x Likewise, the respondent’s act of
living with another woman four years into the marriage cannot automatically
be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific
evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the
inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent
was caring and faithful when they were going steady and for a time after
their marriage; their problems only came in later.
x x x To use the words of Navales v. Navales:
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere
“difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of marital
obligations or “ill will” on the part of the spouse is different from
“incapacity” rooted on some debilitating psychological condition
or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant
a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as
the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is
contemplated by said rule.[31] (Citations omitted, underlining
ours and emphasis in the original)
It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for more or less seven
years from 1999 to 2006. The foregoing established fact shows that living together as
spouses under one roof is not an impossibility. Mary Grace’s departure from their home
in 2006 indicates either a refusal or mere difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply
with her obligation to live with her husband.
Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined by Dr. Tayag, there
arose a greater burden to present more convincing evidence to prove the gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability of the former’s condition. Glenn, however, failed in
this respect. Glenn’s testimony is wanting in material details. Rodelito, on the other hand,
is a blood relative of Glenn. Glenn’s statements are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn
and Rodelito both referred to Mary Grace’s traits and acts, which she exhibited during
the marriage. Hence, there is nary a proof on the antecedence of Mary Grace’s alleged
incapacity. Glenn even testified that, six months before they got married, they saw each
other almost everyday.[32] Glenn saw “a loving[,] caring and well[-]educated person”[33]
in Mary Grace.
Anent Dr. Tayag’s assessment of Mary Grace’s condition, the Court finds the same as
unfounded. Rumbaua[34] provides some guidelines on how the courts should evaluate
the testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of nullity
of marriage, viz:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the
respondent’s psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to
her by only one side – the petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause
cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the
psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions
deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the
manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the
respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually
hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and
responded to the doctor’s probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner’s narrations, and
on this basis characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric,
and unremorseful person who “believes that the world revolves around
him”; and who “used love as a…deceptive tactic for exploiting the
confidence [petitioner] extended towards him.” x x x.
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and
comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity
existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the
respondent’s narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at
the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature
of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable
of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not
physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag’s
conclusion in her Report – i.e., that the respondent suffered “Narcissistic
Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared
to be grave and incurable” – is an unfounded statement, not a necessary
inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of the
respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could
have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition,
this same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent’s
condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent’s what character and qualities the petitioner brought into her marriage, for
psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to example, why the respondent’s family opposed the marriage and what
our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the events led the respondent to blame the petitioner for the death of his
truthfulness of the content of such evidence. mother, if this allegation is at all correct. To be sure, these are important
because not a few marriages have failed, not because of psychological
xxxx incapacity of either or both of the spouses, but because of basic
incompatibilities and marital developments that do not amount to
psychological incapacity. x x x.[35] (Citations omitted and underlining ours)
A careful reading of Dr. Tayag’s testimony reveals that she failed to
establish the fact that at the time the parties were married, respondent was
already suffering from a psychological defect that deprived him of the ability In the case at bar, Dr. Tayag made general references to Mary Grace’s status as the
to assume the essential duties and responsibilities of marriage. Neither did eldest among her siblings,[36] her father’s being an overseas contract worker and her
she adequately explain how she came to the conclusion that respondent’s very tolerant mother, a housewife.[37] These, however, are not sufficient to establish and
condition was grave and incurable. x x x explain the supposed psychological incapacity of Mary Grace warranting the declaration
of the nullity of the couple’s marriage.
xxxx
The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the statements of
witnesses who can attest to the antecedence of a person’s psychological incapacity, but
First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the
such difficulty does not exempt a petitioner from complying with what the law requires.
respondent’s exact condition except in a very general way. In short, her
While the Court also commiserates with Glenn’s marital woes, the totality of the evidence
testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on
presented provides inadequate basis for the Court to conclude that Mary Grace is indeed
particulars, most notably on how the respondent can be said to be suffering
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her obligations as Glenn’s spouse.
from narcissistic personality disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is
grave and incurable; how and why it was already present at the time of the
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 29, 2013 and
marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondent’s awareness of
Resolution dated August 7, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448 are
and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
AFFIRMED.
All these are critical to the success of the petitioner’s case.
SO ORDERED.
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because
it was wholly based on what the petitioner related to her. x x x If a
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Bersamin,* and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason
exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit. No
such independent evidence, however, appears on record to have been
gathered in this case, particularly about the respondent’s early life and
associations, and about events on or about the time of the marriage and
immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony and report appear to us to be no
more than a diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided and meagre facts
that the petitioner related, and were all slanted to support the conclusion
that a ground exists to justify the nullification of the marriage. We say this
because only the baser qualities of the respondent’s life were examined and
given focus; none of these qualities were weighed and balanced with the
better qualities, such as his focus on having a job, his determination to
improve himself through studies, his care and attention in the first six
months of the marriage, among others. The evidence fails to mention also
 THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 198908, August 03, 2015 ]
VIRGINIA OCAMPO, PETITIONER, VS. DEOGRACIO OCAMPO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
the reversal of the Decision[1] dated August 11, 2010 and Resolution[2] dated October
5, 2011, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 82318, which
denied the petitioner's appeal and motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On September 10, 1990, petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo (Virginia) filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of her Marriage with Deogracio Ocampo (Deogracio) before
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, on the ground of psychological
incapacity, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-6616.[3]
On January 22, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision[4] declaring the marriage
between Virginia and Deogracio as null and void, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The marriage between the
petitioner and the respondent is hereby declared null and void from the
beginning under Article 36 of the Family Code. The status of their children,
however, shall remain legitimate and their custody is hereby awarded to the
petitioner.
As to the couple's property relations, their conjugal partnership of gains
shall necessarily be dissolved and liquidated but since the petitioner has not
submitted any detailed and formal listing or inventory of such property, the
court cannot act now on the liquidation aspect. The parties are given thirty
(30) days to submit an inventory of their conjugal partnership for the
purpose of liquidation.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[5]
The decision became final, since no party appealed the judgment annulling the marriage.
On March 31, 1999, the trial court directed the parties to submit a project of partition of
their inventoried properties, and if they failed to do so, a hearing will be held on the
factual issues with regard to said properties. Having failed to agree on a project of
partition of their conjugal properties, hearing ensued where the parties adduced
evidence in support of their respective stand.
On January 13, 2004, the trial court rendered the assailed Order[6] stating that the
properties declared by the parties belong to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing.
On February 2, 2004, Virginia filed a Notice of Appeal before the trial court.
On February 13, 2004, Deogracio filed a Motion to Deny and/or Dismiss the Notice of
Appeal and for immediate execution pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-1-10.
On February 20, 2004, the trial court denied the aforesaid motion to deny and/or dismiss
the notice of appeal for lack of merit.
On March 4, 2004, Deogracio filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On March 22, 2004,
the trial court denied anew the motion for reconsideration.
In the disputed Decision dated August 11, 2010, the Court of Appeals denied Virginia's
appeal. Virginia moved for reconsideration, but was denied in a Resolution dated
October 5, 2011.
Thus, the instant petition for review substantially questioning whether respondent should
be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of gains by reason of bad faith and
psychological perversity.
The petition lacks merit.
While Virginia and Deogracio tied the marital knot on January 16, 1978, it is still the
Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships, however, which will govern the
property relations between Deogracio and Virginia even if they were married before the
effectivity of the Family Code.
Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to
conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested
rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code,
if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are
conjugal. Hence, the burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal.
This is counter-balanced by the requirement that the properties must first be proven to
have been acquired during the marriage before they are presumed conjugal.[7]
The applicable law, however, in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
assets and liability is concerned, is Article 129[8] of the Family Code in relation to Article
147 of the Family Code.[9]
The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article 36 [10] of
the Family Code, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.[11] Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by
any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in this
case. Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall
be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her
share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common,
without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of
the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to
the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take
place upon termination of the cohabitation.[12]
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no
illegal impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife
under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It is clear, therefore, that for
Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each
other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is
without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void, as in the instant case. The term
"capacitated" in the first paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a
party to contract marriage. Any impediment to marry has not been shown to have existed
on the part of either Virginia or Deogracio. They lived exclusively with each other as
husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.[13]
From the foregoing, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry
should, therefore, be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party's efforts consisted in
the care and maintenance of the family household. Efforts in the care and maintenance
of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common
property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry.[14]
Citing Valdes v. RTC,[15] the Court held that the court a quo did not commit a reversible
error in utilizing Article 147 of the Family Code and in ruling that the former spouses own
the family home and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding
that, in the liquidation and partition of the property that they owned in common, the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code should aptly prevail. The rules which
are set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages,
are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law
spouses or spouses of void marriages.
Thus, the trial court and the appellate court correctly held that the parties will share on
equal shares considering that Virginia failed to prove that the properties were acquired
solely on her own efforts, to wit:
This Court keenly observes that only testimonial evidence was presented by
the parties respectively, to prove and dispute the claim of the other with
regard to the properties and assets acquired during the marriage. In the
absence, therefore, of any documentary evidence to prove the contrary, all
the properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage are presumed
conjugal. Further, the testimonial evidence adduced by the petitioner aimed
at establishing that respondent took no part in acquiring said properties
failed to convince this Court that the latter be given only a meager share
thereof.
While it may be true that management of the businesses referred to herein
may have been actively undertaken by the petitioner, it cannot be gainsaid
that petitioner was able to do so without the invaluable help of respondent.
Even a plain housewife who stays all the time in the house and take[s] care
of the household while the husband indulges in lucrative and gainful
activities is entitled to a share in the same proportion the husband is, to the
property or properties acquired by the marriage. In the same breadth,
 respondent must be considered to be entitled to the same extent.
Petitioner's claim that the seed money in that business was provided by her
mother and that, had it not been for that reason, the properties now subject
of controversy could not have been acquired. That may be true but the
Court is not prone to believe so because of insufficient evidence to prove
such contention but petitioner's self-serving allegations. Of course, attempts
to establish respondent as an irresponsible and unfaithful husband, as well
as family man were made but the testimonies adduced towards that end,
failed to fully convince the Court that respondent should be punished by
depriving him of his share of the conjugal property because of his
indiscretion.[16]

In the instant case, both the trial and appellate courts agreed that the subject properties
were in fact acquired during the marriage of Virginia and Deogracio. We give due
deference to factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed by the appellate
court, as in this case. A reversal of this finding can only occur if petitioners show
sufficient reason for us to doubt its correctness. There is none, in this case.
Likewise, we note that the former spouses both substantially agree that they acquired
the subject properties during the subsistence of their marriage.[17] The certificates of
titles and tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome the presumption under
Article 116 of the Family Code. All properties acquired by the spouses during the
marriage, regardless in whose name the properties are registered, are presumed
conjugal unless proved otherwise. The presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that
the certificate of title of the property or the tax declaration is in the name of one of the
spouses only. Article 116 expressly provides that the presumption remains even if the
property is "registered in the name of one or both of the spouses."[18] Thus, the failure
of Virginia to rebut this presumption, said properties were obtained by the spouses' joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares.
Accordingly, the partition of the former spouses' properties on the basis of co-ownership,
as ordered by the RTC and the appellate court, should be affirmed, and not on the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 11, 2010 and the
Resolution dated October 5, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82318 are
AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the trial court for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Perez,* and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.